Category: John Fitzgerald Kennedy

Reviews of books treating the assassination of John F. Kennedy, its historical and political context and aftermath, and the investigations conducted.

  • Gordon Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster


    Virtual JFK 3


    Part One of this essay reviews the film accompanying this book, which has the same title.

    Part Two of this essay reviews the book accompanying this film, which has the same title.


    See the Virtual JFK web site


    In my discussion of the book Virtual JFK: Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived I first mentioned the name of Gordon Goldstein. Goldstein was to be the co-author, with McGeorge Bundy, of a book Bundy was going to write about his experiences with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson over the Vietnam War. That book was never completed because Bundy died before it was finished. The two had worked on it together for a bit less than two years. From the description of the travail here, plus what Goldstein was able to salvage, it would have been a real contribution to the literature. After Bundy passed away, Goldstein wanted to complete the book on his own. But Bundy’s widow would not allow it. So what he decided to do was to compose this memoir of his many months working with Bundy, and to also offer his own view on the Vietnam issue. Lessons in Disaster is not the book that might have been, but it’s still an interesting effort that is worth reading. Among other things, it gives us an insight into what one of the people directly involved in an epic tragedy thought of that terrible episode many years later. Or as Bundy said to Goldstein before they started, “I was part of a great failure. My wish now is that we had done less.” (p. 24)

    It is interesting to note how this effort began. In 1995, Robert McNamara published his book In Retrospect. In that book, he admitted to three things: 1.) The Vietnam War was a huge mistake 2.) He had determined by April1966 that it could not be won in a military sense (McNamara p. 261), and 3.) President Kennedy would not have Americanized the war and escalated it as President Johnson did ( ibid p. 96).

    (Let me interject something here as a personal sidelight. Although McNamara does not specifically mention John Newman in that book, Newman told me that he had several talks with McNamara before he started writing it. John was surprised at how many things McNamara had forgotten about, especially from the Kennedy years. I asked him how that could be so: How McNamara could have not recalled how different Kennedy’s plans had been? Newman replied, “Jim, if you were part of a decision that eventually took the lives of over 58,000 Americans and over two million Vietnamese, you would want to forget about the option you discarded too.”)

    When In Retrospect created the controversy it did, Bundy was asked to appear on a TV show to discuss the book. He did so. During the program, one of the other guests spoke up in defense of McNamara. He said, “You have a guest on your program, McGeorge Bundy, who was certainly as complicit as McNamara. I don’t know why McNamara should take all the heat.” (Goldstein, p. 22) A few days later, McNamara called Goldstein, and the book project began. Goldstein had worked with the former National Security Adviser while completing his Ph. D. in International Relations at Columbia. Unfortunately, Bundy died in the fall of 1996 before the book was completed. Before the two started in earnest, Bundy told Goldstein something that was to pithily sum up everything that followed, “Kennedy didn’t want to be dumb. Johnson didn’t want to be a coward.”

    McGeorge Bundy was Boston Brahmin. He was born there in 1919. His mother was related to the Lowell family, which was an institution in the area. His father Harvey was educated at Yale, where he was a member of Skull and Bones, and then went to Harvard Law School. In 1931, Mac Bundy joined his brothers Bill and Harvey Jr., at the famous boarding school of Groton, whose motto was “To serve is to rule.” (p. 7) Past attendees had been people like Dean Acheson and Franklin Roosevelt. After achieving a perfect SAT score, he went to Yale and joined Phi Beta Kappa. Like his father he joined Skull and Bones. After graduating, Bundy went to Harvard for post graduate work. During World War II, he joined the Navy and became an aide to Rear Admiral Alan Kirk. After the war, he co-authored a book with Secretary of State Henry Stimson. In 1948, he worked on the presidential campaign of Tom Dewey as a speech writer. After that he went to the Council on Foreign Relations to do a paper on the Marshall Plan with the help of Allen Dulles and Dwight Eisenhower. (p. 11) In 1949 he took a teaching position at Harvard in the Government Department. In 1953, at the young age of 34, he became Dean of Harvard faculty. It is here that Bundy met Senator John Kennedy, who was a member of the Harvard Board of Overseers. (p. 14) When Kennedy won the election for president in 1960, Bundy became his National Security Adviser. There is little doubt that, as Goldstein mentions, he revolutionized the position. He actually brought it out of the shadows and made it a position of primacy in the Cabinet.

    Bundy left the White House in 1966 to run the Ford Foundation. While there, the Pentagon Papers were published. Two Bundy assistants tried to coax him into making pubic the memos he had written under Johnson expressing the doubts he had about the war at the time. (p. 17) Bundy, out of the loyalty he felt to LBJ, decided not to. ( I should note here something the author leaves out of his outline of Bundy’s career. In a famous article published in the seventies in Penthouse, it was revealed that Bundy was the secretary of the Bilderberger Group, working directly under David Rockefeller.)

    In 1979, Bundy left the Ford Foundation and, amid great controversy—since, due to his involvement with Vietnam, most of the faculty did not want him there—became a professor of history at New York University. While there in 1984 he talked to journalist David Talbot about the subject. He told Talbot that he did have doubts about the war, “and it can be argued that I didn’t press hard enough.” (p. 19) He did not go any farther and told him he would sort it out later. He did with Goldstein.

    II

    One of the reasons I have detailed the remarkable pedigree of Bundy is that it proves the opposite of what one would expect. Namely that things like Ivy League credentials, secret societies, upper class origins, and Eastern Establishment connections really don’t mean that much on their own. Why? Because Bundy was not a good National Security Adviser. Although Richard Goodwin and Arthur Schlesinger tried to talk Bundy out of it, Bundy OK’d the Bay of Pigs invasion to Kennedy. (p. 38) Even though Bundy possessed a memo that the operation would not succeed unless it was fully supported by the CIA and Pentagon, he did not forward it to the Oval Office. (p. 40) Bundy offered to resign in the wake of that fiasco but Kennedy would not accept his resignation. He probably should have. Because later in1961, Bundy was one of the advisers urging Kennedy to commit American troops to Vietnam. Then in 1962, Bundy first backed air strikes to solve the Cuban Missile Crisis. He then switched to McNamara’s suggestion of a quarantine around Cuba during the Missile Crisis. He then switched back to the Pentagon plan for surgical air strikes, 800 of them. (pgs. 72-73) Although he later said that he switched at Kennedy’s request, this reason never surfaced until many years after. As Goldstein notes, at the time, Ted Sorenson said that Kennedy was actually a bit disgusted with his National Security Adviser.

    But as Bundy noted to Goldstein, one thing to note about Kennedy’s management of the Bay of Pigs was this: Under very strong pressure from the CIA and the Pentagon, Kennedy did not commit the American military to save the day. (p.44) Bundy also noted another pattern to Goldstein. During the Laotian crisis of the same year, the Pentagon wanted JFK to commit combat troops because if not, as Admiral Arleigh Burke said, all of Southeast Asia would be lost. (p. 46) Again, Kennedy did not go along. After calling for a high alert on Okinawa, Kennedy instructed Averill Harriman to produce a diplomatic solution. (p. 45) And he was so appalled by the advice he was getting that he now requested both Sorenson and Bobby Kennedy sit in on National Security Council meetings. (p. 46) Bundy told Goldstein that, after the way Kennedy handled Laos, he saw that, unlike many others—for instance, LBJ—President Kennedy had not bought into the Domino Theory. The idea that if one country went communist, it would take several nearby nations with it.

    Goldstein does a nice job at this point in sketching the background of the Vietnam crisis as Kennedy first inherited it. After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Ngo Dinh Diem then rigged the plebiscite in order to succeed the proxy French emperor Bao Dai. But as the communist insurgency in the countryside grew larger, Diem’s security forces, led by his brother Nhu, became more brutal and repressive. Captured rebels were beaten, had their legs broken, and females were raped. (p. 51) In 1959, Diem restored the guillotine. Traveling courts in the countryside were now authorized to behead convicted communists. (ibid) Goldstein sums up the scene upon Kennedy’s ascendancy to the White House: “By 1961, as Kennedy assumed power in Washington, the situation in South Vietnam was characterized by an ascending nationalist and communist movement and an oppressive regime that was progressively losing control of the country and credibility with its people.” (ibid)

    What follows is one of the highlights of the book. Goldstein enumerates the number of times Kennedy turned down requests to commit combat troops to save the day before the White House debate over the Taylor/Rostow mission in November of 1961. He starts out with the request of Gen. Ed Lansdale in January of 1961. (p. 52) In April of 1961, McNamara suggested the same. (p. 53) That same month, Kennedy rejected a backdoor: he refused combat troops as trainers. (p. 54) He was asked twice in May and turned down both requests. (ibid) By July he had turned down a total of six requests. (p. 55)

    On July 15th, Max Taylor and Walt Rostow again requested combat troops. Bundy kept notes on this colloquy which Goldstein prints here. He wrote, “Questions from the president showed that the detailed aspects of this military plan had not been developed … the president made clear his own deep concern with the need for realism and accuracy in … military planning. He had observed in earlier military plans with respect to Laos that optimistic estimates were invariably proven false in the event … He emphasized the reluctance of the American people and of many distinguished leaders to see any direct involvement of US troops in that part of the world.” Rostow and Taylor tried to argue back but Kennedy said, “Gen. DeGaulle, out of painful French experience, had spoken with feeling of the difficulty of fighting in this part of the world.” Vice-President Johnson then called for a firmer military commitment to the region, including Laos. Kennedy resisted by saying, “Nothing would be worse than an unsuccessful intervention in the area, and that he did not have confidence in the military practicability of the proposal which had been put before him.” (pgs 56-57) This now made seven rejections of American direct intervention in seven months.

    On October 11th, Deputy Defense Secretary Alexis Johnson joined the push for combat troops. Again, Kennedy did not agree. But he did authorize a mission to South Vietnam by Max Taylor and Walt Rostow. (p. 57) At this time, the hawks in the White House begin to leak stories that Kennedy would now probably commit troops to Vietnam. When Kennedy saw the stories, he himself leaked a story denying it. (ibid)

    On October 20th, Frederick Nolting, the American ambassador in Vietnam, requested combat troops for flood relief purposes. Taylor was on the scene, and he agreed with the request—if he did not put Nolting up to it. Kennedy consulted with an agricultural expert and turned it down. Taylor then talked to the press about the issue. Kennedy telegrammed Taylor to stop doing so. (p. 58)

    When Kennedy received the Taylor/Rostow report, it again requested the sending of combat troops to Vietnam. And it couched the request in dire terms. It said if such a commitment was not made, the fall of South Vietnam would likely follow. (p. 60) The formal White House debate over the recommendation was taken up on November 7th. In addition to Taylor and Rostow, Defense Secretary McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Bundy, and the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff told Kennedy to send combat troops. On November 15th, Kennedy closed the debate. At this point, Goldstein makes two cogent observations. There were only two people in the entire White House who sided with Kennedy on this issue. They were George Ball and John Kenneth Galbraith. When Ball personally approached Kennedy since he thought he might be weakening and could give in, Kennedy replied to him: “George, you’re just crazier than hell. That just isn’t going to happen.” (p. 62) And after this debate, Kennedy told Galbraith he was going to send him to Saigon. He wanted him to render a report also. (p. 61) Knowing what it would say, he would only give it to McNamara. And McNamara would now become Kennedy’s point man on his withdrawal plan. The third result of this debate was Kennedy’s issuance of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 111, which increased the number of advisers to above 15,000, with no provision for combat troops.

    When Bundy reviewed all the above with Goldstein, he was impressed with both Kennedy’s insight and his steadfastness. He also told Professor James Blight, one of the co-editors of the fine book Virtual JFK, that Kennedy simply did not think that combat troops would work in South Vietnam. Because he did not see the struggle as a conventional war but as a classic counter-insurgency conflict. Bundy and Goldstein came to the conclusion that much of this was instilled in Kennedy from his visit to Vietnam in the early fifties during the last throes of the French imperial war there. (p. 235) Another strong influence was his discussion of the issue with Douglas MacArthur. The general told Kennedy it would be foolish to fight a large land war in Southeast Asia. He told him that he could pour a million men into the struggle and still be outnumbered. (p. 235) Alexis Johnson was skeptical of MacArthur’s stance but he admitted that it made a profound effect on President Kennedy. Max Taylor agreed with him. He said MacArthur’s analysis made a “hell of an impression on the President.” (ibid) Kennedy later told Bundy’s assistant Michael Forrestal “that the odds against an American victory over the Viet Cong were 100 to 1.” (p. 239) Since, as Bundy said, Kennedy did not buy into the Domino Theory, those odds were simply not worth it. Consequently, Bundy saw these ten rejections in eleven months as Kennedy’s final decision on the issue. And Bundy described a following meeting in January of 1962 in Palm Beach, Florida where Kennedy emphasized the advice and support role to be played by the Americans. (p. 71) That was a line Kennedy was not going to cross. And he didn’t.

    III

    After receiving Galbraith’s report, McNamara went to work on putting together the withdrawal plan. While he did that, the increased advisory team sent in by NSAM 111 managed to keep the lid on a deteriorating situation. But in 1963, things started going downhill fast. In January of that year, the Viet Cong defeated a regular detachment of the South Vietnamese army at the battle of Ap Bac. (p. 72) As things began to spiral downward, the reactions of the Ngo brothers worsened. Diem demanded that all public gatherings, even funerals, would have to have official state sanction. He even asked for total control over all anti-guerilla operations from the US. Then the epochal Hue crisis broke out in June. In response to a discriminatory edict passed by Diem, a huge Buddhist rally took place in the city of Hue. After a day of speeches, a radio station was bombed with many protesters standing outside. In the resultant chaos, shots were fired into the crowd. Several people were killed and even more were wounded. (The best account of this incident is by Jim Douglass, in JFK and the Unspeakable, pgs. 128-131) As a result of the crackdown ordered by Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, one of the monks leading the demonstration set himself on fire. (Goldstein, p. 75) This horrifying image was captured on both film and photograph and was relayed all over the world. Making it worse was the heinous reaction of Nhu’s wife, Madame Nhu (aka The Dragon Lady). She ridiculed his martyrdom as a “barbecue” and said if any others did the same “we shall clap our hands”. (ibid p. 76) Unfortunately for her, seven others did do the same. (ibid) This chain reaction mushroomed into a huge political crisis since it spawned marches, demonstrations, work stoppages and hunger strikes. (Douglass, p. 133) In reply, Nhu ended up arresting over 1,400 Buddhists.

    It was against the backdrop of this image of a collapsing government and an intractable leader that a small cabal in Washington and Saigon decided to take the next step and remove Diem and his brother from power. Goldstein does a decent job describing the events that led to the eventual coup and deaths of the brothers. (pgs. 76-81) But the best, most detailed description of how it began is by John Newman in his masterful book, JFK and Vietnam. There had been a small group in State and on Bundy’s staff that was waiting for an event like this to get rid of Diem. The group consisted of Averill Harriman and Roger Hilsman at State, and Michael Forrestal of the NSC. While Kennedy was away, Hilsman began sending cables to his ally William Trueheart in the Saigon embassy threatening to ostracize Diem. This was in defiance of Kennedy’s wishes. (Newman, p. 336) But once Henry Cabot Lodge had arrived as the new ambassador in Saigon, this group took an even bolder step.

    As with the sending of the threatening message, they waited until a strategic moment when all the principals of government were out of town. This came on the weekend of August 24-25th. JFK, McNamara, Bundy, Rusk, and CIA Director John McCone were all out of Washington. Three cables came in from Lodge and the CIA officer in contact with the South Vietnamese army, Lucien Conein. The message was that the Army was unhappy with the Ngo brothers and if the USA indicated to the generals that it “would be happy to see Diem and/or Nhu go, and the deed would be done.” Lodge added that he did not think it would be that easy. It could be a “shot in the dark”. (Newman, p. 346) This was all that Hilsman-Harriman-Forrestal needed. They sent a cable back on the 24th. It said that Diem must be given a chance to oust Nhu, “but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem. You may also tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown … ” (ibid)

    Forrestal was given the job of getting this cable cleared. He read it to Kennedy over the phone. Kennedy did not understand why it had to be sent that day. But he said to see if others would OK it, especially McCone. Kennedy probably said this because he knew McCone would not approve it. (ibid p. 347) But, in fact, McCone was never shown the cable. (ibid, p. 351) The cabal also fudged getting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Maxwell Taylor to approve it. Hilsman and Forrestal concocted a story that said that no clearance from the Defense Department was required, meaning McNamara and Alexis Johnson. And further, that Taylor had approved it without question. Neither of these is true. (ibid p. 348) In fact, Taylor never approved the cable. When he saw it he perceptively thought, ” … my first reaction was that the anti-Diem group centered in State had taken advantage of the absence of the principal officials to get out instructions which would never have been approved as written under normal circumstances. ” (ibid p. 349) He also thought it would have never even been passed around if Bundy had been in town. Yet, Taylor did not call Kennedy to tell him what he thought was actually happening. The cable was sent that Saturday night.

    On Monday, Kennedy was upset at what had happened: “This shit has got to stop!” When Forrestal offered to resign Kennedy replied with, “You’re not worth firing. You owe me something, so you stick around.” (ibid, p. 351) But the problem now was that in Saigon, Lodge had immediately jumped on the cable. And, seemingly as if he was part of the plan, he bypassed putting pressure on Diem to fire his brother Nhu, and instead he went straight to the generals. This was on Sunday, the 25th, less than 24 hours after getting the Saturday night cable. (ibid, p. 350) Bypassing Diem was a crucial switch from the original cable, which said that Diem was to be given a chance to oust his brother Nhu. (ibid, p. 346) So now, by the end of Sunday the 25th, the effort to overthrow Diem was in motion with almost irreversible momentum. Even though Kennedy advised Lodge that he was against it and wanted to work with Diem, even though RFK was against it also, Lodge and Conein had cast their lot with the coup plotters. (Goldstein, pgs. 81, 86-88) This ended, of course, with the coup finally succeeding in early November. With the cooperation of Lodge and Conein, the Ngo brothers were not just ousted, they were killed. (Douglass deals with this episode exceedingly well on pgs. 206-210) The death of the brothers deeply troubled Kennedy both morally and religiously. He ordered a complete review of how the August 24th cable was sent, why it was so urgent to do on the weekend, and why it was skewed so much in favor of the generals. (Goldstein p. 90)

    In the aftermath of the coup, Bundy felt that perhaps the USA was now more committed to South Vietnam. But Kennedy did not waver from his withdrawal plan as helmed by McNamara. Goldstein quotes McNamara as saying to his biographer, “I believed that we had done all the training we could. Whether the South Vietnamese were qualified or not to turn back the North Vietnamese, I was certain that if they weren’t it was not for lack of training. More training wouldn’t strengthen them; therefore we should get out. The president agreed.” (ibid p. 84) Therefore in early October, NSAM 263 was issued. This stated that the US would withdraw a thousand advisers by the end of 1963. The White House announcement coupled with this issuance said that it was the first step in the eventual removal of the bulk of American personnel by the end of 1965. (Newman, p. 402) And after November coup, Kennedy said in a speech on November 14th that he did not want the US to put troops in Vietnam. His intent was to bring the Americans home. (Goldstein, pgs 95-96)

    As Goldstein notes, this was all changed by what happened in Dallas a week later.

    IV

    Like most current scholarship, Goldstein describes the sea change that took place on the Vietnam issue after Johnson took over. Bundy told Goldstein that LBJ was not going to jeopardize his election by losing any aspect of the Cold War. (pgs. 98-99) He also told Goldstein that he did not really want to serve under LBJ, but he felt he had to until at least November of 1964. Bundy, and others, felt the real successor to JFK was Bobby Kennedy. (ibid)

    The National Security Advisor states that there is no doubt that, from the first day, Johnson was preoccupied with Vietnam. (p. 105) For instance, Rusk said, “The President has expressed his deep concern that our effort in Vietnam be stepped up to the highest pitch, and that each day we ask ourselves what more we can do to further the struggle.” (p. 105) McCone said, “Johnson definitely feels that we place too much emphasis on social returns; he has very little tolerance with our spending so much time being “do-gooders”. (ibid) Johnson told McNamara that the USA was not doing everything it should in Vietnam. (p. 106) He sent McNamara to Saigon in order to give him a ground level report. Right before Christmas of 1963, McNamara returned with a bad report. (ibid, p. 107) The South Vietnamese had been lying about their progress in the war. A month after that, the Joint Chiefs sent a proposal to the White House recommending bombing the North and the insertion of US combat troops.

    This is quite interesting of course. Not just because of the speed of the reversal. That has been noted by several other authors. But because the fulcrum of Kennedy’s strategy had been to partly base his withdrawal strategy on the false reports he knew he was getting from South Vietnam. In fact, this was one of the main themes of Newman’s milestone book. Namely, that Kennedy knew these were wrong. But he was going to utilize them to base his withdrawal plan on. But the Pentagon and the CIA finally understood what Kennedy was up to and began to change these reports. And they backdated the changes to July, 1963. (Newman, pgs 425, 441) McNamara had to have known this, since Kennedy had appointed him to run the withdrawal plan. But like the others, he understood a new sheriff was in town. So McNamara presented to LBJ the revised figures, the ones done as a reaction to Kennedy’s withdrawal strategy. In light of this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) responded with plans for both an American air and land war in Vietnam. On March 2, 1964 the JCS passed a new war proposal to the White House. This one was even more ambitious. It included bombing, the mining of North Vietnamese harbors, a naval blockade, and possible use of tactical atomic weapons, in case China intervened. (Goldstein, p. 108)

    Johnson said he was not ready for this proposal since he did not have congress yet as a partner and trustee. (ibid, p. 109) But he did order the preparation of NSAM 288. This was essentially a target list of bombing sites that eventually reached 94 possibilities. (Edwin Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, pgs 24-25) By May 25th, with both Richard Nixon and Barry Goldwater clamoring for bombing of the north, LBJ had made the decision that the US would directly attack North Vietnam at an unspecified point in the future. (ibid, p. 26) In fact, the specific campaign, with the steps involved leading to a continuous air campaign, had already been mapped out in time intervals. This plan included the passage of a congressional resolution. (ibid, p. 27) The rough draft of the resolution was drawn up by a young lawyer in the State Department. (ibid) In June, Mac Bundy’s brother, William Bundy, finalized it. That month, Johnson began to lobby certain people in congress in advance. ( ibid, p. 26) On June 10th, McNamara said, “that in the event of a dramatic event in Southeast Asia we would go promptly for a congressional resolution.” (ibid) But Bill Bundy added, the actual decision to expand the war would not be made until after the election. (ibid, p. 44) This is precisely what happened.

    As Goldstein points out, there were other views being voiced at the time. People like Sen. Richard Russell, journalist Walter Lippmann, and French Premier DeGaulle were all pushing for a neutralization plan. It’s interesting to compare Johnson’s reaction to DeGaulle with Kennedy’s. Whereas Kennedy took DeGaulle’s opinion very seriously, Johnson told Bundy to call DeGaulle and get him to take back his appeal for neutralization. (Goldstein, p. 111) Considering all of the above, the only thing Johnson needed now was a casus belli—the “dramatic event” McNamara spoke of. LBJ himself had planted the seed for one.

    As John Newman notes, when Johnson became president, he altered the rough draft of NSAM 273 in more than one way. The most significant alteration was probably to paragraph seven. (Newman, p. 446) In the rough draft prepared by Bundy, it allowed for maritime operations against the north—but only by the government of South Vietnam. (ibid, p. 440) This was changed by LBJ. He struck the sentence specifying that maritime operations be done by the South Vietnamese government. (ibid, p. 446) Probably because this would have taken time, since South Vietnam had no sophisticated navy to speak of. As Newman writes, “This revision opened the door to direct US attacks against North Vietnam, and CINCPAC OPLAN 34-63, which became OPLAN 34A, was promptly submitted to the White House…” (ibid)By December 21, 1963—less than one month after Kennedy was killed—McNamara presented Johnson with a paper entitled “Plans for Covert Action into North Vietnam”. (ibid) One of the actions was to couple OPLAN 34A with DESOTO patrols in the Tonkin Gulf, all along the coast of North Vietnam. OPLAN 34 A consisted of hit and run strikes by small, quick patrol boats manned by South Vietnamese sailors. But outside of that, almost everything else about those missions was American in origin. The DESOTO patrols were completely American. These were destroyers manned with intelligence collecting machines to collect data on where things like North Vietnamese radar installations and torpedo boat harbors were. In other words, they worked in tandem.

    The first naval operations went into effect in February of 1964. (Moise, , p. 6) The destroyer used at that time was called the Craig. The destroyer used for the second set of missions, beginning in July, was the Maddox. An important part of the mission was to “show the flag”. (Moise, p. 55) And part of that was violating the claim the North Vietnamese made about the limits of their territorial waters. They said the limit was twelve miles. Yet on the July/August missions both the attacking patrol boats and the Maddox were in violation of that limit. Not just in relation to the mainland, but also relative to the islands off the coast, which were also attacked. (Moise, p. 68) As many authors have concluded, the design and action of the mission was a provocation. (ibid, p. 68) In fact, people inside the White House, like Forrestal and McCone, later agreed it was. (Goldstein, p. 125)

    There were two incidents that took place in the first week of August, which gave Johnson the pretext to pass his resolution. On August 2nd the Maddox was attacked by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Although torpedoes were launched, none hit. The total damage to the destroyer was one bullet through the hull. (Moise, p. 80) When the Defense Department briefed the senators on this first incident, they misrepresented it. They said the North Vietnamese fired first, that the USA had no role in the patrol boat raids, that the ships were in international waters, and there was no hot pursuit. These were all wrong. (Ibid, p. 87)

    At this point, Captain Herrick of the Maddox suggested the missions be stopped. They were not. And the mission was given direct orders to violate the twelve mile territorial waters claim. Which they did. (ibid, p. 95) LBJ himself authorized the new OPLAN 34A attack on August 3rd. (ibid, p. 105) On this particular DESOTO patrol, the Turner Joy joined the Maddox. On August 4th, the Turner Joy reported that torpedo boats were approaching her. This message was relayed to Washington. McNamara used these messages in his discussion with Johnson. The Turner Joy then opened fire, eventually expending 300 shells. It was later discovered that they were firing at nothing. No attack took place that night. And in fact, the records of the Turner Joy were later altered ” to make the evidence of an attack seem stronger than it actually was …” (ibid, p.147)

    The morning he first heard of the second incident, Johnson marched down to his National Security Advisor’s office. Bundy told Goldstein that this, in itself, was quite unusual. (Goldstein, p. 126) LBJ then told Bundy, “Get the resolution your brother drafted.” Bundy replied, “Mr. President, we ought to think about this.” Johnson said, “I didn’t ask you what you thought, I told you what to do.” (ibid) That exchange should throw the final pile of dirt on the myth of Johnson as the “reluctant warrior”

    But it’s actually worse than that. Because today there is a debate on whether this exchange took place after the phony news of an actual attack, or whether Johnson talked to Bundy just upon hearing that the torpedo boats were approaching. According to Goldstein’s chronology, LBJ told Bundy to get the resolution out before any of the phony news of an attack got to him. (ibid pgs 126-127) Which would mean of course that the attack, which did not occur, was superfluous to Johnson. He was going to use the non-event to get his pre-planned resolution through congress. And in fact, during a meeting on August 5th, Bundy actually said that the evidence for the first attack had stood up, but the evidence for the second attack was questionable. (White House Memorandum. 5 August, 1964.) In 2003, the National Security Archive, released a memo saying that on August 4th, Herrick had actually relayed a message to McNamara saying that the evidence for the second attack was doubtful. McNamara later believed that LBJ did what he did because he did not want to be attacked by the hawks as being weak or indecisive. In other words, he was protecting his right flank. (Moise, p. 211) But at the same time, by campaigning with slogans like “I will not send American boys to fight a war Asian boys should be fighting”, he disguised his real designs from his Democratic base. (Goldstein, p. 129)

    Sticking with his plan, Johnson took out the target list prepared by NSAM 288. He ordered air strikes that very day. But before the planes actually hit their targets, Johnson went on national television to announce the retaliation late on the night of August 4th. This alerted the North Vietnamese anti-aircraft batteries. So in the wee hours of August 5th, two pilots were shot down. (ibid, p. 219) But in another sense, the air strikes did the trick. Johnson’s approval ratings on his handling of the war went up drastically. (ibid p. 226) Afterwards, Johnson continued to deceive congress. He told Sen. William Fulbright that OPLAN 34A was a South Vietnamese operation. ( ibid p. 227) The Tonkin Gulf resolution was passed by both houses, almost unanimously. The whole idea in ramming it through was to change the outline of the event from a provocation by the US into America being a victim of North Vietnamese aggression.

    On August 7th, LBJ sent a message to Maxwell Taylor. He wanted a whole gamut of possible operations presented to him for direct American attacks against the North. This was received in the White House two days later. The target date for a systematic bombing campaign against the North was set for January of 1965. (Moise, p. 244) As we will see, Johnson missed this target by one month.

    After Johnson ordered the reprisal bombing for the non-existent second attack, the government of North Vietnam met. They decided that direct American military intervention in the South was on its way. They also concluded that a continuous bombing campaign was also probable. They decided the public had to be made aware of the coming onslaught. In September, they also began to send the first North Vietnamese regulars down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. (Moise, p. 251)

    All the above was made possible by the alterations in NSAM 273, which Johnson made four days after Kennedy was killed. In other words, LBJ was going to war over one bullet in a destroyer’s hull.

    V

    The last part of Lessons in Disaster describes Bundy’s slightly less than two years in the White House as Johnson implemented his plan to Americanize the war. If ever there was a case for dramatizing John Newman’s axiom about 1964, it is in these pages. Newman said that Kennedy was using the 1964 election to disguise his withdrawal plan; Johnson used the election to disguise his intervention plan. In fact LBJ had once said, Vietnam could not be lost before the election, but it also could not blossom into an all-out war before it either. (Goldstein, p. 133) In fact, CIA analyst Ray Cline had told Bundy that if America waited to intervene until after the election, it would still allow time to save the day. (ibid pgs. 136-37)

    For this book, Bundy threw himself into a review of Vietnam policy, especially under Johnson. The State Department had issued a report saying that a sustained aerial war would not be effective there. And it would not stop Hanoi from aiding the Viet Cong. Bundy ignored these warnings. He favored an air campaign. So did Max Taylor. LBJ disagreed. He told Taylor, “I have never felt this war will be won from the air, and it seems to me that what is much more needed and would be more effective is larger and stronger use of Rangers, and Special Forces, and Marines, or other appropriate military strength on the ground and on the scene.” (ibid, p. 151) Gen. William Westmoreland, the commander in South Vietnam, also agreed in a ground war. In February of 1965, Bundy was touring the country. The Viet Cong attacked an officers HQ in Pleiku, where several Americans were killed and even more injured. Bundy recommended air strikes in retaliation. When Bundy got back to Washington, he asked Johnson about his recommendation. LBJ replied, “Well, isn’t that all decided?” (ibid p. 158) And it had been. Operation Flaming Dart quickly escalated into Rolling Thunder, the greatest aerial bombardment campaign the world had ever seen. Johnson wanted Eisenhower’s approval for it first. He got it in spades. Eisenhower even recommended tactical nukes if necessary. (p. 161) The Domino Theory was quite powerful.

    The only person actually arguing with Johnson, in both public and private, was Vice-President Hubert Humphrey. When he addressed a long memo to Johnson arguing against escalation on quite practical grounds e.g. the instability of the South Vietnamese government, LBJ went ballistic. He barred him from any future meetings on Vietnam, and actually wanted surveillance put on him to see who he was talking to. (p. 162)

    Once the air war escalated, Westmoreland argued for troops to protect the air base at Da Nang. Interestingly, Taylor argued against it since it would break the line in the sand that Kennedy had drawn. (p. 163) LBJ sided with Westmoreland. And the first American combat troops arrived in Vietnam in March of 1965. Within two months of his inauguration, Johnson had begun both the air and land war he had been planning for over a year.

    Johnson’s next step was to ask the Secretary of the Army how many troops it would take to win the war. The response was 500,000 men and at least five years, probably more. (p. 165) On April 1st, just three weeks after the Da Nang landing, Johnson began to pour in the combat troops he felt he needed to win. The first contingent was of 20,000 men, and LBJ specifically changed their mission from base protection to offensive operations. By April 20th, Westmoreland was asking for an increase to 82,000 troops. He got them. (p. 171) At this point, Taylor understood what Johnson’s aim was: He was going to give the military all the men it needed as fast as possible to win the war. He was right. Westmoreland asked for more combat troops on June 7th. He got 42,000 more. He then asked for 52,000 after that. He got them also. By the end of 1965, Johnson’s first 11 months in office, there were over 175,000 combat troops in Vietnam. Under Kennedy there had been none.

    Bundy understood by the end of 1965 that Westmoreland was committed to a war of attrition. He felt he did not do enough analysis of what the war was devolving into. He didn’t press the story of what the real prospects for success were. He didn’t measure the strengths and weaknesses of each side. He didn’t ask: What kind of war will this be?, or How many losses will we sustain? (pgs. 178, 182) He had become a staff officer aiding his commander instead of a detached analyst measuring options in advance and giving the president the ups and downs of each option he takes. He felt that one of his greatest failures was that he never commissioned a detailed study as to what it would cost the USA in every aspect to completely secure South Vietnam. He failed to do this because he was initially in favor of intervention. He later told Goldstein that it was a serious error and he failed to ever address it. (p. 185) Bundy felt that another failure of his was that he did not understand that in this kind of war, numerical success did not equal military victory. Therefore Westmoreland’s famous “body count” tally was not a good barometer of how the war was actually progressing. (p. 188) The incredible thing was that the worse it got, the more people like Eisenhower and Rusk urged Johnson on. And the more troops LBJ committed. But yet, Westmoreland wanted still more. By the second half of 1965, he wanted a doubling of the troop commitment, and a tripling of the air war. (pgs. 201-202) This is where Bundy and Johnson began to part company. Another issue where they parted was on how much to tell the American public. Bundy thought Johnson had to sell the war more to keep America committed. Johnson wanted to keep it low profile. (p. 198)

    But there was something else that bothered Bundy about Johnson’s constant escalation. That’s because he found out the reason the military always got what they wanted. It was because the White House debates were nothing but a piece of choreographed stagecraft. The director being Lyndon Johnson, on instructions from Westmoreland. Bundy discovered that Westmoreland had a secret telegram channel to Johnson. Through this he would make a request, and Johnson would then OK it. It was at this point that LBJ would call the meeting on the requested escalation—after it had been approved. (pgs. 214-15) It was all meant to give people like him the feeling that they had a say in the decision, when they really did not. The decision was a fait accompli.

    Bundy felt that both he and Johnson got caught up in the whole war of attrition fallacy: That even if they achieved only a stalemate, that was better than losing because it would show the world the USA was not a paper tiger. (pgs. 221-222) This was the level of sophistication that was guiding the decisions of this great epic tragedy by the end of 1965.

    After it was all over, and the recriminations and many books had been written about it, Bundy decided to look back on his role in the debacle. One of the first books he read was David Halberstams’s The Best and the Brightest. A book in which he figured prominently. Although he thought it was an entertaining and informative read, he concluded that the central thesis was just wrong. (pgs. 148-49) It was not the advisers—the best and brightest—who did the staff work who got us into the Vietnam War. It was the difference in the men who occupied the Oval Office. It was the difference between Kennedy and Johnson.

    And with that, Lessons in Disaster joins a growing list of books that now almost fill up a shelf. In fact, we have now had two in the last year: Goldstein’s and Virtual JFK. It’s a shame it took so long for the truth to arrive. But finally, as Michael Morrissey wrote years ago, the second biggest lie about Kennedy’s assassination can be laid to rest.

  • James Blight, Virtual JFK (Part 2)


    Virtual JFK:  Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived


    Part One of this essay reviews the film accompanying this book, which has the same title.

    Part Three, Virtual JFK 3: Gordon Goldstein’s Lessons in Disaster


    See the Virtual JFK web site.


    It’s not possible for me to make a joke about the death of John F. Kennedy.

    —Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.


    This Vonnegut quote appears on the first page of Virtual JFK. It was a good signal for me. One of the things it conveyed was that finally, after so many years, the mainstream academic community was going to seriously look at a painful but glaring question: If President Kennedy had lived, would he have withdrawn from Vietnam and not have Americanized that war?

    In 2005, a little less than twenty scholars and former policy makers gathered at a place called the Musgrove Conference Center at St. Simons Island, Georgia. The subject was this very question. All of those involved had a distinct interest in either the Kennedy presidency, the Johnson presidency, or the Vietnam War. Many of them had studied all three. To give you an idea of who was there let me mention who several of the attendees were. Jamie Galbraith is the son of one of Kennedy’s chief advisers and confidantes, John Kenneth Galbraith. He is a Professor of Government and Business relations at the University of Texas at Austin. Inspired by what his father told him about Kennedy and Vietnam, he has been an intelligent, articulate, and authoritative proponent of Kennedy’s desire to withdraw all forces by 1965. Frederick Logevall is a Professor of History at Cornell who in 1999 wrote an extraordinary volume called Choosing War. This was an exhaustive study of Johnson’s decision making from Kennedy’s death until the great escalations of 1965 and beyond. A rather surprising revelation of the book was that, far from stumbling errantly into a colossal debacle, Johnson fully understood and measured what the potential costs in blood and treasure would be. His generals told him in 1965 that the conflict in Vietnam would take 500,000 troops to fight and would last anywhere from five to twenty years. Johnson gave the military 538,000 troops and much more. Chester Cooper was an assistant to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and later worked for Asst. Secretary of State Averill Harriman. He was closely involved in the formation of Vietnam policy under both men and under both presidents. Tom Hughes worked for Chester Bowles, a chief Kennedy adviser during the campaign of 1960. Once Kennedy was elected, Hughes worked first for Bowles and then succeeded Roger Hilsman as director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department. He stayed there for the great escalations of 1965-68. Another policy-maker in attendance was Bill Moyers. Moyers first worked for Lyndon Johnson on his senatorial staff. He then worked for JFK as Deputy Director of the Peace Corps. When Kennedy was killed, he reverted back to being an advisor for Johnson and then rose to Press Secretary. He parted ways with LBJ over Vietnam and left the White House in 1966.

