Category: John Fitzgerald Kennedy

Reviews of books treating the assassination of John F. Kennedy, its historical and political context and aftermath, and the investigations conducted.

  • Vincent M. Palamara, Survivor’s Guilt


    Vince Palamara is, with little question, the critical author who has the most knowledge of the failures of the Secret Service in their obligation to protect President Kennedy on November 22, 1963. In other fields of knowledge and information e.g. who is the most outstanding expert in the medical field, on Jim Garrison, on the HSCA etc., there is some room for debate. But very few would argue about Palamara being on first base in regards to the Secret Service.

    Well over a decade ago, Palamara put together a self-published manuscript of his work in that area. It was also called Survivor’s Guilt. By his own admission, he then burnt out on the case. He succumbed to the hype about Vincent Bugliosi’s colossal charade of a book, Reclaiming History. Impressed by the prosecutor’s reputation, the author put together a You Tube video in which he said that Bugliosi had solved the case. Thankfully, several months later, Palamara then reversed himself on the subject of Reclaiming History. He has since written some good reviews for this site on books by Gerald Blaine and Clint Hill. He also has his own blog, and maintains a site which commemorates the heroism of Abraham Bolden. So today, Palamara is back in good standing among the critics.

    The 2013 version of Survivor’s Guilt runs to about 430 pages of text. In this reviewer’s opinion, the first half of the book is rewarding, informative and well worth reading. That first half makes up one of the more distinctive efforts timed for the 50th anniversary of JFK’s murder. It is well argued, profusely and accurately documented, and is quite frank and candid about what went wrong in Dealey Plaza, and why it is hard to buy the Secret Service’s incredibly poor performance as a case of pure negligence. There are 18 chapters in the book. The first half, that is up to Chapter 9, makes up the worthwhile part of the work. So let us discuss that valuable part at this time.

    I

    Palamara begins the book with what most would think is some of his strongest material indicating a cover up after the fact by the Secret Service. In the days after the murder, there were questions as to why there were no agents riding on the rear bumper of Kennedy’s limousine at the time of the shooting. After all, this is what the specially modeled bumper is designed for. But at the time the limousine entered Dealey Plaza, there were no agents in place on the rear bumper.

    This is an important point to explore. Because if one buys the Warren Commission verdict of three shots from the rear, then having no agents on the rear of the car probably had an effect on the shooting. At the least, if they had been in place, it would have made it more difficult. The Warren Commission had questions about this also. (Palamara, p. 3) Therefore, Secret Service Director James Rowley had five affidavits prepared about their experiences with President Kennedy. As the author notes, “At first glance, all five reports appear to support the notion that President Kennedy did not want agents on or near the rear of his limousine.” (ibid, emphasis added) The five reports were allegedly done by Jerry Behn, Floyd Boring, Emory Roberts, John Ready and Clint Hill.

    The problem with this evidence is that it seems clearly coerced by Rowley. Why? Because when Palamara later interviewed many of these agents, they contradicted what they had written for the Commission. For instance, when Palamara talked to Boring, the agent said that Kennedy did not exercise control over them at all. (ibid, p. 6) Clint Hill told the author that Kennedy never told the agents not to ride on the car. But he further added that, “I had never heard the president ever question procedural recommendations by his Secret Service detail. (ibid, p. 14) In fact, earlier in the Dallas motorcade, Hill actually was on the bumper. (ibid, p. 11)

    Palamara notes other oddities about these submissions. Three of the five reports are not even on official Secret Service stationery. They are on plain typing paper. Clint Hill’s report is not even dated. Four of the five reports are based on exchanges with Boring. In other words, the agents heard this from him. Yet, as the author points out, this was later contradicted by Boring. Gerald Blaine even says there was a Secret Service meeting on November 25th, in which it was decided to cover up Kennedy’s orders not to ride on the car. As Palamara points out, this is absurd. The implication is that Rowley made some of the agents switch the blame for the Secret Service’s lack of protection to Kennedy.

    Palamara further points out the absurdity of Blaine and Rowley’s positions by mentioning the famous film of agent Donald Lawton being called off the back of the limousine by Emory Roberts as it pulled out of Love Field. Lawton memorably shrugs his shoulders in bewilderment three times as this recall. Palamara further adds that agent Henry Rybka was supposed to be in the follow up car. But, in fact, inexplicably, Rybka was left at the airport. (ibid, p. 9)

    Further, and quite compellingly, Palamara now goes to other agents ignored by Rowley. He asks them if Kennedy ever directed the Secret Service not to ride on the back of the limousine. This list of agents goes on well into the double digits. It includes people like Winston Lawson , Rufus Youngblood, and Sam Kinney. Almost none of them back up what Rowley is proffering. For instance, Kinney states, “That is absolutely, positively false … no, no, no. He [Kennedy] had nothing to do with that. No, never.” (ibid, p. 27) Arthur Godfrey said, “That’s a bunch of baloney; that’s not true.” When Palamara asked John F. Norris about the charge against Kennedy, he replied, “I would doubt that very much.” (ibid, p. 28) Jerry O’Rourke wrote to the author, “Did President Kennedy order us off the steps of the limo? To my knowledge, President Kennedy never ordered us to leave the limo.” (ibid, p. 37)

    Clearly, from this opening episode the author is implying that there was some very odd behavior by the Secret Service in Dallas. And secondly, Rowley was intent on covering it up, by any means necessary. Even if it meant he was going to blame the victim for his own death. Palamara then goes on to mention how this myth then got enshrined in the literature by writers like William Manchester, Blaine and Ron Kessler. (ibid, pgs. 19, 20) In fact, Palamara points out that fellow Secret Service agent Talmadge Bailey told him that Blaine made up the information about the November 25, 1963 meeting. (ibid. p. 23) Palamara also points out that Blaine submitted what he termed to be contemporaneous handwritten notes to the National Archives. The author then notes glaring discrepancies which indicate that these “contemporaneous notes” were obviously composed at least months, if not years later. (ibid)

    This opening chapter closes with more interesting evidence discrediting the “Kennedy ordered the agents off the car” myth. Roy Kellerman was the de facto man in charge of the Secret Service detail in Dallas. This was because, Gerald Behn, who should have been in charge on the ground, decided to take a leave at the time. Kellerman testified to the Warren Commission for two days. If Boring had actually relayed a Kennedy order to the Secret Service on this point, would not have Kellerman known about it? If that is so, then why did he not mention it during his two days of testimony? (ibid, p. 43)

    II

    In Chapter 2, Palamara notes another rather bizarre oddity about the failure of the Secret Service in Dallas.

    Most informed observers understand that Dallas was not really in Kennedy’s back pocket politically. In fact, there were many sectors of rightwing animus towards the president. And for a variety of reasons: civil rights, his failure to invade Cuba in 1961 or 1962, his attempt to lower the oil depletion allowance etc. In Miami when the Secret Service checked the security index, they came up with six pages of warnings about people like Orlando Bosch and Pedro Diaz Lanz.(p. 169) Yet, when Secret Service agents Winston Lawson and Kellerman checked the indices of the Protection Research Section (PRS) files for any threats on November 8th and 10th, none were found. Youngblood did a check on the morning of November 22nd. Again, no warnings turned up. This is astonishing; on many different levels. First of all, there was a Cuban exile community in Dallas. In fact, there was a small unit of Alpha 66 in town, one of the most high profile and militant anti-Castro groups in existence. Second, Dallas was the home of former General Edwin Walker. Kennedy had removed Walker from his command for passing out John Birch literature to his men. After this, Walker lived in Dallas. He became quite close to some extreme rightwing groups there. He was also active in the riots at Ole Miss over the entry of James Meredith, an entry which Kennedy backed forcefully. Third, a few months earlier, Kennedy’s UN ambassador Adlai Stevenson had been in town. He was reportedly spat upon and even jostled with a placard. Fourth, in November, Joseph Milteer had already told FBI informant Willie Somersett about a coming assassination attempt on Kennedy from an office building with a high-powered rifle. Why did the Secret Service not have this information in their PRS files? Or anything about the failed attempt to kill Kennedy in Chicago, which predated all three checks.

    Further, there seems to have been some last minute switches in personnel in the November trips to Chicago, Miami, New York and Dallas. For instance, although Glen Bennett was on a temporary assignment for the Presidential Protection Division (PPD), he was on the trips to Tampa and Dallas. Yet, Bennett told the HSCA he was not on this Florida trip, which was on November 18th. (ibid, p. 62) Bennett was detailed from PRS to PPD and then onto protection duty in New York, Tampa and Dallas. Tim McIntyre also denied he was on protection details in November in Chicago and Miami. Yet, he was. This is interesting because there were threats on JFK’s life in both Miami and Tampa. Therefore, PRS and the White House Secret Service detail should have been ratcheted up to the equivalent of Defcon 5 by Dallas. Especially after the (now famous) Chicago attempt on Kennedy’s life. Yet, as everyone knows, most significantly the author, nothing of the sort happened in Dallas. In fact, as Palamara is at pains to show, quite the opposite occurred. Instead of a tightening of security around Kennedy, a loosening of security occurred. A loosening so blatant and extraordinary, that it seems today to cross over into the negligent. If not worse.

    III

    In Chapters 3 and 4, Palamara details two significant aspects of the Secret Service failure in Dallas. He devotes Chapter 3 to denuding another attempt by the White House detail to blame the victim for his own murder. With ample evidence, he shows that it was not Kennedy who wanted the bubble top removed in Dallas. That was a Secret Service decision. (p. 91)

    Chapter 4 is devoted to the setting of the motorcade route. This is a key point. Because as anyone who has been to the Dealey Plaza, triple underpass site will know, the two turns made by the motorcade into the plaza, onto Houston and then Elm, created an almost ideal situation for what military assassins call an L shaped ambush. That is a slow moving target, vulnerable to snipers from concealed places at three points surrounding the target. In addition, the location allowed for easy exits since there were parking lots adjoining at least two sniper locations: the Depository and the grassy knoll. Palamara does some good and interesting work in regard to the mystery of how this bizarre, indefensible route was chosen. He states that considering the fact that agent Gerald Behn, White House assistant Ken O’Donnell and Kennedy advance man Jerry Bruno were all opposed to the Trade Mart as the dinner destination, its seems odd that it was ultimately chosen. (pgs. 98-101) As late as November 14th, there was no dogleg on the motorcade route. The route came straight down Main Street. (ibid, p. 102)

    The author makes the case that the two men who added the dogleg onto Houston and Elm Streets were Secret Service agents Forrest Sorrels and Winston Lawson. There were other routes possible, and the motorcade route was not automatically determined by the selection of the Trade Mart. (ibid, p. 103) Palamara later adds that the final route was not actually decided upon until November 20th. He feels that this change, which included the dogleg, was kept secret after being authorized in Washington by agent Floyd Boring. In a suppressed Commission document the author found, the assistant police chief, Charles Batchelor, revealed that the secrecy about this change in the route made it hard for the local authorities to furnish any help to the Secret Service. (p. 105) Another witness, Sgt. Sam Bellah told the author that the police did not know about the route change until the evening of November 21st. Bellah said the original plan did not have the motorcade pass in front of the Texas School Book Depository. Bellah said that his commander, Captain Lawrence, came to his home late on the evening of the 21st. He took him to the triple underpass to show Bellah the new route for the motorcycle advance escort, of which Bellah was a part. (ibid) Bellah said that there was never any explanation as to why the route was changed at the last moment.

    Another local policeman, Captain Orville Jones told author Larry Sneed the same thing. That the motorcade route was changed just prior to the 22nd. Jones told the author that many people he knew in the Secret Service did not approve of going through Dealey Plaza at all. There were other routes discussed which avoided the triple underpass. (ibid)

    Another witness to this strange alteration was motorcycle officer Bobby Joe Dale. Dale said that there was more than one route discussed and reviewed by the police. In fact, three had been bandied about. Dale said it was not until Kennedy’s arrival at Love Field that morning that he was alerted to what the actual route was going to be. (ibid, p. 106)

    Winston Lawson told the Warren Commission that the dogleg was necessary, “Because it is my understanding there isn’t any entrance to the freeway on Main Street.” (ibid, p. 108) But as the HSCA correctly noted, ” … the Trade Mart was accessible from beyond the triple underpass in such a way that it was not necessary to enter the Elm Street ramp to the expressway. The motorcade could have proceeded westward through Dealey Plaza on Main Street, passed under the underpass and then proceeded on Industrial Boulevard to the Trade Mart.” (ibid) In fact, this is the route that Jones thought Kennedy would take that day. As the HSCA attorney in charge of the motorcade route inquiry wrote, “Any map of Dallas in 1963 shows that it was easy to reach the Trade Mart on streets that join Main on the West side of the overpass.”

    Compounding this shockingly poor choice of a route was the fact that Secret Service protocol was then broken while it was being navigated. Two years before Kennedy’s murder, Mike Torina, Chief Inspector, stated that whenever a motorcade must slow down for a turn, the entire intersection must be checked in advance.(p. 109) That did not occur here.

    James Rowley wrote to the Commission that he had no knowledge of who actually released the motorcade route to the press. This seems another deception by Rowley. Palamara says it was Betty Forsling Harris a Dallas socialite on the local committee, who did so. She was working closely with representatives of John Connally, the Secret Service, and LBJ aide Bill Moyers. Palamara concludes that this false information was given out for purposes of plausible deniability. That is, the Secret Service could later say that the route was purposely advertised in more than one configuration to show that there was more than one option in hand. When, in reality, the Secret Service knew between November 18th and 20th what the actual route was, including the dogleg.

    This is a quite disturbing issue. In and of itself it seems simply bizarre that Lawson and Sorrels would choose this incredibly dangerous route. But then to not protect the president as he was going through this dangerous path is even more bizarre.

    Once this route was chosen, then the only way it could be made secure was by the Secret Service being supplemented by local law enforcement agents i.e. the police, the sheriff’s office, military intelligence. Again, none of this happened. According to the author, Sheriff Decker told his men not to participate in any security operations. Palamara then writes that the local Dallas police force was called off the night before by the Secret Service. (p. 118) Captain Will Fritz was supposed to commander a detail riding behind the Vice-President with rapid-fire machine guns. According to two sources, this was changed the night before. Instead, this detail was sent to the Trade Mart to protect the speaker’s stand.

    Palamara now brings in witnesses like former Eisenhower press secretary Jim Haggerty, and former agent Darwin Horn who state that supplementing the Secret Service with local police was a common practice. He then quotes Winston Lawson as denying this before the Warren Commission under oath. His specific words were, “This was not usual procedure.” (ibid)

    Palamara now makes a penultimate point about the arrangement of the motorcade. Military aide Godfrey McHugh almost always rode in the president’s car on these occasions. Yet, in Dallas, another anomaly took place. In Dallas, he was asked by the Secret Service “for the first time” to “ride in the back, instead, as normally I would do, between the driver and the Secret Service agent in charge of the trip.” (p. 119) The reason given was this would allow the president fuller exposure to the crowd. As Air Force aide, one of McHugh’s duties was to supervise Air Force One.

    Finally, the author notes that Batchelor told the Commission that he did not think any local authorities were in place below Houston Street. He then quotes William Manchester as writing, “Possibly [Police Chief] Curry’s department met its responsibilities by deciding to end supervision of Friday’s crowd at Houston and Main, a block short of the ambush … ” Manchester then added, perhaps for ironic effect, “The weakest link in downtown Dallas was Dealey Plaza.” (p. 120)

    As Palamara points out with detailed accuracy, everything about this route, from its unnecessary choice, to the lack of supporting personnel, to the violation of protocol, to the secrecy about which route was actually to be used, to the almost incredible lack of protection at its most exposed point, cried out for a thorough investigation. To put it mildly, that did not happen.

    IV

    From here, Palamara now moves to probably his most grievous charge against the Secret Service. He calls it “security stripping”. The author notes that as of November 10th, there were 18 motorcycles listed in the motorcade. Buy by November 21st, Winston Lawson had decreased the amount or motorcycles on either side of the limousine from four to two. (ibid, p. 131) At Love Field the orders were relayed for the cycles to ride to the rear of the car. Dallas policeman Marrion Baker wrote the author that he never got to the bottom of this strange order. Fellow policeman cyclist B. J. Martin said the same thing about this formation. That it was given to them at Love Field. And it was the weirdest formation he ever heard of. Martin said, “Ordinarily, you bracket the car with four motorcycles, one on each fender.” (ibid, p. 133) HSCA attorney, Belford Lawson wrote about this matter: “The question that must be answered is why the instructions were given to the officers so shortly before the motorcade…” (ibid, p. 132) In fact, two of the motorcycle cops were so far to the rear of Kennedy, that they weren’t even on the same street with him when he was shot. (ibid, p. 134)

    By way of comparison, the author compares the protection in Tampa, with that in Dallas. There it was much tighter and there were police on top of tall buildings. (ibid, p. 136) Interestingly, Lawson was the advance man on presidential visits that year to Little Rock and Billings, Montana. Those records were destroyed in 1995, after the creation of the ARRB.

    The HSCA shined a light of this issue when it wrote the following: “The Secret Service’s alteration of the original Dallas Police Department motorcycle deployment plan prevented the use of maximum possible security precautions.” It then continues with another comparison, “Surprisingly, the security measure used in the prior motorcades during the same Texas visit shows that the deployment of motorcycles in Dallas by the Secret Service may have been uniquely insecure.” (ibid, pgs. 137-38)

    Palamara now points out still another anomaly about the Dallas motorcade. There was a flat bed truck with the media aboard that was supposed to ride in front of the president’s car. Again, according to members of the press, this was cancelled at the last minute. The press was moved much further back and placed in Chevy convertibles. (ibid, p. 139) Palamara fairly poses the question: “Was the motorcade manipulated to prevent photographic records of the crime from being made.” (p. 139) Which they probably would have been if the truck was in front of Kennedy.

    The same exchange of proximity applies to the president’s physician George Burkley. Burkley said he virtually always rode in close proximity to the president. He could think of only one previous exception, the visit to Rome in July of 1963. But in Dallas, he was actually relegated to a bus at the rear of the motorcade. (ibid, p. 142) This, of course, delayed his reaction time in getting to the president. Towards the end of this discussion of the out of order cars, and passengers, Palamara then drips in another interesting tidbit. It was Lawson who was in charge of the car numbers for the motorcade. (p. 143) The author says these changes occurred somewhere between November 19th and the 22nd. And Lawson tried to pass them off to advance man Jack Puterbaugh. (ibid) But Palamara writes, Puterbaugh never made any mention of any such responsibility on his part. HSCA attorney Belford Lawson again summed the situation up well: “Why was there so much juggling around and controversy about seating at Love Field, and why was there so much constant repositioning and shuffling of dignitaries’ cars in relation to press cars during the Texas trip?” Lawson then added another tantalizing question: “Why was the [Dallas] motorcade longer than any other motorcade on the Texas trip?” (ibid, p. 144) Unfortunately, the HSCA never answered these pointed and crucial questions in anywhere near a satisfactory manner.

    From here Palamara now segues to violations of Secret Service protocol according to various manuals. A prime example was the overpass over Elm Street . It should have been cleared of bystanders. It was not. (ibid, p. 144) Buildings were not checked. Even on the dogleg through the Plaza. Buildings should have been checked in the dogleg onto Houston Street. They were not. (ibid, p. 146)According to inspector Michael Torina, agents and police officers should have been standing atop tall buildings. (p. 147) There should have been policemen facing the crowds. As they had been in Fort Worth. There also should have been military officers on hand, as they had been in San Antonio the day before. (p. 150)

    And, of course, there was the incident at the late night bar called The Cellar. This is where several agents spent the night before drinking hard alcohol. The agents stayed there until at least 3:00 AM. Some stayed even later than that. This was an obvious violation of rules of conduct since the morning call was at seven. But further, the Secret Service then hired local firemen to protect the president while they were partying. In a high-risk city like Dallas. Yet, no one was punished for this clear violation. As many have asked, how can agents react quickly and smoothly with so much alcohol in them. (pgs. 150) Palamara compares the reaction time of Johnson’s Secret Service protector, Rufus Youngblood, which was almost instant, with JFK’s which was very slow. Perhaps fatally slow. Or as former Secret Service officer John Norris stated in colorful language, “Except for George Hickey and Clint Hill, everybody else just basically sat there with their thumbs up their butts while the president was gunned down in front of them.” (Palamara, p. 152) Making this violation even worse was Hill’s comments on the later Secret Service sex scandal in Cartagena Columbia. Hill said, “There’s no tolerance at all , no room for any misbehavior in the Secret Service. There’s no loose chain. You are on the clock from the time you leave, until the time you return home.” As many know, Rowley deliberately chose not to punish anyone even though he knew about the incident.

    As the author then notes, what makes all this malfeasance even more suspicious is that there seems to be an institutional memory about it. For as Palamara notes in the book, in January of 1995, the Secret Service destroyed some records, including presidential protection survey reports for some of Kennedy’s visits in the fall of 1963. (p. 161) This was after the formation of the Assassination Records Review Board. Further, it was discovered that agent James Mostrovito did destroy documents, but he also got rid of a vial containing a portion of Kennedy’s brain. He then went on to a career in the CIA.

    The author concludes this section of the book with a look at the behavior of agent Bill Greer, the driver of Kennedy’s car. He first notes that ordinarily, the Secret Service liked to maintain speeds of at least 20-30 MPH. Which was much faster than what Dealey Plaza allowed. He also adds that, at the first shot, Greer slowed the car down. He then turned around. Kellerman shouted, “Let’s get out of here!” But Greer did not. He disobeyed a superior and turned around again. (p. 188)

    Later on, Greer and Kellerman said there was bullet expelled from the president’s body through cardiac massage. (p. 195) Further, even though agent Richard Johnsen was an important witness to the chain of possession of CE 399, he was not interviewed by the FBI or the WC. The author then makes an error in his discussion of the provenance of CE 399. He writes that Elmer Lee Todd initialed CE 399. Not so. Hoover said this happened. But his initials are not on the bullet today. Which is utterly bizarre. Palamara recovers a bit when he then writes that Dr. Robert Shaw announced that CE 399 was still in Connally’s leg, when in fact, according to the Commission it was being carried on a plane to Washington. And secondly, as Robert Harris has noted, Connally wrote that a bullet fell out of his body after CE 399 was discovered. (Palamara pgs. 197-98)

    Palamara goes on with Secret Service malfeasance in the wake of Kennedy’s murder. The Secret Service did not produce the clothing of the president when the doctors asked for it at Bethesda. A roll of 120 film was destroyed by a Secret Service agent that night. (ibid, p. 199) Admiral David Osborne sated that an intact bullet fell out of Kennedy’s clothing at Bethesda. Osborne added, “Several people had it. I know the Secret Service had it…” And Palamara also notes the role of the infamous Secret Service agent Elmer Moore in altering the first day testimony of the Parkland doctors about the direction of the bullet that pierced Kennedy’s throat. Originally reported as being an entrance wound, after Moore was done massaging the testimony of the doctors and nurses at Parkland, the Commission had enough leeway to make this an exit wound for the SBT.

    V

    The above constitutes what I believe to be the contributions of (considerable) value in this book. From about page 210 on, that is approximately the second half, the quality of the work drops off. And the approach changes. As does the level of the analysis. For instance, at around this point, Palamara begins to rely upon witnesses like Gerry Patrick Hemming, a man who the late, great Gaeton Fonzi warned us all about. Recall, Hemming is the guy who confirmed the Marita Lorenz assassination caravan. Palamara interviewed him twice. (pgs. 213-14) As if that is not enough, the author now brings in DNC advance man Martin Underwood in a big way. (p. 214) Underwood is the guy who the lamentable Gus Russo dug up to try and say that Fabian Escalante and the Cuban G-2 were actually in on the Kennedy murder plot. When Underwood testified before the ARRB, as they revealed in their report, it turned out his so-called contemporaneous notes on official stationary were neither contemporaneous nor official. This was such a blatant Russo ploy, even Max Holland saw through it. I mean when one Oswald did it zealot goes after another zealot, you know the witness has problems. As Underwood does.

    Underwood tells the author that CIA station chief Win Scott told him things he never told anyone. Including his wives and son. Underwood was on a mission for LBJ. LBJ wanted to know what really happened with the JFK case. So Marty goes to talk to Scott in Mexico. Scott tells this low level flunky that the CIA, FBI and the Mob all knew Kennedy was going to be hit. But not just that. They all knew it was going to be on 11/22/63 in Dallas! But eve that it not good enough for Underwood, who here actually goes beyond his flights of fancy for Russo. Let me quote what Underwood tells Palamara: “His number was on the board. I found out later, if they missed him in Dallas, they were thinking of getting him at the LBJ ranch.” (p. 215) This is Alex Jones stuff. But now, good ole Marty goes to see Sam Giancana. Sam tells him to tell Johnson that the Mafia had him on their hit list also.

    But Underwood now tells the author that 18 hours before the landing at Love Field, they were getting all sorts of solid reports about Kennedy being assassinated in Texas. Well, Underwood now goes to the president and tells him about this. What does JFK say? According to Underwood, he replies with “Marty, you worry about me to much.” (ibid)

    Enough about Underwood.

    From here, Palamara now begins a long section of the book which he would have been well advised to forsake. For literally scores of pages, he catalogues the names of dozens of Secret Service agents and what their performance was like in relation to the JFK assassination. I did not understand why he did this. In the fine opening 200 pages of the book, Palamara clearly named the agents he felt should have been seriously investigated, and why. Further, many of the people he names here had little or nothing to do with the assassination. So this gets both superfluous and boring. It’s not all like that of course. But the author would have been much better off trimming this section down by at least 50%. It goes on for more than a hundred pages.

    At the end, Palamara concludes with a couple of more dubious chapters. In Chapter 15, where he talks about a motive for the Secret Service to go along with a plot, he actually brings up Sy Hersh’s excremental book, The Dark Side of Camelot. In other words because Kennedy was having affairs, the Secret Service looked askance at him as being of low character. (p. 385) I didn’t know whether to laugh or cry at this. These are the same guys who Abe Bolden said were heavy drinkers and also serial womanizers. But yet, they could not stomach Kennedy’s philandering? Which we know through many good sources was exaggerated. In fact, by these same Secret Service agents who Hersh enlisted in his cause.

    The author gets back on track a bit by mentioning Elmer Moore’s rightwing politics and his outburst against Kennedy for selling out the country to the Reds. This seems much more realistic as a motive for complicity.

    At the end, Palamara lists a very good chronicle of failures by the Secret Service in Dallas. (p. 387) It goes on for three pages. It is very provocative and even disturbing. The author uses it to crystallize the argument he has been making without being explicit about it. That is, after explaining all these serious lapses in protection which enabled the murder to take place, he concludes that the Secret Service was not just negligent, but culpable in the assassination. With the amount of evidence in the first half of the book, it’s hard to disagree with him.

    In sum, I feel about this work as I do about Doug Horne’s multi- volume set. Palamara needed an editor to control his excesses. If he had done that a book worth reading would have been sterling.

  • Dale Myers, With Malice (Part 2)


    The following is Part Two of a review of the 2013 Kindle edition of Dale Myers’ book With Malice.


    VIII: Proof positive

    Myers dedicates this chapter to a discussion of Tippit’s autopsy, and the physical evidence against Oswald such as the revolver allegedly used to kill Tippit, and the bullets and the spent shell casings. He also discusses the fingerprints found on Tippit’s squad car, and the light gray jacket discarded by the killer in the parking lot behind the Texaco Service station. Myers quotes from DPD captain Will Fritz’s interrogation report where he allegedly asked Oswald where he had obtained the revolver, to which Oswald allegedly replied that he bought it in Fort Worth, Texas (With Malice, Chapter 8). Fritz allegedly asked this question during an interrogation on Saturday November 23, 1963. But in order to believe Fritz, including the FBI and USSS agents who were present during Oswald’s interrogations, one must ignore all of the evidence discussed throughout this review that the DPD had framed Oswald for Tippit’s murder, and that the FBI and the USSS also wanted Oswald to be found guilty. As far as the USSS is concerned, consider that several researchers such as Ian Griggs have explained that the USSS was by all likelihood involved in coercing Howard Brennan into claiming that he was at a DPD line-up, during which he allegedly identified Oswald as the man he saw in the so-called sniper’s nest window on the sixth floor of the TSBD (Griggs, No Case To Answer, page 91).

    It is Myers’ contention that Oswald ordered the revolver from Seaport Traders Inc., Los Angeles, California, on January 27, 1963, under the name A.J. Hidell, and then had it shipped to his P.O. Box in Dallas which was under his real name (ibid). To begin with, Myers simply has no qualms about Oswald having ordered the revolver using an alias, only to have it delivered to his P.O. Box which was under his real name. Obviously, the purpose of Oswald allegedly using an alias to purchase the gun was to hide the fact that he (Oswald) was purchasing it. So then why would he have it shipped to a P.O. box under his real name? Does that not defeat the purpose of having purchased a revolver using an alias? Myers admits that it is not known whether the application for P.O. Box 2915 (to which the revolver was allegedly shipped) listed A.J. Hidell as someone entitled to receive mail at that box (ibid). Myers then uses the Warren Commission testimony of postal inspector Harry Holmes, during which Holmes stated that the portion of the P.O. Box application which listed others entitled to receive mail at the same P.O. Box was discarded in accordance with postal regulations, after the box was closed in May, 1963 (ibid). Myers also uses Holmes’ testimony to explain that regardless of who is entitled to receive a package at a P.O. Box, a notice is placed inside the P.O. Box, and the person who has rented that particular P.O. Box can then take the notice to a window and is given the package.

    Contrary to what Myers wants the reader to believe, Holmes has been caught lying on these issues. As author Jim DiEugenio explains, postal regulation No. 355.111 dictates that; “Mail addressed to a person at a P.O. box who is not authorized to receive mail shall be endorsed ‘addressee unknown’ and returned to the sender where possible” (DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland, pages 60 and 61). Furthermore, according to postal regulation 846.53h, it was customary for the post office to retain the application forms for the P.O. boxes for two years after the box was closed (ibid, page 61). In assessing Holmes’ credibility, the reader should also bear in mind that Holmes was an FBI informant (John Armstrong Baylor collection, tab entitled: Harry Holmes). On November 26, 1963, a memorandum was sent from Alan Belmont to William Sullivan stating that the FBI’s report on the assassination is to; ” … settle the dust, in so far as Oswald and his activities are concerned, both from the standpoint that he is the man who assassinated the President, and relative to Oswald himself and his activities and background, et cetera.” (Church Committee: Book V, page 33). By helping to cement Oswald’s guilt as Tippit’s murderer, the FBI (much like the DPD) could then use Tippit’s murder as evidence that Oswald was more than capable of assassinating the President in cold blood. As an FBI informant, Holmes would only be too happy to help out in that regard. In fact, as Jim DiEugenio explains, Holmes subservience to the FBI was so extreme that his family actually contacted the JFK Lancer group and told them to try and understand his behaviour in this regard (DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland, page 61). Predictably, none of this is mentioned by Myers.

    Myers also cites the testimony of Heinz Michaelis, the office manager of George Rose and company, as evidence that a balance of $19.95 plus a $1.27 shipping charge was collected from Oswald under the name Hidell, and allegedly shipped to P.O. Box 2915 on March 20, 1963 (ibid). However, as author Jim DiEugenio explains, the Railway Express Agency was required to send a postcard to Oswald’s P.O. Box informing him to pick up the revolver (DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland, page 104). But there is no proof, or even evidence, that a postcard was ever sent to Oswald’s P.O. Box (ibid). This is a very odd hole in the evidence trail. Another requirement was that a 5024 form be filled out by Oswald for the revolver. But again, there is no proof that this was done (ibid). There is also no proof of a signed receipt by Oswald (as Hidell) for the revolver; or that he ever produced a certificate of good character to pick-up the revolver as required by the law (ibid). Again, these serious lacunae are glossed over by Myers. In a normal criminal case, they would not be.

    Finally, although Myers mentions in his endnotes that the rifle Oswald allegedly used to assassinate President Kennedy was also shipped to the same P.O. Box, he nevertheless omits that both the rifle and revolver were shipped to Oswald’s P.O. Box on the same day; even though they were ordered over a month apart and from different suppliers! Namely, one supplier (Klein’s Sporting Goods) was from Chicago and the other (Seaport Traders) was from Los Angeles. As it defies the odds that such a thing occurred, Myers is careful not to point this fact out to his readers. Readers should bear in mind that no ammunition for the revolver was found by the DPD at the rooming house at 1026 North Beckley where Oswald was allegedly living at the time of the assassination. Although a holster (WCE 144) was allegedly found at the rooming house by the DPD, researcher Lee Farley has demonstrated that it was actually Larry Crafard who was living at the rooming house and not Oswald! (See the thread entitled A House of Cards? on Greg Parker’s research forum Reopen Kennedy Case).

    Naturally, Myers also uses the Warren Commission testimony of Marina Oswald as evidence that Oswald actually owned the revolver allegedly used to kill Tippit (With Malice, Chapter 8). Unfortunately for him, Marina Oswald has been exposed as an incredibly compromised witness by a multitude of researchers. For one thing, Marina initially denied that Oswald ever used the name Hidell (WCE 1789). However, when she testified before the Warren Commission in February 1964, she now claimed that she first heard of the name Hidell, “When he [Oswald] was interviewed by some anti-Cubans, he used this name and spoke of an organization.” (WC Volume I, page 64). She was referring to Oswald’s debate with Ed Butler of INCA and anti-Castro Cuban Carlos Bringuier on William Stuckey’s radio show on August 21, 1963. The problem is the name Hidell was never mentioned during the debate by anyone (WC Volume XXI, Stuckey Exhibit No. 3).

    When Marina testified before the Warren Commission on June 11, 1964, she now claimed that she signed the name “A.J. Hidell” on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee card (WCE 819), which Oswald allegedly had in his possession when he was arrested in New Orleans on August 9, 1963! (WC Volume V, page 401). It should be obvious to any intellectually honest researcher that Marina was being pressured into being less than honest.

    In assessing Marina Oswald’s credibility as a witness, the reader should also bear in mind that according to Oswald’s brother Robert, Marina may have been deported back to Russia if she didn’t co-operate with the FBI (WC Volume I, page 410). Marina also admitted during her testimony before the Warren Commission that a representative from the United States immigration service had advised her that it would be better for her to help the FBI, in the sense that she would have more rights in the United States (WC Volume I, page 80). Although she testified that she didn’t consider this a threat, the mere fact that she had been advised she would have more rights in the United States if she co-operated should send the message to researchers that she would even lie to obtain those rights (ibid). Marina Oswald also testified that she initially ” … didn’t want to say too much” to evidently protect her husband (WC Volume I, page 14). However, Marina’s friend Elena Hall told the Warren Commission that she didn’t think that Marina ever actually loved her husband, and would apparently belittle him (WC Volume VIII, page 401). Such a revelation undermines the notion that Marina lied to protect her husband. None of these problems with Marina Oswald’s credibility as a witness is ever discussed by Myers.

    But if Myers use of Marina Oswald as a witness isn’t bad enough, then consider that he also cites the book Passport to Assassination, by KGB Colonel Oleg Maximovich Nechiporenko, as evidence that Oswald owned the revolver allegedly used to kill Tippit. According to Nechiporenko, Oswald pulled out a Smith and Wesson revolver inside the Soviet embassy in Mexico City (With Malice, Chapter 8). Sadly for Myers, it has been demonstrated by several competent authors that Oswald was impersonated inside the Soviet embassy in Mexico City; and that he probably never even travelled to Mexico City as postulated by the Warren Commission (see Jim DiEugenio’s long discussion of Oswald’s alleged trip to Mexico City). Finally, as many researchers have explained, the so-called backyard photographs (WCE 133-A and B) of Oswald which show him with the rifle he allegedly used to assassinate the President, and the revolver which he allegedly used to kill Tippit, are very likely ersatz.

    Another piece of evidence cited by Myers as proof that Oswald owned the revolver allegedly used to kill Tippit is the holster (WCE 142). This was discovered in the rooming house on 1026 North Beckley Avenue where Oswald was said to be living at the time of the assassination. However, as previously mentioned, researcher Lee Farley has demonstrated the likliehood that Oswald didn’t live there as claimed. In the final paragraph of his discussion of Oswald’s alleged ownership of the revolver, Myers writes; “There can be little doubt that Oswald owned the 0.38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver pulled from his hand in the Texas Theater” (With Malice, Chapter 8). In light of everything discussed previously in this review about the revolver, this is a tremendously fatuous statement to make. Still, the question remains as to why the FBI would want to forge the order coupon for the revolver using the name Hidell instead of Oswald? Although this reviewer cannot provide a definitive answer, perhaps the FBI believed that this is precisely what Oswald would have done to try and conceal from them that he had ordered a rifle and revolver. Bear in mind that the FBI were well aware of Oswald when he returned from the Soviet Union, but were not aware that Oswald (allegedly) used the name Alek James Hidell as an alias prior to his arrest in New Orleans on August 9, 1963. Therefore, the FBI probably thought they could sell the idea that since Oswald knew the FBI was keeping an eye on him, he would use an alias they weren’t aware of at the time to order both the rifle and revolver.

    On the night of the assassination, FBI agent Vincent Drain confiscated several pieces of evidence against Oswald, such as the Mannlicher Carcano rifle he allegedly used to murder the President. Included amongst the evidence confiscated were the revolver (WCE143) and the bullet removed from Tippit’s body at Methodist Hospital after he was pronounced dead (WCD 81, page 448). However, what the DPD did not release to the FBI were the four spent shell casings discarded by Tippit’s killer, and the three bullets removed by Dr. Earl Rose at Parkland Memorial Hospital during Tippit’s autopsy. The omission of the shell casings is significant, as the unique markings of the breech face and the firing pin of the revolver could be used to determine whether the shell casings were fired from the revolver in question; which the FBI eventually determined was the case (WC Volume III, page 466).

    The implication is that the DPD were concerned that the shell casings were not actually fired from “Oswald’s” revolver. In his endnotes, Myers acknowledges that the DPD did not release the shell casings to the FBI on the night of the assassination, but writes that; “At the time of the submission [of the evidence to the FBI], the Dallas Police had no reason to believe that the bullet and revolver would not be sufficient to connect Oswald’s pistol to Tippit’s death.” But the DPD surely must have known that the markings from the firing pin and breech face of the revolver could be used to determine whether the spent shell casings were fired from the revolver, and therefore, they should have released them to the FBI along with the revolver.

    As FBI agent Cortlandt Cunningham told the Warren Commission, the bullet the DPD released to the FBI on the night of the assassination (WCE 602) was too mutilated, and that; “There were not sufficient microscopic marks remaining on the surface of this bullet, due to the mutilation, to determine whether or not it had been fired from this weapon [WCE 143].” (ibid, page 475) Cunningham also testified that unlike WCE 602, the other three bullets removed from Tippit’s body and head (WCE 603, 604, and 605) did bear microscopic marks for comparison purposes (ibid). As any ballistics expert will be able to confirm, the most mutilated bullet will be the hardest in determining whether it had been fired from a particular gun. Whilst the DPD may not have known just by looking at WCE 602 that it was the most mutilated bullet, a photograph of WCE 602 shows that its nose is bent out of shape. Furthermore, the DPD may have thought that by releasing all four of the bullets to the FBI on the night of the assassination, they would have had a better chance of determining that the bullets had been fired from a different gun.

    But is there actually an innocent explanation for why the DPD initially only released WCE 602 to the FBI? According to Myers, after Dr. Earl Rose had removed the three bullets from Tippit, he gave them to DPD detective Frank J. Corkery. Corkery then delivered them to Captain Will Fritz. When FBI agent Vincent Drain questioned Fritz as to why the DPD had not released these three bullets to the FBI on the night of the assassination, Fritz told Drain that a detective had placed the bullets in his (Fritz’s) files, and had not made a record of their location. Although Myers considers Fritz to be an honest officer who would not deliberately conceal evidence, let’s consider one example which suggests otherwise.

    As every researcher of the assassination is probably aware, DPD officer Marrion Baker and TSBD superintendent Roy Truly allegedly spotted Oswald inside the second floor lunchroom of the TSBD within ninety seconds of the assassination. But contrary to this belief, Baker made no mention of an encounter with Oswald inside the lunchroom in his first day affidavit, writing instead that he had encountered a man walking away from the stairway on either the third or fourth floor of the TSBD (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Item 4). In fact, as researcher Sean Murphy has convincingly demonstrated, Oswald was most likely standing outside the TSBD (on top of the front entrance steps), when the shots were fired at the President! (The Education Forum, thread entitled; Oswald leaving TSBD?).

    Although Roy Truly provided an affidavit to the DPD on November 23, 1963, in which he claimed they had encountered Oswald inside the lunchroom, DPD detective Marvin Johnson wrote in his report to Chief Curry that Officer Baker had encountered a man he ” … later identified as Lee Harvey Oswald … ” on about the fourth floor of the TSBD, walking away from the stairway (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 5, Folder 5, Item 26). However, this was a lie by Johnson, as Baker did not claim in his affidavit that Oswald was the man he encountered; even though, as researcher Greg Parker has pointed out, Baker had to pass by Oswald at DPD headquarters when he made out his affidavit. Johnson’s lie was one which was repeated by Captain Fritz in his note to Chief Curry, where he claimed that Baker had stopped Oswald on either the third or fourth floor, whilst he (Oswald) was coming down the stairs (Papers of Capt. Will Fritz: Note from J.W. Fritz to Jesse Curry of 23 December 1963).

    When Fritz testified before the Warren Commission, he explained that Truly or someone else had told him while he was still at the TSBD that Truly and Baker had “met” Oswald on the stairway, but then added; ” … our investigation shows that he [Baker and/or Truly] actually saw him in a lunchroom … ” (WC Volume IV, page 213). Fritz then claimed that Oswald had told him when he was being interrogated that he was eating his lunch in the lunchroom (ibid).

    Despite what one may believe about where Officer Baker had actually accosted Oswald, Fritz’s claim that Baker had encountered Oswald when Oswald was coming down the stairs was a lie. In this reviewer’s opinion, the most viable explanation for this lie was to make it seem like Oswald was coming down from the sixth floor of the TSBD after allegedly assassinating the President. With all this in mind, it seems very likely that Fritz (and others) would conspire to release only one of the bullets removed from Tippit’s body to the FBI on the night of the assassination, to minimize the chances of the FBI determining that Tippit was shot by a gun other than WCE 143. Although this reviewer is not aware of when the bullets were supposedly handed to Captain Fritz by detective Corkery, it was presumably on the night of the assassination after Dr. Rose had concluded the autopsy on Tippit’s body.

    As probably every researcher is also aware, three of the bullets removed from Tippit were of the Winchester Western brand, and one bullet was of the Remington Peters brand. However, only two of the spent shell casings discarded by Tippit’s killer were of the Winchester Western brand, and the other two were of the Remington Peters brand. This has led conspiracy advocates to believe that the actual shell casings discarded by Tippit’s killer were substituted to help incriminate Oswald; a point of view which this reviewer shares. Myers explanation for this discrepancy is that there were actually five shots fired at Tippit, with one Remington Peters bullet missing him and going astray, and one Winchester Western shell casing being discarded but not handed over to the DPD (With Malice, Chapter 8). Myers admits that the number of shots heard, and the sequence in which they were fired, varied from one witness to another, but then used Ted Callaway’s belief that he heard a total of five shots to bolster the notion that there were indeed five shots fired at Tippit.

    According to Myers, “Over the course of six separate interviews, Callaway has consistently reported hearing five shots coming from the direction of Tenth and Patton [Streets].” (ibid). When Myers interviewed Callaway in 1996, Callaway explained that when he was questioned by the DPD, he informed them that he had heard five shots (ibid). What Myers doesn’t point out to his readers is that when Callaway (allegedly) wrote out his affidavit to the DPD on the day of the assassination, he merely claimed that he heard “some” shots (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 2, Item 1). Whilst some will argue that by “some” shots Callaway could easily have meant that he really heard five shots, why wouldn’t he have just said so in his affidavit? Taking into account all of the aforementioned problems with Callaway as a witness, and the likelihood that he was coaxed into identifying Oswald as Tippit’s killer, it also seems likely that he was coaxed into claiming that he had heard five shots as a way of explaining the aforementioned discrepancy between the bullets and the spent shell casings. The first interview, during which Callaway claimed that he had heard five shots, appears to be his interview with the USSS on December 3, 1963 (WCD 87, page 552). The DPD released the four spent shell casings allegedly discovered at the Tippit murder scene to FBI agent Vincent Drain on November 28, 1963 (WCD205, page 206). Therefore, if the authorities had realised before Callaway’s interview with the USSS that there was a discrepancy between the discarded shell casings and the bullets removed from Tippit’s body, they could have coerced him into claiming that he had heard a total of five shots.

    Another problem with using Callaway to explain a missed shot (which Myers evidently wants to ignore), is that Callaway claimed that he heard two shots fired, followed by three more shots in rapid succession (With Malice, Chapter 8). However, Myers also wants his readers to believe that Jack Tatum heard two or three shots fired, followed by a single shot to Tippit’s head after a slight pause (ibid). So if Tatum is correct, then Callaway’s “recollection” must be in error; and as this reviewer has discussed previously, Tatum’s claim that he witnessed Tippit being shot is not to be trusted. Suffice it to say, Myers cannot have it both ways. This reviewer should also point out that Frank Griffin, who allegedly witnessed Tippit being shot, told Myers during an interview in 2004 that he ” … vividly recalled hearing five gunshots … ” However, Griffin also claimed that he heard the five shots fired “equally spaced” (With Malice, Chapter 8). But if Griffin’s “recollection” is correct, then Jack Tatum’s own “recollection” can’t be true. Griffin also claimed that he saw Oswald fleeing the scene of the murder after the shots were fired (see the thread entitled FRANK GRIFFIN – TKS WITNESS CLAIMS BEFORE 2010? on John Simkin’s Education Forum).

    In his endnotes, Myers writes that Griffin remained silent about what he witnessed because his father, Johnnie Frank Griffin, was murdered after he testified before a grand Jury concerning what he witnessed when Alabama attorney General- elect Albert Patterson was murdered, and evidently feared that he may share the same fate as his father. But as Myers admits, there are several discrepancies between what he told Myers in 2004 and what appeared in his own book in 2008; though he assures us that most of these discrepancies are “minor and of no consequence.” On the contrary, given the discrepancies between his interview with Myers and what he wrote in his book, including the lack of any credible evidence that five equally spaced shots were fired at Tippit, Griffin’s claim that he heard five equally spaced shots and then observed Oswald should be not be considered credible.

    To bolster the notion that one “discarded” shell casing was not recovered, Myers quotes from the interviews of witnesses B.M. (Pat) Patterson, and Harold Russell, both of whom said they witnessed Tippit’s killer come down Patton Street and turn West onto Jefferson Blvd. (With Malice, Chapter 8). Patterson informed the FBI that the killer; “stopped still, ejected the cartridges, reloaded the gun, and then placed the weapon inside his waistband.” (ibid). Russell informed the FBI on February 23, 1964 that; “the man [gunman] unloaded the gun, jammed it in his pants under his belt and disappeared down Jefferson Boulevard.” (ibid). But Myers omits information from his discussion which contradicts what he’s trying to sell to his readers. First of all, in his initial interview with the FBI on January 21, 1964, Russell only stated that the killer was attempting to either reload the gun or place it into his belt. There was no mention of the killer unloading the gun (WC Volume XXI, Russell exhibit A). When Russell was interviewed by the FBI on February 23, 1964, he also claimed that he was put into a DPD squad car by officers to point out the area where he had last seen the killer; even though he made no mention of being put into a squad car in his interview with the FBI one month before (WCD 735, page 270). This is yet another example of how Russell’s story evolved over time.

    With regards to Patterson, during his initial interview with the FBI on January 22, 1964, he made no mention of the killer stopping to eject shells from his gun (WC Volume XXI, Patterson exhibit A). In an affidavit to the FBI on August 25, 1964, Patterson now allegedly claimed that the killer had stopped, ejected cartridges, and then reloaded the gun (WC Volume XXI, Patterson (B.M.) exhibit B). Patterson also allegedly told the FBI on August 26, 1964, that he saw the killer cross over to the North side of Jefferson Blvd (thus implying that the killer went down to the south side of Jefferson Blvd.) after he had stopped (ibid). However, Patterson’s latter claim that the killer had stopped to eject empty shells from the gun is not corroborated by Lewis, Russell, Warren Reynolds, Ted Callaway, and Sam Guinyard. In fact, Harold Russell told the FBI during his interview with them on February 23, 1964, that the killer was ejecting the shells as he was “hurrying down” Patton Street. In light of all of the above, there is no good reason to believe that Tippit’s killer had discarded one or more spent shell casings from the revolver as Russell and Patterson allegedly claimed he did during their latter interviews with the FBI. Besides, if Russell and Patterson really did see the killer discard empty shell casings from the revolver, why didn’t they inform the DPD Officers present at the Tippit murder scene of this observation, or why wouldn’t they have picked up the empty shell casings and hand them to the DPD officers?

    Myers also quotes from his interviews with Barbara and Virginia Davis in 1996 and 1997, during which they told him that their father-in-law, Louis Davis, had discovered a spent shell casing a short time after Tippit’s murder; which was allegedly similar to the ones which the Davis sister-in-laws discovered and gave to the DPD (With Malice, Chapter 8). Louis Davis allegedly kept it as a souvenir. However, given the aforementioned problems with the Davis sister-in-laws as witnesses, and the likelihood that they were coaxed into identifying Oswald as Tippit’s killer, their story that a fifth shell casing was discovered by their father-in-law should not be trusted. Even Myers admits that; “Whether the shell [allegedly found by Louis Davis] was one ejected by Tippit’s killer is likely to remain a mystery” (ibid).

    Suffice it to say, there is no credible evidence that more than four shell casings were discarded by Tippit’s killer, or that more than four shots were fired. There is no evidence that any bullets hit one of the houses in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene, or anything else such as the road surface. The only other explanation for a missing bullet which this reviewer can think of is that for some bizarre reason, Tippit’s killer had fired a shot in the air. However, the eyewitness statements do not support such an assertion. Despite Myers attempt to explain the discrepancy between the shell casings and the bullets, the fact remains that there is no credible evidence that one Remington Peter’s bullet had missed Tippit, and that one Winchester Western shell casing was unaccounted for. All alternative explanations for this discrepancy are also pure speculation.

    There is yet another problem with the spent shell casings which Tippit’s killer allegedly discarded. As most researchers are probably aware, DPD Officer Joe Mack Poe, who was at the Tippit murder scene with his partner Leonard Jez, informed the FBI on July 6, 1964, that he marked the two spent shell casings which were given to him by Domingo Benavides with the initials J.M.P. (WCE 2011). The problem is that Poe’s mark from the two shell casings are curiously missing, and Myers wants his readers to believe that Poe didn’t mark the shells as he claimed. Conspiracy advocates, on the other hand, believe that Poe missing marks are due to the shell casings being substituted for the ones he marked. When Poe testified before the Warren Commission on April 9, 1964, counsel Joseph Ball asked him if he put any markings on the shell casings, to which Poe responded; “I couldn’t swear to it; no, sir.” (Volume VII, page 68). When Ball again asked Poe if he made a mark on the shells after showing them to him, Poe explained; “I can’t swear to it; no, sir.”, but then claimed; “There is a mark. I believe I put on them, but I couldn’t swear to it. I couldn’t make them [the marks] out anymore.” (ibid, page 69). In other words, Poe was implying that he did mark the shells, but was unable to recognise them on the shells he was shown.

    According to Myers, the fact that Poe was reluctant to swear that he had marked the shells, raises the question of whether Poe had marked the shells as he claimed (With Malice, Chapter 8). However, consider that if Poe was an honest police officer who really did mark the shells, but now couldn’t make out his marks on any of the shells shown to him whilst testifying under oath, then his reluctance to swear that he had marked the shells is perfectly understandable. One thing which Myers never bothers to mention in his book is Poe’s interview with author Henry Hurt in 1984. According to Hurt, Poe told him that he was “absolutely certain” that he had marked the shells, and explained that he couldn’t be certain of a single other instance during his twenty eight years as a police officer when he failed to properly mark evidence (Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, page 153). Poe also told Hurt that prior to his testimony before the Warren Commission; he was interviewed by the FBI concerning the shell casings (ibid). However, this reviewer has been unable to locate such an interview.

    Poe also informed Hurt that he “felt certain” that the shell casings entered into evidence were the ones at the scene and that perhaps the reason he couldn’t find his marks was because somebody else had placed their mark on top of his (ibid). Clearly, Poe was implying to Hurt that the shell casings were not switched. After examining the shell casings at the National Archives, Hurt informed Poe that he wasn’t able to find any evidence that this was the case, to which Poe indignantly responded; “I [have] talked to you all I’m going to talk to you. You already got your mind made up about what you’re gonna say. I know what the truth is.” and then abruptly hung up the phone (ibid, page 154). The fact that Hurt included this indignant response from Poe speaks well for Hurt’s credibility on this issue. Hurt also explains that in each of the spent shell casings he examined; “at least 50 percent of the surface area around the inside rim has no marking at all, leaving ample space for even additional identifying marks.” (ibid).

    In an apparent attempt to discredit Poe, Myers quotes from his interview with detective Jim Leavelle in 1996. According to Myers, Leavelle claimed that Poe told him (Leavelle) that he didn’t remember marking the shells, and that Poe only told the FBI that he marked the shells because he was ” … afraid he would get in trouble for failing to mark evidence.” (With Malice, chapter 8). As previously mentioned, Leavelle informed the Warren Commission that ” … the only time I had connections with Oswald was this Sunday morning [November 24, 1963]. I never had [the] occasion to talk with him at any time …”, but then lied to Myers when he claimed he had interrogated Oswald on Friday shortly following his arrest. Evidence discussed below further demonstrates Leavelle’s duplicity. Although Myers doesn’t state that he absolutely believes Leavelle, merely writing that “In retrospect, Leavelle’s explanation has a sense of truth about it”, the fact that Myers uses someone such as Leavelle to discredit Poe, whilst ignoring Poe’s interview with Henry Hurt (even though he quotes from Hurt’s book elsewhere), is yet another example of Myers’ lack of objectivity. Readers should also keep in mind that Leavelle is a dyed in the wool supporter of Oswald’s guilt, who wrote the following blurb for Myers’s book; ” … Dale Myers has finally cut through the veneer of insinuations and innuendos applied by the conspiracy buffs for the past thirty odd years. He has cleared up the points of confusion brought on by the rumors and hearsay that had no basis in facts.” Therefore, it should come as absolutely no surprise to any honest researcher that Leavelle would proffer Poe not marking the spent shells.

    Myers also speculates that due to the presence of DPD Sgt “Pete” Barnes at the Tippit murder scene, allegedly “a few minutes” after Benavides had handed Poe the two spent shell casings, Poe may have handed the shell casings to Barnes without marking them (With Malice, Chapter 8). Whilst Myers is free to speculate as much as he wants, the fact remains that Poe insisted he had marked the two shell casings given to him by Benavides. Then again, we cannot know with absolute certainty that Poe did mark the shell casings. In fact, perhaps the best argument against the shell casings being switched (ironically) came from Sgt. Gerald Hill. When Hurt interviewed Hill in 1984, Hill explained that if the spent shell casings discovered at the Tippit murder scene had been switched, then Poe’s marks would have been forged onto the shell casings (Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, page 155).

    Myers also briefly discusses the issue of Sgt “Pete” Barnes identification of the shell casings which were given to him at the murder scene by Officer Poe. As Myers explains, Barnes ultimately decided that Poe gave him the spent shell casings designated by the FBI as Q-74 and Q-77; which Myers claims were both of the Remington Peters brand (With Malice, Chapter 8). According to his interview with the FBI on June 15, 1964, Barnes had located his mark (this being the letter B) on the aforementioned shell casings (WCE 2011). However, when he testified before the Warren Commission on April 7, 1964, Barnes claimed that the two shell casings he was given were actually Q -74 and Q-75. Myers actually admits that this was the case in his book (With Malice, Chapter 8). Barnes also told the Warren Commission that he placed the letter B ” … the best that I could, inside the hull of Exhibit 74 -I believe it was Q-74 and Q-75 … “ (WC Volume VII, page 275).

    In his demeaning article on researcher Don Thomas’ work on the Tippit murder, Myers explains that Barnes’ mark, “a crude letter B”, can be seen on the inside of the spent shells casings designated Q-74 and Q-77. Myers then went on to explain that this means Barnes did mark the spent shell casings after Poe had given them to him (see the blog post The Tippit Murder: Why Conspiracy Theorists Can’t Tell the Truth about the Rosetta Stone of the Case Against Lee Harvey Oswald on Myers’ blog). Curiously, this explanation is absent from Myers’ book. Although Barnes may very well have placed this crude looking B (which actually looks like the letter D) inside the spent shell casings, this reviewer discusses below that Barnes lied about the fingerprints discovered on Tippit’s squad car in order to conceal the possibility that Oswald didn’t shoot Tippit. Therefore, it is entirely conceivable that Barnes deliberately placed his crude looking mark inside the spent shell casings which the DPD had substituted for the ones which were actually discarded by Tippit’s killer after he shot Tippit, in order to make it appear as though there was no substitution for the spent shell casings.

    Myers writes that; “Two of the four shells recovered at the [Tippit murder] scene have a clear, unbroken chain of custody and were proven to have been fired in Oswald’s revolver to the exclusion of all other weapons” (With Malice, Chapter 8). Myers is referring to the two spent shell casings allegedly discovered by the Davis sister-in-laws shortly following Tippit’s murder, which they then gave to the DPD. Of course, Myers’ explanation ignores all of the aforementioned evidence (including evidence discussed further on) that the spent shell casings recovered from the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene were switched. Myers also discusses the allegations that Tippit’s killer was actually armed with an automatic handgun. The first report that Tippit’s killer was armed with an automatic handgun was from DPD Officer Howell W. Summers, whom reported over the DPD radio that an “eyeball” witness claimed the killer was armed with an automatic (WCE 705/1974). Although Myers believes this witness was Ted Callaway; as discussed previously, there is very good reason to believe that Callaway didn’t actually observe Tippit’s killer; and that the witness could have been the elusive B.D. Searcy.

    In any event, this reviewer should point out that Ted Callaway told Myers during an interview in 1996 that the reason he allegedly thought the killer was armed with an automatic was because; “he [the gunman] had his pistol in a raised position and his left hand going to the pistol. My sidearm was a forty-five. When I was in the Marine corps, and I’d used that same motion before in pushing a loaded magazine up to the handle of a forty-five, you know? And so, when they [the DPD] asked me what kind of gun that he had I told them it was an automatic; on account of that motion.” (With Malice, Chapter 8). No matter whom one might believe was the witness who provided Officer Summers with the information that the killer was armed with an automatic, the witness may have been mistaken if he didn’t get a really good view of the weapon, and if he thought the shots were fired in rapid succession. Keep in mind that the recollections of how many shots, and the sequence in which they were fired at Tippit, were recalled differently by the witnesses who heard the shots. Therefore, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the gun used to kill Tippit was an automatic if a particular witness recalled hearing the shots fired rapidly.

    The second claim that the spent shell casings found in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene were fired from an automatic was by Sgt. Gerald Hill. Hill broadcast the following message over the DPD radio at approximately 1:40 pm; “The shell at the scene indicates that the suspect is armed with an automatic .38 rather than a pistol.” (WCE 705/1974). As this reviewer will explain in the upcoming essay on Hill, Hill had by all likelihood framed Oswald for the murder of Officer Tippit, and that Hill only claimed that the spent shell casings were fired from an automatic handgun to divert suspicion away from himself. Unlike many other conspiracy advocates, this reviewer believes that the revolver Oswald allegedly had in his possession was the gun used to kill Tippit. Shortly following Oswald’s arrest at the Texas Theater, Gerald Hill was filmed showing reporters the revolver and the live rounds removed from the revolver. As Myers explains in his book, the bullets removed from Officer Tippit were of the 0.38 special caliber and had five lands and five grooves with a right twist; which are the class characteristics of the barrel of WCE 143 (With Malice, Chapter 8). The bullets removed from Tippit’s body also had microscopic scratches similar to those found on the test bullets fired from the revolver (ibid). Finally, the bullets removed from Tippit’s body showed signs of gas erosion, which results from the bullets being fired through the barrel of a gun where the diameter of the barrel is slightly larger than the diameter of the bullets; as was the case with the “Oswald” revolver (ibid).

    In his endnotes, Myers discusses the DPD’s alleged discovery of five Winchester Western cartridges inside Oswald’s front left pants pocket following his arrest. The cartridges were allegedly discovered by detective Elmer Boyd, as Boyd and his partner, detective Richard Sims, allegedly searched Oswald just prior to the first line-up (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 4, Item 5). Sims confirmed that the cartridges were removed from Oswald’s left front pants pocket when he testified before the Warren Commission (WC Volume VII, page 173). However; there are several problems with this alleged discovery. First of all, when Gerald Hill was interviewed by Eddie Barker in 1967, he claimed that Oswald was frisked inside the theater, but made no mention of any live rounds of ammunition being found in Oswald’s pants pocket (read Hill’s interview with Barker). Although Hill denied during his testimony before the Warren Commission that Oswald was searched by the arresting officers after he was handcuffed, his denial may have been to conceal the fact that after Oswald was searched, they had failed to discover the five cartridges in his pants pocket (WC Volume VII, page 66). If this was the case, then Hill had probably forgotten that he was meant to deny during his interview with Barker that Oswald was searched shortly following his arrest at the theater.

    Secondly, as researcher Gil Jesus explains on his website, the five rounds of ammunition allegedly removed from Oswald’s pants pocket show corrosion which is consistent with the cartridges having spent a considerable amount of time in either a gun belt or a bullet slide; neither of which were found amongst Oswald’s possessions. Jesus claims that police departments were known to use gun belts and bullet slides; and concludes, based on this assertion, that the five cartridges had originated from the DPD (Read more.) The reader should also keep in mind that the DPD didn’t release the five cartridges to the FBI until November 28, 1963; thus there was more than enough time to fabricate the discovery of the cartridges inside Oswald’s pants pocket (WCD 205, page 206). Finally, consider that, at the time detective Boyd allegedly discovered the five cartridges inside Oswald’s pants pocket, detective Sims had allegedly discovered a bus transfer inside Oswald’s shirt pocket. However, when DPD Chief Jesse Curry was asked by a reporter on the day following the assassination how Oswald had travelled to “the other side of town”, Curry replied that; “We have heard that he [Oswald] was picked up by a negro in a car”, but made no mention of a bus transfer being found in Oswald’s pocket (WCE 2146). Furthermore, researcher Lee Farley has demonstrated that Oswald’s alleged bus ride following the assassination was a likely fabrication (see the thread entitled Oswald and Bus 1213 on John Simkin’s education forum). Therefore, this is more evidence that the DPD would falsify evidence against Oswald.

    In the endnotes to his book, Myers acknowledges that several officers who participated in Oswald’s arrest had observed what appeared to be a nick from the firing pin on one of the live rounds inside the revolver allegedly removed from Oswald inside the theater. This included officers Nick McDonald, Bob Carroll, Gerald Hill, and Ray Hawkins. As Myers also acknowledges, when FBI agent Courtlandt Cunningham testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that there was no evidence that the firing pin of the revolver had hit the bullet (WC Volume III, page 460). In fact, the nick was offset from the centre of the bullet’s primer (ibid). Myers is at a loss to explain what had actually caused the nick. One explanation is that it was put there by the DPD, after perhaps learning from Officers Charles Walker and Thomas Hutson that they heard what they allegedly thought sounded like the snap of the revolver’s hammer (Dallas Municipal archives Box 2, Folder 7, Items 25 and 47). This reviewer will be further discussing the nick on the live round in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill.

    This reviewer should point out that Officer Ray Hawkins told the Warren Commission that “I didn’t know whether it was a snap of the gun or whether it was in the seats someone making the noise” (WC Volume VII, page 94). When Johnny Brewer testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed ” … we heard a seat pop up, but couldn’t see anybody” (ibid, page 5). Therefore, the snapping sound may have been from one of the seats during the scuffle with Oswald, just as Hawkins evidently thought that it might have been. Based on all of the evidence discussed previously, it is this reviewer’s belief that the DPD switched the four spent shell casings found in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene with spent shell casings they had removed from “Oswald’s” revolver after they fired four live rounds from it. For those who doubt that the DPD could have done this, keep in mind that the revolver was returned to them by the FBI on November 24, 1963, and as stated previously, the DPD released the four spent shell casings to the FBI on November 28, 1963 (WCD 5, page 161), (WCD 205, page 206).

    Following his discussion of the ballistics evidence, Myers moves onto a discussion of the fingerprints found on Tippit’s squad car, which were photographed by DPD Sgt. W.E. “Pete” Barnes. As Myers explains, Barnes testified before the Warren Commission that he was told that Tippit’s killer had come up to the right side of Tippit’s squad car, and had possibly placed his hands there (With Malice, Chapter 8). Although Myers admits that Barnes testified that none of the fingerprints found on the car were of value, he nevertheless omits that Barnes also claimed that; “No legible prints were found” after Counsel David Belin asked him; “Were you able to find any identifiable prints?” (WC Volume VII, page 274). (See the photographs of the fingerprints found on Tippit’s squad car.) Looking at the photographs, it is apparent that Barnes was lying when he said that no legible prints were found, as the ridge patterns of some of the fingerprints are distinguishable.

    Furthermore, Myers explains that Herbert Lutz, a senior crime scene technician for Wayne County, Michigan, U.S.A, with twenty six years of experience as a latent fingerprint examiner, had examined the fingerprints found on Tippit’s squad car, and that Lutz; ” … was of the opinion that one person was probably responsible for all of them” (With Malice, Chapter 8). Myers then explains that Lutz believed the ridges and furrows of the fingerprints obtained from the top of the right side passenger door of Tippit’s squad car were consistent with the fingerprints obtained from the right front fender of the car (ibid). Significantly, Myers explains that Lutz compared a fingerprint from Tippit’s squad car, which Lutz identified as being created by the “right-middle index finger”, with the print from Oswald’s right-middle index finger on one of his fingerprint cards (ibid). Based on his examination, Lutz concluded that the fingerprints taken from Tippit’s squad car were not Oswald’s (ibid). But if none of the fingerprints from Tippit’s squad car were legible, as Sgt. “Pete” Barnes testified, then how was an experienced latent fingerprint examiner like Lutz able to determine that the aforementioned print was not caused by Oswald’s right middle index finger?

    Furthermore, if the fingerprints from Tippit’s squad car were not “legible”, then Lutz would surely have said so. Although Barnes never stated how many years of experience he had photographing and dusting for fingerprints during his testimony before the Warren Commission, he nevertheless stated that he had been doing photography work for the crime scene search section of the DPD since the year 1956, and that he had also been personally making Paraffin tests since that same year (WC Volume VII, pages 272 and 279). Therefore, it is apparent that Barnes also had seven years of experience photographing and dusting for fingerprints by the time Tippit was killed. With that in mind, it is inconceivable that Barnes could possibly believe that the prints from Tippit’s squad car were not legible. As stated previously, Barnes testified before the Warren Commission that he was told that Tippit’s killer had come up to the right side of Tippit’s car, and had possibly placed his hands on there. Therefore, it is apparent that Barnes and the DPD wanted to conceal evidence that showed Oswald might be innocent of killing Tippit. Myers must surely be aware of this fact, but by omitting the fact that Barnes testified there were no legible prints found on Tippit’s squad car, he can pretend that this was not the case.

    Of course, the question remains as to whether or not Tippit’s killer did in fact place his hands on the right side of Tippit’s squad car. As Myers explains, witness Jimmy Burt claimed that Tippit’s killer had placed his hands on the right side of the car, as he leaned down and talked to Tippit through the window (With Malice, Chapter 8). In his endnotes, Myers references this claim to Burt’s interview with Al Chapman in 1968. However, Myers also explains that Jack Tatum “specifically recalls” that as he drove past Tippit’s squad car, the killer had both of his hands inside his zipper jacket as he spoke to Tippit (ibid). As this reviewer has discussed previously, it is quite unlikely that Tatum actually witnessed Tippit being shot as he proclaimed; and was coerced into claiming that he had. Thus, his claim that Tippit’s killer had both of his hands in his pockets may have been to dispel the notion that the fingerprints found on the right door of Tippit’s squad car belonged to Tippit’s real killer. By the same token, Jimmy Burt’s claim that he observed Tippit’s killer place his hands on the right side of Tippit’s squad car should also be taken with a grain of salt; as Burt made no mention of having seen the killer talking to Tippit through the window during his interview with the FBI on December 15, 1963, (WCD 194, page 29).