    The point is made. It’s an impressive yet relatively mainstream roster. Some of the other participants are Frances Fitzgerald, author of the Pulitzer Prize winning book about America in Vietnam, Fire in the Lake; Tim Naftali, co-author of One Hell of a Gamble, a history of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Russian viewpoint; and Marilyn Young, Professor of History at NYU and author of The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990. The three people who essentially arranged and ran the conference were David Welch, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto; Janet Lang an associate professor at the Watson Institute, and last but not least, James Blight a Professor of International Relations at Brown. Blight has been part of a few books on the Kennedy presidency, especially dealing with the Missile Crisis.

    They have made an interesting volume. It’s uneven, and in the purest sense, not really a book. But it’s interesting, even compelling, nevertheless. When I say it is not really a book, what I mean is that it is more an oral history plus a document annex. But since the discussions are footnoted, the oral history has a real basis in fact. And since all the participants were issued a thousand page briefing book of the most currently declassified documents on the Vietnam War, most of the discussion is state of the art. Further, the conference organizers arranged for audiotapes to be piped into the room so that the latest declassified phone calls and taped meetings could be heard too. Blight did his homework well. Many of the things that I talked about that were missing from the film of the same name, do appear here. And to say the least, the document annex is quite forceful. A matter I will get to later.

    The conference lasted for two days. And the discussion centered on whether or not there was continuity or breakage between Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Vietnam policy. The book acknowledges the fact that, as John Newman noted in Vietnam: The Early Decisions (edited by Lloyd Gardner and Ted Gittinger), the myth of continuity has been chiefly maintained by prominent mainstream academics. (p. 158) So this conference was a milestone in that regard. It was precipitated by the influence of Newman’s compelling and fully documented 1992 book, JFK and Vietnam. (Newman is mentioned at several points in the discussion.) Prior to that volume some writers had talked about this breakage in policy. But it had been sporadic, the evidence mostly anecdotal, and not really sustained. In fact all the material I could summon for my first book Destiny Betrayed, could not even flesh out a moderately sized book. To give these people their due though, they included Roger Hilsman in To Move a Nation, Ted Sorenson in his book Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger in his long biography Robert Kennedy and His Times, Ralph Martin in A Hero for our Time, and Dave Powers and Ken O’Donnell in Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye. The last is the most interesting. Although it was published in 1972, the same year as David Halberstam’s best-selling The Best and the Brightest, it took serious issue with that standard reference book which argued for continuity. It went on for several pages (pgs. 13-18, 442-444), sternly denying there was any continuity at all. Actually taking issue at one point with proclamations made by Johnson in his memoirs. (This is a theme, Johnson’s attempt to rewrite the record, that I will take up later.) Like Newman would argue in 1992, that book said that Kennedy had decided not to commit combat troops to Vietnam as early as 1961. They based this on two long discussions Kennedy had on the issue with French Premier Charles DeGaulle and General Douglas MacArthur.

    In another form, the two authors who wrote about this subject in essays prior to Newman were Fletcher Prouty and Peter Dale Scott. Scott based most of his work on the Pentagon Papers. Prouty worked from that, plus his own experience inside the Pentagon. He wrote about Kennedy’s plans to withdraw in his fine book The Secret Team (pgs. 401-416), and in a short essay in High Treason (466-473). Scott wrote two interesting essays on the subject. One was originally published in Ramparts and the other in the Gravel edition of the Pentagon Papers.

    But, as I said, John Newman’s book went much further than any of the above. So much further, that the publisher ditched the book. As Galbraith writes in his fine 2003 essay in Boston Review, 32,000 copies of JFK and Vietnam were initially printed in 1992. After 10,000 were sold, Warner Books ceased selling the hardcover. Even though the book had high visibility because of Oliver Stone’s film JFK, the company never spent anything on promoting the book. Incredibly it was never reprinted in trade paperback. When Newman complained about this in 1993, the company quietly returned his rights. But in spite of this, because the book was so well-documented, contained so much new material, and was so convincing in its argument, it has had a strong influence with both public opinion and with scholars.

    Let me note an important point here in order to give Newman’s book its full due. Even though the books and essays noted above had interesting snippets of information, and Scott and Prouty had serious arguments to make, their cumulative impact was minimal. Outside of those interested in President Kennedy’s assassination, and to a lesser degree, his short presidency, they made the briefest of ripples into the general public, the mainstream press, or the halls of academia. The double impact of the film JFK plus the publication of Newman’s book had the effect of a shotgun blast at close range. Newman had labored over his book for ten years. Completely by coincidence, it was being finished at the time Oliver Stone was filming his movie of Jim Garrison’s book On the Trail of the Assassins. And it fit in perfectly with the film because this is something that Garrison sincerely believed in at the time of his prosecution of Clay Shaw. (He had garnered this from things like the Sorenson book plus another source that I will reveal in Part Five of my review of Reclaiming History, which discusses Vincent Bugliosi’s treatment of both Garrison and Stone.) So in the immense controversy that followed the film—and actually preceded it—Newman’s book figured prominently. For instance, when it came out in 1992, Arthur Schlesinger reviewed it on the front page of the New York Times Book Review.

    After the controversy subsided, Newman’s book began to have an impact in academia. The reason it took awhile is because his book absolutely humiliated many of the previous standard bearers in the Vietnam field. Like say Halberstam, and Stanley Karnow, and William Conrad Gibbons. The book was so clear and logically argued that the question became: How could all of these so called “scholars” have acted like lemmings and missed this easily delineated dividing line? In the aforementioned Gardner book, Newman states that the underlying tow is the collective attempt to deny that the Vietnam War was, contrary to popular belief, not an inevitable tragedy. (p. 158) That who actually occupies the Oval Office does make a difference. (p. 159) And Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived furthers this argument substantially. Once an historical paradigm is set, it is very difficult to surmount it. Even if it is wrong. That’s because, contrary to popular belief, there is strong pressure in the academic world not to rock the boat, not to break out of preconceived paradigms. That is, to become part of the Establishment. Much of this comes down through the influence of foundations, conservative think tanks, and of course, the CIA’s influence on campus. Two men written about in Probe previously, Thomas Reeves and Max Holland, are good examples of this.

    But, for reasons stated above, JFK and Vietnam could not be denied. Slowly but surely it began to turn the paradigm around. The shocking thing about the book is that, not only did it enrage the conservatives; it also infuriated the so-called Leftist leaders at the time, namely Alexander Cockburn and Noam Chomsky. Galbraith’s 2003 article in Boston Review, using the since declassified record, negates the rather silly arguments of both polemicists. (And I will detail this further in Part Five of the Bugliosi review.) And the great triumph of Newman ‘s work is that the documents declassified by the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) only fortify what he wrote. Because of that, other historians who wrote after him, followed in his footsteps: LBJ broke with Kennedy’s policies on Vietnam. This included David Kaiser in American Tragedy, Robert Dallek in An Unfinished Life, and Howard Jones in Death of a Generation. Two other books which should be mentioned in this regard which favor Kennedy not Americanizing the war, but are more equivocal in their judgments, are the works of the aforementioned Logevall and Lawrence Freedman’s ironically titled Kennedy’s Wars. (I say “ironically” because the book comes to the conclusion that Kennedy was determined not to get involved in any wars.)

    II

    This book takes a leap forward. Because at the end of the conference a vote was taken on whether, if he had lived, Kennedy would have Americanized the war. Half the respondents said he would not have and would have withdrawn. Thirty percent said he would have escalated as Johnson did. And twenty percent said it was too difficult to say. (p. 210)

    Let me add here, the discussion of the issue is quite wide ranging. As the film did, the book takes in the other opportunities Kennedy had to get involved in wars, which he refused to do. The authors put great weight on Kennedy’s acceptance of failure at the Bay of Pigs rather than sending in American forces, which Admiral Arleigh Burke wanted him to do. As many commentators do, including myself, they see this as a defining moment in President Kennedy’s presidency. In the document section of the book, they print three memoranda that depict Kennedy’s reaction to the disaster he was led into by the CIA. Clearly, Kennedy went through a definite pattern after the Bay of Pigs: shock and dismay at his advisers, feedback as to what exactly had gone wrong, and how the debacle had now placed America in the eyes of its trusted allies abroad. In other words, he grew from the experience. And the book also notes briefly, the two reports that were issued as a result of the Bay of Pigs: the presidentially commissioned Taylor Report, and the internal CIA report by Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick. Both of the reports concluded that the operation was poorly planned and weakly reviewed. As writers like Paul Fay have noted, Kennedy vowed that he would never again accept the advice of his CIA and Pentagon advisers without grilling them at length and in depth.

    What is important about this episode is that it occurs just seven months prior to the first dramatic milestone in Kennedy’s conduct of the Vietnam War. In the fall of 1961, Maxwell Taylor and assistant National Security Adviser Walt Rostow went to Vietnam. They then delivered a report to Kennedy in late October. The recommendation was that, since the Viet Cong were gaining strength and Ngo Dinh Diem’s position was weakening, the time had come for the USA to commit combat troops to the conflict. The debate on this issue lasted for over two weeks. It appears that the only person resisting the siren song of direct military intervention was President Kennedy. One of the real valued documents included in the book is what is probably the only set of notes taken on this debate. They are by White House military aide Col. Howard Burris (pgs 282-283). They deserve to be summarized and paraphrased at length. Here is the gist of it:

    Kennedy stated that Vietnam is not a clear-cut case of aggression as it was in Korea. He says that the conflict in Vietnam is “more obscure and less flagrant.” Kennedy notes that in a situation such as Vietnam, allies are needed even more since the USA would be subject to intense criticism from abroad. He compared the record of the past, where the Vietnamese had resisted foreign forces who had spent millions against them with no success. He then compared the situation in Berlin with Vietnam, saying that in Berlin you had a well-defined conflict whereas the Vietnam situation was obscure. So obscure that you might soon even have Democrats in his own party bewildered by it. Especially since you would largely be fighting a guerilla force, and “sometimes in a phantom-like fashion.” Kennedy said that because of this, the base of operations for American troops would be insecure. At the end of the discussion Kennedy turned the conversation to what would be done next in Vietnam, “rather than whether or not the US would become involved.” I should add, during the talk, Kennedy turned aside attempts by Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Lyman Lemnitzer to derail his thought process. Kennedy had learned his lesson well.

    One of the most important discoveries in the volume is that in the mid-nineties, National Security Advisor Bundy had decided to write a book about his experience with Kennedy and Johnson over Vietnam. His co-author on that endeavor was at the Musgrove Conference. His name is Gordon Goldstein. The two had worked on the book for two years. But Bundy unfortunately passed away in 1996 before it was finished. Goldstein says that one of the great surprises he had in working on the book was that Bundy had virtually no memory of the debate in November of 1961. (p. 76) In fact, Goldstein says that Bundy was actually surprised at 1.) How hawkish he was in the 1961 debate, and 2.) How resistant at all costs Kennedy was. At this time, Bundy actually wrote a memo to Kennedy in which he recommended a force of 25,000 troops be sent because South Vietnam actually wants to be part of the USA! (pgs 280-281) How resistant was Kennedy to all this? When General Max Taylor tried to sneak 8,000 combat troops in for “flood relief” purposes, Kennedy consulted with an agriculture expert to prove you didn’t need them for that purpose. (p. 77) After two years of delving into the record, Bundy had come to the conclusion that Kennedy would not have committed combat troops to Vietnam. As he told Goldstein: “Kennedy very definitely was not going to Americanize the war in Vietnam; and Lyndon Johnson very definitely, from the moment he succeeded Kennedy was going to do whatever it took to win the war in Vietnam, including sending US combat forces in large numbers … ” (p. 53, emphasis added. The phrase in italics is a key point I will return to later.) This now makes it unanimous. The three men in closest proximity to Kennedy concerning military strategy are now on record as saying that Kennedy was not going to commit troops to Vietnam: McNamara in his book In Retrospect, Taylor (pgs. 357, 365), and now Bundy.

    Another point the book makes is that it nails Walt Rostow. As I said, Rostow accompanied Taylor on the Vietnam trip of 1961. Rostow was one of the biggest hawks in the White House up until Kennedy’s 11/61 decision to increase the advisors but not to send in combat troops. This decision was memorialized in NSAM 111, in late November of 1961. Right after this, Kennedy got so tired of Rostow’s memoranda suggesting further American commitment to Vietnam-like invading the north with a million man US army—that he took him out of the White House and placed him in the Policy Planning Department of the State Department. (p. 182) Now, Rostow writes his myriad hawkish memos for Rusk to read. And they seem to have had an effect. Because when Johnson took over, Rusk now became a real hawk on the war. (p. 154) But further, when Bundy decided to resign as National Security Advisor, he suggested two men to replace him: Thomas Hughes or Moyers. Johnson rejected them both. He placed Walt Rostow in the job. Johnson had to have known what he was getting with Rostow. Because he was around for the debates of November of 1961. He knew that the Taylor-Rostow Report recommended American combat troops. He had to have known that Kennedy argued eloquently and soundly against the commitment of combat troops. After all, Howard Burris, the man who wrote the memo containing Kennedy’s arguments—which I quoted from above—was working for Johnson. So when LBJ rescued Rostow from his figurative Siberia in the State Department, he knew what he was getting. And he would have recalled him only if he knew that Rostow’s agenda coincided with his own. Which was to escalate the war. (p. 175) In fact, when Rostow was appointed National Security Advisor, he told Johnson about Kennedy’s “deep commitment to the independence of Vietnam from which he would not have retreated.” (p. 152) According to Chester Cooper, Rostow looked upon negotiations as tantamount to surrender. Rostow wanted a simple goal: an independent South Vietnam. By 1965-66, the actual goal of both Johnson and Rostow was this: “Bringing the Vietnamese communists to their knees via continuously escalating the level of punishment they received from US air and ground forces until the communists gave up.” (p. 179) This was nothing but a delusional fantasy. And Kennedy understood this in 1961 from 1.) His visits to Vietnam during the French imperialist war there in the fifties, 2.) Through his talks with MacArthur, and 3.) His conversations with DeGaulle.

    After this November 1961 decision and the reassignment of Rostow, Kennedy went to Seattle and made a speech. This is the day after NSAM 111 is signed. He talked about how America had to be cautious on the world stage because any crisis might escalate into a catastrophic nuclear war. He specifically mentioned how the massive amount of US firepower could be rendered useless by guerilla warfare and infiltration. He then added that although the US could ship arms abroad, it was up to those peoples to use them correctly and for the right ideals. We could not impose our will on others, and there could not be “an American solution to every problem.” (pgs. 287-288) These were wise and prophetic words, which Rostow and Johnson did not understand or even wish to comprehend.

    III

    One of the most fascinating parts of the book is the discussion of the role of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in Kennedy’s administration. When Kennedy sent Rostow and Taylor to Vietnam in the fall of 1961, he seems to have understood what they would come back with. After all, JFK fully comprehended what Rostow was about pretty quickly. What I will discuss next reveals just how wise Kennedy had become and how smart he was at maneuvering the people in his own Cabinet after the Bay of Pigs. Almost concurrently with the trip by Rostow and Taylor, he also sent John Kenneth Galbraith to Vietnam. (p.129) He realized that what Galbraith wrote up would counter the Rostow-Taylor recommendations. It did of course. But Kennedy did not throw this report out for open discussion. He told Galbraith to give it to McNamara only. This becomes crucial in any discussion of Vietnam in the JFK administration. Because as the book notes, after the issuance of NSAM 111, the only person in the Cabinet who seems to understand what Kennedy is headed for is McNamara. And in fact, Howard Jones discovered that Roswell Gilpatric, McNamara’s Deputy Secretary, talked about the fact that Kennedy eventually entrusted his boss with putting together a withdrawal plan. He referred to it as “part of a plan the president asked him [McNamara] to develop to unwind this whole thing.” (p. 371) This began in earnest in 1962 when McNamara went to the Joint Chiefs and told them to put together a plan for withdrawal. As Jim Douglass wrote in his fine book JFK and the Unspeakable, the Chiefs dragged their feet on this one for a year. Finally at the so-called SecDef conference of May 1963, they presented a plan to the Secretary. He criticized it as being too slow. (pgs 288-291) After telling them to hurry it along, he had a taped conversation with Kennedy and Bundy in October of 1963. He told Kennedy the military mission of the US would be completed by 1965, and if it were not, the South Vietnamese would be ready by then to take it over. Bundy then interjects, “What’s the point of doing that?” McNamara replies, “We need a way to get out of Vietnam. This is a way of doing it. And to leave forces there when they’re not needed, I think is wasteful and complicates both their problem and ours.”

    The above ARRB declassified tape was heard and shown on screen in the accompanying film to this book. When played at the conference its effect was startling. (pgs 100, 124) Why? Because mainstream writers like Karnow and Halberstam had always depicted Vietnam as McNamara’s War. Plus much of the documentation showing this as false had been concealed from the public. In fact, Goldstein actually asked, “Who is the Robert McNamara on these tapes?” To me the comment by Bundy—”What’s the point of doing that?”—is the key. As Gilpatric explained, and Galbraith elucidated, McNamara was appointed by JFK to be his point man on the withdrawal. He was going to drive it home with occasional encouragement from Kennedy. This “back channel” idea was endorsed by James Galbraith, who talked about it with his father. John Kenneth Galbraith told his son that JFK often operated like this. In James Galbraith’s words about McNamara at the conference: “Kennedy and he [McNamara] were agreed in advance that this was the course of policy they were going to follow. That was a position they didn’t share … with virtually no one else. They then imposed this, with McNamara playing the role of giving the argument he already knows Kennedy is going to accept, because Kennedy told him to do it.” (p. 129) This concept was posthumously endorsed through Bundy. When co-author Goldstein talked to Bundy about why McNamara switched so quickly from endorsing combat troops in November of 1961 to being so dovish a month later, Bundy said there was only one answer to explain the apparent paradox. Kennedy had asked him to do so. (p. 125) In fact, McNamara was so immersed in making the withdrawal plan work that he asked the State Department intelligence group (INR) to give him more optimistic scenarios of what was happening on the ground. (p. 117) According to Newman, this was probably done because once the CIA and Pentagon realized Kennedy was going to withdraw, they began to change their intelligence estimates from rosy to pessimistic. And further, they backdated the revisions to July of 1963. (Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 425, 441 Gardner and Gittinger, p. 172) Realizing Kennedy’s plan to use the false and rosy estimates to hoist them on their own petard—that is, to withdraw US forces since they were not needed anymore—the CIA and Pentagon began to fight back.

    What this all says of course is that, as in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy understood that his Cabinet and military advisers were not giving him what he wanted fast enough. In October of 1962, he worked secretly through his brother Robert Kennedy, and to a lesser extent with Rusk. This time around he worked with McNamara, and to a lesser extent with Galbraith. With McNamara running interference, NSAM 263, ordering the withdrawal of the first thousand advisers from Vietnam was signed in October of 1963. (It should be added here that the death of the Nhu brothers in November of 1963 had no effect on the withdrawal plan. See page 372) The press release that announced NSAM 263 also stated that this first thousand troop draw down was part of a phased withdrawal of the major part of all US forces. And that withdrawal would be completed by the end of 1965. (p. 300)

    Finally, when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Max Taylor wrote his memo on NSAM 263 to the service Chiefs, there was no mention about the withdrawal being contingent upon victory. (pgs 106, 110) This is a myth promulgated by anti-Kennedy polemicist Noam Chomsky. Virtually no one at this conference bought it.

    IV

    Ever since the portrayal of Lyndon Johnson’s role in the escalation of the Vietnam War was dramatically depicted in Oliver Stone’s film JFK, there has been an attempt by some e.g. Michael Beschloss and Vincent Bugliosi, to soften that image. What these two try to say is that Johnson was a reluctant warrior who was manipulated by others into plunging America into an epic tragedy that needlessly consumed the lives of over 58,000 Americans and two million Vietnamese. In other words Stone and John Newman (who served as a consultant on the film) got it wrong. They unfairly distorted what Johnson’s real role was in this affair. What this book shows, and with utter finality, is this: it is Beschloss and Bugliosi who have it wrong. If anything, Stone and Newman were being kind to Johnson. The reality is actually worse. And the recall of Walt Rostow to commandeer the escalation is only part of it. The book brings in a new angle: Johnson understood that he was breaking with Kennedy’s policy, and he consciously tried to cover his tracks.

    The story begins with the alterations in NSAM 273. This was the rough draft of a presidential order as assembled by Kennedy’s advisers in Hawaii just prior to Kennedy’s trip to Dallas. The conference there was meant to make any necessary adjustments to Vietnam policy after the death of the Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother. Because of his murder in Dallas, the rough draft of this order, actually written by Bundy, was never signed by President Kennedy. The opening of the draft said that the US mission was still to assist the Government of South Vietnam against the Communist insurgency. It also mentioned that the US intended to withdraw as made clear by the White House announcement of October. Paragraph seven stated that there should be actions against North Vietnam using South Vietnamese resources, especially sea resources. (Newman, p. 440, emphasis added)

    At Johnson’s first Vietnam meeting on November 24, 1963 there was a quite different tone and attitude than anything Kennedy had said with his Cabinet. The new president stated clearly, “I am not going to lose Vietnam. I am not going to be the president who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went.” He ordered South Vietnamese Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to “tell the generals in Saigon that Lyndon Johnson intends to stand by our word.” (Newman, p. 442) This is rather an odd thing to say. Because the word prior to Dallas was that the USA was intending to withdraw and turn the war over to South Vietnam. Johnson then said that he was unhappy with our emphasis on social reforms, he had little tolerance for the US trying to be “do-gooders”. (ibid, p. 443) He then added that he had “never been happy with our operations in Vietnam.” (ibid) His intent was clear: it was to win the war. (McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 102) He then issued a stern warning: He wanted no more dissension or division over policy. Any person that did not conform would be removed. (This would later be demonstrated by his banning of Hubert Humphrey from Vietnam meetings when Humphrey advised Johnson to rethink his policy of military commitment to Vietnam.) When the meeting was over, Bill Moyers remained in the room with Johnson. LBJ said, “So they’ll think with Kennedy dead we’ve lost heart … they’ll think we’re yellow …” Moyers asked whom he was referring to. Johnson replied the Chinese and the Russians. Moyers asked his boss what he was going to do now. Johnson said he was going to give the generals what they wanted, more money. LBJ continued by saying that he was not going to let Vietnam slip away like China did. He was going to tell those generals in Saigon “to get off their butts and get out in those jungles and whip the hell out of some Communists.” (Newsweek, 2/10/75)

    It’s hard to believe, but it is imperative to remember: this is just 48 hours after Kennedy’s death. As the book notes, Johnson’s presidential style was completely different from Kennedy’s. And it locked him into his blinkered view of Vietnam. He tended to personalize the war. He was intolerant of dissent. He wanted to intimidate the opposition. Both in the White House, and on the battlefield. (p. 192) By the summer of 1965, Johnson had so cowed any dissent within his Cabinet that after he had already committed 85,000 combat troops to Vietnam, Gen Westmoreland actually requested another 85,000. LBJ called for a meeting and asked for a vote. The minutes of this meeting end with: “There was no response when the president asked whether anyone in the room opposed the course of action decided upon.” (p. 193) Westmoreland got his troops.

    This drastic change in tone accomplished two things. First, it gave the signal to the hawks and closet hawks that, unlike with JFK, they would now have Johnson’s ear. Secondly, the altered intelligence reports about the declining fortunes on the battlefield would now have their intended effect. Bundy now changed the rough draft of NSAM 273 in accordance with Johnson’s “stronger views on the war”. (Newman, p. 445) First, in keeping with Johnson’s “no dissension or division” reprimand, the new NSAM expressly forbade any public criticisms of the war effort. Second, paragraph seven about South Vietnamese operations against the north was rewritten. And it was rewritten in a way that allowed the US to participate in these covert operations against North Vietnam. (ibid, p. 446) Thus began OPLAN 34A, which was submitted to Johnson less than a month later. Johnson approved it on January 16, 1964. This resulted in Operation DESOTO, consisting of US maritime patrols acquiring visual, electronic, and photographic intelligence in the Tonkin Gulf. These patrols began on February 28, 1964. In early August, the second patrol resulted in the North Vietnamese attack on the US destroyer Maddox. And this opened the door to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which Johnson vigorously pursued as his approval to begin the US air war against North Vietnam. And these first air strikes were considered by Ho Chi Minh to be acts of war by the USA. (p. 162) As the air war intensified—eventually turning into the colossal Operation Rolling Thunder—the US needed protection for the air bases being built. So in early March of 1965, just seven months after the Maddox incident, the first US combat troops arrived in South Vietnam. And 1965 was the year Kennedy had intended to complete his withdrawal plan—after he was reelected. Johnson did the opposite. He inserted combat troops after his reelection. As Newman notes in JFK and Vietnam, the November 1964 election was used by Kennedy to disguise a withdrawal. Johnson used it to disguise his plan for intervention. (Newman, p. 442) In fact, Johnson essentially said this to the Joint Chiefs in December of 1963. He told them at a Christmas party, “Just get me elected, and then you can have your war.” (Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, p. 326)

    V

    Much of the above is taken from Newman’s 1992 book. In working with John after meeting him in 1993, he told me that one of the problems he had in writing JFK and Vietnam was that the CIA eventually found out what he was doing. And they would visit archival institutions—like the Hoover Institute at Stanford—and remove certain things in advance.

    This problem was alleviated by the arrival of the ARRB. I say alleviated. It was not completely cured. For instance, although the ARRB interviewed several people who attended the Honolulu Conference of November 1963, none of them could produce the stenographic record of the meeting. In late 1997, the Board released the records of the SecDef Conference in May of 1963. This was McNamara’s meeting with his Vietnam advisers in Hawaii. Clearly, at this meeting, McNamara is hurrying the withdrawal plan. And as I wrote in Probe, (Vol. 5 No. 3) “On page after page of these documents, at every upper level of the Pentagon, everyone seems aware that Kennedy’s withdrawal plan will begin in December of 1963 … and this would be the beginning of an eventual complete withdrawal by 1965.” (p. 19) How clear was the message McNamara was carrying for Kennedy? General Earle Wheeler wrote, “that proposals for overt action invited a negative PRESIDENTIAL decision.” (ibid, capitals in original) Compare this to Johnson’s telling the generals to get off their butts and whip hell out of some communists. Also, in the November 26th version of NSAM 273, Johnson ordered “intensified operations against North Vietnam” both overt and covert, covering “the full spectrum of sabotage, psychological and raiding activity.” Further, the intensified operations were also against the country of Laos. These operations could now be made without clearance from the State Department. Concerning Cambodia, the new order was to show that charges of US clandestine operations against that country were groundless—which they were not—with no actual measures taken to show they were. (ibid) The entry into Laos and Cambodia were also added by LBJ and Bundy and were definitely alterations of Kennedy’s policies.

    But Virtual JFK: Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived goes even further in this regard. At the 11/24 Cabinet meeting mentioned above, McNamara must have gotten the message that the withdrawal plan was now in the crosshairs of a newly hawkish president. And this surely must have been even more evident when Bundy made the appropriate alterations to NSAM 273 that Johnson desired. But in a newly declassified phone call of 2/20/64 the point that there was a new sheriff in town was hammered home. Johnson told McNamara “I always thought it was foolish for you to make any statements about withdrawing. I thought it was bad psychologically. But you and the president thought otherwise, and I just sat silent.” (p. 310) This is stunning. It clearly denotes that Johnson was aware of what Kennedy was planning. And that he was planning it through McNamara. Further, that he was so opposed to it that he thought it was “foolish”. But since he was in a subordinate position he had to suffer through it. But now he was subordinate no more. And now he was telling the guy who he knew was running the withdrawal plan that it was over.

    In another conversation, less than two weeks later, he actually makes McNamara take back what he said in 1963 about the initial thousand-man withdrawal and the eventual complete withdrawal in 1965. He begins to formulate excuses to say that the plan didn’t really mean that “everybody comes back, that means your training ought to be in pretty good shape that time.” And then Johnson tries to soothe McNamara’s silence over this contradiction—read “lie”—by saying that there was nothing really inconsistent in these new statements he wanted McNamara to make. (ibid) LBJ is consciously breaking with Kennedy’s policy and he is getting Kennedy’s point man on board as he tries to cover his tracks. In January of 1965, Johnson continues this strategy with McNamara. Johnson calls McNamara and tells him that at a Georgetown party the Kennedy crowd had got the word out that Johnson was using CIA Director John McCone “to put the Vietnam War on Kennedy’s tomb. And I had a conspiracy going on to show that it was Kennedy’s immaturity and poor judgment that originally led us into this thing, that got us involved … And that this was my game: to lay Vietnam off onto Kennedy’s inexperience and immaturity and so forth.” (p. 306) Johnson then continues by saying that since McNamara was part of Kennedy’s administration, that he did not resent very much what was said or he would have spoken up. (ibid) Johnson later had Rostow collect all of Kennedy’s public statements supporting the war to show there was no breakage in policy between the two men. Johnson’s co-opting of McNamara was now complete. The war that was unfairly tagged as McNamara’s War was really imposed on him by Johnson.

    But even prior to these conversations, on February 3, 1964 LBJ revealed that he knew what he was going to do way before Rolling Thunder and the commitment of combat troops. In a phone call with John Knight of the Miami Herald, he said that there were three options he had. The first was to get out. But he said the dominoes would now start falling over. “And God Almighty, what they said about us leaving China would just be warming up compared to what they’d say now.” So getting out was eliminated. He then said that “you can sit down and agree to neutralize all of it. But nobody is going to neutralize North Vietnam, so that’s totally impractical.” So now, neutralization was eliminated. “And so it really boils down to … getting out or getting in.” (p. 211) Now if you compare the getting out option with the dominoes falling all over Southeast Asia , and even greater historical Red baiting than losing China, which option do you think Johnson had in mind? And further, what kind of foreign policy thinker compares losing a country the size of China with the narrow peninsula of South Vietnam? Answer: A thinker with—unlike Kennedy—no discrimination or sophistication. As Logevall notes here, Johnson was a hawk from the beginning. With him it was “We can fight them in South Vietnam, or we can fight them in San Francisco.” (p. 169)

    But it was actually even worse than that. Johnson was so shallow in his foreign policy views that he actually compared losing South Vietnam with what Neville Chamberlain did with Hitler at Munich! He actually said this to biographer Doris Kearns. (Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, p. 264) He then added, “And I knew that if we let Communist aggression succeed in taking over South Vietnam, there would follow in this country an endless national debate … that would shatter my presidency, kill my administration, and damage our democracy.” (He was exactly wrong of course. It was his prosecution of the war that destroyed his presidency.) Incredibly, he then compared the loss of China and the rise of McCarthy and the Red Scare with the loss of South Vietnam. After comparing them, he actually said the loss of the latter would be worse! “Losing the Great Society was a terrible thought, but not so terrible as the thought of being responsible for America’s losing a war to the Communists. Nothing could possibly be worse than that.” This is ignorance that is almost beyond description.

    But it is particularly stark when compared with what Bundy told Goldstein Kennedy was planning for in his second term. The goals were 1.) A reduction in East-West tensions 2.) Reduction in nuclear weapons held by the US and USSR 3.) Strict arms control, and 4.) Normalization of relations with China. (p. 227) If anyone thinks Bundy was talking through his hat, Dean Rusk vouched for the China venture.

    Further contravening Beschloss and Bugliosi, Johnson could not wait for a confirmation of the second attack on the Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin. There was real confusion about whether such an attack occurred. And it turned out that it had not. But in listening to the dialogue between Admiral Sharp, McNamara and Johnson it became clear that Sharp’s efforts to discern the truth “were gradually eclipsed by the need LBJ felt to order some kind of retaliation and to do it quickly.” (p. 379) To me, all the above is indicative of a man who has been thoroughly indoctrinated into the complete, and false, paradigm of the Cold War. As Richard Mahoney showed in JFK: Ordeal in Africa, Kennedy had not been so indoctrinated. So the agony and depression LBJ felt as the Vietnam disaster unfolded was in part because he knew there were other options he could have chosen. And unlike Kennedy, he had not. As Moyers stated, “He knew more than anyone in the room what it was going to cost him: everything, as he kept saying, was on the table. His agenda, and lives, and knowing more than anyone else, he still made the choice. It was his to make; no one made it for him.” (p. 197)

    The book is well worth buying. In my view, it closes the chapter on a debate that has been going on since 1992. As shown here, it’s a debate that should have never started.

  • Douglas Horne, Inside the ARRB (Part IV)


    Inside the ARRB, Vol. IV, by Doug Horne

    A Nearly-Entirely-Positive Review


    This is a Review of Volume IV, which includes

    Part II: Fraud in the Evidence: A Pattern of Deception (continued)
    Chapter 13: What Really Happened at the Bethesda Morgue? (and in Dealey Plaza)
    Chapter 14: The Zapruder Film Mystery.


     

    The death of a democracy is not likely to be an assassination from ambush. It will be a
    slow extinction from apathy, indifference, and undernourishment.

     ~ Robert Maynard Hutchins, Great Books (1954)


    My title here is a parody of my review1 of Reclaiming History (2007) by Vincent Bugliosi. Since that review was (in my opinion) rather devastating for Bugliosi, my title was intended to be sardonic. Despite this, Vince lifted a few quotes from it (out of context and without my permission) and included them with his abbreviated paperback version, Four Days in November (2008). The total page count (CD included) of his massive doorstopper was about 2786, almost exactly three times as long as the 888-page Warren Report. Horne’s book, by contrast, is shorter: 1880 pages, including the front matter (pages i-lxxiii). I had stated that Bugliosi’s book was likely to stand forever as the magnum opus of this case, though not without serious flaws. As a magnum opus, however, Horne’s five-volume set is a serious challenge to Bugliosi, but with virtually none of Bugliosi’s flaws. The current review, however, focuses (almost) solely on Volume IV, which I regard as Horne’s set piece (as that phrase is used in literature and film, but not in soccer).

    Although some men believe that women age like fine wine, in this case it is Horne himself who has aged well – he waited the better part of a decade after his experiences with the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) before beginning the serious work on his book. He does hint, though, that Bugliosi drop-kicked him (he is an Ohio State Buckeye fan) onto the playing field. Volume IV focuses on the two chief themes of the entire five-volume set: (1) the illicit surgery, before the official autopsy began, by pathologists James J. Humes and J. Thornton Boswell2 at the Bethesda morgue and (2) the Zapruder film riddles. It is likely that the success or failure of Horne’s work will rise or fall with this single volume. In this review, I shall address these two topics in sequence, critique a few puzzles, then draw some conclusions and finish with several suggestions. By way of a caveat emptor, I should confess that I initially encountered Horne at his first COPA (Committee on Political Assassinations) conference (when he interviewed with the ARRB), have intermittently met him since, and consider him a very good friend. He is also a very bright and strong-willed investigator.

    Illicit Surgery at the Bethesda Morgue

    In order to paint Humes and Boswell (H&B hereafter) as the morbid co-conspirators, Horne needs first to clarify the timeline – which he does brilliantly (see the Appendix at the end of this review). The ARRB learned, for the first time, that JFK’s body initially arrived at the Bethesda morgue at 6:35 PM local time (in a black hearse). That information derives from an after-action report (written on November 26, 1963) by Marine Sergeant Roger Boyajian.3 Quite astonishingly, Boyajian had retained a copy of his report, which he presented to the ARRB. His report corroborates the recollections of Dennis David4 who saw the light gray navy ambulance (with the bronze casket from Dallas) arrive at the front of the hospital, where he saw Jackie exit; its arrival time was either 6:53 PM or 6:55 PM (the sources vary).5 But just about 20 minutes earlier, David had directed his on-duty sailors as they delivered the body in a cheap casket, i.e., the entry described by Boyajian. David estimated (from memory) the delivery time as 6:40 PM, or perhaps 6:45 PM. His estimate is strikingly close to Boyajian’s recorded time of 6:35 PM. Horne concludes that this arrival time of 6:35 PM must now be accepted as a foundation stone in this case. As further corroboration for this time, he emphasizes that even Humes agreed with it: before the ARRB, Humes cited the initial arrival as possibly as early as 6:45 PM.6 In my opinion, therefore, it is very difficult to disagree with this early arrival time. If this is accepted, though, the repercussions are colossal – it means that the bronze casket (the one that traveled with Jackie) was empty. Horne next compiles a long table7 of witnesses to the cheap casket and the body bag, both of which were seen at this initial entry. He is also very persuasive here, although he rightfully credits Lifton with much of this groundbreaking work.

    Now if the body arrived at 6:35 PM in a cheap shipping casket, when did it exit the bronze casket (the one that left Parkland)? Horne suggests that this transfer occurred right after the bronze casket boarded Air Force One. (Lifton again blazed this trail.) As corroboration for this, Horne8 describes JFK’s Air Force Aide, Godfrey McHugh, as perturbed about a delay caused by a ‘luggage transfer’ between the two official planes. After this transfer to a body bag, tampering became feasible. Horne suggests that an initial foray into the body took place in the forward baggage compartment prior to the flight to DC; the goal was to extract metal debris or a bullet from the throat wound. (It is not known whether anything was found.) Horne infers that a similar attempt was made on the brain, but that attempt likely foundered because the requisite tool (e.g., a bone saw) was missing.

    The second casket entry (via a light gray navy ambulance) occurred at about 7:17 PM. James W. Sibert and Francis X. O’Neill, Jr. (the two-member FBI team) and Roy H. Kellerman and William Greer (both Secret Service) together delivered the (empty) bronze casket to the morgue.9 This time is consistent with the arrival time of the bronze casket (shortly before 7 PM) at the front of the hospital. The third casket entry (with the body inside) has traditionally been accepted as the official one – at 8 PM (in a light gray navy ambulance). It was delivered by the Joint Service Casket Team.10 The transfer of the body must have occurred (in the morgue) after the second entry at 7:17 PM. But it must also have transpired after the initial X-rays (for reasons to be discussed below).11 Finally, this transfer must have occurred well in advance of 8 PM so that the bronze casket could leave the morgue (Tom Robinson recalled this temporary departure12), be ‘found’ by the official casket team, and then delivered again at 8 PM. This sequence of three casket entries looks like a classic French farce, i.e., an affair concocted by a half-mad scriptwriter. Unfortunately, all of the evidence points strongly in the direction of three casket entries. Perhaps this would have been unnecessary, as Horne points out, if only Jackie had not insisted on staying with the bronze casket en route to the morgue. (She had declined a helicopter ride to the White House, which would have separated her from the Dallas casket.) Most likely the plan had been to surreptitiously transfer the body between caskets at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center. But Jackie’s unexpected decision to remain with the bronze Dallas casket waylaid those plans, which meant that Kellerman (who Horne nominates as the morgue manager) had to improvise on the spot. It was a highly risky business, during which this escapade was nearly uncovered, according to Horne.

    Lifton had argued that body alteration had occurred somewhere before Bethesda. He believed that altering the geometry of the shooting through “trajectory reversal” – i.e., turning entrance wounds into exit wounds, and planting false entrance wounds on the body – was the primary reason for the illicit post mortem surgery, and that removing bullet fragments was only a co-equal, or even secondary, goal of the clandestine surgery.13 Horne takes a different tack: he believes that the reason for assaulting the body (before Bethesda) was merely to extract bullet debris, not primarily to alter wounds.

    My own views come into play at this point. Before Horne’s work, I had become convinced that someone had messed with the throat wound, most likely to extract bullet fragments. The evidence for this was that the two sets of witnesses – those at Parkland vs. those at Bethesda – had disagreed so profoundly. Also, Malcolm Perry, the surgeon who performed the tracheotomy, claimed that he had left the throat wound ‘inviolate,’ meaning that it was easily visible after the tube was pulled. In addition, Charles Crenshaw insisted that the tracheotomy at Parkland was nothing like the one in the autopsy photographs. I also had my own (telephone) encounter with the autopsy radiologist, John Ebersole.14 I still sense the horror in his voice as he recalled the tracheotomy and declared that he would never do one like that. Horne’s witnesses (there are more) only validate my prior conclusion about throat tampering.

    Before Horne’s work, I was uncertain about head tampering before Bethesda (although Lifton had made a strong case for it). Nonetheless, I had to agree that if the throat had been explored, then of course the head might also have been invaded. Although Horne is still open-minded about illegal tampering of the skull before Bethesda, he believes that such an event can be inferred from (1) Finck’s statement (to the defense team at the Clay Shaw trial in 1969) that the autopsy report (presumably an earlier one, as the extant one does not say this) described the spinal cord as severed when the body arrived at Bethesda and (2) Tom Robinson’s comment to the ARRB that the top of the skull was ‘badly broken’ when the body was received at Bethesda, but that the large defect (in the superior skull) in the autopsy photographs was ‘what the [autopsy] doctors did’ – i.e., that the missing skull was due to the pathologists, not due an assassin’s bullet(s).15 These reports therefore provide more evidence that the head was explored somewhere before Bethesda; the goal was to retrieve bullet debris, but it failed – because the brain could not be extracted from the skull. In summary then, the body arrived at Bethesda as follows: (1) with a radically enlarged tracheotomy16 and no bullet debris in the neck (perhaps there never was any, as I have suggested elsewhere17) and (2) with the same (right occipital) exit wound that was seen at Parkland and with a brain that had not been removed from the skull and that therefore closely, or possibly even exactly, resembled the Parkland brain. Most likely the brain still contained most, or even all, of the bullet fragments from Dealey Plaza. (These metal fragments are, of course, absent from the official record today.) Those are Horne’s conclusions about H&B, but let’s look at the evidence.

    So why does Horne conclude that H&B illicitly removed (and altered) the brain shortly after 6:35 PM, before any X-rays were taken, and before the official autopsy began? He here introduces two intriguing witnesses – the two R’s, namely Reed and Robinson. Edward Reed was assistant to Jerrol Custer (the radiology tech), while Tom Robinson was a mortician. Rather consistently with one another, but quite independently, both describe critical steps taken by H&B that no one else reports. (Horne documents why no one else reported these events – almost everyone else had been evicted from the morgue before this clandestine interlude.) After the body was placed on the morgue table (and before X-rays were taken), Reed briefly sat in the gallery.18 Reed states19 that Humes first used a scalpel across the top of the forehead to pull the scalp back. Then he used a saw to cut the forehead bone, after which he (and Custer, too) were asked to leave the morgue. (Reed was not aware that this intervention by Humes was unofficial.) This activity by Humes is highly significant because multiple witnesses saw the intact entry hole high in the right forehead at the hairline. On the other hand, the autopsy photographs show only a thin incision at this site, an incision that no Parkland witness ever saw. The implication is obvious: this specific autopsy photograph was taken after Humes altered the forehead – thereby likely obliterating the entry hole.

    Reed’s report suggests that Humes deliberately obliterated the right forehead entry; in fact, the autopsy photograph does not show this entry site. Paradoxically, however, Robinson (the mortician) recalls20 seeing, during restoration, a wound about º inch across at this very location. He even recalls having to place wax at this site. So the question is obvious: If Humes had obliterated the wound (as seems the case based on the extant autopsy photograph), how then could Robinson still see the wound during restoration? This question cannot be answered with certainty, but two options arise: (1) perhaps the wound was indeed obliterated (or mostly obliterated) and Robinson merely suffered some memory merge – i.e., even though he added wax to the incision (the one still visible in the extant photograph), he was actually recalling the way it looked before Humes got to it, or (2) the photograph itself has been altered – to disguise the wound that was visible in an original photograph. The latter option was seemingly endorsed by Joe O’Donnell, the USIA photographer,21 who said that Knudsen actually showed him such a photograph.

    Regarding Robinson, Horne concludes that he arrived with the hearse that brought the body (i.e., the first entry). After that, Robinson simply observed events from the morgue gallery; contrary to Reed’s experience, he was not asked to leave. Just before 7 PM, Robinson22 saw H&B remove large portions of the rear and top of the skull with a saw, in order to access the brain. (Robinson was not aware that this activity was off the record.) He also observed ten or more bullet fragments extracted from the brain. Although these do not appear in the official record, Dennis David recalls23 preparing a receipt for at least four fragments.24

    Contrary to Reed and Robinson, Humes25 declared that a saw was not important:

    We had to do virtually no work with a saw to remove these portions of the skull, they came apart in our hands very easily, and we attempted to further examine the brain.

    Although James Jenkins (an autopsy technician) does not explicitly describe the use of a saw, he does recall that damage to the brain (as seen inside the skull) was less than the corresponding size of the cranial defect; this indirectly implies prior removal of some of the skull.26

    Horne adds an independent argument for multiple casket entries.27 Pierre Finck told the Journal of the American Medical Association28 that he was at home when Humes telephoned him at 7:30 PM. (In his 2/1/65 report to General Blumberg he cites 8 PM.29) Finck, as a forensic pathologist, had been asked to assist with the autopsy. As further confirmation for Finck’s overall timeline, he arrived (see his Blumberg report) at the morgue at 8:30 PM. But here is the clincher: during this phone call, Humes told Finck that X-rays had already been taken – and had already been viewed. On the other hand, the official entry time (with the Joint Service Casket Team) was at 8 PM! If that indeed was the one and only entry time, how then could X-rays have been taken – let alone developed and viewed (a process of 30 minutes minimum) – even before the official entry time? The only possible answer is that the body did not first arrive at 8 PM. Furthermore, Custer and Reed, the radiology techs, provide timelines consistent with much earlier X-rays; in particular, they recall seeing Jackie enter the hospital lobby,30 well after the 6:35 PM casket entry – an entry they had personally witnessed. In summary, eyewitnesses convincingly support a much earlier timeline than the official entry of 8 PM. Therefore, multiple casket entries are logically required. And that more relaxed timeline gave H&B time both to perform their illicit surgery and also for skull X-rays to be taken and read, most likely all before 7:30-8:00 PM.

    The reader might well ask why Reed and Robinson (and Custer, too) were permitted to observe (at least briefly) this illegal surgery by H&B. Horne proposes that the morgue manager that night (Kellerman) was not present for the first casket entry – that’s because he was riding with Jackie and the bronze casket. Therefore, before he arrived (most likely that was shortly after 7 PM), there was no hands-on stage manager in the morgue. It is even possible that Kellerman himself ejected Reed and Custer as soon as he arrived. Robinson, on the other hand, dressed in civilian clothing, may have seemed to Kellerman a lesser threat, so Robinson stayed.

    Several conclusions follow from the above analysis. First, the official skull X-rays31 do not show the condition of the skull or the brain as seen at Parkland. Instead, they were taken after tampering by H&B, perhaps even after significant tampering, especially if Robinson and Reed are correct. Furthermore, the massive damage seen in the photographs and X-rays was not caused just by a bullet or even by multiple bullets, but instead by pathological hands. In particular, for a single, full metal-jacketed bullet (the Warren Commission’s inevitable scenario) to generate such an enormous defect has always defied credibility.32 Likewise, Boswell’s sketch (for the ARRB) on a skull33 of this enormous defect only shows the condition of the skull after tampering by H&B – and does not reflect the skull as seen at Parkland. (The Parkland witnesses fully concur with this.) On the other hand, many witnesses at Bethesda saw the condition of the skull before such tampering began. These witnesses, both physicians and paraprofessionals, uniformly describe a right occipital blowout,34 consistent with a shot from the front. Leaving aside the pathologists, as many as eight Bethesda physicians may be on this list.35 In photographs,36 both Parkland and Bethesda witnesses demonstrate with remarkable unanimity, on their own heads, the location of this obvious exit wound on the right rear skull.

    The X-rays do, however, show many small fragments distributed across the top of the skull.37 So why didn’t Humes extract more of these? I have previously proposed (based on their actual appearance – as viewed in detail on multiple occasions at the Archives) that they look more like mercury than like lead. If so, then Humes would not have been able to palpate them (mercury is liquid) and would therefore have been unable to remove them during his illicit surgery phase.

    We could go on to ask: What other evidence exists for such illicit surgery? Lifton initially introduced this issue by citing the FBI report (by Sibert and O’Neill), which quoted Humes as describing surgery to the head.38 Sibert, in the 2000s, still insisted that they had quoted Humes correctly about such surgery.39 (I also heard Sibert say this in Fort Myers, Florida, during one of Law’s taping sessions.) Furthermore, the FBI had no reason to fabricate such a statement. On Lifton’s tape (which I have heard), he queries Humes about this; to me, Humes does sound remarkably suspicious and evasive. But the FBI men are not the only witnesses to his statement. Another is James Jenkins, who quotes Humes40 as asking: ‘Did they do surgery at Parkland?’ Furthermore, Humes was later told, when some skull fragments arrived at the morgue,41 that these had been ‘removed’ during surgery at Parkland. We all know that did not happen, so where did they come from? Horne implies that Humes himself had removed them during the illicit phase. Another supporting argument is the remarkable ease of removing the brain from the skull (during the official autopsy phase), but this is not so surprising if it had previously been removed during the unofficial phase. James Jenkins42 observed that the brainstem had been cut, as if by a scalpel (not severed by a bullet), which also suggests its earlier removal that evening (while Jenkins was absent). In any case, such an early removal was likely essential to successfully search for (and extract) bullet debris. Even Finck43 bears witness to a transected spinal cord: to the defense team at the Shaw trial in 1969, Finck stated that the autopsy report (presumably an earlier one, as the extant one does not say this) described the spinal cord as severed when the body arrived at Bethesda. Finck was still absent when the brain was removed, so someone must have told him this, most likely Humes.

    Horne comments further on the throat wound. He concludes that H&B were well aware of this wound that night and he provides considerable evidence for this conclusion.44 However, given the absence of the throat wound from the FBI report, H&B probably learned of it only after the FBI left, i.e., after 11 PM.45 That information then led to the pathologists’ interim discussion of an exit through the throat, as later reported by Richard Lipsey.46 Horne even speculates that an early version of the autopsy report included exactly this scenario, which later had to be discarded because of timing data from the Zapruder film.

    Regarding the throat wound I would add the following. Warren Commission loyalists like to cite medical articles that ER personnel cannot reliably distinguish entry from exit wounds. Even if true, though, that comment obfuscates the situation. To the contrary, in this particular case several facts trump those medical reports: (1) such a tiny exit wound could not be duplicated in experiments47 and (2) Milton Helpern (who had done 60,000 autopsies) said that he had never seen an exit wound that was so small (under similar conditions).48 Then there is the question of the magic bullet. As Horne summarizes, its provenance has been extensively investigated by Josiah Thompson49 (with recent assistance from Gary Aguilar). In the face of the persistent refusal of the pertinent witnesses to identify this bullet, most likely it would never have been admitted at trial – and that alone would thoroughly devastate any Warren Commission case.50 A final telling blow derives from the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC): before political leverage was exerted, their scenario actually included a frontal throat shot!51

    The Zapruder Film Mystery

    Based on his relentless defense of the extant film, Josiah Thompson can justifiably claim the title, ‘High Priest of Z Film.’ His initial claim derives from his work for LIFE magazine in the 1960s, which led to Six Seconds in Dallas (1967).He claimed (p. 7): ‘Quite obviously, the Zapruder film contained the nearest thing to absolute truth about the sequence of events in Dealey Plaza.’ His most recent public paper (2007)52 finalized his claim to the above title. Unfortunately for Thompson, Horne’s work has created deep fractures in his purported bedrock, and has pulverized some rockheads into finely ground sand.53 When Thompson wrote his ‘Bedrock’ article he ignored two witnesses54 who had been extensively interviewed by the ARRB (actually by Horne himself) and whose interviews were surely already known to Thompson, who is nothing if not a very bright detective. These witnesses were Ben Hunter and Homer McMahon, employees of the NPIC (a subsidiary of the CIA), who received the original (in their view) film from a Secret Service agent. The latter, in turn, had just couriered it from Rochester, New York, headquarters of Eastman Kodak. Moreover, this agent (‘Bill Smith’) specifically said that the film had been developed (sic) in Rochester. If that was true, then there must have been a second film, one not shot by Zapruder (his film, after all, had been developed in Dallas), but rather one filmed from a nearly identical site in Dealey Plaza.55

    But Horne’s next stroke is the mortal blow to the Zapruder film, one beyond even the skills of a contemporary Parsifal. Horne details Peter Janney’s encounters (including seven interviews) with Dino Brugioni,56 a founder of the NPIC. John McCone, Director of the CIA, had telephoned the NPIC director, Arthur Lundahl (Brugioni’s superior), asking him to assist the Secret Service in analyzing the original (Zapruder) film.57 Beginning late on Saturday night (November 23), Brugioni viewed an original, 8 mm film and prepared briefing boards, which were presented to McCone the next morning. Amazingly, Brugioni stated that neither Ben Hunter nor Captain Sands were at his event.

    (Brugioni did not recall ever meeting Homer McMahon; he could therefore not personally report whether or not McMahon was present at Event I on Saturday night. Of course, since Brugioni was positive that Ben Hunter was absent, and because Hunter and McMahon were linked by their recall of one another, then McMahon should not have been present at Brugioni’s event.) In a detailed analysis Horne shows convincingly that two separate events, both highly compartmentalized, occurred on successive nights. During these recent interviews, when Brugioni finally learned – after 46 years – of two unrelated events, both at NPIC, he was stunned!

    Horne assembles a magnificent table58 that contrasts these two events: the Saturday night (November 23) event with Brugioni and the Sunday night event (November 24) with Hunter and McMahon. Horne demonstrates how compartmentalized these two events were: they differed in attendees, film format, and briefing boards. Brugioni knew Ben Hunter, but did not see him at his event. Brugioni had handled an 8 mm film (Hunter and McMahon had a 16 mm film) that he considered an original; that it was 8 mm is certain because NPIC had to purchase a projector (near midnight on Saturday) from a private local store. (The NPIC did not own its own 8 mm projector.) Brugioni also viewed photographs of the briefing boards currently in the Archives, which had been authenticated by Hunter and McMahon. However, Brugioni was certain that these were not his. He was even able to recall how his differed from these. Although Hunter and McMahon’s film reportedly came from Rochester, Brugioni was not told where his had originated (most likely it was Zapruder’s original – diverted from Chicago to DC that Saturday).

    Based on these interviews, Horne draws several conclusions: (1) the CIA had an immediate and high level interest in the film; (2) the original film had been split from 16 mm to 8 mm in Dallas, just as the Dallas witnesses had agreed;59 (3) the extreme compartmentalization implies that the two films were different; (4) Brugioni viewed Zapruder’s original (8mm), whereas Hunter and McMahon viewed an altered film (in 16 mm, unslit format); (5) the alterations were done during the day on Sunday, November 24, in Rochester, New York; (6) most likely aerial imaging was used for these alterations; and (7) the three copies of the original (already in circulation60) then had to be replaced by copies of the newly altered film. The reason that Horne chooses Sunday is straightforward: LIFE‘s next issue reached the marketplace on Tuesday (November 26) and it contained images from the extant film (the one currently in the Archives). Some of these low resolution, black and white LIFE images (in Horne’s opinion – and mine, too) show signs of alteration, particularly the bizarre debris (sometimes called the ‘blob’) on JFK’s face and the disappearance of the white object in the background grass. Horne suspects that the alterations had all been completed by Sunday night, although he seems not finally wedded to this concept. In any case, Loudon Wainwright61 said that 31 frames were employed for that issue of LIFE. Although other frames might have been open to alteration after Sunday, it seems likely that these 31 frames would have restricted later changes. (There are fewer than 500 in the entire film.)

    Horne next reviews the momentous technical issues that bedevil the extant film – anomalies that really should not be present. In fact, none of these would have been predicted for an original film. Even a single one casts doubts on authenticity, but when a complete list is compiled the evidence becomes overwhelming. Aside from image content issues (which are very serious) this technical list includes the following items: (1) the location of the punched number 183 is inconsistent on both the extant film and (in photographic images) on the extant copies, (2) the punched numbers unique to each of the three copies are quite strangely located, (3) the absence of intersprocket images on the three copies was not predicted by the Jamieson lab, which had exposed them, (4) Zavada could not reproduce the septum line, (5) the double registration of the Dallas processing edge print is odd, (6) no one in Dallas recalled the bracketing (by exposure differences) that is present in the three extant copies, (7) Zavada has shown remarkable indecisiveness about when Zapruder’s film was slit from 16 mm format to 8 mm, (8) the ‘full flush left’ issue62 was not resolved, and (9) claw flare is still a puzzle. That so many purely technical issues persist would, by itself, be a wonder if the extant film indeed were authentic.63

    Horne also reviews the curious stories of Dan Rather64 and Cartha DeLoach.65 Both had been early viewers of the film and both had reported that JFK’s head had gone violently forward. To put this into perspective, the reader might ask himself this question: How many individuals have you met who, after once viewing the film, agreed with the reports of these two men? I have never met any.An actual Dealey Plaza witness, James Altgens, a photographer, also described JFK’s head as going forward.66 Horne also reminds us that early viewers of the film easily saw debris (possibly brain tissue) flying to the rear. One of these witnesses was Erwin Schwartz (Zapruder’s partner), who saw the film multiple times the very day that it was developed.67 Such backward-flying debris is nowhere seen in the extant film. Horne also notes the unrecorded turn from Houston to Elm (which both Zapruder and his secretary recalled filming) as well as the now-ancient problem of the limousine stop (first emphasized by Lifton many years ago). The discrepancies between the autopsy photographs, on the one hand, and the Zapruder film, on the other, are also reviewed. Horne offers likely explanations (of incompetent tampering) for these inconsistencies.

    In an Addendum, ‘The Zapruder Film Goes to Hollywood,’ Horne recounts his viewing of HD scans based on a 35 mm ‘dupe negative.’ His Hollywood contact got her copy of the extant film (for $795) from a private laboratory, to which she had been referred by the Archives’ personnel themselves. (There is no other means to obtain such a copy, as the Archives do not directly reproduce copies.) Horne describes his viewing experiences with several Hollywood professionals (I have seen these, too). Quite striking were (1) the black patch over JFK’s head,68 (2) the oddly truncated corner of the Stemmons Freeway sign,69 and (3) the ‘blob’ on JFK’s face.70 The black patch, in particular, had sharp and geometric borders and was astonishingly black, especially when compared to earlier frames (before Z-313) of JFK’s head and also when compared to the natural shadow on the back and side of Connally’s head. I have since viewed the MPI transparencies (copied directly from the extant film at the Archives) at the Sixth Floor Museum in Dallas. These images, too, are quite striking. Since they are accessible by the public, anyone should be able see them, merely by arranging an appointment with the Museum. Horne concludes this section by printing his FOIA letter to the CIA and associated letters on this subject to President Obama, Senator Webb, and DCI Panetta (the CIA response is still pending). Among other items, he requested information on (1) the highly secret CIA facility in Rochester, New York (Hawkeyeworks), (2) the optical printer(s) available there in 1963, (3) the briefing boards prepared by Brugioni (which might still exist), and (4) Brugioni’s personal history of the NPIC. Brugioni told Janney that he himself had written this history, which included a brief mention of his Zapruder film event.

    Aside from David Wrone (not discussed here, but worth reading about), the individual who fares worst as Horne’s mark is Roland Zavada, author of the now-infamous Zavada Report. Although this was purportedly a study to confirm the authenticity of the Zapruder film, no such claim is actually made in that report. After many tÍte-ý-tÍtes with Zavada, Horne concludes that Zavada has ruined his own credibility in matters of the Zapruder film.71 Horne especially, and appropriately, critiques him for his public dithering on multiple serious issues, all of which are well documented. I myself have accused him of frequently employing ex post facto logic.72 That may be appropriate in the courtroom but is wholly out of place in a scientific investigation. Horne specifically faults him for these items: (1) the printing aperture issue, (2) the bracketing issue, (3) the edge printing light issue, and (4) the inconsistent locations of the punched numbers on the copy films. I concur with all of these – and have previously so stated in print.

    Critiques

    It is impossible to write any comprehensive treatise about the JFK case and expect to go unscathed (as I well know). The data are simply too complex and, as Horne repeatedly emphasizes, they are too often corrupted. The sole recourse then for the investigator is simply to speculate, based on those data he considers most reliable. Horne clearly recognizes his vulnerability here. Horne and I differ, as he knows, on several issues, the most obvious being the role of Robert Knudsen in the autopsy.73

    Horne concludes that none (or at least very few) of the autopsy photographs derive from the official photographer, John Stringer. Instead he nominates Knudsen as the source of the extant autopsy photographs. Knudsen was the social photographer for the White House and he told his family that he had been busy that night filming the autopsy (he was not home for three nights in a row). The embarrassing fact, of course, is that no one saw him there. Not even the Secret Service agents mention him, though they surely recognized one another from their White House duties.74 Horne regards the autopsy photographs as authentic (i.e., not photographically altered), chiefly based on his viewing of high resolution images at Eastman Kodak, in Rochester, while he served on the ARRB. (Nonetheless, he maintains that they are highly misleading.) On the other hand, I regard several images (certainly not all of them) as photographically altered, especially the posterior head images.75 An entire essay could be spent developing these divergent arguments (of photo-alteration vs. no alteration), but I shall not do so here. My viewing of the posterior scalp, with a large format stereo viewer (on multiple occasions and while sampling all imaginable photographic variations of the two pertinent images), repeatedly showed that the back of the head, precisely at the occipital blowout, did not yield a 3D image. This could only occur if the occipital area was precisely identical on the two photographs in the stereo viewer; such a resulting 2D image is exactly what would be expected if the same photographic patch (a soft matte insertion) had been used for each member of the pair. (Ordinarily the two images should have derived from slightly different perspectives.) Otherwise, the expected 3D images were readily obtained, both on other portions of these same suspect photographs and also on all other photographs that I examined. This impression of an anomalous area, precisely where the witnesses disagreed with the photographs – and only there – was inescapably striking to me. Unfortunately, Horne did not perform such stereo viewing, as he acknowledges with some regret.

    In addition, other serious problems plague Knudsen’s role as assigned to him by Horne. Foremost is his statement to his own son: he rode in the limousine with the bronze casket.76 Now we know that the bronze casket arrived at the front of the hospital by 6:55 PM and that it arrived at the morgue by 7:17 PM. That is a very tight timeline for Knudsen, if he was at the morgue at all. In view of that, it does seem unlikely that he took very early photographs of the right upper forehead. By then (according the timeline offered by Tom Robinson, and also probably by Ed Reed), H&B had already committed at least some of their nefarious manipulations. Some skull X-rays may even have been taken by 7:17 PM. If that is true, how then could Knudsen have photographed the head before these alterations – as Horne claims he did? Perhaps he got there much earlier (and did not ride with the bronze casket), but no evidence exists for this. And Stringer himself clearly implies that photography began only after 8 PM. If both Stringer and Riebe are correct about this timeline, then what equipment did Knudsen use? And who set it up for him? That task would typically fall to an assistant, such as Riebe, but Ed Reed tells us that he saw no photographic equipment when he took the initial X-rays.77 And, since Knudsen was a total novice at an autopsy, how did he know to take two photographs from a similar perspective, in order to create stereo pairs?

    Here is another major challenge to Horne’s scenario: he proposes that Knudsen took photographs after reconstruction by the morticians, when both Riebe and Stringer were absent from the morgue. Horne bases this on Riebe’s recollection78 that they had both left by then. Unfortunately, that is not what Stringer recalled. In fact, he clearly stated that he remained until reconstruction had been completed and that he did not get home until about 4 AM.79 Who would best remember Stringer’s presence during that time: Riebe or Stringer? Therefore, if Stringer stayed around, Knudsen gets left out. There is simply no need for two photographers. Furthermore, Stringer never saw Knudsen.80

    The record shows Knudsen making many trips to develop the autopsy photographs. And, of all places, they went to the highly secret Anacostia facility. (Ordinarily, Stringer would have developed his own photographs; furthermore, he would never have used Anacostia.) That so many trips were required, over the next several weeks,81 is suspicious in itself. After all, there are only nine autopsy views and only 52 catalogued photographs.82 So why were so many trips necessary?

    My conclusions about Knudsen, only briefly supported here, disagree with Horne’s. I instead conclude that Knudsen indeed worked with the autopsy photographs (in the darkroom, but not in the morgue), perhaps by improving them cosmetically for the Kennedy family – or by supervising someone else who did this. I suspect he was an unwitting conspirator, being played by his superiors. Furthermore, if the Oswald evidence photographs were doctored, if Dealey Plaza photographs were touched up, if the skull X-rays were altered (in the darkroom), if the Zapruder film was revised, then why would the autopsy photographs remain pristine? After all, it is much, much easier to alter a photograph than to correctly improvise a misleading autopsy scene in the morgue (especially a scene that was often described by attendees as a madhouse). Furthermore, time limits do not apply in the darkroom, where one can leisurely keep improving the image until success is achieved.

    I also disagree with Horne about the semicircular defect (with apparent beveling), as seen in F8.83 This mysterious photo, which I consider to be the back of the head, was described as precisely that during the initial ‘military review’ by the autopsy personnel on November 1, 1966. In addition, Paul O’Connor (autopsy technician) clearly confirmed this.84 Horne concludes that this beveled defect represents an important exit site. Because it looks like an exit, I agree with Horne that the pathologists should have discussed it. In fact, they do not – and that is suspicious. However, Roger McCarthy,85 after his own experiments, concluded that such beveled defects can occur independently of exiting bullets or bullet fragments. Furthermore, this site does not fit with any other metal debris in the skull X-rays – certainly not the fragment trail across the top of the skull nor the two fragments removed by H&B – nor does it match the right occipital blowout. To finally bury this proposal, no witness at either Parkland or Bethesda observed a scalp wound that corresponded to this semicircular beveled defect, so it may simply be a red herring.

    How many shots struck JFK’s head? Horne argues for three,86 which will perplex many a reader. Even critics of the Warren Commission typically argue for only two head shots at most. (The Warren Commission’s scenario was simple: a single shot entered at the rear, near the external occipital protuberance (EOP).)87 Although I agree with that shot, a second shot likely entered high on the right forehead, very near the hairline.) I confess that Horne has forced me to think again about a third shot. Although I had previously been inclined to ascribe the supposed left temple entry to observer error (confusing left for right – or perhaps just seeing a blood clot88), I am now more inclined to believe in such an entry. Horne cites the Parkland physicians – Marion Jenkins, Robert McClelland, Ronald Jones, and Lito Puerto (aka Porto)89 – who clearly reported a small wound in the left temple. Others include Dr. Adolph Giesecke,90 Dr. David Stewart,91 Father Oscar Huber,92 photographers Altgens93 and Similas94 and, more recently, Hugh Huggins (aka Hugh Howell),95 who was RFK’s emissary to the autopsy.

    Although I was reluctant to visualize Greer with a pistol during the shooting, Secret Service agents did pull their pistols during the tussle over JFK’s body in the ER. It is even possible that Greer fired, though I can’t imagine what his target was. But it is most unlikely that he deliberately fired at JFK. That would have been far too risky – multiple witnesses would have fingered him, yet no one has done so. Furthermore, no photograph shows him doing this (although it is theoretically possible that such photographs have been culled or altered). Besides, although he may have disliked JFK, we have no evidence that he was involved in the plot to kill JFK.

    In the end, though, I must admit that evidence of a third shot to the head persists. Perhaps the major clue is the right occipital blowout. The right forehead shot96 likely produced the debris across the top of the skull X-rays (neither the Warren Commission’s scenario nor the HSCA’s scenario match that trail), but that fragment trail does not fit (at all) with a right occipital blowout. Furthermore, if the bullet that caused the visible fragment trail had been mercury filled (as I suggested), then perhaps much of the mercury remained inside the skull. So what produced the occipital blowout? The Warren Commission shot (from the rear) surely could not do that. But a shot from the left front could be just right. What is odd, though, is that no witness at Bethesda, absolutely no one, ever reported such an entrance hole.97

    Then there is the Clarence Israel story, related by Janie Taylor, a biologist at NIH, across the street from the Bethesda Hospital.98 Israel (now deceased), an orderly in the morgue that night, saw a doctor working at a ‘hurried’ pace to mutilate three bullet punctures to the head area. Like Jeremy Gunn, I don’t know what to do with this tale, although it is striking that three head wounds are cited.

    Diana Bowron, a Parkland nurse,99 told Livingstone that less than 50% of the right brain remained (the right rear quadrant was most effected) and about a quarter of the left hemisphere was also missing. I am not aware of any other Parkland comments about the left hemisphere, and there is very little clear-cut information from Bethesda either. But if Bowron is correct, then her report constitutes powerful evidence for a left frontal shot. Of course, her report also flatly contradicts the official brain photographs, which show no missing left brain.100 The optical density data also support Bowron; they show that only 60-65% of the left brain was present, as measured on the AP skull at the National Archives.101 Of course, in view of Horne’s conclusions, some of this missing brain might have been due to H&B. But, even if H&B had removed this, that alone would be suspicious – i.e., they would have had no reason to excise left brain tissue at all unless trauma had occurred there.

    To all of this, Horne adds the support of Dr. Charles Wilbur, who carefully reviewed the microscopic pathology report of the left brain sample.102 This showed ‘extensive disruption associated with hemorrhage.’ Wilbur concluded: ‘These observations rekindle my interest in the observations made in Dallas on the ER table (by several medical personnel) Ö that there was an entry hole in the left temporal region, in front of the ear and at the hairline.’ In conclusion, I would say that the left temple wound seems more likely than ever, especially with support from the optical density data.

    It might have been expected the brain photographs would have resolved this mystery; unfortunately, they are not of JFK’s brain. Horne was the first to deduce, from multiple lines of disparate data (see his detailed table),103 that a surrogate brain had been introduced at a second brain examination. Even the (sole) autopsy photographer of the brain, John Stringer, stated in no uncertain terms that these were not his photographs. One reason was that they were on the wrong brand of film.104 My own optical density data (taken directly from the extant skull X-rays at the National Archives)105 are totally inconsistent with the brain photographs (which I have observed at the National Archives with Cyril Wecht). Insofar as the amount of residual brain goes, one can accept either the X-ray data as authentic or the brain photographs as authentic, but not both. They are inconsistent with one another – in fact, wildly inconsistent. To date, no Warren Commission supporter has come to terms with this intractable paradox. It should also be emphasized that the optical density data actually preceded Horne’s proposal, but these data are entirely consistent with his two-brain proposal.

    I also object to Horne’s proposal that puncture wounds106 were deliberately created in the scalp that night.107 Oddly, he does not identify the perpetrator, or even who issued the order. Of course, none of that is in the official record. Horne proposes that the high posterior ‘red spot’ (selected by the HSCA as the official entry site – albeit persistently denied by the pathologists) was deliberately created that night. How the red color was achieved he does not say. And why that particular site was selected is also mysterious – did it fit better with the ‘sniper’s nest’ than did the EOP site? If so, who in the morgue would have known that so early in the game? But what madness it would be to create another wound! After all, H&B had already identified a lower (EOP) entry site; therefore this higher one would immediately imply two shots to the head – exactly what no one wanted that night. But Horne does not stop there; he also believes that the lower ‘white spot’ (very near the posterior hairline) was deliberately man-made.108 We might well ask why he takes these risks. But that question has a simple answer: because he refuses to consider photographic alteration, he has no choice. Think about this: that red spot nearly correlates spatially with the 6.5 mm object on the skull X-ray – as it should since both were fakes. However, what breathtaking serendipity such a match was for subsequent government panels – they had their entry site!109 But because Horne has boxed himself in (no photo-alteration allowed) his only option is to say that the red spot really was present that night. Unless photographic doctoring is permitted, that red spot could not abruptly appear later. But no one at the autopsy saw this red spot (let alone its creation) – and the pathologists forever adamantly refused to recognize it (despite Horne’s insinuation that they themselves had created it). All of this, taken together, is quite damning evidence in favor of (at least some) photographic alteration.110

    Horne suggests that the original Zapruder film may have been shot at 48 frames per second, an option that was available on that camera:

    Removing the Car Stop and the Exit Debris From the Film Would Have Been Simple if Zapruder Had Actually Filmed the Motorcade at ëSlow Motion,’ or at 48 Frames Per Second, Instead of at the Normal ëRun’ Setting of 16 Frames Per Second.111

    Horne suggests that simple frame excision could then have eliminated much of the evidence of conspiracy. But this cannot work, as Costella has explained: the ghost images (in the intersprocket area) make this impossible.112 When Zapruder’s camera exposed one frame (call it number 10), the gate (the metal frame that actually admits light to the film) simultaneously exposed (in the intersprocket area) a modest portion of each neighboring frame (call these 9 and 11).113 When Costella examined the film he learned that these ghost images are, in fact, consistent with the central frame in each case – i.e., 10 is always adjacent to 9 and 11 (and this works for any three adjacent frames). In a sense then, each adjacent ghost image ‘belongs’ to its primary frame – and not to any other frame. On the other hand, if frame excision had occurred, each ghost image would become separated from its simultaneously exposed primary frame; i.e., such excision would have led to an adjacent ghost image exposed at a different time from the primary frame. For example, for excision of every other frame, 10 would end up next to 8 and 12; for excision of two of every three frames, 10 would end up next to 7 and 13. In either case, these ghost images would not match the frames next to them. And Costella emphasizes that enough information (e.g., motion blur) exists in these ghost images to permit such a deduction. The bottom line is that such inconsistencies are not found in the extant film. Furthermore, there is no escape from this problem, i.e., it is not possible simply to erase a ghost image from the intersprocket area – once there, it is always there. Partly based on this very powerful argument, Costella has argued that the extant film must be a fabrication, i.e., a re-creation using parts of multiple films (and probably only a rather modest portion of Zapruder’s film at most). At least one of these films must have been shot during the motorcade, but others could have been shot before or after, even some days before or after. These then had to be stitched together to compose the extant film. Even differences of perspective (as would be expected for films shot from slightly different sites) could be overcome by selecting only pertinent parts of frames.

    Costella concludes that the Stemmons freeway sign is one example of such a cut and paste job. By analyzing the effects of pincushion distortion114 he concludes that the sign was placed into the film after the fact, i.e., it looks constant in all frames. On the other hand, if it had been shot from Zapruder’s camera, it should have experienced pincushion distortion: i.e., the sign would successively change its appearance from one frame to the next. Furthermore, after several frames, these changes would accumulate to become even more obvious. But the bottom line is that the Stemmons sign does not show such pincushion effects, which means that it was placed after the fact by the film forgers. This situation is closely analogous to the fake hairpiece on the back of JFK’s head, where the image looks 2D rather than 3D via the stereo viewer. In both cases, the same fake image was placed (into multiple photographs – or into multiple frames) in a manner that violates the basic rules of optics.

    Based on these arguments, Costella concludes that it would have been impossible to alter the film without discarding essentially all of the intersprocket areas and starting all over. In that case, he argues, the total time for (final) fabrication would have taken much longer than several days. Although Horne does not require completion of a final film (i.e., the extant film) by Sunday night (November 24) he does suggest that the Jamieson copies were switched quite promptly, likely within several days. Such a prompt (yet final) switch implies a timeline that sharply contrasts with Costella’s more leisurely pace. Even David Healy (a professional video producer with decades of experience) emphasized in his 2003 Duluth lecture that even if an altered film had been viewed on Sunday night, November 24, it need not have been the final product (i.e., the extant film), but merely an interim film.115 Horne ultimately agrees that alterations might have continued for ‘several weeks’ afterwards, especially if a traveling matte had been employed.116

    Costella also refers to the possibility that the proposed second film of the motorcade (by an unknown photographer – or photographers) might have been shot in 16 mm format. If so, that would have made forgery ever so much easier, particularly since the contemporaneous optical printers were not designed for 8 mm. It might also have made the subsequent first generation copies (the extant ones, which are probably not the Jamieson copies) appear more authentic after fabrication.

    Costella goes on to wonder whether the splices in the film (e.g., between Z-208 and Z-212) were unavoidable during forgery for a simple reason: they may have contained telltale ghost images of bystanders who appeared under the left edge of the Stemmons sign.117 A splice is also present at Z-155 to Z-157. Curiously, this is close to frames where Michael Stroscio, a physicist, identified a possible shot at Z-152 to Z-153.118

    There is a final, simple argument against a 48 fps scenario for Zapruder. If 48 fps had been used, then when the film was shown that weekend, all of the action would have appeared in slow motion – as if the actors were subject to the lesser gravity of the moon. However, no one reported such an odd effect, even though someone surely should have.

    My final paragraph in this section is not really a criticism of Horne at all. It merely reflects an unblinking reality: no one (not even Bugliosi119) can address everything important in this case. I refer here to the police dictabelt and the acoustics data.120 Horne implies that the acoustics data support conspiracy – based on the number of audible shots and also on timing problems, i.e., two shots are only 1.66 seconds apart, an interval much too short for the Mannlicher-Carcano. However, he does not cite the work of Don Thomas,121 which reinvigorated this subject, nor does he mention the fallout from that work. The discussion continues; the interested reader may begin with Wikipedia for current references.122

    Conclusions

    I stand in awe of the scope, detail, and profound insights that Horne has achieved, especially in the medical evidence – to say nothing of his Olympian effort. Given the circumstances of its creation (mostly on weekends, within a cumulative time span of perhaps two years) it is nothing short of phenomenal. Contrast Horne’s effort with Bugliosi’s, which extended over several decades, and which may have included writing assistants and editors. Bugliosi also did not have to self-publish. The bottom line is that I feel a deep debt of gratitude to Horne for further disentangling this nearly half-century old Gordian knot. By contrast, I should emphasize that I never experienced that sensation with Bugliosi.