    One other witness who claimed she saw Tippit’s killer lean over and place his hands on the right door of Tippit’s squad car was Helen Markham. Although Myers mentions that Markham demonstrated to the DPD officers at the Tippit murder scene how the killer had leaned on the passenger (right side) door of Tippit’s squad car as he spoke through the “cracked vent window” in chapter five, he curiously omits this from his discussion of the fingerprints in chapter eight. When Markham testified before the Warren Commission, she stated that the killer had placed his arms; “On the ledge of the window” (WC Volume III, page 307). In fact, during a television interview, Markham demonstrated that the killer had placed both of his hands on the top of the window ledge as he leaned over to talk with Tippit (See the footage.) Yet, all of the fingerprints in question were (allegedly) removed from the outside of the right front door.

    If Tippit’s killer had placed his hands on the outside of the right front door of Tippit’s squad car; then the killer (by Hubert Lutz’s examination of the fingerprints) was not Oswald. Although Markham was consistent with her claim that she observed Tippit’s killer place his hands on the right front door of Tippit’s squad car, this reviewer should point out that given the angle from which she observed Tippit’s killer as she was standing on the northwest corner of the tenth and Patton street intersection, and given her overall lack of credibility as a witness, Markham’s claim that Tippit’s killer had placed his hands on top of the window ledge should not be taken too seriously. In conclusion, given that there is no credible eyewitness account that Tippit’s killer was responsible for the fingerprints found on the right side of Tippit’s squad car, the lack of Oswald’s prints on the squad car shouldn’t be used as proof that Oswald didn’t shoot Tippit.

    The final piece of evidence which Myers uses to convict Oswald for Tippit’s murder is the light gray zipper jacket (WCE 162) which the killer discarded in the parking lot behind the Texaco Service station located on Jefferson Blvd. The DPD allegedly discovered the jacket under the rear of a car in the parking lot (With Malice, Chapter 8). It is alleged that Tippit’s killer discarded the jacket to alter his appearance. This reviewer has no qualms with that assertion. Myers uses Marina Oswald’s testimony before the Warren Commission as evidence that the light gray jacket was owned by Oswald, but once again neglects to inform his readers of the problems with Marina’s credibility. Although Myers acknowledges that the jacket had the size M (Medium) printed in its collar, he never mentions that Oswald wore size small shirts and sweaters (WCD 205, pages 162 and 163). In light of this fact, it makes little sense that Oswald would be wearing a size medium jacket.

    The DPD discovered that the light gray jacket had a dry cleaner tag inside it with the number B 9738. This was broadcasted over the DPD radio at about 1:44 pm (CE 705/1974). The jacket also contained the laundry mark “30” in its collar (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 9, Folder 4, Item 5). Myers admits that the FBI had canvassed hundreds of dry cleaners in Dallas and New Orleans; and that they were unable to determine if any of them had served Oswald, or had even used a laundry tag identical to the one found inside the jacket (With Malice, Chapter 8). In fact, the FBI also claimed that none of Oswald’s other clothing contained a dry cleaners or laundry mark that could be associated with the laundry tag of the light gray jacket (ibid). Although Myers states that none of Oswald’s belongings contained any dry cleaning tags, a pair of Khaki-colored trousers and a Khaki long-sleeved shirt which belonged to Oswald, contained laundry tags bearing the number “03230”. However, this is not identical to the laundry mark or dry cleaning tag found on the light gray jacket. Finally, even Myers admits that Marina Oswald told the FBI that she could not recall if Oswald ever sent the light gray jacket to a dry cleaner; but that she recalled hand washing them herself (ibid).

    Myers admits that the eyewitness recollections of what color the jacket that Tippit’s killer was wearing varied from one witness to another, and that Earlene Roberts, the housekeeper at the rooming house on 1026 North Beckley where Oswald was allegedly living at the time of the assassination, gave differing accounts of what color the jacket the man (whom she thought was Oswald) was wearing as he left the rooming house (With Malice, Chapter 8). Oswald had allegedly returned to the rooming house following the President’s assassination, and left after allegedly retrieving the jacket and the revolver used to kill Tippit. When Roberts testified before the Warren Commission, she explained that as “Oswald” was leaving the rooming house, he was zipping up a jacket (WC Volume VI, page 439). When Counsel Joseph Ball showed Roberts the light gray jacket, she claimed that the jacket which “Oswald” was wearing when he left was a darker colored jacket (ibid). However, Myers explains that when Roberts was interviewed on radio during the afternoon of November 22, 1963, she “accurately described” the jacket “Oswald” was wearing when he left as a “short gray coat” (With Malice, Chapter 8).

    Whilst Roberts may certainly have been describing the light gray jacket found in the parking lot behind the Texaco Service station, this reviewer has previously pointed out that researcher Lee Farley has explained that it was actually Larry Crafard (and not Oswald) who was living at the 1026 North Beckley rooming house at the time of the assassination. Therefore, it may well have been Crafard whom Roberts observed entering and then leaving the rooming house with the jacket. In fact, as Greg Parker has explained to this reviewer, researcher Mark Groubert believes the jacket Crafard was wearing when he was photographed by the FBI on November 28, 1963, was from the same manufacturer of WCE 162; namely Maurice Holman of Los Angeles, California (See the thread entitled The Stevenson Incident and the Assassination on Greg Parker’s research forum).

    There are also problems with the discovery of the jacket. To give one example, the Warren report states that the jacket was discovered by DPD captain W.R. Westbrook (WCR, page 175). However, this was a lie! When Westbrook testified before the Warren Commission, he stated that as the jacket was still lying on the ground, it was pointed out to him by “someone”; whom he thought might have been a DPD Officer (WC Volume VII, page 115). In fact, Westbrook testified that the jacket was pointed out to him after the false alarm at the Jefferson Branch Library (ibid). But according to the transcripts of the DPD radio recordings, an unidentified Officer (whom Myers believes was motorcycle officer J.T. Griffin) broadcasted the discovery of the jacket at approximately 1:25 pm (WCE 705/1974). According to the same transcripts, Officer Charles Walker broadcasted on the radio that he had seen whom he thought was Tippit’s killer entering the Jefferson Branch Library at approximately 1:35 pm! So unless the Officer(s) who discovered the jacket decided to leave it lying on the ground for over ten minutes following its discovery, Westbrook lied when he said it was lying on the ground when it was pointed out to him. Myers mentions none of this to his readers.

    Myers asks the reader; “If Oswald didn’t kill Tippit, what happened to his [Oswald’s] jacket?” He then cites an a FBI lab report, dated December 3, 1963, in which it is stated that dark-blue, gray-black, and orange-yellow cottons fibers were found in the debris removed from the inside areas of the sleeves of the jacket, and that the fibers “match” in their microscopic characteristics to the fibers from the shirt (WCE 150) which Oswald was wearing when he was arrested inside the Texas theater. However, this finding is nowhere to be found in the Warren Report, and it was not mentioned by Paul Morgan Stombaugh, the FBI’s hair and fiber examiner, when he testified before the Warren Commission. In his endnotes, Myers explains that in a letter he wrote in the year 1998 to former Warren Commission counsel, David Belin, he asked him why this alleged finding was not used by the Commission. According to Myers, Belin’s response was that there was “overwhelming” evidence to tie Oswald to the Tippit shooting, such as the “positive” identification of Oswald as the killer by witnesses, and the ballistics evidence. Belin went on to explain that the “experts” retained by the commission determined that individual fibers are not unique, and that apparently he didn’t believe that the quality of the fiber evidence was as good as the ballistics identification of the spent shell casings allegedly recovered from the Tippit murder scene as having been fired from “Oswald’s” revolver. In spite of Belin’s explanation to Myers, it seems incredibly odd to this reviewer that the Warren Commission would never mention this alleged finding.

    Myers naturally believes that the fibres allegedly found inside the sleeves of the light gray jacket are authentic, and that they weren’t placed there by either the DPD or the FBI. However, this ignores all of the previously discussed evidence that the spent shell casings discovered at the Tippit murder scene were switched to ensure that the shell casings would be ballistically matched to the revolver which Oswald allegedly had in his possession when he was arrested. It also ignores all of the previously discussed evidence that the eyewitnesses were coaxed by the DPD into identifying Oswald as Tippit’s killer; and the aforementioned memorandum from Alan Belmont to William Sullivan on November 26, 1963. On his website, researcher Pat Speer explains that the DPD had likely planted fibers from the shirt Oswald was wearing when he was arrested onto the butt end of the rifle discovered on the sixth floor of the TSBD (Read more.) Such a notion reinforces the belief that it was the DPD who planted fibers from that shirt into the sleeves of the light gray jacket.

    Should the reader remain unconvinced that the DPD wanted Oswald to be found guilty of Tippit’s murder, then consider the following from Ted Callaway’s testimony before the Warren Commission. Callaway explained to Counsel Joseph Ball that when he and Sam Guinyard were waiting to view the line-up of Oswald, detective Jim Leavelle told them; “When I show you these guys [in the line-up], be sure, take your time, see if you can make a positive identification … .. We want to be sure, we want to try to wrap him [Oswald] up real tight on killing this officer. We think he is the same one that shot the President. But if we can wrap him up tight on killing this officer, we have got him” (WC Volume III, page 355). Sam Guinyard, who allegedly viewed the line-up with Callaway, denied during his testimony that any DPD Officer had said anything to them before they viewed the line-up (WC Volume VII, page 400). Cecil McWatters; the bus driver who also allegedly viewed the line-up of Oswald with Callaway, also failed to confirm that any DPD Officer had said anything to them before they viewed the line-up.

    Despite the lack of corroboration by Guinyard and McWatters, during an interview with author Joseph McBride, Leavelle claimed that captain Fritz told him to ” … .go ahead and make a tight case on him [for Tippit’s murder] in case we have trouble making this one on the presidential shooting.” (McBride, Into the Nightmare, pages 235 and 236) Not only do these statements imply that the DPD were determined that they wanted Oswald to be convicted for both Tippit’s murder and the President’s assassination, but that they would also fabricate evidence to ensure that such was the case. One could rightly ask why Callaway would want the Warren Commission to know that the DPD wanted Oswald to be found guilty of Tippit’s murder if he was coerced by them into identifying Oswald as the killer. This reviewer can think of two alternative reasons. Perhaps Callaway was under a fair amount of pressure (and nervous) when testifying, and therefore, he didn’t realize the implication of what he told the Commission. On the other hand, perhaps Callaway, feeling guilty for helping to implicate Oswald, wanted to give the Commission a clue that he was coerced into identifying Oswald by the DPD. One could also ask why Callaway, and indeed all the other witnesses who had been coerced into identifying Oswald, wouldn’t eventually confess that they had been coerced into identifying Oswald as Tippit’s killer. In this reviewer’s opinion, it was probably because they didn’t want to expose themselves as liars who helped convict an innocent man for murder.

    Myers concludes this chapter with the following remarks: “The physical case against Oswald is impressive. When combined with his actions, there seems little doubt he killed J.D. Tippit.” But as this reviewer has demonstrated throughout this review, this is hyperbole of the first order. Myers then writes; “But before drawing any conclusions, it’s important to consider some of the claims that challenge the notion of Oswald as perpetrator.”

    IX: Hints and allegations

    Throughout this chapter, Myers discusses many of the allegations made by conspiracy advocates concerning Tippit’s murder. For the purpose of this review, I will only be discussing two of the allegations which Myers writes about in his book. According to Myers; ” … many claims have been proven to be groundless, but some hold just enough intrigue to make us wonder if there really isn’t more to the whole story” (With Malice, Chapter 9). The first allegation which Myers discusses is the discovery of a wallet in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene containing identification for Oswald and his alleged alias, Alek James Hidell. The wallet can be seen in film footage by WFAA-TV cameraman Ron Reiland, as it is shown to DPD captain George M. Doughty by Sgt. Calvin “Bud” Owens (ibid). A third person, believed to be Captain Westbrook, reaches for the wallet with his left hand, just as Reiland’s footage of the wallet concludes (ibid).

    The allegation surfaced when former FBI agent James Hosty wrote in his book Assignment Oswald that captain Westbrook had shown FBI agent Robert M. Barrett a wallet allegedly found at the Tippit murder scene which contained identification for Oswald and Hidell; and had asked Barrett if the FBI knew anything about Oswald and Hidell (ibid). However, Myers writes that when he interviewed Barrett in 1996, Barrett told him that he wasn’t shown any of the identification inside the wallet, but that Westbrook merely asked him if he knew who Lee Harvey Oswald or Alek James Hidell were, as he held the wallet in his hand (ibid). In fact, Myers explains that Barrett was adamant that he was asked about the names at the Tippit murder scene (ibid). But contrary to Barrett’s claim, identification for Hidell was allegedly found inside Oswald’s wallet after he was arrested inside the Texas Theater. After Oswald had been placed into an unmarked DPD car to be taken to DPD headquarters, detective Paul Bentley removed a wallet from Oswald’s pants pocket (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 4).

    If both accounts are true, then the implication is that Tippit’s killer left the wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell after he killed Tippit to incriminate Oswald. The only other explanation is that for some bizarre reason, Oswald was carrying two wallets with him when he shot Tippit, and then he (unbelievably) left one of them behind which had identification for Hidell in it. However, it makes little sense that Oswald would be carrying two wallets on his person; let alone that he would have identification for Hidell in his wallet on the day he allegedly used a rifle he ordered under that name to assassinate the President. According to Myers, Barrett also told him that a witness claimed that Tippit’s killer had handed Tippit a wallet through the right front passenger window of his squad car (With Malice, Chapter 9). However, the identity of this so-called witness is unknown. As this reviewer has discussed previously, Barrett wrote in his report on the day of the assassination that he heard Oswald yell in a loud voice; “Kill all the sons of bitches!” inside the Texas Theater as he was scuffling with DPD Officers (WCD 5, page 84). But as stated previously, Barrett was almost certainly lying about this, as no other witness or DPD Officer involved in Oswald’s arrest ever claimed that Oswald yelled out “Kill all the sons of bitches!” This then raises the possibility that Barrett was lying when he said that Captain Westbrook had asked him at the Tippit murder scene if he knew who Oswald and Hidell were; in order to reinforce the notion that Oswald was Tippit’s killer.

    Myers’ contention is that Barrett had simply misremembered where he was when Westbrook asked him if he knew who Hidell and Oswald were, and that the wallet which Paul Bentley removed from Oswald’s pocket en route to DPD headquarters contained identification for both Oswald and Hidell (With Malice, Chapter 9). Myers explains that Barrett failed to mention the wallet in his report which he wrote on the day of the assassination, and that he had failed to mention the wallet again when he testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities in 1975 (ibid). This also raises the possibility that Barrett lied when he claimed that Westbrook asked him if he knew who Oswald and Hidell were to counter all the claims that Oswald wasn’t Tippit’s murderer. On the other hand, perhaps Barrett didn’t mention the wallet in his report on the day of the assassination because he had assumed that the DPD would have mentioned it to the media, and that the officers present at the Tippit murder scene would have mentioned it in their own reports. Hence, Barrett may have thought that there would be no point of him mentioning it in his own report. Alternatively, Barrett may have neglected to mention it if he had observed/heard one of the DPD Officers broadcast the discovery of the wallet with identification for Oswald and Hidell over the police radio at the Tippit murder scene. Although no such transmission exists in the transcripts of the DPD radio recordings, this transmission may have been removed from the recordings to hide the fact that Oswald had been framed for Tippit’s murder.

    Rather than simply speculating whether Barrett lied, or even misremembered where he was when Captain Westbrook asked him if he knew who Oswald and Hidell were, let’s consider all of the evidence which supports Barrett’s claim; evidence which Myers either omits, distorts, or buries in his endnotes.

    But first, it’s important to keep in mind that several disinformation shills such as Vincent Bugliosi and David Von Pein have argued that the wallet filmed by Ron Reiland belonged to Tippit. However, Myers explains that in the year 2012, he was shown photographs of Tippit’s wallet which; ” … clearly show that Tippit’s black billfold was different in style than the one depicted in the WFAA-TV film footage [by Ron Reiland]” (ibid). The bottom line is that Tippit’s wallet was definitely not the wallet which Reiland filmed. Myers also explains that in the year 2009, he interviewed reserve Sgt. Kenneth Croy, the first officer to arrive at the Tippit murder scene. Croy told Myers that after he arrived at the murder scene, he recovered Tippit’s revolver and a billfold (wallet) which he thought had seven different ID’s in it; but that none was for Oswald. In fact, Myers writes that Croy was “particularly adamant” that there was no identification for Oswald in the wallet (ibid). However, researcher Jones Harris told George Bailey that when he (Jones) interviewed Croy in 1990, Croy claimed that he didn’t examine the contents of the wallet (See George Bailey’s review of With Malice on his blog).

    Croy told Myers that a witness claimed that Tippit’s killer threw the wallet away as he fled. However, Myers explains that no witness has come forward saying that the killer discarded a wallet as he fled (With Malice, Chapter 9). But if Croy’s recollection was correct, then it would seem that Oswald wasn’t Tippit’s killer, as there was no identification for Oswald inside the wallet. Croy also told Myers that Tippit’s killer picked up Tippit’s revolver then threw it away; and that it was allegedly found with the wallet a short distance from the murder scene (ibid). But contrary to Croy’s recollection, when he testified before the Warren Commission, he said that; “There was a report that a cab driver [William Scoggins] had picked up Tippit’s gun and had left, presumably”, but made no mention of a witness who allegedly saw the killer toss Tippit’s revolver (WC Volume XII, page 202). In fact, it was allegedly Ted Callaway who had picked-up Tippit’s revolver from the ground, and then placed it on the hood of Tippit’s squad car (WC Volume III, page 354). Furthermore, T.F. Bowley claimed that he had taken Tippit’s gun from the hood of Tippit’s car, and placed it inside the car (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 14). Suffice it to say, Kenneth Croy’s forty six year old recollections are not particularly credible.

    In his endnotes, Myers explains that assassination researcher John Armstrong wrote in his book Harvey and Lee that when researcher Jones Harris interviewed Kenneth Croy in the year 2002, Croy told him that an unidentified civilian had handed him a wallet “later found to contain identification for Lee Harvey Oswald and Alex Hidell.” Myers then reminds his readers that Croy told him during his interview in the year 2009 that the wallet didn’t contain identification for Oswald. According to researcher George Bailey, Harris told him that when he interviewed FBI agent Robert Barrett, he asked Barrett why didn’t mention the wallet in his report. Harris claimed that Barrett replied; “What was the point Mr. Harris, after all, the man is dead” (See George Bailey’s review of With Malice on his blog). Although it is not clear from reading Bailey’s review whether Barrett was referring to Oswald or Tippit when he allegedly told Harris ” … after all, the man is dead”, if he was referring to Oswald, either Barrett was mistaken or lying (or perhaps Harris was lying), as Oswald was very much alive when Barrett wrote out his report on the day of the assassination (WCD 5, page 84). Suffice it to say, it would be foolish to consider what Harris told Bailey (including what Croy allegedly told Harris for that matter) as being unquestionably reliable.

    During a filmed interview, former FBI analyst Farris Rookstool claimed that Kenneth Croy informed him that he had recovered Oswald’s wallet at the murder scene. (See the interview of Rookstool.) Robert Barrett was also interviewed, and again insisted that he was asked about Oswald and Hidell at the Tippit murder scene. Croy’s claim to Rookstool that he recovered Oswald’s wallet contradicts what Croy allegedly told Myers in 2009. Given all of the contradictions between the statements which Croy allegedly made to the aforementioned researchers, this reviewer takes everything Croy allegedly had to say about the wallet with a grain of salt. Also, readers are encouraged to read through Lee Farley’s discussion of Croy’s credibility in the thread entitled Kenneth Hudson Croy at Greg Parker’s research forum.

    Myers explains to his readers that a number of people who were at the scene “in the first moments”, such as Jack Tatum, Ted Callaway, and ambulance attendant Eddie Kinsley and Clayton Butler, insisted that no wallet was found near Tippit’s body (With Malice, Chapter 9). However, as this reviewer has discussed previously, Tatum and Callaway should not be regarded as credible witnesses, as they were most likely coerced into identifying Oswald as the killer. With this mind, if a wallet containing identification for Oswald was really found at the Tippit murder scene (which would imply that Oswald was framed for the murder), then perhaps Callaway and Tatum were also coerced into saying that no wallet was found. As for Kinsley and Butler, Myers explains that the only thing they reported seeing lying near Tippit’s body was his revolver (ibid). Of course, this doesn’t discount the possibility that the wallet with identification for Oswald and Hidell may have been found on the right side of Tippit’s squad car.

    When Myers interviewed former DPD Officer Joe Mack Poe in 1996, Poe told him that to his knowledge, no wallet was found at the scene (ibid). However, given the controversy created by his missing marks from two of the spent shell casings recovered at the murder scene, Poe may only have said that to Myers to avoid stirring up another controversy. Myers also interviewed Poe’s partner, Leonard Jez, and he also claimed that he knew nothing about a wallet being found at the murder scene (ibid). However, in his endnotes, Myers explains that when Jez had attended a conference for JFK assassination researchers on November 20, 1999, he allegedly told researcher Martha Moyer that Oswald’s wallet had been found at the Tippit murder scene! According to Myers, Moyer told him in an email exchange in December, 2012, that she was listening to Jez as he was talking about his experiences at the Tippit murder scene during the conference banquet, when she asked him whose wallet was found there. Moyer also explained to Myers that she thought Jez said he heard the names Oswald and Hidell mentioned as the wallet was being examined at the scene. When Moyer asked Jez if he was certain that a wallet containing identification for Oswald was found at the murder scene, Jez told her (without smiling); “Missy, you can take it to the bank!”

    Myers attempts to discredit what Jez allegedly told Moyer by noting that during the morning of the conference when Jez was interviewed on camera, he claimed that he didn’t remember seeing a wallet. Myers then smugly writes that “more importantly”; Moyer’s account is at odds with what Jez told him (Myers) during his interview with him in 1996. Namely that he didn’t know anything about a wallet being found. However, Jez may have only said this to Myers, because at the time, Jez may not have known that James Hosty had published Barrett’s allegation that the wallet discovered in the vicinity of the murder scene contained identification for Oswald and Hidell in his book Assignment Oswald, and didn’t want to start a controversy over it. Furthermore, as researcher John Armstrong explains in his book, a confidential source who knows Jez claimed that Jez doesn’t want to be formally interviewed on the issue of the wallet, but he told her (the confidential source); “You can bet your life that was Oswald’s wallet.” (Armstrong, Harvey and Lee: How the CIA framed Oswald, pages 856 and 857). Revealingly, Myers doesn’t mention this information; even though he did mention the allegation that Croy was given a wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell which was on the same page of Armstrong’s book!

    If Jez didn’t want to be formally interviewed on the issue of the wallet, as the confidential source claims, then this could explain why Jez didn’t tell the audience at the JFK assassination conference that a wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell was examined at the Tippit murder scene. As for why he would later tell Martha Moyer about the wallet; perhaps after learning (sometime prior to the conference) that Barrett claimed a wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell was found in the vicinity of the murder scene, Jez felt comfortable enough to tell someone about it to get it off his chest. The reader should keep in mind that in the endnotes to his book, Myers wrote that after the first edition of his book was published in 1998, he gave Jez a copy of the book. Therefore, it would seem that Jez learned about Barrett’s allegation from reading Myers book. The end result is that two independent sources claimed that Jez told them it was Oswald’s wallet which was found at the murder scene, and although Jez referred to the wallet as belonging to Oswald, he naturally would have assumed this to be the case if he heard Oswald’s name mentioned as the contents of the wallet were being examined.

    In addition to Robert Barrett, Kenneth Croy, and Leonard Jez, evidence that the DPD were examining a wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell at the murder scene comes from Julia Postal, the Texas theater cashier. In her interview with the FBI on February 27, 1964, Postal claimed that the Officers who were arresting Oswald identified him to her by calling out his name (WCD 735, page 265). However, the official story is that Oswald’s wallet was removed from Oswald’s left hip pocket after he was taken out of the theater, and that the DPD didn’t broadcast over the radio that Oswald was missing from the TSBD after the superintendent, Roy Truly, had informed Captain Fritz of this fact. But if the DPD had discovered identification for Oswald in the wallet being examined at the Tippit murder scene with his photograph on it, then this would explain how they knew his name was Oswald.

    Myers acknowledges in his endnotes that Postal told the FBI that Oswald’s name was called out by the arresting officers. But Myers explains that in her interview with the USSS on December 3, 1963, she made no mention of the “onsite identification” (WCD 87, page 819). Myers also explains that in her affidavit to the DPD on December 4, 1963, Postal claimed that “Later on I found out that the man’s name, who the officers arrested at the Texas Theater, was Lee Harvey Oswald.” (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 21). Finally, Myers writes that when Postal testified before the Warren Commission, she explained that; ” … the officers were trying to hold on to Oswald – when I say ‘Oswald’, that man, because as I said, I didn’t know who he was at that time … ” (WC Volume VII, pages 12 and 13). Whilst all of this true, the fact that Postal didn’t inform the USSS that she heard Oswald’s name being called doesn’t actually contradict what she told the FBI.

    As for what Postal said in her affidavit to the DPD, Postal may have only claimed that she found out later on that Oswald was the man who was arrested, if the DPD had coerced her into saying so. Think about it. If the DPD wanted to hide evidence that a wallet containing identification for Oswald was found in the vicinity of the Tippit murder, they would coerce Postal into not mentioning that Oswald’s name was called out before his wallet was removed from his pocket. But then why would Postal inform the FBI that Oswald’s name was called out? In this reviewer’s opinion, it is entirely conceivable that Postal forgot that she was not to mention it when she was interviewed by the FBI. If the DPD had learned that she did tell the FBI, then they would have reminded her not to mention it when she testified before the Warren Commission. This could explain why she stated during her testimony that she didn’t know who he was at the time.

    Myers explains that after Oswald was arrested, Sgt. Gerald Hill was ” … the first person on record talking about Oswald’s wallet” (With Malice, Chapter 9). During a television interview recorded by NBC-TV, a reporter asked Hill; “What was his [Oswald’s] name on the billfold?” (WCE 2160). The reporter surely meant to ask Hill what the name inside the billfold was. Hill responded that it was Lee H. Oswald (ibid). Myers acknowledges this in his book, but omits that Hill never told the reporters that the name Hidell was also found inside the wallet. When Hill testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that after detective Paul Bentley removed Oswald’s wallet from his pants pocket, he called out Oswald’s name from the wallet (WC Volume VII, page 58). He went on to say that Bentley called out another name which he couldn’t remember, but that it was the same name (Hidell) that Oswald “bought the gun under”, and that Hidell sounded like the name her heard Bentley call out (ibid). But despite allegedly knowing at the time he was questioned by reporters that the name Hidell was inside Oswald’s wallet when Oswald was arrested, Hill only mentioned the name Oswald.

    Myers writes that when detective Paul Bentley was interviewed on the day following the assassination by WFAA-TV, he stated that he obtained Oswald’s identification from his wallet (With Malice, Chapter 9). However, what Myers omits is that Bentley was specifically asked during that interview what kind of identification Oswald had in his wallet. Bentley responded that he obtained Oswald’s name from a Dallas public Library card, and that he thought Oswald had a driver’s license, credit cards, and “things like that”, but made absolutely no mention of any identification for Hidell being discovered! (See the interview.) In fact, Bentley also made no mention of identification for Hidell being found in Oswald’s wallet in his arrest report to Chief Curry; the same report in which he wrote that he had obtained Oswald’s name from his wallet en route to police headquarters (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 4). When the FBI interviewed Bentley on June 11, 1964, he allegedly admitted that he removed a Selective Service System, Notice of Classification Card; and a United States Marine Corps Certificate of Service Card, both bearing the name Alek James Hidell from Oswald’s wallet (WCE 2011). Despite whether or not Paul Bentley actually informed the FBI that he did remove these cards from Oswald’s wallet, it is utterly inconceivable that Bentley would not remember one day following the assassination that he had found identification for Hidell inside of Oswald’s wallet.

    Myers informs his readers that detective Bob Carroll also testified before the Warren Commission that he recalled two names being mentioned inside the unmarked DPD car which took Oswald to Police headquarters (With Malice, Chapter 9). However, Myers does not inform his readers that Carroll made no mention of this in his arrest report to Chief Curry. In fact, none of the five Officers who were with Oswald inside the car; Bob Carroll, Kenneth Lyon, Gerald Hill, Paul Bentley, and Charles Walker mentioned anything about identification for a second name being found inside of Oswald’s wallet (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Items 4, 12, 23, 28, and 47). Though granted, the fact that none of the five officers mentioned in their reports that identification for a second name was found inside Oswald’s wallet, doesn’t necessarily mean that no identification for a second name was found.

    It is also noteworthy that Dallas DA Henry Wade didn’t mention that identification bearing the name Hidell was found inside of Oswald’s wallet during his press conferences on November 22 and 23, 1963. In fact, Wade first mentioned the Hidell name on Sunday, November 24, when he told reporters that Oswald had ordered the rifle allegedly used to assassinate President Kenney under that name (WCE 2168). According to Mark Lane’s testimony before the Warren Commission, Henry Wade’s office had released the name “A. Hidell” on November 23, 1963, after the FBI had “indicated” that Oswald had ordered the rifle under that name (WC Volume II, page 46). However, it would seem that Lane was in error, as Wade apparently didn’t tell reporters about the name Hidell until Sunday November 24, 1963. Myers does not point this out to his readers.

    On the day following the assassination, DPD chief Jesse Curry informed reporters that the FBI had the money order which Oswald allegedly used to order the rifle under the name “A. Hidell” (WCE 2145). However, Curry did not inform the reporters that identification for Hidell was found in Oswald’s wallet after he was arrested. In fact, Curry claimed that he didn’t know if Oswald had ever used the name Hidell as an alias before (ibid). Myers does not mention this to his readers. In that same press conference, Curry explained that this evidence would be shown to Oswald by Captain Will Fritz, but gave no indication that Fritz was already aware of the fact that the rifle was ordered using the name A. Hidell (ibid). When Fritz testified before the Warren Commission, Counsel Joseph Ball asked him if he had questioned Oswald on the day of the assassination about ” … this card which he [Oswald] had in his pocket with the name Alek Hidell?”, to which Fritz responded that he did (WC Volume IV, pages 221 and 222). When Chief Curry testified before the Warren Commission, he indicated that he had spoken to Captain Fritz on the day of the assassination following Oswald’s first interrogation (WC Volume IV, page 157).

    If identification for Hidell was found in Oswald’s wallet, then presumably, Fritz would have informed Curry of that fact. And if he did, it is inconceivable that Curry would not have informed the reporters that identification for the same name which Oswald allegedly used to order the rifle was not found in his wallet following his arrest. However, it’s possible that since a connection between the name Hidell and the money order for the rifle had not yet been established on the day of the assassination, Fritz may not have informed Curry that identification for Hidell was found in Oswald’s wallet. Therefore, it should not be assumed that just because Curry didn’t inform the reporters that identification for Hidell was found in Oswald’s wallet, Oswald actually didn’t have such identification in his wallet.

    The reader should keep in mind that in his report to Chief Jesse Curry, detective Paul Bentley claimed that he turned Oswald’s identification over to Lt. T.L Baker of the homicide and Robbery bureau (Dallas Municipal archives Box 2, Folder 7, Item 4). According to Myers, when he interviewed Lt. Baker in the year 1999, Baker told him that; “The Officers [who brought Oswald from the Texas Theater] handed [the wallet] to me and I left it on Captain Fritz’ office desk for just a couple of minutes. I asked that two officers stay with him in the interrogation room because all our Officers were out at the time. So then, I went back in Captain Fritz’ office and I started going through his billfold [wallet] and I came across two sets of identification -Hidell and Oswald” (With Malice, Chapter 9). Baker then went to explain that Oswald told him his real name was Oswald; and that he then turned the wallet over to Captain Fritz (ibid).

    What Myers doesn’t tell his readers is that, contrary to what Baker told him in 1999, Baker never once mentioned in his lengthy report to Chief Curry that there was identification for Hidell inside Oswald’s wallet (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 5, Folder 5, Item 4). Also, despite telling Myers that; “all our [homicide and Robbery bureau] Officers were out”, Baker wrote in his report that Oswald was being held inside the interrogation room by detectives Guy “Gus” Rose and Richard Stovall, both of whom were homicide detectives (ibid). As stated previously, detectives Rose and Stovall confirmed in their own report to Chief Curry that they were with Oswald; and confirmed this when they testified before the Warren Commission (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 1, Item 3), (WC Volume VII, pages 187 and 228).

    Myers writes; “Two officers remembered Oswald’s wallet and identification being in close proximity to the suspect shortly after his arrival at Police headquarters.” He then names Charles Walker and Jim Leavelle as the two officers, but never tells his readers that the two officers to whom Baker was referring to in his aforementioned interview were almost certainly Gus Rose and Richard Stovall; and that Baker was mistaken when he told Myers thirty six years later that all of the homicide and Robbery Bureau officers were “out” (With Malice, Chapter 9). The reader should keep in mind that although Rose and Stovall both testified that they found identification for Hidell inside of Oswald’s wallet when they spoke to him, they made no mention of any such identification being found in their report to Chief Curry (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 1, Item 3). When Rose testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that after Oswald was asked what his name was, he told him that it was Hidell (WC Volume VII, page 228).

    But when Richard Stovall (who was in the interrogation room with Oswald and Rose) testified before the Warren Commission, he stated that Oswald said his name was Lee Oswald ” … as well as I remember.” (ibid, page 187). Both men cannot be correct, and it is inconceivable that they could have confused one name for the other, as the two names sound nothing alike. It also makes no sense that Oswald would admit that he was Hidell if he had allegedly ordered the rifle used to assassinate the President under that name; let alone that he would be carrying identification for Hidell in his wallet on the day he allegedly used that rifle to murder the President. The reader should also keep in mind that both Rose and Stovall testified that they found a card inside Oswald’s wallet which said “A. Hidell” (WC Volume VII, pages 187 and 228). However, the Selective Service System, Notice of Classification Card; and the United States Marine Corps Certificate of Service Card which Oswald allegedly had inside of his wallet when arrested bore the name “Alek James Hidell”, and not “A. Hidell”

    When Officer Charles Walker testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that after he had escorted Oswald from the Texas theater; “I sat down there [in the interrogation room], and I had his pistol, and he had a card in there with a picture and the name A.J. Hidell on it.” (WC Volume VII, page 41). It is apparent that by “Pistol”, Walker actually meant wallet. Therefore, he either misspoke, or the transcription of his testimony was in error. Walker also stated that after he allegedly asked Oswald if Hidell was his real name, Oswald told him that it wasn’t (ibid). If both Walker and Richard Stovall were telling the truth, then it’s fairly obvious that Gus Rose was lying when he told the Warren Commission that Oswald said his name was Hidell. Myers acknowledges that Walker told the Warren Commission he had Oswald’s wallet, but also cites Walker’s interview with the HSCA, during which Walker stated that he remembered taking Oswald’s wallet out of his pants pocket, and that he had found a card inside it with the name Hidell on it (With Malice, Chapter 9).

    There can be little doubt that Walker was lying when he said that he had Oswald’s wallet, and that he found a card inside it with the name Hidell on it. First of all, as stated previously, detective Paul Bentley was interviewed on the day following the assassination by WFAA-TV, and stated that he obtained Oswald’s wallet en route to police headquarters; and verified this in his report to DPD Chief Jesse Curry. Secondly, Gerald Hill testified before the Warren Commission that it was Bentley who had removed Oswald’s wallet from his hip pocket (WC Volume VII, page 58). Thirdly, as even Myers indirectly acknowledges in his book, Walker made no mention of obtaining Oswald’s wallet in his own report to Chief Curry (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 47).

    The reader should also bear in mind that detective Gus Rose told the Warren Commission that two uniformed Officers had brought Oswald into the interrogation. However, it is an established fact that Charles Walker was the only uniformed Officer who brought Oswald into the interrogation room (WC Volume VII, page 228). Rose also stated that he didn’t know if the officer (Charles Walker) who brought Oswald into the interrogation room had Oswald’s wallet or not (ibid). However, during a television documentary, Rose claimed that it was he who had removed Oswald’s wallet from his pants pocket; despite making no such claim when he testified before the Warren Commission! (Dealey Plaza Echo, Volume 13, Issue 2, page 3). It should be readily apparent to any intellectually honest researcher that both Walker and Rose were lying; and that there is no good reason to believe either one of them when they claimed that Oswald had identification for Hidell in his wallet when he was arrested. Myers avoids Rose, but he simply cannot bring himself to admit that Walker was lying. In fact, how desperate must Myers be to cite both Walker’s claim that he had Oswald’s wallet; and the evidence which actually contradicts it in order to assure his readers that Oswald had identification for Hidell in his wallet? In this reviewer’s opinion, Myers desperation is almost humorous.

    When Myers interviewed Jim Leavelle in the year 1996, Leavelle claimed that Oswald’s wallet was still in the interrogation room when he allegedly arrived to question Oswald following his arrest (With Malice, Chapter 9). Leavelle claimed that he remembered seeing an identification card with Oswald’s name, but apparently, he couldn’t remember if there was any identification for Hidell (ibid). Once again, Myers neglects to inform his readers that Leavelle testified before the Warren Commission that he had not spoken to Oswald prior to the morning of Sunday November 24, 1963; and was therefore likely lying to Myers when he said that he had questioned Oswald (WC Volume VII, page 268). During his testimony, Leavelle claimed that when Oswald was interrogated on the morning of Sunday November 24, 1963, inspector Thomas Kelly of the USSS asked Oswald; “Well, isn’t it a fact when you were arrested you had an identification card with his [Hidell’s] name on it in your possession?” (ibid, page 267). According to Leavelle, Oswald admitted that he did, and that when inspector Kelly asked Oswald; “How do you explain that”, Oswald responded with words to the effect; “I don’t explain it.” (ibid, page 268). However, in his report on Oswald’s interrogation, inspector Kelly made no mention of asking Oswald about any identification card bearing the name Hidell (Warren report, Appendix XI: Reports relating to the interrogation of Lee Harvey Oswald at the Dallas Police department).

    In fact, U.S. Postal inspector Harry Holmes, who was also present at the Sunday morning interrogation, wrote in his own report on the interrogation that it was Captain Fritz who had asked Oswald about the Selective service card bearing the name Hidell (ibid). According to Holmes, Oswald indignantly told Fritz; “I’ve told all I’m going to about that card … . You have the card … . you know about it as much as I do” (ibid). When Holmes testified before the Warren Commission, he stated that when Captain Fritz asked Oswald about the card with the name Hidell on it, Oswald allegedly responded; “Now, I have told you all I am going to tell you about that card in my billfold … . You have the card yourself, and you know as much about it as I do.” (WC Volume VII, page 299). What’s noteworthy is that unlike in his interrogation report, Holmes claimed that Oswald admitted to having the card in his wallet.

    But if this were true, then surely Holmes would have mentioned it in his report. Furthermore, Oswald’s claim that Fritz knew as much about the card as he did implies (in so many words) that Oswald actually didn’t know anything about the card. With this mind, it is apparent to this reviewer that Holmes was lying when he told the Warren Commission that Oswald admitted to having the card in his wallet. But if the rest of what Holmes claimed concerning the Selective Service card bearing the name Hidell is true, then it is apparent that Jim Leavelle was lying when he testified that it was USSS inspector Thomas Kelly who had asked Oswald about the card, and was also lying when claimed that Oswald admitted to Kelly that he had it in his wallet. Not that it matters to Myers.

    But to gain a broader understanding of how the authorities lied about Oswald having the selective service card with the name Alek James Hidell in his wallet following his arrest, the reader should consider the following. According to the report by Lt. T.L. Baker to DPD Chief Curry, Oswald was interrogated twice on the day following the assassination. The first interrogation began at approximately 10:30 am, and the second at approximately 6:30 pm (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 5, Folder 5, Item 4). FBI agent James Bookhout and Inspector Thomas Kelly of the USSS were present during both interrogations (ibid). According to Bookhout’s report on the morning interrogation, Oswald admitted to Captain Fritz that he had carried this card in his wallet, but that he declined to stated that he wrote the signature of Hidell on the card (Warren report, Appendix XI: Reports relating to the interrogation of Lee Harvey Oswald at the Dallas Police department). Bookhout repeated this when he testified before the Warren Commission (WC Volume VII, page 310).

    In his own report concerning that interrogation, Thomas Kelly made no mention of Oswald admitting that he carried the card, stating instead that Oswald refused to discuss it after both Bookhout and Captain Fritz allegedly asked Oswald for an explanation of it (Warren report, Appendix XI: Reports relating to the interrogation of Lee Harvey Oswald at the Dallas Police department). If Oswald really did admit to carrying the card in his wallet, then surely Kelly would have no reason not to mention this in his report. On the other hand, if Fritz didn’t actually ask Oswald if he carried the card in his wallet, then both Bookhout and Kelly were lying in their reports. Either way, both men could not have been telling the truth.

    It is also noteworthy that in that same report, Clements omits that a United States Marine Corps Certificate of Service Card with the name Alek James Hidell was found inside Oswald’s wallet. This reviewer should also point out that although DPD detectives Walter E. Potts and B.L. Senkel mentioned in their own reports to chief Curry that upon arrival at the rooming house on 1026 North Beckley, they checked the registration book for a person named Hidell, what’s significant is that none of the officers who claimed to have handled Oswald’s wallet (Bentley, Walker, Rose, Stovall, and Baker) mentioned in their own reports that any identification bearing the name Hidell was found inside his wallet (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 9, Item 32), (ibid, Box 3, Folder 12, Item 1).

    Myers explains that ultimately, three wallets were catalogued by the FBI as being part of Oswald’s property (With Malice, Chapter 9). Myers lists them as a brown billfold, found in the residence of Ruth Paine (with whom Oswald’s wife Marina was living with at the time of the assassination) by the DPD, a red billfold also found by the DPD in the residence of Ruth Paine, and the wallet Oswald had in his left hip pocket when he was arrested at the Texas theater (ibid). In his endnotes, Myers states that a fourth wallet described as; “black plastic with an advertisement that reads: ‘Waggoner National Bank, Vernon, Texas.’”, which was given to Oswald by his mother Marguerite, was allegedly found on Marina Oswald’s bedroom dresser following the assassination. This wallet was catalogued by the USSS. Myers states that neither the brown or red billfolds discovered in the residence of Ruth Paine resembled the wallet being handled by DPD Officers at the Tippit murder scene (With Malice, Chapter 9). However, Myers also states that the wallet removed from Oswald’s left hip pocket following his arrest does resemble the wallet being examined at the Tippit murder scene (ibid).

    After obtaining permission from the national archives, Myers took photographs of the wallet Oswald had when he was arrested, and compared them with the film footage of the wallet being examined at the Tippit murder scene. According to Myers, both wallets were “apparently” made of leather, both had a photo picture sleeve area covered with a leather flap, both had a snap and a metal band mounted on the photo flap, and both had a zipper for the area holding paper money (ibid). Myers concludes that the wallet examined by the DPD is not the wallet which was removed from Oswald’s hip pocket following his arrest at the Texas Theater. According to Myers, the wallet which was examined at the Tippit murder scene is ” … thinner and considerably more worn than Oswald’s arrest wallet”, and the metal band on the wallet which was examined at the Tippit murder scene covers the leather flap “edge to edge”, whereas Oswald’ wallet has a metal band which is “shorter and centered” (ibid). Myers adds that the corners of the leather flap of the wallet which was examined at the Tippit murder scene are square, whereas the corners of the leather flap of Oswald’s are “rounded”; and that surface imperfections which are “visible” on the wallet examined at the Tippit murder scene are not seen on Oswald’s wallet (ibid).

    This reviewer is unable to tell by comparing film footage of the wallet examined at the Tippit murder scene to photographs of the wallet removed from Oswald’s left hip pocket, whether the former wallet is considerably more worn and has surface imperfections not seen on the latter wallet. However, it appears that Myers is correct in stating that the wallet examined at the Tippit murder scene is thinner, and has a different metal band and leather flap than Oswald’s wallet. Therefore, it is also this reviewer’s opinion that they are two different wallets. Myers states that Captain Fritz kept the wallet removed from Oswald’s left hip pocket until November 27, 1963, when he released it to FBI agent James Hosty (ibid). Indeed, there is a receipt for a billfold and for 16 cards and pictures taken from Oswald following his arrest (Dallas Municipal archives Box 15, Folder 2, Item 61). Myers writes that Hosty photographed Oswald’s wallet and other items prior to them being shipped to Washington for analysis (With Malice, Chapter 9). In his endnotes, Myers references this claim to pages 79 and 80 of Hosty’s book, Assignment Oswald. Myers explains that on the day following the assassination, Captain Fritz sent Oswald’s wallet and its contents to the DPD crime lab for photographs to be made (ibid). This is based on the crime scene search section form, which lists 16 miscellaneous pictures, Identification cards, and the wallet to be photographed (Dallas Municipal archives Box 7, Folder 2, Item 23).

    Although Myers writes that the wallet itself was not photographed, in his endnotes, he explains that a 1966 Police report describing evidence pertaining to the assassination states that the wallet was photographed. According to the report, the aforementioned items were brought to the DPD crime lab by homicide detective Richard Sims. However, Myers states that no photograph of the wallet was found ” … among any of the official records.” The fact that the DPD apparently took no photographs of the wallet, and the fact that Captain Fritz released the wallet to FBI agent James Hosty five days following the assassination, has led to speculation that perhaps the wallet which was given to Hosty was the one found in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene. Although this reviewer doesn’t dismiss that possibility, it seems unlikely that Fritz would actually give that wallet to the FBI if he wanted to conceal its existence.

    In this reviewer’s opinion, the weight of the evidence strongly suggests that the wallet which was examined by DPD Officers at the Tippit murder scene contained identification for Oswald and his alleged alias, Alek James Hidell. It is also this reviewer’s opinion that the wallet did not belong to Oswald, but was a mock-up wallet left behind by Tippit’s real killer in order to frame Oswald for the murder. When FBI agent Manning Clements testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that the Selective Service System, Notice of Classification Card with the name Alek James Hidell allegedly found in Oswald’s wallet following his arrest was “obviously fictitious”, as it had a photograph on it (WC Volume VII, page 321). Therefore, if Oswald had ordered the rifle he allegedly used to assassinate the President under the name Hidell, why would he be carrying in his wallet a fake card with a photograph of him (and with the name Hidell on it) on the day of the assassination, when the only purpose it served was to incriminate him?

    Myers speculates that perhaps it was either Ted Callaway’s or Williams Scoggins’ wallet the police were examining, as both men went after the killer with Tippit’s revolver, and then returned to the murder scene. But Myers admits that neither one of them claimed that their wallet was examined by the DPD (With Malice, Chapter 9). Myers states that if a wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell was really found; “It certainly would have been trumpeted by the world press that very afternoon, held up for the world to see by the Police that weekend, and served as prima facie evidence in the Warren Commission’s case against Lee Harvey Oswald.” (ibid). Myers then snidely remarks; “Even conspiracy theorists who fancy the wallet filmed by WFAA-TV as a plant, left behind by Tippit’s ‘real’ killer, would have to admit that police would have no reason to hold back the discovery of a discarded wallet with Oswald’s name in it the night of the assassination; and even less reason for the press to ignore such an important detail.” (ibid).

    In his blog post chastising Farris Rookstool (and others), Myers also snidely remarked that; “Anyone with a brain knows that if Oswald’s wallet had been found at the Tippit murder scene it would have been printed in every newspaper and broadcast on every radio and television station in America before the end of the day, Friday, November 22, 1963” (see the blog post entitled JFK Assassination Redux: The best and the worst of 50th Anniversary Coverage on Myer’s blog). By the same token, anyone with a brain, aside from perhaps Myers, must understand that after the President of the United States of America was arrogantly gunned down in full public view in broad daylight, Captain Fritz and the DPD would have been under a tremendous amount of pressure to find those responsible for the crime. If Fritz and the DPD were unable to find those responsible, they would undoubtedly have faced severe embarrassment. Therefore, they had to place the blame on someone! That someone was Lee Harvey Oswald. When Captain Fritz testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that after TSBD superintendent, Roy Truly, allegedly informed him that Oswald was missing from the building, he “immediately” left the TSBD as he ” … felt it important to hold that man [Oswald]” (WC Volume IV, page 206). Fritz also explained that he wanted to check to see if Oswald had a criminal record, and that after learning that Oswald was arrested for Tippit’s murder, he wanted to ” … prepare a real good case on the officer’s [Tippit’s] killing so we would have a case to hold him [Oswald] without bond while we investigated the President’s killing where we didn’t have so many witnesses” (ibid, page 207).

    Evidently, from the time he left the TSBD to the time he arrived at police headquarters, Captain Fritz had determined that Oswald was President Kennedy’s assassin. By implicating Oswald for Tippit’s murder, Fritz and the DPD could portray Oswald as a homicidal maniac who was not only capable of assassinating the President, but that he shot Tippit because he thought the DPD suspected he killed the President, and wanted to avoid being arrested. However, after learning that Oswald’s wallet was removed from his hip pocket following his arrest, and that a wallet bearing identification for Oswald was also discarded in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene, an experienced detective like Fritz would surely have realised that Oswald was framed for Tippit’s murder, and quite possibly for the President’s assassination as well. But Captain Fritz and the DPD needed Oswald to be found guilty for both crimes, so that they could then inform the public (and the entire world for that matter) that President Kennedy’s assassin was caught.

    Therefore, the decision was made that the wallet left behind to implicate Oswald for Tippit’s murder would be concealed. By the account of FBI agent Robert Barrett, the last known person who handled the discarded wallet was Captain W.R. Westbrook. It is with little doubt that as soon as Captain Westbrook arrived at Police headquarters, he would have turned over the discarded wallet to Captain Fritz, or to one of Fritz’s men to give it to him. Although Westbrook wrote in his report to DPD Chief Jesse Curry, and also informed the Warren Commission that he asked Oswald what his name was inside the Texas Theater following his arrest, he may have only stated this to cover up the fact that he already knew what his name might be from the contents of the discarded wallet (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 50), (WC Volume VII, page 113).

    But is there other evidence which supports the contention that the DPD were determined early on that Oswald was both President Kennedy’s assassin, and Tippit’s murderer? As it turns out, there is. When Johnny Brewer testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that one (or more) of the officers yelled out to Oswald; “Kill the President, will you.” (WC Volume VII, page 6). When Julia Postal testified before the Warren Commission, she claimed that she overheard an officer using the telephone inside the box office of the theater say “I think we have got our man on both accounts” (ibid, page 12). Although Postal only wrote in her affidavit to the DPD that some officer said; “I’m sure we’ve got the man that shot officer Tippit”, she may have been coerced into not making any statements that the DPD were determined from the time Oswald was arrested that he was also President Kennedy’s assassin; as they may have thought that people would suspect they would falsify evidence against Oswald to implicate him for the President’s assassination as they didn’t have evidence at the time that the Mannlicher Carcano rifle allegedly used to murder the President belonged to Oswald (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 21).

    Myers also spends several pages discussing the attempted murder of Tippit murder witness, Warren Reynolds. On the night of January 23, 1964; two days following his initial interview with the FBI, Reynolds was shot in the head by a .22 caliber rifle inside the basement of Johnny Reynolds Motor Company (WCD 897, page 417). As Myers explains, the man suspected of shooting Reynolds was Darrell Wayne Garner. (With Malice, Chapter 9). Garner had been at Johnny Reynolds Motor Company on Monday January 20, 1964, and had gotten “extremely upset” with Warren Reynolds when Reynolds refused to buy a 1957 Oldsmobile which Garner was trying to sell (WCD 897, page 418). Garner had boasted to his sister-in-law that he had shot Reynolds, but then claimed that he only said this because he wanted her to think that he was a “big shot” (ibid).

    Nancy Jane Mooney, who allegedly worked at Jack Ruby’s carousel club as a stripper, provided Garner an alibi for the time of the shooting; and apparently committed suicide by hanging herself with her toreador slacks in her jail cell on February 13, 1964, after she was arrested by the DPD for disturbing the peace (ibid). Although many researchers believe that Mooney was killed because she provided Garner an alibi for the time Reynolds was shot, an acquaintance of Mooney’s named William Grady Goode claimed that she had attempted suicide on two occasions (WCD 897, page 420). Readers should also keep in mind that the DPD had allegedly determined that a .22 caliber rifle removed from the home of Garner’s mother was not the rifle used to shoot Reynolds (ibid, page 419).

    Prior to being shot, Reynolds informed the FBI that although he believed Oswald was Tippit’s killer ” … he would hesitate to definitely identify Oswald as the individual [he observed].” (With Malice, Chapter 9). Reynolds suspected that he was shot because he had observed Tippit’s killer; a belief which is shared by many researchers (ibid). When Reynolds testified before the Warren Commission, he now claimed that in his own mind, Oswald was Tippit’s killer (ibid). However, given his belief that he was shot because he had observed Tippit’s killer, Reynolds’ latter claim to the Warren Commission should not be considered reliable; as he may have thought that he would be shot at again (and killed) if he didn’t identify Oswald as the killer.

    Many researchers, such as Robert Groden, have suggested that witness Domingo Benavides was also targeted by the conspirators because he failed to identify Oswald as Tippit’s killer. As Myers explains, in February, 1965, Edward (Eddie) Benavides, who was Domingo Benavides’ brother, was allegedly shot and killed in a Dallas tavern by accident; after he was caught in the middle of an argument inside the tavern (ibid). Many researchers have alleged that Edward Benavides was shot because he was mistaken for Domingo, and that he was shot in February, 1964. This then allegedly caused Domingo to tell the Warren Commission when he testified on April 2, 1964, that Tippit’s killer resembled Oswald.

    But in spite of the allegation that Eddie Benavides was shot in February, 1964, Dallas county death records show that Edward Benavides was shot and killed in February, 1965! (John McAdams’ website: The Not-So-Mysterious Death of Eddie Benavides). According to a Dallas Morning News article dated February 17, 1965, witnesses to Edward Benavides’ death claimed that he was not involved in the fight inside the bar, but was seeking cover when he was shot (ibid). Furthermore, if Domingo Benavides was truly fearful that he would be shot if he didn’t identify Oswald as Tippit’s killer, then why didn’t Benavides positively identify Oswald as the killer, instead of merely informing the Warren Commission that Oswald looked like the killer? (WC Volume VI, page 452).

    In his discussion of whether Edward Benavides was shot because he was mistaken for his brother, Myers reminds his readers that Benavides allegedly told his boss, Ted Callaway, that he didn’t actually see Tippit’s killer (With Malice, Chapter 9). But as this reviewer has explained previously, Myers conceals evidence from his readers which indicates that Callaway’s claim is not to be trusted. But despite his misrepresentation, Myers then has the smugness to write that: ” … this book shows that much of Benavides’ story, including his identification of the gunman, was embellished after the fact.” (ibid).

    The reader should keep in mind that John Berendt from Esquire magazine wrote that after Benavides had changed jobs, the man who replaced him in his job, and who allegedly resembled him, was also shot (Esquire, August, 1966). Berendt also wrote that, amongst other things; “Threats had become a daily occurrence”, and that Benavides’ father-in-law had also been shot at (ibid). However, it is not known whether any of this is related to the fact that Benavides had initially failed to positively identify Oswald as Tippit’s killer. But Myers mentions none of this.

    X: Profile of a killer

    We now come to what is probably the most asinine chapter of Myers’ book. Myers begins by explaining to his readers that the Tippit murder scene ” … clearly fits the profile of a disorganized murder” (With Malice, Chapter 10). He explains that a disorganized crime scene ” … is one in which the crime was committed suddenly and with no plan for deterring detection.” He then writes that; “In a disorganized crime scene, the victim is usually left in the position in which he was killed. No attempt is made to conceal the body. Fingerprints, footprints and physical evidence are usually left behind at the crime scene providing police with plenty of evidence” (ibid). He references these findings to an FBI law enforcement bulletin entitled; Crime Scene and Profile Characteristics of Organized and Disorganized Murders, and to a book by a forensic psychiatrist named John Marshall McDonald entitled; The Murderer and His Victim (published in 1986). Continuing on, Myers writes that; “Tippit was caught off guard by his murderer and was left in the street where he fell … The killer then fled, unloading his gun and dropping incriminating evidence [the spent shell casings] at the scene” (ibid). As discussed previously, if Oswald was framed for Tippit’s murder, then it only makes perfect sense that the real killer would leave behind the spent shell casings hoping that the authorities would be able to determine that they had been discarded from the revolver which Oswald allegedly had in his possession when he was arrested at the Texas Theater.

    Quoting Herbert Lutz, whose police work included extensive work in the field of criminal personality profiling, Myers writes; “Another clue to the murderer’s desperation is seen in the quickness with which the gunman reloads. This indicates that he feels he will need his weapon again almost immediately. In other words, he doesn’t feel the threat [to him] has been totally eliminated by the death of Officer Tippit.” (ibid). Of course, Lutz’s explanation to Myers ignores all of the evidence that Oswald was framed for Tippit’s murder. Once again referring to John Marshall McDonald’s book The Murderer and His Victim, Myers writes that; “The murderer of a disorganized crime scene was likely below average intelligence and a high school dropout. If he served in the armed forces he may have been discharged within a few months. He has a menial job and a poor work record. He does not own a car and may be unable to drive, so he rides a bicycle or relies on public transportation. He is a sloppy dresser and a loner of solitary interests such as watching television or reading books. He lives alone or with his parents. He may have a physical handicap or a speech impediment and has a poor self- image” (ibid).

    In yet another attempt to link Oswald to Tippit’s murder, Myers writes that like the above character profile, Oswald was a high school dropout, with an employment history of menial jobs ” … none of which lasted long”, who didn’t own a car and instead used public transportation “religiously”, had a small number of friends and was living alone at the time of the assassination (ibid). He also writes that Oswald took a hardship discharge from the U.S. Marines, had a “voracious appetite for reading”, but allegedly suffered from Dyslexia; which Myers believes was the cause of his reading, writing, and spelling problems (ibid). However, much of the above can be accounted for by Asperger’s syndrome; an autism spectrum disorder which was apparently first recognized in the United States as a separate disorder in 1994 (Cognitive -Behavioral Therapy for Adult Asperger Syndrome, by Valerie L. Gaus).

    Readers are encouraged to read through the research of Greg Parker on the likelihood that Oswald had Asperger’s Syndrome, and to spend some time researching Asperger’s syndrome themselves (Readers are also encouraged to read through researcher Allen Lowe’s comments concerning this discussion on Greg Parker’s research forum.) Although expert opinions on whether a person with Asperger’s syndrome is likely to commit a crime such as murder vary, in the book The Complete Guide to Asperger’s Syndrome, author Tony Attwood explains that; “Experience has indicated that people with Asperger’s Syndrome who have committed an offence have often been quick to confess and justify their actions” (this information can be found through a Google search of Attwood’s book). Although it will probably never be known with certainty whether Oswald had Asperger’s Syndrome, researchers should not solely rely on Myers’ narrow minded evaluation of Oswald’s habits and personality traits. But on the issue of Oswald’s so-called hardship discharge from the U.S. Marines, many researchers such as Jim DiEugenio have shown that it was nothing but an utter sham, so that it is truly laughable that Myers would use it to try and portray Oswald as a “disorganized” murderer.

    Like every supporter of the lone assassin theory before him, Myers believes that after Oswald left the TSBD building, he first attempted to return to the rooming house on 1026 North Beckley avenue (where he was allegedly living) by first boarding the bus driven by Cecil McWatters, but then riding in the cab driven by Cab driver William Whaley after McWatters’ bus allegedly became jammed in traffic (With Malice, Chapter 10). However, as researcher Lee Farley has thoroughly demonstrated, both the bus ride and cab ride stories were fabricated by the DPD (see threads entitled; Oswald and cab 36 and Oswald and bus 1213 on John Simkin’s education forum). Myers portrays Oswald as a man desperate to escape the TSBD following the assassination, but he nevertheless believes that Oswald stayed inside the rooming house for over two minutes after he allegedly returned there and retrieved “his” revolver (With Malice, Timetable of events). But if Oswald was a man desperate to avoid capture by the DPD, it seems likely that he would have left the rooming house in less than a minute.

    In a pathetic attempt to again portray Oswald as a guilty man to his readers, Myers writes; “Unlike an innocent man, Oswald did not cooperate with [the] police upon capture” (With Malice, Chapter 10). In this reviewer’s opinion, this statement is laughable. Does Myers honestly believe that after being assaulted by DPD Officers inside the Texas Theater, and after having his face forcibly covered by officer Charles Walkers’ hat outside the Theater (as shown in a photograph taken by Stuart Reed), and after the humiliation he faced with bystanders shouting out words such as “Kill the dirty ‘Sob’” (as detective Bob Carroll wrote in his report to Chief Jesse Curry), that Oswald (guilty or not) would be acting friendly towards the police? Myers then explains that when detective Jim Leavelle allegedly questioned Oswald shortly following his arrest, Leavelle asked him about shooting Tippit, to which Oswald allegedly remarked; “I didn’t shoot anybody” (ibid). According to Leavelle, Oswald’s remark that he didn’t shoot “anybody”, as opposed to saying that he didn’t shoot “the cop” or “that officer”, was an indication to him that Oswald knew that the DPD were also going to accuse him of assassinating the President (ibid). However, Myers once again fails to inform his readers that when Leavelle testified before the Warren Commission, he denied questioning Oswald prior to the morning of Sunday November 24, 1963; and that Leavelle was likely dissimulating when he claimed later on that he had questioned Oswald.

    Myers also spends several pages discussing the question of whether or not Oswald could have reached the Tippit murder scene from the rooming house at 1026 North Beckley in time to shoot Tippit. Although Myers places the time of Tippit’s murder at approximately 1:14.30 pm, as this reviewer has explained previously, Tippit was most likely shot at about 1:06 pm. Although Earlene Roberts told the Warren Commission that “Oswald” arrived at the rooming house circa 1:00 pm, and then left after spending “about 3 or 4 minutes” inside his room, when she was interviewed by KLIF radio on the afternoon of the assassination, she claimed that “Oswald” had “rushed in -and got a short gray coat and went on back out in a hurry” (WC Volume VI, page 438). Roberts’ claim suggests that “Oswald” did not spend about three to four minutes inside the rooming house, but had left much sooner. If the person whom Roberts thought was Oswald (entering the rooming house) was in fact Tippit’s actual murderer, it seems highly unlikely that he would spend over a minute inside the house before leaving to murder Tippit. Bear in mind that witnesses such as William Lawrence Smith and Jimmy Brewer claimed that Tippit’s killer was walking west along Tenth Street when he confronted Tippit, and that as this reviewer has explained previously, there is no credible evidence that Tippit’s killer was walking east.

    When the FBI timed how long it would have taken Oswald to have walked the assumed 0.8 mile (approximately 1.29 km) distance from the rooming house to the Tippit murder scene, they determined that it would have required twelve minutes to cover that distance (WCE 1987). However, as Myers more or less explains, the FBI had assumed that Tippit’s killer was initially walking east and not west along Tenth Street when he confronted Tippit (With Malice, Chapter 10). This reviewer will be discussing the issue of whether or not Oswald could have made it to the Tippit murder scene at about 1:06 pm to shoot Tippit in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill. It is also worth pointing out that Myers admits, in so many words, that no witnesses have ever come forward claiming that they had seen Oswald going towards the Tippit murder scene on foot (ibid).

    According to former assistant Dallas district attorney William F. Alexander, the DPD were unable to determine whether Oswald had travelled towards the Tippit murder scene by a bus or a cab from the rooming house (ibid). Myers then writes that; “If Oswald did hitch a ride, it apparently had to come from the private sector”, and that if an “innocent citizen” had given Oswald a lift, he or she would not have come forward and admitted this “for obvious reasons” (ibid). Indeed, if one or more persons had given Oswald a lift form the rooming house towards the Tippit murder scene; they almost certainly would have been embarrassed to publicly admit that they had given the alleged murderer of a police officer a lift. Besides, they may have feared that the DPD might charge them as accessories to Tippit’s murder. Myers also snidely remarks that; ” … it’s difficult to imagine any believable scenario that has conspirators picking up Oswald at his room, only to discharge him a short distance later” (ibid). First of all, this belief assumes that Oswald actually was living at the rooming house on 1026 North Beckley Avenue at the time of the assassination. Secondly, it dismisses the likelihood that DPD squad car 207 was outside the rooming house at the time “Oswald” was inside, just as Earlene Roberts told the FBI when they interviewed her on November 29, 1963, that it was (WCE 2781). As this reviewer will explain in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill, Hill had (by all likelihood) commandeered DPD squad car 207, and that he and another DPD Officer picked up Tippit’s murderer from the rooming house, and then dropped him off somewhere to the east of where Tippit was shot.

    But despite the question of whether or not Oswald could have made it on time to shoot Tippit, Myers writes that; ” … one thing is certain; eyewitness testimony and physical evidence proves Oswald’s presence on Tenth Street” (With Malice, Chapter 10). He then reminds his readers that Helen Markham, William Scoggins, Ted Callaway, Sam Guinyard, and the Davis sister-in-laws all identified Oswald as the killer from the DPD line-ups. But as this reviewer has previously explained, none of these identifications should be considered credible. Myers then adds that Warren Reynolds, Harold Russell, and B.M. “Pat” Patterson all subsequently identified Oswald as the man they observed from photographs. Although (as discussed previously) Reynolds informed the FBI when they interviewed him on January 21, 1964, that he thought Oswald was the man he observed coming down Patton street, but would hesitate to definitely identify Oswald as the man, his later “certainty” that it was Oswald should not be considered credible, as he informed the FBI that he thought he was shot on January 23, 1964, due to the fact that he had observed the gunman (WCE 2587). Therefore, he may have only claimed that Oswald was the man he observed out of fear of being shot again.

    Although Harold Russell “positively” identified Oswald as the man he observed when he was interviewed by the FBI on January 21, 1964, Russell’s “positive” identification may have been influenced by the fact he had seen Oswald’s face on television and in the Newspapers following his arrest for Tippit’s murder and the President’ assassination (WC Volume XXI, Russell exhibit A). There can be little doubt, as explained in this review, that Tippit’s actual killer would have resembled Oswald somewhat, and after seeing Oswald’s face on television and in the newspapers in connection with Tippit’s murder, Russell may have convinced himself that Oswald was indeed the man he observed. Whilst some researchers may believe that the two FBI agents who interviewed Russell fabricated Russell’s “positive” identification of Oswald as the man he observed, readers should keep in mind that those same two FBI agents also interviewed witness L.J. Lewis on the same day they interviewed Russell, and claimed that Lewis told them that he ” … would hesitate to state whether the individual [he observed] was identical with Oswald” (WC Volume XX, Lewis (L.J.) exhibit A).

    As for B.M. (Pat) Patterson, Myers omits that in his interview with the FBI dated August 25, 1964, Patterson claimed that he couldn’t recall being shown a photograph of Oswald when he was interviewed by the FBI on January 22, 1964 (WC Volume XXI, Patterson (B.M.) exhibit B). However, when Patterson was interviewed by the FBI on August 26, 1964, he was allegedly shown two photographs of Oswald, and claimed that Oswald was “positively and unquestionably” the same person he had observed coming down Patton Street (ibid). But as discussed previously, in that same interview, Patterson allegedly claimed that Oswald had stopped still and removed spent shell casings from the revolver; even though this is not what he claimed in his initial interview with the FBI (WC Volume XXI, Patterson (B.M.) exhibit A). Readers should also keep in mind that Warren Reynolds, Harold Russell, L.J. Lewis, Ted Callaway, and Sam Guinyard never claimed that they had seen Tippit’s killer stop still and then remove spent shell casings from the revolver. Therefore, Patterson’s interview with the FBI should not be considered credible. Even if we are to believe that Patterson had simply forgotten that he had been shown a photograph of Oswald (and identified him as the man he had observed) in his initial interview with the FBI, he may have been influenced in a similar way to Harold Russell into believing Oswald was the man he had observed.