    If H&B indeed played alterationists with the skull and brain (as I now accept), then Horne has initiated a paradigm shift in our understanding of the cover-up. But, as Horne acknowledges, this does not necessarily convert H&B into villains. After all, they may well have considered themselves to be heroic patriots, who single-handedly aborted World War III,123 depending on exactly what their military superiors124 had told them.

    Josiah Thompson has proclaimed that the Zapruder debate has been a gigantic waste of time, because it is ‘junk science’ that has produced nothing.125 Like Einstein’s opinion of quantum mechanics,126 Thompson’s mind is stuck in the past. In fact, Horne has presented revolutionary new data about the chain of possession. In view of Thompson’s now-shaky bedrock, many will find this new information very convincing indeed – especially younger researchers new to the case, whose minds are still open. I have previously summarized traditional historical (and scientific) views that were later overturned,127 so no one should be surprised at this dÈnouement. Without nascent heretics, our world would soon become more impoverished. In retrospect, it was best not to offer obeisance to Roland Zavada (as the inerrant pope of the film), as Thompson implied we should do.128 The two-event sequence at NPIC has all the hallmarks of a covert operation – but for 46 years not even Brugioni knew what had transpired – and he wrote the history of the NPIC!Some of us did not need more evidence, but others did. These fence-sitters may now take their own time to decide. Some may even wish to make a pilgrimage to view the MPI transparencies in Dallas. The real point, though, as Horne states, is that the alteration of the film is, in itself, major evidence of a government cover-up. I could not agree more.

    What remains controversial for many though is the timeline for alteration. Horne favors a very short timeline, while Costella prefers a distinctly longer one. The early appearance in LIFE of altered frames (e.g., the ‘blob’ on JFK’s face and the disappearance of the white object in the background grass) indicate that some frames had been altered before Sunday night, November 24. In addition, the Hunter/McMahon briefing boards show the extremely black patch over JFK’s occiput, as well as the blob. It is possible, though not certain, that incriminating flying debris was also removed by Sunday night. The Stemmons sign and the lamppost (both added after the fact, according to Costella) also appear in LIFE‘s first JFK issue, in low-resolution black and white photographs. Now consider this: McMahon concluded that JFK was hit by 6-8 shots, fired from at least three directions. Evidence for these shots is absent from the extant film, so he must have seen a different film (though probably not the original). If McMahon’s observations were correct, then he must have seen a partly altered film. That would leave time for Costella’s more leisurely scenario.

    The chief argument for a short timeline is the need to dispose promptly of the Jamieson (first-day) copies; the problem, of course, is that the longer these persisted the longer the original images might be copied – or recalled – by others. Horne notes that the FBI returned its Jamieson copy to the Secret Service by Tuesday, November 26.129 However, we do not know the disposition of any other FBI copies, i.e., later generation copies made from the Jamieson copies (that the FBI might have already made by then).130 So perhaps this cover-up was a two-step process: (1) retrieve quickly all possible copies (including Jamieson copies and all those made from Jamieson’s)131 and (2) sometime later (e.g., within one or two months) replace those earlier ones by copies subsequently made from the extant film. Perhaps the FBI was even given some credible excuse for the delay in replacement (e.g., an improved quality copy was pending); in any case, it is likely that J. Edgar Hoover would have cooperated with any reasonable suggestion to abet the cover-up. But LIFE, too, had a copy. However, after their early assassination coverage, they had no need for the film, as a movie film. Given the role of C. D. Jackson (LIFE‘s publisher), first in the very expensive purchase of the film, and then in his sequestering of the film (with no profit accruing to LIFE), it is likely (especially in view of his longtime intelligence connections)132 that he also would have agreed to such a delayed replacement.

    But there is still the matter of the three black and white copies of the extant film, discovered in the year 2000 by the Sixth Floor Museum among materials sold to Zapruder in 1975 by Time, Inc.133 Their format is 16 mm, unslit, with the motorcade on one side and Zapruder home scenes on the other (adjacent) side. These include markings on the film that identify specific frames actually printed in LIFE.134 An irresistible deduction from these markings, of course, is that the extant film had already been completed by that early date. In fact, however, all that is certain is that specific frames (those made public) must have been finalized by that date. On the other hand, if Costella’s more leisurely timeframe is adopted, that would imply that these black and white copies were only later placed into the LIFE collection – marked up appropriately after the fact – so as to give the impression that the markings (and the extant film, too) dated to November. Although this scenario may be true, no eyewitness to date has corroborated it.

    Suggestions

    The HD scans (cited above) of selected Zapruder frames should be scanned with an optical densitometer. If possible, multiple wavelengths (colors) should be employed. These scans should then be compared to controls, e.g., JFK’s head before Z-313 and Connally’s head (at most any time). This might quantify the magnitude of photo-alteration, thus making the conclusions more scientific. Further studies may be forthcoming from the Hollywood nexus. New films shot via a camera like Zapruder’s might yet provide further insights. Of course, if extant films (i.e., original ones, not altered ones) from Zapruder’s actual camera can still be located that would be even better. As Horne suggests, at the National Archives two autopsy photographs of the posterior scalp (from a matched pair) should be overlaid on a view box. If the images of the suspect area perfectly align, that would constitute powerful evidence of photo-alteration. Control areas should also be extensively compared, just to see what non-identical (but stereo-matched) pairs look like. Surprisingly, no one has done this.

    There are three X-ray films of the bone fragments,135 which seems a bit excessive. Is it possible that these extra films were taken to replace those X-rays that had been discarded – in order that the total number of X-ray films remained fixed at 14? Is it even possible that these three films are identical to one another? If so, that would be even more suspicious. To check on this (for the first time – no one has done this), Horne suggests that the films simply be overlaid to see if they match precisely.

    I have never looked for the head brace on the X-rays nor, apparently, has anyone else. Since the autopsy personnel did not recognize this, it would be useful to look for this on the X-ray films. (Custer told the ARRB that he had used a blanket behind the head, but Custer’s memory has not always been reliable.) In view of Horne’s proposal that Knudsen took autopsy photographs with the head brace (apparently while no autopsy personnel were present – because no one recalls this), the presence or absence of such a brace on the X-rays might shed further light on Horne’s proposed timeline for Knudsen (if he was involved at all).

    The optical density data from the X-rays should be confirmed. The National Archives have their own densitometer(s); perhaps they would even assist with this. Actually the data need not be too extensive – even a few select data points inside the 6.5 mm object and inside the ‘white patches’136 could be highly confirmatory.

    My observation at the National Archives of intact emulsion (where there should be none) over the T-shaped inscription on a lateral skull X-ray137 provided prima facie evidence that this X-ray must be a copy. That clearly means that (1) the original is missing and (2) the door lies open to alteration (during copying). Surprisingly, no one has yet attempted to confirm my observation (of the paradoxically missing emulsion), despite the fact that Chad Zimmerman and Larry Sturdivan had that opportunity after my observation became public.138 Furthermore, Bugliosi should be a bit red-faced that he did not accompany them at that critical moment. Even he could have made that observation.

    Perhaps some other creative minds can think further about three head shots. My fear, though, is that this impasse may never be resolved due to insufficient data. Given the destruction inflicted on the skull by H&B (and perhaps by their predecessors), I am not even certain that a second autopsy would help to resolve that question.

    Addendum: The 6.5 mm Mystery on the AP Skull X-ray

    Although Horne’s discussion of the suspicious 6.5 mm object on the AP X-ray is in Volume II, I could not resist a few comments about it here.139 To date no one else has explained this object, not even the three experts interviewed by the ARRB.140 Furthermore, each one of the three autopsy pathologists (interviewed separately and under oath) denied either seeing or removing this thing at the autopsy.141 Even Larry Sturdivan142 admits that it cannot be a bullet fragment (this admission, almost by itself, destroys the case against the lone gunman), but then after his visit to the National Archives he had to confess that it remained as mysterious as ever. He did, however, offer one half-hearted proposal that he did not really endorse, namely that the fragment had been present on the AP X-ray, but had fallen off before the lateral was taken. (He necessarily assumed that the AP had been taken first.) But this does not explain an awkward fact: the lateral X-ray143 still shows a small metal fragment at precisely the expected site! Furthermore, this proposal disagrees with Reed’s sequence of X-rays: Reed said he took the lateral film first.144 In fact, the only viable explanation for this bizarre 6.5 mm object is photographic addition in the dark room.145 Horne recounts my own adventures with this fantastic forgery in some detail. Given that he began his odyssey as a layman in medicine and radiology, Horne offers a splendid summary of this entire subject.146

     

    Appendix: Three Casket Entries

    Time (PM) Casket Type Witnesses Remarks
        Paul O’Connor  
    6:35 Shipping Roger Boyajian Black hearse
      casket Dennis David Body bag
        Donald Rebentisch  
        Floyd Riebe  

    Note: this first entry was documented by Boyajian and corroborated by the above witnesses.147

    7:17 Bronze viewing Jim Sibert Light gray navy
      casket Frank O’Neill ambulance 
      (from Parkland) Roy Kellerman Empty casket
        William Greer  

    Note: this second entry was documented in the report of Sibert and O’Neill.148

    8:00 Bronze viewing Joint Service Casket Team Light gray navy
      casket Godfrey McHugh ambulance 
          Body inside, wrapped
    in sheets – no body bag

    Note: this third entry was supervised by Lt. Samuel Bird from Fort Myer.149


    NOTES

    1 Google: ‘A Not-Entirely-Positive Review.’ Also see Jim DiEugenio’s very extensive review of Bugliosi’s book, Reclaiming Parkland.

    2 Visit their photographs at Douglas Horne, Inside the ARRB (2009), Volume I at Figures 77-80.

    3 Ibid. at Figure 68 and at xxxiii. A more detailed account is in Horne’s Appendix 38; see http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/docset/getList.do?docSetId=1932.

    4 David Lifton, Best Evidence (1988), at 569-588.

    5 For example, see Clint Hill’s statement at http://www.jfk-online.com/clhill.html:
    ‘The motorcade arrived Bethesda Naval Hospital at 6:55 p.m.’
    Hill also describes landing with Air Force One at Andrews Air Force Base at 5:58 PM.

    6 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1002.

    7 Ibid. at 989-992.

    8 Horne cites William Manchester, Death of a President (1967).

    9 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1006.

    10 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 70.

    11 The entire X-ray collection is listed in Ibid. at Figure 58.

    12 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1007.

    13 In retrospect, Lifton had been grievously misled by the HSCA’s false statements, namely that the autopsy photographs were authentic and that all the witnesses agreed with them. This falsehood was only discovered after the movie, JFK, triggered the release of multiple, sequestered witness statements that disagreed with the photographs.

    14 James Fetzer, editor, Murder in Dealey Plaza (2000), at 433 and 436.

    15 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1164.

    16 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 60.

    17 Fetzer (2000), supra, at 258-259.

    18 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 40, shows a sketch of the morgue floor plan, including the gallery.

    19 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1035, 1163-1171 and Volume II at 426 and 437.

    20 Fetzer (2000), supra, at 250.

    21 Ibid. at 242.

    22 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1005.

    23 Lifton (1988), supra, at 492 and 579.

    24 Harry Livingstone actually prints a photograph of four fragments in High Treason (1998), at 562. Their provenance, however, seems uncertain.

    25 Warren Commission Hearings, Volume II at 354.

    26 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1042-1043.

    27 Ibid. at 1000.

    28 Breo, D.L., ‘JFK’s death, Part II – Dr. Finck speaks out, ëtwo bullets, from the rear,’ ‘ JAMA 268:1749 (1992).

    29 http://www.jfk-assassination.net/weberman/finck1.htm. Or see Horne’s Appendix 29 or 7 HSCA 101, 122, 135, 191. The list of appendices is in Horne, supra, Volume I at xix-lii. The appendices themselves are at the Mary Ferrell website. See my footnote 3 for a link.

    30 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1005.

    31 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figures 37-38.

    32 See Boswell’s sketch from the autopsy: Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 11.

    33 Ibid. at Figures 12-15.

    34 For two eyewitness sketches see Ibid. at Figures 21 & 30. Also see the sketch approved by Parkland physician, Robert McClelland: Ibid. at Figure 81.

    35 Michael Kurtz includes George Burkley, Robert Canada, John Ebersole, Calvin Galloway, Robert Karnei, Edward Kenney, David Osborne, and John Stover; see The Assassination Debates (2006), at 39 and 126.

    36 Robert Groden, The Killing of a President (1993), at 86-88.

    37 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figures 37-38.

    38 Lifton, supra, at 295-307.

    39 William Law, In the Eye of History (2005), at 143-288.

    40 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1036 and 1038.

    41 See their X-rays in Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 39.

    42 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1037.

    43 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1036-1037.

    44 Ebersole also confirmed a call to Dallas during our telephone conversations (see my footnote 14). He estimated the time as about 10:30 PM (Ibid. at 999). What struck me, though, is the reason why he recalled this event so clearly: he said that after they learned about the throat wound, they stopped searching for bullet debris on the X-rays (Fetzer (2000), supra, at 437). Quite interestingly, Stringer also seemed to recall such a telephone call (Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1011; Volume I at 166; or HSCA interview with John Stringer, Document 013617, at 4). Moreover, Stringer’s estimate of the time agreed with Ebersole’s estimate. Dr. Robert Karnei (resident pathologist) also recalled a telephone call to Parkland on that Friday night; see Harry Livingstone, High Treason II (1992), at 186.

    45 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 999. Oddly enough, Malcolm Perry, before the Warren Commission, initially recalled his conversation with Humes as Friday night; see Warren Commission Hearings, Volume III at 380 or http://jfkassassination.net/russ/testimony/perry_m1.htm:
    Mr. SPECTER – Dr. Perry, did you have occasion to discuss your observations with Comdr. James J. Humes of the Bethesda Naval Hospital?
    Dr. PERRY – Yes, sir; I did.
    Mr. SPECTER – When did that conversation occur?
    Dr. PERRY – My knowledge as to the exact accuracy of it is obviously in doubt. I was under the initial impression that I talked to him on Friday, but I understand it was on Saturday. I didn’t recall exactly when.

    46 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 83.

    47 Olivier, A.G., Dziemian, A.J., ‘Wound Ballistics of the 6.5 mm Mannlicher-Carcano Ammunition. US Army Edgewood Arsenal Technical Report CRDLR 3264.’ March 1965. Also see Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1083 and Kurtz, supra, at 35.

    48 Kurtz, supra, at 35. Also see Marshall Houts, Where Death Delights; the Story of Dr. Milton Helpern and Forensic Medicine (1967).

    49 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1089-1095. Also see Josiah Thompson, Six Seconds in Dallas (1967), at 176. Thompson here actually wonders if the bullet had been switched by government agents sometime after its initial appearance. Also see http://www.historymatters.com/essays/frameup/EvenMoreMagical/EvenMoreMagical.htm.

    50 David Wrone has made a similar argument for the chain of possession of the Zapruder film; see Fetzer (1998), supra, at 265. Wrone claims that a good lawyer could have kept the film out of the courtroom (although it did surface for the Clay Shaw trial). Given the recent interviews with Dino Brugioni (see below), that argument today is stronger than ever.

    51 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1208-1212; the NPIC proposed such a frontal shot at frame Z-190. Of course, there is also the article by Paul Mandel (Ibid. at 1202 and LIFE, December 6, 1963) about the Zapruder film: “Öthe 8 mm film shows the President turning his body far around to the right as he waves to someone in the crowd. His throat is exposed—towards the sniper’s nest—just before he clutches it.”

    53 Ironically, a Captain (Pierre) Sands attended the Hunter-McMahon event (see below). The layman should understand that ‘rockhead’ is neither an epithet nor a pejorative for certain types of music lovers. It is merely a geological formation.

    54 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1226-1227.

    55 John Costella, an Australian Ph.D. physicist with expertise in optics, has offered very compelling physical arguments as to why more than just an original Zapruder film was absolutely necessary to fabricate the extant film. See James Fetzer, editor, The Great Zapruder Film Hoax (2003), at 145-238. One researcher has advised me that he has made some progress, but identifying the pertinent photographer(s) remains an open question.

    56 Dino Brugioni, Photofakery: the History and Techniques of Photographic Deception and Manipulation (1999). His recollections of the Cuban missile crisis are documented at 109-110.

    57 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1220-1243.

    58 Ibid. at 1236.

    59 This contradicts Roland Zavada’s final verdict on this question, although his initial conclusion had been precisely the opposite; see below for more on Zavada.

    60 It is possible that some copies of these copies (sic) escaped the dragnet. Dan Rather, for example (The Camera Never Blinks (1977), at 127), claims that security for the film was extremely poor while he was at CBS. Multiple individuals have reported viewing a very different Zapruder film, actually one more consistent with the eyewitnesses (Fetzer (2000), supra, at 354). Millicent Cranor described to me a film that she saw in 1992 at NBC; she added that John Lattimer must have seen a similar film (Resident and Staff Physician, May 1972, at 60). The LIFE issue of October 2, 1964, had six different versions according to Paul Hoch and Vincent Salandria (Fred Newcomb and Perry Adams, Murder from Within (1974), at 143). In one version Z-323 had a caption that described JFK’s head as ‘snapping to one side’ (also see my footnote 67); another version replaced this frame with Z-313 and a caption describing JFK’s head as going forward.

    61 Horne, supra, Volume IVat 1346. Wainwright was a LIFE employee who published The Great American Magazine – An Inside Story of LIFE (1986).This includes a (second-hand) account of these images in LIFE (November 29, 1963). He states that 31 enlargements were used in creating a sequential layout for that issue.

    62 I recently viewed an original Zavada report; there is indeed one image of the red truck (Zavada Report (1998) at 1285) that does extend very near the left edge, just as Horne states. However, Horne’s point is that the images in the extant Zapruder film nearly always extend fully left, whereas Zavada’s test images only rarely show this phenomenon. Horne also cites the Janowitz/Myers film (Horne, supra, Volume IVat 1290), shot in Dealey Plaza with a camera like Zapruder’s. As he viewed it on a DVD it seemed to show ‘full flush left,’ but Horne noted that he personally could not authenticate this film and would really prefer to see a film actually shot through Zapruder’s camera. For more on this J/M film see http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=15326.

    63 Many of these points had previously been made, as Horne acknowledges, both by Harry Livingstone and by me, although our work was admittedly based on Horne’s initial efforts. Horne emphasizes that he only read Livingstone’s book after he had done his own research. That the two of them reached so many common conclusions (they did indeed do so) is taken by Horne as (at least partial) verification of his own work. See Fetzer (1998), supra, and Fetzer (2000), supra, and also Harry Livingstone, The Hoax of the Century: Decoding the Forgery of the Zapruder Film (2004).

    64 Rather, supra, at 127.

    65 Noel Twyman and I independently discovered DeLoach’s report in his autobiography, Hoover’s FBI: The Inside Story by Hoover’s Trusted Lieutenant (1995), at 139. DeLoach does not comment on his obvious disagreement with the extant Zapruder film.

    66 Fetzer (2003), supra, at 200.

    67 Also see a review by Richard J. DellaRosa at http://www.jfkresearch.com/book_review.html: ‘When interviewed in the 1990s, Zapruder’s business partner, Erwin Schwartz, said that he vividly recalled watching the film and remembered seeing JFK’s head suddenly ëwhip around to the left’ and saw an explosion of blood and brains from his head and that it had been blown out ëto the left rear.’ ‘ Also see my footnote 60.

    68 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figures 87-88.

    69 Ibid. at Figures 85-86.

    70 Ibid. atFigures 89-90.

    71 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1281.

    72 See the Preface (by me – but amputated by Harry) to Harry Livingstone, The Hoax of the Century: Decoding the Forgery of the Zapruder Film (2004).

    74 Ibid. at 251.

    75 Ibid. at Figure 65 (autopsy photographs 43 & 44).

    76 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1003 (footnote 3).

    77Horne, supra, Volume II at 435. Gunn: Did you, at any point, see photographers in the morgue?
    Reed: Yes, I did. But they didn’t have their equipment. There was no equipment at that time with them.

    78Horne, supra, Volume I at 237.

    79 Ibid. at 165 and 167. Of course, both men could be right. Stringer might have been only temporarily absent – shortly after Riebe left. Stringer also added a major observation: no photographs were taken either during or after the embalming. Although Godfrey McHugh reported the opposite, I would be inclined in this case to believe the photographer.

    80 Ibid. at 250. Also recall that Knudsen claimed to be the sole autopsy photographer; by implication, therefore, he did not see Stringer.

    81 Fetzer (2000), supra, at 275.

    82 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 57.

    83 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1027. Also seeHorne, supra, Volume I at Figure 66 (autopsy photographs 17&18, 44&45). Larry Sturdivan precisely identifies this site with a pointer; see JFK Myths (2005), at 195 (Figure 44). These sites are also identified in PowerPoint slides from my November 2009 lecture in Dallas; see the Mary Ferrell website at http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/index.php/Main_Page. Alternate websites, with slightly updated slides, are at http://www.assassinationscience.com and http://www.assassinationresearch.com.

    84 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1027. Stringer also disagreed with Michael Baden’s orientation (Horne, supra, Volume I at 165).

    85 Fetzer (2000), supra, at 282.

    86 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1147-1155.

    87 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 47.

    88 Horne, supra, Volume II at 642.

    89 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1150. Also see Horne, supra, Volume III at 757, 765-769.

    90 Warren Commission Hearings, Volume VI at 74. However, Giesecke also thought the occipital wound was on the left side. He later admitted that he had described the wrong side: http://www.assassinationresearch.com/v4n2/v4n2part1.pdf.

    91 Harold Weisberg, Post-Mortem (1969), at 60-61.

    93 Fetzer (2003), supra, at 200.

    94 New York Times, November 23, 1963; Edgar F. Tatro, The Quincy Sun, November 21, 1984, at 1-17.

    95 Bill Sloan, JFK: Breaking the Silence (1993), at 183.

    96 See the incision in the high right forehead, near the hairline, in Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 62.

    97 The autopsy photo of the left lateral head also does not show such an entry hole: Ibid. at Figure 59.

    98 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1063-64.

    99 Ibid. at 1045 (footnote). Also see Harry Livingstone, Killing the Truth (1993), at 195.

    100 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 35.

    101 David W. Mantik and Cyril H. Wecht, ‘Paradoxes of the JFK Assassination: The Brain Enigma,’ in James DiEugenio and Lisa Pease, editors, The Assassinations (2002), at 264.

    102 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1151. Also compare Wilbur’s description of the wound location to that of Dr. Marion Jenkins before the Warren Commission: http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/russ/testimony/jenkins.htm.

    103 Horne, supra, Volume III at 777-844: ‘Two Brain Examinations – Cover-up Confirmed.’ The relevant table is at 791. Horne’s ARRB memo was dated June 2, 1998. Only while writing this review did I recall that I had asked this same question some years earlier. See Harry Livingstone, Killing Kennedy (1995), at 268 (footnote): ‘Is Boswell describing different brains on these two occasions?’ Horne, however, was the one who pursued the question fully.

    104 Horne, supra, Volume I at 42-43.

    105 Mantik and Wecht (2002), supra, at 250-271.

    106 These sites are precisely identified in PowerPoint slides from my November 2009 lecture in Dallas; see the Mary Ferrell website at http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/index.php/Main_Page. Alternate websites, with slightly updated slides, are at http://www.assassinationscience.com and http://www.assassinationresearch.com.

    107 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 999.

    108 In his defense, Horne notes that Lipsey recalled seeing the white spot – and also recalled the pathologists’ discussion of it – during his HSCA interview. He even recalled it well enough that he identified this site on a sketch. See http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/med_testimony/Lipsey_1-18-78/HSCA-Lipsey.htm. As further corroboration, Horne adds that Robinson also recalled a probe entering low on the back of the head.

    109 For an unbiased perspective, however, see the summary reports of the three medical experts for the ARRB (Horne, supra, Volume II at 583-587). None of them could identify such an entry site on the skull X-rays – and there was great uncertainty about the red spot, as well. For full summaries see Horne’s Appendices at the Mary Ferrell website or visit my November 2009 lecture (about these experts) at the same website: http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/index.php/Main_Page.

    110 Most likely the red spot was simply added in the darkroom; after all, that site fit much better with the ‘sniper’s nest’ than did the EOP site. The white spot was merely an oversight. When the darkroom magicians covered up the large skull defect they simply neglected to extend their new (photographic) hairpiece inferiorly enough.

    111 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1335.

    112 See these ghost images in Fetzer (2003), supra, at 210.

    113 Each intersprocket area therefore contains two ghost images: one from the frame before and one from the frame after the primary frame that was exposed.

    114 Fetzer (2003), supra, at xi, 23, 35, 164-169, 209.

    115 Horne, supra, Volume IVat 1309. Healy has suggested two weeks for the complete job (Ibid. at 1339).

    116 Ibid. at 1341 (footnote).

    117 Ibid. at 220.

    118 Fetzer (1998), supra, at 343-344.

    119 See my footnote 1.

    120 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1127-1131 and 1213.

    121 Thomas, Donald B., ‘Echo correlation analysis and the acoustic evidence in the Kennedy assassination revisited.’ Science & Justice (The Forensic Science Society) 41: 21ñ32 (2002).

    123 LBJ later gave Humes a personal set of presidential cufflinks, which Humes wore during his ARRB visit.

    124 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1188. Horne cites these superiors as Edward C. Kenney (Surgeon General of the Navy), Calvin Galloway (Commanding Officer of the Bethesda National Naval Medical Center), and George Burkley (White House Physician). All were admirals. Also see Vincent Palamara’s summary at http://www.assassinationresearch.com/v4n2/v4n2part3.pdf.

    125 Josiah Thompson: ‘One way of looking at this continuing argument is to see it as a gigantic waste of time, as a prime example of junk science from educated people who ought to know better. It may have amusement value in some chronicle of ësilly science,’ but, in terms of knowledge about the Kennedy assassination, it has produced literally nothing.’ See his entire essay at
    http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/index.php/Essay_-_Bedrock_Evidence_in_the_Kennedy_Assassination.

    126 Rebecca Goldstein (a MacArthur Genius Fellow), The Mind-Body Problem: A Novel (1983), at 140-141.

    127 Fetzer (2000), supra, at 371-411.

    128 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1290. At the 2003 Pittsburgh conference, Cyril Wecht set his sails in precisely the opposite direction – he advised his audience not to trust the experts but instead to do their own analysis; see www.cyrilwecht.com/journal/archives/jfk/index.php. I very much side with Wecht.

    129 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1199.

    130 The National Archives does possess later generation copies of the extant film, labeled as being from the FBI.

    131 Costella implies that this collection process was not entirely successful, i.e., that there were ‘multiple films’ in circulation, ‘not one.’

    132 Ibid. at 1202.

    133 Ibid. at 1199.

    134 That issue was dated November 29, 1963, but most likely it first appeared on newsstands on Tuesday, November 26.

    135 Horne, supra, Volume II at 389.

    136 For an image of the white patch, see Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 67.

    137 See my November 2009 lecture at http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/index.php/Main_Page. Alternate websites, with slightly updated slides, are at http://www.assassinationscience.com and http://www.assassinationresearch.com.

    138 Sturdivan, supra, at 193.

    139 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 38; look inside JFK’s right orbit for this white object. Also see Fetzer (1998), supra, at 120-137.

    140 Horne, supra, Volume II at 583-587. Detailed summaries of the experts’ opinions are in Horne’s Appendices; see the list of appendices in Horne, supra, Volume I at xix-lii. The appendices themselves are posted at the Mary Ferrell website (see my footnote 3 for a link).

    141 Horne, supra, Volume II at 564 (Humes), at 573 (Boswell), and at 580 (Finck).

    142 Sturdivan, supra, at 193.

    143 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 37.

    144 Horne, supra, Volume II at 426, 430-431.

    145 Fetzer (1998), supra, at 120-137. Also see my lecture (November 2009) at the Mary Ferrell website (see my footnote 137). Alternate websites, with slightly updated slides, are at http://www.assassinationscience.com and http://www.assassinationresearch.com.

    146 Horne, supra, Volume II at 546-554.

    147 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1002-1013.

    148 http://www.jfklancer.com/Sibert-ONeill.html. Or see Thompson, supra, Appendix G. The time of 7:17 PM appeared in their interview with Arlen Specter (March 12, 1964): FBI 62-109060-2637 at 2. Also see Lifton, supra, at 484-485.

    149 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1008 and Volume I at Figure 70. Also see Military District of Washington, Bird Report and Lifton, supra, at 399, 406-407.

  • Douglas Horne, Inside the ARRB

    Douglas Horne, Inside the ARRB


    Jim DiEugenio’s review of Inside The ARRB originally appeared in four installments.  These have been combined into a single article here for convenience.


    Volume One

    Douglas Horne’s five volume set is formally titled Inside the Assassination Records Review Board: The U.S. Government’s Final Attempt to Reconcile the Conflicting Medical Evidence in the Assassination of JFK. In almost record time it has become an object of heated and almost embattled controversy. There was at first a barrage of advance, and pretty much unqualified, praise from certain quarters of the research community. The book was then attacked by both Krazy Kid Oswald advocates and certain Warren Commission critics. In reading Horne’s series two things strike me about the book’s reception. First, the reaction seems to me to be predictable since Horne is postulating a rather radical interpretation of the medical evidence and the Zapruder film. Second, although Volume Four was released first, and has generated the most controversy, it seems rather shortsighted to concentrate on that particular book in explaining this work. To understand Horne, and where his book is coming from, one has to read Volume I first. I read it twice and consider it crucial in any evaluation of this rather large outpouring of writing and research.

    Doug Horne
    Doug Horne (CTKA file photo)

    The first time I ever heard of Horne was through the estimable and respected lawyer-researcher Carol Hewitt. It was around the summer of 1996, and through her output in Probe, Carol had developed a reputation as an important writer and careful researcher. Since I edited her essays, I had developed a professional relationship with her. So around this time, or a bit later, I had a phone conversation with her at her home in Florida. She asked, “Jim, have you heard of this ARRB guy named Doug Horne?” I said no I had not. She said words to the effect that Horne had become friends with David Lifton when the latter was speaking in Hawaii. He then secured a position on the ARRB and he was now trying to bolster Lifton’s theories and discredit those Lifton disagreed with, e.g., John Armstrong and his Oswald doppelganger concept. It’s clear that Carol was correct. All one has to do is read the rather long Preface to the first volume to understand that. For there Horne discusses Lifton’s Hawaii speech and their following friendship. (p. lxix) Further, in the photo section of the volume you will see two pictures of Lifton. One is with Horne outside the National Archives. The important point about the photo is that it was taken in 1999, after the ARRB closed shop. Horne’s friendship with Lifton began before he took his position and continued after his ARRB function was completed.

    This is important in any analysis and/or evaluation of Inside the ARRB. And in fact, Horne clearly explains why in his Preface. He says that he has read Best Evidence four times. (For comparison purposes, I have not read any assassination book from cover to cover more than twice.) And the praise he lavishes on that book is, to say the least, lush. He is so intent on enshrining it in the pantheon that he indulges in a technique that, heretofore, only Gus Russo and David Heymann had used. He says Best Evidence was a nominee for the Pulitzer Prize. (Horne, p. 4) This startled me since I had never even heard Lifton say this. I also found it hard to believe that a committee as mainstream as that body would so honor a book that postulates a conspiracy in the JFK case – and a rather extreme one at that. So I went to the Pulitzer site. As with Russo and Heymann, I discovered that Best Evidence was not a finalist that year. It may have been submitted for consideration. But as Lisa Pease noted in her review of Heymann’s trashy book Bobby and Jackie, scores of people do that.

    In measuring the importance of Best Evidence, Horne writes that Lifton reminded us that gunshot wound evidence is a road map to any shooting, and it is evidence that trumps all eyewitness testimony and human recollection. (p. lxi) After this, he calls Best Evidence a “paradigm-buster”. (ibid) He continues his medical evidence primacy argument by saying that such evidence was used to counteract the impact of the Zapruder film when it was shown in 1975. He then adds, “…the medico-legal evidence from an autopsy will always outweigh eyewitness testimony. [Therefore] the debate had grown tiresome and inconclusive …” before Lifton published his volume. (p. lxiii) In discussing the House Select Committee on Assassinations, he talks about the differing recollections of medical observers of Kennedy’s body, those in Dallas, and those at Bethesda. Although the HSCA sided with the latter’s observations, Horne writes: “What if both groups of medical witnesses – all medical professionals – had told the truth and provided an accurate description of the President’s wounds at the time they saw them.” (p. lxiv) And with this, the author now introduces the critical concept of “old paradigm” research versus “new paradigm” research. For anyone familiar with these rubrics and line of argument, it follows naturally that, to Horne, Best Evidence represents the new paradigm and Josiah Thompson’s Six Seconds in Dallas represents the old paradigm.

    The reason I use the phrase “follows naturally” is that this demarcation of “old and new” is familiar to anyone who has read Best Evidence, which was published back in 1980. In fact, Lifton begins the book with a recital of the major points the critical community had achieved until that time. He also discusses the methods of research such as reading documents and considering redactions, and minutely examining photographs from Dealey Plaza. After many rather condescending pages of this review of the state of the evidence at the time, the author then launched into the chronicle of his “search for new evidence” in the JFK case. This is why he calls Part 2 of the book, “A New Hypothesis”. As Roger Feinman pointed out in his essay Between the Signal and the Noise, there is in Best Evidence a not so subtle disdain for what the critical community had accomplished up to that time. And as Feinman also noted, in an odd way, Lifton seemed to actually defend the Warren Commission against the polemics of Sylvia Meagher, Mark Lane and Thompson. For instance, Lifton wrote that some critics did not understand the “best evidence” concept and how the Commission had relied on the autopsy as a talisman for all that came afterwards. Lifton continued in this vein by writing that the critics “actually believed the Commission first decided Oswald was the lone assassin” and then colluded with the pathologists, namely James Humes, to concoct a lone assassin autopsy report. (Lifton p. 144. All references to Best Evidence are to the trade paperback, 1988 edition.) Right after his long prelude, Lifton began to concentrate on pathologist James Humes as a “central figure” in his book. From there, Lifton proceeded to put together his rather dramatic reconstruction of what really happened in both Dealey Plaza and at Bethesda. To say that it was a radical scenario is putting it mildly.

    But to return to the point, it is really Lifton who started this whole “old paradigm” versus “new paradigm” mode of thinking about assassination literature. For Horne to adapt it shows the clear and deep influence of Best Evidence on his thinking. In retrospect, it is hard not to detect a bit of self-promotion at the expense of those who came before him in Lifton’s gambit. And I don’t believe it’s merited. Why? Because as Pat Speer has pointed out on his web site, the first real milestone in the medical evidence did not come from the HSCA or Best Evidence. The first real giveaway movement was from the proponents of the official story itself. In 1968, Attorney General Ramsey Clark tasked Dr. Russell Fisher with reviewing the work of the autopsy surgeons: Humes, Thornton Boswell, and Pierre Finck. Fisher and Clark did three things that do not happen in normal medical practice. They moved the head wound up 4 inches, they noted particles in the neck, and they saw something that the pathologists had not seen: a 6.5 mm fragment in the cowlick area at the rear of the skull. As Speer notes, the Fisher panel was put together to specifically negate the work that Thompson had done on the ballistics and the autopsy. So in other words, Thompson, the “old paradigm” guy had actually been the first to rock the official story of the medical evidence in the JFK case. In my view, these movements of wound location, and the appearance and notation of fragments in the neck and high in the head – largely endorsed by the HSCA – have caused defenders of the official story many more problems than the more dramatic parts of Best Evidence. Again, this was caused by the author that both Horne and Lifton consider “old school”, i.e., Josiah Thompson. (For the exact way Thompson caused it, see my review of Reclaiming History, Part 4, Section IV)

    The next big crack in the medical evidence occurred in 1969. And it was caused by the inquiry of another man who Lifton showed clear disdain for: Jim Garrison. Lifton actually called the Garrison investigation “a farce”. (Lifton, p. 717) At the trial of Clay Shaw, under sharp cross-examination by Garrison’s assistant DA Alvin Oser, Pierre Finck finally raised the curtain on the autopsy. He admitted that it was largely controlled by the military officers in attendance. He also admitted that he did not examine the president’s clothes, and he did not see the autopsy photos until 1967. (James DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, pp. 290-309) The impact of Finck’s testimony was greatly underplayed by the media. But to serious students of the Kennedy case it went a long way in explaining just why the autopsy was so deficient in every aspect.

    Lifton’s book was published a year after the HSCA released its Final Report. The HSCA acknowledged that a serious difference existed with the observations of the back of Kennedy’s head between the Dallas doctors and the personnel at Bethesda. Many of the former witnesses said they saw a rather large hole in the rear of Kennedy’s skull. Yet the famous back of the head photographs, which are in Horne’s book and labeled Figures 64 and 65, depict no such wound. In fact, the head seems intact and untouched. Therefore the HSCA said the Dallas doctors were wrong about this. They added that the observations of the Bethesda doctors differed from the Dallas doctors on this issue. And since the Bethesda doctors had the body in front of them for hours instead of minutes, they were correct. Since Lifton’s book was published many years before the ARRB declassified the HSCA files, Best Evidence made much of this discrepancy. In fact it was one of the main underpinnings of Lifton’s theory of body hijacking and alteration. (Which we will discuss later.)

    But when the ARRB did declassify the HSCA medical files on this subject, it turned out that this was all a subterfuge. The medical personnel at Bethesda largely agreed with the Dallas observers about a gaping hole in the back of Kennedy’s skull. The witness statements were all there in the newly declassified files which Robert Blakey and Michael Baden had chosen to keep hidden from the public. Gary Aguilar did a magnificent job in collecting and collating these newly declassified witness affidavits. He put them on a chart and showed that, except for a small minority, most of the witnesses from both locations agreed that there was a gaping hole in the rear of the skull and where it was located. (See Aguilar’s essay in Murder in Dealey Plaza, especially pages 188, 199. In my view, this is one of the three or four best long pieces written on the medical evidence since the ARRB closed shop in 1998.) What had happened was that the HSCA realized that if these statements were published then the Dallas vs. Bethesda dichotomy would be largely minimized. And you would have a near unanimous verdict that this hole in the rear skull existed. This would create serious problems for the official story in two ways. First, the avulsive nature of the wound strongly suggested a front to back trajectory through the skull. Second, these observations would bring into doubt the autopsy photos mentioned above which reveal no trace of such a violent wound in the rear skull area.

    As noted above, Aguilar’s work on this issue posed a problem for Lifton’s theory. Because now the split between the Dallas observations and the Bethesda observations were at least slightly ameliorated. Milicent Cranor’s essay on Malcolm Perry, “Ricochet of a Lie,” posited another problem for Best Evidence. Her work poses a question about the differing size of the tracheotomy. As Robert McClelland stated at the Lancer Conference in 2009, a wide tracheotomy was not unusual practice for Parkland. And for Malcolm Perry to have seen the organs in the throat that he reported on, he almost had to have cut a wider tracheotomy than he let on about.

    This brings us to the main thesis of Best Evidence. Lifton was making the following proposals:

    1. All the shots in Dealey Plaza came from the front
    2. The Parkland Hospital doctors saw this evidence
    3. The body was then hijacked as it left Air Force One
    4. The body was then altered to show shots from the rear
    5. The conspirators dug out the bullets from the body
    6. The Commission was fooled by this alteration

    There were always very serious problems with these proposals. For instance, the nature of John Connally’s wounds and the testimony of Dr. Robert Shaw make number one nearly impossible to believe. Concerning number two, since Kennedy’s body was not flipped over, the Parkland personnel could not see Kennedy’s back wound. (Lifton postulated that this was later “punched in”. See p. 376)) There isn’t any credible evidence for the casket being secretly diverted to another hospital. (The author suggests Walter Reed. See p. 681) Further, Lifton could come up with no credible witnesses to his pre-autopsy extensive surgery. Finally, as the declassified records of the Warren Commission show, at the very first meeting of December 5th, the fix was in against Oswald. This was before there was any discussion of the autopsy report. So the idea that the Commission based their guilty verdict of Oswald on Humes was not valid.

    Consequently, Best Evidence has not worn well. Today, there are very few medical experts inside the research community who back the book. On the other hand, the book has plenty of critics, e.g., Feinman, Milicent Cranor, Cyril Wecht. As for myself, although I found Best Evidence entertaining to read, and thought the book contained some interesting information and anecdotes, two things troubled me. First, Lifton’s concentration on the medical evidence implicitly discounted other physical evidence that I felt was more solid and probative than what he was relying upon. Second, the author had a troubling tendency to take a piece of evidence that was not really well-grounded and then use it as a springboard to launch into all kinds of hyper-dramatic criminal scenarios. As Gary Aguilar once said to Lifton: Extravagant claims demand extravagant evidence. One example of this would be the sentence in the FBI’s Sibert-O’Neill report on the autopsy, which states that Humes noticed surgery of the head area when he looked at Kennedy’s body for the first time. What Lifton did with this piece of hearsay was rather remarkable. Just consider how he begins Chapter 8 shortly after he surfaces it: “I arose on Sunday morning convinced I had discovered the darkest secret of the crime of the century.” (Lifton, p. 181) This is before he even talked to Humes. For when he did, Humes denied any such pre-autopsy surgery. (ibid p. 256) But that didn’t matter to the author. He deduced that Humes was just covering up.

    Speaking of this specific accusation, Best Evidence severely dissipated for me on April 3, 1993. That is when I heard Lifton speak during a famous debate on the medical evidence in Chicago. This was part of a conference sponsored by Doug Carlson and called the Midwest Symposium. Lifton’s presentation consisted of two main parts. The first consisted of him rattling off about 20 almost violently accusatory charges he would ask Humes about if he ever got him on the witness stand. From this artillery barrage against the doctor, one would have guessed that people like Arlen Specter, J. Edgar Hoover, James Angleton, and Allen Dulles were all guiltless in the cover-up of the Kennedy murder. Humes was the real linchpin of the plot. And it was his work that gulled these four fine men. (I have little doubt that Lifton supplied similar questions to Horne in preparation for Humes’ ARRB deposition. And it was these “When’s the last time you beat your wife?” type queries that Jeremy Gunn bawled Horne out about behind closed doors. See Horne, p. 85)

    Lifton concluded in Chicago by playing a tape recording of a phone conversation he had with Humes concerning this subject, i.e., pre-autopsy surgery. In his book, due to Lifton’s description of phrasing and pauses, plus the author’s seemingly telepathic attribution of hidden knowledge to the pathologist, Humes’ words carried a certain sinister weight to them – almost like the pathologist was hiding something in this regard. But when the tape was played, this all but evaporated. It was clear to me – and many, many others – that Lifton had left out the tone and inflection of the doctor’s voice and words. And these betrayed that Humes was actually playing with Lifton: a playfulness grounded in his being taken aback by the insinuation, so much so that he didn’t take it seriously. I found it hard to believe that Lifton could not detect this when most of the spectators I talked to could. This indicated to me that the author had lost critical distance from his subject.

    II

    In spite of all the above, Horne still genuflects to Best Evidence. To the point that he essentially admits that the main reason he joined the ARRB was to prove or disprove Lifton’s thesis. (p. lxviii) Sealing and qualifying this emotional bond is the following statement: “David Lifton’s work has been a great inspiration to me over the years, and he and I eventually became very close personal friends, as well as fellow travelers on the same intellectual journey.” (p. lxix) In light of the warm feelings betrayed in that statement, it is hard to believe that Horne expended a lot of time on disproving Lifton’s thesis. In fact, I feel comfortable in writing that if Horne had never read Best Evidence, he would never have written his series or joined the ARRB.

    All the above introductory material is necessary to understand my decidedly mixed feelings about Inside the ARRB. There seem to me a lot of good things in Horne’s very long work. And I will discuss them both here and later. But where the author gets into trouble is when he tries to fit the interesting facts and testimony he discusses into an overarching theory. Because as we will see, although Horne has revised Best Evidence, he still sticks to the concept of pre-autopsy surgery, and extensive criminal conduct by the pathologists. And as Lifton clearly suggested in his book, Horne will also argue that the Zapruder film was both edited and optically printed. (Lifton pp. 555-557)

    For me, the most interesting chapter in Volume I is also a disappointing one. And it has little, if anything, to do with Horne’s attempt to revive and revise Best Evidence. Horne entitles it “Prologue: The Culture of the ARRB”. Here he offers his insights into the personalities and stances of the people he worked with and for at the Board. Specifically the other staffers, the Executive Director, and the ARRB members. I thought this chapter was both valuable and unique for the simple reason it had not been done before from anyone who was actually there at the time. One of the most startling revelations is that Executive Director David Marwell regularly talked to and lunched with the likes of Max Holland, Gus Russo, and the anti-Christ himself Gerald Posner. (p. 13) In fact, when Marwell was hired he told a newspaper interviewer that he found much of value in Case Closed. Although this was startling, it only set the stage for what the book reveals about that body as a whole: information the research community did not know at the time and which now sets off retroactive light.

    For beginners, not one Board member – historians Anna Nelson and Henry Graff, Dean Kermit Hall, archivist William Joyce, or Judge Jack Tunheim – believed Kennedy was killed by a conspiracy. (p. 10) Further, Horne estimates that well over half of the staff members believed Oswald did it. To the point that many exhibited a prejudice bordering on condescension toward those who did not believe the Warren Commission fairy tale. (p. 11) Chief Counsel Jeremy Gunn actually told Horne not to talk to the Board members about conspiracy angles, no matter how well founded they were. (p. 12) Why? Because the Board members were so mainstream oriented they would probably doubt his suitability for the ARRB.

    Horne believes this was done by design. It originated with the Board members in their choice of Marwell. It was then transmitted from Marwell to his hiring of staffers. Horne observes that Marwell’s orientation resulted in the following: 1.) Few staffers were concerned with the conflicts in the evidence 2.) Most were not well versed in the nuances of the case, and 3.) Most did not even have a natural interest in the Kennedy assassination. This fulfilled Marwell’s mandate of having an ARRB staff that was “neutral”. But it also resulted in a staff that was way behind the curve when it came to fulfilling their mandate of looking for records, interviewing witnesses who knew where the records were and/or could resolve conflicts in the evidence. I can certify this as true. When the ARRB started up, Anne Buttimer, their first chief investigator, called me and discussed the New Orleans aspect of the case for about an hour. From her questions I could tell she did not know a lot about that famous milieu. Anne eventually quit. (Horne does not mention Buttimer or why she left.)

    The Board members never got any briefing in any controversial evidentiary aspect of the case. When Marwell gave Jeremy Gunn permission to interview some medical witnesses, Gunn’s first chosen assistant dragged his feet in preparation for the depositions. He then secretly lobbied Marwell to halt the medical deposition process completely. (p. 15) While this interview process was ongoing, not one Board member read a single deposition Gunn had done. (p. 17) It wasn’t until the end of the ARRB, when the medical investigation gained some publicity, that three of the Board members asked to read these now “hot” items. (ibid)

    How obsessed was Marwell and the Board with the image of “neutrality”? There were no wall photos or portraits of President Kennedy in the waiting room or foyer of the ARRB offices.

    Did the ARRB do a good job? That is open to question today, especially with the new discoveries about the documents they missed. The most famous example being the George Johannides documents which were originally kept from the HSCA. But consider this about the HSCA’s Lopez Report on Mexico City: the Board never found out what happened to the annex of that report entitled “Was Oswald an Agent of the CIA”. It is not attached to the report today. Further, the Board never surfaced the working notes Ed Lopez and Dan Hardway made while assembling that report. Even though Lopez strongly recommend they do so since he filed the notes every day in the safe the CIA had built at HSCA headquarters. Finally, the Board never even seriously contemplated interviewing Ruth and Michael Paine. Even though much interesting material had been declassified about them, which authors like Carol Hewitt and Steve Jones utilized to the couple’s detriment.

    Up to now, these failings were generally written off due to lack of time and money. But with what Horne reveals here, there may have been more to it than that. The ARRB’s effort to appear “neutral” may have meant sacrificing some important opportunities and not following up on others. While in operation, this failing was generally kept from the public because the Board had two good front people who managed to shield the inner dynamic. They were Tunheim and public relations director Tom Samoluk. But this new information sheds light on the Board members’ desire to proclaim that they declassified no “smoking guns”. But since the Board members were already convinced the Warren Commission was correct, those proclamations are hollow since they were predictable. With what Horne writes about here, it appears the Board members saw their mission as declassifying as much as possible, looking as neutral as possible in the process, and then proclaiming that the two million new pages didn’t make any difference anyway. The Warren Commission got it right back in 1964.

    I wish Horne had spent more time and length on this chapter. It only fills 14 pages. If I had been advising him, it would have easily been two or three times as long. And his contribution would have been comparable to Edward Epstein’s Inquest or Gaeton Fonzi’s The Last Investigation. In other words an explanation of not just what happened, but why and how it went down that way.

    III

    After this, and throughout the rest of this volume, Horne concentrates on the investigation of the medical evidence by the ARRB, as headed by Jeremy Gunn. Before approaching that inquiry and evaluating it, let me add some qualifications to this ARRB endeavor. As others, like medical investigator Pat Speer, have written, one has to qualify some of this testimony simply because it came so late in the game. From the chart Horne produces on pages 59-64, the ARRB medical interviews started in early 1996 and extended to October of 1997. So the witnesses were addressing the issue anywhere from 33-34 years after the fact. Further, many of the witnesses were quite old at the time. And although I am not that old, I can attest to the fact that memories do not get better as one gets older, they usually get worse. Third, because of all the controversy on this issue, plus the fact that it is politically charged, testimony tends to get altered or fudged. And Horne describes two witnesses who changed their stories on an important issue: John Stringer and Floyd Riebe. In 1972, autopsy photographer Stringer – who, incredibly, was not contacted by the Warren Commission – said that the damage to Kennedy’s skull was in the rear. He then changed his story for the HSCA and ARRB. He now said it was on the right side above the right ear – which coincides with the autopsy report. (p. 183) Riebe, Stringer’s assistant, earlier told researchers about this gaping hole in the back of Kennedy’s head. When Gunn showed him the alleged autopsy photos which show an intact rear skull, he now agreed that this is what he saw that night. (p. 229) Further, Stringer says that Riebe took no photographs. (p. 166) Riebe has always said he did. Although the number and type have slightly varied through the years. (See chart on page 226) Further, Robert Knudsen, a White House photographer who insisted that he, at the very least, developed photographs from the autopsy is not even known by Stringer! (p. 177) I found this remarkable. Gunn asks Stringer about Knudsen in more than one way. Yet Knudsen’s name is so foreign to Stringer that he actually asks Gunn if Knudsen was a doctor. (The Knudsen mystery is an interesting episode which I will return to later.)

    Having established these serious qualifications, let me state why I think they exist. It is not the fault of Doug Horne, or Jeremy Gunn, or the ARRB. In my view, and disagreeing with David Lifton, this much varied and at times, unfathomable and irreconcilable medical record is owed to one man above all: Arlen Specter. It is not possible today to read Specter’s 3/16/64 examination of the three pathologists and not be disgusted. Specter understood that something was seriously remiss with the medical evidence in the JFK case. So he decided to cover up the many discrepancies in the record. He did things like deep-sixing the testimony of Jim Sibert and Frank O’Neill since it would wreck the single bullet theory and raise questions about the trajectory of the fatal head shot. The Commission did not print the death certificate signed by Kennedy’s personal physician George Burkley because Specter understood that it would show that the wound in the back entered too low to exit the throat. Specter then cooperated in a scheme to misrepresent the Kennedy wounds before the Commission. After rehearsing both men over a period of weeks, he had Humes and Boswell testify to false drawings prepared by student illustrator Harold Rydberg. In these drawings the back wound was raised into the neck area, and Kennedy’s head position was magically anteflexed to allow for the shot in the lower skull to exit above the right ear. (See my review of Reclaiming History, Part 4, Section III.) Specter understood that if he did otherwise, this would open up a Pandora’s Box of questions that would unravel the official story forever. So he did what his masters on the Commission wanted: He deliberately concealed the truth. And this robbed us all of a true cross-examination of the medical witnesses at the time when they were not old and infirm and when their memories were fresh.

    The fact that Specter did what he did guaranteed that pieces of the story would dribble out piecemeal over the years. And this made the purveyors of the official deception alter the official story, e.g., as did the Fisher Panel. So today, the JFK medical record is scattered all over the place. So much so that one can marshall evidence for both versions of the official story: the Warren Commission’s with low skull wound entry and a neck-throat wound; or the HSCA’s with high skull wound entry and upper back wound. Third, one can argue that the evidence is authentic and still argue conspiracy, e.g., Pat Speer, Dr. Randy Robertson and Roger Feinman. Fourth, one can make a case for what can be termed moderate alterations, that is the x-rays and photos have been tampered with, e.g., Robert Groden, Harrison Livingstone, Gary Aguilar, Cyril Wecht, Doug DeSalles and many others. Fifth, one can argue for a radical alterationist view. That is the body was hijacked, wounds were physically altered, and the x-rays were also, e.g., Lifton and Horne. But the very fact that one can make all five arguments should tell almost everyone that something is wrong someplace. Because this does not happen in real life.

    As I pointed out, Horne is in the last school. He therefore – and somewhat understandably – picks and chooses things to bolster his view. This mars the book, and I will explain why later. But I want to make the point that when Horne does not adhere to this practice he reveals a lot of valuable and interesting information. And although one can say that much of it is in other books, I know of no other volume that has as much of it between two covers. (Or in this case, ten covers.)

    Some of the remarkable testimony includes autopsy photographer John Stringer saying that he shot no basilar views of Kennedy’s brain. (p. 41) Yet there are basilar – that is, shot from below – views in the autopsy collection. If Stringer says only he shot all the autopsy photos, then who took these shots? Stringer also says that he recalled the cerebellum being damaged. (p. 43) This is the part of the brain almost at the stem, low in the rear of the skull. This damage is not depicted in the extant photography. As Horne appropriately notes, both of these observations by Stringer lead one to question the condition of the brain as depicted in the present pictures. Stringer was the official photographer and he’s raising questions about the authenticity of his photos. These two particular questions lead one to doubt the rendering of what the HSCA artist Ida Dox depicted as an almost intact brain. Especially when one factors in how many witnesses said that Kennedy’s brain was not just blasted, but that much of it was gone. (For example FBI agent Frank O’Neill said half of it was gone. See p. 45) One does not have to agree with Horne – that there were actually two viewings of the brain and that Pierre Finck was snookered by the dastardly duo of Humes and Boswell – to understand that something is wrong here. Especially when there is no official weight given to the brain at the autopsy, but later it weighed in at 1500 grams – which is actually at the top end for an intact brain. This is very hard to believe. Especially considering the fact that so many witnesses saw a brain that was nowhere near intact.

    IV

    Jeremy Gunn’s questioning of the pathologists was interesting in multiple aspects. The highlight for me is when he got Jim Humes to admit that not only did he burn the notes from his autopsy, but that he also burned the first draft of that report. (p. 95) In his discussion of this issue in the End Notes to Reclaiming History, Vincent Bugliosi tries to say that Humes became confused on this point. (Bugliosi EN pp. 276-280) The problem with Bugliosi trying to say that is that Humes testified to it three times. And Horne prints them all. (p. 95) When Gunn asked him why he burned the draft, Humes replied, “I don’t recall. I don’t know … You’re splitting hairs here and I’ll tell you it’s getting to me a little bit, as you may be able to detect.” (ibid) Clearly, Humes did something he should not have done. He does not want to reveal why he did it. And he is angered that he is finally being exposed on this point.

    Another fascinating point Gunn uncovered is that Humes never saw the Burkley death certificate that I mentioned earlier. (p. 97) Which depicts the back wound much lower than where the Warren Commission said it was. One has to wonder if Specter deliberately kept it from him, since it would have blown to smithereens the phony Rydberg drawings. Humes is kind of pathetic when asked his reason for not dissecting the neck wound the night of the autopsy: “But it wouldn’t make a great deal of sense to go slashing open the neck. What would we learn? Nothing you know. So I didn’t – I don’t know if anybody said don’t do this or don’t do that. I wouldn’t have done it no matter what anybody said. That was not important.” (p. 99) I love the use of the word “slashing”. I mean what else do you do when you dissect a wound track? And the rhetorical question of “What would we learn?” is almost priceless. Well Jim, how about if the back wound exited the throat? And then him not knowing if anyone said not to do so, this is obviously in reference to Pierre Finck’s testimony at the Clay Shaw trial where he said Humes was told not to dissect the track of the back wound. Humes was clearly in denial on this whole dissection issue. Again, he knows he did something seriously wrong and can’t admit it.

    Thornton Boswell stated that he suspected that Malcolm Perry’s tracheotomy was cut over a bullet wound. (pp. 109-110) Which is quite interesting since the official story has always been that Humes did not realize this until the next morning when he called Dallas. But Gunn never asked the obvious follow up question: If you did, did you tell Humes that at the time? (If Gunn did pose this query, Horne did not include it here.) Boswell differed with Humes as to when the composing of the autopsy report began. Boswell said it started on Saturday during the day. (pp. 116-17) Humes said he did not start it until Saturday night and completed in the wee hours of the morning on Sunday. Finally, Boswell saw a probe go in the back. (p. 120) But it only went in three inches.

    Pierre Finck also agreed that the probe did not go through the body. (p. 122) But as Horne notes, the significant thing about Finck was how many times he said, “I can’t remember” or “I can’t answer that.”(ibid) For instance, when asked who told him that he could not see the president’s clothing after he asked for it, Finck said he couldn’t recall who. (p. 124) And further, many times he would ask for a document and then read his answer from that record.(p. 123) Finck was intent on being evasive and giving away as little as possible. This was probably a reaction to his all too revealing testimony at the Shaw trial.

    Robert Karnei was the fourth pathologist on hand that night, although he did not participate in the autopsy. Karnei saw the actual probe that Finck inserted in Kennedy’s back. He also says it did not go through the body. But beyond that, he insisted that there were photographs taken of this. He was clearly agitated when he was told those photographs do not exist today. (p. 127) According to Karnei, no exit for the wound in the back was ever found. He recalled the pathologists searching for one until almost midnight. (p. 128) So clearly, in opposition to Humes, the failure to dissect the back wound created a real problem. Finally, Karnei said that he did hear from someone that Humes had called Dallas that night to learn about Perry’s tracheotomy. (p. 128) I should add here, John Stringer also stated that Humes called Dallas that night. (p. 165) By the end of the night, did Humes know about the throat wound? If he did, could he not admit that because the many probe attempts could not connect the back wound with the throat wound?

    From here, Horne goes into a thorough chronicling of the photographs taken the night of the autopsy. Near the beginning of this section, Horne adduces more evidence that Arlen Specter and the Warren Commission lied about their access to the autopsy photographs. One of the excuses the Commission always gave for doing such a poor job was that they did not have access to the autopsy photographs and x-rays. People like Specter and John McCloy usually blamed this on the Kennedy family. But as time has gone on, more and more evidence has accrued that reveals this to be a deception. For the Commission did view the autopsy photographic record. And Horne adds to that growing accumulation here. Secret Service officer Robert Bouck told the HSCA that he recalled that a representative of the Warren Commission looked at the autopsy photographs. Horne feels this had to be either J. Lee Rankin or Specter. Further, there is a Treasury Department memorandum noting that the Warren Commission was briefed on the autopsy procedures by using the actual x-rays to do so. (p. 135)

    Another curious point that Horne develops is that at least some of the photos were not developed at either Bethesda or the Secret Service lab. Some of them were developed at the Navy Processing Center at Anacostia where color prints were made from positive transparencies. (p. 135) Why some of the films were taken there is not clearly known. When Gunn asked Stringer about this, the photographer said that the Anacostia lab was larger and more secret. (p. 208)

    But as early as 1966, for a Justice Department review, Humes, Boswell and Stringer all stated that some pictures were missing. Stringer specified three of them to be gone, including a full body shot taken from overhead. (p. 146) But this fact could not be admitted to the public at the time. Especially since the first books critical of the Commission were now entering the market. So Justice Department official Carl Belcher arranged for another lie to be formalized. Belcher requested that some of the Bethesda witnesses sign a false inventory saying that at this 1966 review all the autopsy photos taken in 1963 were accounted for. Yet to get himself off the hook, Belcher had his name removed from the final draft of the false document. Horne discovered this by uncovering the fact that the preliminary draft did contain his name. (pp. 146-47) Stringer admitted to Gunn that he knew the inventory list was false before he signed it. He said he was told to sign it anyway. (p. 206) As to why Stringer knowingly signed a false document, I wish to relate one of the most memorable exchanges in all the ARRB depositions. After Gunn noted to Stringer that certain protocol was not followed in the taking of photographs, he asked him why he did not object. Stringer replied, “You don’t object to things.” Gunn replied with, “Some people do.” Stringer shot back with the following rather pithy remark, ” Yeah, they do. But they don’t last long.” (p. 213) Those eight words tell us all we need to know about how the lid was kept on the autopsy cover up for so long.

    After his ARRB testimony, Gunn and Horne came to believe that by the time of the HSCA, a total of five views taken by Stringer had disappeared. (pp.182-83) Reinforcing this was one of the real finds of the ARRB: an interview done with photographer Karl McDonald. After taking the formal picture of the Board members, Marwell found out that McDonald had been the medical photographer at Bethesda for eight years. Further, that he had been tutored by, and worked with, Stringer. (p. 152) And he had ended up by being that institute’s senior instructor in medical photography. In his ARRB interview he shed a lot of light on just how bad the extant pictorial record of Kennedy’s autopsy is.

    He first said that he always developed his own pictures. He never sent anything to Anacostia. He also said that he was always sure to take a battery of full body shots – of which none exist in the Kennedy case. He testified that there was always an autopsy card included with each and every photo. The card included an autopsy number and the year. Again, none exist in the Kennedy case. He said for trauma shots – places on the body where bullets impacted – he always took three views: wide-angle, medium shot, close-up. In light of the above strictures, Gunn asked him to give an overall grade to what purports to be Stringer’s work today. McDonald replied that he would grade the collection with very low marks. This was the guy who was taught photography procedure by Stringer. Did Stringer forget the very lessons he once gave? Not likely.

    V

    I will conclude this review of Volume I by discussing what can only be called the enigma of Robert Knudsen. Knudsen has been discussed before by other writers, like David Mantik. But in light of the fact that Horne spends seven pages on him (pp.247-254), and he implies that he may have actually taken at least some of the autopsy photographs in existence today, I think it’s necessary to write a bit about the unplumbed mystery of the man. Because, to me, he has been ignored for too long.

    One way to begin to point out the strangeness of Robert Knudsen is with this fact: Although Stringer denied knowing who Knudsen was, Knudsen had Stringer’s name and phone number in his appointments book. (p. 252) Which strongly implies that Knudsen did know Stringer. The question obviously becomes: How could Knudsen know Stringer if Stringer didn’t know Knudsen? And in fact, if Stringer did know him, is he feigning that he did not? If so, why? Because as we will see, under the circumstances we will describe, it is hard to believe that Stringer completely forgot about the man.

    Knudsen was one of two White House photographers in 1963. The other was Cecil Stoughton. (p. 249) As he revealed in his HSCA interview, Knudsen began his career as a Navy photographer who was then detailed to the White House in 1958. (8/11/78 HSCA transcript, p. 4) Generally speaking, Knudsen covered President Kennedy on state trips, and Stoughton covered the First Lady. (p. 250) In fact, Knudsen was scheduled to cover the Dallas trip. But he injured himself the week before. Therefore he did not accompany President Kennedy to Texas, Stoughton did. (ibid) At around 3:00 PM on the afternoon of the murder, Knudsen received a phone call. He was ordered to go to Andrews Air Force Base to meet Air Force One and to accompany the body of President Kennedy to Bethesda. And thus begins a fascinating puzzle. For, as Horne writes, there is no documented evidence that Knudsen was ever interviewed by the Warren Commission. (If this is true, the fact that the Commission never talked to either Knudsen or Stringer tells us plenty about Specter’s investigation of the autopsy.) The first, and only, on the record interview with Knudsen about this subject came with Andy Purdy of the HSCA. And that transcript was classified by Robert Blakey and Michael Baden. The ARRB declassified it in 1993. And on the version of the audiotape at the History Matters site, Knudsen’s voice is not audible on the actual recording. It sounds like a woman who is phrasing the transcript for copying purposes is repeating his words. (See for yourself.)

    How did the HSCA find out about Knudsen and the autopsy? In 1977, Knudsen gave an interview to a trade magazine in which he said that he was the only photographer to record Kennedy’s autopsy. (Horne, p. 250) What makes this odd is not just that Knudsen was not on the Bethesda staff, but that Stringer and his assistant Floyd Riebe have always maintained that they were the only photographers in the morgue that night. There were no civilian photographers taking pictures. Obviously, Knudsen did not have to say what he did to a magazine. But since the HSCA had been convened in 1976, after the electrifying viewing of the Zapruder film on ABC in 1975, Knudsen may have felt compelled to reveal what he knew.

    Unfortunately for Gunn and Horne, Knudsen had passed away before the ARRB was formed. But the Board got in contact with the survivors of his family, his widow and two children. What they told the ARRB about the aftermath of Knudsen at Bethesda makes the story even more tantalizing. They told the Board that Knudsen disappeared for three days after he was called to report the day of the murder. (ibid) He didn’t return home until after Kennedy’s funeral on the 25th. Knudsen told his son Robert that he had been present at the beginning of the autopsy. (ibid) Further, he told his family that he had photographed probes going into he back of President Kennedy. Which, as noted before, do not exist today. In a statement that is hard to reconcile with the record, Knudsen told them that he was the only one with a camera in the morgue. (Horne, p. 251) He also told his son that he did not recognize 4 or 5 of the photos shown to him by the HSCA. And at least one had been altered. Hair had been drawn in on it to conceal the missing portion of the top-back of Kennedy’s head. (ibid) In keeping with many other witnesses, Knudsen told his wife that much of Kennedy’s brain was blown away. (ibid) When Knudsen tried to get a copy of his HSCA transcript, he was told that “there was no record of him or his testimony.” (ibid)

    I have saved for last what is probably the most fascinating piece of information that the ARRB garnered from Knudsen’s survivors. All three of them said “Knudsen appeared before an official government body again some time in 1988, about six months before he died in January of 1989.” They all agreed “Knudsen came away from this experience very disturbed, saying that four photographs were missing, and that one was badly altered.” Gloria Knudsen continued by saying that Knudsen felt “that the wounds he saw in the photos shown to him in 1988 did not represent what he saw or took.” (p. 252) One reason he was disturbed by the experience was that “as soon as he would answer a question consistent with what he remembered, he would immediately be challenged and contradicted by people whom he felt already had their minds made up.” (ibid) Knudsen told his wife that he knew who had possession of the autopsy photographs he took. That based on that, he could then find out who had made some of them disappear and who had altered the back of the head picture. But he was not going to stick his neck out on something this huge because he had a family to protect. (p. 253)

    Andy Purdy’s HSCA interview with Knudsen is a disappointment. As Horne notes, Purdy concentrates almost completely on the photo negatives that were sent to the Navy Photographic Center at Anacostia. Knudsen notes that this was done because of the color facilities there. And Navy officer Saundra Spencer handled the color operation there. (HSCA transcript, p. 47) Secret Service photographer Jim Fox accompanied Knudsen there. According to Knudsen they were ordered to do this by George Burkley on the morning after the autopsy. (ibid, p. 5) Knudsen told Purdy that afterwards, Burkley ordered seven prints made. (ibid, p. 8) Which, as Purdy later noted, was an unusually high number that no one else recalled. Knudsen noted that after he turned in the work product to the White House, he never saw the photos again until Purdy showed them to him that day. (ibid, p. 16) When asked, he distinctly recalled photos of a large cavity in the back of Kennedy’s head and a side view with probes going through the body. (ibid, p.22) Unlike others, the views he saw showed the probes extending all the way through the body. Again, Purdy reminded him that no one else recalled such a photo. There was another photo of the chest cavity which Knudsen recalled that today is not in existence. (ibid, p. 39)

    Now, Knudsen said that it took about two hours for him to develop the color photos at Anacostia. But yet he told Purdy that the four-day period of the assassination and its aftermath were like a fog to him. He recalled working continuously through it. (ibid, pp. 9-12) This period roughly coincides with how long his family said he was gone from home. Incredibly, Purdy never asked the obvious question: “Mr. Knudsen, if the processing took two hours, but you worked for 3-4 days, what did you do the rest of the time?” And as Horne notes, even though Knudsen told the trade magazine the previous year that he actually took photos of the autopsy, Purdy never asked him any direct questions on this point. Like, how many pictures did he take, what kind of camera did he use, when did he take the shots, and did he give his photos to Stringer or Riebe?

    Now, as is his usual tendency, Horne makes an extreme assumption: There were actually two sets of photographs made and Knudsen shot pictures of the intact back of the head. And he did it at the request of Humes, Boswell and Finck. (Horne, p. 247) Or as he puts it, it was an “intentional creation by higher authority of a fraudulent photographic record designed to replace the real photos taken by Stringer and Riebe of a huge occipital defect in the head …”(ibid) Which ignores the fact that, as I noted, Knudsen saw just such a photo. Horne even uses the testimony of a friend of Knudsen’s, USIA photographer Joe O’Donnell to make his case. Yet this is a man who, as his own family has noted, was likely suffering from dementia brought on by his failing health at the time the ARRB interviewed him. After all, he had two rods in his back, suffered three strokes, had two heart attacks, incurred skin cancer and had part of his colon taken out. Not the best witness. (NY Times, 9/15/2007) Further, O’Donnell had been known to testify falsely about photographic records before. (ibid)

    To me, the incomplete evidentiary record does not conclusively lead to Horne’s bold conspiratorial denouement. The case of Robert Knudsen, as I said before, is and remains a mystery. What it actually reveals about the JFK case is that there has never been anywhere near a first-class criminal inquiry into what really happened. In any professional inquiry, with say someone like Patrick Fitzgerald in charge, Knudsen would have been called in under oath with an attorney. He would have been warned in advance that he was expected to answer all questions under penalty of perjury. If he refused to answer he would be charged with contempt. He would have been asked to bring in any corroborative witnesses and exhibits. He would have been asked specifically, “Did you take any autopsy pictures at any time in 1963?” If he said yes, he would have been asked specific questions about when and where he took them and with whom. He would have been specifically asked if he worked with anyone else in making them. Stringer would have been asked the question, “Do you recall anyone else taking pictures at the autopsy?”, and also, “If you did not know Knudsen then how did he get your name and phone number?” And this inquiry would have been followed to its ultimate destination: to find out if Knudsen took or did not take any photos. To me that is where the status is of the evidence concerning Knudsen. I believe Horne goes too far in making his assumptions about the man.

    But to give Horne his due, at least he brings these matters to the attention of the reader. That is to his credit, since very few others have done it. And no one else has done so in such a complete way.


    Volume Two

    The second volume of Doug Horne’s Inside the ARRB ostensibly deals with the following topics: a second section on autopsy photography, a very long section on the x-rays (about 200 pages), interviews with the morticians from Joseph Gawler’s Sons, and Horne’s report on the ARRB interviews with Parkland Hospital staff. But as we shall see, it actually deals with a lot more than that. For it is here where Horne begins to reveal his revisions to David Lifton’s Best Evidence concerning the skullduggery he believes happened at Bethesda before the autopsy.

    I

    Volume II picks up with a continuation of Horne’s discussion of what he perceives as Robert Knudsen’s role in autopsy photography. As I noted at the end of my review of Volume I, Horne and I have a disagreement about just what that role was. Horne believes Knudsen took a second set of pictures. I believe that whatever Knudsen’s role was, it is mysterious and unproven. But Horne does good work in reviewing just how many different photographic views were actually taken of Kennedy’s body and what is missing from the collection today.

    He also sticks with Knudsen’s friend and professional colleague Joe O’Donnell as a witness for Knudsen taking a second set of autopsy photos. (See, for example, pp. 285-86) As I noted in my previous installment, the deceased O’Donnell has some real credibility problems. But in spite of that, in this volume, Horne uses and then extends him. He is now a witness to Zapruder film alteration. This deserves some elaboration.

    O’Donnell stated that he showed Jackie Kennedy the Zapruder film a few weeks after the assassination. (Horne, p. 287) The two were in the projection room alone. Jackie was unsettled by the sight of the head shot. She told him she never wanted to see it again. O’Donnell took this to mean she wanted it excised from the film. He then said he cut out about ten feet from the film. (ibid)

    This tale poses further problems for O’Donnell as a witness. First, as we shall later see – according to Horne – he is altering the film a second time. Because in his discussion in Volume 4, Horne believes the film was altered shortly after the assassination at a CIA photographic center. Yet O’Donnell here is talking about a few weeks afterwards in Washington. Secondly, O’Donnell says that he showed the widow an original version, not a copy. (ibid) But he says this film was in 16 mm format. The Zapruder film was shot in regular 8 mm. So how could this be an original? Third, if O’Donnell actually cut about ten feet out of this film, then you have some real statistical problems. Thirty seconds of 16 mm film is about 18 feet long. Considering the fact that the Zapruder film is less than thirty seconds long, the man chopped off more than half the film. How could any editor, no matter how gifted, put together a film with any continuity after eliminating over half the sequence?

    But when one analyzes it, this story is even more untenable. O’Donnell says that Jackie told him she did not want to see the head shot again. The actual head explosion takes only a matter of several frames. So why did O’Donnell cut out over half the film? Further, has anyone ever reported seeing a 16 mm version of the Zapruder film without the head explosion? This all seems not just untenable, but rather wild. Yet Horne actually takes the time to consider O’Donnell seriously. In fact, he composes a topic heading (not included in his Table of Contents) entitled “Analysis of the O’Donnell Interviews” (See p. 287). For all the reasons I have noted here and in Part One of my review, I would have just discarded the man as a witness. Horne does not. This may owe to Horne’s desire to give Knudsen his previously mentioned secret photographic assignment. Therefore he uses O’Donnell, even with all his credibility problems.

    There is another indication of Horne’s strong desire to keep Knudsen’s “second set of photos” secret assignment. Toward the end of Volume I Horne made his first notable mentions of Knudsen and O’Donnell. (See pp. 252-254.) But there, he also mentions Dr. Randy Robertson. He states that it was Robertson who first brought O’Donnell to the Board’s attention. Robertson, a board certified radiologist, has done some interesting work on the Kennedy autopsy. So when he heard that O’Donnell was in his vicinity, he talked to him. After listening to his unusual statements about Knudsen’s photographs of the autopsy, Robertson then called Knudsen’s widow, Gloria. After this, he relayed some of this information to the Board so they would follow up on it. In Volume I, Horne described his own conversations with the widowed Gloria Knudsen. Through information garnered from her, Horne wrote that 1.) Randy told her that he was the only person with access to the JFK medical materials 2.) Randy found Gloria through the ARRB 3.) Robertson challenged the woman on whether or not her husband had actually taken autopsy photographs.

    I have the good fortune of knowing Randy Robertson. As do several people in the JFK research community. When I read the above, I decided to get in contact with him. Why? Because it just does not sound like him. To the people who know him, Randy is the epitome of the well-mannered southern gentleman.

    In my conversation with him he said he had just one phone call with Gloria. Since he had been at the National Archives, he sent her some autopsy materials. He discussed nothing of substance with her at all. And he represented himself as no one except who he was, i.e., a board certified radiologist who had seen the autopsy materials. He found out about her through O’Donnell and the ARRB declassified documents. In their brief call, he did not challenge any specific claims of her husband. In fact, at the time, he did not even know that Knudsen claimed to have taken any autopsy photographs. (Communication with Robertson, 5/31/10)

    But further, Randy told me that Horne did not interview him for his book. Which is odd. To most people, what Knudsen’s widow said about Robertson would be perceived as rather derogatory. After all, the first two statements are lies, and the third is a direct challenge to her dead husband’s credibility. As I noted, it would also seem to be out of character to anyone who knows the man. Consequently, as a matter of fairness, one would extend Randy the courtesy of a conversation. And then one would at least state his denials in a footnote at the bottom of the page. According to Randy, Horne didn’t do the former, so he couldn’t do the latter.

    But there is also an evidentiary issue here. For if Randy is accurate about his version of the call, then it touches on the credibility of Knudsen’s widow. Which, apparently, is an issue that Horne does not want to surface.