    Mary Brock, who observed Tippit’s killer going north towards the parking lot behind the Texaco service station located on Jefferson Blvd., was interviewed by the FBI on January 21, 1964, and told them that the man who went past her was Oswald (WC Volume XIX, Brock (Mary) exhibit A). However, she may also have been influenced in a similar way to Harold Russell into believing Oswald was the man she observed. Readers should keep in mind that her husband, Robert Brock, who was with her and also observed Tippit’s killer head north towards the parking lot, failed to identify him as Oswald when he was interviewed by the FBI on the same date (WC Volume XIX, Brock (Robert) exhibit A). Another witness who later on claimed that Oswald was Tippit’s killer was William Arthur Smith. When the FBI interviewed Smith on December 12, 1963, he informed them that he was ” … too far away from the individual [who shot Tippit] to positively identify him” (WCD 205, page 243). When Smith testified before the Warren Commission, he now claimed that Oswald was Tippit’s killer. However, he also stated that he only saw the side and back of “Oswald” as he was running away (WC Volume VII, page 84). Furthermore, although Smith “identified” WCE 162 as the jacket the killer was wearing during his testimony, he told the FBI that the killer was wearing a “light brown” jacket (WCD 205, page 243). It seems apparent to this reviewer that Smith was coerced into identifying Oswald as the killer when he testified before the Warren Commission, and therefore, his claim that Oswald was Tippit’s killer should be taken with a grain of salt.

    Despite Murray Jackson’s ridiculous explanation for why he allegedly ordered Tippit to move into the central Oak Cliff area, the discovery of the wallet bearing identification for Oswald and Hidell in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene is strong evidence that Oswald was framed for Tippit’s murder, and that Tippit was lured to Tenth Street to be shot. Although several researchers are of the opinion that Tippit attempted to contact the DPD dispatchers at approximately 1:08 pm (per WCE 705) because he had just encountered a suspect, it seems highly unlikely that he did try to contact the dispatchers, as the last thing the conspirators would have wanted was for Tippit to become suspicious. As for how Tippit was lured to Tenth Street, this reviewer can only speculate that perhaps one of the DPD conspirators, such as Gerald Hill, told Tippit (for example) that he was to meet up with a confidential informant along Tenth Street who would be wearing a light gray jacket so that Tippit would be able to recognise him, and that the “informant” would have confidential information to give him “related” to a DPD investigation. Keep in mind that Helen Markham told the Warren Commission that Tippit was driving “real slow” along Tenth Street (WC Volume III, page 307). Similarly, William Scoggins told the Warren Commission that Tippit was driving “Not more that 10 or 12 miles [an] hour, I would say” (ibid, page 324). It is almost as if Tippit was looking to meet up with someone.

    After Tippit spotted his would be killer wearing the light gray jacket, he probably called him over through the cracked vent window of his squad car, and asked him if he was the man he was to meet up with. If the statements by Helen Markham and Jimmy Burt are to be believed, the killer then leaned down to talk to Tippit through the front right window with his hands on the door. In this reviewer’s opinion, the killer probably told Tippit to step outside of his car so that they could talk, and as Tippit got to the hood of the car, the killer shot him. Several witnesses such as T.F. Bowley and Ted Callaway claimed that Tippit’s gun was out of his holster when he was lying down on the ground (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 14), (WC Volume III, page 354). According to Murray Jackson, Tippit usually walked with his hand on the butt of his gun, “western style” (With Malice, Chapter 4). Therefore, if Tippit had seen his killer pull out the revolver used to kill him, he probably had enough time to pull out his own revolver before he was shot.

    In yet another apparent attempt to reinforce the notion that Oswald shot Tippit, Myers explains that Oswald’s brother Robert wrote in his book; Lee: A Portrait of Lee Harvey Oswald By his Brother, that Oswald had once made the remark “That dumb cop!” about a police officer who had given Robert a ticket for running a red light (With Malice, Chapter 10). Myers then explains that William Scoggins recalled hearing Tippit’s killer mutter the words “poor dumb cop” or “poor damn cop” as he went by his cab (ibid). Another explanation for why Tippit’s killer would have snidely muttered the words “poor dumb cop” is because he thought Tippit was “dumb” for unwittingly allowing himself to be lured to Tenth Street and then be shot.

    One mystery about Tippit’s murder which remains to be answered is why Tenth Street was chosen by the conspirators as the location to murder Tippit? First of all, we should keep in mind that several witnesses have indicated through their statements that Tippit was a frequent visitor to neighbourhood in which he was killed. When Jimmy Burt was interviewed by the FBI, he claimed that he recognised Tippit as an officer who frequented the neighbourhood, and that the residents of that area knew him by the name “friendly” (WCD 194, page 29). When Mark Lane interviewed Aquilla Clemmons, he asked her if she knew Tippit. Clemmons remarked; “Yes, I saw him … many times” (See Lane’s interview with Clemmons.) When William Scoggins testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that he wasn’t paying too much attention to Tippit as he went by his parked cab because he ” … just used to see him [Tippit] every day … ” (WC Volume III, page 325).

    Most interesting of all, Virginia Davis stated during her testimony that Tippit’s car was parked ” … between the hedge that marks the apartment house where he [Tippit] lives in and the house next door” (WC Volume VI, page 468). Although Tippit certainly didn’t live in that house, Davis’s statement clearly implies that Tippit (for some reason) was a frequent visitor to that particular house. Myers explains that when he interviewed Virginia Davis in 1997, she “recalled how nervous she was” when she testified before the Warren Commission, and that what she probably meant to say was that Tippit’s car was parked between the hedge that marked the apartment house where “we” were living in at the time of Tippit’s murder, and the house next door (With Malice, Chapter 9). She also allegedly told Myers that she had never known or seen Tippit prior to time he was shot (ibid).

    The reader should keep in mind that when Myers interviewed former DPD Officer Tommy Tilson in 1983, Tilson claimed that Tippit was having an affair with a waitress who lived in the house directly in front of where he was killed (ibid). However, Tilson is also well known for his ludicrous allegation that he had seen a man come down the grassy slope from the railroad tracks on the West side of the triple underpass, then throw something into the back seat of a black car, and then took off, with Tilson chasing after him (The Dallas Morning News, Ex-officer suspects he chased ‘2nd gun’, by Earl Golz). Although Tilson’s daughter, Judy Ladner, “verified” her father’s allegation, there is absolutely no independent corroboration for Tilson’s tale (ibid). Furthermore, there doesn’t appear to be any independent corroboration for Tilson’s claim that Tippit was having an affair with a waitress who allegedly lived in the house directly in front of where he was killed; and therefore, Tilson should not be considered a reliable witness.

    As for Virginia Davis, although this reviewer believes that she is a compromisedwitness, it is entirely possible that she did misspeak when she testified before the Warren Commission. Finally, whilst we may never know why Tippit was specifically lured to Tenth Street to be shot, it was nevertheless in close proximity to the rooming house in which Oswald was allegedly living in at the time of the assassination. Thus, the conspirators probably thought that with a wallet left behind bearing identification for Oswald and his alleged alias Hidell, the DPD would be convinced that Oswald could easily have traversed the distance from the rooming house to Tenth Street.

    Perhaps the most important question pertaining to Tippit’s murder is if Oswald didn’t shoot Tippit, then who did? Although shills such as David Von Pein believe that researchers who doubt that Oswald murdered Tippit are under an obligation to provide an answer to that question, the reality is that they are under no obligation whatsoever. Just consider that when a defendant appears in court in the U.S. for a crime, the presiding judge doesn’t tell the defence attorney(s) that he/she must find out who actually committed the crime, otherwise their client will be found guilty for the crime for which they have been charged. With that said (and as stated previously), in an upcoming essay, this reviewer will make the case that Tippit’s killer could have been Larry Crafard.

    Throughout this review, this reviewer has explained how Myers omits, distorts, or buries evidence in his endnotes which contradicts or undermines his contention that Lee Harvey Oswald shot and killed DPD Officer, J.D. Tippit. Although this reviewer doesn’t pretend to have explained/demonstrated beyond any doubt that Oswald didn’t shoot Tippit, this reviewer can state beyond any doubt that With Malice is not the definitive book on Tippit’s murder! Not by a long shot. It is a thoroughly deceptive book with a strong bias against any notion that someone other than Oswald killed Tippit. The truth is that many who praise the book e.g. Vince Bugliosi, David Von Pein, care not one iota about the truth behind Tippit’s murder or President Kennedy’s assassination. Their only interest is in upholding the myth that Oswald murdered both Tippit and the President. According to Von Pein; ” … Myers leaves no room here for even the slimmest sliver of doubt with regard to the question at hand: ‘Who Killed Officer Tippit?’” Recall, Von Pein is fond of calling hard working and honest researchers such as Jim DiEugenio “kooks”. He cannot bring himself to admit that Myers cherry picks evidence which bolsters the notion that Oswald shot Tippit. According to David Reitzes, Myers has; ” … done, in essence, what all the king’s horses and all the king’s men couldn’t: closed the Tippit case.” But as this reviewer has explained throughout this review, nothing could be further from the truth.

    September 27, this year, will mark the 50th anniversary of the day the Warren Report was released for the public to read. After all these years, it is time for people interested in learning the truth behind the tragic events of November 22, 1963, to stop paying attention to these disinformation shills.

    Acknowledgements

    I would like to thank researchers Jim DiEugenio, Greg Parker, Lee Farley, Steven Duffy, Martin Hay, and Robert Charles-Dunne for all the help and advice they have given me. With all of the disinformation out there concerning Tippit’s murder and President Kennedy’s assassination, even after 50 years, we need honest and hardworking researchers such as them more than ever.


    Go to Part 1

     

  • Dale Myers, With Malice (Part 1)


    The following is a review of the 2013 Kindle edition of Dale Myers’ book With Malice.

    Commonly used abbreviations throughout this review:

    DPD = Dallas Police department
    WCD = Warren Commission document
    FBI = Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Sgt. = Seargent
    USSS = United States Secret Service
    Lt. = Lieutenant
    WCE = Warren Commission exhibit


    For the 50th anniversary of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the murder of Dallas Policeman J.D. Tippit, Dale Myers decided to publish an updated version of his book on Tippit’s murder entitled, With Malice. The updated book contains new text, photographs and maps pertaining to Tippit’s death. I had never read With Malice before, and it was only at the insistence of Jim DiEugenio that I decided to review the updated book. As anyone who is familiar with Myers knows, his contention is that Lee Harvey Oswald murdered Tippit in cold blood, after allegedly assassinating the President. As I hope to explain throughout this review, the notion that Oswald shot Tippit is utterly absurd. But before getting to the book itself, it is first important to outline some of the reasons why Dale Myers is not to be trusted when it comes to both Tippit’s murder and President Kennedy’s assassination.

    As most researchers of the JFK assassination are probably aware, Myers has claimed to have proven through his 3-D animation of President Kennedy’s assassination that the single bullet theory is actually true. However, as researchers such as Milicent Cranor, Bob Harris, and Pat Speer have shown, Myers’ work is highly deceptive. Speer’s comprehensive analysis of the statements of the ear/eye witnesses to the assassination has demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the majority of ear/eye witnesses didn’t hear the so-called single bullet shot, and that the shot(s) to Governor Connally did not originate from the sixth floor of the Texas School book depository. Myers is also known for his support of the ludicrous notion that the first shot missed the President’s limousine, and caused the injury to bystander James Tague. Contrary to this belief, Tague always denied that the first shot was responsible for the cut to his left cheek. In fact, following the airing of Max Holland’s utterly fallacious documentary, The Lost Bullet, in which Holland claimed Tague’s injury was caused by the first shot, Tague indignantly exclaimed; “Holland is full of crap. One thing I know for sure is that the first shot was not the missed curb shot. Another thing I am positive about is that the last shot was the missed shot. You may not want to believe the Warren Commission’s final findings, but you can believe the 11 witnesses who state it was the last shot that missed.” (Read Tague’s remark). Although Tague was not always certain whether it was the second or third shot he heard which caused his injury, his confusion is understandable given that like the majority of ear/eye witnesses, he claimed that the next two shots he heard were fired in rapid succession (WCD 205, page 31). The fact that Myers pretends this theory is true in spite of Tague’s adamant denial, speaks poorly for his credibility as a researcher.

    Then there is Myers’ interview with John Kelin in 1982. During that interview, Kelin asked Myers what he thought about Oswald, to which Myers responded with the following remark; “…First off, I don’t think Lee Harvey Oswald pulled the trigger.” Myers also said that as far as saying Oswald is guilty, “…I find that extremely hard to believe”. However, most revealing of all was his denial that Oswald had shot Tippit; namely that “I think I will be able to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Oswald was not the killer of J.D. Tippit.” Researcher and author Jim DiEugenio once asked what had caused Myers to suddenly believe that Oswald hard murdered Tippit? Although we may never know the real answer to that question, it hardly matters. However, in this reviewer’s opinion, it was most likely due to Myers fondness for many of the DPD Officers he had interviewed, such as former DPD dispatcher Murray James Jackson. In fact, as this reviewer demonstrates below, Myers shows favouritism towards these very same officers.

    Although there are some people who believe that With Malice is the definitive book on Tippit’s murder, nothing could be further from the truth. Myers omits many facts and pieces of evidence which tend to exonerate Oswald as Tippit’s killer. Myers also shows favouritism towards witnesses who support Oswald’s guilt (even though, as I will explain, they lack credibility). In the introduction to his book, Myers also quotes many of Tippit’s family members and friends who dismiss the notion that Tippit was somehow involved in a conspiracy to murder either President Kennedy or Oswald. For example, Myers quotes Marie Frances Gasway, Tippit’s widow, who said the following during an interview in 2003: “The conspiracy stuff is so untrue, so totally unfounded.” (With Malice, Introduction). Quoting Tippit’s youngest son, Curtis Tippit, Myers writes: “People want sensationalism. Mom’s been abused by conspiracy theories and tabloid publications… Too many people want to cling to a false history, believing my father was in on something with Jack Ruby… Really it’s all kind of silly and funny” (ibid).

    Although it is perfectly understandable that Tippit’s family and friends want to feel a sense of closure by believing that the man who allegedly murdered Tippit was arrested by the DPD, it is nevertheless important that an honest analysis of the evidence and facts pertaining to his murder be presented to current and future researchers of that case. Furthermore, given the shame and embarrassment any allegation that Tippit was somehow involved in a conspiracy would bring to his family members and friends, it is also perfectly understandable that they would vehemently deny any such allegations. Readers should keep in mind that since writing several articles on Tippit’s murder on my blog, I have since changed my mind on a number of issues, and have come to realize that I had also made a number of mistakes and misjudgements.

    I: The search begins

    Myers begins his above titled Chapter 1 with the following sentences: “Lee Harvey Oswald murdered J.D. Tippit. The Dallas Cops believed it. The newspapers reported it. The Warren Commission made it official and the House Select Committee on Assassinations reaffirmed it.” (With Malice, Chapter 1). Myers and his fellow Warren Commission defenders scoff at the idea that the DPD and the Dallas district attorney’s Office could have helped frame Oswald for the murders of President Kennedy and J.D. Tippit. In fact, Myers snidely writes the following: “It was claimed [by Warren Commission critics] that Oswald was framed by a zealous Police force” (ibid). Thanks to Dallas district attorney Craig Watkins, we now know that with Henry Wade as District Attorney of Dallas, the DPD was one of the most corrupt Police departments in the entire United States; something which Myers and his ilk want to pretend isn’t true. To give the reader one example of just how bad the DA’s Office and the DPD were, let’s take the case of James Lee Woodard. Woodard was an African American man who spent twenty seven years in prison for a murder he didn’t commit. As it turned out, Henry Wade’s Office had withheld evidence from Woodard’s defence attorney which exonerated him as the killer. According to Michelle Moore, the President of the Innocence Project of Texas’ “…we’re finding lots of places where detectives in those cases, they kind of trimmed the corners to just get the case done”. She also added; “Whether that’s the fault of the detectives or the DA’s, I don’t know.” (Readers are strongly encouraged to read through this article, to see for themselves just how corrupt Wade’s Office and the DPD were).

    As for why the DA’s Office and the DPD would want to frame Oswald, just consider the following. The president of the United States of America (the most powerful man in the world) was gunned down in broad daylight and in full public view. Naturally, the entire United States, including the leaders of foreign countries, were anxiously waiting to learn who was responsible for the crime. Since the assassination of a sitting President was not a federal crime in 1963, the DPD had jurisdiction, and were undoubtedly under a tremendous amount of pressure to find those responsible, in order to avoid embarrassment for not being able to identify those responsible. Naturally, the DPD also had to find those responsible for the murder of one of their own policemen. As many researchers of the assassination have pointed out, a wallet bearing identification for Oswald and his alleged alias, Alek James Hidell, was discovered in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene. This allegation first appeared in the book by former FBI agent James Hosty entitled Assignment Oswald. Myers dismisses the idea such a wallet was left behind to incriminate Oswald. But as this reviewer explains later on in this review, there is very good reason to believe that this was the case.

    It’s important to keep in mind that with a wallet left behind to incriminate Oswald, the DPD had a viable suspect for Tippit’s murder. The DPD could then use Tippit’s murder to portray Oswald as a violent man who was capable of assassinating the President. In fact, Warren Commission counsel David Belin once remarked that: “Once the hypothesis is admitted that Oswald killed patrolman Tippit, there can be no doubt that the overall evidence shows that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin of John F. Kennedy”. (ibid). To say that such a belief is narrow-minded would be an understatement. Myers also makes several demeaning comments against those who refuse to believe that Oswald shot Tippit. For example, Myers writes that; “Many eyewitness accounts of the [Tippit] shooting were twisted to exonerate Oswald” (ibid). The readers of this review can make up their own minds on whether or not this is the case. Myers also writes that; “Lee Harvey Oswald murdered Officer J.D. Tippit. There can no longer be any doubt about that”, and that no matter what role Oswald had in the President’s assassination “…Oswald’s guilt in the Tippit shooting must be hereafter considered a historic truth.” (ibid). In light of all the evidence to the contrary, to say that Oswald’s guilt in the Tippit murder must be considered a historic truth is almost absurd. However, Myers can make that claim, because he omits a lot of the evidence which tends to exonerate Oswald.

    II: The quiet cop

    In this chapter, Myers discusses Tippit’s life from his childhood, his high school years, his service in the United States Army as a paratrooper, on to his career as a DPD Officer. Myers portrays Tippit as a good and honest cop, killed in the line of duty. In his discussion of Tippit’s Army experiences, Myers explains that it had “…made deep impressions…” Namely that Tippit’s friends recalled that he would be startled by any loud noise and that he was “…still a little nervous…” (With Malice, Chapter 2). What Myers omits however, is that Tippit’s DPD personnel files contain evidence that he may possibly have been unstable. (Reopen Kennedy case forum, thread entitled: J.D Tippit: the perfect DPD recruit). In his discussion of Tippit’s career as a DPD Officer, Myers explains that since joining the DPD as an apprentice Policeman in July, 1952, Tippit was an “exemplary” Police Officer (With Malice, Chapter 2). However, Myers also mentions that in 1955, Tippit had received several reprimands for not appearing in court as ordered (ibid). In order to bolster his claim that Tippit was a good and honest Police Officer, Myers quotes several of Tippit’s fellow Police Officers, such as Tippit’s supervisor, Calvin “Bud” Owens, who vouched for this (ibid). Even if these claims are true, it has little bearing on whether Tippit was lured to Tenth Street to be shot and killed. The evidence for that lies in the fact that a wallet was left behind to incriminate Oswald for his murder. Furthermore, the DPD would naturally want to avoid making claims to the contrary, as any such claims could lead to speculation that Tippit was somehow involved in a conspiracy; and bring about embarrassment to the DPD.

    III: The final hours

    In this chapter, Myers relates to the readers the final hours of Tippit’s life; from the time he left his home at 6:15 am, to the time he was shot and killed on Tenth Street in the central Oak Cliff area of Dallas (With Malice, Chapter 3). The issues which Myers deals with here include why Tippit was in central Oak Cliff when he was killed, the sighting of Tippit at the Gloco Service station located at 1502 North Zangs blvd., the sighting of a DPD squad car which Earlene Roberts, the house keeper at 1026 North Beckley where Oswald was allegedly living at the time of the assassination, a car she claimed was outside the rooming house when “Oswald” was inside following the assassination, and finally, Tippit’s alleged presence at the Top Ten records store a few minutes prior to his death. Myers writes that; “Tippit wished he could have seen the President, whom he had voted for and admired.” (ibid) Whilst that may be true, it is this reviewer’s belief that it has little (if any) bearing on his death. Myers also relates to his readers the all too familiar tale that Howard Brennan was sitting directly across from the TSBD on Elm Street, when he allegedly observed Oswald firing the shots at President Kennedy (ibid). But what Myers doesn’t tell his readers is that the Zapruder film shows beyond any doubt that Brennan was sitting directly across Houston Street, and that Brennan was lying when he said he sitting directly across from the TSBD.

    In his discussion of whether or not Earlene Roberts had really seen a DPD squad car outside of the rooming house, Myers does everything he can to discredit her story. When Roberts was interviewed by the FBI on November 29, 1963, she told them that the number of the car she observed outside the rooming house was 207 (WCE 2781). As Myers explains, that particular car was assigned to DPD Officer Jim M. Valentine, and which took DPD Sgt. Gerald Hill and Dallas Morning News reporter Jim Ewell to Dealey Plaza from Police headquarters. As this reviewer will explain in an upcoming essay on Gerald Hill, Hill had by all likelihood commandeered car 207 from Officer Valentine, and was one of the two Officers inside the car when it was seen by Roberts outside of the rooming house. In that same essay, this reviewer will discuss Myers’ narrow minded attempt to discredit Roberts.

    On the day of the assassination, Tippit was assigned to patrol district 78 (testimony of Calvin Bud Owens, WC Volume VII, page 80). However, the patrol district in which Tippit was killed (district 91) was assigned to a DPD Officer named William Duane Mentzel (WCE 2645). Tippit and another Officer named Ronald C. Nelson were allegedly ordered to move into the central Oak Cliff by DPD dispatcher Murray Jackson at approximately 12:45 pm (WCE 705/1974). According to DPD chief Jesse Curry, the central Oak Cliff area included patrol district 91 (WCD 1259, page 3). According to the map of the DPD patrol districts, it stands to reason that districts 92, 93, 94, 108, and 109 which were adjacent to district 91 were also part of the central Oak Cliff area (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 7, Folder 10, Item 2). Although Jackson was never called to testify before the Warren Commission, during a filmed interview with Eddie Barker from CBS, he explained that he had ordered Tippit into the central Oak Cliff area because “We [the dispatchers] were draining the Oak Cliff area of available Police Officers….” (See the interview). Myers accepts that this was the case, and writes that Jackson told him during an interview that he had ordered Tippit into the central Oak Cliff area because Tippit had once helped him out during an incident with seven drunk teenagers, and that allegedly feeling that he could once again rely on Tippit, Jackson ordered Tippit into the Oak Cliff area to “help him [Jackson] again…. to cover Oak Cliff” (With Malice, Chapter 3).

    But contrary to Jackson’s claim, there is very good reason to believe that he never ordered Tippit and Nelson to move into the central Oak Cliff area. In the first transcript of channel one of the DPD radio recordings (Sawyer exhibit B), the order to send Tippit and Nelson into the central Oak Cliff area is curiously missing. Myers doesn’t mention this to his readers. In that very same transcript, the channel one dispatchers (Jackson and Clifford Hulse), allegedly broadcast the following message over the DPD radio at approximately 12:43 pm; “Attention all squads in the downtown area code three [lights on and sirens blazing] to Elm and Houston with caution.” (Sawyer exhibit B, page 398). Myers acknowledges this in his timetable of the events which occurred on the day of the assassination, but hides from his readers the fact that according to the next transcript which the DPD had provided to the FBI on March 20, 1964, the dispatchers had actually broadcast the following message: “Attention all squads, report to [the] downtown area code 3 to Elm and Houston, with caution.” (WCE 705).

    Whilst it certainly makes more sense that only the squads in the downtown area would be dispatched to the assassination scene, thereby leaving all the “outer” area squads in their assigned districts in the event a crime such as a robbery were to occur, the exact same transmission appears in the next transcript on the DPD channel one and two radio recordings (WCE 1974). On July 21, 1964, DPD chief Jesse Curry furnished the FBI a copy of the “original” tape recordings of the DPD radio traffic, which were reviewed by an agent of the FBI at the DPD (ibid). If the transmission “Attention all squads, report to [the] downtown area code 3 to Elm and Houston, with caution” was not recorded on the tapes, then the FBI would surely not have allowed it to be placed into the new transcript. Confirmation that the dispatchers had actually ordered all squads and not only the squads in the downtown area to proceed to Elm and Houston comes from DPD chief Curry himself. In a letter to the Warren Commission on July 17, 1964, Curry wrote; “…between 12:37 p.m. and 12:45 p.m., the dispatcher requested all squads to report to Elm and Houston in the downtown area, code 3” (WCD 1259, page 3). Curry then added; “It might further be pointed out that Officer Tippit remained on his district until the dispatcher had requested all squads to report to Elm and Houston…” (ibid). But perhaps most significantly of all, Jackson himself confirmed that all squads had been dispatched to Elm and Houston Streets in his filmed interview with Eddie Barker in 1967. According to Jackson; “…we immediately dispatched every available unit [squad] to the triple underpass where the shot was reported to have come from.” Myers mentions none of this to his readers.

    In light of all of the above, the notion that Jackson was only concerned that the Oak Cliff area was being “drained’ of available DPD Officers when all squads had been ordered to Elm and Houston seems strained. Jackson’s next transmission to Tippit was at approximately 12:54 pm, when he asked Tippit if he was in the Oak Cliff area (WCE 705/1974). Tippit allegedly responded that he was at Lancaster and Eighth. Jackson then allegedly instructed Tippit; “You will be at large for any emergency that comes in.” Keep in mind that the alleged order to Tippit and Nelson was to move into the central Oak Cliff area. On the day of the assassination, districts 93 and 94 were assigned to Officer Holley M. Ashcraft, and districts 108 and 109 were assigned to Officer Owen H. Ludwig (WCE 2645). Although the tape recordings of channel one of the DPD radio reveal that the dispatchers sent Ashcraft to Inwood road and Stemmons expressway to cut traffic (Listen to the recording), and although Ludwig was allegedly guarding the front of the Sheraton-Dallas-Hotel, Jackson never bothered to try and contact William Mentzel on the radio, who was on a lunch break at approximately the time of the assassination (ibid). None of the transcripts of the DPD radio communications show that Jackson had attempted to contact Mentzel; and the notion that Jackson would order Tippit and Nelson to move into the central Oak Cliff without even once bothering to contact Mentzel to ensure that Mentzel was patrolling his assigned districts (91 and 92) is also strained (ibid). Again, Myers does not mention to his readers that Jackson never bothered to contact Mentzel by the DPD radio.

    Finally, there is the fact that despite being allegedly ordered to move into the central Oak Cliff area, Ronald Nelson proceeded to Dealey Plaza, and even told the dispatcher that he had gone there at approximately 12:52 pm (WCE 705/1974). But despite disobeying Jackson’s order, we are supposed to believe that he had the audacity to then ask the dispatchers if they wanted him to go over to the Tippit murder scene (ibid). Myers explains that after Jackson allegedly ordered Tippit and Nelson to move into the central Oak Cliff area, Tippit responded; “I’m at Kiest and Bonnieview”, and Nelson allegedly responded that he is “…going North of Marsalis, on R.L. Thornton” (With Malice, Chapter 3). What Myers doesn’t mention is that the aforementioned alleged responses by Tippit and Nelson do not appear in either WCE 705 or Sawyer exhibit B. They first appear in WCE 1974. Myers also writes that Nelson told the dispatchers that he was at the South end of the Houston Street Viaduct (ibid). However, according to both WCE 705 and WCE 1974, the Officer who made the transmission was actually B.L. Bass; and that Bass had identified himself to the dispatchers by his radio number (101).

    When author Henry Hurt interviewed Nelson in 1984, he asked him; “Did you get the call to go to central Oak Cliff” (Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, page 162). After first telling Hurt that he wasn’t sure what he meant by his question, he then said “I had rather not talk about that” (ibid). According to Hurt, Nelson apparently considered that information to be worth some money (ibid). Myers explains that Nelson had declined a request for an interview with him (With Malice, Chapter 3). Nelson’s reluctance to be interviewed may have been due to the fact that he actually wasn’t ordered to move into the central Oak Cliff area, and that his explanation to Hurt that it was worth some money was just an excuse to discourage Hurt from talking about it with him. Suffice it to say, the notion that Tippit and Nelson were ordered to move into the central Oak Cliff area is dubious, and the transcripts and tape recordings of the DPD radio communications were in all likelihood altered to make it appear as though they actually were sent into the central Oak Cliff area.

    Obviously, the DPD had to provide an explanation for what Tippit was doing there; hence Jackson was coerced into claiming that he had sent them into central Oak Cliff. In this reviewer’s opinion, the DPD claimed that Nelson was also sent into central Oak Cliff so that they wouldn’t make it appear obvious that they were covering up for Tippit’s singular presence there. But did Jackson also have a personal reason for lying about Tippit’s presence in central Oak Cliff? As it turns out, there is. Jackson told Henry Hurt during an interview with him that he was a very close personal friend of both Tippit and his family (Hurt, Reasonable doubt, page 162). As any reasonable person would be able to understand, Tippit’s unauthorised presence in central Oak Cliff would have led to rumours which would probably be upsetting for his family members. Jackson may have thought that by claiming he had ordered Tippit to move into the central Oak Cliff area, he would be sparing Tippit’s family members of these upsetting rumours.

    In his timetable of events which occurred on the day of the assassination, Myers writes that Tippit was at the GLOCO (Good luck Oil Company) service station, located on 1502 North Zangs Blvd., apparently watching traffic “coming out of downtown.”, from about 12:56 pm to 1:06 pm (With Malice, Timetable of events). In the endnotes, Myers cites David Lifton’s interview with a photographer named Al Volkland, who told him that he was well acquainted with Tippit, and that he had seen him at the service station. Volkland’s claim of seeing Tippit there was allegedly confirmed by his wife; and both claimed that they observed Tippit at the service station 10 or 20 minutes following the assassination. Furthermore, J.B. “Shorty” Lewis and Emmett Hollingshead, who were employed at the service station, and Tom Mullins who was the owner of the station at the time of the assassination, also claimed they had seen Tippit there (With Malice, Chapter 3).

    In his endnotes, Myers also cites the Ramparts magazine article by David Welsh, in which Welsh wrote that Lewis, Hollingshead, and Mullins claimed Tippit was at the service station for about ten minutes, between 12:45 pm and 1:00 pm. However, Myers explains that in an interview with him in 1983, Hollingshead claimed that he had seen Tippit at the service station before the President was assassinated. Myers also claims that in an interview with him in 1983, Lewis said that other employees of the service station had seen Tippit there, and not him. Myers offers no source for why he believes Tippit arrived at the service station at 12:56 pm, and as this reviewer explains below, there is compelling evidence that Tippit was actually shot at about 1:06 pm. If Tippit really was at the service station, his presence there is a mystery. Whilst Myers doesn’t believe that Tippit was at the service station by 12:45 pm, and that he only moved into the central Oak Cliff area following the alleged order by Murray Jackson to do so, he nevertheless ignores all of the compelling evidence that Jackson didn’t order Tippit to move into the central Oak Cliff area.

    According to the DPD radio transmission transcripts, Murray Jackson asked Tippit for his location at approximately 1:03 pm, but received no response (WCE 705/1974). However, Myers writes that as the dispatchers were trying to determine the location of Officer A.D. Duncan, a garbled transmission was made that had the tonal characteristics of other “known” transmissions made by Tippit (With Malice, Chapter 3). In his endnotes, Myers explains that the transcripts describe the alleged transmission by Tippit as “more interference”, which is true (WCE 705/1974). In fact, according to the transcripts of the DPD radio communications, the interference was due to “…intermodulation similar, according to [the] Dallas Police Department, to that most often originating from the Dallas Power and light company” (ibid). Given Myers skewed conclusion driven agenda , as demonstrated throughout this review, readers are cautioned against believing much of what Myers writes. According to Myers, Tippit was at the Tip Top Records store at 1:11 pm, where he was allegedly trying to place a phone call to someone (With Malice, Chapter 3). However, given that Tippit didn’t respond to Jackson at 1:03 pm, Tippit was probably in the store at this point in time. If Tippit really was in the store trying to call someone, it remains a mystery as to who it was, and why he was trying to call him/her.

    IV: Murder on Tenth Street

    Myers now discusses Tippit’s murder on Tenth Street, and the events that followed. It is Myers contention that Tippit was shot at approximately 1:14.30 pm (With Malice, Chapter 4). Myers writes that the tape recordings of the DPD radio communications show that Domingo Benavides had attempted to inform the DPD dispatchers of Tippit’s death at 1:16 pm, as the tape recordings show that he began “keying” Tippit’s microphone at that time; and had been doing so for about one minute and forty one seconds. Based on the eyewitness account of Ted Callaway , Myers then speculates that Tippit was probably shot ninety seconds prior to Benavides attempt to contact the dispatcher (ibid). However, let’s look at all the evidence that Myers ignores to reach his conclusion that Tippit was shot at about 1:14.30 pm. To begin with, Myers never informs his readers that according to WCE 705, T.F. Bowley, who had arrived at the murder scene shortly following Tippit’s death, reported Tippit’s death just prior to 1:10 pm! In WCE 1974 however, the time of Bowley’s transmission was noted as being made at about 1:19 pm.

    Bowley claimed in his affidavit to the DPD that when he arrived at the Tippit murder scene, he looked at his watch and it read 1:10 pm. He also claimed that the first thing he did was to try and help Tippit, and then informed the DPD dispatchers that Tippit was shot (Dallas municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 14). Assuming that Bowley took no more than a minute to try and help Tippit before informing the dispatchers of the shooting, the actual time of Bowley’s arrival would have been approximately 1:09 pm. Nevertheless, both WCE 705 and Bowley’s watch place Tippit’s death sooner than Myers time of 1:14.30. Myers deals with Bowley’s watch reading 1:10 pm in his endnotes, where he writes that no one determined whether Bowley’s watch was accurate on the day of the assassination. Whilst we will probably never know just how accurate Bowley’s watch was, WCE 705 places Bowley’s transmission at about 1:10 pm, which is fairly consistent with Bowley’s claim his watch read 1:10 pm after he arrived.

    In his endnotes, Myers also deals with the allegation by Mrs. Margie Higgins, who lived 150 feet east of and across the street from where Tippit was shot. As Myers writes, Mrs. Higgins told author Barry Ernest that she was watching the news, when the announcer stated that the time was 1:06 pm (Ernest, The Girl On The Stairs, page 90). Mrs Higgins told Ernest that she then checked the clock on top of the TV, which confirmed that the time was 1:06 pm, and that it was at that point when she heard the shooting. Myers tries to discredit Mrs Higgins’ claim by telling his readers that, “A review of archival recordings of all three networks broadcasting that afternoon in Dallas failed to verify her [Mrs Higgins’] recollection.” Myers then adds “In fact, none of the networks broadcast a time check at 1:06 p.m. as she claimed.” Although this review cannot verify whether this is true or not, readers are once again cautioned against taking Myers word for it, for this reviewer demonstrates throughout this review that Myers is not a candid or balanced researcher. Readers should also keep in mind that Mrs. Higgins’ claim is consistent with Helen Markham’s claim in her affidavit that she was standing on the corner of Tenth and Patton Streets at approximately 1:06 pm when Tippit was shot (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Item 18).

    Both Markham’s and Mrs Higgins’ claims are also consistent with the fact that Markham told FBI agent Robert M. Barrett that when she left the Washateria of her apartment to catch her bus, she noticed the time shown on the clock of the Washateria was 1:04 pm (WCD 630). Markham explained to Barrett that she was attempting to call her daughter on the Washateria phone (ibid). The FBI determined that it would have taken Markham about two and a half minutes to reach the intersection of Tenth and Patton Streets, which means Markham would have arrived at the intersection close to 1:07 pm (ibid). Myers acknowledges in his book that Markham reportedly left the Washateria at 1:04 pm, but claims that Markham “probably” didn’t leave the Washateria before 1:11 pm, and speculates that this was perhaps the case because of her “eagerness” to contact her daughter by phone (With Malice, Chapter 4). In his endnotes, Myers snidely writes that in order to believe the statements by Markham, Higgins, and Bowley of when Tippit was killed; “…one would have to believe that Tippit lay dead in the Street for eight to twelve minutes before anyone notified [the] Police.” But only by ignoring the fact that WCE 705 places the time of Bowley’s radio transmission at approximately 1:10 pm can Myers make this claim and think that he can get away with it.

    Myers writes that the Dudley Hughes Funeral home, which had dispatched the ambulance which took Tippit’s body to Methodist hospital, was informed of the shooting at 1:18 pm by the DPD, and that Dudley M. Hughes Junior, who took the call from the DPD at the funeral home, allegedly filled out an ambulance call slip which was time stamped 1:18 pm (With Malice, Chapter 5). Myers references this call slip to an essay by researchers George and Patricia Nash in The New Leader entitled: The Other Witnesses (John Armstrong Baylor collection, tab entitled: George & Patricia Nash). However, the call slip itself doesn’t appear to be amongst the Dallas Municipal archives collection, and taking into account all of the evidence which contradicts the notion that the funeral home received the call at 1:18 pm, this piece of evidence should be considered unreliable. Of course, it is entirely likely that if the ambulance call slip actually exists, the DPD had falsified it in order to bolster the notion that Tippit was shot close to 1:18 pm; and thereby allowing Oswald plenty of time to reach Tenth and Patton in order to shoot Tippit after he allegedly left the rooming house at 1026 North Beckley.

    Readers should keep in mind that justice of the peace, Joe B. Brown, filled out an authorisation permit for an autopsy to be performed on Tippit’s body, and in that permit, Brown noted that Tippit was pronounced dead on arrival at Methodist hospital, and noted the time of death as 1:15 pm (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 24, Item 2). Although there is conflicting evidence for the time Tippit was pronounced dead at Methodist hospital, researcher Martin Hay discovered that in a supplementary offense report by DPD Officers R.A. Davenport and W.R. Bardin, Dr. Richard Liguori pronounced Tippit dead at Methodist Hospital at 1:15 pm (ReopenKennedycase forum, thread entitled: Question Concerning Time). Given the fact that (according to WCE 705) T.F. Bowley’s transmission to the DPD dispatchers was at approximately 1:10 pm, and given all of the aforementioned evidence which supports the notion that Tippit was shot prior to 1:10 pm and then taken to Methodist Hospital where he was most likely pronounced dead at 1:15 pm, Myers assertion that Tippit was shot at 1:14.30 pm is simply not tenable.

    According to WCE 705, Tippit allegedly tried to contact the DPD dispatchers twice at approximately 1:08 pm. However, these alleged transmissions are curiously missing from WCE 1974; and instead, there appears to be two garbled transmission from DPD Officers with the radio numbers 58 and 488. Although some researchers believe that the alleged call by Tippit at circa 1:08 pm is proof that Tippit was still alive at that time, and that he was attempting to report that he had just encountered a suspect, there is good reason to believe that this alleged call was added into the transcript by the DPD. Consider that with Helen Markham’s first day affidavit, the DPD would have realised that Tippit was killed at approximately 1:06 pm. It is this reviewer’s opinion that the DPD took advantage of the fact that there were two garbled transmissions at about 1:08 pm, and claimed that it was Tippit to make it appear as though he was alive after 1:06 pm.

    As far as Tippit’s alleged attempts to report that he had just encountered a suspect are concerned, the discovery of the wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene strongly implies that Tippit was lured to Tenth Street to be shot. With this in mind, the last thing the conspirators would surely have wanted was for Tippit to become suspicious. Therefore, it seems very unlikely that Tippit actually attempted to report that he had encountered a suspect. Myers never mentions that WCE 705 shows that Tippit attempted to contact the dispatchers, writing instead that: “A check of the Dallas Police tapes revealed that Tippit did not notify the dispatcher that he was stopping to question the man on Tenth Street” (With Malice, Chapter 4). It is this reviewer’s belief that Myers never mentions Tippit’s alleged attempts to contact the dispatchers, because he was probably concerned that his readers would think that Tippit had stopped “Oswald” at about 1:08 pm; and by implication, was also shot at this time.

    This reviewer would also like to point out that when T.F. Bowley reported the shooting to the DPD dispatchers, Murray Jackson allegedly responded by calling out Tippit’s radio number (78), because according to Myers, Tippit was “…thought to be the only available patrol unit in the Oak Cliff area.” (ibid) By ignoring all the evidence that the DPD radio traffic tape recordings have been altered, Myers can pretend that Jackson really did call for Tippit.

    Furthermore, in an apparent attempt to explain why Jackson immediately thought of calling for Tippit instead of William Mentzel, Myers writes in his endnotes that Mentzel, and another officer named Vernon R. Nolan, were sent to a traffic accident at about 1:11 pm. Curiously, there is nothing within WCE 705 and WCE 1974 that Mentzel was sent to a traffic accident.

    Another issue which Myers discusses in this chapter is the direction in which the killer was walking when he was spotted by Tippit. Based on the observations by William Lawrence Smith, Jimmy Burt, Jimmy Brewer, and William Scoggins, Myers concludes that Tippit’s killer was initially walking west (ibid). This reviewer agrees. However, readers should keep in mind that in his interview with the FBI on December 15, 1963, Burt made no mention of seeing Tippit’s killer at all (WCD 194, page 29). Based on the statements of witnesses Helen Markham and Jack Ray Tatum, Myers speculates that Tippit’s killer then turned around and was walking east when he observed Tippit’s squad car approaching, and that this is what caused Tippit to pull over to the curb and question his soon to be killer (ibid). According to Myers: “The eyewitness accounts depict the suspect traveling in two conflicting directions, with the key moment of change occurring just east of Tenth and Patton” (ibid). But as even Myers ironically notes at the end of this chapter, Helen Markham told the USSS on December 2, 1963, that she first observed Tippit’s killer on the sidewalk after Tippit had pulled his squad car to the curb (ibid). Myers also notes that on March 17, 1964, Markham told FBI agent Robert M. Barrett that she had first seen Tippit’s killer as Tippit passed the intersection of Tenth and Patton (ibid). When Markham testified before the Warren Commission, she claimed that she saw Tippit’s killer crossing Patton street (heading east), and about to step up onto the curb (WC Volume III, page 307).

    Not only do Markham’s statements directly contradict Myers assertion that the killer changed direction just east of Tenth and Patton, but given her overall unreliability as a witness, her claim that she had observed Tippit’s killer walking east should not be considered credible. Also, consider that in her affidavit to the DPD, she made no mention of which direction Tippit’s killer was walking when she first observed him (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Item 18). According to researcher John Armstrong, a barber named Mr Clark claimed he had also seen Tippit’s killer walking west along Tenth Street, and that he would bet his life that the man he saw was Oswald However, Clark does not count as a witness to seeing Tippit’s killer walking west along Tenth Street, because he claimed he saw the man in the morning, whereas Tippit was most certainly there after 1:00 pm in the afternoon (John Armstrong Baylor research collection, tab entitled: 10th St. Barber shop).

    Myers also explains to his readers that a Mrs Ann McCravey (believed to be Mrs Ann McRavin who allegedly lived at 404 east Tenth Street) claimed that she had seen Tippit’s killer running (With Malice, Chapter 4). Although McRavin didn’t specify which direction she had seen Tippit’s killer running, Myers writes that given her vantage point; “…Tippit’s killer could only have been running in a westerly direction [when she saw him]…” (ibid). But contrary to McRavin’s claim, no other witness is on record saying that Tippit’s killer was running, and given the evidence that Tippit was lured to Tenth Street to be shot, it seems highly unlikely that his killer would have been running and making himself appear suspicious to Tippit. Therefore, if she really did see Tippit’s killer, her claim that he was running should not be considered credible.

    As far as Jack Tatum is concerned, there is good reason to believe that he may be a phony witness used not only to help incriminate Oswald for Tippit’s murder, but to also help explain the presence of a suspicious red Ford at the Tippit murder scene. When Tatum was interviewed by HSCA investigators on February 1, 1978, he claimed that after he witnessed Tippit being shot in the head, he sped off in his car, and made no mention of having returned to the murder scene (HSCA report, Volume XII, page 41). In fact, when Tatum was asked if there was anything he wished to add to the statement he made to investigators Jack Moriarty and Joe Bastori, he replied; “At this time I can’t think of anything.” (John Armstrong Baylor research collection, tab entitled: Jack Tatum). However, when Myers interviewed Tatum in 1983/84, Tatum now began to aggrandize his story and his importance in it. He now claimed that he had gone back to the Tippit murder scene, and had taken Helen Markham to a policeman (With Malice, Chapter 4). Evidently, by the time Myers had interviewed him, Tatum had experienced a case of memory improvement. It is also noteworthy that during a telephone interview on March 18, 1986, Tatum allegedly stated that he had taken Markham to the police station to give evidence (John Armstrong Baylor research collection, tab entitled: Jack Tatum). However, this allegation is dubious. As Myers acknowledges in his book, Markham was taken to DPD headquarters by an officer named George W. Hammer (With Malice, Chapter 7). According to the transcripts of the DPD radio communications, Hammer was indeed the officer who took Markham to DPD headquarters (WCE 705/1974).

    Whilst Myers and his ilk will probably argue that the interviewer was in error, the truth is that no intellectually honest researcher should assume that this was the case, and then argue that Tatum definitely didn’t make such a claim. Readers should also bear in mind that Tatum didn’t come forward as a witness shortly following Tippit’s murder because he allegedly thought that there were enough witnesses, and that he didn’t think he could “add anything” (John Armstrong Baylor research collection, tab entitled: Jack Tatum). During his aforementioned telephone interview, Tatum also claimed that he was concerned about rumors of a conspiracy, and in particular a Mafia one; and that this may have been another reason for him remaining quiet (ibid). Perhaps the most significant detail about Tatum is that he was employed by the Baylor Medical Centre in Dallas, which, according to researcher William Kelly, had received funds from both the U.S. Army and the CIA for the heinous MK/ULTRA research, between the years 1963 and 1965 (John Simkin’s education forum, thread entitled: Frank Kaiser). As many researchers have pointed out, the CIA has been involved in the cover-up of Oswald as President Kennedy’s assassin. Therefore, the possibility exists that the CIA may have been involved in coercing Tatum into identifying Oswald as Tippit’s killer in order to bolster the notion that he was President Kennedy’s assassin. Whilst this reviewer feels certain that Myers will dismiss this as ridiculous, it nevertheless remains a possibility.

    When Domingo Benavides testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that a man in a red colored Ford had stopped and pulled over following the shooting, and that he never saw him get out of his car (WC Volume VI, page 463). During his interview with John Berendt from Esquire magazine, Benavides claimed that the car he had seen was red colored Ford with a white top, and that it came back to the Tippit murder scene a few minutes following the shooting (John Armstrong Baylor research collection, tab entitled: Igor Vaganov). Jack Tatum claimed that the car he was driving in when he arrived at the Tippit murder scene was a red colored 1964 model Ford Galaxie 500 (With Malice, Chapter 10). Whilst Myers readily accepts that the car Benavides had seen belonged to Jack Tatum, several researchers are of the opinion that it actually belonged to Igor Vaganov, who quite possibly played a role in Tippit’s murder (see the thread entitled Igor Vaganov on John Simkin’s Education Forum). Whilst this reviewer believes that the driver of the red Ford was quite possibly Igor Vaganov, it is also this reviewer’s opinion that Tatum was quite likely pushed into saying that he was the man driving the red Ford to help dispel the notion that the car belonged to Vaganov. As for why Tatum wasn’t coerced into coming forward sooner with his tale, this reviewer cannot offer an explanation. On a final note, Tatum may have been coerced into saying that Oswald was walking east to make it appear as though Tippit had stopped “Oswald” because he had turned around after seeing Tippit approaching in his squad car; just as Myers contends.

    V: Search for a killer

    Myers now explains to the readers the search for Tippit’s killer by the DPD, beginning with the discovery of the spent shell casings on the sixth floor of the TSBD by Dallas County deputy Sheriff, Luke Mooney (With Malice, Chapter 5). Myers believes that DPD Sgt. Gerald Hill was on the sixth floor when Mooney discovered the spent shell casings. But as this reviewer will explain in an upcoming essay on Hill, there is very good reason to believe that Hill was on the sixth floor of the TSBD before Mooney discovered the spent shell casings. Myers writes that the first officer to arrive at the Tippit murder scene was Kenneth Hudson Croy, who was a sergeant in the DPD reserves (With Malice, Chapter 5). According to Myers, the next Officer to arrive at the scene was Howell W. Summers, arriving about one minute after Kenneth Croy, circa 1:20 pm. However, according to the transcripts of channel one of the DPD radio transmissions, Officer Summers informs the dispatchers that he is at the murder scene after 1:25 pm, and after Officers Joe M. Poe, Leonard E. Jez, and Sgt. Calvin “Bud” Owens report that they have arrived at the murder scene (WCE 705/1974).

    Now if Summers was the second Officer to arrive, he waited for over five minutes before telling the dispatchers he arrived, which seems ridiculous. Although this reviewer doesn’t know why Myers doesn’t point this out to his readers, the fact that he doesn’t speaks poorly for his credibility. But in order to bolster the notion that Summers was the second Officer to arrive, Myers writes in his endnotes that Officer Roy W. Walker, who broadcast the first description of Tippit’s killer at about 1:22 pm, told him during an interview in 1983 that when he (Walker) arrived at the murder scene, there were two Officers already there. One of the Officers would undoubtedly have been reserve Sgt. Kenneth Croy. However, the identity of the second Officer to arrive (if Walker’s recollection was accurate) remains an open question.

    According to both WCE 705 and 1974, at approximately 1:32 pm, DPD Officer Jerry Pollard informs the dispatchers on channel one of the DPD radio that; “They [witnesses] say he [the killer] is running west in the alley between Jefferson and Tenth [Streets]”. Myers explains that the two witnesses who gave this information to the DPD Officers were Jimmy Burt and William Arthur Smith (With Malice, chapter 5). In his endnotes, Myers sources this claim to Burt’s interview with Al Chapman in 1968. According to Burt’s interview with the FBI on December 16, 1963, Burt claimed that “…he ran to the intersection of 10th and Patton and when he [Burt] was close enough to Patton Street to see to the south he saw the man running into an alley located between 10th and Jefferson Avenue on Patton Street. The man ran in the alley to the right would be running west at this point.” (WCD 194, page 29). However, Burt was most certainly lying, as no less than four witnesses; Warren Reynolds, B.M. “Pat” Patterson, L.J. Lewis, and Harold Russell, claimed they observed the gunman turn west from Patton Street onto Jefferson Blvd. (With Malice, Chapter 4). When Burt was interviewed by Al Chapman in 1968, he claimed that he and William Arthur Smith “…got to the alley [between Tenth and Jefferson] and we kind of come to a stop and looked down the alley and we saw this guy down there. He was down almost to the next street.” (With Malice, Chapter 4). Myers then writes that Burt and Smith may have been the last two witnesses to see Tippit’s killer fleeing west along the alley behind the Texaco Service station located on Jefferson Blvd. (ibid).

    In his endnotes, Myers acknowledges the discrepancies between Burt’s remarks to the FBI and his remarks to Al Chapman, but tries to explain the discrepancy by stating that because of his police record, his trouble with the U.S. Military, and his alleged desire to withhold his identity from the DPD, Burt possibly “altered” his 1963 interview with the FBI to avoid “deeper” involvement in the case. However, this appears to be nothing but a pathetic attempt at trying to conceal the fact that Burt lied during his interview with Al Chapman, and that the so-called radio transmission by Officer Pollard was probably added into the recordings/transcripts of the DPD radio transmissions to dismiss the possibility that Tippit’s real killer was hiding inside the Abundant Life Temple, located on the corner of Tenth and Crawford Streets (this reviewer will elaborate on this in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill). Now if Burt really was concerned about all of the above as Myers claims, then why the heck would he lie to the FBI when he surely would have realized that he would be getting himself into more trouble? Myers also acknowledges in his endnotes that William Arthur Smith informed both the FBI and the Warren Commission that he and Burt did not follow the gunman, and also acknowledges that when he (Myers) interviewed Smith in 1997, Smith was unable to recall if they had followed the killer or not. Given all of the above, and despite what Myers wants his readers to believe, Burt should not be considered a credible witness.

    VI: Closing in

    Myers begins this chapter with a discussion of the false alarm at the Jefferson branch Library located on Marsalis and Jefferson streets, and concludes the chapter with Oswald’s arrest inside the Texas Theater. The person who triggered the false alarm at the library was Adrian Hamby, who worked there as a page (With Malice, Chapter 6). Hamby was approached by two plainclothes DPD “detectives”, and was allegedly told to go into the Library and inform management that a Police Officer was shot, and to have them lock all the doors and to not let anyone enter the Library until they secured the area (ibid). As Hamby was entering the Library, he was allegedly spotted by DPD Officer Charles T. Walker, after which Walker put a broadcast on the DPD radio that the suspect was in the library (WCE 705/1974). In his report to DPD Chief Jesse Curry, detective Marvin Buhk wrote that there were “Secret Service” men at the Jefferson Branch Library who informed DPD Officers at the Library that after Adrian Hamby came out of the Library, one of them claimed that Hamby was not the suspect (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 56).

    In his endnotes, Myers writes that detective Buhk was the only officer to mention Secret Service agents being at the Library. As far as this reviewer in concerned, Myers is correct. Myers also writes that the “Secret Service” man referred to by Buhk in his report was actually one of the two “lawmen” who instructed Hamby to go into the library and have all the doors locked. The fact of the matter is that there is no known evidence that any genuine Secret Service agents were present at the Jefferson Branch Library on the day of the assassination. Furthermore, the identity of the two men who spoke to Hamby has never been determined, and if they were DPD detectives, then surely their identity would be known to Buhk and others, and surely Buhk would not have referred to them as Secret Service agents. One alternative explanation is that the so-called Secret Service men may have been conspirators, who may have deliberately triggered the false alarm at the Library to pull the DPD Officers away from the Abundant Life Temple, where Tippit’s actual killer was perhaps hiding (this reviewer will be discussing this theory in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill). The possibility that these “Secret Service” men were conspirators is bolstered by the fact that several men who identified themselves as Secret Service men were present in Dealey Plaza shortly following President Kennedy’s assassination (readers are encouraged to read through this article on this reviewer’s blog). In his dismissal of the “Secret Service” men at the Library as being nothing sinister, Myers never mentions the fact that men identifying themselves as Secret Service men were present in Dealey Plaza.

    As perhaps every researcher of the JFK assassination is aware, Oswald was apprehended inside the Texas Theater after he allegedly tried to shoot Officer M. Nick McDonald with the revolver he supposedly used to murder Tippit. Myers’ discussion of the scuffle inside the theater with Oswald is perhaps the low point of his book, a considerable negative achievement. The author deliberately ignores evidence which contradicts the notion that Oswald had pulled out the revolver and tried to shoot Officer McDonald. Before entering the theater, Oswald was allegedly spotted by shoe store owner Johnny Calvin Brewer outside the lobby of his store on Jefferson Blvd., as he was allegedly trying to avoid the DPD (With Malice, Chapter 6). Brewer then allegedly observed Oswald duck into the theater behind Julia Elizabeth Postal, who was the cashier at the theater (ibid). Myers explains that Oswald had not paid for a ticket, and that Postal had seen Oswald “out of the corner of her eye” as he was coming towards the theater from the east (ibid). During her testimony before the Warren Commission, Postal claimed that she informed the DPD over the telephone that she hadn’t heard of Oswald’s description, but then described him as “ruddy looking.” (WC Volume VII, page 11).

    Towards the end of her testimony, counsel Joseph Ball showed Postal the shirt Oswald was wearing (WCE 150), when he was arrested inside the theatre. He asked her; “when he went in [to the Theater] was it [the shirt] tucked into his pants when he went in?” to which Postal responded; “No, sir; because I remember he came flying around the corner, because his hair was and his shirt was waving.”, and that “It [the shirt] was hanging out”! (ibid). So if Postal had merely seen “Oswald” out of the corner of her eye, how on Earth was she able to describe all of the above? The simple answer is that she did not see “Oswald” out of the corner of her eye, but actually got a good view of him. But, ironically, she also testified that she did not see him enter the theatre.

    Another pertinent piece of information which Myers omits is that when researcher Jones Harris allegedly interviewed Postal in 1963, Harris asked her if she had sold Oswald a ticket for the theater. Upon hearing the question, Postal burst into tears. When Harris asked her again if she had sold him a ticket, he received the same response. The obvious implication of Postal’s reaction is that she did sell a ticket to Oswald. Although this reviewer discusses evidence further on in this review which casts doubt on Harris’s credibility as far as the wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell is concerned, Postal’s own testimony as described above suggests that she did in fact sell Oswald a ticket. In fact, in both her affidavit to the DPD and in her interview with the FBI on February 29, 1964, she claimed that she had seen/noticed Oswald duck into the Theater (WCD 735, page 264), (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 21) . As the reader can see, Postal is a problematic witness. And it appears to be that she did sell Oswald a ticket.

    Which makes Johnny Brewer problematic. Brewer testified that he had seen Oswald duck into the theater without paying for a ticket (WC Volume VII, page 4). However, he also testified that he had asked Postal if she sold him a ticket (ibid). When Counsel Joseph Ball enquired why Brewer had asked Postal if she sold Oswald a ticket, he said that he didn’t know! (ibid, page 5). The notion that Brewer would have to ask Postal if she had sold a ticket to Oswald, when he already knew the answer is far fetched. Brewer, along with Warren “Butch” Burroughs, who worked behind the concession stand inside the theater, then allegedly searched the theater to find Oswald (With Malice, Chapter 6). After they were unable to find him, Postal called the police (ibid). One important detail which Myers never mentions in his book is that Brewer told author Ian Griggs during an interview in 1996 that when he allegedly observed Oswald standing outside his store, there were two men from IBM in the store with him (Griggs, No Case to Answer, page 58). According to researcher Lee Farley, one of the two so-called “IBM men” was quite possibly Igor Vaganov (see the thread entitled Igor Vaganov on John Simkin’s education forum). This reviewer believes that Vaganov was likely one of the two “IBM” men in the store, and that the purpose of these two men was to alert Brewer that they had seen a man enter the theater with a gun looking like he was trying to hide from the police, so that Brewer would then alert the theater staff to call the DPD in order for Oswald to be arrested.

    Readers should keep in mind that when Warren Commission counsel David Belin asked Brewer how he found out about President Kennedy’s assassination, he testified that; “We were listening to a transistor radio there in the store…” (WC Volume VII, page 2). Belin however, didn’t both to ask Brewer who was in the store with him. Although Postal and Brewer were the two people who purportedly led the DPD to the Theater, the DPD never bothered to take affidavits from them on the day of the assassination. In fact, Postal and Brewer provided their affidavits to the DPD on December 4 and 6, 1963, respectively (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Items 16 and 21). On the other hand, George Applin, who witnessed Oswald’s arrest inside the Texas Theater, provided the DPD an affidavit on the day of the assassination (Ibid, Folder 2, Item 3). Similarly, many of the people who witnessed the President’s assassination provided affidavits on the day of the assassination. Yet, incredibly, Postal and Brewer provided affidavits to the DPD over a week following the assassination. Curiously, there doesn’t appear to be an affidavit from Warren “Butch” Burroughs amongst the Dallas Municipal archives. Furthermore, according to both Warren Burroughs and a theater patron named Jack Davis, Oswald may have been inside the theater much sooner than when Brewer allegedly saw him outside his store at about 1:36 pm looking “funny/scared”

    After the police arrived at the Theater, the first Officer to approach Oswald as he was sitting down was Nick McDonald. Although Johnny Brewer was credited with pointing Oswald out to the DPD Officers inside the theater, Myers writes in his endnotes that the Dallas Morning News and the Dallas Times Herald published an article two days after the assassination, in which McDonald was quoted as saying; “A man sitting near the front, and I still don’t know who it was, tipped me [that] the man I wanted was sitting on the third row from the rear on the ground floor and not the balcony.” However, Brewer testified that he pointed Oswald out to the officers as he was standing on the stage of the theater (WC Volume VII, page 6) If McDonald’s account is true, then the obvious implication is that Brewer wasn’t the man who pointed Oswald out to the police. Myers evidently wants his readers to believe that the man was in fact Johnny Brewer, but doesn’t mention that Brewer was standing on the stage when he allegedly pointed Oswald out to the Officers.

    When Officer McDonald testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed he ordered Oswald to stand up, after which Oswald raised both of his hands and then allegedly yelled out “Well, it is all over now” (WC Volume III, page 300). Although McDonald also wrote in his arrest report to DPD Chief Jesse Curry that Oswald said “Well, it’s all over now”, this is not what McDonald initially claimed Oswald had said to him (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 32). When McDonald was interviewed by WFAA-TV on the day following the assassination, he explained that Oswald said “This is it” (See the video). What’s most telling about the interview is that McDonald looks down to the table and sounds nervous (both of which are indications of lying) as he explains that Oswald said “This is it”. Myers doesn’t mention this discrepancy to his readers. Furthermore, when McDonald was interviewed by Lloyd Shearer, he told Shearer that he heard Oswald say “Now, it’s all over” (Oakland Tribune Parade, March 8, 1964). When Gerald Hill testified before the Warren Commission, he informed Counsel David Belin that he thought McDonald and Officer Thomas Hutson (who was also involved in Oswald’s arrest), said that they heard Oswald say “This is it”; but that he didn’t hear this himself (WC Volume VII, page 51). However, when Hutson was asked by Counsel David Belin if he remembered hearing Oswald say anything, Hutson said that he didn’t (WC Volume VII, page 32). It would therefore seem that Hill may have been embellishing.

    When Ian Griggs interviewed Johnny Brewer in 1996, Brewer told him that he heard Oswald shout out “It’s all over”; or words to that effect (Griggs, No Case to Answer, page 64). But when Brewer testified before the Warren Commission, Brewer merely claimed that he heard some hollering, and that he couldn’t make out exactly what Oswald said (WC Volume VII, page 6). Contained within the John Armstrong Baylor collection is an interview with a little known witness named David. According to David, he was with a friend named Bob in the theater when Oswald was arrested (John Armstrong Baylor collection, tab entitled: ‘David’). Evidently, David and Bob are the two young boys spotted by Officer Thomas Hutson sitting at the rear of the theater (WC Volume VII, page 31). David claimed that when McDonald approached Oswald and asked him to stand-up, the only thing he recalled Oswald saying was words similar to “All right”, and made no mention of him saying anything else The reader should bear in mind that there doesn’t appear to be any direct corroboration for the presence of Bob and David in the theater when Oswald was arrested. Yet, none of the above is even mentioned by Myers.

    In his report to Dallas Sheriff Bill Decker, Deputy Sheriff Buddy Walthers, who also allegedly witnessed Oswald’s arrest, wrote that the only thing he heard Oswald say was “It’s all over” (WC Volume XIX, Decker exhibit 5323). However, after reading through Walther’s report, it isn’t clear whether Walthers was saying Oswald said “it’s all over” before or after he was arrested; and as this reviewer will explain in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill, former Dallas deputy sheriffs Bill Courson and Roger Craig have disputed Walther’s claim that he was inside the theater when Oswald was arrested. Readers should keep in mind that none of the other officers involved in Oswald’s arrest, or theater patrons John Gibson and George Applin who witnessed his arrest, claimed they heard Oswald shout out either “This is it” or “Well, it’s all over now” as McDonald claimed.

    As Myers writes in his book, FBI agent Robert M. Barrett, who also witnessed Oswald’s arrest, claimed in the report he wrote out on the day of the assassination that Oswald shouted in a loud voice; “Kill all the sons of bitches!” (With Malice, Chapter 6). But what Myers doesn’t tell his readers is that no other witness to Oswald’s arrest said that they heard him shout out words similar to what Barrett claimed he did; and that Barrett was almost certainly lying. In conclusion, it is readily apparent that McDonald was lying when he claimed that Oswald said; “This is it” or “Well, it’s all over now”. It is utterly inconceivable that McDonald could have confused the expressions “This is it” with “Well, it’s all over now” as they sound nothing alike. But Myers cannot admit that McDonald (and Barrett for that matter) were lying; as their agenda is to convince researchers that Oswald was guilty of killing Tippit beyond any doubt. Readers are encouraged to read through this article on this reviewer’s blog, which further demonstrates that McDonald was a liar.

    We now come to the question of whether or not Oswald tried to shoot Officer McDonald after McDonald ordered him to stand up; and whether Oswald did in fact have a gun when he was arrested. Although Myers admits in his endnotes that McDonald told Eddie Barker from CBS that he prevented “Oswald’s” gun from firing when his hand was allegedly jammed between the primer of the gun and the hammer, he nevertheless omits that when detective Paul Bentley was interviewed by reporters on the day following the assassination, he claimed that he prevented it from firing! (WCE 2157). However, Bentley also claimed that “…we [evidently referring to McDonald] got a thumb or something in between the hammer and the firing pin so that it mashed the firing [of the gun]…” and that the hammer of the gun “just snapped slightly” (ibid). But despite being allegedly confused about who had prevented the gun from firing, Bentley then almost humorously said; “…my hand was across to prevent it from firing…we don’t know if it was my thumb, finger or hand. I got a bruised hand from it. I don’t know if it was the thumb or the finger.” (ibid). Even though a photograph taken inside the Texas theater shows Bentley standing to the right of Oswald as he is apparently being handcuffed, there is no corroboration from McDonald or anyone else that Bentley prevented the gun from firing as he described (see Gerald Hill Exhibit A). It is therefore probable that Bentley was lying.

    Myers writes in his endnotes that WFAA-TV cameraman, Tom Alyea, claimed that he had seen a bandaged wound on McDonald’s hand during a filmed interview, but that when Alyea wanted to film it, McDonald objected. Although this would seem to corroborate McDonald’s claim that his hand had been jammed between the hammer and the firing pin of the revolver, Alyea described it as looking like someone had jabbed an ice-pick into it. In other words, it didn’t appear as though it was caused by the hammer of a revolver. If McDonald already had this injury before the scuffle with Oswald, then perhaps this is what gave him the idea later on to claim that the hammer of the gun had struck the fleshy part of his hand. Also, given that McDonald made no mention of his hand preventing the gun from firing in either his report to DPD chief Jesse Curry or during his testimony before the Warren Commission, it is apparent he has a credibility problem. McDonald also testified that the four inch scar on his left cheek was made by “Oswald’s” revolver during the scuffle inside the theater (WC Volume III, page 300). However, according to FBI agent Robert M. Barrett, McDonald told him that the graze on his left cheek was caused by Oswald punching him in the face, and knocking him against the seat; and not by the gun (WCD 5, page 84). Myers does not mention this contradiction in his book.

    Although McDonald implies in his report to DPD Chief Jesse Curry that officers Ray Hawkins, Charles Walker, and Thomas Hutson were with him when Oswald allegedly pulled out the revolver from his belt, during his testimony before the Warren Commission, he claimed that he had already disarmed Oswald by the time the aforementioned Officers had arrived to assist him (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 32, WC Volume III, page 300). However, Hawkins, Walker, and Hutson all testified that Oswald had pulled the revolver out of his belt after they had arrived (WC Volume VII, pages 32, 39, and 94). Although McDonald took full credit for disarming Oswald, officer Hutson testified that McDonald and “somebody else” had taken the gun out of Oswald’s hand, but added that he “couldn’t say exactly” (ibid, page 32). Walker also testified that as several hands were on the gun, a detective “…reached over and pulled the gun away from everybody, pulled it away from everyone, best I can recall” (WC Volume VII, page 40). However, McDonald told the Warren Commission that after he had disarmed Oswald, he handed the gun to detective Bob Carroll (WC Volume III, page 301). When Carroll testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that he saw a gun pointing at him (towards the south aisle of the theater) and then grabbed it and jerked it away from whoever had it (WC Volume VII, page 20).

    Myers selectively quotes from the testimony of Officer Charles Walker before the Warren Commission, during which Walker claimed that after Oswald pulled the revolver from under his shirt, it was about waist high and pointed at about a forty-five degree angle (With Malice, Chapter 6). Walker also wrote in his report to Chief Curry that the gun was being waved around approximately waist high (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 47). Although Walker also testified that one the Officers had commanded Oswald to “let go of the gun”, to which Oswald allegedly responded “I can’t” (With Malice, Chapter 6). Whilst Myers has no problem using this claim by Walker, he nevertheless neglects to tell his readers that there is no corroboration for Walker’s claim; let alone that no officer is on record claiming that he had ordered Oswald to let go of the gun. Officer Hutson told the Warren Commission that Oswald was pointing the gun towards the theater screen when he allegedly heard the snap of the gun’s hammer, and that Oswald wasn’t aiming the gun at any Officer in particular (WC Volume VII, page 32). However, when McDonald was interviewed by Eddie Barker from CBS in 1964, he demonstrated to Barker that Oswald had allegedly aimed the gun at him (towards the south aisle of the theatre), and then the gun allegedly snapped as he and Oswald were down in the theater seats scuffling (See the footage).

    Hutson also testified that the only officer who could have come between the line of fire of the gun as it was allegedly aimed towards the screen was Ray Hawkins (ibid). Although Charles Walker testified that; “…Hawkins was in the general direction of the gun”, and that the gun was pointing slightly towards the theater screen, this is not what Hawkins claimed during his own testimony (WC Volume VII, page 39). Hawkins, who had approached Oswald and McDonald from the row of seats in front of them, testified that when the gun came out of Oswald’s belt “…it was pulled across to their right, or toward the south aisle of the theatre” and made no mention of the gun being aimed in the direction of the theater screen or towards him (WC Volume VII, page 94).

    When Johnny Brewer testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that he observed a gun in Oswald’s hand aimed “up in the air” (WC Volume VII, page 6). During his interview with Ian Griggs in 1996, he now claimed that Oswald was trying to shoot McDonald in the head (Griggs, No Case to Answer, page 64). Yet, none of the other witnesses and the arresting Officers, let alone Nick McDonald, claimed that this is what they had seen during the scuffle. Moreover, Brewer’s claim is directly contradicted by Charles Walker, who stated that the gun was pointed about waist high. In his report to Chief Curry, detective John B. Toney wrote that Oswald had a pistol in his right hand, with his right arm “pinioned” across McDonald’s left shoulder (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 43). It is also worth noting that Toney told author Larry Sneed many years later that he had seen a gun in “…someone’s hand over someone’s shoulder, and someone was holding the arm.” (Sneed, No More Silence, page 308). Not only do Toney’s remarks contradict what McDonald demonstrated to Eddie Barker in the aforementioned film footage, but none of Toney’s fellow officers offered corroboration for this claim.

    John Gibson, who was a witness to Oswald’s arrest, testified before the Warren Commission that as the DPD Officers walking along the aisles of the theatre, Oswald was standing in the aisle with a gun in his hand! (WC Volume VII, pages 71 and 72). When Counsel Joseph Ball asked him if any of the DPD Officers had a hold of it that time, Gibson testified that he didn’t believe so (ibid, page 72). Gibson’s account of what he allegedly witnessed is bizarre, for not one DPD Officer or any other witness claimed that Oswald was standing in the aisle with the gun in his hand as the Officers were walking along the aisles! Readers should keep in mind that the aforementioned self-proclaimed witness named David, claimed that Oswald pulled a gun, but didn’t see it until it was “taken away from him” It would therefore seem that David had merely assumed that Oswald pulled a gun, and as this reviewer will explain in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill, this was by all likelihood the case. As for Dallas deputy Sheriff Buddy Walthers, he wrote in his report to Sheriff Bill Decker that when he reached the scuffle with Oswald; “…I could see a gun on the floor with 2 or 3 hands on it…” (WC Volume XIX, Decker exhibit 5323). Walthers also wrote that he thought it was detective Bob Carroll who reached down to the floor and got the gun. But when Walthers testified before the Warren Commission, he was now “real sure” that it was Carroll who got the gun, and curiously left out that the gun was on the floor (WC Volume VII, pages 547 and 548).

    Let’s now look at the statements by witness George Jefferson Applin. In his first day affidavit to the DPD, he allegedly wrote that Oswald “…had his arm around the officer’s left shoulder and had a pistol in his hand” (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 2, Item 3). But in his affidavit to the USSS on December 1, 1963, Applin claimed that during the scuffle between Oswald and McDonald “…one of the two had a pistol in his right hand” (WCD 87, page 558). In other words, Applin was saying that he wasn’t sure who had a hold of the gun. In his interview with the FBI on December 16, 1963, Applin allegedly claimed that Oswald pulled out a gun and aimed it at McDonald’s head, and that he thought the gun was on McDonald’s shoulder when Oswald allegedly pulled the trigger (WCD 206, page 69). Aside from what Johnny Brewer told Ian Griggs in 1996, there is no corroboration for the claim that Oswald pointed the gun at McDonald’s head. By the same token, apart from what John Toney wrote in his report to DPD chief Jesse Curry and what he told author Larry Sneed, there is no corroboration from anyone, let alone from McDonald, that Oswald had placed the gun on McDonald’s shoulder. Therefore, the aforementioned statements Applin allegedly made to the FBI should be taken with a grain of salt.

    When Applin testified before the Warren Commission, he made no mention of seeing the gun on McDonald’s shoulder or that he had seen Oswald aim the gun at McDonald’s head. In fact, when Counsel Joseph Ball asked him who pulled out the revolver, Applin claimed; “I guess it was Oswald, because -for one reason, that he had on a short sleeve shirt, and I [had] seen a man’s arm that was connected to the gun.” (WC Volume VII, page 89). Although it isn’t clear, it seems that Applin thought that the man with the short sleeved shirt was the one who had the gun, and that he thought Oswald was wearing a short sleeved shirt. However, Oswald was arrested wearing a long sleeved shirt (WCE 150). Similarly, on the day of the assassination, McDonald was photographed wearing a long sleeved shirt as he was talking to Dallas Morning News reporter Jim Ewell. As far as Applin’s claim (in his first day affidavit) that he had seen Oswald with his arm around McDonald’s shoulder and with a gun in his hand is concerned, the reader should keep in mind that according to DPD Lt. E.L. Cunningham, the officer who took Applin’s affidavit was detective John Toney; the same John Toney who claimed that he had seen a gun in his Oswald’s hand with his right arm pinioned across McDonald’s left shoulder (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 15). Given the similarity between what Toney wrote in his report to Chief Curry and what Applin allegedly claimed in his affidavit, it is entirely conceivable that Toney altered what Applin actually told him.

    None of these many contradictions and inconsistencies between the statements by the aforementioned officers and witnesses is ever mentioned by Myers. Given the fact that he is a rabid advocate of Oswald’s guilt in the Tippit murder, Myers will probably dismiss all of the above contradictions and inconsistencies as being irrelevant. However, the truth is that no intellectually honest researcher would (or should) dismiss them as being irrelevant; and when they are taken in conjunction with all of the evidence discussed in this review that the DPD framed Oswald for Tippit’s murder, there is reason to believe that Oswald never had a revolver with him when he was arrested inside the theater. In a caption to one of the photographs taken outside the theater by Stuart Reed, as Oswald is being dragged towards a police car with his face covered by Charles Walker’s hat, Myers writes that detective Bob Carroll is holding onto Oswald’s revolver (With Malice, Chapter 6). Whilst the photograph does show Carroll holding onto a gun, his own statements rule out that this was “Oswald’s” revolver.

    In his report to DPD chief Jesse Curry, Carroll wrote that; “I grabbed the pistol and stuck it in my belt and then continued to assist in the subduing of Oswald” (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 12). When Carroll testified before the Warren Commission, he confirmed that; “…I saw a pistol pointing at me so I reached and grabbed the pistol and jerked the pistol away and stuck it in my belt and then I grabbed Oswald” (WC Volume VII, page 20). He further added that; “The first time I saw the weapon, it was pointed in my direction, and I reached and grabbed it and stuck it into my belt… At the time, I was assisting in the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald” (ibid, page 24). By omitting these statements from his book, Myers deceives his readers. In the report he wrote out on the day of the assassination, FBI agent Robert M. Barrett stated that; “One of the Officers took a .38 Calibre snub nose revolver out of Oswald’s right hand and handed it to detective [Bob] Carroll”. However, as discussed previously, Barrett lied when he wrote in his report that he heard Oswald yell in a loud voice “Kill all the sons of bitches”, and therefore, his claim that someone handed Carroll “Oswald’s” gun should be taken with a grain of salt (WCD 5, page 84).

    On a further note, the gun which Carroll was photographed holding outside of the theater appears to have a longer barrel than “Oswald’s” revolver, with what appears to be sunlight reflecting off of the barrel towards the muzzle end. As for whose gun Carroll was holding outside of the theater, this review will discuss this issue in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill. In that same essay, this reviewer will be arguing that Hill framed Oswald for Tippit’s murder after he (or possibly one of his co-conspirators from the DPD) obtained the revolver Oswald allegedly had in his possession when arrested from Tippit’s real murderer. The reader should keep in mind that theater patron Jack Davis, told author Jim Marrs that Oswald had first sat next to him, but then got up and sat next to another person. (Crossfire, p. 353) In fact, Davis told Marrs that he thought it was strange that Oswald would sit right next to him inside a big theater with many seats to choose from (ibid). Warren “Butch” Burroughs told Marrs that Oswald had also sat next to a pregnant lady. Oswald’s actions imply that he thought he was to contact someone inside the theatre. And as many researchers, such as Greg Parker have noted, when Oswald was arrested, he had in his possession a torn box top with the label “Cox’s Fort Worth” printed on it, and that Oswald may have been using this to identify himself to the person he thought he was to meet inside the theater (see thread entitled Neely St Questions on John Simkin’s education forum).

    On a further note, the DPD took a list of the names of all the witnesses inside the theater after Oswald was arrested, but the list is now nowhere to be found. And the only two patrons who were interviewed concerning what they witnessed were John Gibson and George Jefferson Applin (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 35). In this reviewer’s opinion, the reason the list was made to disappear was to conceal the identity of any would be conspirators inside the theater. Keep in mind that officer McDonald was quoted by the Dallas Morning News and the Dallas Times Herald as saying that a man sitting in the front row of the theater pointed Oswald out to him as the man he was seeking. It is also worth keeping in mind that George Applin testified that he had told a man sitting in the back row of the theater; “Buddy, you’d better move. There is a gun”, and that after doing so, the man calmly remained seated and didn’t budge (WC Volume VII, page 91). Given the man’s behaviour, the possibility exists that he too may have had some involvement in Oswald’s frame-up.

    Let’s now examine what Oswald allegedly said after he was removed from the theater, words which disinformation shills like David Von Pein have used against him. The five officers who took Oswald to DPD headquarters were Bob Carroll, Kenneth E. Lyon, Gerald Hill, Paul Bentley, and Charles T. Walker. Oswald was sitting in the rear seat, with Bentley sitting to his left and Walker sitting to his right. Myers quotes from K.E Lyon’s reports to DPD chief Jesse Curry in which he claimed that whilst en route to Police headquarters, Oswald admitted to carrying a gun inside the theater (With Malice, Chapter 6). Detective Bob Carroll made this same claim in his own report to Chief Curry (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 12). Myers also quotes from Charles Walker’s Warren Commission testimony, where he claimed that Oswald admitted to carrying a gun inside the theater (ibid). However, Walker didn’t mention this in his report to Chief Curry.

    When Paul Bentley was interviewed by WFAA-TV on the day following the assassination, he also claimed that Oswald admitted to carrying a gun inside the theater. Given all the evidence presented in this review for Oswald being framed for Tippit’s murder, these statements should not be considered credible. The reader should also bear in mind that when Gerald Hill was interviewed by reporters shortly following Oswald’s arrest, he made no mention of Oswald admitting to carrying a gun inside the theater (WCE 2160). In fact, Hill complained that Oswald “…wouldn’t even admit he pulled the trigger on the gun in the theatre” (ibid). When Hill was interviewed by Bob Whitten of KCRA radio on the day of the assassination, he again neglected to mention that Oswald admitted to carrying a gun inside the theater; even though he did claim that Oswald allegedly said “This is it” after Officer McDonald approached him, and that Oswald admitted to being a communist (WCD 1210).

    Myers also quotes from Charles Walker’s testimony before the Warren Commission, during which Walker claimed that after Oswald was told that he was suspected of killing Tippit, Oswald made the remarks; “I hear they burn for murder” and “Well, they say it only takes a second to die” (With Malice, Chapter 6). Although Gerald Hill testified that Oswald made a statement similar to “You only fry for that” or “You can fry for that”, Hill made no mention of this to reporters on the day of the assassination, or during his interview with Bob Whitten (WC Volume VII, page 58). In fact, Hill told Whitten that when they had questioned Oswald inside the car about Killing Tippit, Oswald allegedly made the remark; “I don’t have to tell you all anything”, and made no mention of Oswald saying what both he and Walker claimed he did when they testified before the Warren Commission (WCD 1210). Furthermore, Hill made no mention of Oswald saying the above when he was questioned by reporters on the day of the assassination, telling them instead that Oswald “…did not make any definite statement other than demanding to see a lawyer and demanding his rights…” (WCE 2160).

    When detective Paul Bentley was interviewed by reporters on the night of the assassination, he told them that after Oswald was arrested, he just said “This is it, it’s all over with now” (WCE 2157). Similarly, when Bentley was interviewed the following day by WFAA-TV, he stated that Oswald was advised in the car that he was being placed in jail for suspicion of murdering Tippit; but made no mention of Oswald saying what Walker and Hill told the Warren Commission he did. There was also no mention of these alleged comments by Oswald in the arrest reports by Carroll, Lyon, Hill, Bentley, and Walker to Chief Curry (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Items 4 , 12, 22, 28, and 47). During his testimony, Walker claimed that they never put the conversations they had with suspects in their reports to Chief Curry (WC Volume VII, page 42). However, the evidence discussed throughout this book suggests that Walker was deceptive.

    VII: A bird in the hand

    In this chapter, Myers discusses the events subsequent to Oswald’s arrival at DPD headquarters after his arrest. Myers writes that shorty following Oswald’s arrival at DPD headquarters, he was interrogated by detective Jim Leavelle; the homicide detective who was placed in charge of investigating Tippit’s murder (With Malice, Chapter 7). This is based on Myers’ interview with Leavelle, and was probably one of the most dishonest statements made in the book. When Leavelle testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that the first time he had ever sat in on an interrogation with Oswald was on Sunday morning, November 24, 1963 (WC Volume VII, page 268). In fact, when Counsel Joseph Ball asked Leavelle if he had ever spoken to Oswald before this interrogation, he stated; “No; I had never talked to him before”! (ibid) Leavelle then stated during his testimony that; “…the only time I had connections with Oswald was this Sunday morning [November 24, 1963]. I never had [the] occasion to talk with him at any time…” (ibid, page 269).

    There is also nothing in Leavelle’s own report to DPD chief Curry about him interrogating Oswald shorty following Oswald’s arrival at DPD headquarters on Friday (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 8, Items 1 and 2). Myers is undoubtedly aware that Leavelle testified that he didn’t speak to Oswald before Sunday, but chooses instead to deceive his readers. But let’s understand why Myers does this. It is evident throughout his book that Myers’ agenda is to portray Oswald as the man who killed Tippit, and that the DPD did not frame him for Tippit’s murder. Since Leavelle was the homicide detective put in charge of investigating Tippit’s murder, the last thing Myers would want to admit is that Leavelle was unreliable, or an outright liar. It should also come as no surprise that Myers cannot tell the truth about Leavelle, as he is not even capable of telling readers the truth about where Howard Brennan was sitting when he allegedly witnessed Oswald firing his rifle at the President. Whilst Myers never questions Leavelle’s integrity as a DPD Officer, the reader should keep in mind that when author Joseph McBride interviewed Leavelle, Leavelle told him that the President’s assassination was no different than a South Texas “nigger” killing (McBride, Into the Nightmare, page 240). This remark reveals that Leavelle was a racist who was not really concerned about who killed President Kennedy.

    Myers also deceives his readers by omitting that DPD detectives, Gus Rose and Richard Stovall, wrote in their report to Chief Curry that they had briefly spoken to Oswald after he had been brought into the homicide Office (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 1, Item 3). Rose and Stovall confirmed that they had briefly spoken to Oswald shortly following his arrival, when they testified before the Warren Commission (WC Volume VII, pages 187 and 228). In his report to Chief Curry, Lt. T.L. Baker wrote that Oswald was brought into the interrogation room, from where he was “being held” by detectives Rose and Stovall, and made no mention of Leavelle having interrogated Oswald (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 5, Folder 5, Item 4). Suffice it to say, this reviewer knows of no reason to believe that Leavelle had interrogated Oswald shortly following his arrival at DPD headquarters.

    Myers explains that following Oswald’s arrest, Lt. Colonel Robert E. Jones of the U.S. Army’s 112th Military intelligence group (MIG) learned that a man named A.J Hidell “…had been arrested or come to the attention of law enforcement agencies.” (With Malice, Chapter 7). Myers writes that colonel Jones checked the MIG indices and discovered that there was an index on Hidell which “cross-referenced” with a file on Oswald; who allegedly used the name Alek James Hidell as an alias (ibid). Jones then allegedly pulled the file on Hidell, and notified the San Antonio FBI Office that he had some information (ibid). Colonel Jones testified before the HSCA that military intelligence officials had opened a file on Oswald after they allegedly received a report from the New Orleans Police department that Oswald had been arrested in connection with his activities associated with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (ibid). Whilst Myers apparently considers this to be the gospel truth, Australian researcher Greg Parker has pointed out that Mrs. Marcelle Madden, who worked for the identification division of the New Orleans Police department, informed the FBI agent John Quigley on November 26, 1963, that she had no identification record for a man named Alek James Hidell (Reopen Kennedy case forum, thread entitled Hidell: The frame was bold and ruthless). Although Myers doesn’t mention this to his readers, he does explain in his endnotes that Army intelligence “routinely” destroyed Oswald’s file.

    Myers then moves onto a discussion of DPD Captain Will Fritz, in which he praises Fritz’s legacy as the long-time Captain of the DPD’s Homicide and Robbery bureau. Myers writes that Fritz ran his department “with an iron fist”, and that under his command, the homicide bureau had a 90% success rate at solving murders (With Malice, Chapter 7). What Myers doesn’t mention to his readers is the horrible legacy of the DPD with Henry Wade as the district attorney of Dallas and Fritz as the department chief (as discussed previously). Myers also writes that; “For Captain Fritz, modern technology had no place in his squad room. A calm, disarming manner was his weapon.” (ibid). Evidently, this is Myers’ explanation for why Fritz never tape recorded any of his interrogations with Oswald. As the man who was charged with murdering the President of the United States of America, Fritz; along with the FBI and USSS agents who interrogated Oswald, should have tape recorded the answers Oswald gave to the various questions he was allegedly asked. There is simply no excuse for why the interviews were not tape recorded. Instead, researchers must rely on the typed summary reports by the interrogators, and their testimonies before the Warren Commission. Naturally, Myers doesn’t point this out to his readers.

    In his discussion of the credibility of Helen Markham as an eyewitness to Tippit’s murder, Myers admits that her statements are “…laced with inaccurate and inconsistent details” but omits other pieces of evidence which cast doubt on Markham’s reliability as a witness (ibid). For one thing, Myers writes that when Markham testified before the Warren Commission, she identified Oswald as the number two man in the line-up; but omits that Warren Commission Counsel Joseph Ball had asked her the following leading question during her testimony; “Was there a number two man in their [the line-up]” (WC Volume III, page 310). Ball asked Markham this question after she claimed that she didn’t recognise the men in the line-up from their faces, and had never seen any of them before. But after he asks her this question, she now testifies that she recognised Oswald “Mostly from his face.” (ibid, page 311). Markham also testified that she thought Ball wanted her to describe their clothing, which is allegedly why Markham claimed that she hadn’t previously seen any of the men in the line-up; even though he had not yet asked her that question! (ibid). It is obvious from reading Markham’s testimony that she was an unreliable witness. In fact, during a debate with Mark Lane, Joseph Ball once famously remarked that he thought Markham was “an utter screwball”. Myers does not note this to his readers.

    Myers also omits that when Markham was interviewed by FBI agent Bardwell Odum on the day of the assassination, she told him that the killer was about 18 years old, with black hair, and had a red complexion (WCD 5, page 79). However, Markham denied during her testimony before the Warren Commission that she told Odum the killer had a ruddy complexion. But despite her denial, during a filmed interview for the program The Men who Killed Kennedy, Markham explained that the killer had a ruddy (red) complexion (View Markham’s interview). Curiously, when Domingo Benavides testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that the killer’s skin looked “…a little bit ruddier than mine” (WC Volume VI, page 451). He also testified that the killer’s complexion was “…a little bit darker than average” (ibid). Yet, Oswald’s complexion did not appear to be ruddy/red or what can be described (in this reviewer’s opinion) as a little bit darker than average. The reader should also keep in mind that when Julia Postal testified before the Warren Commission, she claimed that the man who ducked into the theater looked ruddy to her (WC Volume VII, page 11). As Myers writes in his endnotes, Bernard Haire, the owner of Bernie’s hobby house which was located a few doors east of the Texas Theater, claimed he saw a man with a “flushed” appearance. This raises the distinct possibility that the man Haire saw was the same man Julia Postal observed ducking into the theatre. This reviewer will elaborate on this in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill.

    Myers also takes a swipe at Mark Lane for (what he calls) badgering Helen Markham by asking her three times if she had ever told anybody that Tippit’s killer was short/stocky and had bushy hair (With Malice, Chapter 7). But at the same time, Myers apparently has no qualms about Warren Commission counsel David Belin repeatedly asking Virginia Davis if her sister-in-law, Barbara Davis, had telephoned the DPD before or after they had seen Tippit’s killer cut across their lawn (WC Volume VII, pages 455 to 468). Myers also never mentions that in the aforementioned film interview for The Men who Killed Kennedy program, Markham claimed that the killer was “a short guy”.

    Following his discussion of Markham, Myers moves on to a discussion of the identification of Oswald as Tippit’s killer in a line-up viewed by Ted Callaway and Sam Guinyard. Myers considers Callaway to be a reliable witness, writing that; “Ted Callaway has been one of the few Tippit witnesses whose story has remained accurate and unwavering for more than thirty-three years.” (With Malice, Chapter 8). Myers can pretend that Callaway is a reliable witness because he never notes the contradictions between the observations of Callaway and Guinyard, both of whom allegedly observed the killer fleeing south on Patton Street after Tippit was shot. At the time of the assassination, Callaway was the manager of the Harris Bros Auto sales at 501 East Jefferson Blvd, located on the northeast corner of the Patton Street/Jefferson Blvd. intersection (WC Volume III, page 352).

    Sam Guinyard testified that he worked there as a porter, and was polishing a car when he heard the shooting (WC Volume VII, page 395). According to Callaway’s testimony, Tippit’s killer crossed from the east side of Patton Street over to the west side of the street at a point just south of where William Scoggins cab was parked when Scoggins witnessed the shooting (Callaway marked this on WCE 537). In Chapter four of his book, Myers illustrates the killer’s flight path, along with the locations of Callaway and Guinyard when they allegedly saw him walking south on Patton Street; and the location of a third man named B.D. Searcy, who according to Callaway, was standing behind him when Tippit’s killer went by them (WC Volume III, page 354). Evidently, Myers based the killer’s flight path on WCE 735.

    According to Myers’ illustration, the killer had already crossed over to the west side of Patton Street when he went passed Sam Guinyard’s position. However, Guinyard testified that when he observed the gunman, he was on the east side of Patton Street, and he was about ten feet away from him when he observed him! (WC Volume VII, page 398). Guinyard further explained that the killer crossed over to the west side of Patton Street when he got to about five feet from the corner of the intersection of Patton Street and Jefferson Blvd. (ibid, page 397). Yet, Callaway testified, and illustrated on WCE 735, that the killer was already on the west side of Patton Street when he went by him (WC Volume III, page 353). Obviously, both men can not be correct.

    Callaway testified that he hollered at the gunman; “Hey man, what the hell is going on”, after which the gunman turned to look at him, shrugging his shoulders, and said something to him which Callaway claimed he couldn’t understand (ibid, pages 353 and 354). Callaway stated that he then told B.D. Searcy to keep an eye on the gunman and to follow him, after which he ran to the Tippit murder scene (ibid, page 354). On the contrary, Guinyard testified that it was Callaway who followed the gunman; “…trying to see which way he was going”, after which they allegedly went to the Tippit murder scene together (WC Volume VII, page 398). Furthermore, Guinyard made no mention of Callaway hollering at the killer, and the killer looking at Callaway and then saying something to him. When counsel Joseph Ball showed Guinyard the dark brown shirt Oswald was wearing when he was arrested at the Texas theatre, he testified that he saw Oswald wearing it as he came down Patton Street (ibid, page 400). Callaway on the other hand, testified that he couldn’t see this shirt! (WC Volume III, page 356). When Counsel Joseph Ball asked Guinyard if all the men in the line-up were about the same color, Guinyard exclaimed twice that; “…they wasn’t all about the same color.” (WC Volume VII, page 399). However, Oswald and the three men who were with him in the line-up; DPD detective Richard Clark, DPD detective William Perry, and DPD jail clerk Don Ables, were all Caucasians (see WCE 1054). If one is to believe that Guinyard’s eye sight was such that he was able to observe small differences in the skin tones of the four men in the line-up, one must simultaneously ignore all of the above contradictions between Callaway’s observations and his own.

    None of the above contradictions between the observations of Callaway and Guinyard, which raises serious questions about their credibility as witnesses, (and if they actually viewed Oswald in a line-up), are ever mentioned by Myers. Although the line-up allegedly seen by Callaway and Guinyard was conducted at approximately 6:30 pm on the night of the assassination, when Callaway was interviewed by FBI agent Arthur E. Carter on February 23, 1964, he told Carter that he recalled the line-up was conducted on the night after Tippit’s murder (WCD 735, page 262). In other words, Callaway was implying that the line-up was held on the night of November 23, 1963. However, Callaway would go on to testify that it was held on the night of the assassination. The reader should also bear in mind that when Domingo Benavides testified before the Warren Commission, he explained that after Callaway had gotten into William Scoggins cab to look for the killer with Scoggins, he asked him (Benavides) which way the killer went, but found out later on from Callaway that he did see the killer (WC Volume VI, page 452). If Callaway really did see the killer, he obviously had no reason to ask Benavides which way the killer went. Therefore, Benavides testimony strongly implies that Callaway never actually saw Tippit’s killer.

    Although Myers acknowledges in his endnotes that Benavides testified that Callaway asked him which way the killer went, he then uses Callaway and Jim Leavelle to discredit Benavides as a witness. According to Myers, during an interview in 1996, Callaway told him that Benavides confided to him that he didn’t actually see the gunman as he told the Warren Commission that he had (With Malice, Chapter 7). Myers also quotes from Jim Leavelle’s testimony where Leavelle claimed that; “I think he [Benavides] said he never saw the gunman actually…either that or he [Benavides] told me he could not recognise him, one or the other.” (ibid). Readers should also keep in mind that in his supplementary report on Tippit’s murder (evidently written on the day of the assassination), Leavelle wrote that Benavides didn’t see the killer (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 1, Folder 4, Item 3). Myers can pretend that Callaway and Leavelle are both trustworthy on this issue, because he never explains to his readers the serious credibility issues of both of these men It is apparent to this reviewer that Myers wants to discredit Benavides because he wants to maintain that both Callaway and Leavelle are credible witnesses.

    There are some issues with Benavides own credibility as a witness. For one thing, when Benavides testified before the Warren Commission, Counsel David Belin asked him if WCE 163 (the dark greyish blue jacket which Oswald allegedly wore to the TSBD on the morning of the assassination) was the jacket Tippit’s killer was wearing. To which Benavides responded; “I would say this looks just like it.” (WC Volume VI, page 453). However, Benavides had previously testified that the killer was wearing what appeared to be a light-beige jacket (ibid, page 450). In this reviewer’s opinion, Benavides could conceivably have mistaken the light gray jacket which the killer was wearing (WCE 162) as being a light beige color. Furthermore, the possibility that Belin was misquoted by the court reporter when he allegedly asked Benavides if WCE 163 was the jacket the killer was wearing cannot be ruled out.

    Benavides is also known for taking credit for notifying the DPD radio dispatchers that Tippit had been shot, when in fact it was T.F. Bowley who notified the dispatchers. Although this may seem as if Benavides lied to put himself in the spotlight, the fact is that T.F. Bowley was never called to testify before the Warren Commission. Many researchers, including myself, believe Bowley was avoided because according to his affidavit to the DPD, it was about 1:10 pm when he reported the shooting over the DPD radio; which was much too soon for the “official” time at which Tippit was shot (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 14). Therefore, it seems likely that Benavides was coerced into taking credit for reporting the shooting over the radio. Although Benavides never positively identified Oswald as Tippit’s killer when he testified, he nevertheless claimed the killer looked like Oswald (WC Volume VI, page 452).

    Although it is this reviewer’s belief that Ted Callaway and Sam Guinyard never actually observed Tippit’s killer, there is one mystery concerning Callaway that remains. According to the DPD radio transcripts, Officer Howell W. Summers reports that he has an “…eyeball witness to the get-away man; that suspect in this shooting.” (WCE 705/1974). Summers then broadcasted the description of the suspect given to him by the witness over the radio. Although Myers claims that this witness was Ted Callaway, the distinct possibility exists that the witness was in fact B.D. Searcy, who worked at Harris Bros Auto Sales (WCD 735, page 261). Searcy is somewhat of an enigma, as there doesn’t appear to be any FBI and USSS interviews with him, and there also doesn’t appear to be an affidavit by Searcy to the DPD on what he heard and saw. Even though Ted Callaway told the FBI that both he and Searcy were standing on the front porch of the car lot, and even though Callaway was photographed standing on the front porch, there are no photographs depicting Searcy standing on the front porch (ibid, WCD 630, page 38). It is this reviewer’s opinion that Searcy was avoided because, unlike Callaway and Guinyard, he refused to be coaxed into identifying Oswald as Tippit’s killer. The reader should also bear in mind that even though Guinyard identified Oswald as the killer, there doesn’t appear to be an interview of him by the FBI and the USSS, and there doesn’t appear to be any photographs by the FBI showing where Guinyard was standing when he allegedly observed Oswald (WCD 630).

    Following his discussion of the identification of Oswald as Tippit’s killer by Callaway and Guinyard, Myers now moves onto the Davis sister-in-laws, Barbara and Virginia. Both of them allegedly identified Oswald as the killer in a DPD line-up on the evening of the assassination (With Malice, Chapter 7). The Davis sister-in-laws allegedly witnessed Tippit’s killer cut across the lawn of their apartment house, located on the southeast corner of the tenth and Patton Street intersection; emptying shells from the revolver as he did so. Myers writes that some critics have questioned the powers of observation of the two women because Barbara Davis testified before the Warren Commission that she observed the killer wearing a dark coat; even though he was actually wearing a light gray jacket (With Malice, Chapter 7). What Myers omits is that when counsel Joseph Ball asked her if Oswald was dressed the same in the police line-up as he was when she allegedly observed him after Tippit was shot, she replied; “All except he didn’t have a black coat on when I saw him in the line-up” (WC Volume III, page 347). In other words, Davis claimed that Tippit’s killer was wearing a black coat. It is incomprehensible to this reviewer that she could have mistaken or misremembered the light gray jacket (WCE 162) to be a black coat; and when she was shown the light gray jacket during her testimony, she refused to identify it (ibid). Contrary to what Myers wants us to believe, Davis’s testimony that the killer was wearing a black coat raises serious doubts about her credibility as a witness.

    Although Barbara and Virginia Davis allegedly observed the gunman together, they contradicted each other on a number of points. Barbara Davis testified that she called the DPD after the killer had gone out of sight (ibid, page 345). On the other hand, Virginia Davis was confused during her testimony as to whether Barbara called the DPD before or after they had seen the killer. Although Myers acknowledges this in his book, he nevertheless omits several other contradictions between their observations and recollections (With Malice, Chapter 7). For one thing, Barbara Davis testified she was standing on the front porch when the killer went by, whereas Virginia Davis testified that they both observed the killer through the front screen door; only to later on acknowledge that they were standing on the front porch when they saw the killer, just as she claimed in her affidavit to the USSS on December 1, 1963 (WCD 87, page 555). In that same affidavit she claimed that the killer was holding the gun in his left hand and unloading it into his right, and that she was lying down in bed with Barbara and her two children when she heard the shots (ibid).

    However, when she testified before the Warren Commission, she now claimed that the killer was holding the gun in his right hand and unloading it into his left, and that she was actually lying down on the couch when she heard the shots. Barbara Davis testified that she saw the killer cut across the middle of the yard of their apartment house, and illustrated this on WCE 534 (WC Volume III, page 344). However, Virginia Davis testified that the killer cut across the yard only about three feet from the sidewalk on Tenth Street (WC Volume VI, page 458).

    As far as the identification of Oswald in the line-up is concerned, Virginia Davis testified that she was the first to identify Oswald as the killer, and also testified that there were five men in the line-up; when in actual fact there were only four in total (WC Volume VI, page 462). However, when Barbara Davis testified, she took credit for being the first to identify Oswald as the killer (WC Volume III, page 350). Virginia Davis also testified that she went to the DPD to identify Oswald “…probably about 5:30”, which is ridiculous since according to the DPD, the line-up she and her sister-in-law allegedly viewed was conducted at approximately 7:55 pm (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 5, Folder 5, Item 4). Although Warren Commission defenders might argue that the contradictions between the two women’s recollections was due to one or both of them being nervous when they testified, the fact remains that all of the above raises doubts that they had seen the killer; or that they even viewed Oswald in a line-up, as both they and the DPD claimed. Myers actually writes in his book that Virginia Davis told him during an interview in 1997 that she was nervous when she testified before the Warren Commission (With Malice, Chapter 9)

    There is yet another piece of evidence which casts serious doubt on the credibility of the Davis sister-in-laws. Contained within the list of contacts for Jack Ruby is the name Leona Miller, with the telephone number WH3 – 8120 (WCD 717, page 6). When Barbara and Virginia Davis gave their affidavits to the DPD (allegedly on the day of the assassination), they listed their phone number as WH3 – 8120 (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Items 20 and 22). Myers acknowledges this fact in his book, but dismisses its significance by writing that; “…apart from the phone number, there is no known connection between Leona Miller, Barbara Jeannette and Virginia Davis, and Jack Ruby.” (With Malice, Chapter 9). Contrary to what Myers would like us to believe, the fact that the phone number of two witnesses who contradicted each other on their observations of Tippit’s killer (despite both of them being certain that Oswald was the killer), and the fact that Barbara Davis believed that Tippit’s killer was wearing a black coat, raises the distinct possibility that the Davis sister-in-laws were ersatz witnesses used to implicate Oswald as Tippit’s killer. According to the testimony of Curtis Laverne Crafard (a.k.a Larry Crafard), Miller was apparently a girl who had phoned Ruby seeking employment at the Carousel club as a waitress (testimony of Curtis Laverne Crafard, WC Volume XIV).

    Curiously, there was a Leona Miller (married name Leona Lane) with whom Ruby was acquainted (WCD 1121, page 35). However, it is not known whether Miller (Lane) ever lived at the address the Davis sister-in-laws were living at when they allegedly observed Tippit’s killer. In my upcoming essay on Gerald Hill, this reviewer presents evidence that Tippit’s killer could in fact be Larry Crafard; which gives credence to the possibility that the Davis sister-in-laws were fake witnesses used to implicate Oswald. Though, truth be told, there is absolutely no solid connection between Jack Ruby, Larry Crafard, and the Davis sister-in-laws.

    On the day following Tippit’s murder, cab driver William W. Scoggins, along with cab driver William W. Whaley, were brought to the DPD to view Oswald in a line-up (With Malice, Chapter 7). Myers’ book contains a photograph by Jack Beers showing what he claims to be Scoggins and Whaley leaving the DPD homicide office to view the line-up (ibid). Scoggins told the Warren Commission that as the killer went past his cab, the killer looked back over his left shoulder, and that; “It seemed like I could see his face, his features and everything plain, you see.” (WC Volume III, page 327). Although Scoggins testified before the Warren Commission that he identified Oswald as Tippit’s killer in the line-up, he doesn’t mention this in his affidavit to the DPD on November 23, 1963 (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Item 24). Myers doesn’t mention this to his readers. Myers also doesn’t mention that although DPD Lt. T.L. Baker wrote in his report to Chief Curry that Scoggins positively identified Oswald as Tippit’s killer in the line-up, detectives Marvin Johnson and L.D. Montgomery made no mention of this in their own reports to chief Curry. In fact, neither Johnson nor Montgomery mention in their reports that Scoggins viewed a line-up of Oswald (Dallas Municipal archives Box 5, Folder 5, Items 4, 26, 28, and 35).

    Although Myers admits that Scoggins told the Warren Commission that he had seen Oswald’s picture in the newspaper before he allegedly identified Oswald in the line-up as Tippit’s killer, he nevertheless omits that when Scoggins was reinterviewed by the FBI on November 25, 1963, he claimed that after viewing a photograph of Oswald, he was not certain that the man he observed fleeing from the Tippit murder scene was actually Oswald (WCD 5, page 77). The reader should bear in mind that when Scoggins testified, he claimed that some of the photos of Oswald shown to him by the FBI/USSS didn’t resemble Oswald, and that he may have picked the wrong photo (WC Volume III, page 335). However, according to his aforementioned interview with the FBI, Scoggins was only shown one photograph. Therefore, Scoggins was either lying, mistaken, or was actually referring to another interview.

    Scoggins also testified that he overheard William Whaley telling one (or more) of the cab drivers at the Oak Cliff cab company, for whom they were both employed, that he picked Oswald up at the Greyhound bus station, and then dropped him off at the 500 block of Beckley avenue in Oak Cliff (ibid, page 340). However, as researcher Lee Farley has demonstrated, Whaley did not give Oswald a ride to Oak Cliff in his cab, and that Scoggins was lying (see the thread entitled Oswald and cab 36 on John Simkin’s Spartacus education forum). It is also worth keeping in mind that despite hearing Tippit’s killer mumble either “Poor dumb cop” or “Poor damn cop” as he went by his cab, Scoggins never claimed that the killer’s voice was identical to Oswald’s (ibid, page 327), (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Item 24). Finally, perhaps it’s also worth keeping in mind that even though Scoggins testified that he was “kind of crouched” behind his cab; and observed the killer through the windows of his cab, in his affidavit to the USSS on December 2, 1963, he claimed that he saw the killer after he (Scoggins) ran to the west side of Patton Street, opposite to his cab (WCD 87, page 553). In conclusion, much like Ted Callaway, Sam Guinyard, and the Davis sister-in-laws, William Scoggins is a witness whose credibility has question marks around it. Not that it matters to Myers.

    Many conspiracy advocates, past and present, have claimed that the Oswald line-ups were unfair. Although this reviewer shares that opinion, once it has been established that the witnesses were unreliable, and by implication, coaxed by the DPD to identify Oswald as the killer in the line-ups, the issue of whether the line-ups were fair or unfair becomes irrelevant. The contradictions between the alleged observations of Ted Callaway and Sam Guinyard are perhaps the best indication that witnesses were coaxed by the DPD to identify Oswald as Tippit’s killer, and once it is accepted that one or two witnesses were coaxed to identify Oswald as the killer, then logically, every eyewitness identification of Oswald as the killer in the DPD line-ups must be considered suspect. If Oswald was framed for Tippit’s murder by those responsible for the President’s assassination, then it only makes perfect sense that Tippit’s killer resembled Oswald, as they certainly would want any witness who saw the killer to think that it was Oswald.

    Towards the end of this Chapter, Myers discusses the paraffin tests used by the DPD to determine whether or not Oswald had fired a gun on the day of the assassination. Myers writes that; “…the lab report on the paraffin cast from Oswald’s right hand showed that the nitrate traces were not only positive, but ‘typical of the patterns produced in firing a revolver’. Such a finding suggests that, in this case, the presence of nitrates was the direct result of firing a handgun, and not due to the handling of some unknown nitrate-laced product.” (With Malice, Chapter 7). However, once again, Myers deceives his readers. For one thing, although he prints a sketch of the nitrates on Oswald’s right hand, he never explains that most of the nitrates were found on the palm side of the hand, and not on the back side of the hand where the nitrates from the revolver would have been deposited. Myers also omits that the FBI’s agent John Gallagher, who worked in the FBI’s laboratory in the physics and chemistry section, testified that; “No characteristic elements were found by neutron activation analysis of the residues which could be used to distinguish the rifle from the revolver cartridges.” (WC Volume XV, page 748 ). This further undermines the “finding” that the nitrate traces on the paraffin cast of Oswald’s hand are typical of the patterns produced by firing a revolver.

    In his discussion of the paraffin test, Myers also writes that the chemicals used in processing the nitrates will also react to nitrates found in urine, tobacco, cosmetics, kitchen matches, fertilizers and many other common items (ibid). Although Myers believes the paraffin tests applied to Oswald’s hands were valid, he never mentions that according to the report by DPD detectives Elmer Boyd and Richard Sims to Chief Curry, Sgt. W.E. “Pete” Barnes and detective John Hicks of the DPD crime lab applied the paraffin test to Oswald’s hands after Hicks had taken fingerprints from him! (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 4, Item 5). This was confirmed by Lt. T.L. Baker in his own report (ibid, Box 5, Folder 5, Item 4). Now if this true, it casts serious doubt on the validity of the tests, as Oswald’s hands would have been contaminated from the fingerprint ink, and washed afterwards to remove all ink. When Sgt. Barnes testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that that he took palm prints from Oswald’s hands immediately before applying the paraffin test; only to quickly correct himself stating that it was done immediately after the paraffin test (WC Volume VII, page 284). However, Barnes’ correction should not be taken seriously, as evidence discussed below demonstrates that Barnes is not a credible witness. Readers should also keep in mind that when counsel David Belin asked Barnes during his testimony “Suppose I were to wash my hands between the time I fired it [WCE 143] and the time you took the paraffin test?”, Barnes claimed that this would “hurt the test” (WC Volume VII, page 280).

    In spite of all of his deceptions, Myers then has the audacity to write the following; “Every aspect of Tippit’s murder became the focus of relentless – and often unfair – criticism.”, adding that “Some doubters [critics] sought to exonerate Oswald of Tippit’s death by challenging the eyewitness accounts” (With Malice, Chapter 7). Yes, Dale. Shame on those of us who, unlike you, actually want to honestly point out the contradictions between the eyewitness accounts which raise serious doubts about their credibility. Suffice it to say, the readers can judge for themselves whether or not I have made unfair criticisms of the witnesses.


    Go to Part Two

  • Dale Myers, With Malice: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Murder of Officer J. D. Tippit


    Dale Myers and his “So-Called Evidence”

    Dale K. Myers wrote what I have described as “in effect, the Warren Report of the Tippit case.” Myers’s 1998 book, revised for the publication of a second edition in October 2013, gives away its agenda in its title, With Malice: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Murder of Officer J. D. Tippit. Like the Warren Commission, Myers begins by assuming Oswald’s guilt and then works backward to deploy a misleading array of what the accused man called “so-called evidence,” rather than investigating the case empirically to reach conclusions that are not preordained. During part of the thirty-one years I was working on my own investigation of the Tippit murder for my book Into the Nightmare: My Search for the Killers of President John F. Kennedy and Officer J. D. Tippit, published in June 2013 by Hightower Press, I sometimes found Myers’s work a useful foil and a source of documents and other data, much as researchers mine the commission’s twenty-six volumes for nuggets that contradict the report itself.

    But like material emanating from the commission, With Malice must be used with caution because of Myers’s bias and his flawed methodology, which tends to load opposing evidence into his lengthy end notes, there to be summarily dismissed and/or belittled rather than seriously examined. Anything Myers puts forth in his Oswald-did-it Tippit hagiography must be carefully checked against all other available information, a method serious researchers have learned to follow with any assertions and documents in these two murder cases. (Myers’s more widely seen work as a computer animator creating speciously constructed models that purport to show the bullet paths in Dealey Plaza displays his willingness to promote the commission’s single-bullet theory in pseudo-scientific mainstream documentaries.)

    Since Into the Nightmare was published, Myers has taken it upon himself to joust against a few of my arguments as part of “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: New and Updated Books about the JFK Assassination,” his November 18, 2013, survey published on one of his two websites, Secrets of a Homicide. The other website Myers runs is jdtippit.com, a conduit not only to promote his book but also to serve the similarly hagiographic agenda of the Tippit family. They have supplied a wealth of valuable family and historical material to the second edition of With Malice as well as to jdtippit.com.

    Myers’s book survey includes shamelessly giving a rave review to a book he helped write without credit, Vincent Bugliosi’s Reclaiming History: The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (2007), which Myers praises as “Hands down the best single volume on the assassination that was never read. Some minor flaws, but incredibly [sic] readable, exhaustive in its analysis, and highly entertaining.” Perhaps since Myers believes that book “was never read,” he thought readers of his article would not realize he worked with Bugliosi on that gargantuan, often truly incredible anti-conspiracy screed (1,648 pages plus a CD-ROM), before they had a mysterious falling-out. Myers’s involvement is acknowledged by Bugliosi as a “noteworthy” writing contribution; he adds that “no one helped me as much as Dale Myers.” Myers’s contribution is among the topics covered in James DiEugenio’s definitive demolition job in his book Reclaiming Parkland: Tom Hanks, Vincent Bugliosi, and the JFK Assassination in the New Hollywood (published in October 2013). Drawing from information provided by fellow assassination researcher David S. Lifton, DiEugenio reports that Myers has a legal settlement preventing him from discussing the issue of his work with Bugliosi. But if Myers found it impossible to include a disclaimer in his survey, he could have avoided disingenuously reviewing and praising a book to which he heavily contributed. And, in fact, for which he was once slated to get a cover credit.

    Following his standard approach to evidence that contradicts his own propagandistic work on behalf of the lone-nut theory, Myers’s book survey briefly dismisses as “utter nonsense … nutty bull-dongles” the great majority of Into the Nightmare for amassing evidence that points to Oswald’s innocence in both murders. His review can be discounted as sour grapes, the type directed at a rival author whose conclusions are diametrically opposite of his. But Myers has a broader agenda. Here, from the article, is a partial inventory of what Myers views as valid evidence against Oswald: “[H]ow Oswald brought the gun to work, the curtain rod story, how the employees left him on one of the upper floors, the lunchroom encounter, the scuffle and attempt to shoot an officer in the theater, the palm print on the rifle stock, the marked street map found in Oswald’s room, and the statements by bus driver McWatters and taxi driver Whaley.” That all these claims of culpability have been conclusively exposed as fallacious in whole or in part by other researchers, including me, hardly seems to have registered with Myers, whose MO is to pretend that serious issues about the evidence do not exist.

    In regard to the Tippit case, contrary evidence I analyze and often dug up with my own research is scorned in Myers’s article as “the same old re-cycled nonsense about Tippit’s death,” including “a much earlier shooting time than ever officially acknowledged, marginal eyewitness testimonies elevated to central roles, [and] Dallas cops switching evidence to frame poor Lee Oswald.” In this reference to the issue of the shooting time, Myers implicitly dismisses the basic exculpatory question of how Oswald could have walked from his rooming house to the scene of the shooting, a distance of nine-tenths of a mile, in the five minutes between his last sighting at the rooming house and the time Tippit was shot.

    I refer interested readers to the entirety of my 675-page book for my own thorough critique of those and other key points in the official case against Oswald. My exposition and arguments, and the flaws in Myers’s highly selective dossier on Oswald for the two murders, cannot be summarized in a short space without seeming simplistic. But in addressing one major discovery of my investigation and a few other points Myers cherry-picks from my lengthy book – thereby demonstrating his sensitivity to certain issues and the importance he places on trying to refute them – Myers makes some misleading claims about Into the Nightmare, including false aspersions on one of my sources, Edgar Lee Tippit, Officer Tippit’s father.

    II. Edgar Lee Tippit’s revelations

    Let’s start with what Myers calls “The big revelation.” I report that Officer Tippit’s murder did not stem from a random encounter with Oswald but from his assignment by the Dallas Police Department to hunt down Oswald shortly after the 12:30 p.m. assassination in downtown Dallas. Within fifteen minutes of that event and until his death at about 1:09 p.m., Tippit was seen by a number of eyewitnesses racing ever more frantically around suburban Oak Cliff, clearly searching for someone until his fatal encounter with parties other than Oswald on East Tenth Street. Some early coverage of the events of November 22, 1963, and various articles and books over the years speculated that Tippit might have been tracking Oswald, but strongly supporting evidence emerged when I interviewed Edgar Lee Tippit at his home in rural Clarksville, Texas, in December 1992.

    Mr. Tippit, who was then a vigorous, mentally alert ninety years old and would live to the age of 104, had been a farmer most of his life when I went to see him and was still working on farming chores. Mr. Tippit told me that shortly after November 22, another Dallas policeman had come to see J. D.’s widow, Marie, and told her what had happened. As I write, “Tippit’s father told me he had been informed by Marie Tippit, the officer’s widow, that J. D. and another officer had been assigned by the police to hunt down Oswald in Oak Cliff. According to Edgar Lee, ‘They called J. D. and another policeman and said he [Oswald] was headed in that direction. The other policeman told Marie.’ …

    “Edgar Lee made another important revelation in our interview. He told me what Marie learned from that other policeman about why he had not made it to the scene of the shooting on Tenth Street: ‘The other boy stopped – he would have got there but he had a little accident, a wreck. They both started, but J. D. made it. He’d been expecting something. The police notified them Oswald was headed that way.’”

    No source should be taken at face value, including one so close to the subject. So I carefully compared Mr. Tippit’s account to other reliable documentation about the activities of his son J. D. and other police officers in Dallas and Oak Cliff during that time period. I found that Mr. Tippit’s account squared with the other pertinent information, and that he provided the strongest evidence to explain what his son’s mission was that afternoon and how it went awry. Into the Nightmare discusses various suspects in the officer’s shooting and identifies three as highly suspicious persons of interest in the ambush (DPD Officer Harry Olsen, Jack Ruby-connected hoodlum Darrell Wayne [Dago] Garner, and Ruby himself), while exonerating others who have been brought forth as suspects, including Oswald, Tippit’s mistress Johnnie Maxie Witherspoon, and her husband Stephen (Steve) Thompson, Jr.

    Myers conveniently, and falsely, tries to discredit Edgar Lee Tippit by claiming that he was suffering from “a dash of dementia” when I interviewed him and therefore cannot be trusted. Mr. Tippit told me he had never been interviewed before. In one of the end notes to the first edition of With Malice, published while Edgar Lee was still living, Myers wrote, “Little is known about Tippit’s parents, Edgar Lee and Lizzie Mae Tippit.” That situation could have been corrected if Myers, who claims he has been researching the Tippit case since 1978, had ever interviewed Mr. Tippit, but the second edition also shows no sign that happened. Perhaps Myers was reluctant to find out what Edgar Lee had to say. As a source for the allegation that Mr. Tippit was demented, Myers cites Joyce Tippit DeBord, a sister of J. D. whom he reports having interviewed on July 11, 2013. That was ten days after Myers ordered a copy of my book. So he apparently felt the belated need to quickly dig up a family source willing to help him discredit Mr. Tippit and his revealing interview.

    I had a wide-ranging interview of several hours with Mr. Tippit and found him lucid, articulate, and forthcoming. He showed no apparent difficulty recalling events or topics I asked about, and when he did not remember something specific (such as the name of the officer who briefed Marie Tippit), he told me so, a mark of his honesty and a bolstering of his clear recollection of other names and information. In the course of my more than fifty years as a journalist and my long experience as a biographer, I have interviewed many elderly people, including numerous men and women in their nineties and beyond. I have found that, contrary to ageist assumptions, many have still been mentally sharp. For Myers, though, an elderly man’s honesty is a sign of “dementia.”

    The strangest part of Myers’s attack is that he seems to essentially endorse Mr. Tippit’s account even while smearing his cognitive abilities and my reporting. Myers describes Edgar Lee’s story as “slightly skewed” and “no doubt a slightly scrambled version of true events,” while accepting his report that an officer came to see Marie Tippit to explain what happened and told her he was prevented from getting to the scene of the shooting because of a traffic accident. I suggest in Into the Nightmare that the two officers may have been trying to kill Oswald if not take him into custody. Myers denies that Tippit and the other officer were “part of some secret Dallas police hit squad bent on rubbing out Oswald.” The fact that Oswald was soon murdered in the custody of dozens of Dallas policemen and that he may have narrowly escaped that fate while captured in the Texas Theatre shortly after the Tippit killing for which he was scapegoated suggests it is not far-fetched to ask whether the police may have been out to eliminate Oswald that afternoon. And when I interviewed former Dallas County District Attorney Henry Wade in January 1993, he lent further corroboration to this account of an earlier than officially acknowledged pursuit of Oswald, telling me, “Somebody reported to me that the police already knew who he [Oswald] was, and they were looking for him.”

    III. The Other Police Officer

    And who was the other police officer involved in that pursuit, the one who, according to Edgar Lee Tippit’s account, briefed Marie Tippit? I point strong suspicion in Into the Nightmare at Sergeant William Duane Mentzel. A former patrol partner of J. D. Tippit, the thirty-two-year-old Mentzel was the officer actually assigned to the district in which Tippit was shot (Tippit was four miles out of his assigned patrol district). Mentzel gave conflicting stories about his whereabouts during the crucial time period (including whether or not he was eating lunch) and was reported to have gone to the scene of an auto accident at 817 West Davis in Oak Cliff, eleven and a half blocks from the location of the Tippit shooting. That accident was reported at 1:11, two minutes after Tippit was shot. I suggest that Mentzel, who was at the accident scene for only about five to ten minutes (accounts vary), actually may have had the accident he supposedly was investigating.

    After my book appeared, I found what I consider the clinching information that Mentzel was the other officer besides Tippit who was hunting down Oswald, and I found it in a surprising place, i.e., the second edition of Myers’s book. In a new end note reporting on his 2008 interview with Ardyce Mentzel, the officer’s widow (he had died in 2002), Myers reports that Mentzel phoned his wife soon after Tippit was shot and told her, “I’m just calling to say that the police officer shot in Oak Cliff wasn’t me.” Mentzel, writes Myers, “served as an honor guard alongside Tippit’s casket at the Dudley Hughes Funeral Home and at the graveside ceremony. He told his wife Ardyce how bad he felt about Tippit’s death, particularly because of the fact that Tippit had been killed in his district. He felt that Tippit had died for him. He was very emotional about the honor guard duty[,] telling her, ‘It’s so hard for me to go to that funeral.’” Myers also writes in the second edition that when Mentzel arrived at the Tippit shooting scene, “A heavy feeling washed over the patrolman. It could have been him … If he hadn’t been called to the traffic accident on West Davis, it might’ve been him laying [sic] up on a gurney at Methodist Hospital right now, instead of J. D. Tippit.” Myers drew that information from Ardyce Mentzel, whom he further quotes directly in his book survey: “Bill told me how bad he felt about Tippit’s death. He felt like Tippit had died for him, since he was killed in my husband’s district.”

    In telling me what the second officer told Marie Tippit about the accident, Edgar Lee Tippit reported that “he said if he hadn’t been stopped, he was closer to this place [the shooting site on East Tenth Street] than J. D. was, and he’d have been [instead of] J. D. there and he’d have gotten it.” But Myers rather illogically writes, “Officer Mentzel’s link to a traffic accident in Oak Cliff (a fact known for better than thirty years) doesn’t really support the essence of Mr. Tippit’s allegation, does it?” Nevertheless, along with Myers’s somewhat surprising agreement with the bulk of Edgar Lee Tippit’s story about the two officers’ pursuit of Oswald – surprising because Myers seems so exercised by my interviewing Mr. Tippit and reporting what he told me – Myers seems to agree with the conclusion that Mentzel was the other officer involved with J. D. Tippit in the pursuit. Myers writes, “It doesn’t take a mental giant to figure out that Mentzel is the one who approached Marie Tippit” with an account of what happened “and that Marie passed this on to J. D.’s father.” This is how Myers summarizes the events in his article: “Officer Mentzel told his wife that had he not got hung up at the traffic accident he was called to, it likely would have been him that would have come across Oswald, been killed, and been lying up at the funeral home instead of J. D. Tippit.”

    Where Myers draws the line is at my suggestion that Mentzel, like Tippit, could have been out to kill Oswald, not just to capture him or help him escape (although I also raise those two possibilities, while tending to discount the latter). Myers seems to believe Mentzel’s role, like Tippit’s, was not suspicious and does not seem particularly bothered by the likelihood that these two policemen were clandestinely assigned by the DPD to hunt down a suspect whose identity would not officially be known to the department until after he was arrested and taken downtown. That early pursuit of the scapegoat in itself was evidence of a conspiracy involving the DPD and these two officers. Although Mentzel was only a patrolman, after the assassination he was given the important assignments of guarding Oswald’s widow, Marina, and one of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s daughters, according to a 1977 interview with the officer by an investigator for the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

    IV. The alleged lunch

    Myers also objects to my questioning Marie Tippit’s account (actually her changing accounts) of her husband coming home for a quick lunch on November 22. If that were the case, and if the timing were right, Tippit could have had an alibi to show that he was not “Badge Man,” the man who appears to be in a Dallas policeman’s uniform, firing a shot at President Kennedy from the Grassy Knoll. In my book, as others have before me, I discuss the possibility of Tippit being “Badge Man”. Contrary to what Myers writes, I do not establish it as a certainty because of the lingering uncertainty over whether Tippit could have been home for lunch and may have conducted a brief investigation of a reported shoplifting in Oak Cliff at 12:17 p.m. (The evidence for that stop on his itinerary is also questionable).

    Mrs. Tippit, who turned eighty-five in October 2013, is still giving interviews and making public appearances. I heard her speak at the November 22, 2013, DPD memorial tribute to J. D. Tippit. “I was blessed to have him,” she said. “He was a wonderful husband and father.” That comment, similar to others she has made in the past, conflicts with the evidence brought forth in my book and elsewhere that he had been cheating on her with Johnnie Maxie Witherspoon (whom I interviewed at length about their affair) and reportedly had been involved with other women as well. As I discuss in Into the Nightmare, it was said by some observers that soon after her husband’s death, Mrs. Tippit seemed to exhibit suspicions about his fidelity (Myers’s book mentions one of those instances).

    My book does not accuse Mrs. Tippit of “lying about her husband’s lunchtime visit,” as Myers writes in his article. What Into the Nightmare does is question her conflicting accounts of the time of the lunch and when she learned of her husband’s death. These are among the problems surrounding the story of the lunch that, as I write in my book, “raise more troubling questions about whether Tippit was actually home for lunch at all that day or whether that could have been a convenient fiction developed with [fellow DPD officer, friend, and neighbor Bill] Anglin and other helpful friends from the DPD busily engaged in damage control from day one.” Mrs. Tippit has never been interrogated under oath about the lunch, or other events, which seems a conspicuous omission in the official investigations, and a widow giving an alibi for a husband is not sufficient to settle an important question about a criminal case. Myers correctly notes that I wrote Mrs. Tippit on March 5, 2013, to request an interview, and that she did not respond. Somehow he twists that to blame me for not talking with her for my book, which I was continuing to write until shortly before its publication that June. A Dallas Morning News article about the Tippit family on November 1, 2013, contains an interview with Marie, who “says musings that [J. D.] was part of an assassination plot, or wasn’t killed by Oswald, are ‘not worth talking about.’”

    Mrs. Tippit’s public position on what happened that day has remained consistent. She said at the DPD memorial tribute that her husband “was killed by the killer of the president” and “that led to the police being able to capture Oswald sooner.” It’s worth noting that this rationale for portraying Officer Tippit as an heroic figure who sacrificed himself for his country by dying at the hands of the escaping Oswald follows the line first put forth on the very day of the assassination by Bill Anglin himself. Anglin went to the Tippit home that afternoon and told (the ubiquitous coverup specialist) Hugh Aynesworth of the Morning News, “One thing, he [Tippit] didn’t die in vain. Had he not stopped that guy the whole City of Dallas might have been wide open by nightfall.” (“That guy” was not identified by name in the article, but Oswald was identified elsewhere in the paper’s November 23 edition as the suspect charged with both murders.)

    Reports about Tippit’s alleged visit to his home for lunch have shown some further emendations by the Tippit family since my book was published. Into the Nightmare quotes a November 2003 article in the Morning News, drawn from an interview with Marie, which states that on the morning of November 22, 1963, “she received a call from the nurse at [their son] Allan’s school, telling her he was vomiting and needed to come home. So he was there when his dad came home for lunch one last time.” That account could suggest Allan was already in some distress shortly before that day’s murders and might reinforce a report (which Allan later denied, to Myers) that his father, before leaving home for work early that morning, hugged the boy and said, “No matter what happens today, I want you to know that I love you.” But the November 2013 article on the Tippits in the Morning News has Allan claiming he told a false story about why he came home early from school on the day his father was shot: “Allan, the oldest child, remembers when the crushing news arrived. He was home that day from eighth grade, faking a stomach ache to avoid an exam, he says.”

    More importantly, Mrs. Tippit has revised her earlier story about how often her husband came home for lunch. She told Morning News columnist Frank X. Tolbert for an August 1964 profile in the Saturday Evening Post, “My husband was away from his family a lot because of his side jobs, so when it didn’t interfere with his patrols, he came home for lunch, mainly so he could spend an hour with me and little Curtis.” But the 2013 Morning News article states, “Her memory of a husband, father and police officer includes his telephone call that Friday morning half a century ago. He was coming home for lunch, a surprising break in routine.” An article distributed that same day by the Associated Press, also containing an interview with Marie, similarly reports that “J. D. Tippit had broken from his usual routine that day and ate lunch at home with his wife.” And in an interview for Where Were You?: America Remembers the JFK Assassination, a book compiled and edited by Gus Russo and Harry Moses, published on November 5, 2013, Mrs. Tippit says, “This was really something for him to come home for lunch. J. D. never got to come home for lunch.”

    V. The doubting DA

    Myers’s other specific gripe about a portion of my book is to claim I have distorted Dallas DA Henry Wade’s June 8, 1964, testimony to the Warren Commission in order to demonstrate that Wade did not believe he and the Dallas police had a valid case to prosecute Oswald for the murders of Kennedy and Tippit. Myers, who asserts that Wade “felt they had plenty of evidence,” does his usual cherry-picking of material to suit his arguments. Myers pulls three Wade quotes from my book in which the DA expressed concerns to the commission about whether the evidence was sufficient to file a complaint charging Oswald with murdering Kennedy, which actually was filed late on the night of November 22 (although Oswald, as I report, was never arraigned on the charge of killing Kennedy, only on the earlier charge of killing Tippit). By arguing over the timing of Wade’s comments, Myers claims I take his remarks out of context. But in making that argument, Myers takes my quoting of Wade out of the overall context of his testimony and my analysis of it. I preface the DA’s skeptical quotes by writing, “Wade expressed doubts to the commission about the evidence assembled by the police against Oswald and made extraordinarily candid admissions about the overall weakness of the assassination case, in contrast to what he had told the media on November 24, when he declared that Oswald was guilty ‘to a moral certainty’ of killing Kennedy.”

    Wade’s testimony is elaborate and sometimes convoluted and cryptic and covers forty-one pages of the commission’s supplementary Volume V. The initial concerns he testified to having, before he was briefed by the police about their evidence (“I wasn’t sure I was going to take a complaint”), resurfaced later and, in my reading of his testimony, may have been on his mind from the day of the assassination onward. The evidence Wade admitted to the commission was weak included two of the most vital facets of the case against Oswald, i.e., whether he owned the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found in the Texas School Book Depository (which Wade, notoriously, told the media early in the morning on November 23 was “a Mauser, I believe”) and whether Oswald’s palmprint was found underneath the barrel of the rifle. Though the history of these two pieces of “so-called evidence” is too complex to analyze in a short article, those who have read Into the Nightmare and such landmark books as Sylvia Meagher’s Accessories After the Fact: The Warren Commission, The Authorities, and The Report (1967) and John Armstrong’s Harvey and Lee: How the CIA Framed Oswald (2003) will know that both pieces of evidence are fraudulent. The FBI did not find a palmprint on the rifle, but one that supposedly came from the rifle was belatedly supplied by Lieutenant J. C. Day, the print man for the Dallas police. Wade told the commission, referring to Day, “I have learned since that he probably can’t identify the palmprint under there but at that time they told me they had one on it.”

    Myers does not discuss Wade’s curious claim in his testimony that Captain Will Fritz, the DPD’s lead homicide detective, told him about the palmprint evidence in their meeting shortly after 7 p.m. on November 22, which, if true, could be proof that the police were planning or expecting to use fabricated evidence against Oswald. The Warren Report claims Day lifted the palmprint on the night of November 22, but he did not release it to the FBI until November 26, and it did not arrive at the FBI Laboratory until November 29. Neither Captain Fritz nor DPD Chief Jesse Curry mentioned this supposedly crucial piece of evidence to the media on the assassination weekend. As Sylvia Meagher writes, “Oddly enough, the first public mention of Oswald’s palmprint on the rifle came from District Attorney Henry Wade at his Sunday night press conference (of which Mark Lane has said that Wade was not guilty of a single accuracy).” I discuss in Into the Nightmare the possibility that the FBI obtained the palmprint on Sunday night or Monday morning at the Fort Worth funeral home where Oswald’s body was being prepared for burial.

    With his testimony more than six months later, Wade contradicted his own claim to surprised reporters on November 24 that an Oswald palmprint had been found, and in a considerable understatement, admitted about that news conference, “I was a little inaccurate in one or two things but it was because of the communications with the police … I ran through just what I knew, which probably was worse than nothing.” Wade also told the commission that at his earlier news conference shortly after midnight on November 23, following his briefing by the police on the so-called evidence, “I was the one who was answering the questions about things I didn’t know much about, to tell you the truth.”

    Myers argues that I have misled the reader by quoting Wade’s testimony that he “felt like nearly it was a hopeless case” against Oswald after Chief Curry, disregarding Wade’s advice not to have the department broadcast so much evidence, went on national television on the afternoon of November 23 to talk about the FBI evidence supposedly linking Oswald to the purchase of the rifle. Myers fails to mention that Wade, both before and after that comment to the commission, gives them a lengthy disquisition on how hard it would have been to get a conviction of Oswald after the police had so badly tainted the potential jury pool by parading and discussing evidence in public, as was their usual practice. Wade deplored that practice as counterproductive, even though he did a lot of it himself that weekend. Wade testified he told Curry in the late morning of November 23 that “there may not be a place in the United States you can try it with all the publicity you are getting.”

    Differing interpretations indeed can be put on various aspects of Wade’s voluminous and often evasive testimony, as Myers and I both do. The point of my analysis was to highlight some of the many revealing instances in which Wade let slip doubts about the evidence in the midst of his pro-forma support of the lone-gunman theory. Obviously, a leading Dallas establishment figure such as Wade, despite telling me in our 1993 interview, “I probably made a lot of mistakes,” was not going to make public statements in 1963, 1964, or even much later (such as to me), that he and the police had no case at all against Oswald. But those who carefully read his 1964 testimony will find only tepid acknowledgments that he had a case he could try in court, and admissions that he doubted the validity of much of the evidence the police claimed to him they had and that he did not know much of anything about it.

    Nor did Wade believe the allegations of his far-rightwing Deputy DA Bill Alexander that Oswald was part of a communist conspiracy. Wade admitted to me, as he had to the commission, that he found those claims unsupported as well as beside the legal point and that he followed the urging of President Johnson’s aide Cliff Carter by phone on November 22 not to include the conspiracy charge in the complaint against Oswald in Kennedy’s murder. While addressing the conspiracy claims, Wade testified, “I don’t know what evidence we have, we had at that time and actually don’t know yet what all the evidence was.” He further testified, “I never saw any of the physical evidence in the Oswald case other than one or two statements [sic], and I think I saw the gun while they were taking it out of there bringing it to Washington … I will say Captain Fritz is about as good a man at solving a crime as I ever saw, to find out who did it, but he is poorest in the getting evidence that I know, and I am more interested in getting evidence, and there is where our major conflict comes in.” Those are just some of the numerous quotes from Wade’s testimony expressing doubts about the evidence.