    In the first part of this review, I noted Horne’s strong allegiance to Best Evidence. That characteristic is manifest through Volume II. For me, one of the most difficult things to accept about Lifton’s book is his explanation for the apparent intactness of the rear skull in the back of the head photos. In fact, I recall having an argument with another fan of Best Evidence in Dallas at the ASK Symposium in 1993. The argument consisted of whether or not Lifton said that these dubious photos were achieved through posing and altering of the skull in order to conceal the gaping hole beneath, or whether they were done by photographic alteration. The fan said that Lifton was not certain on this issue. I said that I recalled he was pretty close to being that. It turned out I was right. In a conversation Lifton had with HSCA investigator Andy Purdy, Lifton agrees that he believed that “somebody rebuilt the back of the head” before photography. (Best Evidence, p. 560) Later on, in discussing the findings of the HSCA, Lifton concurs with their verdict, i.e., that the x-rays and photos of Kennedy were not altered and that they represented JFK. (ibid, p. 659)

    The work of others in the interim makes this statement dubious today. By others, I mean Robert Groden, Gary Aguilar, David Mantik and Milicent Cranor. (Cranor knows more about the medical evidence – and in finer detail – than anyone I have ever encountered.) We will see why later, when Horne discusses the work of David Mantik on the skull x-rays. But to be brief, it seems to me hard to believe that neither set of images were altered. Yet Horne comes down on the Best Evidence side with the photographs. He says they were not altered. (Horne, p. 290) To be exact, he writes that “I believe the autopsy photographs showing the back-of-the-head to be intact are not photographic alterations, but instead represent fraudulent (but authentic) images showing the result of major manipulation and relocation of scalp by the pathologists after the autopsy … .” (ibid) When one looks at these pictures, this is a difficult hypothesis to maintain. For, as Cyril Wecht has said, it would take more than one expert surgeon hours to perform such faultless reconstructive surgery. And where were they that night? Who was such a highly skilled reconstructive surgeon at Bethesda? No one that I can see. Horne’s thesis seems to be that the autopsy pathologists somehow arranged what was left of Kennedy’s multi-fractured – even fragmented – skull, and then seamlessly fit the torn scalp over that rebuilt mess. Then Knudsen shot the pictures. To me, and many others, the easier and more sensible process would have been to insert a matched matte over certain parts of the skull. This is what Robert Groden has argued for in such books as High Treason.

    But further, in this volume, Horne now says that Knudsen was picked for this job by Robert Kennedy! What is the evidence the author lists for this? As far as I could discern it’s this: Knudsen’s son told the ARRB staffers that his father was close to both RFK and JFK. (Horne, p. 297) And because of that, Horne now says that somehow RFK was in on the cover-up of his own brother’s murder. The author is using the hearsay testimony of both O’Donnell and Knudsen’s surviving family for a lot of mileage.

    II

    One of the sub-sections in the first chapter of this volume is entitled “Vincent Madonia and Autopsy Photography” (p. 292) Madonia was involved in the transfer of photographs from the Secret Service to Evelyn Lincoln at the White House. He was also mentioned by Knudsen in his HSCA testimony as one of those he encountered in the processing of pictures at Anacostia. (ibid)

    Madonia told the ARRB that there was a Secret Service/White House processing facility at Anacostia. Outside of that, I thought his testimony was rather weak and indefinite. He could not be specific about what autopsy photographs he developed, since he said he developed hundreds of pictures of all kinds that weekend. (p. 296) All he could recall was that President Kennedy looked “pretty beat up”. (p. 294) In fact, he made a point about not being too curious about the pictures, because he felt that “the less I know about it, the better.” (ibid) Madonia was not even positive about Knudsen being there, or if he was, when he saw him. (p. 293) All in all, I just didn’t think there was a heck of a lot of value in what he said.

    Imagine my surprise when, about forty pages later, Madonia now constitutes evidence “that a compartmented operation was taking place” concerning the autopsy pictures. Horne now postulates that Madonia was unwittingly part of a “culling” operation. The aim of which was to delete the pictures taken early and include the ones taken later, that is, the reconstructed ones shot by Knudsen. (p. 331)

    When I read this, my eyebrows arched. For two reasons. First, as I wrote above, Madonia’s statements are rather anodyne, nebulous, and non-distinctive. Second, Horne did not mention anything about such a “culling” operation when he first discussed Madonia. So, using my notes, I went back and reread this section to see how I had missed all of this rather important material.

    As far as I can deduce, this is what Horne uses to say that Madonia is part of a “compartmented culling operation”: Madonia told the ARRB that ‘agents did come back for some photos which “may have been about the autopsy” during subsequent weeks, during a couple of subsequent visits. Other than the subsequent visits having taken place, he could not remember any specific details about the work done.’ (p. 294. Italics added.) To be brief but direct: I find this testimony rather unconvincing for the uses that the author makes of it.

    But it brings up an important criticism of Inside the ARRB. As John Costella has pointed out, the organizational guides to the book make it difficult to go back and locate details like the above. The entire set of books is 1,807 pages long. Yet no individual Table of Contents is over a half page in length. This particular volume is over 400 pages long. Horne lists four chapters in his Table of Contents. This averages out to one heading per hundred pages. Yet, as I noted above, Horne does divide his chapters into sub-chapters. Why did he not list these in his Table of Contents? I don’t understand why this was not done, simply as an organizational guide for the reader.

    The lack of an upfront descriptive guide for a very long work would be ameliorated if there were an overall or individual volume index. There are neither. As Costella noted, this is also hard to comprehend. Maybe Horne didn’t have the money to pay an indexer. But the software exists today with which you can arrange your own index. In fact, John Armstrong did just that with his important work Harvey and Lee. That book has 983 pages of text. With such skimpy Contents pages, and with no indexing of any kind, it is quite hard to locate specific points. Especially when they are strung across five volumes.

    This is unfortunate. Because whatever one thinks of Inside the ARRB, Horne uses a lot of valuable and interesting primary source material of many types. Therefore, the book could have been quite useful as a reference work. But how can one use it as such if it is so hard to locate the data inside? But secondly, Horne sometimes refers to matters he previously noted. But in so doing he often fails to use page references – which was the case in this Madonia instance. I found the questionable Madonia reference because I take copious and paginated notes. I do that for these reviews. But who else does? No one that I know. Again, Horne was not served well by whoever was advising him in this very long travail.

    Saundra Spencer is a more interesting witness than Madonia. She also worked at Anacostia. She recalled seeing a photo of a hole in the rear of Kennedy’s skull. Which, of course, is not there today. (p. 302) She also said she saw a full-length picture of the body, which is also absent. (p. 314) And, as we saw in Volume I, was standard practice. But Spencer also presents some problems as a witness. Her description of the anterior neck wound is unlike what anyone recalls, a clean pristine wound like a thumb puncture. (p. 316) Horne is honest enough to note that the famous paper discrepancy that she noted may not be as clear-cut as some have stated. (Horne, p. 330) Spencer brought some paper with her that she had used on the job to compare with the autopsy photos in existence. She said the paper used in the extant photos was different. When Horne took both samples to Kodak, they said the Kodak logos and watermark on the Spencer paper, though a bit darker, were actually the same size. And the experts there had no reason to believe that these autopsy photos were not developed at Anacostia. (ibid)

    In this volume, Horne reviews the testimony of the pathologists and tries to get specific about what autopsy photographs are not in existence today: the photo of the bruise of the chest cavity, a photo of the inside of the skull, and one of the interior of the thorax. (pp.335-340, 373-74) These are all crucial photos because they depict places where one can see bullet impacts. And as the ARRB was told, Stringer taught his students to do three exposures of these areas. Today we have none.

    From here, Horne goes into a discussion of what the panel appointed by Attorney General Ramsey Clark did in its review of the medical evidence in February of 1968. This panel met for only a short period of time, less than a week. (p. 344) Yet, its findings were held back from the public until January 16th, 1969! Yep, for about ten months. Ramsey Clark and the Justice Department decided to announce the findings right on the eve of the Clay Shaw trial. This was part of the huge effort waged by Washington and aimed at 1.) Burying the Garrison investigation in a tidal wave of propaganda, and 2.) Capsizing his inquiry by subversion.

    As most observers know, the Clark Panel was headed by pathologist Russell Fisher, and is sometimes called the Fisher Panel. Fisher moved the entrance wound in the rear skull up four inches into the cowlick area from its original location at the external occipital protuberance (EOP). Horne tells of a related problem encountered by the ARRB. That body hired three experts to look at the x-rays. None of them could find an entrance wound at that point. (p. 346)

    Horne also notes that Humes slightly altered his own location for the EOP entrance for the HSCA. For the HSCA he moved his entrance wound from the right and slightly above the EOP to below it. (p.347) But, of course, this was only a prelude to what the HSCA did to Humes. They eventually made him move the wound from the EOP to where the HSCA Panel wanted it, up into Fisher’s cowlick area. Horne notes that Dr. Charles Petty of the HSCA Panel later revealed that Humes was coerced into doing this. (p. 355) This kind of dancing around of wound locations over decades does not happen in real life. And it is all very interesting material to go over, for it poses what is today one of the weakest parts of the official story. Namely, how and why did this shift occur? But again, in my view, Horne overplays his cards. Under the influence of Best Evidence, this is how far he pushes the issue in posing a hypothetical question for pathologist Jim Humes: “Dr. Humes, did you participate in a cover up of the medical evidence by manipulating loose scalp to cover an exit defect in the posterior skull, and by simulating a higher entry wound (more consistent with being shot from the Book Depository) by puncturing the scalp in the cowlick area.” (p. 364) To which I am sure Humes would have readily broken down, started weeping, and admitted to such culpability.

    Horne closes his section on the autopsy photographs with something which, for me, is even wilder. So much so that I actually find it hard to write about it. So I will deal with it briefly just to get it out of the way. By using the mention of the word incision by a pathologist, the questionable testimony of Dennis David about the late Bruce Pitzer, and the equally questionable testimony of Joe O’Donnell about Robert Knudsen, Horne stitches together something about an “incised wound” being present on the autopsy photos. This is how much he wants to revive Best Evidence. (pp. 382-84) He then says that Robert Kennedy ordered Knudsen to take these shots and that somehow those photos got to Pitzer. He couches this all with Lamar Waldron type qualifiers like “it is just possible” and “then it would be theoretically have been possible” etc. Why he included it at all mystifies me.

    Did Horne have an editor? Someone who knew him well and who he trusted would get tough with him when necessary? Unfortunately, it does not appear that he did.

    III

    From here, Volume II proceeds to a long discussion of the autopsy x-rays. Horne begins by saying that there were officially 14 x-rays taken of President Kennedy. (p. 389) He then brings up an interesting point. The official story maintains that the x-rays were taken the evening of the 22nd at Bethesda. Yet the Harper fragment – a rather large piece of what most observers believe to be occipital bone – did not arrive in Washington for a couple of days after that. (pp. 393-94) So can these x-rays be genuine as they appear to show an intact back of the skull? (According to a man Horne holds in high esteem, this may be possible since David Mantik says the depictions are not fully intact. See Murder in Dealey Plaza, edited by James Fetzer, pp. 227, 281) The absence of the Harper fragment also touches on the question of the photographs, which show a perfectly intact posterior skull also. (Horne, p. 394)

    From here, Horne proceeds to discuss at extreme length the ARRB depositions of Ed Reed, Jerrol Custer, and the HSCA testimony of John Ebersole. Custer was the assistant to Ebersole, who maintained he was Acting Chief of radiology at Bethesda. Reed was a student of Custer at the time.

    Horne begins by quoting Ebersole saying that someone from Dallas had called and said that there had been an exit wound of the neck that had been stitched up. Further, that he had seen such a sutured wound when Kennedy’s body was placed on the table. (p. 399) This is obviously faulty information that Ebersole gave the HSCA. As far as I know, no one else is on record as saying this, and I can recall no author ever using this information to prove any point. But not only does Horne use it, he goes on for two pages about it. Since it is clearly an outlier, I would not have used this particular testimony for anything. Yet Horne uses it to say that Dallas did communicate with Bethesda. Yet that can be established by other testimony – and Horne admits this. (p. 400)

    His second purpose in using it is to say that this was part of the cover up in process at the time to conceal an anterior throat wound. To which I reply: If so, it wasn’t very smart or effective was it? Because no one has ever used this singular information to conceal that since. And, of course, Horne then uses this orphaned story to further the thesis of his friend David Lifton. He writes the following in that regard: “I conclude that David Lifton was correct when he speculated in Best Evidence that conspirators had retrieved the bullet from a frontal shot that impacted the anterior neck just below the larynx to the right of the midline, by probing deep inside the tracheostomy incision … with forceps, and that in doing so they had greatly enlarged the wound … Suturing the enlarged tracheostomy may have been an attempt to disguise the amount of damage inflicted by the clandestine probing.” (ibid)

    How “clandestine” can clandestine be? No one saw or did the suturing in Dallas, and no one saw it except Ebersole in Bethesda. In further undermining this Liftonesque “clandestine” thesis, the wide throat wound is quite obvious in the extant photos. So the clandestine operation hid nothing. Somehow, like with O’Donnell, Horne just can’t admit that Ebersole was either wrong, or he relayed some misinformation. Anything that supports Best Evidence, no matter how weakly substantiated, is somehow in bounds.

    From here, in his next few pages, Horne now proposes something that I think is even wilder than the above (pp. 401-08). What he seems to be saying there is this: What most everyone thought were late arriving bone chips from Dallas that night … well … they weren’t really from Dallas. Horne clearly implies that what was happening was that the Secret Service was stage-managing an illusion worthy of the likes of Genet and Balanchine. In reality, these pieces of skull matter were actually part of the pre-autopsy surgery done somewhere nearby, and the Secret Service was somehow concealing all this and saying the chips came in from Texas.

    What is the evidence that such a rather complex, bizarre scenario was occurring? From what I can see it is this: In referring to a rear skull wound before the Warren Commission, Secret Service agent Roy Kellerman used the phrase that this “skull part was removed”. (p. 403) To Horne, Kellerman gave the pre-autopsy plot away with the use of the word “removed” instead of using the word “missing”. The author then combines that one-word confession with the “surgery to the head area” hearsay that is in the Sibert-O’Neill report. And from what I can discern, that is the foundation for a fantastic plot that eluded so many for so long. (Horne goes into this aspect more a bit later in the volume. But it is not at all clear that what he is discussing at that point is the same pre-autopsy surgery instance discussed here.)

    At this point, the author goes into his long, detailed summary and analysis of the ARRB depositions of both Reed and Custer. Reed says that he recalled taking two skull x-rays (p. 429). When in fact there are three in existence today. Further, Reed told Lifton that the skull exit was posterior parietal in location. But to the ARRB, he said this wound was anterior parietal. (p. 424) This is a quite significant divergence. But further, Reed went on to say that he did not see any wounds in the back of Kennedy’s head and the scalp was intact. (ibid) He further added that he precisely recalled the time distance between the lateral and anterior-posterior skull x-rays since he had them developed on his own. (p. 432) Custer contested this later.(p. 432) Reed also said there were eight x-rays taken of Kennedy’s extremities. Yet there are four in existence today. (p. 433) At one point, when speaking about a technical matter concerning x-ray film exposures, Horne says that Reed went “on and on here, making no sense whatsoever.” (p. 428) Reed also said that, unlike anyone else, he saw the famous and mysterious 6.5 mm fragment on the skull x-ray that night! (p. 446) This is the disk shaped bright object at the rear of the skull table that, today, anyone can notice. Yet, the doctors, FBI agents, and other radiologists did not note that evening. Yet somehow Reed did. And somehow he did not alert anyone to this enormously important observation.

    But beyond the above, there are things in Reed’s deposition that Horne does not mention. Reed told Jeremy Gunn that he recalled being ordered to set up a catheter room for President Johnson since he had had a heart attack. (ARRB deposition, p. 17) He was not sure about when the autopsy ended. It may have been at 1:00 AM, or it may have been at 10:00 PM. (ibid p. 39) And Reed was even worse at when the body was first placed on the table. He says it was between 4-4:30 PM. This is way too early for even the earliest estimates. (ibid p. 76) And what makes all the above a bit worse is the fact that when Gunn asked Reed to characterize his memory of the autopsy events, he rated it at “about 95% correct.” (Horne, p. 423)

    Now, even leaving some of the above items out, Horne still states in several ways that Reed left something to be desired as a witness. For instance, Reed said he had briefly read Ebersole’s deposition when it was first written. Horne writes that when he heard this he “began to get a sinking feeling.” (Horne, p. 423) Why? It was highly improbable since Ebersole’s HSCA deposition was classified and not declassified until 1993. (ibid) Horne further adds that Reed was “not the kind of witness you want to have before you at a neutral, fact-finding deposition …” (ibid)

    In the face of the above, the reader may be surprised to learn that the author then uses Reed as his prime witness to Jim Humes eliminating the evidence of a frontal shot to Kennedy’s head. (p. 437) During his ARRB testimony, Reed described Humes as taking out a mechanical saw and applying it to Kennedy’s forehead. He mentioned it only in passing and Jeremy Gunn made nothing of it. But Horne combines this with the testimony of mortician Tom Robinson and Dr. Boswell’s ARRB drawing to postulate this other part of his Best Evidence revision. Let me describe how he uses Robinson and Boswell.

    At the beginning of Volume I, Horne goes through what he considers are his personal highlights of the Gunn/Horne medical review for the ARRB. One of these is a diagram by Dr. Boswell of how he remembered Kennedy’s head wound. This was a very large wound that extended from the back of the skull far forward to near the forehead. As per Tom Robinson of Gawler’s mortuary, Horne quotes him as saying he saw some sawing also. (p. 613) Robinson also told the ARRB that he thought the damage to the top of the skull was caused by the pathologists. (p. 630) From this, Horne stitches together his revival and revision of Lifton’s original “pre-autopsy surgery to the head” theory.

    He then goes on to explain why this was necessary. He gives three reasons, all of them reminiscent of Best Evidence. First, to remove bullet fragments from the brain that would reveal the existence of a crossfire in Dealey Plaza. Second, to change the appearance of an exit wound in the rear of the skull to more of a blowout wound toward the front of the head indicating a shot from the rear. Third, to remove brain tissue containing a track from front to back. (p. 630)

    In my review of Volume I, I mentioned that one of my problems with Best Evidence was the fact that Lifton would take a piece of rather inconclusive evidence and use it to launch into a rather hyper-dramatic conspiratorial scenario that eliminated other alternatives. In my view, Horne does the same thing. For instance, as Custer and others have stated, the condition of Kennedy’s skull when it arrived at Bethesda was that parts of it were so multi-fractured that it was fragmented. Custer once used the word “egg-shells” to describe how fragile and brittle the condition was. (Horne, pp. 456, 602-13) If this were so, then as the body arrived and as the pathologists handled the skull, would it not then fall apart as they progressed? And therefore, is it not possible that what Boswell drew – which is another outlier that Horne likes to use – was his memory of this wound later on?

    Second, if this sawing was part of a covert operation that the military honchos told Humes to perform, why on earth would they let people like Reed and Robinson see it? And why would they then let Humes talk about it to the Warren Commission, which he did? Third, if the objective was to eliminate the wound to the temple, then why did Robinson still see this wound later? (p. 599)

    Further, like Lifton, Horne gets so involved building these Seven Days in May type plots, that he doesn’t seem to notice when they don’t jibe with the results of what actually happened. For instance, why would it be necessary to remove the evidence of a crossfire from Kennedy’s brain when Horne writes as fact that the brain in evidence is not Kennedy’s?

    As per altering the existence of an exit wound to the rear, the problem here is that too many witnesses saw such a wound in Dallas. The drawing in Josiah Thompson’s Six Seconds In Dallas by Dr. Robert McClelland was something that would forever haunt the official story. (See Thompson, p. 107) Thompson describes McClelland’s memory of this wound as such: “McClelland is quite clearly describing an impact on the right side of the head that blasted backward, springing open the parietal and occipital bones and driving out a mass of brain tissue.” (ibid) Thompson then linked McClelland’s testimony to that of others in Dallas to show that this was clearly what most of the Parkland Hospital witnesses recalled: an avulsive, exit wound to the rear of the skull. Also, if the objective of the military brass in attendance was to alter this exit appearance, why did so many of those witnesses say they saw something pretty much the same as was seen in Dallas? As I noted in my review of Volume I, Gary Aguilar has proven this was the case. Is it not then more logical and deductive to postulate that the picture of the rear skull is in fact an alteration done by photography?

    Clearly, what Horne is describing in this whole pre-autopsy wound alteration scenario is similar, but not the same, as what Lifton described in Best Evidence. But as I noted in Part One of this review, Lifton seemed to say that the pre-autopsy cutting took place at a different location, not at Bethesda. Horne says that it took place at Bethesda. But to show just how wedded to Best Evidence Horne is, please note the following ( I actually had to read this part over twice). If the pre-autopsy surgery was done at Bethesda, then this would seem to bring into serious doubt another very controversial aspect of Lifton’s theory. Namely, the body-snatching from one casket to another. As Roger Feinman has noted in Between the Signal and the Noise, Lifton tried to minimize alternative ways that people could have seen a different casket both upon arrival and inside the morgue. (See here.) For instance, there was a decoy ambulance, the first casket Kennedy was in was damaged, and there was another body ready for burial in the building. But in spite of all this, Horne still wants to insist on this casket-snatching plot. Even though his revision renders it unnecessary! So how does he preserve Lifton in that regard? Let me quote the author: “…the alterations were attempted elsewhere, in a very hurried and inexpert manner – probably in the forward luggage compartment of Air Force One on the ground at Love Field, prior to takeoff…” (Horne, p. 636) This idea – of alterations on Air Force One – has been so discredited by so many different authors that it actually unsettled me when I read it. In his allegiance to Best Evidence, Horne just disregards the serious problems with this concept.

    And since I am describing Horne’s reliance on Best Evidence, I should note another parallel: Horne also insists that Kennedy’s corpse arrived at Bethesda in a bodybag. As Feinman has pointed out, no one ever really made a point of this until the testimony of Paul O’Connor for the HSCA. (See Best Evidence p. 595) Lifton then used this to say that the corpse was “intercepted”. Now, as other witnesses noted – and Horne notes elsewhere – the body was wrapped in sheets. But there was a clear plastic liner that the corpse was lying on. (Lifton, ibid) Now what Horne does not note, and neither did Lifton as I recall, was that between the time Kennedy was shot in 1963 and the beginning of the HSCA in 1976, a rather significant historical event happened. Namely the Vietnam War. For a period of about ten years, the American public was inundated, saturated, overwhelmed, by pictures, video, and reports of the so-called Living Room War. One of the most memorable phrases and images was of soldiers being brought home in “bodybags”. The phrase was repeated so many thousands of times that it became epitomic of that war – almost a part of America’s collective unconscious of the time period. But somehow Lifton and Horne leave all this psychological conditioning and how it can influence memory out of their works. Yet to me, it seems of the greatest importance as to how this angle first surfaced when it did.

    IV

    Horne goes on at almost stultifying length detailing the testimony of Jerrol Custer. How long does he spend on this? I counted: it’s 84 pages.

    There are some things of value here. For instance, Custer said that Ebersole tore a page out of the Duty Log book (Horne, pp. 490-91) Custer said he saw a large fragment fall out of Kennedy’s back. (p. 475) According to Custer, Finck relayed an order from the gallery telling Humes and Boswell to stop a certain procedure. (p. 477) Unlike Reed, Custer says he did 5 skull x-rays and he feels some are missing today. (p. 525) Custer also felt that Ebersole was not honest about his actual position at Bethesda, or the number of people in the morgue that night. According to Custer, Ebersole was not an administrator but an on call resident radiologist. (p. 537) Ebersole never carried any cassettes to be x-rayed, since he never left the morgue. As per the number of people in the morgue, Custer says Ebersole greatly underestimated this number to the HSCA. In response to looking at Ebersole’s HSCA testimony on this point, Custer commented: “Oh, come on. It was pure mayhem. The gallery was completely full … there was definitely more than 15 people in the morgue at that time. The commotion was astronomical … .he was questioned by the HSCA panel to the fact, were there any controlling factors in the gallery that controlled the morgue – the morgue procedure at the time? “No, there were not.” Come on. There were two men that constantly stood up, directed which way things would go.” (p. 537-38)

    As Horne notes, Custer is not a trained radiologist. But Horne has him commenting on the anterior-posterior skull x-rays at length – for 6 pages. He then has Custer go on about the lateral x-rays for 12 pages. And the other body x-rays for another 6 pages. To me, there is no way that the testimony of Custer merited this almost embarrassing length. Horne could have dealt with all the important matters in his interviews and depositions in at least half the length. That way his book would have been shorter and easier to read. Someone needed to tell the author: at times, less is more.

    It is an oddity of this volume that its most valuable contribution is not by either Horne or by the ARRB. It is by another researcher who discovered his evidence pretty much independently of the ARRB. Horne presents a comprehensive review of the work of David Mantik on the skull x-rays. Mantik, a radiation oncologist, has been doing fine work on the Kennedy x-rays for a number of years, actually, for well over a decade. Perhaps no other writer or researcher has made a more compelling case that these x-rays have been altered. And because Mantik’s work is not nearly so reliant on testimony, statements, and depositions done over a period of 40 some years, his work has more intrinsic value than the other things Horne presents here. I was fortunate enough to see Mantik’s first public presentation at the Dallas ASK conference back in 1993. So, of the six sources that Horne lists for his review on the subject, I have firsthand knowledge of five of them. This includes three public presentations in Dallas and Washington, and Mantik’s two long essays in the anthologies edited by James Fetzer, Assassination Science and Murder in Dealey Plaza. (The sixth source appears to be notes Mantik prepared for a co-authored article he did with Cyril Wecht for the anthology edited by Lisa Pease and myself, The Assassinations.)

    As the reader can see, Mantik’s work on the Kennedy autopsy x-rays has been out there now for about 17 years. It has become famous in the community because of its originality and its direct challenge to the authenticity of the x-rays. Horne’s contribution is that he collects it all in one place, and he then presents it clearly and understandably. In the early days, Mantik had a slight problem in making his insights and discoveries accessible to the layman. He has improved in that regard. But by going back and collecting his early work, Horne provides a service to the reader that is singular in the literature.

    Mantik’s first presentation in Dallas in 1993 dramatically and unforgettably contrasted the x-rays of Kennedy’s skull in vivo, with those done post-mortem. In referring to the former, he said they look like other x-rays. In referring to the latter, Mantik said at the time, “I have never seen x-rays that look like this.” It was easy to see why. The post-mortem x-rays have a jarring chiaroscuro effect – especially in the rear of the skull – that makes it look like someone deliberately whitened that part of the x-ray. Some commentators have tried to account for this high contrast effect by blaming the portable machines in use at the time, and saying that they were over-exposed by Custer. The problem is that even allowing for that, the pattern produced is not the same as is exhibited on these x-rays. That is, the high contrast is evenly distributed throughout the film, not concentrated in a particular area. The fact remains: no one has ever produced x-rays that look like this.

    Except David Mantik. At his office in Rancho Mirage, Mantik showed me how this can be achieved very simply. It only took him a few minutes in his darkroom to achieve this effect. Mantik believes that if this was done with the Kennedy x-rays, then it most likely was done in order to conceal a blow-out exit wound in the rear of the skull.

    Another discovery by Mantik makes the above conclusion hard to deflect. Mantik was granted permission by the Kennedy family to look at the autopsy materials at the National Archives. And he has done so on several occasions. On one visit he took an instrument which measures optical densitometry. That is, it measures the amount of light that passes through a surface, in this case a developed x-ray film. As Horne notes on a chart, if the film had an OD reading of zero, this would mean that a hundred percent of light could pass through the film. If the OD reading was ‘1’, only ten percent as much light could pass through compared to zero. And that ratio is the same up to a reading of 4. As Horne notes, “the differences between each whole number on the OD scale is one whole order of magnitude, i.e., a factor of ten.” (Horne, p. 543) The instrument that Mantik brought allowed him to take OD readings at intervals of 0.1 mm apart on the film. Mantik’s previous research revealed that on usual x-rays, the normal range of OD measurement is 0.5 for the lightest areas, and 2.0 for the darkest. (ibid) In other words, the lightest areas transmitted about three times more light than the darkest ones. Well, on the JFK x-rays, the lightest areas transmit about 1100 times more light than the dark areas. Mantik concludes that this is almost surely a physical impossibility. (ibid, p. 547) Clearly, these numbers support the idea that the white patch is artificial, i.e., it was superimposed.

    Horne does a nice job summarizing Mantik’s OD readings on the mysterious 6.5 mm fragment also. (pp. 549-551) Mantik compared OD readings on the 6.5 mm fragment with those of the 7 x 2 fragment, the one that was removed the night of the autopsy. He also compared his 6.5 mm readings with those of Kennedy’s amalgams. These readings revealed that on the anterior-posterior x-ray, the 6.5 mm fragment is “more dense than all of the dental amalgams combined.” (p. 551) It was also denser than the 7 x 2 fragment. Yet the 7 x 2 fragment was less dense on the anterior-posterior x-ray than the amalgams.

    But paradoxically, on the right lateral x-ray, the 6.5 mm object is much less dense than the dental amalgams. (ibid) This would seem to indicate that the 6.5 mm fragment was superimposed on the A-P x-ray only. And that it was imposed over a much smaller fragment. Finally, the OD readings reveal no entrance hole where the HSCA says there is one, that is near the 6.5 mm fragment. (p. 553)

    At Cyril Wecht’s superb Duquesne Conference of 2003, Mantik supplied one more compelling piece of evidence that strongly indicates that the x-rays in evidence today are not originals, but copies. On the left lateral view, there is a hand drawn symbol shaped like a capital letter ‘T’ on its side. As Horne describes it, this appears to be scratched out on the “skull x-ray in front of the cervical spine and directly underneath the jaw.” (p. 562) It was made by scraping off some emulsion on one side. Let me quote Horne on what this likely means and why: “However when Mantik closely examined the surfaces of the emulsion on either side of the lucent ‘T”, he found no disruption or damage whatsoever to the emulsion on both sides of the x-ray film. Mantik said … that the emulsion on both sides of the film in this area was as smooth as new ice in a hockey rink.” (Horne, p. 562, italics in original) As Mantik himself commented, this certainly is evidence that this film is a copy, or else the emulsion would not be so smooth.

    At the 2003 conference, Mantik stated that this is probably the most important discovery he made in his nine visits to the archives. It is consistent with his OD findings, and his x-ray duplicating experiments with both the white patch and the 6.5 mm fragment. Yet it is independent of them in means of proof.

    Horne also discusses Dr. Humes’ observations about the 6.5 mm fragment when confronted with it by Jeremy Gunn. At first, on two occasions, Humes admitted that he himself did not recall seeing the 6.5 mm. fragment at autopsy. (pp. 564, 569). Later on, realizing that this would create a serious problem that he had acknowledged for the first time in over 35 years, he tried to bail himself out by grasping at straws. (As noted in Pt. 1 of this review, Humes has a history of creating improbable cover stories when caught in corners like this.) He now actually tried to say that the 7 x 2 fragment might have been the 6.5 fragment! (p. 570) As Horne properly notes, this is hard to swallow. The first fragment is narrowly oblong in shape and was taken from the front of the skull; the latter is circular in shape and is located at the rear of the skull. Unless all three pathologists were visually impaired and had lost their powers of depth perception for this one instance, this makes for a high improbability. Further, the idea that neither the pathologists nor the FBI agents would have had this recovered as evidence, that doubles the improbability. (p. 570) Horne rightly notes that neither Thornton Boswell nor Pierre Finck recalled the 6.5 mm fragment either. (pp. 573, 580)

    Horne also comments on Gunn’s questioning of Humes about the non-existent trail of particles going from the low back of the skull to the top front of the skull, a trail which he wrote about in his autopsy report. Humes was forced to admit an odd thing during his deposition: the trail does not exist on the extant x-rays today. When pressed on this rather baffling issue, Humes replied in his own defense: “I didn’t write it down out of whole cloth. I wrote down what I saw.” (p. 571) He then added that the fact that it is not there today leads him to think that, “Well, there’s aspects of it I don’t understand.” (ibid) When the lead pathologist from the original autopsy feels that way about his own work, I then have to concur.

    As stated above, Horne’s summary and review of Mantik’s milestone work on the x-rays is the highlight of this volume. Mantik’s discoveries about the x-rays are largely made up of observable data that is difficult to discount. On the basis of that data – plus the primary source evidence about the disappearing trail of particles, and a 6.5 mm fragment that the pathologists did not see that night – it is difficult not to conclude that someone fiddled with the x-rays. The reasons being to: 1.) Cover a back of the skull blow out exit, and 2.) To raise the trajectory of the entrance wound while making it align with the ammunition from the rifle in evidence. Mantik also adds that a third reason may have been to erase evidence of two bullet trails through the skull. (p. 554)

    V

    The last two chapters of Volume II deal with the ARRB interviews of the morticians from Joseph Gawler’s Sons, and a review of interviews done in Dallas with certain 1963 staffers from Parkland.

    There were three men interviewed by the ARRB from Gawler’s: Joseph Hagan, Tom Robinson and John Van Hoesen. Generally speaking, after the discussion of Mantik’s fine and provocative work, Horne slips back into his Best Evidence revision and revival mode here. He even tries to revive the idea that a helicopter may have been used to transport the casket elsewhere. (p. 591)

    I must note here a trait that jarred me and I thought similar to Lifton’s: the tendency to run the length of the football field with one questionable piece of evidence. Hagan was being interviewed by the ARRB over 35 years after the fact. He said that when he arrived the autopsy was nearly finished and he added that photos were being taken. But he qualified this by saying that he could remember no details about this, that is, what views were shot, how many cameramen there were, or what the equipment being used was. (p. 593)

    Now, any lawyer or private investigator will tell you that its details that give a witness credibility. Usually, the more details that one recalls the better the memory of the event. And also the more realistic the memory. Hagan recalled next to nothing about the matter. But yet Horne strongly implies that Hagan was “witnessing photography by Robert Knudsen of a charade that both Knudsen and he both thought was “the end of the autopsy.” (ibid) Not only does Hagan’s hazy memory not justify this conclusion, but sometimes Horne gets so involved in what is now post-autopsy intrigue, that it is hard to understand precisely what he is talking about. What does he mean when he says that Knudsen thought he was involved with the “end of the autopsy”? Recall, Knudsen died and therefore was never cross-examined under oath by the ARRB. In his sworn testimony to the HSCA he was never questioned on this point, i.e., on whether or not he took autopsy photos. But not only does Horne think he did, he actually imagines that he was unwittingly being duped by higher-ups in the chain of command.

    Like Lifton with Humes, Horne imputes cover up motives to those who disagree with the main tenets of Best Evidence. For instance, Hagan made a notation that Kennedy’s body was removed from a metal shipping casket at Bethesda. But he told the ARRB that he never actually saw any casket that night and that someone else delivered this information to him. He also confirmed that the casket Kennedy arrived in was damaged, a handle had broken off and that it was then picked up months later at his place of work. Horne now asks about this testimony: “these remarks by him made me wonder whether he was really being forthcoming about whether or not he had seen a shipping casket at the Bethesda morgue the night of the autopsy.” (p. 597) It wouldn’t be possible for Hagan to look at the casket later on at work?

    Robinson was an interesting witness. He recalled seeing a wound about the size of an orange in the back of the skull between the ears. (p. 599) Robinson was also one of the several witnesses who Horne names who saw a wound in the temple near the hairline that was small enough to be hidden by hair. This latter description also guarantees this was an entry wound. Robinson said this wound “did not have to be hidden by make-up, and was simply plugged by him with some wax during the reconstruction.” Finally, he recalled it being about a quarter inch in diameter. (p. 600) Unlike with Hagan and the post-autopsy pictures, Robinson’s memory of this wound in the temple is vivid enough so that it cannot be easily dismissed.

    Finally, there is a point of confirmation and corroboration made by Robinson. He told the ARRB that the gallery was pretty much filled, that there were way too many people there. He then added that the atmosphere was like a “cocktail party”. He later added that it was even like a “circus”. (p. 611) He felt that there were people in attendance “who clearly had no business being there, and that there was continuous and loud discussion from the gallery which he thought was both improper and distracting”. (p. 611) It is one of the continuing mysteries of this case that no one has been able to explain precisely why all these people were there and who invited them and why they were not asked to leave.

    The volume concludes with a chapter entitled “A Short trip to Texas”. Gunn and Horne went to Texas in 1997 to interview three Parkland staffers who had not been formally interviewed by the Warren Commission: Dr. Charles Crenshaw, Dr. Robert Grossman, and Nurse Audrey Bell.

    Much of what Crenshaw observed has been published in two books of his and discussed by others as a result of his lawsuit against JAMA. But I must note that Horne gets a couple of details of the latter wrong. First, Crenshaw did not win a large settlement against JAMA. In this day and age, a bit over $200,000 cannot be considered large. Second, editor George Lundberg was not fired because of this incident. He was fired because of a later controversy over the Clinton impeachment scandal.

    For me, the two most important bits of information to come out of this visit were the following. First, when Bell saw Perry on November 23rd, Saturday morning, she said that he looked like hell. He replied to her that he “had not gotten much sleep because people from Bethesda Naval hospital had been harassing him all night on the telephone, trying to get him to change his mind” about Kennedy being hit by an entrance wound in the neck. (p. 645) Appropriately, Horne now goes into the whole controversy surrounding Secret Service Agent Elmer Moore. This was the man sent to Washington within 24 hours of the murder. He was then detailed to Dallas to ascertain what happened and then to cover up its true circumstances. (pp. 651-654) Horne adds one important piece of evidence to the Secret Service cover up.

    Arlen Specter had requested of the Secret Service that they obtain for him videotapes and transcripts of the Perry press conference from Parkland on the 22nd. James Rowley of the Secret Service wrote to Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin that, “The video tape and transcript … mentioned in your letter has not been located. After a review … no video tape or transcript could be found of a television interview with Dr. Malcolm Perry.” (p. 647)

    In light of the above it is rather odd that the ARRB found a transcript of the Perry conference that was time stamped “Received US Secret Service, 1963 Nov 26 AM 11 40, Office of the Chief”. In other words, Chief Rowley was deliberately lying about this transcript. It did exist, and he had it in his possession for months when he lied to Rankin. The problem was that what Perry said contradicted the notion of Oswald as the lone killer. Therefore, he understood that early. This was probably why he was complicit with Elmer Moore’s mission to Dallas to talk Perry out of his story.