    When I interviewed Wade, whom Warren Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin described as “a very canny, able prosecutor,” I found he still seemed “canny” and “able,” within his longstanding limitations, as a practicing Dallas attorney of seventy-eight. But Wade’s reputation has suffered grievously from disclosures in recent years that he and his office were riddled with corruption, ethics violations, and bias. So much so that they routinely convicted innocent people of crimes, with a reckless disregard of the evidence. In my interview, I found that Wade continued to display a mixture of evasiveness, genuine or feigned ignorance about the basic facts of the case about the murders of Kennedy and Tippit, and occasional blunt revelations that contradicted major aspects of the official story (such as his claim that the FBI had spoken with Oswald only a day or two before the assassination). In analyzing Wade’s cryptic testimony and my own interview with him, I was recognizing that Wade had an ambivalence about the case that he tended to acknowledge only partially, guardedly, and suggestively.

    And I was following the lead of Carl Oglesby, who in his 1976 book The Yankee and Cowboy War: Conspiracies from Dallas to Watergate brilliantly analyzes the hidden meanings of Jack Ruby’s even more convoluted and cryptic testimony to the Commission on the day before Wade testified. I could have gone on at more length in my already voluminous book about Wade’s curious performance before the commission, but Myers misses the import of my critique of Wade for not being fully forthcoming and my attempt to excavate the deeper meanings he may have been trying to signal to the world.

    VI. The Hofstadter/CIA ploy

    Before leaving Myers and With Malice to the scrutiny of its readers (and I welcome the perverse utility of a book that attempts to catalogue official accounts of that murder), I will pass over Myers’s unintentionally comical pseudo-psychoanalytical theory of why I wrote my book, other than to correct a couple of important factual distortions in his so-called evidence for it.

    In creating a straw man in my place, Myers misquotes an interview I gave to Len Osanic on Black Op Radio on July 25, 2013, in which I discussed how my skepticism about our political system was grounded on being “terribly lied to and fooled as a kid, as a lot of us were, by my religion, my parents, Democratic beliefs – my Democratic Party beliefs – and by the schools, and by the media.” Myers leaves out the phrase “as a lot of us were” and misleadingly puts “democratic” in lowercase while omitting the explanatory phrase “Democratic Party beliefs.” This is an important distinction in quoting a writer whose mother, Marian Dunne McBride, was vice chairman of the Wisconsin Democratic Party when Kennedy won the 1960 presidential primary, in which I worked for him as a volunteer. As I make abundantly clear in Into the Nightmare, I have never lost my democratic beliefs but believe that our political system forfeited its claim to being a genuine democracy after Kennedy was murdered and the government failed to solve the crime. Other than correcting those factual distortions, I will simply note that in constructing his ad hominem attacks, Myers is following the tediously overused playbooks of the late historian Richard Hofstadter and the Central Intelligence Agency about how to attempt to discredit those dreaded “conspiracy theorists.”

    Despite Hofstadter’s high reputation and many excellent books, he was criticized by colleagues in his own field for indulging in amateur psychoanalysis of people with whom he disagreed. That tendency pervades Hofstadter’s influential polemical essay “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” which was first published in November 1964 and was based on a lecture he gave at Oxford University in November 1963. Acting on Hofstadter’s cue and that of the infamous 1967 CIA memo “Countering Criticism of the Warren Report,” countless Warren Commission apologists, including Dale Myers, have routinely employed personal attacks rather than actually grappling with the arguments advanced by those with whom they disagree. Resorting to rhetorical and ad hominem attacks is a standard ploy by those who don’t have real arguments about the basic facts.

    So I am hardly surprised to be subjected to the same basically irrelevant treatment by an author who either refuses to deal seriously with the many genuine issues of the Tippit case or is incapable of doing so, as his book and article seem to indicate. One of the most dismaying aspects of Myers’s approach and the adherence of members of the Tippit family to the official version is that they, like Tippit’s fellow Dallas police officers in 1963, seem content with a seriously flawed concept of the case. In my view, that mythic version of Tippit’s murder ignores much of the real evidence and pins the blame instead on an innocent man.

  • Robert Dallek, Camelot’s Court / An Unfinished Life


    Robert Dallek Camouflages John F. Kennedy, Twice


    Robert Dallek had been a longtime history professor at UCLA with about ten books on American history under his belt when he published a 700-page biography of John F Kennedy, An Unfinished Life. That volume was timed for release in 2003, at the 40th anniversary of Kennedy’s murder. Then, in 2013, for the fiftieth anniversary, Dallek published another biography of Kennedy. This one was called Camelot’s Court. The ostensible reason for the second book was that it was more focused on other figures in Kennedy’s White House. This was a rather dubious pretext for Dallek to use. For the second book is almost wholly reliant on the first.

    An Unfinished Life was rather quickly embraced by the mainstream media at the time of its publication. In fact, newspapers like the New York Times and Washington Post have since accepted it as a – perhaps the – standard biography of both Kennedy and his presidency. The Atlantic Monthly has also embraced Dallek and given him much space. He has since made many appearances on television, even one with Jon Stewart. At the 50th anniversary, PBS made a four-hour two part series largely based on his work. This was the longest program aired during that three week avalanche of denial.

    If an historian is to be judged as having done a good and complete job, generally speaking, that means three major traits are manifest in his work. First, he produced something that was in some way new and original. Second, he was fair, objective and complete in his depiction of his subject. Third, his work did not cut corners or use questionable sources in order to fulfill a pre-conceived agenda.

    In these books, it is very hard to give Dallek passing grades in those three areas. In the area of surfacing anything new, An Unfinished Life was trumpeted as dealing with many of the drugs and medicines Kennedy had to use for his back and adrenal ailments. Its not like this material had not been out there before. It had been available in several other books. Dallek just went further with it and in more detail. But the relevant question has always been: Did these medications impact Kennedy’s performance in any way? In a 2003 interview with Juan Williams of NPR, Dallek himself concluded they had not. Which is a judgment that almost any Kennedy historian could have delivered without these records.

    The second “new” element used to market the book was an alleged discovery Dallek made about a heretofore unknown dalliance Kennedy had with one Mimi Alford, who’s name in 1963 was Marion Beardsley. Alford went in An Unfinished Life by her maiden name in the trade paperback edition. But she did not appear in public or write anything. That all changed in 2012. Now she wrote a book and went on a book tour. The MSM was greatly interested for a week or so. But Alford, and her book quickly disappeared. It wasn’t until afterwards that researchers like Greg Parker, Tom Scully, and Vince Palamara began to poke holes in the specious Dallek/Alford story. I cannot do better than to refer the reader to Parker’s fine work on this subject (also see Parker’s Fiddle & Faddle). But no matter how many holes were poked in this story, Dallek used it again in Camelot’s Court, published in 2013. Here he actually quotes the Alford book in saying Kennedy slept with her during the Missile Crisis, and told her he would rather his children be Red than dead. (Camelot’s Court, p. 330) This is after Kennedy has demanded that every missile be removed from Cuba, and that any missile launched from there would meet with a retaliatory strike from him at the Soviet Union.

    In reality, what was trumpeted as new in An Unfinished Life was, in the first case, irrelevant, and in the second case, with Alford, quite dubious. Therefore, what any real critic should have asked was: is there anything else to recommend these books? In other words, what is there of real and lasting value in Dallek’s work about Kennedy? Let us now deal with that substantial, but ignored, matter.

    II

    To begin to answer that question, one must say that even though the combined length of the books is well over 1,100 pages, one begins to sense that Dallek’s work is not at all complete. The first thing one notices is the absence of a very important influence on young Congressman John Kennedy. In fact, today, some would say it might have been the single most important influence in forming his view of the world. You will not find the name of Edmund Gullion in either book. Which, today, is pretty much inexcusable. Especially after the work of Richard Mahoney and James W. Douglass; respectively JFK: Ordeal in Africa, and JFK and the Unspeakable. Quite naturally, it follows that neither of those books is in either of Dallek’s bibliographies. And that tells us something about his work. Because even though Mahoney’s milestone book gets the back of Dallek’s hand, and Douglass’ fine volume is absent from Camelot’s Court, somehow Dallek did find the space and time to list books about Kennedy by authors like the late John Davis, the writing team of Peter Collier and David Horowitz, Victor Lasky, Thomas C. Reeves, Chris Matthews, and Seymour Hersh. Now, some of these books are written by rightwing hitmen e.g. Collier, Horowitz, Reeves and Lasky. Some are very questionable works by people who were on the make, like Matthews and Davis. Hersh’s book is an out and out hatchet job done for big money. And make no mistake, Dallek uses these books. Why the author would use these kinds of books, but not Mahoney or Douglass, makes his book – to put it mildly – incomplete and lopsided.

    The case of State Department official Edmund Gullion is a good example as to why. Gullion was an important figure for Mahoney and Douglass-and for this reviewer in Destiny Betrayed – because he had a definite impact on Kennedy’s thinking about the issue of anti-communism in the Third World. As Mahoney details in his fine book, it was after his 1951 meeting with Gullion in Saigon that Kennedy began making speeches railing against American foreign policy by both parties in the Third World. (James DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, pgs. 21-22) These early speeches are pretty much absent from both of Dallek’s books.

    Kennedy’s opposition to Operation Vulture is simply absent from Dallek. In fact, you will not find it in the index to either book. Vulture was the Dulles brothers’ solution to lift the siege of Dien Bien Phu and save the French empire in Indochina. It was a giant air armada of well over 200 planes designed to bomb North Vietnamese General Giap’s army, which was closing in on Dien Bien Phu in 1954. That mission included the dropping of three atomic bombs. Senator Kennedy rose on the senate floor twice to object to this mission and ask John Foster Dulles how atomic weapons are meant to be used within the tactics of guerilla warfare. (ibid, p. 23) Also missing from Dallek’s 1,100 pages is the letter that Kennedy wrote to Foster Dulles asking him what his plans were for Vietnam after France fell. (ibid)

    These points are important for two reasons. First, they clearly show a growing conflict between the Dulles/Eisenhower/Nixon view of Vietnam and Third World colonialism, and Senator Kennedy’s. Second, all of this will inform Kennedy’s policy toward Vietnam and Southeast Asia when he becomes president. It helps demonstrate why Cold Warrior Lyndon Johnson was so eager to involve America directly in Indochina and why Kennedy was not.

    All of these shortcomings and lacunae presage what Dallek is going to do with the great Algeria speech Kennedy gave in 1957. Many people, including myself, think this speech might be the greatest Kennedy ever gave. It was courageous since it clearly marked out and named the GOP White House team as being complicit with France in trying to crush the colonial rebellion in Algeria, part of the French African empire. The speech itself is an impressive piece of understanding, insight and nuance, at times, almost visionary. Kennedy actually warns against the dangers of Arab radicalism breaking out against the USA if it insists on being on the wrong side of the struggle. Recall, this was 1957 and Kennedy was 39 years old. Mahoney, understanding its importance, spends over seven pages on the speech and its aftermath. (Mahoney, pgs. 19-27) Dallek spends one paragraph on it. (An Unfinished Life, p. 222)

    Dallek does discuss an article that Kennedy wrote in Foreign Affairs on the subject. But he quotes it very briefly, and then says that Kennedy’s proposals for change were as limited as Eisenhower’s. He then adds, Chris Matthews’ style, that Kennedy’s article was really “a political slogan as much as it was a genuine departure in thinking about overseas affairs.” (ibid, p. 223)

    When I read that, I understood what Dallek was up to. No objective scholar could write such a thing. For the simple reason that Kennedy’s speech, and his ideas, were anything but a political slogan. They were so complex and subtle that one could not express them in a slogan. They reflected a change in Kennedy’s thinking which Gullion had launched six years before. And those ideas would be implemented in the White House in relation to leaders like Patrice Lumumba, Achmed Sukarno and Gamal Abdel Nasser; in places like Congo and Indonesia and Egypt. But just as Dallek does not mention Gullion, he does not mention Nasser or Sukarno, and he deals with Lumumba and the colossal Congo crisis in just two paragraphs. (An Unfinished Life, pgs. 348-49) And to put it mildly, those two paragraphs are pretty much a distortion of what really happened there.

    III

    When I read those two paragraphs, I again saw what Dallek was up to. Dallek tries to draw the Congo struggle as a competitive affair between Kennedy and the Russians. In other words, primarily as an extension of the Cold War. This is simply not accurate or nearly complete. For, unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy did not see Congo as a primarily East-West struggle. As with Algeria, Kennedy saw the Congo as a nationalist crusade by the local rebels against European imperialism. Incredibly, Dallek mentions the colonizing country of Belgium exactly once in those two paragraphs. He mentions Khrushchev or the USSR six times. And even though this titanic struggle went on for the entire three years Kennedy was in office, this is the only place where Dallek deals with it. Therefore, the whole idea that Kennedy took up the struggle that U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld began – which is what happened – is completely lost. After Hammarskjold was murdered, Kennedy worked with the United Nations to make sure Belgium would not retake the country, or that European imperialism would not dominate it. For those European interests (and the CIA) were working to split the very wealthy Katanga province off from the rest of the country. Dallek mentions Katanga. He does not mention this aspect of the imperial struggle around it.

    In fact, Dallek actually writes that Khrushchev accused Hammarskjöld of plotting to kill Lumumba. (An Unfinished Life, p. 349) That accusation was false. But what he leaves out is that Eisenhower and Allen Dulles actually plotted to kill Lumumba. Which is true. (DiEugenio, p. 28) Further, some writers feel these plots were hurried along by Dulles. Because he knew that, once inaugurated, Kennedy would back Lumumba. Which, not knowing he was dead, Kennedy did. (ibid, p. 29) Finally, Dallek leaves out the fact that Congo was really the first foreign policy issue which Kennedy fully addressed with an intense policy review. And when he formulated this policy, it ended up being a reversal of what had preceded him in the Eisenhower White House. (DiEugenio, p. 29)

    As the reader can see by now, Dallek has designed both of his books along the lines that Larry Sabato did in The Kennedy Half Century. They are not full and complete works which try and capture all nuances and tendencies in an objective manner; a manner which will actually elucidate for and enlighten the reader. Like Sabato, Dallek wishes to constrict the biography he is writing to keep Kennedy from being any kind of liberal icon.

    If one needs any more proof of that, then all one needs to do is take a look at what Dallek does with Senator Kennedy and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Dallek writes that Kennedy’s support for the far-reaching powers of Title III, which allowed the Attorney General to intercede in state cases where he could establish discrimination, was simply showboating. Kennedy knew it would not pass in the final form. (An Unfinished Life, pgs. 216-17) But it did pass in slightly modified form in the final bill. And one can observe by just reading the legislation, especially Parts 3 and 4.

    As the reader can see, in Part IV, section c, it allowed for the Attorney General to institute civil actions when he thought voter discrimination was taking place. In my review of Sabato’s book I showed, from personal correspondence, this was the part of the law that Kennedy was actively interested in. It was not any kind of “liberal posing” either. Which is what Dallek tried to dismiss it as. Kennedy really thought this would be a good and effective way to challenge voter discrimination laws in the south. As I further wrote in that review, that is what he told his campaign staff in October of 1960: that he would challenge voter discrimination with Title 3 once he was elected. And this is what he did once Robert Kennedy was approved as Attorney General. There is a through line here which Dallek camouflages.

    Dallek tries to blunt the impact of Kennedy’s epochal civil rights achievements in ways similar to Sabato. He tries to say that Kennedy did not sign an open housing bill until 1962. (Camelot’s Court, p. 251) Again, as Helen Fuller explained in Year of Trial, it was never a question as to if Kennedy was going to sign the open housing order. It was simply a matter of trying to get his trade bill through congress. Something he did not think he could do if he signed the housing bill first. (Fuller, pgs. 37-42)

    Dallek also criticizes Kennedy for appointing judges who would not support his civil rights program. (Camelot’s Court, p. 251) Again, this does not tell the whole story. Bobby Kennedy discussed this problem in the posthumous oral history entitled Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words. President Kennedy did not really appoint these judges. This whole appointment privilege had evolved over time as a result of the advise and consent clause of the constitution. When a vacancy would appear, senators would recommend a short list from which the president would then choose. As RFK said, if the president did not choose, then the senator might be in a position to bottle up whole parts of the president’s legislative program. As, for example, Senator Bob Kerr could have down with Kennedy’s revenue and tax programs. (Robert Kennedy : In His Own Words, edited by Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffery Shulman, pgs. 107-118) RFK is very frank and honest about this dilemma he and his brother faced. And also how they tried to navigate a system they did not like, and had nothing to do with constructing. I would be able to treat Dallek more respectfully if it was not so obvious that he had read this book. I would also be less dismissive if he noted that this problem confronted both Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. Yet Kennedy did more for civil rights in less than three years than either of those presidents did in twenty.

    This points up another serious failing in Dallek’s work. One way that a historian/biographer elucidates his subject is by using contrast. That is, what came before him that either influenced the subject or which he rebelled against. As we have seen, Dallek does not even mention Edmund Gullion. But also, Dallek spends very little time on the character of John Foster Dulles. Which is odd since, as most historians of Eisenhower explain, Foster Dulles had an inordinate amount of influence in the White House. For example, I could not find the fine book, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia in either of his bibliographies. That book was published in 1995, eight years before An Unfinished Life. With reference to that work, Dallek could have studied the contrast between the Dulles’ brothers approach to Sukarno and Indonesia, and Kennedy’s. After all, Foster Dulles did try to overthrow Sukarno in 1958. Kennedy tried hard to mend that relationship. To the point that he negotiated with the Dutch to return West Irian back to Indonesia, something Dulles would not do. The significance of this is that West Irian was either as rich, or richer, in mineral wealth as Katanga. Again, this was a perfect example of what Kennedy was talking about in his 1957 speech, about the problems with the Foster Dulles approach to anti-communism in the Third World. And it was a concrete example of Kennedy acting to change that. If you ignore all of this-Foster Dulles, the 1958 coup attempt, Kennedy and West Irian-then you can reduce Kennedy’s ideas on the subject to just slogans. But that is not writing good history. Its censoring history.

    The final stroke of contrast in the episode would be what happened to Indonesia after Kennedy’s assassination. Within about 18 months of Kennedy’s death, the CIA was now going to make another attempt to displace Sukarno. Lyndon Johnson owed some political favors for his 1964 election to backers who had corporate interests in Indonesia. He placed some of them in a position to influence American foreign policy there. In late 1964, the Dutch intercepted a cable saying that Indonesia would soon fall into the hands of the west. Ten months later, in October of 1965, the CIA’s attempt to dethrone the non-aligned Sukarno succeeded. (DiEugenio, p. 375) It’s most unusual that Dallek left the Indonesia coup story out. Because he had previously written a two part biography of Johnson. But again, these are the kinds of things that allow an historian to mark differences in approach by presidents. Authors like Ronald Rakove in his book Kennedy, Johnson and the Nonaligned World, understood this part of the contrast, the Kennedy-Johnson part. Dallek either does not comprehend it, or he wants to ignore it. Either way his books suffer because of it.

    IV

    There is another lack in these books that Dallek seems unaware of. Dallek is not the stylist, that say, Robert Caro is. Whatever the failings of Caro, the man is an elegant wordsmith. Dallek is perhaps serviceable in that regard. But there is a larger point here that relates to the lack of building any contrast between Eisenhower and Kennedy. That is the issue of the character and shape of the Sixties. Because he makes so little of what preceded Kennedy – Eisenhower/Dulles and the Fifties – Dallek completely misses the explosiveness of the new decade. But further, because his portrait of Kennedy is so constricted, he fails to place Kennedy as the man who helped launch that sensational decade. In other words, there is simply no attempt to capture the temper of the times. And as anyone can attest, they were explosive times to live through. Its obvious today, as historian Philip Muehlenbeck has noted, that Kennedy designed his foreign policy as a reaction to what he was opposed to previously. As Muehlenbeck notes in his fine book, Betting on the Africans, Kennedy spoke about this difference to both George Ball and Harris Wofford. He consciously and specifically rejected the policies of both previous Secretaries of State: Dean Acheson and Foster Dulles. (Muehlenbeck, p. 37) As Ball noted, Kennedy did not want the USA to back the status quo in the Third World. Which usually meant that America would be against nationalism and non-alignment. Kennedy wanted the USA to break out of that Cold War paradigm of “you’re either for us or against us.” Kennedy understood that if America rejected the nationalist and revolutionary leaders, they would inevitably turn toward the Soviets. Therefore, America should amend its policies so as not to be seen resisting the tides of history. (ibid, p. xiv)

    Kennedy mentioned the continent of Africa 479 times during his campaign speeches. He then sent an expedition to Africa led by Senator Frank Church. Church recommended “sweeping changes in America’s attitude towards Africa.” Again, this shows that Dallek is just plain wrong in his characterization of the Algeria speech. Kennedy was not just sloganeering. Because those ideas all ended up influencing his policies. And it resulted in a break with Eisenhower. And not just in the Congo, where Dulles and Eisenhower wanted Lumumba dead. For the first time, the USA voted with an African nation and against the European powers at the United Nations. (ibid, p. 97) Kennedy said he would not trade votes there in order to “prevent subjugated people from being heard.” Even the New York Times understood this was a major shift in American foreign policy. And they called it that. (ibid) What does it say when the New York Times notes a milestone and historian Dallek misses it? Kennedy was consciously breaking with Foster Dulles and what he represented.

    But the point is, because Kennedy’s foreign policy and his civil rights program contrasted with Eisenhower, it was part of the new excitement of the early sixties. Kennedy had promised to get the country moving again with his New Frontier speech at his nominating convention. And this became a part of the trajectory of that fateful decade. One that began with so much expectation and hope. Yet it ended with tens of thousands of body bags returned from Indochina, Nixon as president, blood in the streets of Chicago, and LSD everywhere, perhaps supplied by the CIA. The end was captured symbolically by the stoned out acid rock of Woodstock. Dallek has no sensitivity to any of this. Or President Kennedy’s role in it.

    V

    With Dallek, its instructive I believe to begin with the end of his first book, An Unfinished Life. As noted, he was very much interested in noting Kennedy’s medical conditions and ailments. And since he had a big publisher in Little, Brown and Company, and the book was coming out at the 40th anniversary, he was clearly courting the MSM.

    Therefore, at the end of the book, he clearly comes down in the “Oswald as lone assassin” camp. But he actually goes beyond that. He borrows a phony fact from Seymour Hersh and his trashy The Dark Side of Camelot. Hersh was also in the Oswald did it camp. But he wanted to partly blame Kennedy’s death on himself. So he wrote that, Kennedy may have survived the first shot. But his back brace kept him upright, and this set him up for the fatal headshot.

    Now, in the intervening seven years between when Hersh wrote that balderdash, and Dallek published An Unfinished Life, more than one writer noted that Hersh was off base here in both his information and implication. Kennedy’s “back brace” was really more like a thick belt with a wrapping bandage. (See Robert Groden, Absolute Proof, p. 175) It was therefore flexible. It did not stop him from tilting forward or downward. Dallek could have easily looked this up. The fact that he 1.) trusted Hersh, and 2.) included it without cross-checking, is revealing. (Dallek, p. 694)

    But that’s not all. Dallek recites the whole Warren Commission creed about the Kennedy assassination. Oswald is referred to as “an unstable ne’er-do-well”, who had a “mail-order Italian rifle”from which he fired three shots from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository building. Incredibly, and like his mindless quoting of Hersh, he also writes that a bullet struck “Kennedy in the back of the neck.” (ibid) Which is another lie. We know from the autopsy photos that this wound was not in the neck. It was in Kennedy’s back. But these kinds of things don’ t matter to him.

    Going back from this point, in both books, Dallek closes with Kennedy’s Vietnam policy. Like Larry Sabato, Dallek cannot bring himself to write the phrase “National Security Action Memorandum 263”. In over 1,100 pages of text, I couldn’t find the term. There seems to be a kind of general understanding among those in the media that this is now a taboo phrase. It reached the heights of absurdity in the Tom Brokaw/Gus Russo NBC special, Where Were You? There, either Russo or Brokaw got Richard Reeves, whose book on Kennedy is even worse than either of Dallek’s, to say that this executive order only meant to return kitchen help from Vietnam.

    Dallek is not quite that goofy – or mercenary. But he does something fairly odd. Something that does not align with the new record adduced by scholars like Howard Jones. In both books, he actually tries to insinuate that it was really Defense Secretary Robert McNamara who recommended to Kennedy a withdrawal plan, one beginning in 1963 and culminating in 1965. ( E.g. Camelot’s Court, p. 411) It is true that the actual NSAM does say that Kennedy accepted a recommendation by McNamara and Maxwell Taylor to withdraw a thousand military personnel by the end of 1963. But in the larger context of the issue, to lay the withdrawal plan at McNamara’s feet is simply wrong headed. So much so that it only makes sense as part of the author’s larger scheme: to make JFK into a Cold Warrior, only a slightly more mild and stylish version than Eisenhower or LBJ. Dallek’s problem is that his McNamara thesis is completely counterfeit.

    For many, many years – actually decades – Vietnam had been saddled with the subtitle of being McNamara’s War. In other words, contrary to what Dallek is postulating here, many observers saw it as a war that McNamara actually advocated. This is how bad the MSM reporting on that war actually was. There was some evidence for this of course. During the debates about inserting combat troops in 1961, McNamara was one of the many who advised Kennedy to do so.

    Incredibly, in one part of An Unfinished Life, Dallek writes that no one wanted combat troops injected into Vietnam in 1961. (p. 443) Gordon Goldstein has demonstrated that this is simply false. In his fine book, Lessons in Disaster, Goldstein pinpoints nine different requests for combat troops that year from several different sources-including Defense Secretary McNamara! (Goldstein, pgs. 52-58) These were all submitted before the delivery to Kennedy of the trip report by Max Taylor and Walt Rostow, which again, requested combat troops. Kennedy turned that down also. In light of these facts, what Dallek does here is to seriously distort the issue, and Kennedy’s role in it. Many of the president’s advisers-e.g. Rostow, Taylor, Ambassador Nolting, Ed Lansdale, and Deputy Defense Secretary Alexis Johnson – wanted him to insert combat troops into Vietnam in 1961. It was Kennedy who rejected each proposal. As Goldstein notes, only two men backed Kennedy in arguing against Americanizing the war: George Ball and John Kenneth Galbraith. They were outnumbered by a factor of about 3 to 1.

    So for Dallek to also write that somehow, the idea to withdraw was McNamara’s, this is doubly bizarre. Because, in 1961, McNamara requested combat troops, not once, but twice. The first time he requested 3,600 men. But in the November debates over the Taylor-Rostow report, he upped this to over 60,000! (Goldstein, p. 60) And he argued in a memo that these were needed in order to stop the domino effect from taking place in Indochina. So the obvious question is one that Dallek does not pose. The obvious question is: How and why did McNamara switch sides by 1963? Because it’s quite clear that this happened. There is an October 1963 tape of a meeting between Kennedy, McNamara and McGeorge Bundy in which McNamara essentially insists that they must begin to disengage from Vietnam. (James Blight, Virtual JFK, pgs. 99-103) When Goldstein heard this tape he was so stunned that he asked: Who is this guy? (ibid, p. 124) In other words, how did McNamara go from one side of the issue to the other, and then back again in 1964. So much so that the Vietnam War bore his name?

    Dallek cannot answer these questions because, again, he leaves the relevant information out. The book Virtual JFK was published in 2009. So there really is no excuse for the following information not being in Camelot’s Court. In late 1961, Kennedy sent Galbraith to Saigon in order to give him a counter-report to what Taylor and Rostow had submitted, the insertion of combat troops. Galbraith returned a report saying that there was really no point in America staying in Vietnam. That report was handed to McNamara. As Roswell Gilpatric, a McNamara deputy, later stated, Kennedy had now entrusted McNamara to begin to wind down American involvement in the war. (Blight, pgs. 125, 371) This is an important point, both generally and specifically. Generally, it pinpoints the beginning of Kennedy’s withdrawal plan. Specifically, it counters the Dallek idea that the plan originated with McNamara. It also shows how and why McNamara switched sides. You will not find this turning point in either of Dallek’s books.

    The next step in the withdrawal plan is also seriously discounted by Dallek. After getting his instructions, McNamara then tasked the Pentagon with putting together a withdrawal plan. Predictably, they dragged their feet. But in May of 1963, there was a meeting in Hawaii at which McNamara conferred with a large in-country task force from Vietnam. At this meeting, McNamara heard from each department and reviewed their individual plans for leaving the country. If anything, he wanted the plans speeded up. The documents on this meeting, declassified in 1997, were one of the key finds released by the ARRB. (DiEugenio, p. 366)

    The way Dallek handles this key discovery is puzzling. In Camelot’s Court, he writes that McNamara directed the Pentagon to discuss a plan to withdraw. Be he says this was done for fear of a coup against Diem. He then discussed it with Kennedy. (p. 349). In the earlier book, he wrote that in May of 1963, “Kennedy began planning the withdrawal of U.S. military advisers.” (An Unfinished Life, p. 668) But he based this on oral conversations Kennedy had with people like Ken O’Donnell and Dave Powers and John McCone. Which were related after the fact. This allows him to then write: “But a plan was not a commitment.” (ibid) In neither instance does he refer to the Hawaii meeting. Nor does he refer to any of the declassified documents. Which, with pages of transcriptions of dialogue, numbers, and datelines, certainly does constitute a plan. Again, it is very hard to believe that Dallek was not aware of this new and crucial Hawaii record. Because when it was released, stories were written about it in the mainstream press e.g. The New York Times.

    As late as the autumn of 1963, Dallek is still doing what he can to separate Kennedy from a withdrawal plan. Dallek mentions the trip to Vietnam by McNamara and Taylor at that time. He then says that they told Kennedy that the major part of the mission would be done by 1965 and the USA could begin withdrawing advisers in December of 1963. (Camelot’s Court, p. 411) He then writes that the two emissaries “gave no explanation for why the United States could leave Vietnam in a little over two years.”

    This might take the cake as far as keeping the president away from his own initiated policy. As both John Newman and Fletcher Prouty revealed many years ago, this trip was really more like a staged playlet. The trip report was not written by McNamara or Taylor. It was penned in Washington by General Victor Krulak under the direction of President Kennedy. While composing the report, Krulak was working from instructions he had been given before the visiting party left! (John Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 401) He carried the drafts to the White House each day for approval. In other words, the report by Taylor and McNamara was not presented to Kennedy. Kennedy’s report, written in Washington, was presented to those two men. And the reason it included a phased withdrawal was because that is the objective Kennedy wanted. (ibid, p. 402) Only if this is all left out, which Dallek does, can one add the superfluous and pointless rejoinder about the two men not giving any explanation as to why the Unites States should leave Vietnam.

    In light of what we know today, the whole Vietnam aspect of the book is simply obfuscation and camouflage.

    VI

    Another way to measure the qualities of historical scholarship is through the process called synthesis. That is, how does the author put together pieces of new and old information in order to form a cohesive whole? For example, Philip Melanson’s 1990 Spy Saga, did not really contain very much new information on Lee Oswald. But it was, by far, the best biography to appear up until that time. Simply because of the way he synthesized other information in a new and coherent mosaic. It became the first biography of Oswald that showed him as an intelligence agent. Its influence on what came after was formidable. For anyone who had read Spy Saga could never again look at Oswald the way the Warren Commission portrayed him.

    With this in mind, it’s interesting to examine what Dallek does with the November 2nd coup in Saigon against Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu. As the years go one, many authors have somehow tried to blame the coup, and the subsequent murders of Diem and his brother, on President Kennedy. This includes those on the right and the left, like Tom Blanton, John Prados and the National Security Archive at George Washington University. (Which is also still trying to deny Kennedy was withdrawing from Vietnam.)

    We all know the sorry origins behind this movement. It began during Watergate. Charles Colson and Richard Nixon wanted to somehow say that Kennedy was responsible for the coup and the murders. So they sent Howard Hunt out trying to find witnesses and documents to show this was the case. Hunt couldn’t find anything. But that was not a real problem. He then set about trying to forge a paper trail.

    Dallek is not anywhere near that bad with the record. But he does do some rather inexplicable things. As most knowledgeable observers understand, by the summer of 1963, there was a split in Kennedy’s government between those who wanted to maintain Diem as the chief of South Vietnam, and those who wanted to try and foment a coup to replace him. The reason being that, the Catholics Diem and Nhu, had become so intolerable of the Buddhists, and so anti-democratic, that the Saigon government was beginning to fall apart. Those who wanted to oust Diem were mostly concentrated in the State Department. They included Roger Hilsman, Averill Harriman, Michael Forrestal, George Ball, and, at times, even Secretary of State Dean Rusk. This cabal thought that there simply was no way that Diem’s tyrannical rule, and his brother’s brutal suppression tactics, could ever unite South Vietnam into a credible war effort against the north.

    The real beginning of this terrible division was in January of 1963 and the disappointing results at the Battle of Ap Bac. This is where a division of the South Vietnamese Army faced off against a much smaller force of Viet Cong over two days. Even though Diem’s troops had much more firepower and were supported by American advisers and helicopters, they were routed by the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong sustained less than half the casualties in both dead and wounded as opposed to the government. At the time of this battle, Forrestal and Hilsman were in Vietnam. (Newman, p. 305) They now began to understand that the Pentagon had been lying about the progress of the war effort there. American adviser Jean Paul Vann was on the scene. Through his press contacts with New York Times reporter David Halberstam, he now tried to expose just how bad the war effort was going. He pointed to a cover-up in the Pentagon being run by General Paul Harkins. (ibid, pgs. 306-08) Vann, along with Halberstam, now began to decry Diem’s leadership and acknowledge that direct American involvement was needed. Which was the last thing Kennedy wanted to do.

    This military failure, plus the popular civil unrest over Diem and Nhu’s draconian security forces, managed to split Kennedy’s government into two camps. As Dallek notes, that summer, Rusk sent an unauthorized memo to Diem ordering him to soften his treatment of the Buddhists. (Camelot’s Court, p. 352) At the beginning of August, Hilsman told Ball that there was a 50-50 chance for a coup, and that he was in contact with opposition leaders since he wanted to control the outcome. (ibid, p. 394) What made Diem’s position even more untenable were the vocal outcries against the Buddhists by his sister-in-law Madame Nhu. In late August, even Diem’s own national security adviser told the American embassy, led by Henry Cabot Lodge, that the Nhus had to go. At this same time, Kennedy was desperately trying to get information on who was leading the crackdown against the Buddhists. (ibid, p. 396)

    It is instructive at this point to note what happened next. Because most scholars consider it the single most important event leading to the actual coup. On August 21st, Hilsman cabled Lodge to ask him for the latest information on the scene. After a short stay in Tokyo, Lodge would arrive in Saigon the next day. The sending of that cable, knowing Lodge had yet to arrive, and requesting information about the politics of the new milieu, that should tell the reader something was not quite as it seemed. For how could Lodge understand what was going on in just one day? Nevertheless, within 48 hours of his arrival – on Saturday August 24th – Lodge wired back Hilsman. In fact, on that day Lodge sent back three cables. They culminated with a wire saying that the generals in Saigon said that all the USA had to do was indicate they wanted Diem and the Nhus gone, and they would be gone. (Newman, p. 346) This is startling because Lodge had been there for less than 48 hours. But already, he was not just advocating for a coup. He was relaying messages from the forces who were in a position to perform one. One has to wonder: Were these the men Hilsman was already in contact with? And is this why Hilsman sent the cable on the 21st?

    Because clearly, what seems to have happened next was planned by that State Department cabal in advance. In order to make Kennedy do something he did not want to do: get rid of Diem. They waited for this weekend not just because Lodge – who also wanted to expel Diem – was in Saigon, but also because almost all the major national security players were out of town. This included Rusk, McNamara, CIA Director John McCone, Gilpatric, and Kennedy. National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy also appears to have been absent. The cabal therefore was able to send a reply to Lodge without the reply going through normal channels of debate and approval. The reply sent back – commonly called the Saturday Night Special – demanded the removal of Nhu; and if he did not go peacefully, Diem may not survive. Lodge was then told to consult with the military about these moves and get their approval. Diem was to be given the opportunity to retire his brother. But if he did not, then the USA would accept the implication that Diem could no longer be supported.

    Now, why do I say that this whole scenario seemed planned by the State Department cabal in advance? Because that is what Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Maxwell Taylor realized when he saw the cable. He wrote that once he read it, he immediately understood that:

    …the anti-Diem group centered in State had taken advantage of the absence of the principal officials to get out instructions that would have never been approved as written under normal circumstances. (Newman, p. 349)

    Yet he did not call Kennedy to relay this suspicion. Either on the night of the 24th, or on Sunday, the 25th. Taylor also told Krulak that the cable showed the desire of Hilsman and Forrestal to be rid of Diem, and if McGeorge Bundy had been in town, it would never have been approved or sent. (ibid, p. 350) Kennedy said he would approve the cable only if certain others did. To put it succinctly, he was deceived by the State Department about who signed off on it in order to get it sent. Kennedy had specifically requested McCone’s approval. McCone never saw the cable. (ibid, p. 351) But further, unlike what was in the instructions, once it arrived in Saigon, Lodge never showed the cable to Diem. On Sunday, he went straight to the generals. Again, this was done without Kennedy’s approval. In fact, it is uncertain as to who OK’d this revision in the plan. It may have been George Ball. (ibid, p. 350)

    Kennedy was furious when he returned to Washington. Forrestal, one of the plotters, offered to resign. Kennedy said, “You’re not worth firing. You owe me something.” (ibid, p. 351) Clearly, Kennedy was upset about what happened ands its implications for his policy. For as Dean Rusk told him the next day, it would now mean either getting all our forces out, or moving American troops in. (Ibid, p. 351)

    Now, let us compare the above with what Dallek writes in his books about what happened that fateful weekend. In that regard, reading An Unfinished Life is a bit unsettling. For in a rather disturbing lacuna, the reader will not see any of this in the book! Not one sentence about the State Department subterfuge, or Kennedy’s anger about it. Dallek even writes that when Lodge asked to revise the cable and go directly to the generals with it, bypassing Diem, Kennedy agreed to this. (An Unfinished Life, pgs. 673-74) The author supplies no footnote for that sentence. Probably because there is no record of any communication between Lodge and Kennedy that weekend.

    In Camelot’s Court, Dallek spends all of two paragraphs on the subterfuge. Again, without providing the proper context. And he is also misleading. For example, he writes that Taylor was told Kennedy had approved the dispatch. (p. 397) Dallek does not say that 1.) Kennedy had demanded certain contingencies for his approval, which were not met, and 2.) Taylor was not shown the cable until after it was sent to Saigon. (Newman, p. 349) Probably because, as with McCone, the plotters knew he would not approve it.

    What this did of course was create a new situation in Saigon. Now, certain military officers there seemed predisposed to move against Diem. Kennedy realized that the US delegation would now feel obligated to go even beyond what was in the cable. Especially since, as Jim Douglass showed in JFK and the Unspeakable, Lodge had teamed up with CIA officer Lucien Conein to encourage the plotters. Lodge also helped remove the CIA station chief who was supportive of Diem. But further, as Dallek notes, Harriman and Hilsman then got George Ball to countermand orders from the White House to slow down the process and discourage the coup plotters. On October 27th, Ball signed a cable giving Lodge permission to give a green light to the military. (Camelot’s Court, p. 414) When McGeorge Bundy found out about this, he and Kennedy now tried to channel any further communications to Saigon through the White House. (ibid, p. 415) It was too late. Five days later the plotters, with much help from Lodge and Conein, succeeded. Not only was Diem’s government overturned, Diem and Nhu were murdered. As Douglass shows, beyond any doubt, Lodge and Conein were relaying messages to the generals as to where the brothers were located so there would be no escape for them.

    When it was all over, a disheartened Kennedy taped an anguished monologue in which he described his advisers as being completely split on the issue. He also mourned the fact that he had mishandled the original cable. It should have never gone out on the weekend in the form it did. (ibid, p. 418)

    As with Kennedy’s intent to withdraw from Vietnam, Dallek badly mangles the whole scenario dealing with the coup against Diem. It is badly truncated in the first book, and only slightly less so in Camelot’s Court. But in both, the idea seems to be to downplay the secret maneuvering around Kennedy by people who were trying to make him do something he did not want to do. Which, of course, is the theme of Newman’s milestone book. A big part of Dallek’s agenda is to try and make everyone forget about JFK and Vietnam.

    VII

    Correspondingly, and predictably, Dallek tries to insinuate Kennedy into the plots to kill Castro. (An Unfinished Life, p. 439) To do so, be again breaks the rules of historiography. As we saw with Vietnam, Dallek refused to consult the primary documents, the May 1963 Sec/Def meeting, which would vitiate his “no plan to withdraw” agenda. With the Castro plots, he does the same. He does not use the declassified CIA Inspector General Report. That document specifically contradicts what he wants to imply. For it says the CIA could not claim executive approval for the plots. (IG Report, p. 89) What does the historian do instead? Dallek uses George Smathers’ 1988 statements to implicate Kennedy. In doing so, he commits another lapse. He does not inform the reader that, at that time, Smathers contradicted his earlier testimony to the Church Committee. (James DiEugenio and Lisa Pease, editors, The Assassinations, pgs. 328-29) But that’s not enough. He then commits a third error. He says the plots may have been excessive but it was the Mongoose program instituted by Kennedy that provided the license and atmosphere for the plots. (Camelot’s Court, p. 220) As every informed observer knows, the problem in saying that is that the CIA plots to kill Castro did not begin under Kennedy. They started under Eisenhower.

    One of the oddest imbalances in An Unfinished Life is the short shrift Dallek gives to the Bay of Pigs and its aftermath. The historian gives the Bay of Pigs all of five pages, but for example, he gives the Berlin Crisis seventeen pages. This strikes me as being quite a strange allotment. In my own book, the second edition of Destiny Betrayed, I devoted an entire 22-page chapter to the Bay of Pigs episode. I did that for many reasons. But one of them was that the ARRB had declassified two previously secret reports on the incident: Lyman Kirkpatrick’s CIA Inspector General report, and second, the White House internal inquiry led by General Maxwell Taylor. In my book I referenced many footnotes to this new data.

    Dallek references the Kirkpatrick report ever so slightly. He then makes almost no references to the Taylor Report in An Unfinished Life. (See pgs. 362-67) In Camelot’s Court, he chides Kennedy for appointing Allen Dulles to the investigating committee. But for anyone who reads the record of the Taylor Committee, this allowed Bobby Kennedy, who was also on the committee, to listen to every question, and watch every move made by Dulles. It also allowed RFK to then pose pointed questions to Dulles. It is from Dulles’ lame answers that the Kennedys discovered the worst: that the CIA knew the operation would fail. And they banked on JFK taking back his previous public statement, about no American intervention in Cuba, to save the invasion. (DiEugenio, pgs. 42-44) This is why President Kennedy was so upset afterwards. He tried to rein in the Agency through special instructions to foreign ambassadors abroad, and the issuing of three NSAM’s, taking power from the CIA and giving it to the Pentagon. (ibid, pgs. 52-53)

    Throughout Camelot’s Court, Dallek tries to keep alive the myth of the “cancellation” of the D-Day air strikes. It is clear from the declassified record that these were always contingent upon securing a landing strip on the island. (ibid, pgs. 45-46) Which the invasion never did. Finally, Dallek leaves out the way that Dulles and Howard Hunt hit back at Kennedy for firing Dulles, Deputy Director Charles Cabell, and Director of Plans Dick Bissell. During the Taylor hearings, Hunt was detailed to Dulles. Realizing the writing was on the wall for Dulles’ termination, they prepared a counterattack. That was through the infamous Fortune Magazine story blaming the failure at the Bay of Pigs on Kennedy. (ibid, p. 55) That article created the myth about the “cancelled” D-Day air strikes.

    In sum, there is not one original quality about Dallek’s writing on the Bay of Pigs in either book. Which, considering the fact both books were written after the record was declassified, is really quite a negative achievement.

    No surprise, with Dallek, the Alliance for Progress was just an anti-communist gimmick with very little to show for it. It paled in comparison with FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy. (An Unfinished Life, pgs. 467-68) This, of course, ignores Kennedy’s ideas about economic development in the Third World. Ideas, which as I have tried to show, Kennedy was nurturing from his days as a senator and his opposition to the policies of John Foster Dulles. In a speech in Puerto Rico in 1958, Kennedy urged that Latin America be given a new priority by the White House. And he warned that not all the problems there were communist-inspired. He also endorsed the idea of an Inter-American Bank furnishing loans to encourage land reform. (Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 191)

    He again talked about these problems in an interview in 1959. He said the goal of raising the standards of living in Third World countries was something the USA should understand. And if a country wanted to remain neutral in the Cold War, then the USA had to live with that, and simultaneously help solve these internal economic problems. (Donald Gibson, Battling Wall Street, p. 39) What Kennedy was trying to do was break out of the Cold War confines that Dulles and Eisenhower had created. He was trying to find ways to allow for the Unites States to accept the non-aligned status of nations like Egypt and Indonesia. With the Alliance for Progress he was trying to extend help to the fledgling countries of South America. He was trying to show that, unlike Foster Dulles, he understood the economic havoc created by centuries of colonialism. And, unlike Dulles, he did not want to settle for a new form of that situation, be it called neo-colonialism, or imperialism.

    Kennedy understood the system that the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank had created after the war. As Donald Gibson notes, Kennedy was not content with it. He once said, the desire to help our fellow citizens of the world had apparently been superseded by the narrow interests of bankers and self-seeking politicians. (Gibson, p. 37) As is his natural tendency, Dallek does not describe this prior existing system, or its many shortcomings. Which, as time has gone on, have become more and more exposed. This was done most recently and effectively by John Perkins in his book, Confessions of an Economic Hit Man. As Perkins notes, these policies have tended to favor a small group of international oligarchs whose prime objective has been to keep Third World countries in economic debt while instilling a program of austerity and little in the way of public programs. This is why, to mention one example, Castro rejected this kind of aid package and turned toward the Soviets.

    In the evolution of his ideas on the subject, Kennedy understood that Castro’s choice was actually not so outlandish. Therefore, he thought that one way to compete with the Russians was to loosen up on the requirements of the whole World Bank, Exim Bank and IMF system. Therefore, in 1961, he proposed to congress a different kind of loan system. One that was more interested in infrastructure development, long-term loans, and low interest rates. In that address, Kennedy specifically said that these kinds of loans should not be considered in the realm of normal banking practice. (Gibson, pgs. 37-38) Another objective of Kennedy’s program was to shift the volume of funding away from military aid and toward development. This was another break with the Dulles/Eisenhower approach.

    The Alliance for Progress, which was specifically aimed at making these kinds of loans in South America, was a favorite of Kennedy’s. When announced, it was bitterly attacked by upholders of the status quo on various grounds. But in a speech he gave in 1963, Kennedy said he was satisfied that the program had done what he designed it to do. In fact, Henry Luce’s Fortune Magazine criticized Kennedy’s specific approach with the Alliance as being too much economic interventionism and not enough military aid. (ibid, p. 84) Whereas Kennedy’s ideas were to maintain a government-to-government relationship, the IMF approach, especially under LBJ, accelerated into “private domination of resource markets and credit with the authority of the U. S. government.” (ibid)

    What shows Kennedy was genuine in his new approach was the fact that he put Dick Goodwin and Adolf Berle in charge of the new policy formation. Goodwin was a liberal Harvard lawyer, congressional investigator and speechwriter. Berle had been a member of the FDR Brain Trust, and was assistant secretary for Latin America from 1938-44. Berle was very much for moving economic development forward in the southern hemisphere. Goodwin asked for input from Latin American academics in Washington. (ibid, Schlesinger, p. 203)

    Kennedy himself attended the Punta del Este Conference launching the Alliance in Uruguay. Realizing the danger it represented to Castro, Che Guevara was there also. He said that, although Cuba was in sympathy with many of the aims of the program, Cuba would not take part in it. His rather moderate attack on the Alliance was evidence of its appeal. (ibid, p. 762) Kennedy placed Robert F. Woodward in charge of the program. Woodward was a lifetime diplomat who spent many years stationed in Latin America. Within one year, Kennedy funneled hundred of millions of dollars through the Alliance and into Latin America. Whether or not the Alliance was ultimately successful is an unfair question to ask. Since JFK was assassinated in 1963, and RFK left the government in 1964.

    To cite another Latin America example completely missed by Dallek: consider the case of the Dominican Republic. Dallek mentions the assassination of Rafael Trujillo and the subsequent coming to power of the military junta led by Joaquin Balgauer. He even mentions that Kennedy sent a small fleet to the area in order to prevent Trujillo’s brothers from resuming power. (An Unfinished Life, p. 468)But that is about it. From what I have written above, one can fairly conclude that Dallek does not want the reader to think that Kennedy actually tried to encourage democracy there.

    But he did. Liberal democrat Juan Bosch had been elected in late 1962. He was the first democratically elected president in the Dominican Republic in nearly four decades. But, in less than a year, he was overthrown by the military. Kennedy was furious. Within hours he ordered the suspension of economic aid and diplomatic relations to the new government. (Gibson, p. 78) He then encouraged other Latin American countries to do the same. Which they did. By mid-October the new junta was bitterly complaining about Kennedy’s interventionism and interference in internal affairs. A month later, Kennedy was assassinated and Bosch went into exile in Puerto Rico. But in 1965, he made a renewed effort to gain power. But President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Latin American assistant Thomas Mann decided to portray Bosch and his backers as communist threats to the hemisphere. Which they were not. But this created a pretext for an American invasion in April of 1965. The irony was that the Marines now opposed the same forces Kennedy had praised 18 months earlier as democratic and progressive. (Ibid, p. 79) This was another good example with which to demonstrate Kennedy’s interest in fostering progressive governments in the Third World. And to show the contrast between Kennedy’s cosmopolitan view of the world and Johnson’s much more catholic one. Apparently, Dallek did not think it was important to history.

    Let me add a discussion of one more topic Dallek deals with, this time on the domestic side: Kennedy’s economic policies. Like many other writers on the subject, Dallek deals with these in reviews of the steel crisis and the Kennedy/Heller request for a tax cut. And that is about it. Dallek does not even note the good performance of the economy under Kennedy, or the fact that he bequeathed very good circumstances to Lyndon Johnson. If you don’t mention those good indicators then you don’t have to explain why the economy improved under Kennedy.

    In his appointment of Douglas Dillon to Treasury, Kennedy was making the usual bow to Wall Street. But when he appointed his Council of Economic Advisers, no such bow was involved. The leader on that council was Walter Heller, one of the most noted Keynesian scholars of the age. Heller found Kennedy very interested in the economy, and the forces which drove it. Kennedy was determined to counter what he perceived as a downtrend in the economy by expanding “the Nation’s investment in physical and human resources, and in science and technology.” (Gibson, p. 20) Or, as Gibson notes in his long analysis of Kennedy’s economic program, “Kennedy consistently used his office in an attempt to inject growth-oriented planning into government policy.” (ibid, p. 21)

    After Kennedy’s death, Walter Heller explained the overall program he and Kennedy tried to construct. Kennedy was interested in both productivity and growth. Therefore, three months after taking office, he submitted a tax investment credit plan to congress. This allowed companies tax deductions in return for investing in new plant and equipment. (ibid, p. 21) But he restricted it. The credit was only available on new plant and equipment, with an expected life of six or more years, located in the United States. Kennedy was clear about why he was offering this program. He said it would increase profitability, output and productivity by cutting modernization costs. (ibid, p. 22) As Gibson notes, although most authors only discuss the income tax proposal, most of Kennedy’s tax programs contained this idea. Namely that the president would shape the decisions of those who controlled money and credit; shape them into a national plan encouraging growth.

    Please note: Kennedy only offered this deduction on investments inside the United States. Even though Kennedy was not around for the massive transfer of production and profits overseas – as we call it today, globalization – he and Heller anticipated the dangers it posed. At that time, the tax code encouraged American investment abroad by eliminating taxes on offshore profits. Kennedy singled this out as a tax deferral privilege. Kennedy proposed stopping this by taxing those profits each year even if they stayed outside the USA. He would only allow the deferral if the investment was made in the Third World or developing countries. And only for purposes of actual production, not licensing or tax escape purposes. (ibid, p. 22) Which is perfectly consistent with his foreign policy goals.

    Kennedy also wanted to eliminate tax breaks for companies set up as foreign investment entities. That is for sheer trade and speculative purposes. He and Heller also targeted rich individuals who were transferring wealth offshore to avoid paying estate taxes. (ibid) As the reader can see, Heller and Kennedy were going after those in the financial sector who were going outside the national boundaries to either create speculative enterprises or to dodge taxes.

    As part of his overall 1963 tax cut proposal, Kennedy had a section about large oil and gas producers who manipulated a 1954 law to gain advantages over smaller companies. He also wanted to alter foreign tax credits which allowed energy companies to avoid paying U.S. taxes. (ibid, p. 23)

    With all this, and more, in mind, Gibson has a different take on the 1962 steel crisis. To backtrack: Kennedy had made an arrangement between the steel corporations, unions, and the White House that prices and wages would stay at current levels in order to avoid an inflationary spiral. It was also meant to increase operating capacity. Since only 65% of that was in operation. Kennedy agreed to provide economic aid to cut down that high factor, thereby increasing employment. (ibid, p. 10) The work on this agreement went on for months. Contracts were signed by all the major companies in the field.

    Within days of the agreement being made, the president of U.S. Steel, Roger Blough, flew into Washington. He wanted a meeting with Kennedy. At that meeting, he handed Kennedy a memo saying that he would announce a price increase of 3.5% effective that evening. The press had already been alerted. It would become public within the hour. (ibid)

    Because of Blough’s in-your-face tactics, some authors have suggested this was not just a dispute about the steel industry’s bottom line. Kennedy had assigned several people on his staff, including Labor Secretary Arthur Goldberg, to run the complex negotiations. He had built up liaison with congress on the issue to attempt to funnel funding to crank up capacity. And after all this, contracts had been signed. As others, but not Dallek, have implied, Blough’s move seemed designed not just to break an agreement, but to humiliate Kennedy in public. Blough’s private audience lends even more credence to that scenario.

    As many have noted, the problem with the insistence on the price increase is that, in economic terms, it was unnecessary. The profits for the first quarter in the industry were among the best in history. And the predictions for the next year were even better. Further, the steel companies had paid out hundreds of millions in stock dividends each year for the past five years. (ibid, p. 12)

    Because of all these factors – which Dallek does not describe – some have guessed that the real reason for the direct challenge was to discredit Kennedy and his policies. In Blough’s eyes – and the eyes of others he was working with – Kennedy’s agreement reminded them of Roosevelt’s New Deal planning. Gibson also concludes that U. S. Steel did not like Kennedy’s investment tax proposal. Probably because it encouraged competition. (ibid, p. 11) In fact, Hubert Humphrey commented that Kennedy’s facedown of the companies helped pass his investment tax credit. (ibid, p. 15) What also suggests an ulterior motive is that the decision to challenge Kennedy was made several weeks before the labor agreements were signed. (ibid, p. 13) In fact, Kennedy himself once alluded that the attempt at discrediting his economic programs might have been the reason for the showdown. (ibid, p. 14)

    In May of 1962, in Fortune, it was theorized that Blough was not acting on his own. He was acting as an emissary for the business world to oppose Kennedy’s “jawboning for price controls”. Blough was trying to break through the “bland harmony that has recently prevailed between government and business.” For as the article notes, “If Blough wanted to create the greatest possible uproar and provoke maximum presidential reaction, his procedure was beautifully calculated.”

    None of this, not one iota, is in any of the two discussions of this key episode in either of Dallek’s books. Which indicates that, in almost every aspect, both of them are pedestrian and unrewarding. But really, that is being too kind to Dallek. As we have seen, like Larry Sabato, Dallek continually avoids information and circumstances which indicate Kennedy doing anything anti-status quo, or outside the realm of traditional anti-communism. The problem with this is that other authors – like Donald Gibson and John Newman – have demonstrated, with much evidence, that this was the case. To avoid this as rigorously as Dallek does is to write a book that is not really about John Kennedy. It’s really about the New York Times/Washington Post version of Kennedy. So it’s no surprise that both of those newspapers liked Dallek’s books. For me, there is more truth in the much less voluminous tomes of Ronald Rakove, Philip Muehlenbeck and Gibson than there is in the over 1,100 pages of Dallek’s drivel.

    At the end of my review of Betting on the Africans, I wrote that one book like that was worth five by Robert Dallek. After now analyzing both of Dallek’s books at length, I take that back. I was being too kind to Dallek. Muehlenbeck’s book is worth, not five, but ten by Dallek. In his books, Dallek gives new meaning to the term non-distinction.

  • Larry Sabato, The Kennedy Half Century


    There are two important short sections in The Kennedy Half Century. One occurs at the beginning, the other near the end.

    The author, Professor Larry Sabato, works out of the Center for Politics at the University of Virginia. In his acknowledgements section, Sabato traces his financial backing for this project over the five-year gestation time of the book. Some of his backers include: the Reynolds Foundation, McGuireWoods Consulting, the Hobby Family Foundation, the World Affairs Council of Dallas/Fort Worth, and the president and provost of University of Virginia. It’s with this kind of backing that Sabato was able to do the polling and focus group interviews he did for the volume. Which, to me, is far and away the most valuable part of the tome. His description of these polling results begins on page 406 of the book’s 427 pages of text.

    Like the polling cited by Robert Dallek in Camelot’s Court, Sabato’s polling – through the well-respected Hart Research Associates in Washington – discovered that, of the last nine presidents, Kennedy is the most admired. This is remarkable since that time period includes men like Dwight Eisenhower, Bill Clinton, and Ronald Reagan, all of whom served two full terms. Therefore, they had a much longer time period to both pass legislation and plant their imprint on the national consciousness. And again, as with Dallek, the margin by which Kennedy outpaced the others was not really close. (Sabato, p. 406) Further, a remarkable 78% said that Kennedy’s presidency had a profound impact on the United States. When asked to name four lasting achievements of the JFK presidency, two of the four most named issues dealt with civil rights for black Americans (ibid, p. 412). The other two were the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Apollo mission.

    Sabato then details what are probably the two most politically charged findings in his polling. An amazing 91% of the respondents said that Kennedy’s murder changed the United Sates a “great deal”. (p. 416) Which is a number so astronomically high that it surprised even this writer. The general reaction described was that a “deep depression set in across the country , as the optimism that had mainly prevailed since the end of World War II seemed to evaporate” (ibid). The final result affirmed what had been, more or less, a constant in the polling since about 1967 and the publicity surrounding the Jim Garrison investigation. A full 75% of the public “reject the Warren Commission’s conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone” (ibid). As Sabato notes this is the same percentage that ABC News polled back in 2003 on the 40th anniversary of the Kennedy assassination.

    That is significant in and of itself. Why? Because of what has happened in the intervening decade. There has been a steady stream of cable produced television specials – using the same phony methodology of the 2003 Peter Jennings/Gus Russo/Dale Myers fiasco called Beyond Conspiracy – which have tried to use computer simulations to make the impossible Single Bullet Theory palatable. Many of these execrable programs have been aired on Discovery Channel. Several of them have used the auspices of the Sixth Floor Museum. And some of the very worst have used Sixth Floor employee Gary Mack as either a consultant or a host. Like Dale Myers did, many of these programs have actually altered evidence to make the Magic Bullet possible. (CTKA provided one of many exposes on the infamous Myers.) But miraculously, in the face of this incessant drumbeat of propaganda, the American public has said no, we don’t buy the computer simulations. As they say in the tech business, its all GIGO, garbage in, garbage out.

    Sabato ends this polling chapter with a summary of Kennedy’s presidency in the following terms. Sabato writes that it was “eye-popping to see and hear the terms of endearment lavished on John Kennedy.” He then writes that Kennedy’s presidency is perceived as “the polar opposite of the very unhappy views they have of the country today. Whereas contemporary America is polarized and divided, Kennedy represents unity and common purpose … as well as a sense of hope, possibility and optimism.” (Sabato, p. 417)

    These are quite significant findings. And Sabato is to be congratulated for making them public and employing such a venerated pollster as Peter Hart to attain them. To me, they just about certify all the things that the critical community has been saying about the significance of the Kennedy assassination in the collective unconscious of the American psyche. His murder really was an unprecedented shock to the system. And the fact that Kennedy was perceived as such a breath of fresh air, this made it all the worse as to its impact. This community can certainly cite these results as evidence that our perception of the JFK murder is the right one.

    II

    Unfortunately, that is about as far as the kudos go for this book. The rest of the volume is so inferior that it’s almost like Sabato wrote the rest to counteract the results of the polling. Because much of the rest of the work is arranged around two themes. First, JFK really does not deserve all the admiration the public has for him. Second, although the Warren Commission might have made some errors, they got the bottom line correct: Oswald really did kill President Kennedy. Of course, these two concepts were the major ideas behind much of the programming and many of the books released around the 50th anniversary. Therefore, Sabato’s tome is symptomatic of the much larger MSM and Establishment cultural barrage that took hold of the country in preparation for that event.

    A good example would be the Tom Brokaw/Gus Russo NBC special which was supposed to be made up of personal reminisces of famous people about November 22, 1963. That turned out to be only a pretext to hook the viewer. The actual program, entitled Where Were You, had the same aims as Sabato’s book. Its true agenda was to deceive the public about who actually killed President Kennedy, and to try and demean his presidency so people would not think any kind of legacy was worth honoring about the man. What else could the show have been about with Brokaw hosting it and Gus Russo as the consultant? Both men have been doing those same things for the last 20 years.

    And so with Sabato. According to some CTKA sources at the University of Virginia, Sabato has always strived to get media attention for his Center for Politics. He likes being in front of cameras, no matter what the occasion. He has a rather liberal backing for money for his Center. But, as Mike Swanson notes in the accompanying article, he also knows how to get on television. He knows what feeds the beast of the MSM. Therefore, so as not to seem as big a denialist and cover-up artist as Philip Shenon, he spent some time with Virginia lawyer Dan Alcorn. Alcorn is well versed in the literature of the JFK case. Alcorn knows the many problems with the official story. And he was not shy about telling Sabato about them. Therefore, unlike Shenon, who only spoke to people like Commission lawyer Howard Willens, and took everything Willens said at face value, Sabato displays a bit of sophistication. Not a lot, but a bit. From his polling, he understands that the much larger part of the public does not buy the Warren Commission as any kind of serious fact finding entity. Today, that is simply a dog that will not hunt. Therefore, unlike the preposterous Shenon, he gives some space to some of the problems with the evidence in the JFK case.

    There are really three parts to The Kennedy Half Century. There is a discussion of Kennedy’s path to the presidency and what he did in office. Then, there is a discussion of what happened in Dallas and the evidence for and against the Warren Commission verdict. And third, there is a discussion about how the shadow of JFK and the Kennedy family has been cast over subsequent presidents.

    As we deal with these three parts, it is important to keep in mind the following facts. Sabato is not a historian. He is a political scientist. And one who is very much in tune with the demands of the MSM. Further, he offered an online course about President Kennedy as a lead up to the release of his book. In the syllabus to that course, he listed a wide variety of sources for the student to read. That list revealed he was aware of the good work which has actually broadened our perspectives on who Kennedy was. One of the things that make his book odd is that, in light of that fact, it is striking that his book has no bibliography. One has to go through his long footnotes section – which often includes more text – to find out his basis for the information in the book. Which is what this reviewer, quite laboriously, did.

    As we shall see, there seems to have been a reason for the author to make this odd choice. Because Sabato was selective about the actual texts he used in writing the book. If one compares the volumes he listed for his online course, versus what he used for his book, Sabato appears to have selectively pruned from the former in order to produce a much more MSM friendly product. This made for good public relations for Sabato. Unfortunately, it does not make for good history, or for good scholarship.

    III

    Sabato begins his narrative with Kennedy’s trip to Texas in November of 1963. He traces that through to the arrival in Dallas, the shooting in Dealey Plaza, the trip to Parkland Hospital afterwards, and the actual autopsy at Bethesda Medical Center than night. From here he then launches into a retrospective of Kennedy’s political career from about 1956 to 1963. All this takes up about the first 45 pages of the book. And just from reading that far one begins to see that Sabato has an agenda. For instance, there is no mention in the entire text of State Department official Edmund Gullion. Considering the fact that Sabato is a political scientist, that lack is a bit startling. Even Thurston Clarke understood the importance of Kennedy’s meeting with Gullion in Saigon in 1951, and how that meeting changed Kennedy’s consciousness about communism and the Third World. As many authors today have shown, it was this meeting that then caused Kennedy to make several speeches mapping out his differences with Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers. Especially on how hard the United States should press developing countries on being for us or against us on the issue of being non-aligned between east and west during the Cold War. (James DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, pgs. 21-24)

    In his further attempt to diminish Kennedy, Sabato gives short shrift to the striking speech Kennedy made in 1957 about the French/Algerian colonial conflict. In fact, he deals with it in about one page. (Sabato, pgs. 42-43) Incredibly, he gives over to John Foster Dulles more space for his critique of the speech than he does to Kennedy’s actual speech! And he badly underplays the opposition to the speech itself. Not just from the Republicans, but also from Democrats like Dean Acheson and Adlai Stevenson. (DiEugenio, p. 26) The opposition of Stevenson is important politically since he was considered in the forefront of the liberal section of the Democratic Party. Further, Sabato never mentions that the vast majority of newspaper editorials lined up against Kennedy on the issue. But finally, by not reproducing the actual text of the speech, Sabato avoids mentioning the most powerful part of the address. One which Kennedy made quite explicit. He was comparing what the United States and France had done in Vietnam with what was now happening in Algeria. By allying itself with a European colonial power, America was playing on the wrong side of history.

    Why does Sabato do this tailoring? Because he wants to divorce Kennedy from being a liberal icon. He adds that young people today associate the Kennedy name with liberalism. He writes that it was really the post 1963 Robert Kennedy, and younger brother Teddy “who transformed the family name’s ideology …” (Sabato, p. 41) Well, if you cut out Gullion, eliminate Kennedy’s speeches opposing the Dulles brothers’ foreign policy, excise his interest in the Third World, and significantly curtail his milestone Algeria speech, then yep, you can somehow proffer Kennedy as some kind of a moderate. But that is not writing history. It is practicing a political agenda. It is not scholarship. It is in Edward Luttwak’s phrase, “renting a scholar”.

    The other main way that Sabato tries to denude Kennedy’s liberalism here is through another method, one which has been utilized by a queer combination of the regressive right and loopy left. This hoary complaint says that, somehow, President Kennedy was not really concerned about civil rights for black Americans as a senator. He then moved at a glacial pace on the issue once in the White House. I was really sorry to see that Sabato had enlisted in this kind of Fox News distortion of history. But since he does, let us correct the record.

    There are three good books on this subject. They are Mr. Kennedy and the Negroes by journalist and author Harry Golden, Of Kennedys and Kings by former senator and Kennedy advisor Harris Wofford, and the classic Promises Kept by the late UCLA professor Irving Bernstein. (It is important to this discussion that I could find no reference to either the first or last book in Sabato’s footnotes.) As many on the right note, Senator Kennedy lined up against most liberals in his party on the processing of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. They did not want the House bill to go the Judiciary Committee. Because it was headed by staunch segregationist James Eastland of Mississippi.

    Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson was so apathetic about it that he did not back this move. Kennedy was against it. Not because he was against the overall goal. But because he thought it would create a dangerous precedent in the Senate. One that could be used against liberal Democrats in the future struggle for progressive causes. (Golden, p. 94) Kennedy felt that, if needed, the Democrats could use a discharge petition to yank the bill out of committee and onto the floor for a vote.

    Unlike Fox News, Sabato does not further the myth that Kennedy voted against the act. (That myth has been exposed.) On the procedural question, Kennedy wrote a strongly worded letter to a constituent on the point. He wrote that, “I would be the first to sign a discharge petition to bring the civil rights bill to the floor.” (Letter from Kennedy to Alfred Jarrette, August 1, 1957) Kennedy then added that, “I have fought long and consistently for a good civil rights bill. I was one of only 38 senators who voted to retain Title III in the present bill, the section which would extend civil rights to areas other than voting privileges” (ibid).

    To his credit, Sabato does note Kennedy’s support for Title III. (Sabato, p. 42) But he does not explain why this was so important. That part of the act allowed the Attorney General to step in almost unilaterally in cases of, not just voting discrimination, but also school desegregation. And it allowed the use of civil actions, which could hurt municipalities in the treasury. This was clearly the most far-ranging clause in the bill. And Kennedy was one of its most ardent proponents. Because now, finally, the federal government could intercede inside the obstructionist state governments. And contrary to what Sabato writes, Kennedy trumpeted Title III at the expense of political capital. Many commentators have noted that Kennedy’s outspoken stance about this aspect of the bill is what began to erode his support in the south. (Golden, p. 95)

    In a practical way, what was so important about this as far as civil rights were concerned? Because once Robert Kennedy became Attorney General, the Kennedy brothers began to use that clause in a much more widespread way than Eisenhower ever imagined. But, in keeping with his agenda, Sabato does not tell you this part of the story. On the day Robert Kennedy was confirmed by the senate, Eastland reminded him, “Your predecessor never brought a civil rights case in Mississippi.” (ibid, p. 100) This was true. Eisenhower only used the Title III clause ten times in three years. And two of those cases were filed on the last day of his administration. (ibid, p. 104) The day after Bobby Kennedy was approved, in response to Eastland’s reminder, President Kennedy told his brother, “Get the road maps – and go!” (ibid, p. 100) In other words, start sending investigators into the backwoods of the south and start filing cases.

    RFK did just that. In one year, he doubled the number of lawyers in the civil rights section of the department. At the same time he more than doubled the amount of cases Eisenhower had filed. By 1963, the number of lawyers had been nearly quintupled. (ibid, 105) The Attorney General also hired 18 legal interns to search microfilm records for discrepancies in voting statistics in suspect districts. This allowed him to open files on 61 new investigations. That remarkable number was achieved in just one year. (Ibid, p. 105) This had been a preplanned strategy by JFK. In October of 1960, at a meeting of his civil rights campaign advisory board, Kennedy told them this was the method he had decided upon to break the back of voting discrimination in the south. (ibid, p. 139)

    These facts blow up the myth that Sabato is trying to propagate about Kennedy and civil rights. But let us go further in order to show just how agenda-driven the author really is.

    When Kennedy became president, it was clear that neither the Brown vs. Board decision of 1954, nor the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 were having any strong effect in increasing the black vote in the south. The eight states with the lowest turnout figures in the 1960 election were all in the south. It was obvious that even with those three laws on the books, Eisenhower’s enforcement of them was so lacking in rigor that the southern states felt no real compunction to obey them. And clearly, Eisenhower and Nixon had given those state governments a nod and a wink in this regard. For instance, in 1956 Eisenhower had told a reporter that the Brown vs. Board decision had set back progress in the south at least 15 years. (John Emmet Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, pgs. 200-01) Vice-President Nixon echoed this attitude. He said, “… if the law goes further than public opinion can be brought along to support at a particular time, it may prove to do more harm than good.” (Golden, p. 61)

    This was a self-fulfilling prophecy. The law was not going to go very far because, in fact, it was not being supported to any real degree. This created entrenched resistance to a piecemeal approach. In other words, it might take several years to challenge each district in court. What the Kennedys did next was to try and bypass going district by district in their legal actions. They now decided to collect data on whole states to present in court. This is how President Kennedy took on Eastland’s home state in the case of United States vs. Mississippi. President Kennedy was pleased with the approach. Across the Justice Department’s 1962 report, he scrawled “Keep pushing the cases.” (Golden, p. 111)

    President Kennedy was also sensitive about the lack of black Americans employed in branches of government, including the armed services. Therefore, he appointed the illustrious civil rights lawyer Thurgood Marshall to the federal bench in 1961. Through Abraham Bolden we know he didn’t like the fact that there were no black Americans on the White House Secret Service detail. On his inauguration day, he commented to Lyndon Johnson that there were no black Americans in the Coast Guard marching detail. That evening he learned that there had never been a black student at the Coast Guard Academy. This was remedied in 1962. (Bernstein, p. 52) At one of the first Cabinet meetings he noted that there were only ten African American lawyers employed by the federal government. That figure went up by a factor of seven in six months. (Golden, pgs. 114-15)

    In March of 1961, just two months after being inaugurated, Kennedy first proposed an executive order decreeing there would be no racial discrimination in hiring by contractors working for the federal government. This was signed into law nine months later. In two years, 1700 complaints were heard. Over 70% of the cases ended with the employer being disciplined. Under Eisenhower, only six such suits were ever brought. (Golden, p. 60)

    But Kennedy went further. He got 100 large private corporations to sign onto this agreement voluntarily. He also got 117 labor unions to pledge they would fight for the cause and report hiring discrimination on the job. He then ordered the Labor Department to investigate discrimination in apprenticeship and training programs. (ibid) This attitude, as opposed to the implicit acceptance of the status quo by Eisenhower and Nixon, encouraged thousands of complaints to be filed.

    As a result, by 1963 in South Carolina, black Americans were – for the first time – working alongside whites in advanced positions in textile mills. The superintendent explained it in practical economic terms: if the black Americans were not hired, the company would lose government contracts. If that happened, they would have to close their doors. (Helen Fuller, Year of Trial, p. 131) Again, these kinds of acts cost Kennedy plenty of votes in the south. It hurt him because, unlike with Eisenhower, he actually spoke about the problem and then acted independently of the Supreme Court. With Eisenhower and the Little Rock crisis, commentators could blame the federal intervention on Earl Warren. That was not the case with Kennedy and his new measures. Especially since, on May 6, 1961, Robert Kennedy spoke at the University of Georgia’s Law Day. There he announced that, unlike Eisenhower, he would vigorously pursue the implementation of the Brown vs. Board decision.

    Like others, Sabato criticizes Kennedy for not issuing an executive order on housing as he did on employment until two years after his election. (Sabato , p. 111) As Fuller made clear in her book, this was because Kennedy thoroughly understood that if he signed it earlier, he could never attain other pieces of legislation that were important to him. The entrenched southern power barons in congress would retaliate. (Fuller, pgs. 37-42) In fact, after he signed the housing bill, Senators John Stennis and Richard Russell voted against his test ban treaty. Another example of this occurred when Kennedy tried to create a new cabinet department, Housing and Urban Development. He announced that African American Robert Weaver would be the Secretary for the new department. The House Rules Committee then rejected the proposal. (Golden, p. 121) These were very real concerns that Kennedy rightfully anticipated.

    Robert Kennedy sent a progress report each week to his brother about the court actions in his voting rights cases. At the end of 1962, he told the president it would be all over by 1968. (ibid, p. 131) But something else happened in the meantime. By getting out in front of the issue, and by signing two important executive orders (on employment and housing) President Kennedy was fulfilling the symbolic agreement he had made in the 1960 campaign. This was when he and his brother intervened in the Georgia jail case of Martin Luther King. An incident which Sabato spends about eight words on. (Sabato, p. 70) Through their intervention, King was released from some trumped up charges.

    By openly allying himself with King, Kennedy was giving the civil rights movement ballast and hope. After he won the White House, this encouraged the movement leaders to become more active under his presidency than they had ever been before. So now a certain synergy entered into the equation. Something that would not have happened under Eisenhower and Nixon. In fact, Harris Wofford had written a memo to Kennedy in December of 1960 stating the major problem with civil rights had been the fact that there had been no real leadership in the executive branch or congress to supplement the work of the courts.

    In that memo, Wofford essentially mapped out the path Kennedy should take. He said that in 1961 there did not seem to be any way to get a real omnibus civil rights law through the senate because of the almost guaranteed filibuster by the southerners. Wofford proposed changing the cloture rules on filibuster to circumvent that tactic. Which is something that Kennedy had mentioned in his above referenced 1957 letter to Alfred Jarrette. In the meantime, Wofford proposed that Kennedy use executive actions to advance the cause.

    Kennedy immediately did so by shifting the balance of power on the Commission on Civil Rights. This was a body set up by the 1957 Civil Rights Act. It had the power to launch investigations, hold hearings and make recommendations as far as exposing discriminatory laws went. Eisenhower had made it a rather moderate agency. He manned it with two integrationists, two segregationists, and two middle of the roaders. In March of 1961, Kennedy had an opportunity to make two new appointments. In doing so he tilted the balance toward the integrationists. He furthered this aim by also naming a staff director who was also an integrationist. (Bernstein, pgs. 50-51)

    Kennedy also urged a kind of affirmative action program for all the cabinet level departments. He wanted figures on how many black Americans were employed by each department secretary. When the numbers were returned, he made it clear they were not nearly satisfactory. This sent each secretary scrambling to find suitable black employees in order not to be dressed down by the president at the next meeting. (ibid, p. 53) Kennedy also made it clear that he would not attend functions at any institution that practiced segregation. This created a wave of resignations by White House employees from such places like athletic clubs and golf courses. (ibid)

    It was against this drastically new backdrop that the civil rights movement now began to truly assert itself e.g. the Freedom Riders, King’s SCLC, James Farmer’s CORE. For instance, James Meredith sent away for his application to the University of Mississippi the day after Kennedy was inaugurated. (Bernstein, p. 76) For as Wofford and Bernstein have written, there was never any doubt that Kennedy would support these groups. (Ibid, p. 65) In fact, the White House arranged financing in some cases for them to launch voter registration drives. It was simply a matter of what tactics would be used. But there was a byproduct to these dramatic confrontations e.g. Nicolas Katzenbach removing George Wallace from the front gate at the University of Alabama, President Kennedy calling out the military to quell the violence over Meredith at Ole Miss, Robert Kennedy ordering 500 marshals into Montgomery to protect the Freedom Riders. That was this: the more these ugly confrontations were televised, the more people outside the south became repelled by the actions of the white southerners. In other words, through television, the incidents had a dual effect: the spectacles began to turn people who had previously been apathetic on the subject into civil rights advocates. In turn, this began to isolate the segregationists of the south. Through that double movement, the balance of power began to shift in congress away from Eastland and toward Kennedy and King.

    As Wofford, Robert Kennedy and Bernstein have all noted, the culminating showdown was in Birmingham, Alabama. With a black population of forty per cent, it was probably the most segregated big city in the south. For example, although it was industrialized, less than five per cent of the Hayes Aircraft workforce was black. (ibid, p. 85) The symbol of Birmingham’s unstinting fealty to segregation was Commissioner of Public Safety Eugene “Bull” Connor. Connor was so defiant in the face of Bobby Kennedy’s attempts to integrate the south that he called him a “bobby-soxer” and challenged him to a fistfight. (ibid, p. 86) Because of these factors, the city was a prime target for demonstrations. King had an executive meeting of the SCLC in January of 1963 to plan the assault on Birmingham.

    As everyone knows, Connor played into the hands of Kennedy and King. The images captured by TV cameras of Connor unleashing savage police attack dogs, and using powerful fire department hoses against young boys and girls, these were a media sensation. Birmingham became the magazine, newspaper and television capital of America. President Kennedy sent Burke Marshall, head of the civil rights division, to negotiate an agreement to end the violence. Both King and Robert Kennedy called the agreement a great victory. (Bernstein, p. 92)

    Comedian/activist Dick Gregory had been in Birmingham from the beginning. On the night after Connor unleashed the German Shepherds and hoses, he returned home. His wife was waiting for him when he arrived after midnight. She told him that President Kennedy had called. He had left a message that he wanted Gregory to call him when he got in. Gregory noted the late hour. His wife replied with, “He said it didn’t matter what time it was.” So Gregory called the White House and Kennedy picked up the phone. He said, “Dick, I need to know everything that happened down there.” Gregory went on for about 10 minutes detailing the whole sorry spectacle. When he was done, Kennedy exclaimed, “We’ve got those bastards now!” Gregory, overcome with emotion, began to weep. (2003 radio interview with Gregory)

    After this, Kennedy now wrote his civil rights act, made his memorable national speech the night Medgar Evers was murdered, and supervised – and supplemented with white union members – King’s March on Washington. For all intents and purposes the battle had been won. Because as Kennedy predicted in November of 1963, and as Thurston Clarke proved in his book, the civil rights act was going to pass the next year. As both Johnson and Kennedy understood, the key in the senate was Everett Dirksen, who JFK had good relations with.

    Now, anyone looking at the above précis would have to conclude the obvious: Kennedy did more for the civil rights of black Americans in three years than the previous 18 presidents had done in a century. That includes Harry Truman, Franklin Roosevelt and the so-called progressive presidents: Wilson, Teddy Roosevelt and Taft. Sabato, of course, is aware of all this. But because of his agenda, he can’t admit it. In fact, you will see little, if any, of the above in The Kennedy Half Century. Even though it is accepted history. To be frank, I am a little disturbed that I had to dust off my books and consult them to correct Sabato’s Orwellian attempt to turn Kennedy into the equivalent of a Tennessee congressman on civil rights. It’s a similar trick to what Tom Brokaw and Gus Russo did for their tacky TV special. But this is what happens when one deals with the politically charged Kennedy case. It’s simply not enough to distort the facts of his assassination. The attempt at abridgement extends out from his murder, and into his presidency.

    IV

    As noted, like Robert Dallek, Sabato is intent on denuding Kennedy’s presidency of any real value. So in addition to his misrepresentations on civil rights, the author also goes after the idea that Kennedy was withdrawing from Vietnam at the time of his death. It’s hard to believe that this could be seriously contemplated at this time. But as with Kennedy’s civil rights record, Sabato is not above distorting and simply eliminating aspects of the adduced record in order to achieve his aim. The author is nothing if not Machiavellian.

    Sabato begins his discussion of this issue with a usual ploy used by the likes of Chris Mathews. He tries to make the Vietnam issue something ideological. In two ways. He says that liberals have forgotten all the aid the USA gave to Ngo Dien Diem in the way of military hardware, like Green Berets, guns and money. (Sabato, p. 123) That whole concept is simply bogus. All of this material about Kennedy’s approval of military aid to Diem in late 1961 is thoroughly detailed in John Newman’s masterly book JFK and Vietnam. That book was published over 20 years ago. It is a book that many so-called “liberals” use. But Newman is a conservative. Which should demonstrate to everyone but Sabato that people on both sides of the ideological compass can try to seek the truth of a situation when there is no agenda driving them.

    The other ideological strophe he uses is a real dandy. He writes that, “Eisenhower had been wary of American involvement in Vietnam, having watched the French get bogged down in Southeast Asia and then withdraw in humiliation in 1954” (ibid). For sheer and utter nonsense, for the utter perversity prize in a book that is full of it, this sentence might take the cake. Sabato can only get away with such baloney because, as noted at the top of Section 3 of this review, he leaves out all the important things in the story pertaining to Kennedy ‘s visit to Vietnam in 1951, his meeting with Edmund Gullion, his altered consciousness about the Third World, and most of all, Operation Vulture. This was the proposed atomic bombardment of Dien Bien Phu by the Dulles brothers and Eisenhower. I don’t see how seriously considering the use of an American air armada to deliver nuclear weapons in order to preserve the last vestiges of European colonial empire qualifies Eisenhower as being “wary of American involvement in Vietnam.” In fact, it’s just the opposite of what Sabato implies. It was Kennedy who protested in public this frightening nightmare scenario of dropping three atomic bombs over a country the USA not even formally at war with.

    And make no mistake about just how wrong Sabato is here. Because it was not just in aid of France that Eisenhower was willing to take the final step towards nuclear holocaust. For as Gordon Goldstein notes in his fine book, Lessons in Disaster, President Johnson derived much succor from the fact that Eisenhower supported his escalation in Vietnam each step of the way. Up to and including the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons. (Goldstein, p. 161) In other words, Sabato has the record exactly wrong here about Eisenhower vs. Kennedy and how far each man was willing to go in Vietnam.

    Now, Sabato says it took him five years to put together this book. Goldstein’s work was published in 2008. John Prados’ book, Operation Vulture, was published in 2002. In addition to himself, Sabato had his colleague at Virginia, history professor Andrew Bell, help him compose the book. (Sabato, p. xi) And also Sean Lyons, who “supervised a crack team of graduate and undergraduate interns and researchers.” Sabato then goes on to name 28 members of that intern team. So, in all, we are to believe that 31 people missed both the Goldstein book and the Prados book? I don’t think so. Again, as with the civil rights issue, Sabato ignored the factual record because it did not fit into his preconceived agenda.

    But that is just the beginning of Sabato mangling the record on Kennedy and Vietnam. Sabato writes that by the autumn of 1963, Kennedy realized his strategy for Vietnam was not working. He writes this in the context of Kennedy’s flexible response concept to communism. (Sabato, p. 123) Now, let us assume Sabato is correct: Kennedy had somehow chosen Vietnam as an anti-communist battleground. That he was employing flexible response, and the first step, sending in more advisers was not working. Would not the next step up the response ladder be sending in combat troops? Why did Kennedy not order them in at this time? Why did he do the opposite, that is sign NSAM 263 which actually ordered all advisers out beginning in December of 1963 and the last ones out in 1965? Sabato cannot even bring himself to type the words “NSAM 263”. So he says this was just a political ploy by Kennedy to get re-elected. He can get away with this because he does not tell the reader about the other part of the plan: the total withdrawal by 1965. (Sabato, p. 126)

    But further, Sabato does not tell the reader that today we can pretty much put together the origins of the withdrawal plan. It began way back in early 1962. After Kennedy had agreed to send in more advisers, he sent John Kenneth Galbraith to Saigon to give him a report on conditions there and if further American involvement would help. Predictably, Galbraith came back with a view that increased American involvement would not help Diem. That report was passed on to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Kennedy now told McNamara to begin putting together a plan to wind down the war. The military dragged its feet on this. But at the Sec/Def meeting in May of 1963, the plans were all presented through the assembly of an in country team in Hawaii. McNamara replied that the pace was too slow and it should be speeded up. This was reported back to Kennedy. And this was what Kennedy activated when he signed NSAM 263 in October of 1963. (DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, pgs. 365-371) Needless to say, Sabato leaves all of this out of his book.

    For this and other reasons, both noted and unnoted, as a discussion of Kennedy’s presidency, Sabato’s book is worthless.

    V

    As I noted above, Sabato begins his book with Kennedy’s arrival at Love Field in Dallas. At this point of the book, the author simply describes the assassination pretty much as the Warren Commission does. With all the errors of that fraudulent document intact. For example, the author writes that Howard Brennan saw a man with a gun on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. (Sabato, p. 11) In fact, as many authors, including Ian Griggs have noted, it’s highly unlikely that Brennan saw anyone. Sabato describes the entire Truly/Baker/Oswald incident on the second floor lunchroom just as it is in the Warren Report. Again, this is highly suspect today. It has been questioned by some because Baker never mentioned the incident, or Oswald, in his first day affidavit. Even though when he made out the affidavit, Oswald was sitting right across from him in the witness room at Dallas Police headquarters. (James DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland, pgs. 192-96) But researcher Sean Murphy has gone beyond that. He argues, with compelling evidence and logic that, at the time of the assassination, Oswald was most likely outside the building. Standing back in the alcove of the Houston street doorway with his sandwich and soda pop. In the Darnell film, this image has been termed “Prayer Man”, because of the position of the subject’s hands in still shots. The man next to this figure, and a step above him, is Wesley Frazier. Needless to say, if this figure is actually Oswald, not only is the Warren Commission shown to be a complete fraud, but also the worst suspicions about Frazier being suborned are also true. (See this discussion of the issue.)

    In his discussion of the medical evidence, Sabato has the same problem Philip Shenon did. He doesn’t seem to be aware that what he says contradicts the extant exhibits. For instance, he says that Secret Service agent Emory Roberts saw massive head trauma to Kennedy while taking his body into Parkland Hospital. (Sabato, p. 13) Yet, no photos we have today show such massive head trauma. Two pages later, the author says that Kennedy had one third of his brain blasted away. Well then Larry, why do the photos and the Ida Dox drawings for the HSCA depict an almost totally intact brain? Again, like Shenon, the man doesn’t understand that he is arguing for a case of conspiracy.

    Sabato then goes further in this vein. In his brief discussion of CE 399 he allows that it may have been found on Kennedy’s stretcher. And, in fact, it could have been planted. (ibid) But, a few pages later, he says its certain that Oswald killed Officer Tippit. When, in fact, as John Armstrong and Joe McBride have written, it is not even a sure case that Oswald was at the scene of the Tippit murder. And the latest evidence in that case, the so-called “third wallet”, would appear to indicate that he was not there and someone planted that wallet.

    As per Oswald’s arrest at the Texas Theater, Sabato recites some of the worst Warren Commission balderdash. Namely that Oswald tried to shoot Officer McDonald. As many authors have proven, not only did this not happen, the FBI proved it could not have happened. (Joseph McBride, Into the Nightmare, pgs. 202-03)

    Later on in the book, unlike Shenon, Sabato acknowledges that there are some problems in the evidentiary records. In my e-mail exchange about the book with attorney Dan Alcorn, he revealed that this section probably stems from Sabato’s talks with him. In fact, outside of the chapter on the Hart Research polling, this is probably the best part of the book. Which, as the reader can see, is damning with faint praise.

    Sabato includes in this part of the book, the following statement, “…any fair minded observer can conclude that both the Dallas police and, for more important, the federal government botched the most important murder investigation of the twentieth century.” (Sabato, p. 139) Sabato mentions that the Dallas Police did not cordon off the Depository building anywhere near quickly enough. He then says that Oswald should never have been paraded in front of crowds in the DPD headquarters as he was. He notes that the Warren Commission inexplicable failed to interview some important Dealey Plaza witnesses, like Bill and Gayle Newman. (Ibid, p. 140) He admits that Vickie Adams, who went down the stairs of the Depository right after the shooting was treated like a threat to the Commission, not a valuable witness. (ibid, p. 146)

    But after this fairly decent Chapter 7, something happens. Sabato seems to understand that he has stepped too close to the precipice. So he steps backward in his next chapter, which is mostly about Oswald. He badly underplays all we know about the man today. Sabato actually seems to buy into the hogwash that Oswald was looking to shoot Richard Nixon. Which is a story that not even the Warren Commission bought into. (Sabato, p. 171) He then adds that Oswald also shot at General Walker. In his footnotes, he bases this on the rifling characteristics of the so-called recovered bullet and how it allegedly matches the Mannlicher Carcano rifle in evidence. What he does not say is that, first, almost all rifle bullets have the same rifling pattern the FBI attributed to the bullet in evidence today. (DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland, p. 80) But second, the bullet in evidence today is not the bullet originally recovered by the Dallas Police. (ibid, p. 76) Apparently, Sabato is desperate to make Oswald into some kind of sociopathic killer. He’s so desperate, he uses phony evidence to do it.

    Like Vincent Bugliosi, Sabato is intent on getting the CIA off the hook for any culpability in the JFK case. So, he writes that the Agency as an institution was not involved in the conspiracy. Which is neither here nor there, since no one claims that Director John McCone was involved in the plot. (Sabato, p. 188) But he then writes that, overall, the Agency sent good information to the Warren Commission. Again, this might be true as an overall statement. But it is not true in certain crucial areas of the case. And Sabato cooperates with the Agency in covering up those crucial areas. For instance, in his discussion of the Clinton/Jackson incident, he allows that it may have been David Ferrie with Oswald in the two hamlets. (ibid, p. 176) But he then writes that we don’t know who the third man was. Yes we do. But Sabato does not want to admit to the identification of Clay Shaw since it would lend Jim Garrison too much credibility.

    In his discussion of Mexico City, Sabato writes that, “Without question, someone showed up in the Cuban and Russian embassies claiming to be Lee Oswald, but was he actually an Oswald imposter?” (ibid, p. 178) But Sabato does not make clear that almost all the personnel at the Cuban embassy said that the man who visited was not Oswald. Sabato then caps this with a real puzzler. He says that the two differing cables sent from the CIA about Oswald in Mexico – one describing the real Oswald, one describing the famous Mystery Man photo – were likely the result of a mistake. (ibid) He then writes, under a picture of the Mystery Man photo, that some people claim “he was an agent of the eventual assassins, sent to impersonate Oswald.” Where did Sabato get that piece of information? No one I know of has said such a thing. But right after this, Sabato writes that “others say” he was the Russian Yuri Moskalev. Its more than “others say” Larry. That particular piece of information is in the 400 page, thoroughly documented Lopez Report.

    Which it does not appear that Sabato has read. For if he had read it, he would have known that the picture of Moskalev should have never been sent in the first place. When investigators Ed Lopez and Dan Hardway interviewed Mexico City CIA officer Anne Goodpasture, the woman who originally sent the picture, she said she sent it because it was the only photo the CIA station had of a non-Latin male entering the Soviet compound on October 1st, the day the CIA says Oswald made a call there. That turned out to be a lie. Because when Lopez and Hardway went through the raw data, they discovered the photo of Moskalev was not taken on October 1st, but on October 2nd. (Lopez Report, p. 139) This makes what Goodpasture did even more suspect. Because if the photo had been taken on October 1st, it could have been a mistake, since Oswald was still allegedly in Mexico City. But that standard did not apply for the next day. Because Oswald was supposed to have left that morning. In other words, why was Goodpasture even looking for photos of Oswald taken that day?

    Goodpasture then tried her to conceal her faux pas. She attributed her error about the dates to a misreading of the log sheets. But Lopez and Hardway then found the log sheets. On those sheets, the individual days are marked off in columns separated by red percentage marks! (Lopez Report, p. 140) Because of this fact, Lopez and Hardway found Goodpasture’s excuse about a mistake in days “implausible”. And they found it highly unlikely that she would not know about this error for 13 years. That is until the House Select Committee on Assassinations was formed in 1976. In fact, Goodpasture was lying again. The two dogged investigators found a CIA cable to Mexico City dated 11/23/63. It said that the photo Goodpasture had sent to them was not of Oswald. The cable then requested a recheck of the photos. (Lopez Report, p. 141) When they did the recheck it was discovered that the Agency had other photos of Moskalev taken after October 2. And, in all likelihood, they knew who he was back in October. (Lopez Report, p. 179) In fact, Lopez and Hardway concluded that Goodpasture knew the picture was not Oswald by October 11th. (ibid, p. 159) In other words, when one familiarizes oneself with the primary documents, the possibility that the Mystery man photo was sent in error is all but eliminated.

    But there is more in this regard that makes the whole Goodpasture/Mystery Man discussion even more malignant. From his footnotes, it does not appear that Sabato interviewed Lopez or Hardway. If he had interviewed them he would have learned something which he probably would not have put in his book. The two had prepared an indictment of Goodpasture for the Justice Department over her multiple perjuries. In other words, Goodpasture was going to be indicted for lying about Oswald and Mexico City in a murder case. (Author’s interview with Dan Hardway, 10/17/2013) But beyond that, the HSCA had prepared two perjury indictments for Goodpasture’s working colleague David Phillips also. And they were on separate counts. When people lie continually, and they risk being indicted by the Justice Department, it’s usually not because they were in error. Its because they were trying to cover something up. The question then becomes: Why were they covering up?

    VI

    If Sabato is not adequate with New Orleans or Mexico City, what can one say about his description of Kennedy’s autopsy. He says, “…the autopsy performed at Bethesda Naval Medical Center … was inadequate in some ways.” (Sabato p. 212) Inadequate? Some, like the HSCA’s Dr. Michael Baden, have called it the exemplar for how not to do an autopsy. For example, neither bullet path in Kennedy was dissected. Neither the bullet that entered his back nor the one that entered his skull. Sabato chalks this up to time limitations. (ibid) This is ridiculous since the body was in front of the pathologists for three hours that night. And the supplementary examination of Kennedy’s brain was done on a different day. Further, Sabato tries to imply that the autopsy doctors – Jim Humes, Thornton Boswell, and Pierre Finck – later agreed with the HSCA about the placement of the head wound in the cowlick area. (Sabato, pgs. 214-15) This is simply false. Humes, and Humes alone, agreed with this at his testimony before the public hearings of the HSCA. But two years later, he went back to his original testimony, that the bullet entered at the base of the skull. The other two doctors have never wavered on this point. (DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland, p. 132)

    Towards the end of his discussion of the evidence, Sabato begins to side with the official story, all the way down the line. He even tries to explain away the fact that there was no copper found on the curb where a bullet ricocheted and hit bystander Jim Tague. (Sabato,pgs. 221, 508) Yet to anyone who has seen the copper coated, Western Cartridge Company bullets supplied for the Mannlicher Carcano rifle attributed to Oswald, this seems simply impossible.

    Chapter 12 culminates Sabato’s six-chapter discussion of the evidence in the JFK case. Predictably, he comes down on the side of the official story. He writes, “There is no reasonable doubt that at least one of John F. Kennedy’s assassins was Lee Harvey Oswald. It may well be that Oswald was the only killer in Dealey Plaza…” (Sabato, p. 248) What he does now is list some of the most questionable and mildewed evidence possible to support that thesis. For instance, he writes that the Mannlicher Carcano was Oswald’s rifle. As several authors have noted, that is no longer a categorical fact. The rifle the Warren Commission says Oswald ordered is not the same rifle the Commission placed into evidence. The Warren Commission had to have known this, but they papered it over. (James DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland, pgs. 57-63) Sabato also says that “…the weight of the evidence is overwhelming that Oswald was there in the window and fired the bullets.” Actually, the weight of the evidence says Oswald was not in that window. If he had been, then he would have had to have run down the stairs after the shooting. Depository workers Vickie Adams and Sandra Styles would have seen or heard him. They did not. Again, the Commission had to have known this. And again, they papered it over. (ibid, pgs. 91-95) The Commission’s star witness to place Oswald on the sixth floor, Howard Brennan, is so bad that not only do people question his identification, today people even wonder if he ever actually identified Oswald at a lineup. (ibid, p. 207)

    Finally, there is Sabato’s bought and paid for attempt to denigrate the acoustics evidence produced by the HSCA, which indicated more than one assassin, and therefore a conspiracy. Sonalysts is a sound engineering company which does much work for both the media and the government. Suffice it to say, since the HSCA’s verdict of conspiracy was issued in 1979 based on the acoustical record of the Dallas Police motorcycle dictabelt, many government-associated bodies have spent countless hours trying to discredit it. I have no strong feelings about this aspect of the case, since in my view, one can prove conspiracy in the JFK case many other ways. But for Sabato to say that not only were the two teams of professionals that the HSCA employed for this study wrong, but they were amateurish to the point that somehow they did not even know where the recording motorcycle was or was not, or if it was even in Dealey Plaza at the time, well that is a bit wild. But it fits with the book’s agenda.

    I don’t consider myself an authority on this aspect of the case. Don Thomas is. I cannot do better in discounting this part of the book than he has already done. I therefore gladly recommend the reader to read his essay on Sabato’s irresponsibility with this evidence.

    VII

    The last part of the book, Chapters 13 through 20, deals with the shadow cast over later presidents by comparisons with the Kennedys. Although there are some interesting observations in this section, like how Ronald Reagan tried to give himself cover for his supply side tax cut by invoking Kennedy’s name, its really rather unsatisfactory. And that is because, throughout, the very unsteady hand of Larry Sabato is drawing comparisons with his misguided historical compass.

    One of the most bizarre statements in this part of the book is when the author says that, since LBJ followed Kennedy, we must give both men credit for not just the civil rights legislation passed in 1964 and 1965, but also for the expansion of the Vietnam War. (Sabato, p. 426) I had to read that statement twice to see if I had misinterpreted it. Unfortunately, I didn’t. I actually think Sabato means it. Which is a bit scary. Because, with the civil rights issue, Johnson was continuing something Kennedy had advocated since, at least, 1957. And, in fact, JFK had largely paved the way for Johnson to come in and sign the 1964 act.

    The case with Vietnam is not at all the same. Johnson actually broke with Kennedy’s withdrawal policy, which had been in preparation since 1962. And which Kennedy had explicitly primed through McNamara at the Sec/Def meeting in Hawaii, and then signed into law with NSAM 263. And, in fact, if one consults the latest scholarly books on the subject, e.g. James Blight’s Virtual JFK, one will see documentary evidence that says Johnson knowingly and deliberately reversed Kennedy’s policy. Contrary to what Sabato writes, LBJ thoroughly understood that he was breaking with Kennedy’s withdrawal policy. (Sabato, p. 281) But he did it anyway. Further, he bullied McNamara into now being his point man on an escalation policy. At the same time that he ridiculed Kennedy’s withdrawal plan to the secretary! (Blight, pgs. 304-310) Why should Sabato ask us to give Kennedy equal credit for a policy of his that Johnson had now reversed?

    But beyond that, there was a precedent for this in the record. In 1961, President Kennedy sent Vice-President Johnson to Saigon to meet with South Vietnam’s leader, Ngo Dinh Diem. Even at this early date, Johnson was in consultations with the Pentagon and being advised the USA had to escalate the war. When he met with Diem, with one of the generals he had talked to previously in the room, he told him he probably needed American combat troops to win the war. (John Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 72) This was not in line with Kennedy’s policy. In 1961, JFK turned down no less than nine requests to send combat troops to Vietnam. (Gordon Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster, pgs. 53-66) And we know what happened afterwards. In less than three months, Johnson signed NSAM 288. These were plans for a massive air war over Vietnam. In other words, something Kennedy never even contemplated in three years, Johnson had signed off on in three months. (DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, p. 369) No surprise, NSAM 288 is not even mentioned by Sabato.

    Sabato goes even further in this regard. He makes the argument, similar to one in David Halberstam’s obsolete book The Best and the Brightest, that somehow there was a consensus within America for Johnson to escalate the war. That somehow, this was pre-ordained and that the Vietnam War was part of some kind of inevitable, tragic arc. As Fredrik Logevall demonstrated in his book, Choosing War, this is simply not the case. Johnson could have gotten out in 1964. In fact, LBJ was encouraged by some powerful and important people, like Walter Lippman, to do just that. He ignored that advice. (Blight, p. 240) As Logevall demonstrates in detail, from almost the week he became president, to the spring of 1965, Johnson essentially planned for America’s direct intervention in Vietnam. As Logevall further demonstrates, but which Sabato tries to imply, Robert Kennedy had nothing to do with any of it. (Sabato, p. 279)

    Just how obsessed was Johnson with presenting a unified front in his escalation plan? When Vice-President Hubert Humphrey suggested a rather mild alternative – negotiating with North Vietnam – Johnson banned him from meetings and placed him under surveillance. (Blight, pgs. 188-89) I would like to hear Sabato say that Kennedy would have done the same.

    Near the end, the Sabato can’t control himself. And now his true agenda becomes manifest. He actually says that President Obama is well to the left of President Kennedy. (Sabato, p. 339) Which is such a ludicrous statement that it could only be designed to get him on television. Since only the likes of Tom Brokaw and Dan Rather could listen to such nonsense without laughing. In my book Destiny Betrayed, and further in my speech at Cyril Wecht’s Passing the Torch conference in Pittsburgh, I demonstrated in depth and detail where Kennedy had consciously and deliberately altered the Eisenhower/Dulles foreign policy. That previous policy was based on a globalist view of American imperialism, especially in the Third World. Kennedy’s overall view of this matter was different. Kennedy was much more of a nationalist who was willing to accept non-aligned countries e.g. Indonesia, Laos, Congo, Egypt, Brazil. Therefore, once he took office, there was a clear demarcation and overturning of previous policy. (DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, pgs. 28-33) This had been in the making for years, since Kennedy’s foreign policy ideas can be traced back to his meeting with State Department official Edmund Gullion in Saigon in 1951. (ibid, p. 21)

    The problem that many people have with Obama is that there has been no real reversal in foreign policy from his horrendous predecessor. Or if there has, it has been rather minimal. On the domestic side, because he took office in time of economic emergency, Obama had an opportunity to actually launch a Second New Deal. To put it mildly, he did not. That he was not going to do so was pretty much a given once one saw who he was placing into positions of power on his economics team e.g. Lawrence Summers. Kennedy’s chief economic adviser, Walter Heller, was a Keynesian. I doubt very much that Heller would have been satisfied with what Summers and Tim Geithner proposed to get the USA out of the greatest economic debacle since 1929. In fact, their anemic proposals are a large reason we are still mired in what Paul Krugman has called The Great Recession. Recall, Kennedy thought the Eisenhower recession was unacceptable. In fact, one can argue that the Obama/Geithner/Summers plan essentially preserved the nutty supply-side theories Ronald Reagan, which were adapted from Milton Friedman. Friedman was a man who Heller used to make fun of. And it was Friedman’s ideas, as implemented by Reagan, that caused the great and permanent transfer of wealth from the middle class to the upper classes in America.

    So when Sabato ends his book by saying there really was no Kennedy legacy, this tells us more about him than it tells us about Kennedy. If there was no lasting legacy, it was because that legacy was crushed. This was begun by Johnson’s reversal of Kennedy’s foreign policy in several places, like Indonesia and Congo. Another place would be Kennedy’s back channel with Fidel Castro. Sabato doesn’t mention these, so he can act as if they did not exist. Secondly, Johnson’s escalation of the Vietnam War began the economic stagflation which afflicted the economy for well over a decade. In fact, it was the wrenching of that stagflation out of the economy by Federal Reserve chair Paul Volcker under President Carter that contributed to the coming of Ronald Reagan.

    The other factor that brought on Reagan was Carter’s coziness with the Shah of Iran. Once Carter appointed Zbigniew Brzezinski as his National Security Advisor, this automatically brought Carter closer to David Rockefeller. Rockefeller was a friend of the Shah’s since his bank housed much of Iran’s money. As Donald Gibson has pointed out, Kennedy was opposed to the globalist designs of David Rockefeller. (Battling Wall Street, pgs. 73-74) And as James Bill notes in his book The Eagle and the Lion, the Kennedy brothers were much opposed to the Shah’s regime. Therefore, because of the Carter/Brzezinski/Rockefeller axis, once the Shah was overthrown, and the fundamentalist Islamic forces took power, America became their target. This was something which Kennedy warned about as far back as his great Algeria speech in 1957. All of this crucial data is quite naturally ignored by Sabato and his team of 31. But you can read about it here.

    Except for where he notes some of the problems with the JFK assassination’s evidentiary record, this book is pretty much not just without distinction, but so agenda driven as to be misleading. On the 50th anniversary of Kennedy’s murder, we needed a lot better. As Mike Swanson notes, Sabato got his MSM appearances. But the rest of us needed a book that told us much more about John Kennedy, and much less about Larry Sabato.

  • Howard P. Willens, History Will Prove Us Right


    Nobody likes to admit they were wrong, even on small, trivial issues. So imagine you screwed up – whether by accident or design – something as monumental as the investigation into the murder of the President? How much time do you think would have to pass before you were ready to hold up your hand?

    Apparently, for former Warren Commission lawyer Howard Willens, even 50 years is not long enough. Because, despite close to five decades of criticism, Willens remains defiant and unapologetic in his defense of the Commission and its now-defunct conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone. And it is not as if that criticism has come entirely from conspiracy “buffs.” Far from it. The Commission’s findings and methods have been questioned by historians, pathologists, lawyers, district attorneys, state governors, US senators, presidents, and even members of the Commission itself.

    For example, in 1979 the House Select Committee on Assassinations concluded that “The Warren Commission failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President.” (HSCA report, p. 256) It went on to say that “the committee found fault with the manner in which the conclusions of the Warren Commission were stated…There were instances, the committee found, in which the conclusions did not accurately reflect the efforts undertaken by the Commission and the evidence before it…the Commission overstated the thoroughness of its investigation and the weight of its evidence in a number of areas, in particular that of the conspiracy investigation…It is a reality to be lamented that the Commission failed to live up to its promise” (Ibid, 259-261). Indeed this failure to do as promised and fully explore the possibility of a conspiracy is the reason why one of the Commission’s own members, Senator Richard Russell, later admitted to not being satisfied that Lee Harvey Oswald really had planned and executed the assassination all by himself.

    Professor emeritus of history, Gerald McKnight, goes much further in his landmark book, Breach of Trust: How the Warren Commission Failed the Nation and Why. McKnight describes the Warren Report as “a shoddily improvised political exercise in public relations and not a good-faith investigation into the Kennedy assassination.” (McKnight, p. 7) He explains that the Commission “favoured witnesses who strengthened the case for Oswald’s guilt and discounted or even suppressed testimony (and evidence) of those who jeopardized the prosecution case the government was building against a dead man.” (Ibid, p. 3) McKnight does not just say these things, he proves them over and over again, using the government’s own records almost exclusively.

    Willens is having none of it. He dedicates his book “To my colleagues on the staff of the Warren Commission who knew that Truth was their only client”. And he insists, presumably with a straight face, that “In the nearly fifty years since the report was published in 1964, not one fact has emerged that undercuts the main conclusions of the commission that Oswald was the assassin and that there is no credible evidence that either he or Ruby was part of a larger conspiracy.” (Willens, p. 11)

    This is patently absurd. After careful study of the Warren report and its 26 volumes of hearing and evidence, first generation critics like Harold Weisberg, Mark Lane, and Sylvia Meagher proved beyond any shadow of a doubt that the evidence before the Commission undermined, contradicted, and flat-out disproved its central conclusions. That was over 40 years ago and the Commission’s conclusions do not look any better today.

    There is a word for Willens’s stance: denial. Quite frankly, Willens needs to step up and admit that the world is round.

    At the time of the assassination, Howard Willens was a lawyer in the Justice Department’s criminal division. After President Lyndon Johnson announced that he was putting a Commission together, Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach hand-picked Willens to “help the commission get up and running.” (Ibid) This is significant because Katzenbach made his own objectives abundantly clear within hours of Oswald’s murder on November 25, 1963. “The public must be satisfied”, he wrote in his now infamous memo to Bill Moyers, “that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at large, and that the evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial.” He also suggested that “speculation about Oswald’s motivation ought to be cut off” and that the government should rebut “thought that this was a Communist conspiracy or…a right-wing conspiracy to blame it on the Communists.”

    In other words, the buck stops with Oswald. This was long before the facts of the case had been established. On November 25th the authorities did not have a single credible eyewitness against Oswald, had not yet “found” his print on the rifle, and had performed a nitrate test that indicated he had not fired the weapon. It had not even been established that Oswald was the gunman let alone that there was no conspiracy. Clearly, the real solution to the crime mattered very little to Katzenbach.

    When Katzenbach picked Willens for the job, one can assume he trusted Willens would not rock the boat. And his own actions suggest that Willens did not want to disappoint. As he writes, “Beginning on December 20, 1963, I devoted the next three weeks to assisting [J. Lee] Rankin in getting the commission staffed and organized.” (p. 37) But Willens did not look for brilliant, independent-minded, professional investigators as would be expected in a genuine pursuit of the truth. He brought in a bunch of Ivy League lawyers; men whose skills lay not in investigating, but in assembling a case. Which, of course, suited the desires of Katzenbach and the Commission perfectly, since they intended to rely on the FBI and other federal agencies to supply the evidence while they put the correct spin on it for their report.

    What’s more, the men Willens picked were mostly business or corporate lawyers. One staff member, Burt Griffin, admitted later on that when he arrived in Washington he “was struck by how few of his new colleagues had been prosecutors or had any other experience in law enforcement.” (Philip Shenon, A Cruel and Shocking Act, p. 124) This only got worse when several members of the staff left before the work was done. With a report yet to be finished, Willens brought in men with virtually no legal experience at all. One of these, Murray Lauchlit, began working for the Commission the day after he received his diploma! (Ibid, p. 404) Did Willens really think this staff was up to the task of solving the assassination? Or were they picked because they would most likely fulfill Katzenbach’s objectives?

    II

    History Will Prove Us Right is a whitewash of a whitewash that seeks to undermine long-established truths about the Commission’s aims and methodology. Willens writes, “The repeated claim by critics that the White House, a federal agency, or unspecified powerful forces influenced the extent of the commission’s investigation or the content of its report is simply false.” (Willens, p. 266) In order to make this seem plausible, he has to distort or omit reams of relevant information – including the aforementioned memo written by his boss, Nicholas Katzenbach, from which he avoids quoting at all costs.

    To me, the way in which Willens deals with Earl Warren’s acquiescence to chair the Commission is a perfect example of his desire to hide, and unwillingness to confront, the evidence that casts serious doubt on his claims. It is well known that Warren did not want to take the job, but gave in after President Johnson called him to the White House. In Willens’s account of their meeting, there is no mention of the way in which the Chief Justice was reportedly brought to tears by LBJ’s dire warning that millions of lives were in jeopardy. Johnson later reported telling Warren, “Now these wild people are chargin’ Khrushchev killed Kennedy, and Castro killed Kennedy.” He then raised the possibility that if the American public came to believe this story, they might call for a retaliation that could lead to a nuclear exchange with the Soviets. “If Khrushchev moved on us”, he said, “he could kill 39 million in an hour, and we could kill 100 million in his country in an hour. You could be speaking for 39 million people.” (Shenon, p. 60-61) Understandably, these words had a profound effect on Warren who, according to historian David Wrone, “From the day he assumed chairmanship of the Commission until the day of his death…firmly believed that a Soviet conspiracy had assassinated President John F. Kennedy.” (Wrone, The Zapruder Film, p. 245) So, understanding his duty was to take a Soviet conspiracy out of the equation, Warren agreed to take the chair.

    On January 20, 1964, Warren held his first meeting with the Commission staff. There, he impressed upon them the seriousness of the situation, restating LBJ’s concerns. The contents of the meeting were recorded in a revealing memo written by staff member Melvin Eisenberg:

    “After brief introductions, the Chief Justice discussed the circumstances under which he had accepted the chairmanship of the Commission…The President stated that rumors of the most exaggerated kind were circulating in this country and overseas. Some rumors went so far as attributing the assassination to a faction within the Government wishing to see the Presidency assumed by President Johnson. Others, if not quenched, could conceivably lead the country into a war which could cost 40 million lives. No one would refuse to do something which might help prevent such a possibility. The President convinced him that this was an occasion on which actual conditions had to override general principles.”

    Perhaps the key sentence in this memo is the one about it being “an occasion on which actual conditions had to override general principles.” As historian Jim DiEugenio asked, “How could the message be made any clearer to a bunch of Yale, Stanford, and Harvard law school graduates? The threat of 40 million dead was going to take precedence over the general legal principles he had espoused.” (DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland, p. 254-253). Willens hides all of this from his readers. And because he does not disclose Warren’s reasons for accepting the chairmanship, Willens does not have to explain just who it was that got LBJ worried about a conspiracy involving Krushchev and Castro. It was the CIA.

    The echoes of gunfire in Dealey Plaza had barely stopped ringing when the CIA began a campaign to lay the blame for the assassination at Castro’s feet through the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) – an anti-Castro Cuban exile group the Agency funded. According to journalist Jefferson Morley, “the DRE was perhaps the single biggest and most active organization opposing Fidel Castro’s regime.” CIA veteran George Joannides “was giving the leaders of the group up to $25,000 a month in cash for what he described as ‘intelligence collection’ and ‘propaganda.’” (Morley, The Man Who Didn’t Talk and Other Tales from the New Kennedy Assassination Files.) The DRE was known to have had contact with Oswald during the summer of 1963. Within hours of his arrest on November 22, a representative of the group telephoned Clair Booth Luce (wife of TIME magazine publisher, Henry Luce), to tell her that Oswald was part of a hit team organized by Castro. The DRE then assembled a package for the media which included photographs of Oswald and Castro under the heading “Presumed Assassins.” Thus, as Mark Lane noted, “it was the CIA and Joannides that paid for, organized and published the very first conspiracy theory about the assassination” (Lane, Last Word, p. 234).

    Having planted a seed in the press, the CIA turned its attention to the White House. On Saturday, November 23, LBJ met twice with CIA director John McCone who briefed him about Oswald’s alleged visit to Mexico City two months earlier. Based on information sent to headquarters by the CIA’s Mexico City station, McCone reported that Oswald had been in contact with Soviet consular Valery Kostikov, whom, it was alleged, was an expert in assassinations. Shaking Johnson up some more, the CIA followed this up on Monday, November 25, with a cablegram from Mexico City Station Chief Winston Scott, who claimed to have uncovered evidence that Castro, with Soviet support, had paid Oswald to kill Kennedy. (McKnight, p. 24 & 66-67) The effect these stories from the CIA had on Johnson cannot be overstated since he was already of a paranoid disposition. According to Kennedy military aide, General Godfrey McHugh, LBJ was already crying about a plot to “get us all” before Air Force One had even left Dallas on the afternoon of the assassination. And there seems little doubt that Johnson was convinced by the CIA reports, because years later, he said to ABC News anchorman Thomas K. Smith, “I’ll tell you something that will rock you. Kennedy was trying to get to Castro, but Castro got to him first.” (Shenon, p. 526)

    When we take all of the information above and put it together, it paints a fairly clear picture. The CIA fed false information to the press and the White House, blaming Castro for the assassination. A terrified Johnson balked at the idea of retaliation that might lead to a nuclear confrontation with the Soviets and so appointed Earl Warren to chair a Commission that would ensure the blame rested squarely on Oswald’s shoulders. Warren, in turn, tacitly explained to the Commission’s staff at its very first meeting the perceived severity of the situation and just what was expected of them. Consequently, as McKnight puts it, “the Warren Commission went through the motions of an investigation that was little more than an improvised exercise in public relations.” (McKnight, p. 361) Little wonder, then, that Willens leaves all of these details out of his book.

    III

    If there is a “Rosetta Stone” to the Kennedy Assassination, it is Oswald’s alleged sojourn in Mexico City. Because the evidence suggests that the whole episode was staged in advance of the assassination so that it could be exploited afterwards to precipitate an attack on Cuba (as detailed above).

    The tamer version of the story as eventually reported by the Commission, and obviously not questioned by Willens, is that Oswald arrived in Mexico City on September 27, 1963, and soon after visited the Cuban embassy to apply for a visa to visit Cuba on his way to Russia. There he was informed by Cuban consul Silvia Duran that he could not get a Cuban visa until he obtained one from the Soviets, and that could take several months. An angry Oswald kicked up a stink, made futile attempts to obtain a visa from the Soviet embassy, and finally returned home angry and disillusioned. The trouble with this story is that Oswald denied making the trip and, before his wife Marina was threatened with deportation, she too said she knew nothing about any such visit. As we shall see, and as the FBI discovered, the evidence indicates that someone was impersonating Oswald in Mexico City.

    The CIA, which was the initial source of all information placing Oswald in Mexico City, claimed it had photographs of Oswald visiting, and a tape recording of a phone call he made to, the Soviet Embassy. But when the photographs appeared, they showed a middle-aged, heavy-set man who looked nothing like the slight, 24-year-old Oswald. The Agency later changed its tune, saying that the cameras were inoperable on the day of Oswald’s visit, which turned out to be another lie. The tape recording of the phone call made its way to the FBI the day after the assassination. Bureau Director J. Edgar Hoover then wrote a memo to Secret Service Chief James Rowley stating that the FBI agents who had participated in Oswald’s interrogations in Dallas had listened to the tape and concluded that it was not the voice of Lee Harvey Oswald. (Lopez Report, Addendum to footnote #614) Hoover telephoned President Johnson and informed him that “it appears that there is a second person who was at the Soviet Embassy down there.” (McKnight, p. 67) This, of course, was all kept from the American public who were instead told that the tapes had been routinely destroyed beforethe assassination. But not only did the tapes of this Oswald imposter survive until November 22, 1963, they were still in existence in the spring of 1964.

    In History Will Prove Us Right, Willens reveals that on April 8, 1968, he accompanied Commission lawyers William Coleman and David Slawson on their trip to Mexico City to “investigate” the whole affair. What he doesn’t reveal is what Coleman and Slawson told author Anthony Summers which is that while they were there, they too listened to the tapes “mainly to check that they corresponded with the CIA transcripts.” (Summers, Not in Your Lifetime, p. 277) Slawson would later characterize the CIA’s claim that the tapes had been destroyed before the assassination as “a goddamned lie”. (Shenon, p. 296) Needless to say, these tapes never made it back to Washington and were not entered into evidence by the Commission. The obvious reason being that the tapes would have proven that somebody was impersonating Oswald, which would cast the assassination in an entirely different light.

    Also not making it back to Washington was crucial eyewitness Silvia Duran. Duran was a Mexican national who worked at the Cuban embassy and, as noted above, supposedly dealt with Oswald’s visa request. Without the tapes and photographs, the entire story of Oswald’s visit rested on her shoulders and yet she was never called to testify before the Commission. Willens tries to explain this away by saying that “…bringing Duran and her husband to Washington involved certain risks – including antagonizing Mexican law enforcement authorities – and we understood Warren’s position. We already had a clear and documented report of her encounters with Oswald based on Mexican authorities’ interview of Duran, corroborated by the wiretaps, and the additional information she might have provided about Oswald was unlikely to be important enough to justify assuming these risks.” (Willens, p. 133) Not only did they choose not to take her back to Washington to testify, none of the staff members even bothered to contact her while they were in Mexico City.

    Whatever Willens says, the real reason the Commission and its staff avoided Duran like the plague is because they no doubt understood that when she was first questioned, she refused to identify Oswald as the man she dealt with in the Cuban consulate. The CIA then directed its assets in the Mexican police to arrest Duran and place her in solitary confinement. A fearful Duran soon agreed to sign a statement identifying Oswald (Lane, p. 204).

    Once released, she began to complain about her treatment at the hands of Mexican police, unaware that the CIA was calling the shots. The Agency then sent a priority cable ordering her rearrest and requesting that “to be certain that there is no misunderstanding between us, we want to ensure that Silvia Duran gets no impression that Americans are behind her rearrest. In other words, “we want Mexican authorities to take responsibility for the whole affair.” [emphasis in original] (Ibid) Years later, Duran told the HSCA that the man identifying himself as Oswald was “Short…about my size” (3HSCA103) Duran was only 5’3″ whereas the real Oswald was 5’9″. She also said that he had “blonde hair” and “blue or green eyes” (Ibid, p. 69) neither of which is true of the real Oswald.

    This was not just a latter day recollection. Even in her original November 27, 1963, statement she insisted that the man was “blonde, short, dressed unelegantly” but this information was edited out before it was published by the Warren Commission. (Lopez Report, p. 186-190) Based on the above, for Willens to claim that there was little point in the Commission taking testimony from Duran because she would have had little to add is ridiculous. He might argue that the staff was unaware of some of this in 1964, which I doubt. But the fact remains that we are all aware of it today. And to leave these facts out of a book published in 2013 is extremely disingenuous.

    Today we know that there were no photographs of Oswald in Mexico City as there should have been since the CIA had both the Cuban and Soviet embassies under constant surveillance. And we know that the tape recordings and eyewitness testimony indicate that he was impersonated. According to Mark Lane, David Atlee Phillips, who was working at the CIA’s Mexico City station in 1963, admitted in a live debate in 1977 that “there is no evidence to show that Lee Harvey Oswald ever visited the Soviet embassy.” (Lane, p. 229) So it seems that Philips in 1977 was more forthcoming than Willens is in 2013. Which tells you an awful lot about this book.

    IV

    In 1961, following the Bay of Pigs debacle, President Kennedy fired Allen Dulles from his position as director of the CIA; a position he had held for longer than anyone else. Two years later, Dulles was made a member of the Commission charged with investigating Kennedy’s brutal murder. Ever since, critics and researchers have been scratching their heads over how such a thing came to be. Even the least sceptical of minds would have to admit that this is a curious set of circumstances. Dulles had every reason to feel at the very least resentful towards the deceased President and little obvious reason to care about finding those responsible for his death. In fact he was once heard to remark, “That little Kennedy…He thought he was a god.” (James W. Douglass, JFK and the Unspeakable, p. 16.) So what on earth was he doing on that Commission?

    Willens has an answer to this question that he presumably hopes will dispel any sinister implications. He claims that President Johnson asked JFK’s brother Robert Kennedy for suggestions on Commission members, and that it was he who recommended Dulles. (Willens, p. 26) This Willens sources to Robert Caro’s flawed biography of Johnson, The Passage of Power. Obviously I have no way of knowing whether or not Willens really believes this tale, but I do know that it is nonsense and I believe anyone else with an ounce of sense would realise that too. The original source of this lie is Johnson himself. But he did not say it until after Robert Kennedy was dead and, therefore, unable to contradict him. And the fact of the matter is that there is not a shred of evidence to support it.

    It is believed that Johnson settled on the idea of appointing a Commission on November 28, 1963. The following day he telephoned Dulles and asked him to serve on the Commission. There is no known record of any meeting or phone call between Johnson and RFK on the 28th or the 29th, so it does not appear that Kennedy even had the opportunity to offer suggestions at that time.

    Further, when LBJ floated the names of prospective Commission members past Hoover in a phone call on the afternoon of November 29, he asked him, “What do you think about Allen Dulles?” without mentioning RFK. And when LBJ called Dulles, he said to him “you’ve got to go on that for me”, [my emphasis] making no reference to any recommendations by Robert Kennedy. But the capper comes from the call Johnson made to Senator Russell that same day. Russell asked Johnson point blank if he was going to let RFK “nominate someone” and he responded with a simple and direct “No.” So the contemporaneous record completely contradicts Johnson’s latter day claim.

    It is also worth noting at this point that the very notion that Robert Kennedy would have recommended Dulles, of all people, to investigate his brother’s death is ludicrous. RFK had served on the board of inquiry into the failure at the Bay of Pigs and, as a result, was heavily involved in the firing of Dulles. Once he was gone, Kennedy asked Secretary of State Dean Rusk if there were any other Dulles family members serving in the administration. When Rusk told him that Dulles’s sister Elanor worked under him at the State Department, RFK told him to fire her too because “he didn’t want anymore of the Dulles family around.” (DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, p. 395) So the idea that he would then recommend Dulles for the Commission is simply not worthy of serious consideration.

    It is well documented that there was great animosity between RFK and Johnson. Kennedy described LBJ as “mean, bitter, vicious; an animal in many ways…incapable of telling the truth.” Johnson in turn referred to Kennedy as a “snot-nosed little son-of-a-bitch”. By 1969, LBJ was facing a ruined Presidency. His reputation was in tatters and he believed this was partly due to Robert Kennedy, whom he thought was behind the criticism of the Warren Report. Johnson told aides that he was sure that RFK was trying to keep the conspiracy theories alive. (Shenon, p. 509) This is most likely why he tried to cover his own ass by turning the tables and blaming RFK for Dulles’s presence on the Commission.

    The issue of who got Dulles the job is significant, because he came to play a dominant role on the Commission. At one of the its earliest executive sessions, Dulles handed out copies of a book on Presidential assassination attempts in America. He pointed out that they were all the work of lone nuts, saying, “you’ll find a pattern running through here that I think we’ll find in this present case.” When John McCloy pointed out that the Lincoln assassination was a conspiracy, Dulles countered, “Yes, but one man was so dominant that it almost wasn’t a plot.” (WC Executive Session, December 16, 1963, p. 52.)

    Dulles went on to become the most active member of the Commission. As author Walt Brown pointed out, Dulles attended more full hearings than any other member and also asked the biggest number of questions. This seriously undermines Willens’s claim that Warren “probably spent more time on the commission’s work than the other six members combined”. (Willens, p. 222) In fact, in the number of questions asked, Dulles outdistanced Warren by a considerable margin; asking 2,154 questions to Warren’s 608. (Brown, The Warren Omission, p. 83-85)

    That Dulles had the best interests of the CIA at the forefront of his mind during his tenure on the Commission is proven by the fact that he withheld any and all information about the Agency’s repeated attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. After these plots were made public by the Church Committee in 1975, several members of the Commission’s staff expressed their dismay that this obviously relevant information had not been shared with them. As staff lawyer Burt Griffin told the HSCA, “If we had known that the CIA had wanted to assassinate Castro, then all of the Cuban motivations that we were exploring about this made much, much more sense. If we had further known that the CIA was involved with organized criminal figures in an assassination attempt in the Caribbean, then we would have had a completely different perspective on this thing.” (11HSCA300) That Dulles kept these details to himself clearly demonstrates that he had an agenda that was of far more importance to him than the truth about Kennedy’s murder.

    V

    Because Willens refuses to acknowledge that there was any more to the assassination story than Lee Harvey Oswald, he has no choice but to defend the Single Bullet Theory. And because the two are so heavily intertwined, he must also attempt to defend the Commission’s handling of the medical evidence. Which is a very difficult thing to do today. The Commission told verifiable lies about the President’s wounds and Willens has to tell more lies to explain away problems with the medical record.

    The FBI handed the Commission what appeared to be a very simple case. The Bureau said that three shots were fired, two striking Kennedy, one Governor Connally, and all were fired by Oswald. But it soon became apparent that this scenario was untenable. When the staff gathered to watch the Zapruder film, they were confronted with the fact that Kennedy and Connally clearly reacted to gunshots at different times but too close together for Oswald to have squeezed off two shots from his antique bolt-action rifle, which required 2.3 seconds between shots. (3H407) On top of this, they had evidence that a shot had missed the Presidential limousine altogether, struck a curb and wounded bystander James Tague. Because of the time constraints imposed by the Zapruder film, the Commission could not admit to a fourth shot without admitting to a second rifle. But ambitious staffer Arlen Specter offered them a way out of the box, suggesting that JFK and Connally had been hit by the same bullet and Connally had simply suffered a “delayed reaction.”

    Before the Commission could endorse Specter’s hypothesis, it had a big problem to overcome: the location of Kennedy’s two non fatal wounds. For the SBT to work, the bullet had to pass through Kennedy on a downward trajectory of approximately 20 degrees. The problem is, the bullet hole in JFK’s back was lower down his body than the wound in his throat. Which meant that any bullet travelling back-to-front would have followed an upward trajectory. Rather than admit to a faulty hypothesis, which would also mean admitting to a second gunman, the Commission got around this by ignoring the autopsy photographs and publishing a deceptive diagram that showed a bullet entering the back of Kennedy’s neck. (see CE388, 16H977) Commissioner Gerald Ford then had the language changed in the Warren report so that it described a wound at the “base of the neck” rather than in the back. As unbelievable as it seems, the Commission actually moved the wound to suit its purposes.

    Commission apologists like Vincent Bugliosi – for whom Willens has nothing but the highest praise – have claimed that the moving of the back wound was all an honest mistake, made because the Commission did not have access to the autopsy photographs. This assertion is utterly false and is disproven by the Commissions own records. The transcript of the January 27, 1964, executive session contains the following exchange:

    RANKIN: Then there is a great range of material in regard to the wounds, and the autopsy and this point of exit or entrance of the bullet in the front of the neck…We have an explanation there in the autopsy that probably a fragment came out the front of the neck, but with the elevation the shot must have come from, the angle, it seems quite apparent now, since we have the picture of where the bullet entered in the back, that the bullet entered below the shoulder blade, to the right of the backbone, which is below the place where the picture shows the bullet came out in the neckband of the shirt in front, and the bullet, according to the autopsy didn’t strike any bone at all, that particular bullet, and go through. So how it could turn—

    BOGGS: I thought I read that bullet just went in a finger’s length.

    RANKIN: That is what they first said. [my emphasis]

    There it is. No ifs, ands, or buts. The Commission knew all along that the wound in the back was below the wound in the throat and it had the pictures to prove it. Willens himself admits that Earl Warren did look at the photographs (p. 193-194), so no honest researcher can claim that Warren did not know the truth about the President’s wounds. And yet he and the other members of the Commission signed off on the SBT knowing that the trajectory through Kennedy was actually an upward one. Of course, this assumes that the bullet which entered the back also exited the throat; which something that has never been proven.

    The official autopsy report describes the back wound as one “presumably of entry” and the throat wound as one “presumably of exit.” (ARRB MD3) Chief pathologist Dr. James J. Humes used such cautious language because his conclusion that the two wounds were connected was based on an inference and not on observation. During efforts to save Kennedy’s life at Parkland Hospital, doctors had made a tracheotomy incision over the bullet hole in the throat. This apparently obscured the wound so that it was no longer visible when the body arrived at Bethesda Naval Institute for autopsy. Humes told the Warren Commission that he did not know the throat wound existed until the following morning, when he spoke Dr. Malcolm Perry of Parkland Hospital. (2H362) By that time Humes no longer had access to the body. Realising that he had made a major blunder by missing one of Kennedy’s wounds, Humes burned the original draft of his autopsy report (3H373) and rewrote it to include a presumed exit in the throat. Which is all well and good except that a contemporaneous FBI report and the testimony of the two agents who wrote it tells us that, at the close of the autopsy, Humes and his colleagues were absolutely certain that the back wound was shallow with no point of exit.

    The report of FBI agents James Sibert and Francis O’Neill, who were present for the entirety of the autopsy, notes that the back wound “was probed by Dr. Humes with the finger, at which time it was determined that the trajectory of the missile entering at this point had entered at a downward position of 45 to 60 degrees. Further probing determined that the distance traveled by this missile was a short distance inasmuch as the end of the opening could be felt with the finger.” (ARRB MD44) O’Neill explained in his testimony for the Assassination Records Review Board that, using a metal probe, the autopsy doctors probed the back wound “to a point where they could not probe any further. In other words, it did not go any further. There – it only went in, I guess, the length of a half of a finger or something like that. And they could not push the probe any further.” (O’Neil ARRB Testimony, p. 131-132) He also explained that Humes was certain that the bullet which caused the wound had “worked its way out through external cardiac massage” at Parkland. “There was not the slightest scintilla of doubt whatsoever that this is what had occurred…And viewing them with the surgical probe and their fingers, there was absolutely no point of exit…this was the exact thought when the entire autopsy was completed.” (Ibid, p. 30-31)

    As if the seemingly shallow back wound was not problematic enough for the SBT, there is also the uncertain nature of the throat wound. Dr. Perry described the wound as being 3 to 5 mm in diameter and looking very much like an entrance wound. He told the Commission that “”It’s edges were neither ragged nor were they punched out, but rather clean cut.” (3H372) Dr. Ronald Jones said it was a “very small, smooth wound.” (6H54) And Dr. Charles Carrico described the wound as “4-7 mm…It was, as I recall, rather round and there were no jagged edges or stellate lacerations.” (6H3) These descriptions are not what would be expected of an exit wound made by a 6.5 mm Mannlicher Carcano bullet. In tests performed for the Commission at Edgewood Arsenal, Dr. Alfred Olivier discovered that typical exit wounds created by Oswald’s rifle at a distance of 180 feet (approximately the distance from the Texas School Book Depository to the Presidential limousine at Zapruder frame 224) were 10 to 15 mm; at least twice the size of the wound described by the Parkland physicians. (5H77, 17H846)

    The Commission dealt with these issues mostly by pretending that they did not exist. The Sibert/O’Neil report was excluded from the Commission’s published volumes and neither man was called to give testimony. The Parkland staff could not be so easily ignored, so instead they were pressured into testifying that the throat wound could have been either an entrance or an exit. In his attempt explain all this away, Willens takes a different tack. He writes that the FBI was mistaken about JFK’s back wound because it “relied in part on the initial, but inaccurate, information from Parkland Hospital that the first bullet that hit Kennedy had not exited from his body.” (Willens, p. 32) That’s right, he conflates two separate events so that he can effectively make the controversy about the throat wound vanish whilst simultaneously making it appear as if the shallow probing of the back wound at autopsy was nothing more than a mistaken observation made by emergency room staff! This is one of the most disgustingly dishonest things I have ever read in any book dealing with the assassination of President Kennedy. It says a lot about Willens’s integrity – and the desperation of the lone nut crowd in general – that he has to stoop so low.

    VI

    In this review I have concentrated on how Willens deals with the most crucial aspects of the assassination and the cover-up. It is widely understood that the medical evidence is the heart of any murder investigation. Any honest investigation would have made full use of the autopsy photographs and X-rays to deduce the precise cause of death. But to fit its pre-conceived “solution,” the Commission ignored, misrepresented and lied about the forensic record. To his eternal shame, Willens attempts to uphold the Commission’s deceptions and, even worse, tries to muddy the waters even further to hide that which destroys the Commission’s fallacious and utterly absurd Single Bullet Theory. He knows he must, because as Commission lawyer Norman Redlich candidly admitted to author Edward Epstein, “To say that [President Kennedy and Governor Connally] were hit by separate bullets, is synonymous with saying that there were two assassins.” (Epstein, Inquest, p. 38) Two assassins equals conspiracy; a conspiracy Willens, 50 years later, is still not ready to admit existed.