    Let me conclude with a memorable interview that Gunn and Horne did with Grossman, who is a neurosurgeon. He said he saw a hole near the external occipital protuberance in the back of the skull. And through it he observed what he thought was cerebellum. (P. 655)

    He was then shown the famous Ida Dox drawing prepared for the HSCA which depicts an intact rear of the skull. He replied quite simply with “That’s completely incorrect.” Grossman insisted without qualification that “there had been a hole devoid of bone and scalp about 2 centimeters in diameter near the center of the occipital bone.” Unfortunately, this was not tape-recorded. But as Horne notes, “it will always be one of the most vivid memories that I have from all of our interviews and depositions.” (p. 656)

    I’ll say.


    Volume Three

    I

    Volume III of Inside the ARRB includes the end of what Doug Horne calls Part 1, and the beginning of Part 2. Horne defines Part 1 as a review of the work of the ARRB, especially the value of the witness depositions. That takes up a little more than a hundred pages of this volume. Then he launches into Part 2 of the book. This is entitled “Fraud in the Evidence”. Part 2 will continue into and take up all of Volume 4, which includes his (quite naturally) very long discussion of the Zapruder film. Then Volume 5 is called “The Political Context of the Assassination”.

    As indicated previously, Horne needed a good and tough editor. If he had one, his series could have easily and logically been divided into three neat volumes of Parts 1, 2, and 3. This would have let him thematically divide up the book into a comprehensible structure. The more accessible structure, plus pruning at least a couple of hundred pages, would have made the book easier to read and understand.

    In concluding his review of the ARRB medical depositions, Horne will now first review the testimony of FBI agents Jim Sibert and Frank O’Neill. This takes about 75 pages. Then Chapter 9 reviews Jeremy Gunn’s group interview of the Parkland Hospital emergency room doctors. For Horne, this is relatively brief, about 35 pages.

    I must comment on a recurring trait of Horne, because, on the second page of this volume, Horne comments on it himself. Although in strictest terms, the book is not an oral history, in many ways and on many pages, it is. Because Horne quotes at length from ARRB depositions. Now, oral history has real value. In fact, one of the better books on the medical evidence in the JFK case is an oral history, i.e., William Law’s In the Eye of History. There is nothing wrong with an author writing an expository introduction to an interview with one of his oral history subjects: Who is this person, why are they important, who else has interviewed them, what is new in this interview etc.

    Horne goes way beyond that. Let me use his own words to describe what he does that is rather unusual: “I have taken the liberty of engaging in lengthy, speculative discussions of the probable importance of various entries in these reports … Sibert and O’Neill participated in, and witnessed, key events … It does no good to simply report what they told someone about what they saw … without giving it context and discussing what it means in relation to what others witnessed that evening. Engaging in open, responsible, and detailed speculation now about the meaning of the observations and recollections of James Sibert and Frank O’Neill … will considerably streamline the writing (and reading) of Part II when I lay out my conclusions about what I believe really happened during and after the autopsy on President John F. Kennedy.” (pp. 668-69)

    Is Horne serious about the last part? The book is over 1,800 pages long. Where did he “streamline” anything? Part 2, which he says he actually did ‘streamline’, clocks in at 600 pages. What Horne is doing is justifying his frequent interjections into the oral history portions of the book. It is a practice that I have never seen any other author do to the extent he does. And in such a derogatory and, at times, personal way. When Dr. Petty is questioning Jim Humes about when the x-rays were taken, he is “peddling pure bullshit”. Horne actually inserts that phrase into the dialogue, like a stage direction. (p. 933) Frank O’Neill also indulges in “bullshit” (p. 724) And, of course, Horne really let’s them have it when they contradict Best Evidence. If the FBI agents say they never lost sight of the casket, they must be lying and he wants them to “come clean”. But Horne understands why they are lying: it’s because they let the conspirators get away with murder. (p. 726) At one point, O’Neill is accused of saying what he does because he hates David Lifton. (p. 719) Ironically, Horne even accuses O’Neill of being in love with the sound of his own voice. (p. 731) This from a guy who wrote a book that is close to 2,000 pages long.

    And since I am mentioning a form of editorializing, let me bring up a point that John Costella did. The accepted academic tradition in adding stress, emphasis, or drawing attention to a passage is the use of italics. Again, Horne goes beyond that tradition. He uses both bold italics and underlining. Often in the same passage. I think I get the point Doug.

    Let’s get back to facts. The testimony of Sibert and O’Neill is quite important for several reasons. First, it shows just how thoroughly compromised Arlen Specter was from the start. Specter talked to the agents informally. He never swore them in for a formal deposition. Why? Because he did not want their testimony in the record. In fact, the Sibert-O’Neill report is not in the Warren Commission volumes. The main reason being that they were told by the doctors that the back wound did not penetrate the body and that it came in at an angle of 45 degrees. Those two observations completely destroy the single bullet theory. Which it was Specter’s function to create and uphold. In the memo of his 3/12/64 interview, he writes that Sibert did not take any notes that night, and O’Neill took only a few. Both statements are completely false. (See p. 680) But further, in this memo on the meeting, Specter was careful not to ask the agents about the difference between the “non-transiting” bullet of their report, and the “transiting” bullet in the autopsy report. As Horne notes, “Specter did not want any indication in the official record that he was even aware of any discrepancy between the FBI report … and the autopsy report in evidence, CE 387.” (p. 673) Especially when it undermined the official mythology.

    When interviewed by the HSCA, the agents said that they learned that the projectile that caused the back wound ended up on a stretcher at Dallas. They learned this from a phone call that night. (p. 681) They also said that there was no discussion in the morgue that ever considered the throat wound a wound of exit. (ibid)

    Both men seriously questioned the back of the head photo. Sibert said he did not recall seeing the skull that intact: “I don’t remember seeing anything that was like this photo.” (p. 691) He then went on to add that “the hair looks like it’s been straightened out and cleaned up more than what it was when we left the autopsy.” (ibid) When Jeremy Gunn asked him if he recalled anything like that photo from the night of the autopsy, Sibert said, “No. I don’t recall anything like this at all during the autopsy.” (p. 692) When O’Neill saw the same picture, his reaction was similar. He said it looked like the photo had been, “…doctored in some way.” (ibid) He also did not recall the hair being so neat and clean. As for the depiction of the wound, he said “there was more of a massive wound”. (p. 693)

    I would be remiss if I did not note two areas that, in reading Horne, he is greatly preoccupied by. From way back when the self-published manuscript Murder from Within was issued (1975), its authors – Fred Newcomb and Perry Adams– have posited a theory of the crime that implicates LBJ and the Secret Service as the prime suspects. David Lifton was close to Newcomb at one time. In fact, he actually once said that this book stole his idea of body alteration. And it does posit that theory.

    Newcomb and Adams went way beyond the accepted knowledge of the Secret Service failure to protect Kennedy in Dealey Plaza. They seemed to imply that the Secret Service were the actual assassins, and that Roy Kellerman was actually a “stage manager” of the cover-up. In an interview in 1992, Newcomb stated that “In order to cover-up the shooting of JFK by Greer, the wounds had to be altered to make it appear that he was shot from the rear instead of the front. Control of the president’s body was paramount. The Dallas coroner at one point wanted to open the ceremonial coffin to do an autopsy in Dallas. Secret Service agent Roy Kellerman pulled a gun to stop him…” In fact, as one can read from this last linked page, many of Lifton’s concepts were clearly shared with Newcomb. Who came up with them first is probably a matter of conjecture. But it’s fairly clear that the whole Bill Cooper hoax, that is using a very bad copy of the Zapruder film to insinuate that Greer shot Kennedy, most likely originated with that book.

    Since Horne is enamored of all things in Best Evidence, Roy Kellerman now becomes a “stage manager” in the cover-up. That is, when certain skullduggery is going on, it’s Kellerman who is somehow involved in making sure certain people are present in the morgue and certain people are not. Which is odd, since most people believe that the military brass was actually controlling things. But Horne actually goes well beyond that point. In one rather outlandish excerpt, Horne seems to say that Kellerman was actually involved in the pre-autopsy surgery. As far as I could see, this was based upon the memory of a co-pilot on Air Force One who said he recalled that Kellerman had blood on the front of his shirt. (Horne, p. 696. There is no date given for when this interview took place.) So based upon this, Kellerman now joins Humes in pre-autopsy surgery. And he’s not even a doctor. Whether or not this memory is accurate, when it was recalled, whether it dovetails with anyone else, these questions are all left suspended. Assumedly, such questions are not to be asked. And the further unspoken corollary is that if this info is accurate, there can be no other way that Kellerman got blood on his shirt.

    Hmm. Talk about a hanging judge.

    Just let me note one sequence in the book that shows just how “stage-managed” Horne wants us to believe the conspiracy was. Let me describe what he projects as about a 40-45 minute time stretch at Bethesda that night. (p. 735) This is what Horne says happened from about 7:17-8:00:

    1. An inspection is made to see which wound alterations are necessary to the skull.
    2. Pictures are taken to record the true nature of the shots, and are later destroyed.
    3. Pre-autopsy surgery is done to remove the brain and to remove bullet fragments from a frontal shot.
    4. Further surgery continues as openings are made on the skull above the right ear and on top of the head.
    5. More surgery is done to camouflage evidence of a frontal shot.
    6. X-rays are taken after evidence of a frontal shot is surgically excised.
    7. A special photo shoot is arranged to take pictures of the president, but these do not include the back of the skull.
    8. The circumstances of this special photo shoot are now disguised and dismantled, and the body is transferred to the Dallas casket to be wrapped in sheets.

    Kellerman must have been one heck of a stage director. In fact, I would say he missed his calling. I mean, he managed all this without any rehearsal time. He should have been on Broadway.

    And we are also to believe that no one noticed the before and after difference in the corpse’s appearance.

    II

    The last chapter in Part 1 is Horne’s description of both the attempt to interview the Parkland Hospital doctors and the highlights of this group deposition. For Horne, this is a relatively brief chapter, about 35 pages. But I thought it was interesting because it gave us some insights into the workings of the ARRB and the relationship between Jeremy Gunn and Horne.

    The mission of the ARRB was to locate and make public as many hidden records as possible pertaining to the John Kennedy murder case. But there was also a clause written into the legislation which permitted them to explore and clarify certain ambiguities in the evidentiary record. Jeremy Gunn did this in several instances. But, by far, the one instance the Board took the most time and energy to do so was in the medical field. Nothing else was even close. Whether this was a good decision or a bad decision is not really the subject of this book or this review. But it is an unalterable fact.

    Now Horne not only wanted to do this, he also wanted it structured in a certain way. He wanted the depositions of the Dallas doctors taken first, and then the autopsy pathologists. (p. 742) Now from what Horne revealed about the temperament of the Board, and the ties that David Marwell had with people like Gus Russo, Max Holland, and Michael Baden, this was not going to be easy to attain. But evidently, at the beginning, Jeremy Gunn had some capital with Marwell and the Board. So Marwell had Gunn’s request to interview the pathologists approved. This seemed to me to be a good idea at the time since the examination of the three pathologists by Arlen Specter was pretty much a joke. Clearly, Specter understood something was weird about the autopsy, so his examination of Humes, Boswell, and Finck actually defines the phrase “dog and pony show”.

    Secondly, although the HSCA had written a report and included a lot of their inquiry into the medical evidence in it, Robert Blakey had classified much of it. Therefore, once this was declassified, there would be more information with which to prepare depositions for the three autopsy doctors.

    Third, as I noted in my review of Volume II, there were some Dallas personnel who had not been formally deposed by the Warren Commission. So Gunn and Horne interviewed Nurse Bell, and Doctors Grossman and Crenshaw.

    But, by 1995, there had been quite an extensive record established of interviews with the rest of the Dallas treating physicians who were in the Parkland emergency room. In addition to the interviews done by the Warren Commission and the HSCA, these men had agreed to be interviewed both by the press and private researchers. And generally speaking, they had done this often. So the question then became: Could a compelling case be made for ‘clarification of the record’ with these subjects? I mean, the ARRB never even seriously considered interviewing Ruth and Michael Paine. Even though neither one had been deposed by the HSCA. And much evidence had surfaced in the interim that would seem to warrant a ‘clarification of the evidentiary record’.

    But Horne urged such a process. Further, he wanted the Dallas doctors interviewed before the Bethesda personnel. This, of course, was in keeping with what he perceives as the “Dallas Lens” vs. the “Bethesda Lens”. Which is the way one would probably structure a criminal inquiry, or the presentation of a court case. (Horne, p. 742) But the point to remember is this: The ARRB was not such an inquiry. Not by any means. For Gunn and Marwell to go just as far as they did in this field could have been construed as pushing the envelope.

    But something changed that made the Dallas excursion possible. David Marwell stepped down as Executive Director to take another job. (p. 743) Most of the staffers then thought Gunn would be promoted almost automatically. It actually took three weeks. (ibid) Horne notes that this betrays the fact that the Board was never completely comfortable with Gunn as they had been with Marwell. That probably owes to the fact that Marwell was never a critic of the official story. Gunn let it be known at a speech at Stanford University, he was. (See Probe Vol. 5 No. 5) In fact, according to Horne, Gunn had actually applied for the Executive Director’s job originally. But the Board was not interested in hiring him for any position. Once Marwell was installed, it was his idea to hire Gunn. (pp. 743-44) Gunn eventually became General Counsel and in that office he earned the enmity of three Board members. (Horne does not name them. But they most likely are the late Kermit Hall, Henry Graff, and Anna K. Nelson.) But once Marwell left, Gunn did not want to push the issue of deposing the Dallas doctors further with the Board.

    So Horne decided to do an end-run around Gunn. He wrote a memorandum to Gunn and PR officer Tom Samoluk, enclosing five blind copies for the Board members. Understandably, Gunn got angry with Horne. (p. 746) Samoluk and another staffer tried to arrange a peace meeting. This did not work, but Gunn stated something interesting and relevant at the time. He said that Anna Nelson had recommended against hiring Horne because he would try to solve the assassination. (ibid) Which Gunn evidently was beginning to think Horne was trying to do. (I would disagree with Gunn on this score. As Horne wrote in Volume I, he was actually trying to prove or disprove Best Evidence.)

    Samoluk’s attempt at reconciling the two failed. Horne writes that this was the end of the working relationship with Gunn.

    In light of what I already wrote about the prolific public record of the Dallas treating physicians, one really has to wonder why Horne did what he did. Jeremy Gunn went about as far as one could be expected to go in this regard. And if there is a guy I would like to talk to and try to have a candid conversation with on the Board, it is him. I can imagine the book he could write. Horne now has no relationship with the man. (ibid)

    Further, shortly after this imbroglio, Gunn decided to quit the ARRB. (p. 748) Horne is not specific about why. He just writes that he heard it was over a matter of principle and he actually tendered his resignation before he had secured another job. To say the least, it would have been interesting to know why Gunn left. As I noted in my review of Volume I, I really wish Horne had filled out this behind the scenes part of the book, because no one else has.

    It was decided to go ahead and interview some of the Dallas doctors. But there were three serious problems with the process. First, the – now rudderless – ARRB agreed to do the interview in Dallas, not Washington. Therefore, approval had to be granted to move the autopsy materials to Texas. The approval was denied. Horne points the figure for the failure at Archivist Steve Tilley who told reporter George Lardner, “I was the one who turned off the transportation of those autopsy photos with Burke Marshall.” (p. 741 Marshall is the Kennedy representative on the deed-of-gift who has to approve requests to see the autopsy materials.)

    Second, without Gunn at the helm, the ARRB was pretty much adrift at sea the last several months of its existence. There really was no attorney who was familiar enough with the autopsy issues to do the depositions. The new and final executive director, pretty much by default, was Laura Denk. Denk once told Horne that it really didn’t matter to her where the hole in Kennedy’s skull was located. (ibid) Which pretty much fulfills the original Board intent of hiring people who had no interest or aptitude about the subject.

    Third, because the Board had essentially run aground, Gunn had to be recalled to do the interviews. But now it was decided that it would be a group interview of five doctors: Robert McClelland, Paul Peters, Ronald C. Jones, Charles Baxter, and Malcolm Perry. Which is pretty much inexplicable. I mean with all the Board had dug up just about Malcolm Perry, you could have spent hours just interviewing him. But further, Gunn seemed to be just going through the motions now. He did not bring with him the bootleg versions of the autopsy photos and he did not ask the doctors to draw on a skull their version of the head wounds. (p. 755)

    But even with all those qualifiers, some interesting observations were recorded. Dr. Jones said he saw no damage on the right side of the head above the ear-which does exist on the autopsy photos. (p. 757) More than one witness saw a left temple wound. (ibid) Peters said he saw lacerated cerebellum through a hole in the rear of the skull. (p. 758-59) McClelland agreed with this blasted cerebellum observation. (p. 762) And Jones made a quite interesting comment. He said he did see a very small wound, which he thought was an entrance wound to the head. (p. 765) As I said, Gunn by now was just going through the motions. He didn’t follow up on this important detail in order to pin down the location and appearance.

    For me, the most fascinating vignette from this interview was offered up by Jones. Gunn asked the subjects if anyone tried to get them to alter their stories. (p. 769) A question to which Perry should have jumped up at. But it was Jones who gave the interesting answer. He said that during his interview with Arlen Specter, he alluded more than once to the throat wound being a wound of entry. Specter seemed to question his expertise with projectiles. When Jones stepped down, Specter followed him out into the hallway. He then said, “I want to tell you something that I don’t want you to say anything about. We have people who will testify that they saw the President shot from the front. You can always get people to testify about something. But we are pretty convinced he was shot from the back.” Jones said that the message was that although he may have thought the neck wound was an entrance, it wasn’t. And that was that. Jones replied that he was only 31 at the time, so he didn’t say anything about this exchange. But he did think it was unusual. (p. 770)

    I agree that it was. But he knew he could get away with it.

    III

    As Horne notes, the discussion of Gunn’s group interview ends Part 1 of the book, i.e., his review of the ARRB testimony. Part 2 is where Horne applies the work of the ARRB to describe as he calls it, “Fraud in the Evidence – A Pattern of Deception”. There are three chapters that deal with this in the volume: Chapters 10-12. The first is by far the best. In fact, it may be the highlight of the entire five volumes.

    In the summer of 1998, Horne completed a long memorandum at the behest of Jeremy Gunn. In examining the history (and mystery) of the fate of President Kennedy’s brain, Horne had come to some rather surprising and startling conclusions. This memo was released to the press and it created a small buzz. What Horne was postulating was two things. First, that there were actually two examinations of the brain, one of Kennedy’s actual brain and one with a substitute brain. Second, that the photos of Kennedy’s brain in the National Archives today depict this substitute brain, not Kennedy’s actual brain after the shooting.

    This memorandum gave Vincent Bugliosi an epileptic fit. As I noted in the first part of my review of Reclaiming History, since Bugliosi could come up with almost no new evidence to support the Warren Commission, he resorted to an extraordinary barrage of invective and insults in order to demonize and dehumanize the critics. Nowhere was that litany of belittlement more pronounced than in his discussion of Horne’s memo. He called it “obscenely irresponsible” and as Horne notes, that was actually the soft-edged part of the broadside. (Horne, p. 822) The problem with Bugliosi’s polemic in this regard is the problem with his entire book: He is wrong. Which is not to say that I agree with the entire Horne memorandum. I don’t. But when all is said and done, the weight of the evidence says that the pictures in the National Archives are not what they say they are. And that creates a huge problem for the purveyors of the official story. It’s a problem that, combined with David Mantik’s work on the x-rays, is fundamentally insurmountable.

    First, let me assess what I believe to be the strengths of Horne’s work on the subject. Let us begin with something simple to understand. As I just mentioned in my review of the Dallas doctors group interview with Gunn, physicians Jones and McClelland both said the cerebellum was lacerated. FBI agent Frank O’Neill said half the brain was gone. And that a significant portion of the brain was missing from the rear. (Horne, p. 797) Mortician Tom Robinson said that a large percentage of the brain was gone “in the back” and “that the portion of the brain that was missing was about the size of a closed fist. ” (Horne, p.. 814) Dr, Boswell, during his ARRB interview, said that about a third of the brain was missing. (David Mantik, “The Medical Evidence Decoded” in Murder In Dealey Plaza, edited by James Fetzer, p. 284) In an interview he gave in 1992 to the Journal of the American Medical Association, Jim Humes said that 2/3 of the right cerebrum was gone. (ibid) Floyd Reibe recalled for the ARRB that he saw the brain removed but there was only about half of it left. (op cit, Fetzer, p. 212, in Gary Aguilar “The Converging Medical Case for Conspiracy”) James Sibert commented that “you look at a picture, an anatomical picture of a brain and it’s all – there was nothing like that.” (William Law, In the Eye of History, p. 257) James Jenkins said the brain was so damaged on the underside that it was hard to introduce needles for perfusion with formalin. (Harrison Livingstone, High Treason II, p. 226))

    At Dallas’ Parkland Hospital Dr. Robert McClelland said that “probably a third or so, at least, of the brain tissue, posterior cerebral tissue and some of the cerebellar tissue had been blasted out.” (Robert Groden and Harrison Livingstone, High Treason, p. 42) Dr. Ronald Jones said that “as the president lay on the cart with what appeared to be some brain hanging out this wound with multiple pieces of skull next with the brain and with a tremendous amount of clot and blood.” (ibid) Dr. Perry described a gaping wound at the rear of the skull “exposing lacerated brain”. Further in his testimony before the Commission he states “there was severe laceration of underlying brain tissue.” (ibid, p. 47) Dr. Charles Carrico described an avulsive rear skull wound in which the brain had both cerebral and cerebellar shredded and macerated tissue. And this was exhibited both in the wounds and on the hanging skull fragments. (ibid p. 50) Before the body left, Nurse Diana Bowron packed the head wound with gauze squares at Parkland. She later recalled that much of the brain, about a half total from both sides, was gone. (Harrison Livingstone, Killing the Truth, p. 195)

    All the above is consistent with what we see on the Zapruder film: a terrific head explosion with matter ejecting high into the air. It is also consistent with the very first witnesses in and around the car. As we all know, Jackie Kennedy turned over pieces of her husband’s skull and brain to a doctor at Parkland Hospital. Motorcycle cops Martin and Hargis recall being splattered with blood and brain. (op cit, Groden and Livingstone, p. 231) As Horne will reveal in Volume 4, a Secret Service agent later recovered a piece of the brain from the car.

    Keeping all the above in mind about the extensive damage done, when one looks at the HSCA artist’s rendition of the existing brain, it is surprising to view a pretty much intact brain. (See Fetzer, p. 232) Even Earl Rose of the HSCA noted that the underside of this brain does not match the description of the head wound described by the pathologists (ibid. As we will see, there is a real question as to who shot the basilar, i.e., underneath, views of this brain) As David Mantik has written, there is minimal impact seen in the extant brain. There is some, but only some, impact seen in the right front. And even Dr. Humes was puzzled by this fact. Before the ARRB, he said, “…the structure which is on the right side of the brain appears to be intact – the cerebrum intact – and that’s not right, because it was not.” (ibid p. 264) And recall, that is the part of the extant brain that betrays impact. The rest is pretty much intact. So here you have a brain in the record whose appearance simply does not jibe with the evidence listed above, i.e., the witness testimony and the Zapruder film.

    Neither does its weight. Which is 1500 grams. This is startling. Because the average weight of a brain for a 40-49 year old male is 1350 grams. If one even allows for a period of formalin fixing afterwards, Kennedy’s brain actually has more volume to it than a normal brain. Even though it had been blasted away, went flying through the air, and landed on other people in Dealey Plaza. Now, what makes this mystery even more intriguing is that the brain was not weighed the night of the autopsy in Bethesda. (David Mantik and Cyril Wecht, “Paradoxes of the JFK Assassination: The Brian Enigma” in The Assassinations edited by James DiEugenio and Lisa Pease, p. 253) As Mantik and Wecht write, this is inexplicable. And in fact, according to Boswell’s ARRB testimony, he recalled that it actually was weighed. (ibid) It is hard to gauge which is worse: if it was done and the results eliminated, or if it was not done at all. One wonders if this was part of the annotated record that was later destroyed.

    The first date in the record for an actual weight is recorded by Pierre Finck. In a report he wrote for his military superiors in 1965, he wrote that the brain was weighed at 1500 grams on 11/29. (ibid, p. 255) And here another problem surfaces. For Humes said that Admiral George Burkley came out to Bethesda to get all the autopsy materials: “He told me the family wanted to inter the brain with the President ‘s body …” (ibid) So what was Finck looking at on 11/29? Humes realized this presented a problem so he changed his story later and said he gave the brain to Burkley within about ten days. (Horne, p. 829)

    Further, Humes never tendered any receipts for this transfer to either the Commission or the HSCA. (ibid) And as we all know, Burkley later deposited the brain with White House secretary Evelyn Lincoln, who turned it over to Angie Novello, Robert Kennedy’s secretary. So Humes’ story about turning over the brain to Burkley sometime before the funeral on 11/25 appears to be problematic. And he seemed to realize this himself. What makes the intrigue deeper is that Burkley wrote in 1978 that he wanted to do further examination of the brain. (ibid, p. 256) Also, if Burkley had retrieved the brain for interment, then how long could the brain have been fixed in formalin? At most, a bit over two days.

    Which leads to another problem: the purpose of formalin fixing is to section a brain to trace gunshot trajectories. According to Humes and Boswell this was not done. (Horne, p. 792) Which, again, is incredible in a gunshot to the head case. This may be why Humes first tried to say that Burkley called for the autopsy materials early. He may have thought this could be his excuse for the lack of sectioning, not realizing it created other problems for him.

    The other problem is that photographer John Stringer said the brain was sectioned. (ibid) He said he recalled this since he photographed it. The problem is that under examination by the ARRB Stringer just about wrecked the thesis that it was he who took any archival pictures of the brain. First, as mentioned in Part 1, Stringer said he took no basilar views of the brain – but there are such underneath shots in the archives. He also said there were identification tags used in such shots. There are none in these photographs. (Horne, p. 806) Jeremy Gunn then asked him if based on those facts would he be able to identify the photographs before him as photographs of the brain of President Kennedy? Stringer said, “No, I couldn’t say that they were President Kennedy’s … All I know is, I gave everything to Jim Humes, and he gave them to Admiral Burkley.” (ibid.)

    It then got worse. Stringer had identified to Gunn the types of film he used for both black and white and color pictures. The type of film used in the brain photos is Ansco. Stringer was genuinely puzzled when he discovered this because not only was it the wrong film, but it was used in a photographic technique called a press pack, which he did not use. This was betrayed by a series number in the pictures, something which Stringer was almost stunned to see. (Horne, pp. 807-08) Stringer also did not recognize the film used in the color shots of the brain either. (ibid, p. 809) And, of course, there were no photos of the brain as being sectioned. What is most puzzling about this last is that Stringer remembered photographing the sections using a light box. (p. 810)

    To put it mildly, something is rotten in Denmark. When the pictures of an intact brain do not correspond to what the nurse who packed the skull in gauze packages recalled – along with about ten other witnesses – something is up. When Humes’ story about when he surrendered the brain to Burkley keeps on changing, something is up. When Humes and Boswell say the brain was not sectioned, but the guy who shot the sections says it was, something is up. And when that photographer who says he shot the photos, denies the photos in the Archives are his, then you have a real problem.

    As I said, I don’t agree with everything that Horne wrote in this chapter. But I agree with enough of it to grant him his major point: The pictures of the brain in the National Archives are not of President Kennedy’s brain. And they therefore do not depict that actual damage done to his skull during the assassination. I believe the evidence for this is so powerful that it could be used in a court of law. And it is a strong indication of a national security cover-up.

    IV

    The next chapter in his Fraud in the Evidence section is entitled “The Autopsy Report – A Botched Cover Up”. In this chapter Horne essentially tries to show something that many people have suspected and even written about. In fact, I wrote about it in Part IV of my Reclaiming History review. Namely that the autopsy report was an evolving document that was not actually supposed to register the findings made at Bethesda that night. It was actually meant to disguise what the actual observations were.

    Horne begins by enumerating all the serious problems with the actual autopsy procedure, e.g., the hair was not shaved, no proper labeling of pictures, clothing not checked by doctors etc. Even Michael Baden has noted just how bad it was. (pp. 845-46) Then after noting all this, he writes that the autopsy report in evidence, CE 387, is not the first version of the report. Which, of course, we know through Jeremy Gunn’s examination of Humes. For Humes admitted that he burned not just his notes, but also the first draft of the report.

    Horne is going to count the Sibert-O’Neill report as his first draft of the autopsy protocol. I guess this will suffice, but there are some problems with doing so. First, the two FBI agents left that evening. So they had no consultation with the doctors afterwards and no consultation with their paperwork. They were also not privy to any of the work done afterwards on the body, like the supplemental report.

    But even though it lacks detail and depth and technical expertise, we can grant Horne this step. Simply because whatever the failings of these two FBI agents, they are much more honest men than the pathologists. And we can see from above that they do not go along with either the Single Bullet Theory, or the intact back of the skull photos. At this point in the evolution of the autopsy, the back wound bullet had fallen out through cardiac massage.

    This idea, that the back wound was a non-transiting wound was short lived. Horne says it didn’t last long because “after the FBI agents left the Bethesda Morgue, the pathologists established communication with Dr. Perry about the bullet wound he observed in the anterior neck…” (p. 851) Horne says that Humes always stated that this did not happen until Saturday, but this is not credible today. I agree. There is just too much testimony today to indicate that this was a cover story. And Horne points it all out. (pp. 851-854)

    Horne makes a kind of odd choice for his second draft of the report. He wants to use the HSCA testimony of Richard Lipsey, aide to General Wehle, as an interim report. This is problematic since Lipsey’s testimony is oral testimony many years after the fact. Horne wants to use him because he told the HSCA that Kennedy was shot three times from behind. The FBI report says Kennedy was shot twice. (p. 857) According to Lipsey, the anterior neck wound was never a tracheotomy but known as a bullet wound of exit.

    What is interesting about Lipsey’s testimony is that he allows for two entrance wounds on the neck. One up high, near the hairline, which exited the throat. A second one very low, or in the upper back. The first trajectory is one which people like Milicent Cranor and Pat Speer have written about as being possible. (See Cranor’s article in The Kennedy Assassination Chronicles, Summer 1999 issue, entitled “The Third Wound”.)

    Image courtesy Pat Speer

     

    Lipsey’s version was then revised. Why? Horne says that it was because of the news of the hit to James Tague – which would have then given us four bullets. (p. 863) There was no footnote to this. And I found both the mention and the lack of footnoting puzzling. Because the time period the author is talking about is early morning on the 23rd. This is how Horne informs us: by the time the autopsy report was reviewed on the 23rd, “the entire nation, and indeed the world, had become aware one shot had missed, and had wounded bystander James Tague in the cheek, after striking a curb on Main Street In Dealey Plaza.” (p. 863 Let me add, that the lack of footnotes in parts of the book where Horne is making a presentation, rather than in quoting ARRB testimony, is a bit of a problem for his book. Just as the book has no index, it has no End Note section either. Horne lists the few he does use on the page, but there are many things that go unnoted and also, at times, he gives us very general references, like to a whole book.)

    Now, one of the best pieces of reporting in the critical literature on the Tague hit is Gerald McKnight’s sterling volume Breach of Trust. If you read the two parts of that book which deal with the issue, you will see that what Horne is talking about seems highly improbable, if not impossible. (McKnight, pp.97-98, 228-33) The simple fact being that the Tague bullet strike was kept under wraps by the FBI. In fact, it was not even mentioned in the FBI report of December 9th. As far as media exposure goes, there was one story about it in the Dallas papers over the weekend. So what Horne is describing, “the entire nation and indeed the world” knowing about Tague, this is just plain wrong. Which brings into question his whole line of argument here. Was Lipsey’s testimony ever really an autopsy report version? If so, then what is the real reason it was altered? Horne’s thesis about Lipsey may or may not be true. Yet Lipsey’s bullet above the hairline, at a slightly different place than where the doctors placed it, seems to be an accurate observation. But if this is so, it may be that the location of this wound changed simply to make the head exit wound more viable. As I explained in Part 4 of my review of Reclaiming History, the location of this wound has always been a problem for an exit high on the right side of the head above the ear. This actual location, since it is slightly lower, makes it even more of one. And it may be that the pathologists juggled this location later in order to ameliorate that problem. Because the other two locations for an entrance wound are problematic, since it is difficult to discern an entrance with the naked eye looking at normal sized photos.

    Horne then says that the pathologists first tried to explain the throat wound as a fragment from the head shot. (pp. 864-65) He bases this on a transcript from an executive session hearing of the Commission. This is the quote by J. Lee Rankin, “We have an explanation there in the autopsy that probably a fragment came out the front of the neck …” This is from a January 27, 1964 meeting, way after all parts of the autopsy protocol had been submitted. And Rankin is talking about other problems in the medical evidence here, like the back wound not lining up with the throat wound. Horne goes on to say that this excerpt of a sentence reveals Rankin’s apparent knowledge of “two separate and conflicting autopsy report explanations for the bullet wound in the throat.” Again, to me, this is an overstatement. We don’t know where Rankin got his “fragment theory” from. Is Horne actually saying that Humes forwarded to the Commission two autopsy protocols and said, “Pick the one you want. And then read parts of the one you discard into the record.” Highly unlikely. Rankin’s quote is an interesting one. In fact, some people, like Josiah Thompson used this idea. But to say it reveals what Horne says it does is, for me, a stretch.

    Horne then slips back onto more solid ground. In his discussion of Humes’ testimony before the HSCA about the initial writing of his report and his destruction of it, Horne makes a good case that Humes lied, and the HSCA let him get away with it in public. First, as established by two witnesses, Humes had a report during the day on Saturday, so he could not have composed it on Saturday night as he told the Committee. (Horne, p. 867) Secondly, he told the HSCA that he incinerated only his notes. But he actually burned both the notes and a first draft. (ibid, p. 868)

    The timing of this burning appears to be Sunday morning. (See Horne, Volume I, pp.94-96) Which is interesting. Because the reason for the destruction of the notes and the report may be the killing of Oswald by Ruby. More than one author, including Horne, has made a case for this. Realizing that no sharp defense lawyer was going to check his report against his notes, Humes may have felt free enough to discard both of them. And then to rewrite a document that was not bound by either. Humes also lied here about the reason for the burning. He told the HSCA that he did not want the bloodstained notes to end up in the hands of a meretricious souvenir hunter. The problem is the first draft had no blood on it since he wrote it at his home. (ibid, p. 96) Clearly, Humes was being dodgy about this entire issue. Which usually indicates the witness is concealing something.

    For some reason, Horne does not follow the chronology of this revised draft. According to Gerald McKnight, parts of this were rewritten in the office of Admiral Galloway. (McKnight, p. 163) According to the HSCA testimony of Pierre Finck, all three pathologists were in Galloway’s office on this occasion. And they all ended up signing the end result. (ibid, p. 410) McKnight notes that the changes made in this version in Galloway’s office all align with the official story. For instance, “Three shots were heard and the President fell forward.” When we know the Zapruder film depicts Kennedy rocketing backward. But further, the ARRB let Humes get away with the statement that the autopsy report in the record today is based upon the notes also in the record. This cannot be true. As McKnight notes, 70% of the “facts and statements in the final autopsy draft do not appear in any published government records.” (ibid, p. 166) Now the autopsy in evidence was checked in at around 6 PM on the 24th. (ibid, p. 162) On November 26th Admiral Burkley sent it to the Secret Service. The question then becomes: What were these facts based upon if they are not in the extant notes? I was sorry to see that Horne did not address this important point. Because Humes said something interesting in this regard to Jeremy Gunn. When caught in his web of deceit about the burning, he said, “I don’t know what was the matter with it, or whether I even ever did that.” (ibid, p. 165) Did Humes preserve the notes and burn the draft instead? Realizing that later revisions would need to be based upon them? If so, someone else deep-sixed the notes.

    What Horne does with the rest of this is, to me, questionable. In a rather weird argument, he goes back to the Rankin quote and then says that the “head fragment theory” was abandoned because of the Zapruder film. He bases this on Kennedy’s hands going to his neck before the head shot. (p. 873) I didn’t quite comprehend this argument. First, what was the evidence that the pathologists or Galloway saw the film before the 24th? If such evidence exists, Horne should have produced it. Second, can anyone see the neck wound on Kennedy at this instant in the film? If not, then this probably is not the reason it was abandoned, if it was ever really entertained.

    Finally, Horne tries to advance one last argument for saying that two versions of an autopsy report were submitted to the Commission. He says that in addition to the autopsy materials submitted to the National Archives by the Secret Service, there was a memorandum noting another report in the 1966 Kennedy deed of gift. (Horne, p. 875) But this was one of the items not available when the transfer was made. The problem with Horne spending so much time on this is that there is no credible evidence that this was a different version than what the Secret Service had and turned over to the Archives. Admiral Burkley handled the autopsy materials that went to the Secret Service and the Kennedys. Are we to believe that he handed the former group one autopsy report, and then gave the Kennedys a different one? And that before making such a huge faux pas, that he never bothered to check if they were the same?

    I agree with Horne that the autopsy protocol was an evolving document that would be very hard to defend in court. In fact, it would be quite vulnerable to attack on the grounds that it changed under special circumstances. I just don’t agree with some of the circumstances he adduces.

    V

    The last chapter of this volume is Chapter 12. It is entitled “The Autopsy Photographs and X-rays Explained”. In this, and the beginning chapter of Volume IV, Horne is going to try and explain what happened at the morgue, and in Dealey Plaza. Whenever someone tries to do this in the detail Horne does, it always puts me off. Simply because, lacking a detailed confession, one has to assume and speculate about certain things; Horne calls it “intelligent speculation”. (p. 909) In this day and age, I would prefer an author stick only with things about which he can be either sure, or fairly sure about. But allowing for that, there are three items of value in these last 100 pages.

    The first is a topic that has been reviewed by two other writers in the field, namely Pat Speer and David Mantik. In my review of Speer’s video, I discussed his pungent comments on a highly controversial photo in the autopsy collection. (Click here.) That photo is sometimes called F8, or the Mystery Photo. Horne here calls it the Open Cranium photo. The reason it’s called the Mystery Photo is that it is one of the worst autopsy pictures ever composed or shot. It is shot from such a bad angle and distance that it is hard to figure what one is looking at. But the clear consensus in the critical community today is that the photo depicts the back of Kennedy’s skull with the scalp refracted. As Speer well illustrated, Michael Baden of the HSCA lectured the public about this photo by saying it depicted a beveled wound of exit. The problem is that both the original pathologists and the panel appointed by Ramsey Clark both said that there was no wound at the point Baden was talking about. In fact, Baden was so lost in orienting the picture that he placed it upside down on the easel during his lecture.