    Most serious researchers agree that the Mexico City story is not only the key to unlocking the conspiracy but also the key to understanding how and why the cover-up was perpetrated. As we saw, in History Will Prove Us Right, Willens leaves out all of the crucial details that would shed light on the whole sorry Mexico City charade. He also keeps secret the panic that gripped Washington when the CIA began peddling its manufactured story and how this led to Earl Warren’s decision to put “actual conditions” before “general principles”. Or, in other words, politics before truth. Of course, Willens had to leave all of this out because, if he did not, he would have had no book. Or he would have had a very different book with a very different title. Perhaps something like “History Has Proven Us Wrong”. That book might have actually been worth reading. Unfortunately, the one Willens wrote is not.

  • Jerome Corsi, Who Really Killed Kennedy?


    I. Introduction

    Jerome Corsi is the senior staff reporter for online conservative news giant World Net Daily (WND). He has now written a book called Who Really Killed Kennedy? It is his take on the most controversial subject in American history: the JFK assassination. Because of the scope of Corsi’s reach, his effort should not go unnoticed.

    Corsi, who holds a Harvard Ph.d in political science, is best known for his two New York Times best sellers, The Obama Nation and Unfit for Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak out against John Kerry. I did not have the chance to read these two books so I will judge the author without prior bias. I will base my critique only on his work on the JFK assassination. According to the book’s description, Corsi has read almost every book written on the case and thousands of documents – including all twenty six volumes of the Warren report – plus films and photographs. The book is the culmination of years of meticulous research.

    It consists of seven chapters plus a conclusion at the end, followed by notes and index. Chapters one, two and three deal mostly with a micro-study of the case, like ballistics, trajectories, witnesses, the grassy knoll, medical evidence and, in general, the crime scenes of the Kennedy and Tippit murders.

    Chapters four, five, six and seven deal with a macro-study of the case. Corsi now investigates Oswald’s life, the Mafia, the CIA, politicians like LBJ and Nixon, all in his quest to find out who really killed Kennedy. The book is fully documented and well sourced. The author has included in his notes the works of some of the best assassination researchers like James Douglass, Jim DiEugenio, Gaeton Fonzi, David Talbot, Josiah Thompson, Mark Lane, and Sylvia Meagher. But he also uses the work of some less credible researchers, like Lamar Waldron and Thom Hartmann, plus a dubious former Soviet bloc intelligence official.

    The publisher states “that the book will set a new standard for JFK assassination research, demanding that future researchers understand the deep, and unfortunately sinister, political forces, that led up to an unthinkable event that marked a profound change in America and the world.” Has the book lived up to its promise? This is something that we will now try to find out.

    II. Ballistics, trajectories and medical evidence

    In Chapter 1, Corsi tries to deconstruct the single bullet theory. He does that in a very concise manner. He first discusses Paul Mandel’s infamous article in the December 6, 1963 issue of Life Magazine. That article said that JFK was looking back toward the Texas School Book Depository at the time of the shooting. This is how he got an entrance wound in the front of his neck from the alleged assassin Lee Harvey Oswald. Corsi does this to show that, from the very beginning, there was an attempt to feed journalists information that would refute the medical evidence observed by the doctors at Parkland Hospital. Although the article’s purpose was to prove that Oswald was the lone assassin, somehow it had a different effect: to raise questions of conspiracy. Mandel described that, according to the doctors, a bullet had entered the President’s throat from the front and to justify how this could have happened he lied to the American people. He claimed that the Zapruder film showed that the President had turned his body far around so his throat was directly exposed to the sniper’s nest. Mandel was following the FBI’s official theory that three bullets were fired, of which, two struck the President and one hit Connally.

    Corsi begins with the missed shot that hit bystander James Tague’s cheek. This goes to show that the FBI’s theory was flawed, and how it helped make Arlen Specter invent the single bullet theory with the help of the pristine bullet that was allegedly found on the stretcher where John Connally was lying. Based on Josiah Thompson’s work, he then goes on to prove that bullet CE399 was probably planted by Jack Ruby on that stretcher. Examining John Connally’s wounds he shows that it would have been impossible for the pristine bullet to have caused the wounds to both Kennedy and Connally as described by the Warren Commission. Both the doctors who examined Connally and the ballistics experts who ran tests testified that the pristine bullet would have been severely deformed if it had caused the damage attributed to it. The position of the president’s back and throat wounds prove that the single bullet theory was not valid, and Governor Connally, to the end of his life, maintained that he was hit by a separate shot.

    In Chapter 2 he examines the Grassy Knoll area and the possibility that an assassin might have fired a shot from behind the stockade fence. He refers to Craig Roberts book Kill Zone to prove that Oswald could not have fired the shots attributed to him and to successfully hit his target. He explains that the medical evidence proves that there were multiple shooters in Dealey Plaza, and he quotes witnesses like Bowers and Newman to support the conclusion that there was a shooter on the Grassy Knoll. He also discusses the presence of Secret Service agents with false credentials on the Grassy Knoll, and one of them could be suspected of being part of the hit team.

    He continues in this Commission critique effort to prove that Oswald was not in the sixth floor window. Key witness, Howard L. Brennan, is the only person who claimed that he saw Oswald firing from the infamous sniper’s nest. The police gave the description of the suspect as white, slender, weighing about 165 pounds, about 5’10” tall, in his early thirties. Reputable researchers like Sylvia Meagher and Gerald McKnight have proved that it was impossible for Brennan to have a clear view to provide such a detailed description and he had also first failed to identify Oswald as the shooter in a police line up.

    Corsi believes that the headshot that killed JFK was a double shot and he bases his conclusion on the work of Josiah Thompson and his book Six Seconds in Dallas. After analyzing the Zapruder film, Thompson concluded that “JFK’s head moved forward violently beginning in frames 311-312, only to be driven violently back and to the left, beginning in frames 313-314.” (p. 73). Thompson explained that JFK was struck by two shots, the first at Z312 hitting in the back of the head and immediately afterwards, at Z313, a second shot from the front struck him on a tangent that caused his head to move back an to the left.

    If Corsi had waited for Thompson’s presentation at the October 2013 Wecht Symposium before publishing his book,he would have known that Thompson no longer holds to that theory. He now believes that there was no shot from the back at Z312 and that JFK was hit from the front at Z313 but there was a second shot from the back much later, at frame Z329.

    Corsi seems to agree with David Lifton’s theory of a secret autopsy as described in his 1980 book Best Evidence. It would have been wiser if Corsi hadn’t proscribed to Lifton’s theory. It is very controversial at best, and for many, has lost credibility.

    Corsi then proceeds to show that the rifle initially found on the sixth floor of the TSBD was a Mauser and not a Mannlicher-Carcano, and that Oswald was in the lunch room at the time of the shooting. He is up to date with the latest developments in this regard. He uses Barry Ernest’s book The Girl on the Stairs where Victoria Adams, a TSBD employee who, after the shooting, came down the same stairs to the first floor as Oswald. She testified that she never heard or encountered Oswald. Unfortunately the Warren Commission enlisted other witnesses to negate her deposition and alter its meaning.

    On the whole, Corsi does a decent job in presenting evidence that Oswald was innocent of the crime attributed to him, that he was never on the south east window, that he never fired any shot and that the single bullet theory was a fraud.

    In chapter 4 he tries to show that Oswald did not shoot Officer J. D. Tippit. He draws on material from books written by notable researchers like Sylvia Meagher, Mark Lane, John Armstrong but also from the lone nut propagandist Dale Myers. I believe that he could have made his case without using Myers as a source.

    III. Oswald a KGB Agent?

    If Corsi wanted to find the best sources available to examine the Soviet defection of Oswald and if he was recruited by the KGB he would have chosen, for example, John Newman’s Oswald and the CIA and/or John Armstrong’s Harvey and Lee. Strangely enough, Corsi has chosen to listen to Ian Mihai Pacepa, a deputy chief of Romania’s Intelligence Service (DIE). I consider this to be a big mistake. Most of the information here comes from Pacepa’s book Programmed to Kill and email exchanges between Corsi and Pacepa.

    Pacepa believed that the Soviets recruited Oswald when he was stationed in Atsugi, Japan. To substantiate his claim, he refers to Edward Jay Epstein’s book Legend: The Secret War of Lee Harvey Oswald. At this point Corsi makes an error and refers to Epstein as “Lifton”, who we all know is a different researcher. Somehow, the editor of the book didn’t notice. According to Epstein the Soviets used an attractive hostess that worked at the Queen Bee bar to lure Oswald under the KGB influence. Why anyone would believe Epstein and Pacepa is anybody’s guess. If Corsi had conducted his research correctly, he would have known that Epstein was fed information by none other than James Angleton, the master of deceit, the head of CIA’s counterintelligence. If he had read Dick Russell’s The Man Who Knew Too Much (p. 457), he would have known that Oswald was frequenting the bar with the possible mission to help a Soviet Colonel Nikolai Eroskin to defect, but this was aborted. Oswald was part of a U-2 operation called Detachment C, a secret unit that had the mission to collect vital data for intelligence that flew over Russia, China and Taiwan (see Newman, Oswald and the CIA p. 30-31). Pacepa argues that, humiliated by his defeat during the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev decided to have Kennedy killed as an act of revenge, and so KGB gave Oswald the mission to assassinate Kennedy. Any serious student of the assassination would know better than to fall for Pacepa’s nonsense. His book provides zero evidence to support his thesis. It is well known that rivals in the Communist party, liker Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Antropov were waiting on the wings to overthrow Khrushchev and replace him as premier. Why Khrushchev would risk an international incident and his position to replace Kennedy with someone like LBJ who was a hardliner is beyond belief. After all Pacepa had defected to USA so it was to his benefit to perpetuate a myth that would only serve those who killed Kennedy. It is like he was reading everything he claimed from a script written by James Angleton himself.

    The whole story is ludicrous since all researchers like Newman, Phil Melanson, Jim Douglass, Lisa Pease, Jim DiEugenio, Russell, Armstrong, among others, have made a strong case that Oswald went to the USSR as a US intelligence operative, part of a false defectors’ program orchestrated by the US intelligence agencies and the military.

    According to Pacepa, Khrushchev had a change of heart and decided to call off the hit on Kennedy. So he ordered the KGB to deprogram Oswald so as not to assassinate Kennedy. Oswald was not happy with the turn of events so he went to Mexico City to meet with the KGB officers to convince them to let him carry on with the assassination as planned. Again, Corsi should have known that Oswald or an Oswald impostor more likely had gone to Mexico as part of a CIA-FBI operation to embarrass the FPCC abroad were it had support (see, for instance, John Newman, Oswald and the CIA). Pacepa continues that the KGB decided to stop him from assassinating Kennedy by silencing him forever. However he does not explain why this never materialized. If one reads the HSCA’s Lopez Report, it is hard not to conclude that Oswald was impersonated by some unknown party to leave a trail in the official files that the Cubans and the Soviets were controlling Oswald. And also to show that Oswald met with Valeri Kostikov, the head of the KGB assassinations unit, the notorious Department 13. As we all know there were never any photographs of Oswald taken in Mexico and the voice on the tapes given to FBI did not correspond to his voice. As Newman showed, the purpose of the Mexico impersonation was to dim the lights so the intelligence community would not sound an alert that a former Soviet defector met with Kostikov, the head of the KGB assassinations unit, Department 13. This would have resulted in putting Oswald on the FBI’s watch list and as a result he would have never been allowed to be in a building above the Presidential route. The real Oswald could not be captured on film or seen by witnesses in Mexico. His handlers could not risk Oswald’s detection or his possible accidental murder since his survival was vital to the plot’s success.

    It was Ruth Paine who produced much of the suspect evidence that Oswald was in Mexico. Even after the police had searched her house and they had not come up with anything. Yet, Ruth Paine found some incriminating evidence that the Police could not find (DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland, p. 284). This is the same woman who arranged for Oswald’s job at the Texas School Book Depository in October 1963. Ruth Paine had also claimed to have seen, on November 9, 1963, Oswald typing a letter referring to his meeting in Mexico with agent Kostin, apparently another name for Kostikov. This letter was sent to the Soviet Embassy in Washington (Douglass, JFK and the Unspeakable, p. 233). Some think the letter is a forgery, planted in order to incriminate Oswald. The Warren Commission accepted the genuineness of this letter. Largely because of corroborating evidence in the form of a rough draft, said to be in Oswald’s handwriting, which Ruth Paine also allegedly discovered. What is particularly suspect about the November 9th Kostin letter is its timing. After being intercepted by the FBI on its way to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the letter was summarized and communicated to Dallas, where the news arrived on November 22nd (see Peter Scott, Deep Politics III).

    To make things worse, Pacepa claims that George DeMohrenschildt was a KGB agent. To his credit, Corsi acknowledges that the evidence that DeMonhreschildt was a CIA agent ” …is as strong and important counterweight to Pacepa’s suggestion that DeMohrenschildt was a KGB agent assigned to be Oswald’s handler in Dallas” (p. 163). Despite that he comes back to repeat Pacepa’s claim about DeMohrenschildt being a Soviet agent since Pacepa had first hand experience in the upper ranks of the Soviet intelligence network.

    Corsi states that DeMohrenschildt was an important link to several pieces of evidence that the Warren Commission used to conclude that Oswald killed Kennedy. Some of it had to do with the Gen. Edwin Walker shooting incident that occurred on March 10, 1963. At 9 pm that evening a bullet penetrated General Walker’s window and slammed into the wall, only narrowly missing his head. De Mohrenschildt testified to the Commission that he had joked to Oswald if he was the guy who shot Walker. Although Oswald never said yes, the Baron saw guilt in his face. In 1967, four years after the assassination, and four years after the infamous backyard photos showing Oswald holding a rifle were found in Ruth Paine’s garage, another backyard photo was found in DeMohrenschildt’s storage unit. This backyard photo was signed “To my friend George from Lee” and dated “5/IV/1963, the Cyrillic version of April 5, 1963 (DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland, p. 82). This photo, because of its different boundary at the edge and finer resolution, is suspected of being a plant, in order to incriminate Oswald for the Walker shooting. Pacepa believes that this is a further proof that DeMohrenschildt knew more about the Walker incident than he ever admitted. Yet George was puzzled as to how is showed up in his belongings so many years after the fact.

    Two pieces of physical evidence implicated Oswald in the Walker shooting. Photos of Walker’s house, which were found in Ruth Paine’s garage, and a handwritten note in Russian allegedly left from Lee to Marina. Pacepa found telltale clues in this note proving that Oswald was a KGB agent. He claimed that in that letter Oswald instructs Marina what to do in case he is arrested. In that note Pacepa recognized KGB codes like “friends” a code for support officer and “Red Cross” a code for financial help.

    Pacepa is really stretching things. He then stretches further. He constructs a myth to demonstrate that Oswald shot at Walker. The truth is that both the picture and the note were surfaced by Ruth Paine after the assassination. Again, the police had searched her house for two days after the murder and had failed to recover the items. After they got it, the Secret Service had the note returned to Ruth because they thought it was from her. (DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland, pp. 77-78). It is fairly evident that DeMohrenschildt and Ruth Paine were CIA assets. And it was Ruth who was the person that produced the most incriminating evidence that convicted Oswald in the public mind as the president’s killer. This included evidence that Oswald was in Mexico, the Kostin letter, and the Walker photographs and note. Yet Corsi sidesteps her great importance in the case and chooses to listen to Pacepa. None of the crucial information above regarding Ruth Paine is reported in his book. In fact, Corsi seems to accept the idea that Oswald actually shot General Walker. As Gerald McKnight wrote in his book Breach of Trust , the bullet fired into the Walker house was a steel-jacketed 30.06 bullet. But after the assassination the FBI changed the bullet to a 6.5 copper jacketed bullet. Even the bullet stored in the National Archives today is copper jacketed (DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland, p. 76).

    The Pacepa story is not over yet. Corsi seems to believe Pacepa’s claims that the KGB advised all the Eastern Bloc Intelligence services to spread the rumors that the CIA and LBJ had killed JFK so as to divert world attention away from the Soviet Union. To prove Pacepa right, Corsi brings up the case of Vasili Mitrokhin, a retired KGB officer who claimed that the KGB had financed Mark Lane, among others, to promote the JFK assassination conspiracies. There are many writers who think that the possibility exists that Mitrokhin, an dother former KGB officers, were used by western intelligence agencies after the fall of the USSR for their own agendas. Why Corsi would choose to waste so many pages on Pacepa’s story is something I can’t figure out. Especially since the Soviet Union and KGB do not figure in his list of conspirators at the end of his book. I believe he could have done himself a great favor if he had omitted this whole Pacepa section.

    Corsi then tries to tie Oswald in with China by connecting the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) organization to the Maoist Progressive Labor Party (PLP). Oswald was corresponding with Vincent T. Lee, the national director of FPCC who was also a member of the PLP. Corsi wonders what would have happened if Oswald had been killed immediately after the assassination. The CIA would have claimed that he was a kGB agent who had become disillusioned with Russian Communism and had turned now to Maoist China. Corsi provides no evidence to support this except Allen Dulles who during the Warren Commission hearings said out of the blue “It would have been a blessing for us if (Lee Harvey Oswald) … had taken his passport and gone to China as he may have contemplated” (p. 157). Unfortunately Dulles is not the most credible source, and the China angle is classic disinformation by Dulles to mud the waters and false sponsor China for the crime.

    IV. The Mob, CIA and the French Connection

    Corsi then informs the reader that we cannot lay all the blame on KGB alone. If we do then we make the KGB responsible for launching multiple look-alike plans to assassinate JFK. Plus we ignore recently discovered evidence of the involvement of the mob and the CIA in the assassination plots.

    To make his point, Corsi goes on to evaluate the two plots to assassinate JFK that were thwarted before they could happen. The Chicago Plot on November 2, 1963 and the Tampa Plot on November 18, 1963. Both were eerily similar to the one in which succeeded in Dallas.

    According to Corsi, in writing his book, he did extensive research that included reading almost every previous book. So what was his source upon which to base his information for these two plots? When I saw the name of the book and its authors I froze in disbelief. I looked at my calendar to see if it was the 1st of April. But the cold outside reminded that it was December and Corsi was not trying to fool me. Sadly enough, his source was Ultimate Sacrifice, the book by Lamar Waldron and Thom Hartmann. Recall, this pair had concluded that the Kennedy brothers were planning to invade Cuba on December 1, 1963, with the help of Castro’s General Juan Almeida. Unfortunately for them the top conspirator Almeida was scheduled to travel to Africa at about that same time. Ultimately, this fact did not deter them. They followed up with a sequel titled Legacy of Secrecy.

    In both books, they maintained that it was the Mafia with help of CIA rogue agents that killed Kennedy. They have been discredited since and their books are considered, at best, fiction and at worst, disinformation. Author James DiEugenio did a stellar job in pointing out the many serious problems with Waldron’s and Hartmann’s thesis. You could read both of his detailed reviews on CTKA.

    Why am I so critical of Corsi’s choice of source material? Because if he had done his homework, he would have known that everything we know about the Chicago plot is due to the great investigative journalism by Chicago reporter Edwin Black of the Chicago Independent. To be fair to Corsi, he also does refer to JFK and the Unspeakable to examine the Chicago Plot. If the readers want to find out more about the Chicago Plot, they should read Black’s original article, “The Plot to Kill JFK in Chicago.”

    The plot to kill Kennedy in Chicago involved a patsy by the name of Thomas Vallee. Like Oswald, he was an ex-Marine. But unlike Oswald, he was afflicted with mental problems due to a combat injury. Again, like Oswald, he served at a U-2 base in Japan, was involved with Cuban exiles and worked in a place overlooking the Presidential route from a building next to a difficult left turn, like the one in Dallas, on Elm Street. Vallee had been diagnosed as schizophrenic, something that Oswald had not been. If one examines the Clinton-Jackson incident, one would think that Shaw and Ferrie were planning to have Oswald work in a mental hospital. The plan did not materialize. But if Oswald had secured a job there, it would have been easy after JFK’s assassination to switch the files to show that Oswald was a patient at the Jackson hospital.

    Besides their similarities, Oswald and Vallee had some important differences. Vallee had not visited the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City. Therefore, there was no indication he had met with Valeri Kostikov. If the Chicago plot had succeeded, it would have been much more difficult for the plotters to have been able to blame Cuba and/or the Soviet Union, and use that as leverage to force a cover up. Which is what LBJ used to force Earl Warren and Sen. Richard Russell to go along with the cover up.

    When it comes to the plot in Tampa, Corsi again enlists the help of Lamar Waldron and Thom Hartmann to describe it. According to them, the patsy set to take the blame was a young Cuban American named Gilberto Policarpo Lopez. Who, like Oswald, was a member of the Miami FPCC, had been to Mexico and wanted to travel to Cuba. On November 25, 1963 Lopez entered Mexico via Nuevo Laredo and on November 27 he was photographed by the CIA at the Mexico City airport and flew to Cuba. Unfortunately we don’t have much reliable information about the Tampa plot, and most people have a hard time relying on Waldron/Hartmann and questionable sources in this regard. After all, both men believed that it was the Mafia that planned both plots, Sam Giancana in Chicago and Santo Trafficante in Tampa.

    Corsi then discusses another mysterious person, Miguel Casas Saez, who according to the CIA was a Castro agent. On November 22, 1963 Saez had arrived at the Mexico City airport with a private two engine airplane and boarded a Cubana Airlines flight to Havana, Cuba.

    It is difficult to believe that Lopez or Saez were involved in an assassination plot to kill the American President. James Jesus Angleton the head of CIA’s Counterintelligence “maintained that Castro sent three DGI agents to Dallas in the days before November 22. In Angleton’s theory agents Policarpo and Casas, plus a third man whom Angleton would not name, separately worked their way to Dallas, where they met up and carried out the assassination” (Joe Trento, The Secret History of the CIA, p. 266). Now it is obvious that the man who invented the “Wilderness of Mirrors” strategy where everything is possible but nothing is certain, was trying to falsely implicate Castro in the assassination. The same man who John Newman believes was the man who designed the Mexico City plot and choreographed “Oswald’s” moves during his visit to the embassies.

    Corsi then tries to explain, with Waldron’s help, how the Mafia got the idea of using a Communist patsy. According to him the CIA assassinated Guatemala’s President Armas in 1957 and blamed the murder on Romeo Vasquez Sanchez an alleged Communist sympathizer. Waldron believes that mobsters Rosselli and Marcello would remember from the 1957 assassination the importance of having a patsy to quickly take the blame. Corsi continues to quote Waldron. And he even uses the alleged Carlos Marcello prison “confession”, the one he made as he was becoming senile, to the effect that he had ordered the assassination of President Kennedy to an FBI undercover agent placed in the same cell with him. To make things worse, Corsi then refers to Chuck Giancana’s book Double Cross to support the view that the Mafia had killed JFK. Chuck was the brother of Chicago Mafia boss, Sam Giancana. According to Chuck, he had confessed to him his part in the assassination. Giancana explained to his brother that they had overthrown governments in foreign countries, and he outlined the plot and the people he used. Among them were Jack Ruby, John Rosselli and Charles Nicolleti. Then Corsi goes even further in this vein. He chooses to believe Frank Ragano, Santo Trafficante’s lawyer. Ragano wrote a book about the JFK assassination after the deaths of Jimmy Hoffa and Santo Trafficante where he claimed that both Hoffa and Trafficante had been involved in the assassination. As Jim DiEugenio discussed in his review of Legacy of Secrecy, it is almost certain that Ragano was lying.

    Corsi refers to the famous Nixon warning to the CIA during the Watergate scandal that “E. H. Hunt was involved … and will make him look bad and it is likely to blow the whole Bay of Pigs …” (p. 233). H. R. Haldeman, Nixon’s aide, said some years later that when Nixon was talking about the “Bay of Pigs” he really meant the JFK assassination. Nixon had worked with the CIA and suggested help from the Mafia to prepare an invasion of Cuba when he was Eisenhower’s Vice President. It is peculiar that most of the Watergate burglars were also part of the Bay of Pigs operation, among them E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis.

    As he was dying, Hunt confessed to his son that he was a benchwarmer on a CIA plot to assassinate JFK, the “big event” as they called it. Hunt named LBJ, Cord Meyer, David Phillips, David Sanchez Morales, William Harvey and a French Gunman named Lucien Sarti as the plotters. Hunt, who didn’t like Harvey and considered him to be an “Alcoholic Psycho”, claimed that Harvey was the man who handled the Executive Action program ZR/RIFLE, and had recruited Corsican assassins from the “Marseilles drug traffickers also known as the “French Connection” to assassinate JFK. In an article I co-authored with Seamus Coogan and Phil Dragoo titled “Evaluating the Case against Lyndon Johnson,” there is a section devoted to E. Howard Hunt and his deathbed confession where we discuss that his confession as a limited hangout to divert attention from the real conspirators like Jim Angleton, Allen Dulles and those above them.

    To understand the role of the “French Connection” one should read Henrik Kruger’s excellent book The Great Heroin Coup where he unravels Nixon’s plan to develop a new drug superagency to control world heroin trade. Nixon’s public declaration in June 1971 of his war on heroin promptly led to his assemblage of White House Plumbers, Cubans, and even “hit squads” with the avowed purpose of combating the international narcotics traffic. The “great heroin coup” – the “remarkable shift” from Marseilles (Corsican) to Southeast Asian and Mexican (Mafia) heroin in the United States – was a deliberate move to reconstruct and redirect the heroin trade, rather than to eliminate it. And that Cuban exiles, Santo Trafficante, the CIA, and the Nixon White House were all involved. The major points from Kruger’s book are:

    1. Edward Lansdale and Lucien Conein began the war against the Corsican mafia in southeast Asia and paved the way for the CIA and Trafficante in that area.
    2. Lansky and Trafficante made all the necessary arrangements in southeast Asia to assume control of the opium production with the help of CIA.
    3. In 1971 the great heroin coup was underway. Cuban exiles were involved in the White House drug operation with E.H.Hunt and Lucien Conein. The US drug enforcement agencies waged an all out war against the Corsican/Marseilles/Turkey/USA drug network, i.e. against the French Connection. The French connection network was run by CIA’s arch-enemies, the French intelligence SDECE who were loyal to DeGaulle, and were competing with CIA over the control of the world heroin trade. The CIA achieved two things with the heroin coup. To take over the heroin trade from the French and second with the help of their ally, Pompidou the new French President, to crush the old Gaullist intelligence network.
    4. The CIA faction associated with the heroin coup was the China/SE Asia/Cuba lobby, and E. H. Hunt was the main representative of that lobby.
    5. When the French network was defeated, heroin began flowing into the USA from SE Asia and Mexico. And the man Hunt named as a shooter behind the picket fence, Lucien Sarti was one of the victims of this war when he was killed in Mexico on April 1972.

    From the above, one could conclude that the CIA, in their effort to crush this Corsican and SDECE network, blamed them for the assassination of JFK, labeling them as false sponsors of the plot. This is evident in Steve Rivele’s original false theory, the one that ran on the first installment of The Men Who Killed Kennedy. It may be echoed in E. H. Hunt’s deathbed confession that Lucien Sarti was the shooter behind the picket fence. Lamar Waldron names Michel Victor Mertz as one of the assassins, a man who was a member of SDECE and an enemy of OAS, the organization that tried to murder Charles DeGaulle, the same man that saved DeGaulle’s life. Which makes Corsi’s reliance on Waldron and this idea that the Diem heroin dynasty, the American and Marseille mafia were responsible for the assassination look kind of silly.

    Corsi discusses the French Connection and a CIA released document confirming that a French assassin was apprehended in Dallas on November 1963. The memo names this assassin as Jean Souetre, a.k.a. Michel Roux, a.k.a Michel Mertz. Now Corsi makes the mistake of repeatedly calling him a Corsican hit man. In reality neither of these men were Corsican, but Frenchmen from the mainland. The OAS hated JFK for supporting Algerian independence. Eugene Dinkin a US army code breaker referred to in Dick Russell’s, The Man who Knew too Much, discovered a message that JFK was to be assassinated in November. Dinkin was stationed in Metz, France and one of his duties was to decipher cable traffic originating with the OAS.

    Souetre gave an interview later which confused things even more. He claimed that he was in Spain that day, not Dallas, and that he could prove it. He said that a man named Michel Victor Mertz, a narcotics smuggler and SDECE agent, was actually impersonating him in order to leave a trail that could lead, not back to Mertz, but to his enemy Souetre. Of course it could have been the other way round: it was Souetre who was impersonating Mertz. Michel Victor Mertz was an agent of SDECE, the agency that was competing with the CIA for the control of drug supplies. James Jesus Angleton was in contact with SDECE and especially a man named Phillipe de Vosjoli, who many believe was spying against his country for Angleton.

    A third alternative is that neither Mertz nor Souetre were involved in the assassination. And this dual confusion of two men using each other’s name was deliberately designed to confuse researchers and again create a cognitive dissonance were everything is possible but nothing is certain. We recognize again the so familiar wilderness of mirrors strategy of “CIA’s Magicians” at work.

    V. Cui Bono?

    When it comes to the crucial question of who was responsible for the assassination Corsi names LBJ, Nixon, the CIA, the Military Industrial Complex and Organized Crime. They were those who stood to gain from Kennedy’s removal by replacing him with Johnson in order to alter his policies. JFK planned to withdraw from Vietnam and LBJ reversed that policy. Thereby escalating the war, which meant huge profits from military contracts and the heroin trade. Corsi argues that LBJ, Nixon and the Military Industrial Complex lacked the operational capabilities to plan the assassination so they asked the help of those who could, namely the CIA and the Mafia. Needless to say LBJ was not the “Mastermind” of the assassination and he did not conceive, instigate and plan the assassination. He was just a puppet who covered up the crime after the fact and later as President continued the Cold War, as John Newman and James DiEugenio showed in their books, JFK and Vietnam and Destiny Betrayed. The article I mentioned earlier, “Evaluating the Case against Lyndon Johnson,” tried to disprove the theory that LBJ was the man that instigated the crime. Books like Philip Nelson’s LBJ: the Mastermind of the Assassination have been discredited and scorned by many researchers. Corsi considers the Bobby Baker scandal as important. Baker had been a close associate and aide to LBJ in the senate and if he was convicted and imprisoned he may have tried to take LBJ with him. It was Life magazine that exposed the Baker scandal and Corsi believes that it was Robert Kennedy himself who fed information to their reporters.

    I am convinced this was not the case. For the simple reason that Henry Luce, the owner and founder of the magazine, was quite anti-Kennedy and anti-Communist. And he felt that Kennedy was not doing enough to liberate Cuba. Luce and his wife Clare Booth Luce were financing the Cuban exiles in their war against Castro and were very critical of Kennedy’s failure to do more in that regard. At one point they walked out of a White House dinner after disagreeing with JFK when he tried to convince them to cool it down over Cuba. After the assassination it was C.D. Jackson, publisher of Time, and Luce’s personal friend and emissary to the CIA , who purchased the Zapruder film and Life kept it locked up for many years. That way Life was able to control vital information in the film that would have proved conspiracy. To believe that Luce would help the Kennedys destroy LBJ seems a bit unlikely. It would make more sense that conspirators of the assassination used Life to corner and weaken LBJ in order to use him as an accessory to cover up the crime committed in his Texas backyard.

    Nixon has been named as one of the conspirators by some researchers. Corsi uses the fact that Nixon was in Dallas the day of the assassination for a Pepsi conference to join them. Unfortunately this is not enough to make him a conspirator and there is no credible evidence to prove that he was. Same goes for George H.W. Bush who was in Texas the same day in the small city of Tyler. Researchers like Jim Fetzer who claim he was involved in the plot refer to a photo of a man standing outside the Texas School Book Depository after the assassination that allegedly bears a striking resemblance to Bush. Unfortunately for them an enlargement of the photograph reveals the features of a man that does not look like Bush. Others claim that one of the boats that were part of the Bay of Pigs operation was named Zapata after Bush’s company Zapata Oil. While the truth is that Zapata was the name of the peninsula where the Bay of Pigs was located. I take a different approach and I don’t believe that Nixon or Bush were part of the conspiracy but may been in Dallas, or the area, to set them up as false sponsors. This made it easier to manipulate them later as presidents.

    We now come to Allen Dulles. Corsi has used the latest information found in Jim DiEugenio’s book Destiny Betrayed, where the author makes a good case to prove that Dulles was one of the high level conspirators. Corsi continues that good work by using other material from Destiny Betrayed, especially the part were he examines JFK’s split with the Eastern Establishment over his foreign policy. For more information on this you can read DiEugenio’s article, “JFK’s Embrace of Third World Nationalism.”

    Ultimately, Corsi blames the “New World Order” as the sponsor of the assassination. This group wanted to use military force to preserve private business interests around the world, instead of the genuine interests of the United States. In a sense he is right but I disagree with his term “New World Order.” Those interests were as old as recorded history. And they have a strategy to conceal their identities by manipulating the pubic’s sense of wonder and the thirst for the mysterious, the occult and the mystical. They try to convince people of the inevitability of their actions guided by something divine and mystical. I have a different name for the “New World Order”. It is “The Money Trust”, and it functions like the board of a huge global corporation. It has many different factions and views to gain the same end, and some interests have one or more seats and votes on the board. Although at times the board has conflicting interests they have the same end goal: power, and the control of the many by the few.

    VI. Conclusions

    It is true that Corsi relied too much on the likes of Lamar Waldron, Thom Hartmann and the allegations of Pacepa. If had done the meticulous search that he promised he would have thought twice before using them for references. He should have been aware that the research community has disproved the Waldron/Harmtann theories. In the case of Pacepa I am convinced that Corsi does not really believe him because he does not include Pacepa’s allegations in his conclusions. I believe that he wanted to make a difference by using information given to him by Pacepa in private emails, in order to make a sensation. I also feel that his chapters were not very well connected to each other but spread out irregularly. It seems that Corsi gathered too much information from so many sources that it became difficult to put it all together in the best way possible.

    Despites its mistakes this is a decent enough book for the novice and general public who are not aware of the machinations of deep politics and JFK assassination case. Corsi is a NY Times best selling author and he can help attract a wider audience that is not familiar with case. Afterwards the readers can take some of the good sources of his book like Douglass, DiEugenio, Fonzi, Newman among others to broaden their knowledge and realize how deep the rabbit hole actually is.

  • Larry Sabato, the Kennedy Assassination, and the Rise of the Post-Modern Sound Bite Scholar


    Dozens of new books have been published to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963. Many of them are breaking new ground.

    The JFK research community has come a long way in just the past twenty years. I first got interested in the assassination right before Oliver Stone’s JFK movie was released and probably read thirty or so book around that time. They all pointed to one theory or another. It was easy for someone new to the topic to get lost in the deluge of counter theories.

    But things have changed since then. I went to a conference of the leading JFK assassination researchers in Pittsburgh last month, organized by the famous forensic pathologist Cyril Wecht and his son. It was called “Passing the Torch.”

    I don’t pretend to have all of the answers, but it became clear to me at this event that something of a consensus has emerged in the JFK research community pointing to elements of the government being involved. In particular men working with Cuban exiles associated with Operation Mongoose, the CIA operation to subvert Cuba and overthrow Castro after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, have come under increasing suspicion. Simply put more has become known thanks to the release of government files following the JFK movie. And people are still learning things and there are yet to be documents to be released.

    Not only are new details of the suspicious characters around Oswald, and the mystery man himself, being discovered, but we now have a much better understanding of what was actually going during Kennedy’s Presidency.

    To name just one example a new work is being developed by a scholar at the UVA Miller Center based on Presidential tapes about Kennedy’s policies in Vietnam and moves towards withdrawal he made in the last year of his life. The release of new tapes and records over the past fifteen years show that Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sharp disagreements over Cuba, Vietnam, and nuclear weapons policies. They had what can only be described as dismal relations with each other.

    Even popular mainstream historians like Robert Dallek are touching upon this area – and it is hard not to find out some of these things and wonder about the assassination itself. As Douglas Horne, who worked for the Assassination Archives Review Board put it JFK “was at war” with the national security state. But some things have never changed. During this anniversary year if you have watched November’s TV specials you would not know of any of this new information. National Geographic’s testament to the Kennedy assassination was the retread boring Killing Kennedy movie. Almost all network news broadcasts managed to stick to the lone assassin line and promote only those books and authors that conform with the proper talking points.

    One exception I saw shows you the straight jacket that is television. CNN’s Piers Morgan had Jesse Ventura on to discuss the government shutdown that was going on at the time and Ventura’s new book about the assassination called They Killed Our President. The book isn’t designed to solve the murder, but to present some of the dozens upon dozens of facts pointing to a conspiracy.

    Morgan looked at Ventura and his book and just repeated over and over again that he thought there was no conspiracy, because he said he talked to former Secret Service agent Clint Hill and he told him there wasn’t one. Ventura countered by listing some of the things in his book and Morgan completely dismissed him, treating Ventura as if he was merely making it all up. At the end of the interview Morgan said this was spot, because it made for a great “talking point.” You can see this discussion in this video at around the five minute mark:

    The ugly truth is that many people have made fortunes off of the assassination by creating books that line up with exactly the talking points required of them to get praised by the TV media. Gerald Posner’s work Case Closed did this following Oliver Stone’s movie and he became a celebrated talking head for a few years until he fell into a nasty plagiarism scandal.

    Vincent Bugliosi took his place for a few years with his doorstop sized book Reclaiming History, which has been demolished by James DiEugenio in a recent book. But it seems like the overwhelming size of the book made it so that it was difficult to catch on with the general public, even though it became a vehicle for Bugliosi to get on TV and be used as a counterpoint whenever a reasonable author who wrote a book about the darker aspects of the assassination got on TV, as when Chris Mathews used him as an attack dog against David Talbot when he did a segment on his Brothers Book.

    But Bugliosi seems to have disappeared. The Tom Hanks Parkland movie, which was credited as having been based upon his work, totally bombed at the box office. It was just too banal and boring. But a few have come into the picture to try to use the Kennedy assassination to get on TV this 50th anniversary and promote themselves by delivering the right talking points.

    There is probably no better example of this than University of Virginia professor Larry Sabato. Sabato’s book The Kennedy Half Century was written by a team of people at the UVA Center for Politics, which Sabato runs. It is really three small books in one. The first part of it is a fast recap of Kennedy’s political career, the second part deals with the assassination and the final part of the book is his “legacy” with examples of how the Presidents since President Kennedy claimed his mantel from time to time.

    I found the first and last part of the book to actually be the weakest parts of it. The amount of research that went into them just seemed to be very thin. The first part in particular really added nothing new and seemed to have little understanding of Kennedy’s real legacy and his foreign policy. For example he claimed that the Soviets put missiles in Cuba, because they perceived that Kennedy was a weak man after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion who wouldn’t do anything in response. In reality Khrushchev put missiles in Cuba out of desperation – he had fallen behind the United States in the nuclear arms race and put missiles in Cuba as a hail marry pass to try to force Kennedy into making some sort of deal. It was something the Soviets did out of weakness – they perceived the United States as being the stronger and more aggressive party, which is exactly the opposite of what Sabato claims in his book.

    We know all this because of the work of Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali and their book Khruschchev’s Cold War, based in part on transcripts of Soviet Politburo records. This book is seven years old now and an important part of the scholarship. You would think Sabato would know of it, especially since Naftali used to work at the UVA Miller Center in the Presidential recordings program. Incredibly when I looked at the acknowledgements to his book it appeared that Sabato did not consult with hardly anyone there and barely any academic historians at all.

    Sabato did manage to consult with Gary Mack of the Sixth Floor Museum in Dallas, John McAdams and TV media stars such as James Carville, Bill Moyers, and Chris Matthews. And he indeed has been able to use his book to get on the television set. You can get a feeling for what Gary Mack is about in this video:

    He has been able to provide TV producers with the correct talking points. Sabato has made a career out of being a minor TV celebrity able to charge $10,000 a pop speaking fees so he knows the game.

    In the initial promotion for the book he was on CBS News, which put a story on its website with the headline “JFK assassination conspiracy theory ‘blown out of the water’ in new book, author says”, to describe an interview with Sabato.

    Sabato said he commissioned a study of dictabelt recordings that the Congressional House Select Committee on Assassinations used that they said showed that more than three shots were fired, which would mean there was a conspiracy. Sabato said he had “new” evidence that he commissioned by a sound analysis company called Sonalysts, Inc. which proved that the HSCA study was flawed. But in reality other researchers who studied these tapes in the early 1980’s came to the same conclusion, so there was nothing “new” in what Sabato said. The tapes aren’t important in the big picture.

    But his claim enabled him to make a big splash and get on TV, because it made for a great politically correct talking point. Nonetheless, there is much more evidence of a conspiracy than these tapes and Sabato knows this. He also knows that over 80% of the American people do not believe in the Warren Commission and so to be someone who simply mouths the Warren Commission line can damage one’s image with today’s public.

    However, to talk of conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination means becoming toxic to American TV news producers. It could mean the end of being a talking head. When I was at UVA over fifteen years ago, in the graduate history program, I had one professor tell me that to write about the Kennedy assassination would make a career in academia impossible. That wasn’t because of something about UVA in particular, but the reality of the way the topic is treated by the mainstream media and upper reaches of establishment research. It’s simply not politically correct to talk about and you’ll be blacked out by TV if you do. It would be like being against slavery in the pre-Civil War American South.

    Despite what I’ve said so far, the strongest part of Sabato’s book is actually his section on the assassination. Even though I do not agree with his conclusions, he does make some interesting comments, and you can tell from the footnotes that more research went into putting this part of the book together than the rest of it.

    Sabato argues that the “establishment view, even today, in the halls of government and many media organizations” is “that it is irresponsible to question the ‘carefully considered’ conclusions of the Warren Commission report.” Sabato warns that there are some who consider it close to being a threat to national security. “Further, say the lone gunman theory’s advocates, the widespread accusations that senior political, governmental, and military figures participated in the planning, execution, or cover-up of the assassination of President Kennedy have damaged the image of the United States around the globe, fueling anti-American sentiments by undermining the very basis of our democratic system, ” he explains. In such a siege atmosphere it is no surprise that TV news producers have stuck managed to keep themselves within the bounds of the proper “responsible” talking points. And so has Sabato.

    Sabato declares to his reader that “given the lack of hard evidence, to accuse any arm or agency of the federal government of orchestrating Kennedy’s assassination is both irresponsible and disingenuous.” However, it is hard for anyone who studies the assassination by going beyond the Warren Commission’s final report to escape the conclusion that there was more to the assassination than Oswald. On the day after the assassination at President Lyndon Johnson’s first morning meeting as President CIA director John McCone told him that Lee Harvey Oswald went to the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City and had contact with a dangerous KGB agent. After this meeting Johnson had a phone conversation with FBI director J. Edgar Hoover who told him that the evidence as it stood was not enough to convict Oswald and that someone else was in Mexico City pretending to be him. Hoover told him that information that the CIA gave him, such as taped phone conversations, that was supposed to be Oswald wasn’t him.

    Sabato knows that the lone assassin story simply is not credible. So he writes, “at the same time, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that a small, secret cabal of CIA hard-liners, angry about Kennedy’s handling of Cuba and sensing a leftward turn on negotiations with the Soviets and the prosecution of the war in Vietnam, took matters into their own hands lest the United States go soft on Communism.”

    Sabato dismisses just about all possible conspiracy theories in his book. He claims it simply is “irresponsible” to think that elements of the United States government could be involved. He won’t do that so he comes up with one possible politically correct conspiracy theory of his own buried in a footnote – “in theory, the cabal could also have been the opposite: Communist inspired. In April, 1961 FBI J. Edgar Hoover sent Attorney General Robert Kennedy a memo admitting that the Office of Strategic Services (the CIA’s parent organization) had been infiltrated by a “Communist element” that “created problems and situations which even to this day affect US intelligence operations.”

    In other words it’s a thought crime to think that some people in the United States government could have been a party to President Kennedy’s assassination so if there were people like that they must have been under the control of the KGB. If the CIA killed Kennedy so to speak it did so, because it was actually a cat’s paw of the KGB.

    Well, look there are a lot of crazy conspiracy theories that have been peddled over the years, from the driver did it, to some Secret Service agent accidently shot the President, and on and on. Most of the theories have no real proof, but what Sabato proposes is one of the craziest theories I’ve ever seen in print. In fact the idea that the CIA was under the control of the KGB is more of a nightmare than any of the Kennedy assassination conspiracy theories.

    Sabato tries to appeal to all sides in his book. On one hand he says that there are plenty of reasons to believe in a conspiracy, because the Warren Commission was such a botched investigation, but in the end he comes down on the side of believing in the single assassin theory, but does little to convince the reader of that. It’s a line though that he uses to get on TV.

    You can watch Sabato essentially play for the TV in this interview making big talking point sound bites:

    In this interview Sabato makes the big claim that Oswald is the only person who killed Kennedy, but “we’ll never know” the truth. Of course that’s a nonsensical statement, because if it’s only Oswald than what is there not to know so to speak? But it’s the proper politically correct talking point for TV news. Sabato doesn’t provide a shred of evidence in this TV appearance explaining why he thinks Oswald is the only person involved.

    Now In his book Sabato has a few paragraphs of evidence in support of the Oswald did it alone story in his giant book. The evidence Sabato marshals is that Oswald “is the only logical suspect from the Depository, the place where he worked from and from which he fled. The murder weapon was Oswald’s, his palm print was on the gun, and (despite the dispute over the size of Oswald’s ‘curtain rods’ package) he likely brought it to work with him the morning of the assassination.” He also says Oswald shot the policeman J.D. Tippit and “four bullets were retrieved from Tippit’s body, one of which matched Oswald’s revolver.”

    However, Henry Hurt’s book Reasonable Doubt demolished most of this more than twenty years ago. Hurt found that the crime scene investigator left marks on the bullets at the Tippit slaying that were not on the bullets used as evidence by the Warren Commission. The palm print was not on the gun when it was first examined by the authorities and only later magically appeared on it. I cite Hurt’s book, because it an excellent account of the evidence and Sabato cites him in his acknowledgments, so surely he must know of these things. He may not know of John Armstrong’s work Harvey and Lee which even puts Oswald purchase and ownership of the rifle in doubt, because it is newer. Who can read every single Kennedy assassination book?

    Do we even need to talk, though, about the medical evidence and all of the doctors at Parkland who saw the back of Kennedy’s head shot out by an exit wound? To make a long story short the evidence against Oswald is a joke and Sabato only spends a few paragraphs in his book using it in support of the lone assassin story.

    To his credit though Sabato does talk about the contradictory evidence. I just think a reader will be left with more confusion than answers from it. In the end though what is most interesting about Sabato’s book and media appearances is his talking line stance. He does not merely play the same card of a Posner or Bugliosi and try to merely uphold the Warren Commission one more time.

    Instead he tries to recognize the disbelief of the public and still keep to the required talking points message to be acceptable to the Washington beltway media establishment. He is indeed “responsible” to the Washington power structure. We live in an era of economic malaise and an empire falling apart. The power elites are failing this nation and the assassination of President Kennedy will be seen decades from now as an event that took us to where we are.

    The way the Kennedy assassination is being treated by the media 50 years after the event is an example of how disjointed the Washington elites and TV talking heads are from the rest of the nation, but they are where true power in the United States rests. So enter Sabato and his positioning. It’s an interesting play he has made – and the right one when it comes to getting on TV and selling books as a result. He can now charge for more speaking appearances as a Kennedy assassination expert, because the TV proclaimed him to be one.

    Sabato says that many inside the Washington beltway crowd and national TV producers fear that talk of a Kennedy assassination conspiracy is a potential danger to national security, because it can cause people to doubt the United States government and lash out at it.

    But to take such a rigid position does one have to sacrifice the search for truth in order to hold onto a proper political line? That is not what scholarship is about.

    Nor is that what journalism is about either, but there is a big difference between it and what passes as “reporting” on TV. TV news does very little real investigative work to what really is going on in the economy and the government.

    A few weeks before the November anniversary of the JFK assassination CBS News “Face the Nation” aired a segment about a new book on the subject that contained evidence that the Warren Commission covered up facts.

    When it was her turn to talk about the book popular talking head Peggy Noonan said that as a nation we were lucky that the truth didn’t come out, because it could have been “destabilizing.” She seemed to suggest that she agreed with covering things up.

    The book being discussed doesn’t say there was a conspiracy so it’s safe enough to talk about on TV. It just says there were things being covered up, but they cause people to ask too many questions, so Noonan is thankful for the cover-up.

    Then reporter Bob Woodward and Noonan spoke of a “deep state” that engages in covert operations and mass surveillance in the name of national security, saying the things being covered up in regards to the JFK assassination is a part of the “deep state” activities. I call it the war state. But they seem to have no problem with cover-ups.

    This “Face the Nation” segment is in essence an argument in justification of the JFK assassination cover-up.

    The phrase “deep state” was created by professor Peter Dale Scott to explain the Kennedy assassination.

    Is the duty of a journalist to hide government secrets? That seems like a slippery slope that leads to becoming a sycophant or propagandist. That is not what journalism is about.

    TV news acted as a cheerleader for the war in Iraq and asked no questions before it started. It wasn’t until it turned into a total disaster that they asked a few questions and then they simply stopped reporting on it all together.

    They never talk about the war in Afghanistan. They failed to recognize the problems that led into the 2008 financial crisis and fail to even talk about the problems of debt inflation caused by the Federal Reserve today.

    If you think back to just the past few months and how TV news has reported on the NSA spying revelations you can see how it has done almost no real investigative work and acted simply as a mouthpiece for power.

    Instead of really digging into what the NSA spy programs are doing to the American people and the legal issues surrounding them TV news made the story about Snowden and the real journalists that were doing research into the affair and demonized them as enemies.

    The journalist Glen Greenwald has been at the forefront of breaking the story about NSA spying. When he appeared on MSNBC talking head reporter David Gregory attacked him and questioned him on whether he should be considered a criminal and virtual enemy of the state. You can see this in this video clip:

    It isn’t hard to imagine that if producers of shows such as this think that to investigate the JFK assassination could threaten national security than they could easily conclude that to investigate the NSA spy programs is too.

    The problem is the press is supposed to investigate government and look for wrongdoings and crimes. It is supposed to act as a watchdog for the people – and if it doesn’t something is seriously wrong.

    It also means that to make oneself into a TV news talking head celebrity one has to make giant sacrifices of integrity. One has to be willing not to care about searching for the truth and to conform to the correct talking points and political lines. It means becoming a professional propagandist instead of a scholar.

    It’s sad to think that some people have to do this to become acceptable and important in the circles of power in the United States and you know they must suffer in one way or another. You know that if they have a conscience they have trouble sleeping at night and feel like in the end they are not leaving much of a legacy behind. They end up being either cowards or total opportunists.

    I want to say one last thing. Sabato has claimed in at least one TV appearance “we will never know” the real truth when it comes to the assassination. He never asks if that is true, then why? The answer would be simple: lack of political will by the men in Washington. When I see Sabato on TV and read his book I feel like he really doesn’t even care what the truth is. He is mostly interested in being credible and “responsible” for the TV producers. In reality much of the truth is sitting there and more is being discovered – it’s just not politically correct for the TV to talk about it.

    But Sabato seems to be an example of today’s post-modern scholar. Right before the financial crash of 2008 there were economists doing “research” to “prove” that everything was great with the financial system and that mortgage backed securities and other such inventions were wonderful “innovations.” Some were paid to go to countries with troubled debt situations and say everything was great. They were complicit in the crash that helped bring today’s economic mess. The story of one was detailed in the movie Inside Job. It was a story NEVER revealed on CNBC – and never will be:

    Men such as this were “post-modern” economists who catered to their paymasters. It is in small movies like this, books, internet sites, and newspaper articles that real journalism, scholarship, and investigative reporting takes place. The TV has failed to ever dig anything up about the Kennedy assassination in fifty years and has failed to inform the public about the reality of the economy, the recent wars associated with the “war on terror,” and the depth of the NSA spy programs. Instead it simply repeats talking points and TV producers seem to always be able find people willing to say and do anything to get on TV and mouth the establishment propaganda lines in this age of dying empire and transition into a new age.

  • John McAdams, JFK Assassination Logic: How to Think about Claims of Conspiracy – Three Reviews (1)

    John McAdams, JFK Assassination Logic: How to Think about Claims of Conspiracy – Three Reviews (1)


    How to Think Like John McAdams

    A Book Review by David W. Mantik

    Every man has a right to his opinion, but no man has a right to be wrong in his facts.

    —Bernard Baruch—

    Note: Italics identify quotes from the book; for my own emphases, I use underlining here.


    Overview

    Despite his pompous claim to teach all of us how to think critically, McAdams offers not a single reference to standard works on logical fallacies. Nor does he ever present his unique credentials for this task. After all, why would a professor of “American politics, public opinion, and voter behavior” automatically possess such superior skills in critical thinking? On the contrary, in this rather narrow-minded book, he demonstrates all three of these political disciplines. In order to persuade the reader to vote for his dubious conclusions, he uses the standard tools of manipulation and commits a variety of crimes against logic—the straw man, the invalid analogy, begging the question, special pleading, the false dichotomy, and the moving goalpost. Numerous examples of these fallacies are presented below. Fortunately, although his online persona is sometimes less than admirable, here he does not often resort to ad hominem attacks.

    Given the subject matter, this is a remarkably brief book (254 pages). McAdams therefore frequently dispenses with critical issues in a sentence or two, often based on feeble (anti-conspiracy) sources. An example is Zapruder film tampering (p. 193). Even if McAdams is technically unable to address the luminous work on the Zapruder film by optical physicist John Costella, why not at least cite a more detailed and current source, possibly even from his own turf—such as Vincent Bugliosi’s Reclaiming History? (My decidedly negative reviews of Bugliosi’s two recent books are here and here.)

    My chief objections to the book, though, are its numerous sins of omission. Paradoxically, although McAdams claims to loathe these transgressions in others, he often forgets to adjust his own mirror. For example, in his Preface, he states:

    Everybody knows that writers, newscasters, and producers of documentaries can mislead their audiences by leaving out certain information. The reader of this book may be dismayed to discover how often these omissions happen.

    But McAdams frankly tells us why he himself omits data (p. 250):

    To actually solve a crime, you have to throw away most of your pieces of “evidence.” You have to conclude that this sighting of the suspect where he could not have been is bogus, that the crackpot witness is not to be believed, and that a juicy-looking “connection” actually leads nowhere. When you do that, you are left with reasonably hard and reliable evidence, and with some luck, you can break the case. If you refuse to cull your evidence, you end up with suspicions out the ears, and no solution to the crime.

    McAdams cites no textbook on evidence for this method—nor does he provide a general framework for such culling.  In fact, he violates a fundamental principle of scientific reasoning: the requirement of total evidence, which insists that conclusions must be based upon all the relevant evidence. On the contrary, McAdams’s goal seems extraordinary: he strives for a conclusion at all costs, even if it is the wrong one.

    Curiously enough, McAdams had earlier (p. 12) stated that evidence should not be discarded:

    Scientists will sometimes throw away observations that are considered outliers. When the data points will fit a neat pattern and one observation sticks out far from the rest, scientists often discard it. Scientists throw such observations away on the ground that they reflect a measurement error of some sort…. One should not be too cavalier about deleting this information, since an outlier can be valid information and may in fact be the tip-off to something interesting.[The 6.5 mm object, discussed below, plays precisely such a role.] When scientists throw away an outlier because it doesn’t fit the model and because they can’t explain it, they are making an ad hoc assumption. [The measurement of electron charge is an excellent historical example.]

    This is a sensible statement, but McAdams prefers outliers that do not threaten his case. Unfortunately, as occurs too often, he makes these selections behind the scenes. This means that his reader is actively blind folded, i.e., he is stripped of the opportunity to decide for himself what evidence is authentic.

    In her essay, “Trajectory of a Lie,” Milicent Cranor cites a guideline that could apply to any evidence. The author was a forensic pathologist, Alan R. Moritz, M.D., in “Classical Mistakes in Forensic Pathology,” American Journal of Clinical Pathology 1956; volume 26, p. 1383: 

    . . . it is better to describe 10 findings that might prove to be of no significance than to omit one that might be critical. The purpose of a protocol is twofold. One is to record a sufficiently detailed, factual, and noninterpretive [emphasis added] description of the observed conditions, in order that a competent reader may form his own [emphasis added] opinions in regard to the significance of the changes described. Thus, a region of dark blue discoloration in the… may or may not be a bruise. To refer to it as a contusion in the descriptive part of the protocol is to substitute an interpretation for a description, and this is as unwarranted as it may be misleading….

    Dr. Moritz was a member of the Clark Panel (1968), which reviewed the JFK evidence. As Cranor observed, Moritz and his panel violated this principle when, based on their examination of poor quality photographs taken from a distance, they pronounced JFK’s throat wound as “characteristic of that of the exit wound of a bullet” (Clark Panel Report, p. 9). On the contrary, because it was a small, round wound, it was in fact typical of an entrance wound. As Cranor notes, they gave no description of its appearance, and gave instead “an interpretation for a description.” For decades now, defenders of the lone assassin theory have fine tuned such skills of misdirection, and John McAdams here similarly proves to be an apt student of this technique.

    Eyewitness Testimony

    If one theme can be extracted from this book it is this: Do not trust eyewitnesses—except for those approved by McAdams. It is widely understood that eyewitnesses are not very reliable in recalling complex matters, including recognition of faces, especially if these are only briefly glimpsed. In addition, intricate sequences of events (especially with multiple actors) are challenging for eyewitnesses. Nowhere, however, does McAdams cite one of his own authorities (Elizabeth Loftus) for those contrary occasions when eyewitness testimony has been shown to be highly reliable. In fact, when recall is prompt, and items are salient and simple, eyewitnesses do remarkably well. See Appendix 2 for further details.

    Despite his passionate and nearly uniform condemnation of eyewitness testimony throughout the book, McAdams does not take any serious pains to distinguish prompt recall from later recall, nor does he ever recognize the critical role of salience (or simplicity). Until he pays attention to these crucial parameters, his incessant nagging about eyewitness failures is quite pointless. Ideally, his principle should instead read: “Do not trust eyewitnesses—except in those specific cases when experience shows you should.

    McAdams accuses conspiracy partisans of carefully selecting eyewitnesses to make their case. Paradoxically, however, although McAdams (p. 2) emphasizes that the Dealey Plaza witnesses are central, he does not have the courage to discuss the ten Plaza witnesses who were closest to the limousine that day, many of whom were ignored by the Warren Commission (WC). These witnesses are clearly not randomly selected (p. 28), yet they uniformly (and promptly) recalled a simple and salient event that day: they said that the limousine stopped (or nearly stopped). This is relevant to understanding the assassination and cover-up because the Zapruder film does not show such a stop. (Historically, this was the initial reason for suspecting that the film itself had been altered.) For a compilation of these witnesses, with citations for their comments, see Murder in Dealey Plaza (MIDP, pp. 341-342). Since these witnesses disagree with the Zapruder film, which McAdams takes to be “hard” evidence, perhaps he has merely chosen to cull them—but then he has done so without telling us. On the other hand, when multiple witnesses describe Tippit’s murderer as manually ejecting spent cartridges from his weapon (p. 177), McAdams has no trouble believing these witnesses (who of course support his case). As expected, after reviewing the ballistic evidence in this murder he concludes that Oswald did it. However, Don Thomas reviews this same evidence (Hear No Evil, Chapter 14) and reminds us that three separate sets of experts have arrived at “three irreconcilably different opinions….” McAdams, of course, reports none of this, so he is guilty here of a methodological inconsistency (often called “a double standard”), which of course merely impugns his credibility.

    But what about the witnesses to the back of JFK’s head? McAdams argues, as expected, that the autopsy photos take precedence over eyewitness testimony (even though it has been customary in court for eyewitnesses to first validate photos before these are admitted as evidence). As we might now expect, though, McAdams does not acknowledge the profound disagreement with the reports of the Dallas physicians (see Appendix 3). And to rebut Gary Aguilar’s long list of witnesses who saw a posterior blow-out, McAdams resorts to a halfhearted bout of nit-picking (pp. 28-30)—no doubt because he has no other options. For example, he cites Jerrol Custer’s much later recall of the skull wound as being more accurate than his earlier description (which violates the rule that earlier reports are to be privileged over later ones). In any case, Custer’s wandering recollections for the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) raise deep doubts about his (later) memory. McAdams has again employed special pleading, i.e., selecting evidence favorable to his side and ignoring the rest. (For a photo showing Custer demonstrating the occipital wound, see The Killing of a President by Robert Groden (p. 88). For Custer’s report that the rear of the head had been blown off, see Best Evidence 1980 by Lifton (pp. 619-620). Also review the fine essay by Gary Aguilar and Kathy Cunningham (now Evans.)

    Furthermore, although McAdams claims that the Zapruder film shows no occipital wound, this issue is at least controversial. Recent work by Hollywood professionals has shown a distinct black, geometric-shaped mask lying precisely over the occipital area in question (on multiple frames in a film approved by the National Archives). This apparent artifact is highly suggestive of photo tampering. I have observed this geometric mask myself in Hollywood, and have confirmed the same feature on the MPI images at the Sixth Floor Museum in Dallas (while accompanied by one of the Hollywood personnel). Surely, at the very least, McAdams must view these MPI images before he draws conclusions—after all, these images are accessible to the public.

    Two Oswalds (pp. 41-43)

    Even if history is replete with false sightings of individuals, especially famous miscreants (e.g., Malcolm Naden and John Wilkes Booth), as McAdams maintains, then that information can tell us very little about the two-Oswald hypothesis—instead, each case must be decided on its own merits. After all, some sightings are not false (e.g., John Wilkes Booth was probably photographed at Lincoln’s second inauguration—see here). Determining the accuracy of such sightings is analogous to deciding what past events have been authentic conspiracies. As McAdams himself admits, for such a decision a case-by case approach is essential (p. ix). Ironically, McAdams himself—a self-anointed instructor in logic—falls prey here to another logical fallacy: the appeal to probability, i.e., just because something could have happened (mistaken sightings in this case), it is inevitable that it did happen.

    Although McAdams accepts 9/11 as a real conspiracy (pp. ix and 201), he still maintains that “conspiracy theories” see the government as “very evil but very competent.” Paradoxically, though, sometimes the government itself reports a conspiracy (e.g., 9/11 and the Lincoln assassination), so we can ask: Does that imply to McAdams that conspiracists also view these (government) reports as evil, but nonetheless competent? (Surely, doubters of The 9/11 Commission Report would not agree with this.) This is the kind of logical absurdity that follows from (possibly subconsciously) considering all conspiracy theories to be false.

    Another point should be made. Because false sightings do occur, and because humans are quite poor at recalling briefly encountered faces, we ought therefore to conclude that, rather than discrediting the two-Oswald hypothesis, this human flaw lends some support (unintentionally and indirectly) to the two-Oswald scenario. Why should that be true? Consider this: If two Oswalds existed, then eyewitnesses could not reliably distinguish between them. For example (since we cannot trust eyewitnesses) even if the same witness had seen two different Oswalds on two different occasions, that would not be sufficient proof of two Oswalds. Therefore, since we cannot fully trust eyewitnesses on this matter, the question of two Oswalds is actually left open by the eyewitnesses—it must instead be decided by objective evidence, such as documents and photos.

    When McAdams discusses the two-Oswald scenario, he dodges the more recent 983-page opus by John Armstrong (Harvey and Lee–$325 on Amazon) and instead cites (p. 42) the 1966 book by Richard Popkin (The Second Oswald). Armstrong does not even appear in McAdams’s index. On the contrary, readers might, for example, like to view the strange newspaper photo of “Oswald” at the time of his defection. (See: note image 13 of 50, second row, third photo.) And surely the man photographed in Mexico City as “Oswald” was not Oswald. Even J. Edgar Hoover conceded that the “Oswald” voice on the tape was not Oswald.

    This omission of Harvey and Lee exemplifies the logical fallacy of special pleading, i.e., citing only evidence favorable to one’s case, while suppressing the rest.

    Fact Checking

    The Acknowledgments cite no fact checker, a singular omission, especially in view of the high risk for errors that any JFK author inevitably faces. As we shall soon see (items 1-6 below), this is a grievous mistake. Although three editors at Potomac are listed, a copy editor would also have been wise, e.g., McAdams lists Zapruder, Nix, and Muchmore as shooters in Dealey Plaza (p. 180)! Another blooper occurs when he comments (p. 27) on David Lifton’s theory: “But if you ignore the weight of the evidence, it’s likely to be an absurd theory.” Of course, he meant “accept,” not “ignore.” An amusing mistake occurs in the timeline (p. 259): “Oswald arrested…after attempting to shoot…McDonald…and scuffing with police.” (Scuffing is defined as walking without lifting the feet.) The long list of those thanked (second paragraph in this section) invites skepticism—almost all would be described as anti-conspiracy; in other words, McAdams has plainly, and without apparent embarrassment, skewed his case from the outset.

    1. McAdams claims that, because individuals cannot keep a secret, a large conspiracy is impossible (p. 248) and for this he offers an unintentionally comical statistical “proof.” One of his scenarios assumes 20 conspirators, ironically just one more than that cited by the official 9/11 report. From this he predicts a 95.5% probability that the secret (of the conspirators) would get out. However, we all know that, in the case of 9/11, the secret (of flying into structures) did not get out. In a similar vein, I have previously cited multiple powerful examples in which many individuals actually did keep deep and important secrets (see Appendix 4). McAdams then heroically wades into a statistical morass—by introducing his supposed analogy of false positives in medicine (p. 192). He conjures up a test for leukemia (for 61 subjects) in which 11 or 12 false positives are to be expected. (Although he states that leukemia is rare, my own father died from it.) He claims, without any statistical analysis, that if 15 subjects actually test positive then we can conclude that no one has leukemia and that everyone should relax. Of course, he has omitted the critical piece of information—the standard deviation for this test, which means that we cannot assess his conclusion. (Readers interested in a serious discussion of these issues should consult a superb book by H. Gilbert Welch: Should I be Tested for Cancer? Even worse, though, his analogy to the 15 matches in the acoustic data is a false analogy (see discussion below).
    2. McAdams claims (pp. 26-27) that the vast majority of witnesses saw JFK’s body arrive at the Bethesda morgue in the same casket that had left Dallas, and that nobody else (other than Paul O’Connor) reported a body bag. Although he is not cited by McAdams, Douglas Horne demonstrates that these statements cannot be justified—after all, at least six witnesses reported a wrapping like a body bag: Paul O’Connor, Floyd Riebe, Jerrol Custer (initially), Ed Reed, John VanHoesen, and Capt. John Stover, MD. (Horne’s table lists the witnesses and the sources of their statements; see Inside the ARRB, Volume IV, pp. 989-992.) Witnesses to a shipping type casket were Dennis David, Paul O’Connor, Floyd Riebe, Ed Reed, James Jenkins, and Capt. John Stover, MD. (Custer saw two caskets, one of which was bronze.) Although these recollections were not uniformly identical (and Custer later recanted about a body bag), rather remarkable similarity does exist among these statements. Furthermore, most of these individuals were consistent over time and also with different interviewers. Horne’s summary therefore seriously discredits McAdams (for only citing O’Connor)—but McAdams’s comment also implies that he failed to read Horne’s work. Even if McAdams dislikes these conclusions, he has nonetheless ignored relevant evidence and has thereby committed the logical fallacy of begging the question (by assuming conclusions that may be false). This approach has also sometimes been called “cherry picking.”
    3. He implies that Jim Sibert and Francis O’Neill were the only witnesses who heard Humes describe prior surgery to the head. This is false, however, as I have previously emphasized, because James Jenkins is another (High Treason 2 by Harrison Livingstone, p. 234; also see In the Eye of History by William Law, p. 80). Jenkins repeated this statement to a small group (which included me) in Fort Myers, Florida in September 2002. Furthermore, Doug Horne summarizes how Tom Robinson and Ed Reed recalled how James Humes, the pathologist, may have performed cranial surgery before the official autopsy began (Inside the ARRB, Volume IV, pp. 1005 and 1167-1169).
    4. Regarding Robert McClelland and the back of head (p. 30, footnote 60), McAdams claims that McClelland could not see the occipital defect because JFK was lying face up and his head was not lifted up (this is more begging of the question). Yet here are words directly from McClelland (6H33 or see http://www.assassinationresearch.com/v4n2/v4n2part1.pdf):

      As I took the position at the head of the table…I was in such a position that I could very closely examine the head wound, and I noted that the right posterior portion of the skull had been blasted. It had been shattered, apparently, by the force of the shot so that the parietal bone was protruded up through the scalp and seemed to be fractured almost along its posterior half, as well as some of the occipital bone being fractured in its lateral half, and this sprung open the bones that I mentioned in such a way that you could actually look down into the skull cavity itself, and see that probably a third or so, at least, of the brain tissue, posterior cerebral tissue and some of the cerebellar tissue had been blasted out.

    5. McAdams promotes the idea (p. 229) that the oval shape of Connally’s back wound proves that it was caused by a yawing bullet–the result of first striking another object (which he supposes was JFK’s neck.) McAdams cites 7HSCA144 (Volume 7, page 144 of the House Select Committee on Assassinations), but that page raises an alternate explanation for an elongated wound: a tangential strike. (McAdams wonders whether a “sharp” angle might explain the wound, but it is not clear whether McAdams means tangential.)Michael Baden, one of McAdams’s favorite sources, has gone to great lengths to “prove” that Connally’s back was not only struck by a yawing bullet, but by one that struck sideways (with the full length of the bullet), thus creating a 3 cm long wound.  However, Milicent Cranor buried this myth in her decisive essay: “The Trajectory of a Lie” (http://www.history-matters.com/essays/jfkmed/BigLieSmallWound/BigLieSmallWound.htm). Baden’s mistaken belief had originated with John Lattimer, M.D. In an article published in 1974, Lattimer used the operative report as evidence: it described the size of the wound during surgery, after it had been cleaned and enlarged (as by a scalpel) to 3 cm.  But the pre-operative back wound, i.e., the size created by the bullet, was only 1.5 x 0.8 cm. Cranor notes that the actual size of Connally’s back wound was almost the very same size as the entrance wound in JFK’s head: 1.5 x 0.6 cm. She delights in observing that no one has ever said that JFK’s head was hit by a yawing bullet. McAdams seems oblivious to the facts in Cranor’s analysis, which includes thorough documentation for these measurements. Even Bugliosi refrained from promoting this myth of a 3 cm back wound, reportedly because of Cranor’s article, although he does not cite it.
    6. McAdams claims that no bullet fragments are seen on the left side of JFK’s AP X-ray. (That is JFK’s left—the side of lesser trauma—which would be the reader’s right side.) But this is manifestly false, as I have repeatedly emphasized over many years (see Appendix 5, Figure 1). How do I know that this object is metallic? First, it is also visible on both lateral X-rays; that an artifact would be so spatially consistent—on three X-rays—is quite unlikely. Second, at the National Archives, it does look like metal: its borders are sharp while its optical density and shape are also consistent with metal (compared to the other metallic fragments). Third, the relative densities on the three X-ray views are all consistent with one another. Perhaps McAdams should just take a look (at the Archives). Why is this important? McAdams implies that the absence of such a left-sided fragment suggests that no bullet struck JFK from the front—and that, we all would agree, is indeed a central issue. I would emphasize however that, even though McAdams is clearly wrong about the existence of this fragment, its presence is indeed perplexing and that, by itself, raises some prickly and unorthodox questions.

    The Throat Wound           

    McAdams claims (p. 70) that Malcolm Perry, who performed the tracheotomy, and Charles Carrico were the only two physicians who saw the throat wound. Surely, however, McAdams is well aware of Perry’s own statement that he had left the wound “inviolate,” i.e., untouched and therefore still readily visible. In that case, Charles Crenshaw and Robert McClelland, as well as other physicians, could easily have witnessed this wound. Even Milton Helpern, the éminence grise of forensic pathologists, agreed that Perry’s incision should not have affected the visibility of the wound. In fact, physicians Baxter (6H42), McClelland (6H32), and Jones (6H54) offered specific descriptions of this wound, and so also did Drs. Akins and Jenkins. (The reference 6H54 is to WC ancillary volume 6, page 54.) However, the most interesting witness to the throat wound was pathologist J. Thornton Boswell himself. Although the pathologists had originally denied seeing a throat wound during the autopsy, Boswell later told Andy Purdy of the HSCA (August 17, 1977, p. 8) that he had in fact seen “part of the perimeter of a bullet wound in the anterior neck.” In fact, only three years after the assassination, Boswell had told The Baltimore Sun (Richard H. Levine, 25 November 1966, front page article) that, before the autopsy began, the pathologists had been apprised of JFK’s wounds and what had been done to him at Parkland. (Actually, multiple witnesses were aware of the throat wound at Bethesda; Kathy Cunningham, in particular, has summarized this data.) Is McAdams truly ignorant of these statements? In any case, he reveals none of this to his readers, thereby giving us another example of begging the question, i.e., he takes for granted a conclusion that first requires independent verification. Of course, his approach here serves his purpose well: after all, if only two Parkland physicians saw the wound (as McAdams wants to believe), these two could more easily be overruled by the official autopsy report (than if many Parkland doctors had seen and reported an apparent entrance wound—which is actually what they did report).

    McAdams cites a Bowman-Gray study (p. 226), which concluded that ER doctors misinterpreted single bullet wounds (i.e., confusing entrance with exit) 37% of the time. Even if ER personnel cannot reliably distinguish entry from exit wounds, though, that comment obfuscates the situation. To the contrary, in this particular case several facts trump those medical reports: (1) such a tiny exit wound could not be duplicated in WC experiments and (2) Milton Helpern (who had done 60,000 autopsies) said that he had never seen an exit wound that was so small (under similar conditions). Of course these (negative) WC experiments made specific assumptions: a certain (low) entry site on JFK’s head, an explicit distance and elevation for the shooter, a Carcano bullet, etc., which means that the relevance of their experiments could be debated.

    Rather suspiciously, during a WC Executive Session (December 18, 1963), John McCloy, Hale Boggs, and Gerald Ford actually discussed a possible frontal shot from the overpass. Of course, Paul Mandel in LIFE magazine, with his contortionist view of JFK, had also raised the possibility of a frontal throat shot (that strangely enough came from the rear): see here. A final, telling blow derives from the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC): before political leverage was exerted, their first scenario actually included a throat shot at Z-190, many frames before Connally was struck, which was grossly inconsistent with the single bullet theory (SBT). See this data here. This NPIC study likely occurred after the LIFE article—after all, it quotes Mandel verbatim. These NPIC records were transferred from the CIA to the National Archives in 1993. They are located in flat #90A in the JFK Records Collection, along with the 4-panel briefing boards of the Zapruder film made by McMahon and Hunter.

    Although McAdams credits Josiah Thompson (Six Seconds in Dallas 1967) with the best pro-conspiracy book (p. vii), this may be a calculated selection by him, since that book ends on an equivocal note. Meanwhile, he ignores other books (e.g., Best Evidence, Murder in Dealey Plaza, Inside the ARRB) that present a far more powerful (and far more contemporary) case for conspiracy. But there is also the question of the magic bullet: its provenance has been extensively investigated by Josiah Thompson. In the face of the persistent refusal of the pertinent witnesses to identify this bullet, most likely it would never have been admitted at trial—and that alone would devastate any WC case. Thompson (with Gary Aguilar’s more recent assistance) has now so thoroughly destroyed the credibility of the alleged “magic bullet” that it (the bullet) should now simply be tossed into the outgoing trash. But, despite his reverence for Thompson, we learn none of this from McAdams. Here, however, is a direct quote from him about hiding evidence (p. 87):

    But sometimes withholding facts can be used to make a situation appear to be quite different from what it really is. That’s way too common in books about the Kennedy assassination. [By ignoring his own advice here, McAdams again commits the logical fallacy of inconsistency.]

    Here is yet one more problem (of many) with the SBT: so that the throat wound can remain (very) small, McAdams requires that the shirt and collar buttress the skin (p. 225). However, the eyewitness evidence is clear: the wound was above the shirt and tie. While before the WC, Charles Carrico (a surgeon, who saw the wound at Parkland) clearly implied that the wound was above the necktie and above the shirt collar (3H361-362). To leave no doubt about what Carrico had seen, Harold Weisberg reports his own confirmatory interview with Carrico (Post-Mortem 1969, pp. 357-358 and 375-376). Nurse Diana Bowron also reported seeing this wound while JFK was still in the limousine—before JFK was undressed (Killing the Truth by Harry Livingstone, p. 188)—but she could not have seen it unless it had been above the tie. Now think about this: if the wound indeed lay above the necktie, no buttressing would have been possible and McAdams’s case would then be at least suspect, if not lost. So McAdams has again hidden evidence from his reader and, as usual, this is evidence that seriously threatens his case. For more on the throat wound, see Milicent Cranor’s “Trajectory of a Lie” (as cited above). Ms. Cranor, after a thorough review of the ballistics literature, has offered an enlightening summary of relevant conclusions (see Appendix 6).

    The Back Wound

    In the autopsy photograph (Appendix 5, Figure 2), the back wound appears to lie at about T1 (i.e., the first thoracic vertebra), just above the level of the scapular spine. This seriously disagrees with the T3 on the death certificate, which was prepared by Admiral Burkley (p. 221). Two individuals even placed it at T4: James Jenkins and, in a conversation with me, John Ebersole (who practiced my specialty of radiation oncology). For normal anatomy see Appendix 5, Figures 3A and 3B. As is well known, the back wound in the autopsy photo is noticeably higher than the holes in the shirt or jacket. Furthermore, the wound on the Autopsy Descriptive Sheet (prepared by Boswell at the autopsy; see Appendix 5, Figure 4) appears to lie well below T1—at least as low as T2, if not even lower. An online source assigns a typical level to the scapular spine as T3 (manualmed.blogspot.com/2008/09/thoracicspine-landmarks.html). In fact, any level for this back wound below T1 would destroy the SBT (because the back wound would then be lower than the throat wound). However, Boswell later elevated this wound, thus abandoning his earlier, on-site observation. Somewhat amusingly, on this second occasion Boswell elevated this back wound far too high (compared to the autopsy photo), actually into the neck, which only raises questions about either his memory or his honesty. (See these two incompatible placements by Boswell at Inside the ARRB by Douglas Horne, Volume I, Figure 56.) A likely explanation for the discrepancy between the photo and the Descriptive Sheet is post-autopsy (illicit) photo alteration in the dark room. Curiously, this is the precise autopsy photo that displays an anomalous object on the back (not noted by prior investigations), which might be a leftover image from photographic tampering. Further discussion of this follows below.

    Another point is worth emphasizing: physical tests showed no copper deposits on the shirt or on the collar (in the front), even though they were present on the back of JFK’s jacket. This is consistent with a metal projectile as the source for the back wound, but it is inconsistent with a metal projectile through the front of the shirt. On the contrary, the slits had probably been created by the nurses’ scalpels. In an interview in 1971, Carrico actually confirmed this to Harold Weisberg—see Weisberg’s Subject Index File, under “Carrico,” items 02 and 03. (Jerry McKnight reports this.) In addition, based on my personal observations at the Archives, some cloth is missing from both the back of the shirt and the back of the jacket, but none appears missing from the slits at the collar. Furthermore, although McAdams claims that a throat wound at C7/T1 is feasible, he totally ignores the anatomic conundrums in the horizontal plane. (For pertinent, and rather devastating, anatomy and radiology images see Appendix 5, Figures 5-7.) For a more precise vertical level for the throat wound see MIDP (p. 228). James H. Fetzer has also offered a concise analysis of this evidence in “Reasoning about Assassinations,” which he presented at Cambridge and then published in an international, peer-reviewed journal (The International Journal of the Humanities (2005-2006), Volume 3, Issue 10, pp. 31-40).

    McAdams asks a pertinent question about the SBT: If a bullet struck the back, then where did this bullet go? He disregards a possible deflected fragment (from the street) that might have caused this wound. Such a bullet ricochet (possibly more than one) was reported by multiple eyewitnesses (6H238, 7H291, 7H507-515, MIDP, p. 36, and No More Silence by Larry Sneed, p. 145). Because this option—of a deflected projectile (not necessarily an entire bullet)—even appears in the WC ancillary volumes, McAdams has no excuse for omitting it.

    Of course, the same question might be asked about a frontal bullet to the throat: Where did it go? Again, McAdams has restricted the options, although he need not have done so. In MIDP (p. 258) I asked whether a glass fragment might have caused this wound. Such a fragment from the windshield (expelled by a frontal bullet) might fit this scenario. Moreover, its very narrow scattering cone (well documented in the ballistics literature) likely would have missed everyone else. Furthermore, the three tiny puncture wounds in JFK’s right cheek (reported by Tom Robinson during embalming) are also consistent with several additional, tiny scattered fragments from the front. (Given the typically short range of small particles, it is unlikely that they could have originated from the rear, as bone fragments for example, and then exited the cheek.) Of course, I don’t claim to know that a glass fragment is the explanation, but at least it should remain in this discussion. I know of no reason a priori to rule it out. To make matters even worse for McAdams, he himself quotes McClelland (p. 227): the president had “a fragment [emphasis added] wound of the trachea.” (This is actually McClelland’s handwritten note, as reproduced in the Warren Report (October 1964, p. 490).Therefore, by limiting the options for the throat wound, and for the back wound, McAdams has committed another logical fallacy—the false dichotomy.

    The Hole in the Windshield

    If the windshield had a perforated hole (from either direction), then the SBT would be seriously discredited, but McAdams insists (p. 193) that such a through-and-through hole did not exist. Assume for the moment that the hole existed: How then could that have occurred? A shot from the front, of course, might explain both such a hole as well as the throat wound (the latter possibly via a glass fragment), but the final destination of such a bullet would still be unexplained. (Perhaps it missed the limousine occupants, but then struck the street; multiple witnesses recalled such events on the street surface.) Here is another option: a shot from the rear (such as the WC bullet that missed) might be deployed for double duty, e.g., perhaps it was the source of James Tague’s wound after it traversed the windshield. Or perhaps a fragment of the headshot bullet (in the WC scenario) might have gone entirely through the windshield. Of course, the WC (and the HSCA, too) did not review these options—because their windshield had no hole. However, as is too often the case with McAdams, there is more to the story. Readers may wish to read the latest chapter on this matter, as reported by Doug Weldon. Unlike some contributors to this windshield discussion, Weldon has personally communicated with several of the witnesses. He notes that Richard Dudman, a reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, was flown to Washington, shown a windshield without a hole and only after that did he retract his prior statement. (See Dudman’s original article of December 21, 1963: “Commentary of an Eyewitness.” This can be viewed here.) Notably, after this he also severed his long-standing friendship with Robert Livingston, M.D., who had originally heard about the hole from Dudman. (Livingston, who directed a National Institute of Health at the time, also advised me that he had heard about replacement windshields while in Washington, which is surely a bizarre event if it had no substance.) Besides Dudman, witnesses who discussed a hole include Stavis Ellis (12HSCA23), Harry Freeman, Evangelea Glanges, Nick Principe, and Charles Taylor, Jr. Weldon reminds us that Taylor had written “…in 1963 that he saw a hole, confirmed it in 1975, and then was approached by the government and suddenly an affidavit is signed that he was mistaken and that the windshield he saw then was the same one he saw in 1963 without a hole.” Weldon credits Martin Hinrichs with a detailed comparison of windshield photos taken at different times, after which Hinrichs seriously questioned whether they were the same. Weldon also emphasizes his conversation with the Ford Motor Company witness, George Whitaker, who stated that the original windshield had been scrapped on November 25, 1963 in Dearborn, Michigan. This witness, who had much experience with gunshots through windshields, also recalled that the bullet had come from the front. (See Appendix 7 for a quotation from Weldon.)

    The Shirt and Jacket Holes (p. 223)

    McAdams assumes that the location of these holes supports the SBT. While at the Archives I had a tall male wear the jacket (while standing). He was an inch or two taller than JFK. What was surprising was how low these holes lay. The bullet holes in the shirt and jacket were nearly at the same level (as one another); the center of the hole in the shirt lay 7 ½ centimeters inferior to the horizontal shoulder seam. It also lay about 3 centimeters inferior to the top of the scapula. The clothing images may be seen at here and here. McAdams cites a photographic study that shows the jacket elevated during the motorcade here. Although it is likely that the jacket was elevated at the critical moment, this study surprisingly does not estimate how much it was elevated. This study concludes: “As a direct result, the ‘low’ bullet holes in John Kennedy’s shirt and jacket are not accurate indicators of the entry location, which must have been higher.” But this conclusion about the shirt cannot be certain—there is no photographic evidence of the shirt bunching up. In fact, Charles Carrico reported (3H359) that the back brace (“with stays and corset, in a corset-type arrangement and buckles”) extended upward nearly to the navel. This brace may therefore have kept the shirt from rising very much.

    The Head Wound(s)

    The most important JFK wounds are those of the head, but McAdams discusses these only tangentially. This is a truly astonishing lack of emphasis. Despite a stunning disagreement with McAdams by most of the professional witnesses, he insists (p. 180) that the back of the head was intact. He also insists that the autopsy photographs and X-rays are authentic, but we now know otherwise (see further discussion below). Images of the back of the head (on the AP skull X-ray) show a bone flap, which probably could swing in and out, remarkably consistent with McClelland’s verbal description of it. I have identified this structure on images (MIDP, p. 227); when this flap was closed, the occipital hole was probably less obvious. I have also identified the skull defect left behind by the Harper fragment—an observation I initially noted with my (then-myopic) naked eyes, but then also confirmed via optical density data. But the real riddles of these wounds (and the X-rays, too) are totally ignored by McAdams. For example, among other inconsistencies, the three pathologists and one radiologist all placed the posterior skull entry wound about 10 centimeters inferior to the trail of metallic debris. (I refer here to the obvious collection of metallic like particles located high in the skull; many of these particles have fuzzy borders, an observation that raises the possibility of a mercury bullet—from the front.) Additional paradoxes are cited in my unanswered letter (see Appendix 8) to Max Holland, another writer who is cited approvingly by McAdams (p. vii).

    Although not discussed by McAdams, the evidence for a right temple/forehead entry is particularly suggestive. Robert Karnei, a pathology resident at Bethesda (and later chief at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology), would have performed the autopsy had it been a routine one. He recalled that the embalmers were putting some wax into a tear or a laceration near the eye. At the news conference at Parkland Hospital immediately after the assassination, Malcolm Kilduff, the assistant press secretary (Pierre Salinger was flying over the Pacific with several cabinet members), was asked about the cause of death. He stated: “Dr. Burkley told me, it is a simple matter … of a bullet right through the head.” The striking feature of his response, however, was the non-verbal portion: as he made this statement, he pointed toward his right forehead, indicating the entry site. A photograph (The Killing of a President by Robert Groden, p. 59) captured this gesture at the critical moment. A follow-up question asked: “Can you say where the bullet entered his head, Mac?” To this Kilduff replied: “It is my understanding that it entered in the temple, the right temple.” Later that day, Chet Huntley repeated this: “President Kennedy, we are now informed, was shot in the right temple. ‘It was a simple matter of a bullet right through the head,’ said Dr. George Burkley, the White House medical officer.” (See JFK: The Medical Evidence Reference, by Vincent Palamara, p. 44.)

    Others corroborate this location, such as Seth Kantor (20H353), a Scripps-Howard reporter whose notes stated: “intered (sic) right temple.” Charles Crenshaw, M.D., one of the treating physicians in Trauma Room One, demonstrated this on live television for Geraldo Rivera (“Now It Can Be Told,” 2 April 1992). I still have this video in my personal library; Crenshaw shows just where this shot entered—near the hairline, just above the lateral border of the right eye socket.

    Tom Robinson, the embalmer who restored JFK’s head, described a wound, about 1/4 inch across, above the right eye near the hairline, where he had to place wax to disguise it (HSCA interview of January 12, 1977). He added that this wound was so close to the hairline that the hair could easily cover it, which may explain why more witnesses did not see it.

    Joe O’Donnell (photographer for the US Information Agency), afriend and occasional colleague of Robert Knudsen, was deposed by the ARRB. Within a short time after the assassination—in fact on two different occasions—Knudsen had shown him autopsy photographs. On the first of these, he saw a hole (about the size of a grapefruit) in the back of JFK’s head, about two inches above the hairline. This hole penetrated the skull and was very deep. Another photograph showed a hole in the forehead, above the right eye; this wound was round and about 3/8 inch in diameter. O’Donnell interpreted this as the frontal entry for a bullet that caused the large hole at the right rear. (The trail of metallic like debris across the top of the skull, however, is not consistent with a blowout of the right occiput—which is much lower—but that is a discussion for another day.)

    Dennis David also saw photographs with a bullet entry high in the right forehead. These were shown to him by William Pitzer (In the Eye of History by William Law, p. 23).

    Despite the right forehead laceration seen in the autopsy photo, the Parkland witnesses denied seeing any damage to JFK’s face. However, at Bethesda, Ed Reed (for the ARRB) recalled that Humes had made an incision in the forehead. Reed even recalls Humes sawing into the forehead bone and Robinson likewise recalls some sawing; furthermore, these events occurred quite early that evening.

    The skull X-rays themselves are quite consistent with such a right temple entry. The small metallic particles in these X-rays appear to align with just such an entry site. Even more intriguing, this extrapolated line seems to pass through a notch in the skull (the right forehead) that I noticed on the X-rays (for my sketch, see Killing Kennedy by Harrison Livingstone, p. 102). Furthermore, Boswell also sketched missing bone at precisely this site (when he drew on a skull model for the ARRB). There is one last tantalizing clue: the largest metal fragment should have the greatest range—and so it does. The lateral skull X-ray clearly shows that the largest authentic metal fragment (not the small one correlated with the 6.5 mm object within JFK’s right orbit on the AP X-ray) lies near the back of the head—which is consistent with a frontal shot.

    The Police Dictabelt

    McAdams devotes less than one page (!) to this data (p. 181). He baldly states that the HSCA study was “torn to pieces” by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). This would be a non-fallacious appeal to authority if the NAS scientists had been appropriately qualified (but none were actually acoustic experts—see Hear No Evil, p. 619). However, he ignores all of the work done since 1982, including a peer reviewed article by Donald Thomas as well as Don’s rather large book. But much other signally important work, including follow-up by some of the same NAS physicists, is also ignored. Interested readers can reference my three-part review of these issues here. Even the minimal data that McAdams does report is misleading: he implies that fifteen matches were found. In fact, 13 impulses were found on the test tape and 15 impulses on the dictabelt. Comparison of these echo peaks yielded eleven coincident impulses, with an impressive binary correlation coefficient of 0.79. This result led to their conclusion: a gunman was 95% present on the grassy knoll. When discussing false positives (pp. 182 and 192), McAdams reports: “…the scientific match–identified fifteen matches [sic]. There were, in short, way too many false positives.”

    But McAdams misleads us here—the evidence did not mean fifteen possible shots. (For further details, see Appendix 9.) After all, duplicate test shots had been fired from the Texas School Book Depository (TSBD), meaning both inside and outside the window. Furthermore, matches sometimes occurred at adjacent microphones—from the same shot—as might well be expected if the motorcycle had been between two adjacent microphones. In fact, only four actual shots were proposed. One can only wonder if McAdams has even a novice’s grasp of this subject. As the wise man said, “Where ignorance reigns, silence is golden.”

    Moreover, with these acoustics data we begin to unmask the profound biases of Professor McAdams. Although he acknowledges the debunking contributions of some pro-conspiracy researchers (p. 193), he curiously ignores another one—my own highly itemized (and definitely negative) review of the acoustics data. One of the blurb writers for McAdams’s book has noted that I am the only pro-conspiracy researcher who has publicly distanced himself from these acoustics data. Given the admiration of McAdams for his coterie of “debunking conspiracists,” my acoustics review might well have caught his (favorable) eye. Curiously, my favorable review of Dale Myers on this matter also escaped McAdams’s notice. McAdams should have enjoyed my negative conclusion about the acoustic data; for this he might at least have awarded me “honorable mention” in his coterie’s hall of fame. (Myers, of course, was given first class honors by McAdams for his computer reconstruction, despite the fact that Cranor, Jim DiEugenio, and I, among others, have skewered that entire project.) That the Mantik name does not even appear in the book’s index only provokes some probing questions about the mindset of our ersatz instructor in logic. Paradoxically, some of his cited articles do recognize me.

    “The Most Reliable Evidence”: the X-rays and Photos

    “Focusing on the most reliable evidence violates the collector’s instinct of conspiracy theorists. They collect evidence assiduously, and whoever has the biggest collection is the best researcher—just as the best stamp collector is one who has the largest number and the rarest stamps” (p. 157).

    As stamp collector I strongly object, on multiple levels, to this characterization. First, I have done precisely what McAdams has advised (p. x), i.e., “focus on the hard data.” I have repeatedly examined the autopsy materials at the National Archives (online: “20 conclusions after 9 visits”), yet McAdams has unfailingly ignored this data. Even more damning though, these data from the Archives are not theoretical (no conspiracy theorist here); rather, they are observational and experimental (perhaps I am a “conspiracy experimentalist”), replete with hundreds of measurements. Furthermore, these data can in principle be reproduced by anyone with access to the autopsy X-rays. (I have seen an optical densitometer at the Archives, which they might loan to McAdams; even a nonscientist can quickly learn to use it—with minimal instruction.) The use of optical density measurements in radiology is an old science (for this history see Appendix 10) and data acquisition itself is rather trivial. After calibrating the device (a simple matter—which I often did during my work), the X-ray is positioned and a reading is taken. For the 6.5 mm object within JFK’s right orbit (on the AP X-ray) I have done this many, many times, typically in the presence of multiple witnesses: an ophthalmologist, an astronomer (who employs optical density measurements in his specialty), and multiple staff members from the Archives. These simple data are astounding: the apparent metallic length of this 6.5 mm object (from front to back), implied by even a single measurement, is radically inconsistent with reality (it is far too long). At this juncture, Sherlock Holmes, from my favorite childhood tale (The Sign of the Four)is precisely on target: “Eliminate all other factors, and the one which remains must be the truth.” In this case the conclusion is unambiguous: this 6.5 mm object must have been superimposed in the darkroom and must therefore be a forgery (Assassination Science, edited by James Fetzer, pp. 120-137). Even Larry Sturdivan, the ballistics expert who testified before the WC (and who is even cited by McAdams, p. 130) could not explain this object.

    I’m not sure just what that 6.5 mm fragment is. One thing I’m sure it is NOT is a cross-section from the interior of a bullet. I have seen literally thousands of bullets, deformed and undeformed, after penetrating tissue and tissue simulants. Some were bent, some torn in two or more pieces, but to have a cross-section sheared out is physically impossible. That fragment has a lot of mystery associated with it. Some have said it was a piece of the jacket, sheared off by the bone and left on the outside of the skull. I’ve never seen a perfectly round piece of bullet jacket in any wound. Furthermore, the fragment seems to have greater optical density thin-face on [the frontal X-ray] than it does edgewise [the lateral X-ray]…. The only thing I can think is that it is an artifact (MIDP, p. 266).

    Of course, Sturdivan’s conclusion is just more vital evidence that McAdams has decided to cull; even worse, though, he does not so inform his readers. To date, no one (unless forgery is invoked) has been able to explain this bizarre 6.5 mm object on JFK’s AP X-ray. Even the experts for the ARRB (including the forensic radiologist, John J. Fitzpatrick, who was visibly troubled by this strange feature) could not explain this fantastic object). So we are left with this conclusion about this hardest of “hard” evidence: an odd event occurred in JFK’s X-rays that has never, before or since, been seen in the history of radiology. Furthermore, even the best experts in forensic radiology still cannot explain it. And this is what McAdams—who has never claimed to be an expert on X-rays—takes for “hard” evidence of no conspiracy. (Since Speer’s essays overlap with these issues, readers might also review my response to Pat’s protests at here.) Also recall that Helpern, in over 60,000 cases, had never seen an exit bullet produce a wound like that in JFK’s throat. That might raise an acutely troubling question about the lone gunman scenario: How likely is it that two such unprecedented events would spontaneously appear in just one case?

    McAdams asks whether the photos and X-rays had changed in the interval between the autopsy and the Clark Panel (1968). He has an excellent reason for asking this question: the perplexing 6.5 mm object within JFK’s right orbit had not been reported at the autopsy, even though the chief goal of the X-rays had been to identify precisely such objects. Moreover, McAdams never asks the most embarrassing question: Of the many individuals who saw the X-rays that night, why did no one discuss, report, or recall this bizarre object?

    To make matters even worse for this “hard” evidence, I made one more critical observation on a lateral JFK skull X-ray at the Archives, an observation that any amateur could easily reproduce (including several anti-conspiracists who have since visited, yet apparently failed to look): this left lateral is obviously a copy, not an original. Why does that matter? First, the Archives claim that it is an original, so something is clearly amiss. Secondly, though, if it is a copy, the door would be left wide open to manipulation in the dark room. And how do I know it is a copy? Because a T-shaped inscription was made on the original film by someone (for an unknown reason, but it doesn’t matter); this could only have been done by scraping the emulsion off the film, a fact that would be trivial to see on an original. But here is the problem: the film at the Archives has no missing emulsion! In fact all surfaces (near this inscription) show entirely intact emulsion—which, of course, perfectly describes a duplicate X-ray film. Of course, McAdams has also culled this observation from his data set. He could easily have tested this observation himself—even now, why doesn’t he just book a trip to the Archives?

    The autopsy photographs constitute more “hard” evidence that McAdams likes to cite, but all is not kosher here either. Despite what the HSCA reported, stereo viewing in one particular photographic pair (of the back of the head) does not yield a 3D image. As the HSCA concluded, however, all other such pairs do indeed yield a 3D image (as I also observed via the stereo viewer). I would emphasize though that the HSCA never actually viewed a control photo in which such a hairpiece had actually been photographically inserted. Therefore, when they finally saw such a photo in the autopsy collection, it was not surprising that they failed to recognize it as fraudulent. In fact, precisely where the hair is suspect, the image is 2D, just what would be expected if an identical replacement hairpiece had been inserted (in the darkroom) into both members of a matched pair of photos. I made this observation (consistently) on multiple pairs: the transparencies, the colored prints, and the black and white pair. This paradox remained unchanged no matter how I positioned or rotated each member of the pair.

    But there is yet more trouble: a matched stereo pair of 5×7 transparencies (of JFK’s back) displays a different object (on the left back) for each transparency. On one, a small dark spot is visible (possibly clotted blood, although the actual cause is irrelevant for this discussion), but on the second transparency (at the same site on the back), this dark spot has been transformed into a much lighter spot, with a horizontal dark line through it! Furthermore, each of the two matched color prints (of this same perspective) shows only the dark spot. (I know that these prints are a matched pair because they yield a 3D image of the back via the stereo viewer.) So now the questions become obvious: How can two transparencies, supposedly taken just seconds apart at the autopsy, be that different? And how can these two color prints (each showing a dark spot) derive, as they must, from two different transparencies (i.e., only one of these transparencies shows the dark spot)? This is impossible, and that by itself raises troubling questions about the authenticity of at least one transparency (especially the one with the lighter spot and horizontal line). We can put this paradox in another way: one of the color prints must be an orphan, i.e., both color prints display the dark spot, but only one transparency displays this spot, so where is the transparency that gave rise to the second color print? (The transparencies are claimed to be the actual photos exposed by the autopsy photographer, while the prints, on the other hand, were supposedly copied from the transparencies.) These anomalous observations are profoundly troubling: they inescapably open the door to alteration in the darkroom. Even more suspiciously, this photo (of the back) just happens also to include the bizarre hairpiece. McAdams has never viewed these autopsy materials himself—as usual, he just quotes the impressions of others. Why doesn’t he finally take a look himself (and remember to bring along a stereo viewer)? After all, personal observation beats trading on the reports of others, but it does take a little effort.

    Quite strikingly, the photo experts agreed with Robert Groden that an area at the back of JFK’s head looked abnormally dark, but they said that the hair (curiously in just this limited area) must have been washed before the photos were taken (presumably in order to make the wound more visible). Although they said this area looked wet, no one at the autopsy recalled such washing; in fact, everyone who was asked denied such cleaning. (See The Boston Globe, June 21, 1981.) Finally, this “wet” area is precisely the same site that looked suspicious to me during my stereo viewing. What is the likelihood of that occurring by chance alone?

    Fingerprint Evidence (pp. 160-161)

    Identifying criminals by their fingerprints had been introduced in the 1860s by Sir William James Herschel in India. Francis Galton (with an IQ of 200 and a half-cousin to Charles Darwin) identified specific types of fingerprint patterns. He described and classified them into eight broad categories and his work led to their use in the courtroom. Galton also invented a pocket counting device used to record attractive women in Great Britain, which allowed him to create the first “beauty map” of the land. Although he also invented the term “eugenics,” he appears not to have suggested selecting for gorgeous offspring.

    McAdams enthuses over the fingerprint (and palm print) evidence, which he claims implicates Oswald. Although Carl Day was the criminalist in question (pp. 66 and 160), quite amazingly, in 1964 he refused to sign a written statement confirming his fingerprint findings! (See WC Exhibit 3145, which is the FBI interview of September 9, 1964.)

    Both McAdams and Bugliosi totally ignore a recent insurrection in the use of fingerprint evidence, as currently practiced. In fact, it has come under increasing skepticism—as unscientific (see further discussion below). Not so long ago, a similar revolt occurred in the mainstream scientific community against neutron activation analysis, which HSCA Chief Counsel Robert Blakey had once called the “linch pin” of the case against Oswald. Now, however, because it was not scientific, the FBI has abandoned its use in the courtroom. Even Blakey has since described it as “junk science.” Although I suspect that fingerprint evidence can eventually be resuscitated for courtroom use, this practice still has a long way to go—and that recognition has come surprisingly late. For far too long, these practitioners have hoodwinked the judges (and McAdams and Bugliosi, too) into believing that they are as infallible as the pope, as we see in this quotation:

    It would seem that a majority of our FP experts agree that fingerprint identification properly carried out & verified is an absolute fact, not an opinion. (“FP Identification—Opinion or Fact,” circulated by Euan Innes, Head of the Scottish Fingerprint Service.

    In fact, these practitioners can offer only opinions, which have often been proved wrong. Two examples include the Cowansand Mayfield cases (for the latter, see Hear No Evil by Donald Thomas, p. 71). In an article published on March 15, 2005, Sandy L. Zabell, Ph.D., Professor of Mathematics and Statistics at Northwestern University, tells us about subjectivity in “Fingerprint Evidence”:

    Another important reason for the increased scrutiny of fingerprint evidence is the increasing number of documented misidentifications based on fingerprint analysis. Such misidentifications are of interest for several reasons: they illustrate the subjective nature of fingerprint evidence; they directly contradict a number of claims advanced by the fingerprint profession; and they provide concrete illustrations of just what can go wrong.

    Latent print examination necessarily contains a large subjective component, something that automatically rules out certainty. The ability of the human mind to see what it hopes or expects is truly remarkable, and this ability flourishes in the absence of stringent safeguards. (article here)

    We humans are remarkably skilled at seeing what we want to see. For example, see “The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion,” by Michel D. Risinger, et al., California Law Review, Volume 90, p. 1 (2002). For a classic discussion of human misperception, see Water Witching by Evon Z. Vogt and Ray Hyman. More to the point, David E. Bernstein, Professor, George Mason University School of Law, tells it like it is:

    Much “forensic science” testimony is actually connoisseur testimony disguised as science. If one asks (as this author has) fingerprint experts, forensic anthropologists, polygraph examiners, and many other forensic “scientists” what basis the jury ultimately has to trust their testimony, the answer is that the jury must rely on their training and years of experience. (“Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert Revolution”)

    Although the reliability of the individual examiner naturally varies, the underlying problem is the estimate of rarity, i.e., how many individuals have quite similar fingerprint patterns? Although the FBI now uses a computer data bank (Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System) for comparisons, that has not historically been the case. (Dana Priest and William Arkin, in Top Secret America 2011, report that 96 million sets of prints are currently stored at the FBI’s facility at Clarksburg, West Virginia.) On the contrary, it has been more typical for a single expert merely to offer his opinion on the probability of a match—based on his own necessarily limited experience, as we see here:

    In the absence of data for calculating rarity estimates, it has been left to individual examiners themselves to purportedly make subjective estimates of the rarity of the consistent detail in each latent print within the population…. This is, of course, yet another way in which a latent finger examiner’s conclusion…is an opinion, not a ‘fact”…. (“The Opinionization of Fingerprint Evidence,” by Simon Cole, BioSocieties (2008), 3, 105-113.)

    This also means that the opinion rendered does not (and intrinsically cannot) estimate the probability of error. Because an error estimate is often seen as the hallmark of real science, fingerprint evidence in general is inevitably left in a kind of forensic limbo. The following quotation illustrates just how large a chasm exists between judges and science today:

    Courts have ruled uniformly in more than 40 Daubert hearings since 1999 that fingerprint  evidence rests on a valid method, referred to as the Analysis-Comparison-Evaluation-Verification (ACE-V) method.… We analyze evidence for the validity of the standards underlying the conclusions made by fingerprint examiners. We conclude that the kinds of experiments that would establish the validity of ACE-V and the standards on which conclusions are based have not been performed. These experiments require a number of prerequisites, which also have yet to be met, so that the ACE-V method currently is both untested and untestable. (“Scientific Validation of Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert,” by Lyn Haber and Ralph Norman Haber, Law Probability and Risk (2008) 7 (2): 87-109.)

    The Hyde Park Bombing is a specific example of how opinions can differ, sometimes by a lot:

    Another case which clearly exemplifies this ‘different opinions’ position is the appeal case against Gilbert McNamee (The Hyde Park Bombing). In brief, FP marks were found on a Duracell battery which was removed from an explosive device. McNamee was convicted and appealed but was turned down. After serving 12 years in prison McNamee’s case was raised and heard by the Criminal Review Commission. At the end of November 1998, 13 different experts including Heads and Deputy heads of bureaux in England, Senior fingerprint experts and Independent experts gave opinions at the Royal Court of Justice in London as to their findings. Opinions ranged from “not identical”, “identical” and “insufficient.” Opinions also ranged as to whether the mark had any movement in it. McNamee’s appeal was successful.

    How does all of this impact the case against Oswald? First, as Don Thomas reminds us in scrupulous detail (Hear No Evil, chapter 2), there are major problems with the provenance of Oswald’s fingerprints. But secondly, only one expert (Vincent Scalese for Frontline, in the 1993 PBS documentary) has fingered Oswald based on the fingerprints from the trigger guard (aka the magazine housing). In view of the history of opinions on this specific print (e.g., Scalese had earlier claimed that it had no value and Carl Day had declined to make a positive identification), is it likely that a single opinion has now finally arrived at the truth? According to Bugliosi, this probability is 100% (Reclaiming History 2007, p. 804), but when Bugliosi reached this conclusion, why did he ignore Zabell’s comment (made in 2005—two years before Bugliosi’s publication date) that 100% certainty is undeniably excessive? (See further discussion below.)

    Perhaps Oswald had handled the Mannlicher gun barrel (when disassembled) at some earlier date—based on Carl Day’s observation of the print under the wooden stock, and his statement that this print was dry (and therefore old). But the fingerprint evidence (from the trigger guard) that Oswald had handled the rifle on or about November 22 is not conclusive.

    McAdams lists his “killer evidence” (p. 2) as fingerprints, handwriting, ballistics, and photographs (notice that he omits neutron activation analysis). With fingerprint evidence now under the gun, an independent look at the ballistics evidence might also be wise. For example, Howard Donahue (a court-certified firearms expert and a world-class marksman), after viewing one of the limousine fragments (at the Archives), was quite puzzled by how severely its jacket had been peeled back, which was hardly consistent with its striking JFK’s head. On the contrary, he thought it much more likely that concrete (i.e., a ricochet from the street) caused this near-magical bending (Mortal Error by Bonar Menninger, p. 75). We can only wonder: With the “linch pin” permanently missing in action and now fingerprint evidence also severely threatened, can we expect any WC loyalists to reconsider their positions—or does “hard” evidence not matter after all?

    I conclude this section with another quotation from Sandy L. Zabell (see citation above). Especially note the lack of correlation between a courtroom conviction and the scientific truth:

    In the past, the fingerprint community has defended its lack of scientific grounding, in part, by appealing to its track record in the courts. The importance of Cowansand Mayfield, among other things, is that they underscore the shakiness of such an argument. Obtaining a conviction does not validate the identification [emphasis added].

    A rigorous system of mandatory, frequent, external blind proficiency testing needs to be implemented. Second, a mechanism for routine, random, blind audits of latent identifications should be established. Third, the government needs to fund research into the validity and reliability of fingerprint identification, the development of pattern recognition software, and the quantification of the uncertainty inherent in latent print identifications.

    Finally, the courts have a role to play as well. Limits should be placed on the testimony of fingerprint examiners (“100 percent positive identification”), so that their testimony reflects the true limits of their expertise. “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent.” (The quote is from the concluding sentence of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1921).)

    In 1993, for Frontline, Vincent Scalese set himself up as the perfect target for Zabell’s quotation (about “100 percent positive identification”):

    …we’re able for the first time to actually say that these are definitely the fingerprints of Lee Harvey Oswald and that they are on the rifle. There is no doubt about it (McAdams, p. 161, note 27).

    This is what McAdams calls “killer evidence” (pp. 2 and 161). Unfortunately, though, Scalese’s report came about a decade (or more) before the many strictly opposite quotations above. Despite his obeisance to fingerprints, McAdams seems blissfully unaware of the recent revolution in the scientific use of this evidence.                                         

    Conclusions

    I was seriously disappointed by this book, not merely because I disagreed with it on so many fundamental issues, but even more so because it fell so far short of its announced goals (of explaining and promoting critical thinking). I was also disenchanted that it so often merely regurgitated second hand data; McAdams appears to have done little research of his own—and none at all at the National Archives and apparently none at the Sixth Floor Museum. Chiefly, however, I was astonished by the central issues that he frequently overlooked. Moreover, not every one of his oversights is easily explained by random chance, and that inevitably raises the ugly specter of evidence suppression. After all, if some of these omissions were deliberate, that is radically different from merely overlooking critical problems. Of course, the book is rather short, and space was limited, but many of these neglected issues (such as those I cite here, even in this limited review) could have been incorporated, had McAdams merely been willing to dispense with his incessant and peripatetic comments, e.g., 9/11, UFOs, moon landings, unrelated conspiracies, bureaucrats, Obama’s birth certificate, and especially his interminable thrashing of inconsequential witnesses. (After all, the book’s title is JFK Assassination Logic.) He might also have called off his attacks on feeble-minded conspiracy believers in favor of a few more fundamental issues, but that would, of course, have necessitated more critical thinking.

    Although McAdams persistently rants about the critical role of hard evidence, we might ask a simple question: Does he follow his own advice? Obviously not. In fact, aside from Chapter 15 (the SBT), only about one in every nine pages qualifies for that mark of respect. McAdams even agrees with me that the “best” evidence includes the medical evidence (p. 179). So how many pages does McAdams devote to this?—aside from Chapter 15, only about 10 pages (in a book of 254 pages).

    Although it was a ground-breaking book for its time, citing Six Seconds in Dallas as still “the best conspiracy book” seems self-serving. Does McAdams somberly believe that no significant books have been published in the 44 years since 1967? If so, that would totally account for—without comment or discussion—most of the points that had to be raised in this review. Of course, such an attitude by McAdams just creates another straw man, i.e., he suggests that a far older (and therefore necessarily more incomplete) conspiracy book presents a stronger case than that presented by more recent conspiracy-oriented books. In summary, we don’t need more books like this. We have recently been gifted with two books packed full of sundry details—by Bugliosi and by Horne—but both strangely ignored by McAdams. We don’t need any more short survey books either (Stewart Galanor has already bestowed on us his brilliant Cover-Up). What we do need now are researchers dedicated to specific issues (McAdams does cite several examples), but above all we need authors with open minds. That would indeed be novel, but these two traits do not feature strongly in this book. McAdams might instead go back to doing whatever he does best—with elections on the horizon, perhaps voter behavior might give him pleasure. He might also benefit from a course in logic—after all, as we have repeatedly seen, critical thinking about JFK is clearly not his strong suit (see Appendix 11).

                                       

    Appendix 1: Abbreviations

    ARRB = Assassination Records Review Board
    FP = fingerprint
    HSCA = House Select Committee on Assassinations
    JAMA = Journal of the American Medical Association
    MIDP = Murder in Dealey Plaza
    NAS = National Academy of Sciences
    SBT = single bullet theory
    TSBD= Texas School Book Depository
    WC = Warren Commission

    Appendix 2: Eyewitness Recall

    In her book (Eyewitness Testimony 1996, p. 25), Elizabeth Loftus summarized a highly pertinent Michigan paper. Ironically, the dust jacket of her book questions the reliability of eyewitnesses. Contrary to the dust jacket, however, the original University of Michigan paper by Marshall, Marquis, and Oskamp (Harvard Law Review 84: 1620 (1971)) makes a startlingly powerful case for eyewitness reliability. [Coincidentally, I was on the tenure-track Michigan physics faculty that same year.]

    Marshall et al. showed a two-minute, homemade, color movie film with sound to 151 “witnesses.” Within minutes of their viewing they gave a “free report,” during which the interrogator said almost nothing. In individual interviews held in private rooms they were asked to be as accurate and complete as possible, with the understanding that the interviewer had not seen the movie. After this, they were examined using one of four types of questions: (1) open-ended with moderate guidance, (2) open-ended with high guidance, (3) structured, multiple choice questions, and (4) structured leading questions. In addition, half of the witnesses encountered a supportive atmosphere whereas the other half met a hostile atmosphere. To assess salience of specific items, a second group (high school students and members of the survey staff) were asked to recall as many as possible of the 900 items in the movie; if more than 50% of these viewers reported a particular item it was labeled highly salient. The conclusions of this study are as follows.
    The first surprise was that the experimental atmosphere, whether hostile or supportive, had no important effect on either the accuracy or completeness of the testimony. In the free report format, the accuracy of the witnesses was never less than 95% for any degree of salience, and it was 99% for highly salient items. And for these items, it made little difference how the questions were asked: the accuracy ranged from 96 to 99%.

    The free report format yielded the lowest completeness—70% for highly salient items. For these items, higher levels of completeness were found for moderate guidance (84%), high guidance (88%), multiple choice (98%), and leading (98%) questions. The greater the salience, the less was the effect of different types of interrogation on accuracy. Also, as salience increased there was only a small increase in completeness. The authors note that the trade-off between accuracy and completeness was much less than expected; in fact, coverage could increase a great deal while accuracy declined only slightly.

    Accuracy and completeness were also assessed by type of item: person, action, sound, and object. In the free report, accuracy for sounds was 92%, while the other formats ranged from 78% to 90%. For actions—the most pertinent item for the JFK motorcade—accuracy remained high with moderate guidance (97%) or even with high guidance (94%). For actions, completeness was as follows: free report (28%), moderate guidance (38%), high guidance (42%), multiple choice (86%), and leading (87%). These researchers concluded: “Our witnesses were able to testify with impressive ability. For instance, those confronted with leading interrogation in a challenging atmosphere testified with approximately 83% accuracy and 84% coverage.”

    The astonishing reliability of these witnesses is quite remarkable: it is totally contrary to the traditional view of eyewitness unreliability. What made these witnesses so reliable? The authors note that an immediate interview is different from the usual courtroom situation, which often occurs months or even years after the event. This promptness, no doubt, improved the performances of the witnesses. The authors also add, however, that salience is a major factor and they emphasize that prior studies had often investigated nonsalient items. [The above has been adapted from my article in MIDP, pp. 339-340.]

    The effect of violence on memory is yet another issue. It seems likely that violence, by itself, need not necessarily reduce one’s memory for an event. See “Effects of Television Violence on Memory for Violent and Nonviolent Advertising,” by Barrie Gunter, Adrian Furnham, and Eleni Pappa at http://public.wsu.edu/~mija_shin/alex.pdf:

    The nonviolent version of the target advertisement was less well remembered when placed in the violent film than in the nonviolent film, supporting Bushman and Bonacci (2002). In contrast, the violent version of the target advertisement was remembered much better than the nonviolent version when placed in the violent film sequence. Participants’ hostility scores were higher only after watching the violent film, and associated with an impairment in the memory of the nonviolent advertisements, while enhancing the memory of the violent advertisement, thus providing some support for Bushman’s (1998a) hostile-thought hypothesis.

     Appendix 3: Recollections of the Parkland Physicians

    Here is a list of Dallas physicians who, at some time, stated that the photograph of the back of the head was (at least) distinctly different from what they had seen at Parkland:          

    Kemp Clark Marion Jenkins Jackie Hunt Malcolm Perry
    Joe Goldstrich Jim Carrico Ronald Jones Robert McClelland
    Gene Akin Paul Peters Charles Baxter Charles Crenshaw
    Richard Dulaney Fouad Bashour Kenneth Salyer Adolph Giesecke

    In case the reader is waiting for a companion list—those who saw this photograph and immediately recognized it as authentic—there is none. No Parkland physician, on first seeing the posterior photograph of the skull, recognized that image as authentic! [This has been adapted from my article in MIDP, p. 240.]

    Appendix 4: Major Secrets Can be Kept

    Many lines of evidence suggest that major secrets can be kept for long intervals of time. This is not only possible, but for bureaucracies, is surprisingly common (Voltaire’s Bastards by John Ralston Paul; see Chapter 12, “The Art of the Secret,” especially p. 289). Gary L. Aguilar, M.D., has reminded us that Daniel Ellsberg, who released the Pentagon Papers, recalls that in 1964 at least 100 people knew the same information that he disclosed in 1971, yet no one said anything about it before he did. See this article of May 27, 1997: “Ellsberg Remembers,” The Nation (p. 7).

    On the morning that the first nuclear bomb was exploded in the New Mexico desert in 1945, Mrs. Leslie Groves received a telephone call. The caller suggested that she listen to the radio during the day since one of her family members would be in the news. Not knowing what to expect, and not even knowing which family member was meant, she was shocked to learn that her husband, General Leslie Groves, had been the military director of the Manhattan Project. Many others at Los Alamos, to say nothing of family and friends, honored this same state of secrecy. Neither the public nor the media knew any significant details of this project during the several years that it continued, or if they did know, they also kept the secret.

    Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary tried (irresponsibly) to take credit for exposing the (unethical, by today’s standards) radiation experiments that began in the 1940s. However, it was only through the persistent and courageous work of Eileen Welsome (The Plutonium Files 1999) that the public finally learned about these escapades. My files contain numerous examples of medical misbehavior over several decades—about which no one ever said anything for many years. Without Welsome we may never have learned about the radiation experiments either. Furthermore, these experiments were performed at blue ribbon universities and institutions. In each of these cases the secret was kept for many years, and often kept by many.

    Walter Goodman (“Mass Media: The Generation of the Lie,” All Honorable Men 1963, Chapter 4) recalls the TV quiz shows of that era. Congressional hearings were conducted and participants (at all levels) were questioned under oath. New York County District Attorney Frank Hogan (interim HSCA Chief Counsel Robert Tanenbaum later worked in the same office) reported that of 150 contestants on Tic-Tac-Dough and Twenty-One, no fewer than 100 had lied about getting answers. Would we have known any of this without Herbert Stempel? Could we even—especially during that era—have believed it? Nor can it be said that disclosure was inevitable, since the shows were losing popularity and their long-term survival was becoming less certain. [The above has been adapted from my article in MIDP, pp. 337-338.]

    Another remarkable example is MyLai. It parallels the JFK case by also being a military cover-up. Psychiatrist M. Scott Peck (People of the Lie, p. 214) informs us that 500 personnel probably knew that war crimes had been committed, but no one had said anything. Only because Ron Ridenhour, a nonparticipant, sent a letter in March 1969 to several congressmen did this affair come to light. (Also see my Foreword to In the Eye of History by William Law.)

    Appendix 5: Anatomy and Radiology

    image Figure 1. AP Autopsy X-ray of JFK’s skull. Note the semi-lunar (6.5 mm) object inside JFK’s right orbit (vertical green arrow). The metal fragment overlying the left skull is identified by the horizontal red arrow. When questioned by the WC, James Humes (the pathologist) stated (2H100) that the largest metal fragment removed from JFK’s skull was “Flat, irregular, two or three millimeters.” Surely this does not describe the 6.5 mm object seen here. Before the ARRB, Humes was again asked whether the metal fragments he had removed were larger or smaller than this 6.5 mm object. He replied (MIDP, p. 449), “Smaller. Smaller; considerably smaller….I don’t recall retrieving anything of this size.” The other two pathologists also did not recall this object.

    http://i217.photobucket.com/albums/cc151/David_Von_Pein/MISCELLANEOUS%20JFK-RELATED%20PHOTOS/JFK_Autopsy_Photo_3.jpg?t=1278230684 http://jfk-archives.blogspot.com/2010/07/jfk-back-wound-location.html
    Figure 2. Autopsy photograph of JFK’s back. The wound (arrow) appears to be at about T1. The scapular spine is faintly visible.

    posterior view Figure 3A. The horizontal scapular spine can be faintly seen (red arrow), inferior to the level of T1. The scapular spine appears to lie at about the level of T2 or T3, close to Boswell’s level for the back wound on his Autopsy Descriptive Sheet. In other words, the autopsy photo and Boswell’s Sheet are inconsistent. Far worse, though, Boswell later elevated this wound into the neck, much higher than shown in the autopsy photograph. Any level inferior to T1 for the back wound makes the SBT impossible.

    http://i.cdn.turner.com/dr/teg/tsg/release/sites/default/files/imagecache/750x970/documents/descriptive1.gif Figure 3B. Another view of the back. Here the scapular spine appears to lie at the level of T3 or T4. An online source assigns a typical level to the scapular spine as T3 (manualmed.blogspot.com/2008/09/thoracicspine-landmarks.html). The C-designations here are for the cervical nerves, not for the vertebrae. (Nerves C2-C8 exit inferior to the vertebrae C1-C7, respectively.)

    http://www.herniatedlumbardisk.com/images/Spine-Anatomy.jpg http://www.thesmokinggun.com/file/autopsy-descriptive-sheet?page=0
    Figure 4. The Autopsy Descriptive Sheet, prepared by Boswell. Note the level of the back wound (indicated by the horizontal line from “7 x 4 mm”). It appears to lie at least as low as T2, possibly even lower. If accurate, that would immediately invalidate the SBT.

    http://ts1.mm.bing.net/images/thumbnail.aspx?q=1339753571660&id=269f742be9d2ee98ca6377cafcccf958&url=http%3a%2f%2fwww.waterburyhospital.org%2fservices%2fortho%2fimages%2fcspine3.jpg Figure 5. Skeleton as viewed from the front. McAdams claims (p. 223) that the bullet (of the SBT) traversed JFK at C7/T1 (between the levels of the seventh cervical and the first thoracic vertebrae)—at about the tip of the vertical cyan arrow. The horizontal red arrow identifies the C7 vertebra. As seen here, it is impossible for a bullet to pass between the transverse process of C7 and the medial portion of the first rib (cyan arrow), without damaging bone. Also note how close together (actually overlapping) these transverse processes are for all of the cervical vertebrae. Therefore, no bullet could have traversed JFK at any cervical level and still be consistent with the autopsy photograph (without causing obvious bone destruction). On the other hand, a bullet inferior to T1 would likely have perforated the right lung apex, which was not seen at the autopsy. Only a contusion was seen there.
    http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=Anatomy+Of+Spine&FORM=IQFRDR#x0y1427

    Cervical Spine X-Ray: Image 1 http://www.info-radiologie.ch/cervical_spine_radiograph.php
    Figure 6. Cervical Spine X-ray: AP view. 1, Clavicle. 2, 1st rib (from T1). 3, Trachea. 4, Spinous process of C7. 5, Vertebral Body of C5. 6, Uncinate process. A bullet could not pass at the site implied by McAdams (tip of the vertical cyan arrow), which lies between the level of the C7 vertebral body (horizontal red arrow) and the level of T1, without causing obvious bone destruction. That was not seen in JFK.

     

    911_Card24.jpg Figure 7. CT scan of a patient. This cross section is very close to C7-T1, the level chosen by McAdams for the SBT. I used JFK’s wound measurements to place the hypothetical trajectory (in red). Such a trajectory is impossible here because bone from the spine (the transverse process) intervenes. Based on his X-rays, JFK experienced no such bone trauma. In 1963, CT scans were still in the distant future. This visual disproof of the single bullet theory was first anticipated several years after the assassination (but still well before CT scanners) by a pathologist, John Nichols, MD, PhD.

    Appendix 6: Exit and Entrance Wounds in the Literature (per Milicent Cranor)

    1. Entrance wounds can be jagged. A few JFK witnesses said that the throat wound was somewhat jagged; these comments have been used by WC loyalists to conclude that the throat wound was an exit.

    1. Entrance wounds need not have abrasion collars. Some of the Parkland doctors indicated that JFK’s throat wound had an abrasion collar, which would suggest an entrance wound. However, its absence would prove nothing.

    1. Shored (buttressed) exit wounds do have abrasion collars; in fact, these are typically large (not the case for JFK). The abrasion collar is formed when the bullet crushes the skin against a rigid object that “shores” the skin, i.e., the skin is fixed in place as the bullet exits. And, because the skin is kept in place and is not stretched outward while the bullet advances, the wound size matches the bullet size (like a cookie cutter). Most entrance wounds are shored by muscle or bone and are therefore small. JFK’s small throat wound is sometimes attributed (by WC loyalists) to shoring by the collar and necktie. But in every case of a shored wound, there is a pronounced abrasion collar, with bits of skin pulled outward as the neck and shirt eventually separate. Therefore, skin is left behind on the material (in this case, the shirt). The FBI examined the inside of JFK’s shirt, but they found not even a scrap of skin.

    1. Exit wounds can be small, as proved by well-controlled experiments and wartime experience. A typical (unshored) exit wound is large. In this case, the bullet stretches the skin outward, causing tenting and then tearing of the skin as it exits, and it leaves behind a star-shaped wound. Loose clothing can permit enough stretching that the bullet can exit before it encounters cloth. In specific cases though unshored exit wounds can be even smaller than the entrance wounds from the same bullet. This is more likely when the exit speed is low. In particular, a bullet fired from a great distance may lose much of its energy, and thereby create a small exit wound.

    1. When police cannot decide between an entrance versus an exit wound (e.g., when the context is controversial), pathologists are asked to analyze the wound under the microscope. For instance, just as the beveling of the skull can often determine entrance versus exit, so also can the beveling of bullet wounds in skin, i.e., dermis and epidermis are affected similarly to the skull tables.

    Appendix 7: The Hole in the Windshield

    The following is a quotation from Doug Weldon at (http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=15484).

    The windshield Taylor was shown in 1975 had to be the one you [presumably meaning “Barb and Jerry”] showed in your comparison study in your article by John Hunt. Martin Hinrichs did a detailed study and demonstrated that the cracks were not the same. Jerry himself now questions whether the two windshields in the article are the same. Jerry wrote on this forum “Yes, that’s correct. Right now, I don’t think any windshield comparison can be conclusive including Hunt’s. If we can gather better data at the Archives it might be possible, but right now I’m certain that we really don’t know exactly what it is we’re trying to compare.” Martin Hinrichs also pointed out a very pertinent fact: “A comparison of this (sic) two windshield cracks is nevertheless dominated by the following undeniable principal: The windshield was kicked out at 11/26/63 by the feet of the Arlington Glass men. And that dominant cross crack should be visible in every photo post to 11/26/63.” There is also evidence that the Secret Service ordered twelve windshields after the assassination for “target practice.” Did they need these windshields to attempt to duplicate the damage to the original windshield but without a crack,” (sic) George Whitaker stated that the original windshield was “scrapped” (destroyed) on November 25, 1963 in Dearborn, Michigan. [The “sic” entries are mine—DM.]

    Appendix 8: My (Still Unanswered) Letter to Max Holland

    From the new medical depositions taken by the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB), we now know that the only recognized autopsy photographer, John Stringer, did not take the autopsy photographs of the brain. A memorandum issued by the ARRB strongly suggests that two different brains were autopsied and that the brain photographs in the National Archives most likely are not those of JFK. My personal, detailed studies of the autopsy skull X-rays, including an original use of optical densitometry, show virtually no brain tissue in a fist-sized area at the front of the skull, just where the photographs (paradoxically) show nearly intact brain. My measurements are not only consistent with the conclusions of the ARRB, but actually anticipated them by several years.

    The shot (or shots) to the head pose even worse conundrums for Holland. If he agrees with the pathologists that JFK was struck low on the right rear of the skull, he then has no explanation for the obvious trail of metallic debris that lies more than 4 inches higher. Alternately, if he concludes that a bullet entered much higher, he must then believe that all three qualified pathologists were wrong by 4 inches, and that an absurdly unique event occurred in the history of ballistics—namely that an internal 6.5 mm cross section of a bullet was sliced out and then migrated 1 cm lower and stayed there. In addition, and after all this, he must also believe that the trail of metallic debris still lies well above his proposed entry site. No ballistics expert has ever testified to seeing so much nonsense from one bullet.

    Even worse for Holland, just within the past year, Larry Sturdivan, the ballistics expert for the 1977–78 Congressional investigation, has insisted that this 6.5 mm cross section cannot represent a metallic fragment at all—thus crippling the central basis for the conclusions reached in prior official inquiries. My own research on the X-rays over the past 5 years (performed at the National Archives and now published in Assassination Science, edited by James Fetzer) agrees with Sturdivan that this object cannot represent a real piece of metal. [Only a tiny metal fragment is visible at the corresponding site on the lateral X-ray.] I have, in addition, shown how simple it was in that era deliberately to manufacture (in the darkroom) an altered X-ray with a 6.5 mm metallic image added to it (so that Oswald’s rifle would be incriminated). Finally, at my request the ARRB specifically asked each of the autopsy pathologists under oath if they recalled seeing this flagrantly obvious, 6.5 mm object on the X-rays during the autopsy. Just as I had predicted, none of them could recall this artifact—one that my 7-year-old (nonradiologist) son instantly spotted on the extant anterior skull X-ray. [This has been slightly adapted from my article in MIDP, p. 400].

    Appendix 9: the Police Dictabelt

    The following is extracted from my review of Hear No Evil by Donald Thomas at here.

    1. The task now was to find matches, if any, between the 432 test shot patterns and the six evidence patterns. Such matches would presumably determine both the shooter locations and the target sites. For this exercise, the reader must imagine a very large matrix, consisting of 432 entries vertically and six entries horizontally. For each element of this matrix there is an evidence pattern and a test pattern, which are to be compared to one another. So a total of 432 x 6 = 2592 comparisons must be made.

    2. Matches for a specific shot were decided based solely on the time between spikes, i.e., amplitude was ignored (except, of course, for the already completed, initial selection of suspect gunshots).

    3. A deviation of eight milliseconds (msec) was permitted, since the microphones might not precisely match the motorcycle position. Even air movement might change the matches.

    4. The statistical formula for detecting a match was this:

    Binary Correlation Coefficient = r =   i  / √ (N x n)
    where i = number of coincident events
              N = number of spikes in the evidence pattern and
              n = number of spikes in the test pattern.

    1. For a perfect match, r = 1, while r = 0 means no match. But, partly because of so much noise, a perfect match could not be expected. Results of interest were for r > 0.6; however, it should be emphasized that this is an arbitrary value. Some other value could have been chosen, with a likely different final outcome, possibly even wildly different.
    2. Values for r < 0.5 were ignored; that left only 15 possible matches (see Table 13 by Thomas). These 15 had the generic pattern of gunshot echoes in Dealey Plaza. The reader must understand that this does not mean 15 shots! After all, duplicate test shots had been fired from the TSBD (inside and outside the window). Furthermore, matches sometimes occurred at adjacent microphones—from the same shot—as might well be expected if the motorcycle had been between two adjacent microphones. Only four actual shots were proposed.

    Appendix 10. Optical Density and Characteristic Curves for X-ray Films

    Because no one recalls the history of this science (of optical density), a short review is appropriate. This history was summarized in a November 1989 article from the Eastman Kodak Laboratory, co-authored by Arthur Haus and John Cullinan—“Screen Film Processing Systems for Medical Radiography: A Historical Review,” Radiographics, Volume 9, p. 1203. The article can also be found online at http://radiographics.rsna.org/content/9/6/1203.full.pdf. After I had completed my original article on the JFK X-rays, I sent a copy to Arthur Haus (the above author). After reviewing it he offered no criticisms of it. I had had a prior conference telephone call with him and his colleague about X-ray films of the 1960s. This information had played a major role in my detective work on the JFK autopsy X-rays and was included in my paper. I later met Haus in person at my specialty meetings in Los Angeles.

    The characteristic curve is central to this discussion. It is a graph of optical density versus X-ray intensity (actually the logarithm of intensity). It shows how the optical density of the film varies with the intensity of the X-rays that strike the film. Haus recalls (pp. 1217-1218 of his article) that this data was first explored for photographic films in 1890; the classical paper was by Hurter and Driffield. In 1917, M. B. Hodgson showed that this earlier work could be applied to X-ray films as well. In other words, this science is now nearly a century old. To put this into the context of 1917, JFK and my mother were both born that year; the US entered World War I; and Lenin, although a bit tardy, arrived on Russian soil (from Switzerland, via Sweden and Finland). But the FBI would not begin its fingerprint files for another seven years (in 1924) and John McAdams’s own mother was still very young (or possibly not even conceived) in 1917. (Ironically, McAdams was born in Kennedy, Alabama.)

    In the late 1960s, Haus (the same one) and Rossman developed an automated inverse square sensitometer for collecting this data, a device that was still in widespread use in 1989. After I graduated in 1976 from the University of Michigan Medical School, I entered the specialty of radiation oncology. While at USC during residency, I worked with compensating filters for radiation therapy of cancer patients. These devices were built from small metal blocks that were placed in the X-ray beam during radiation treatments, in order to compensate for missing (patient) tissue in the path of the therapeutic X-rays. They helped to prevent hot spots in the dose distribution (inside the patient). Picture a checkerboard pattern in which small metal blocks are piled to a specific height on each square, with greater heights corresponding to more missing tissue. More recently, computer planning systems have used CT-derived compensators to correct for missing (or excess) tissue, such as air cavities (or intervening bone). But the principle is similar: the CT numbers play a role like that played by optical density. (See Radiotherapy for Head and Neck Cancer: Indications and Techniques, 3rd edition, by K. Kian Ang and Adam S. Garden, p. 36.)

    When I measured the optical density of the 6.5 mm artifact within JFK’s right orbit (at the Archives), I had invoked the same principles—the optical density was related to the amount of tissue traversed by the X-rays (that had struck a specific point on the film). Of course, if JFK’s X-rays had been double exposed in the darkroom precisely over this 6.5 mm object (as I have proposed—and whose feasibility I have even demonstrated), then this data would make no sense. Such nonsense, of course, is exactly what the data showed. And, consistent with this, no professional has ever been able to make sense of this 6.5 mm object either. It remains unique in the history of radiology. In any case, my major point here is simple and straightforward: no one should claim that optical density measurements are too novel to be used in analyzing X-ray films. The only parameter that is new here is its application to a president of the United States—the principles are the same.

    Appendix 11: Odd output from John McAdams’s Filter Factory for Facts

    A. Most pieces of evidence must be discarded. (Or, if a different page by McAdams is cited, then such evidence should not be discarded.)

    B. Eyewitnesses, even physicians doing what they usually do, cannot be trusted. Furthermore, no distinction need be made between earlier and later recollections of eyewitnesses.

    C. Photos are to be trusted over eyewitnesses, even when no one recognizes the photos.

    D. The size of Connally’s back wound after surgery is more relevant than its original size.

    E Only two physicians at Parkland saw JFK’s throat wound.

    F. Because false sightings in general are unreliable, two Oswalds are not possible.

    G. Major secrets cannot be kept.

    H. The acoustic evidence contained 15 matches.

    I. There is nothing noteworthy about the 6.5 mm object within JFK’s right orbit on the AP X-ray.

    J.  On JFK’s skull X-rays, no metal fragment is seen on JFK’s left side.

    K.  Fingerprint evidence is “killer” evidence.


    Reviews of John McAdams’ book JFK Assassination Logic by
    Pat Speer
    Gary Aguilar
    Frank Cassano