    Horne notes the HSCA’s insistence at orienting this photo as frontal bone. Even when autopsy photographer John Stringer told them that Baden had oriented it incorrectly. (Horne, p. 900) Why all this Keystone Kops fumbling about? Because if the picture is oriented properly, that is as the rear of the skull, there goes the official story. Since it depicts external beveling, then the wound was made by a bullet from the front. What makes it even worse for the likes of Baden is that, back in 1966, when pathologists Humes and Boswell were classifying the photos for something called a Military Review, they labeled it as depicting the posterior of Kennedy’s skull! So in other words, the photographer and the original pathologists both say it is taken from the rear. But since it clashes with the Krazy Kid Oswald fantasy, this cannot stand.

    In Speer’s video, he notes about four pieces of photographic evidence that strongly indicates the picture is taken from behind. In Jim Fetzer’s Murder in Dealey Plaza, David Mantik uses the Harper fragment, the x-rays, and an anatomic landmark in the color photos, to show the same, i.e., the photo is taken from the rear. (Horne, pp. 917-18) In addition, Admiral Burkley told author Michael Kurtz that the posterior skull wound had all the appearances of an exit. (Horne, p. 927) Today, it seems to me quite difficult to argue Baden’s point of view. Baden’s insistence shows just how much he had discarded logic and evidence once Bob Tanenbaum had left the HSCA and the Blakey-Cornwell regime was installed.

    Horne includes an exchange between Allen Dulles and James Humes to illustrate the paradoxes that this photo holds. Dulles essentially asked Humes if the exit wound in the skull must have originated from the rear, that it could not have come from the front or side. (Horne, p. 922) Humes replied with one of the most bewildering and enigmatic answers in the volumes. He said, “Scientifically, sir, it is impossible for it to have been fired from other than behind. Or to have exited from other than behind.”

    What on earth does this mean? If taken literally, Humes seems to be saying that the shot came in and exited at the same point. Which is not possible. Does he mean, as many critics suspect, that the exiting point for a frontal shot became an entrance point for a rear shot? If so, that might be an obtuse way of explaining this photo.

    A second point developed in this chapter that is worth noting takes us back to Best Evidence country. As the reader will note, in his book, David Lifton postulated that all the shots came from the front. This gave the author a problem, in the sense that he now had to explain the physical evidence for shots from the rear. Lifton came up with the “puncture thesis”. That is, holes were battered into the body, including the back wound. In addition to the problem I mentioned in Part One, with the testimony of Dr. Robert Shaw about John Connally’s wounds, there is also the inconvenient eyewitness testimony about a back wound. This would include people like Secret Service agent Glen Bennett and Nurse Diana Bowron. In spite of this testimony, Horne stays true to his friend David Lifton. Horne writes that the back wound visible in the photos “could be a man-made puncture, inflicted upon the body after the conclusion of the autopsy to fool the camera.” (p. 985)

    But this is only the beginning of Horne’s puncture trail. The ARRB had the autopsy photos enhanced and digitalized. In gazing at these new reproductions, Horne came to the conclusion that the famous “white spot” at the bottom of the photo, well Horne saw a puncture there also. This is how he explains it: “I believe this puncture was man-made – a deliberate, cynical act of forgery on the body of the President instituted after the formal end of the autopsy…” (p. 911)

    And so is the “red spot”. This is the place in the upper part of the skull where most people see what they think is a spot of dried blood. The HSCA used this as their new entrance wound, replacing the one at the bottom of the skull that the pathologists designated. Well, Horne sees a puncture up there too: “I think the “Red Spot” in the cowlick is also a man-made puncture … because the conspirators managing the cover up were trying to solve several problems with one set of photos created after midnight.” (ibid. Need I add, Horne also believes Kennedy’s had was also battered pre-autopsy.)

    Horne believes the actual entrance wound is 2.5 centimeters to the right and only slightly above the external occipital protuberance. According to the author, the punctures were all the result of confusion in the conspiracy. (p. 912) No comment.

    I’ve saved what I think is something of real and lasting value for last. It does not originate with Horne but he wisely chose to include it in this volume. Although I think he erred by not including it in the previous chapter about the evolution of the autopsy report. Author Michael Kurtz interviewed Dr. Robert Canada, the commanding officer at Bethesda, in 1968. Canada told him that he observed a gaping wound in the lower right portion of Kennedy’s skull at autopsy. He said it was clearly an exit wound because the bone had exploded outward. Kurtz replied that this was at odds with the official autopsy report, which mentioned only a small entrance wound in the rear of the skull. Dr. Canada told Kurtz that “the document had to be rewritten to conform to the lone assassin thesis … Dr. Canada insisted that the contents of this interview be kept secret until at least a quarter century after his death.” (Horne pp. 927-28) In keeping with Canada’s wishes, Kurtz did not write about it until 2006 in his book The JFK Assassination Debates.

    Needless to say, if Canada was telling the truth – which his 25 year embargo strongly indicates was the case – this bombshell revelation tells us just about all we need to know about the autopsy report in our hands today. It is a piece of fiction. And the pictures accompanying it were either altered or posed. And the men involved were intimidated into going along with a cover-up over the death of their Commander-in-Chief.

    Canada was loyal to the end, and 25 years beyond that.


    Volumes Four and Five

    I almost don’t want to review the last two volumes of Doug Horne’s series entitled Inside the ARRB. For more than one reason. First of all, although this series is supposed to be about the medical evidence and testimony adduced by the Assassination Records Review Board, these last two volumes don’t really come under that rubric.

    Volume IV has two chapters in it. Chapter 13 is entitled “What Really Happened at the Bethesda Morgue (And in Dealey Plaza)?” This is where Horne tries to theorize as to what actually happened during the autopsy and from there, what was the real firing sequence and angles in the Dealey Plaza. Chapter 14 is entitled, “The Zapruder Film Mystery,” and this relates only tangentially to the new medical testimony and declassified files of the ARRB. Volume V deals with what Horne calls “The Political Context of the Assassination”. And this really has absolutely nothing to do with the medical inquiry conducted for the ARRB by Horne and Jeremy Gunn. So in these two volumes, I think Horne has gone astray from what his subject matter is supposed to be about, and what is of real value in the book.

    As noted in my previous three reviews, the book does have real value. But its value is in what Horne and Gunn discovered in their probe of the medical evidence. Here the author is largely stepping outside that boundary. The purpose of that is questionable. And in my view, in addition to losing its raison d’être, the series loses a lot of its steam.

    I

    As I mentioned above, much of Chapter 13 is given to a reconstruction of what Horne thinks happened both in Dealey Plaza and at the morgue. I could find very little of any new importance here. But there is one exception. That was an interview that Horne did with Secret Service agent Floyd Boring.

    Boring began the interview with a rather bracing general declaration: “I didn’t have anything to do with it, and I don’t know anything.” (p. 1096) Horne describes this as an “attention-getter,” which it was. It was Boring who was supposed to have turned over the fragments found in the front area of the car to the FBI. Yet oddly, he at first denied inspecting the Presidential limousine. He then said he did, but did not recall when he did it: if it happened the evening of the 22nd or the next day. But further, he had no recollection of finding any bullet fragments in the car. (p. 1097) Horne handed him SA Frazier’s testimony describing this episode, but Boring’s memory was not refreshed. Horne speculates as to why Boring said this. It may be that he thought the ARRB was conducting an investigation into whether or not the fragments had been planted, and he wanted to avoid being a target of inquiry. (p. 1098)

    But Boring really got interesting when he discussed his search of the follow-up car, sometimes called the “Queen Mary”. Completely unprompted by Horne, the witness told him that “he had discovered a piece of bone skull with brain attached in the footwell just in front of the back seat bench….” (p. 1097) He estimated it about 1 x 2 inches in size. He did not write this up and did not know the final disposition of this material. When Horne tried to correct him about where he found it, Boring insisted it was in the follow-up car. Which would be just about proof positive that Kennedy was hit from the front.

    And someone must have told Boring that after the interview. For as Horne further notes, something weird happened after the Boring interview. Something that Horne says never happened to him during his tenure at the ARRB. Boring called him back the next day. He now said he could not have found the skull debris in the ‘Queen Mary,’ it had to have been in the presidential limo. (p. 1099) This retraction convinced Horne that someone had debriefed Boring after the ARRB interview.

    A similar reversal happened with the heir to Admiral George Burkley. But this episode I had heard about before. Jeremy Gunn wanted to get Nancy Denlea, Burkley’s daughter and the executor of his estate, to sign a waiver to let the ARRB peruse the deceased admiral’s files at his attorney’s office for evidence. She agreed to this at first. So the ARRB sent her the written waiver. But she later called back and told counsel Jeremy Gunn she had changed her mind and would not sign. Again, Horne wonders if someone got to her. (p. 1054)

    As most readers of The Assassinations (by Lisa Pease and myself) know, Robert Kennedy ultimately OK’d the dispersal of the Dallas casket into the ocean, a military dump off the Delaware-Maryland coast. (DiEugenio and Pease, p. 268) Well, skipping back into his Best Evidence mode, the author now tries to insinuate that somehow this was a deliberate and willful act done by RFK to somehow conceal the true facts of his brother’s murder. (pp. 1057-1062) Yep. that’s what he does. He actually says the casket was destroyed by RFK. Yet, in the documents Jim Lesar has collected at the AARC, this does not appear to be the case.

    The movement to dump the casket was begun by the fact that Nicolas Katzenbach and Lawson Knott of General Services Administration were getting pressure from an associate of William Manchester and also from former Dallas mayor Earle Cabell. Cabell claimed to be outraged by the morbid curiosity attached to the object. (Letter from Cabell to Katzenbach, 9/13/65) Since he was now in congress, Cabell was probably sensitive to the fact that the casket drew attention to his city. Manchester was threatening to write about in 1968 – a threat which Kennedy did not appreciate. (Call between Knott and RFK 2/3/66) No one involved believed it had any value as evidence. So upon the recommendations of Katzenbach and Knott, Kennedy agreed to have the casket disposed of. Period.

    Horne equates all this to RFK somehow being the prime engineer behind the casket’s disposal. Why would RFK be a participant in this diabolical effort? Not because of the pressure described above. No. According to Horne, it is because the casket had the potential to explode the medical cover up! (p. 1057) To me, this leap – and that is what it is – is completely unwarranted, perhaps a wee bit goofy. I mean, in 1966, Lifton had not published Best Evidence. He was still in his Ramparts days, that is, doing essays that resembled the work of Josiah Thompson. Without that impetus, how RFK could then divine such a thing as the casket’s importance in Lifton’s future book is completely illogical – since no one had written about it at the time. But how Horne can somehow fathom that Kennedy understood all that anyway – despite the fact that there is no reference to such a thing in the literature at the time – well, that is a mystery for the ages.

    But Horne goes even farther. He holds out the possibility that the missing autopsy materials – the brain, tissue slides, etc. – may have been deep-sixed inside the original casket. (p. 1061) He even says that if there is no record of these materials being dumped with the casket – and there is not – then perhaps RFK relayed a message to the Chief of Naval Operations not to include it in the inventory. (ibid)

    This is what I mean about Horne needing an editor. First of all, although there is circumstantial evidence, there is no proof that it was indeed RFK who seized these materials. We simply do not know that with any real certainty. But second of all, if he did, it may not be that his intent was to cover anything up. It may have been just the opposite. One of the most interesting parts of David Talbot’s book Brothers, is that he reveals that RFK never believed the Krazy Kid Oswald story. Not for one instant. And from the beginning, he was sending out feelers to try and comprehend what really happened in Dallas. One of the things he was interested in was the physical evidence that “he thought might be vital in a credible investigation in the future – that is, one under his control.” (Talbot, p. 16)

    Roger Feinman also believes this may be the case. Let me quote him at length in this regard:

    Two different sets of photos of JFK’s mortal remains were prepared on the night of November 22-23, 1963. They were taken by different photographers and developed at different times. One set was developed on Saturday, November 23, the other not until Wednesday, November 27, after Oswald and Kennedy had been buried. The set that was developed first anticipated public disclosure in the event of a trial of the accused assassin. The set that was developed second was never supposed to see the light of day. Yet a third set, of an isolated formalin-fixed brain that carried no identifying information, was taken and developed later in conjunction with the purported supplemental procedure. The collection of photos that was ultimately deposited in the National Archives pursuant to a “deed of gift” from Robert and Jacqueline Kennedy, dated October 31, 1966, was culled from the totality of this source material, albeit who did the culling and for what purpose remain a mystery.

    The available historical record implies that Robert Kennedy authorized an independent medical evaluation of whatever materials actually wound up in his possession, custody or control. But because the ARRB, guided by Douglas Horne in consultation with author David Lifton and a handful of other conspiracy advocates, were preoccupied by theories of body alteration and photo fakery, intimates of the Kennedy family and its closest allies were never pressed by the Review Board to clarify exactly how the materials were handled, and by whom, so that a complete documentary trail could be established and responsibility for any suppression justly assigned. Therefore, Mr. Horne’s speculations notwithstanding, any imputation of a cover-up to the Kennedys is not yet warranted. Their silence should not be taken as acquiescence in the official autopsy results; it may just as plausibly reflect unease and uncertainty.

    The ARRB’s so-called “investigation” of the medical evidence was slipshod and fueled by a fervor for theories rather than a dispassionate and objective unraveling of the facts. I ascribe most of this failure to staff lawyers Jeremy Gunn and his predecessor as executive director, David Marwell, who should have known better than to give rein to a group of amateur detectives. I am particularly appalled by Mr. Gunn’s utter waste of the ARRB’s limited resources in the pointless persecution of Robert Groden, which yielded nothing of any tangible value either to the Board or to the historical record. They would have done far better to compile the areas of interest for formal investigation beyond the scope of the ARRB’s mandate, competence, and budget, and to present a compelling brief for further congressional oversight and follow-up that could not have been ignored without invoking a public outcry.

    This leads to another issue. One that I was quite curious about. As previously mentioned, this was not the first time that Horne had floated this idea that Bobby Kennedy had a role in the cover up. Which is an idea that has been surfaced by the likes of Gus Russo before, but has never been able to attain any credibility, since there has never been any evidence for it. I mean, try and find any way that Bobby Kennedy had a hand in the Warren Commission proceedings. Well, I kept reading and reading in order to find some kind of key to why Horne had joined in the “RFK as part of the cover-up” ranks. I finally found it in Volume 5. Not surprisingly, it’s David Lifton.

    Horne has gotten a look at one of the working drafts of Lifton’s long awaited biography of Oswald. He praises the book as presenting a persuasive case that the plot not only took out Kennedy, but the cover story about Oswald built in a fail-safe point against RFK. Namely that by making Oswald into a Castro sympathizer, Kennedy’s murder could be perceived as retaliation for the CIA plots to kill Castro. In which Horne thinks RFK was involved; in spite of the CIA Inspector General Report on this matter which exonerates both brothers. (pp. 1666-67) From other sources, I understand that Lifton was influenced by Joan Mellen’s thesis about RFK in A Farewell to Justice. How and why he should be so influenced is a mystery to me. (Click here for my review.) But apparently Horne then accepts this hoary, specious idea.

    II

    As I alluded to above, I take reconstructions of what happened in Dealey Plaza with a grain of salt. I feel that one researcher’s version is as good – or bad – as the next. I only even blink when something wild is written. Well, with Horne I blinked. More than once. First, he postulates five shots to the head, three from the front. (pp. 1150, 1153-54) This, to me, is incredible. In fact, I have never read of such a thing. And in keeping with his Murder from Within thesis, he writes that “The very unpleasant and tentative possibility exists that limousine driver William Greer fired a fourth head shot into the President’s left temple with his revolver.”

    I don’t understand this. There is no evidence for this in the Zapruder film. There is no evidence for this in any picture I have ever seen. The single bit of testimony used most often to bolster it is the 11/22/63 affidavit of Hugh Betzner. In this affidavit, Betzner states he was shooting pictures when he “heard a loud noise” he thought was a firecracker. He then heard another loud noise. He then saw a “flash of pink” standing up and then sitting back down. (This is obviously Jackie Kennedy reaching out to the trunk of the car, after frame 313 and the head explosion.) He then writes that he saw, in either the limousine or the following car, someone with a rifle and someone in the limousine, or around the limo, with a handgun. He then said that the car disappeared beneath the underpass. And this is the best Horne can do in this regard. (He tries Jean Hill, but her affidavit is even less definite as to location than Betzner’s.)

    To me, and to most, it’s not nearly enough. Besides the fact that the time frame by Betzner is ambiguous as to when he saw this happen, to have any credibility at all, it would seem to have to occur within the firing sequence of around Z frames 190-325. Not only does the affidavit seem to say it took place after that, but if it did take place at those frames, why on earth did no one else see it? Especially when the car was so close to so many witnesses on the grassy knoll? To me, to say they did not see it is sort of like all those witnesses in the pantry of the Ambassador Hotel who did not see Sirhan get his handgun to the back of Robert Kennedy’s skull. But in this case they missed a guy with a rifle also.

    Furthermore, there is the matter of how this murderous scenario could have been presented to Greer. He had to have known that he was going to be driving a motorcade in the midst of crowds on both sides of him. Consequently, there would be at least scores of witnesses to him turning around and shooting Kennedy. In addition, he had to understand that many of these people would have Kodaks and also movie cameras to capture the moment. So therefore, it would not just be eyewitness testimony – there could be photos and films to prove his treachery. Further, he also knew there would be some law enforcement agents along the path that probably were not involved in the plot. If one of them saw him, and arrested him, and later a photo or film was adduced, Greer would be lost. And for what? Dealey Plaza provided an ideal ambush location for what snipers call an L shaped trap. So how could either the plotters or Greer possibly be convinced to go along with a scenario that was so high-risk for both of them? When it was so unnecessary. This is what I mean about Horne needing an editor. He apparently never thought of any of this.

    There is one other thing that I wish to note about Chapter 13. And I think this will provide some insight into where Horne is coming from. The author devotes several pages to a statement by Josiah Thompson from 1988 and a speech Thompson made in 1993. (pp. 1132-1138) I was aware of both of these. And unlike Horne, I saw the speech in person in 1993, rather than watching it on DVD. In 1988, for a PBS Nova program, Thompson made the following comments: “In a homicide case, you get a convergence of the evidence after a while. There may be discrepancies in detail; but on the whole, things come together. With this case – it’s now 25 years – things haven’t gotten any simpler. They haven’t come together. If anything, they’ve become more problematical, more and more mysterious. That just isn’t the way a homicide case develops.” (Horne, p. 1133)

    In 1993 at a conference in Chicago, Thompson repeated and amplified on these remarks. He said that it is easy to wreck the Magic Bullet fantasy. But it is much harder to say what actually happened in those six seconds in Dealey Plaza. Further, he said that in most cases – Thompson is now a private investigator – the actual circumstances of the crime are never in doubt. Not like this one. Horne then writes that this speech “really lit a fire under my ass.” (p. 1135) He then writes that this was one of the major reasons he joined up with the ARRB. In order to clear up some of the ambiguities in the record so these uncertainties would be removed. He also says that the reason he felt much of this murkiness existed was because of tainted evidence, and fraud in the record. (ibid)

    As I said, I was actually in the audience when Thompson made this speech in Chicago. I had a quite different reaction than Horne’s. It did not light any fire underneath my behind. Quite the contrary. I was disappointed in both the content and tenor of Thompson’s remarks. And so were many others. Thompson was essentially saying that we were no closer to resolving this case than we were in 1967, when his book came out. In fact, we might be further away. (Horne, p. 1134) I strongly disagreed with this evaluation. And I don’t understand why Thompson said it. It is something that might have been scripted by the likes of Paul Hoch or Robert Blakey. And I don’t associate Thompson with either of those men. If you compare the state of the knowledge database in 1993 with 1967, to say there was not a ton of progress made is just plain wrong. It is to deny the contributions of writers like Henry Hurt, George Michael Evica, Howard Roffman, and Tony Summers (among others). It is to say that the investigation of Jim Garrison produced nothing of any evidentiary value. Which is ridiculous. To name just two things of the utmost importance: that inquest revealed the Clinton-Jackson incident, and it uncovered why Oswald was at 544 Camp Street. Even though, at the time, the roles and characters of people like the Paines, David Phillips, and J. Edgar Hoover had not been completely filled in, we clearly had enough information to understand approximately who they were. And through the 1969 testimony of Pierre Finck in New Orleans, we had gained valuable insight into why the autopsy on JFK was so poor. I could go on and on, but I did not accept Thompson’s thesis to any real degree.

    I also did not agree with Horne’s major reason why he agreed with this flawed thesis, i.e., fraud in the evidence. Let me say first, there is no doubt that this occurred. And elsewhere, I have noted it. And Horne has pointed some of it out. But to me, this was not the real reason why the case was so unresolved (if one really believed that). To me, the real reason was the cover-up that took place almost immediately by those in charge of the inquiry. This would be, in order: the Dallas Police, the FBI, and the Warren Commission. If this would not have happened, the case would not be so murky. Just to take one example, if Oswald had lived to stand trial, who knows what would have happened? If someone other than Hoover had been in charge at the FBI, he may have cracked open the case. If Earl Warren had been allowed to chose Warren Olney as his Chief Counsel, again, things may have been different.

    One thing that has become obvious since the releases of the ARRB, is that no real investigation was going to happen. (And the Powers That Be were not going to let Jim Garrison proceed unimpeded either.) One reason being that the cover up was built into the conspiracy. And unlike Horne, Lifton, and Joan Mellen – who somehow blame RFK for this – I believe the three telltale signs of this plan were all exhibited on that very day: 1.) The murder of Tippit; 2.) The Mexico City charade about Oswald, the Cubans, and Russians; and 3.) The unbelievable control exhibited by the military at the autopsy.

    The first made sure the DPD would do all they could to railroad that “cop-killer” Oswald. The second ensured that the national security state would go into CYA mode about Oswald’s alleged dealings with the Russians and Cubans on the eve of the assassination. The third took away any possibility that the true circumstances of how Kennedy was actually killed would ever be revealed.

    So to say we were no closer to what happened in 1993 than in 1967, I believe was just wrong. Although I like Tink Thompson and think his book is still a good one, I didn’t agree with what he said at all. To his credit, I think he has changed his tune today.

    III

    Chapter 14 is Horne’s very long essay on the Zapruder film. How long is it? Try almost 300 pages – 292 to be exact.

    Before I get started, let me indicate where I am on this bitterly contested issue. I am an agnostic on this point. For three reasons. First, although there is some interesting stuff out there, I have not seen any overwhelming evidence that convinces me the film has been altered. Second, to me this dispute has the elements of an unnecessary sideshow. Because the film itself contains a variety of evidence revealing a conspiracy. To deny this is to deny reality. The two times the film was shown to a mass audience (i.e., in 1975 on ABC television network, and in 1991 via Oliver Stone’s film JFK), its effect was overpowering. Third, to argue that the film has been altered necessitates a whole other level of proof. Because now you have to, in turn, prove that other films and photos have also been altered. It’s something that I am not interested in spending years doing.

    How did Horne and the ARRB get onto the Zapruder alteration business? It appears to be at Horne’s instigation. (p. 1186) Horne suggested an authenticity report be done through Kodak. According to Horne, he did not read the report until after the ARRB dissolved. (ibid) We will get to the results of that report later.

    First, like many others in his camp, Horne tries to discount the impact of the film and its indications of conspiracy. (p. 1190) As noted above, I disagree with this. But I do agree that it is not possible to get a precise shot sequence from Zapruder. But I believe the main reason for that is the lack of a soundtrack. Horne then goes to a chronicling of the handling of the film and its first copies in the days right after the shooting. (pp. 1197ff) And here I must note something counter-productive to his argument. If you count up the times Horne describes screenings of the film in the first 24 hours, you will note something puzzling. Abraham Zapruder saw his film four times in 24 hours. His partner Erwin Schwartz saw it three times. Harry McCormack of the Dallas Morning News saw it twice. So did staff members at Kodak.

    Which outlines a problem. If all these people saw the film more than once that soon, they had to have seen the original film. To me, that would have been a memorable experience. If the film was altered in any significant way, why did no one ever say it was altered from what they saw on the first day? I sure would have. And the wait was not until 1975. Because during the legal proceedings against Clay Shaw, Jim Garrison ran off many copies of the film for researchers like Penn Jones living in the Dallas area. Further, at the trial of Shaw, Zapruder was a witness. He was asked more than once if the film shown in court was the original. He replied in the affirmative each time. (Trial transcript of 2/13/69)

    Horne realizes this is a problem for him. So he does something that I personally had not seen before. He says that when Life went ahead and raised its offer to Zapruder by an additional hundred thousand dollars, this was not just to purchase motion picture rights in addition to still picture rights. This was really to pay out hush money to Zapruder for him to shut up about the movie being altered. (p. 1242) I don’t quite understand this. First, did Dick Stolley – the Time-Life rep with Zapruder – know the film was going to be altered? And did he transmit these oral instructions to Zapruder? If so, what is the evidence for that? Second, once the agreement was signed, Zapruder was going to get his money as long as he did not sell any picture or movie rights on his own. Which he did not. Was there a clause in the contract that forbade him from even speaking about the film? If there was, Horne does not print it. Third, the true monetary value of Zapruder’s film was in the motion picture rights, which the family made tons of money off of, not the still picture rights. So the large increase in the offer seems quite logical – since Zapruder could have made real money by leasing out those rights.

    Now, what Time-Life did with the film is reprehensible. Once they had the motion picture rights, they kept the film almost completely hidden for 11 years. (The exception being Garrison’s subpoena for the Shaw trial.) But that does not necessarily denote Horne’s alteration thesis. Most people know that men like Henry Luce and C.D. Jackson of Time-Life were staunch Cold Warrior types who dreamed of an American Century. And like John McCloy, they did not want to give away evidence that turned the USA into a version of a Banana Republic, and the Warren Commission into a kangaroo court. Especially after Life had been used to incriminate Oswald by putting one of the specious backyard photos on its cover, thereby greasing the skids for the Commission. So any dramatic evidence of conspiracy, which the Z film was and is, was going to stay under wraps with these guys.

    Let’s get to what Horne considers his best evidence for Zapruder film alteration. I see this as three main issues:

    1. The “briefing board” matters at NPIC;
    2. David Lifton’s “full flush left” argument; and
    3. The “Hollywood Group” and the painted on black patch and head burst.

    This first is an issue that Horne has written about previously. (See Murder in Dealey Plaza, (pp. 311-324) What Horne is saying is that what he thinks was the original was first sent to a CIA photographic plant in Rochester called Hawkeye Works, and then forwarded to the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in the Washington area. (Horne, p. 1220) The basis for this are 1997 interviews done by the ARRB with two men named Homer McMahon and Ben Hunter – and later interviews with Dino Brugioni. All three men worked at NPIC in 1963. Hunter worked for and with McMahon. McMahon said that a mysterious man named Bill Smith (not his real name) brought the Zapruder film to NPIC. Smith was supposed to be a Secret Service agent and they wanted the CIA to do an analysis of the film. Smith told McMahon that the original film had been flown from Dallas to a Kodak facility in Rochester, New York. It was developed there and he was delivering copies for analysis. (Horne, p. 1223-24) Briefing boards were made of certain enlarged frames.

    Again, let us note that the two men were recalling something that happened 34 years previous – which is always tricky business in measuring credibility. Horne buys it all and says he believes that Bill Smith told the truth about the film he carried to NPIC and it being developed in Rochester. Yet, no one knows who Smith really is, and the ARRB never talked to him. But based on this decades-old testimony, Horne now says that “the extant film in the Archives is not a camera original film, but a simulated “original” created with an optical printer at the CIA’s secret film lab in Rochester.” (p. 1226)

    Horne now goes to Brugioni and tries to get some tie-in between what Hunter and McMahon described and what Brugioni recalls. (p. 1231) Now recall, the above testimony is well over 30 years past the event. But Brugioni’s case is even worse. He was not interviewed until 2009! Which is almost half a century after the event. Yet Horne shows no trepidation about using the nearly five-decade-old memories of a man who was 87 years old at the time of the recall.

    Brugioni first thought his work on Zapruder began on the night of the assassination. He then changed this to the next day. But he had previously told author David Wrone that he began his work on Sunday, the 24th. (p. 1231) He eventually decided that the start date was Saturday. The actual date of his briefing of Director John McCone would help here, but I could not find any written evidence for this exact date.

    What is Horne getting at here? He is saying that these are two distinct events and the end product was two different films. Horne says that the Brugioni film was unaltered and the other McMahon-Hunter film was altered. Altered to what, he doesn’t say. But again, this scenario seems to present a problem. To go through everything the analysts did with the film would mean you would have had to study it. If the Brugioni film was unaltered, then why does no one recall any differences between what they saw at NPIC and what was later revealed in the film we have today? I don’t recall this question being addressed by Horne. Secondly, why on earth would the conspirators on this Zapruder film assignment bring both an altered and unaltered version of the film to the same place at the same time where both versions could be plainly seen and analyzed? Again, I did not see this question addressed by the author.

    Why is it not posed? Probably because Horne needs this to be another “compartmentalized” operation. If the film Brugioni worked on for McCone is the same one that McMahon and Hunter got from Smith, then his thesis is pretty much gone. The problem is this: Because of the decades-old recall and the indefiniteness of the start and end dates for all three men, that possibility is a distinct one.

    Let us now go to the Horne-Lifton “full flush left” (ffl) argument. What this means is that images on the Zapruder film bleed over into the sprocket area and even over it. Lifton believed this to be proof that the film we have is not the original but a copy, which was printed on an optical printer. Since, as he insisted, the Zapruder camera should not be able to produce this effect. Lifton also said that Kodak expert Roland Zavada had not been able to duplicate this effect in his authentication experiments for the ARRB. In fact, in a talk on You Tube for a conference by Jim Fetzer, Lifton actually said that he would take this ffl evidence “to the bank.”

    Well, I hope not too many people took that advice. The check would have been returned for “insufficient funds”. First of all, according to Robert Groden, with an optical printer working one frame at a time with a shuttle mechanism, the image would not be allowed to stray outside the sprocket area. (Communication with Groden, 7/21/10) Further, as Tink Thompson pointed out in a post at the Spartacus Educational site in December of 2009, Zavada did produce frames where this effect was exhibited. But Horne and Lifton only consulted a low resolution B & W version of Zavada’s work, which made it difficult to discern. Thompson added in another post on 1/12/10 that the effect is seen clearly in high-resolution color versions.

    Horne and Lifton then said that the experiment would have to produce continuous ffl to have accuracy. The problem here is that, for a second time, the pair seem to have ignored evidence to keep their thesis alive. Horne writes that three or four years ago he received a DVD of a film shot by Rick Janowitz. It was shot in Dealey Plaza on a same type camera as Zapruder’s Bell and Howell. (p. 1290) Horne admits that the film does “appear” to show consistent ffl. Yet he then writes that he has no way of authenticating this film. This is an odd argument to make. Janowitz is a research associate of Dave Healey and Scott Myers, whom Horne and Lifton know of. It would have been easy to call one of them, and in turn to be put in contact with Rick. He would have then testified to the terms of the experiment.

    Craig Lamson also got hold of the Janowitz test film. He posted the results on the Spartacus site on January 22, 2010. The experiment shows that you can attain consistent ffl with a camera just like Zapruder’s. And the effect is in agreement with what is on the film.

    Horne’s third major argument is that a “black patch” was inserted in the back of Kennedy’s head to conceal an exit wound there, and the front head wound is “painted in”. (ppg. 1358-61) The evidence for this is a group of Hollywood editors and restoration professionals who have made very high resolution scans of the film. Horne includes their comments on these scans: “Oh, that’s horrible, that’s just terrible! That’s such a bad fake.” Another is, “”We’re not looking at opticals; we are looking at artwork.”

    Again, there are some problems with this. First, as Robert Groden has stated, you can see a hole in the back of Kennedy’s head in the Zapruder film. So whoever put the “black patch” on, did not do a very good job. Second, Kodachrome II, the film used by Zapruder is, for that time, and that gauge, very high quality film. So when one makes enlarged slides or still pictures from it, much of the information is preserved. If this painted on effect is not visible in 35 mm enlargements or 4 x 5 Ektachrome enlargements, then how could it be so obvious on a digitalized scan? With apprehension and curiosity, I await to see the results. It should be interesting.

    Much of the rest of this chapter is Horne’s unrestrained and bitter attack on Roland Zavada. Zavada was the Kodak chemist who the company brought out of retirement to conduct the authenticity study of the film. His report concluded the film was genuine. Horne, the man who instigated the test, didn’t like that. So he wades into Zavada, fists flying. I won’t enumerate all the technical points, since to me they are arcane and somewhat boring. And as I say, I don’t have a dog in this fight. But I was put off by the personal insults Horne hurled at Zavada. On page 1283, he is referred to as “pathological.” On page 1292 he is termed an “intentional saboteur.” On page 1293 Horne scores a two-fer, Zavada is said to be “acting as a CIA agent” and also “to ignore or rewrite history.” He then says the man has destroyed his own credibility and should retire from any further involvement in the debate over the film. (p. 1281) This, from a guy who pushed the full flush left argument when, for years, he had evidence that undermined it.

    Maybe the film has been altered. Maybe it hasn’t. As I said, I don’t have a dog in this fight. But the highly inflammatory language Horne uses here does not seem to do justice to this debate. (Click here for Zavada’s reply to Horne.)

    IV

    The last volume of the series has two chapters to it. Chapter 15 is entitled “The Setup – Planning the Texas Trip and the Dallas Motorcade;” chapter 16 is called simply “Inconvenient Truths.” The first deals with the origination and planning of the trip to Texas by the White House; the second with what Horne perceives to be the motivating factors behind the murder of President Kennedy.

    This volume is 425 pages long. I took by far the least amount of notes on it than I did for any volume. If you know this material and have studied Kennedy’s presidency, there is very little that is new or enlightening in it. I feel safe in predicting that no one in the near future is going to do better than Jim Douglass at explaining the political circumstances of President Kennedy’s death. And, to his credit, Horne praises JFK and the Unspeakable. But I found very little original in this volume. And I didn’t think Horne brought any new insights into the material that he profusely borrowed. Further, as we shall see, he made two or three questionable choices in the sources he did use.

    The first chapter in the last volume is again partly owed to David Lifton. Lifton believes Lyndon Johnson was an integral part of the plot, and that Jerry Bruno’s advance man work on the motorcade route is important to the workings of the conspiracy.

    Like John Hankey, Horne feels that somehow John Connally was an agent of the plot. And that he and LBJ somehow lured Kennedy to Texas in the fall of 1963. How President Kennedy could be lured into doing something he did not want to do as major as this, escapes me. But this seems to be the premise of this chapter. Arthur Schlesinger, for one, did not see it that way. He wrote that, as the election approached, Kennedy looked to Johnson for help in Texas. He specifically wanted him to use his influence to help stop the warring factions of the Texas Democratic party. This meant the liberal and conservative wings as represented respectively by Sen. Ralph Yarborough and Governor Connally. (A Thousand Days, p. 1019) Ted Sorenson says much the same thing about the genesis of the Texas excursion: “His trip to Texas…was a journey of reconciliation – to harmonize the warring factions of Texas Democrats, to dispel the myths of the right-wing in one of its strongest citadels, and to broaden the base for his own re-election in 1964.” (Kennedy, p. 843) From these two men, who were both quite close to Kennedy, and worked with him at the White House, JFK wanted to go to Texas for quite practical political reasons.

    But Horne sees it as otherwise. And he uses John Connally’s article in Life magazine of 11/24/67 to indict the governor. He goes after Connally for saying that he was not all that eager for Kennedy to go to Texas. (p. 1386) Which considering the fact he was much more moderate than Kennedy, and the ugly incident that had just occurred with Adlai Stevenson being spat upon, is kind of understandable. Horne counters this with a quote from Evelyn Lincoln’s book, Kennedy and Johnson, in which she writes that Kennedy told her that Connally seemed anxious for JFK to go. (ibid) But Horne does not supply the timeline for this quote. The reality as pointed out in our Hankey exposé is that Connally (who had become the point man with the White House on the excursion). (ibid, p. 1387) was reluctant at first, but once persuaded, was eager to get it over and done with as quickly as possible (Jim Reston, The Lone Star: The Life of John Connally pp. 240-260)

    Connally and LBJ are not enough for Horne. He entitles one sub-chapter, “The Crucial role of Congressman Al Thomas in Luring JFK to Texas and Why It Matters.” Let’s be upfront about this: In Best Evidence, Lifton shows pictures of Thomas looking at Johnson after he was sworn in on Air Force One. Thomas appears to wink at LBJ after he has taken the oath. Consequently, this means he is part of the plot. Question: What if he had just shook hands with Johnson? What would that have meant to Horne and Lifton? More or less?

    In talks with Jim Marrs, he has told me that it is not necessarily true that the choice of the Trade Mart necessitated the dogleg turns in Dealey Plaza. He has told me that all that was necessary was to place a relatively short wood platform on the road and the motorcade could have accessed the freeway from Main Street. (Horne, p. 1397) Connally opposed a parade route. The parade route was specifically organised by Secret Service men Winston Lawson and Forrest Sorrels, who overrode the Dallas authorities they were supposed to plan it with. Horne also makes much of the insistence by Connally of having the luncheon at the Trade Mart instead of the Women’s Center. Yes, the latter could accommodate more people, but Connally’s image as a business-oriented Democrat could be said it was more in keeping with the Trade Mart, Connally loudly voiced security concerns about the final venue’s size, referring to the Trade Mart’s balcony and 53 entrances. He was also uninformed of the actual parade route (WCR pp.27-30; Vince Palamara: Survivors Guilt pp.2-9)

    To his credit, Horne uses much of Vince Palamara’s good work on the Secret Service and their incredible negligence in making the assassination possible. For instance, the number of motorcycles was reduced and, weirdly, they were placed to the rear. (p. 1401) And that this decision was later falsely placed on the president. He also mentions the quite curious behavior of Secret Service agent Emory Roberts in ordering Henry Rybka off the fender of the presidential limousine at Love Field. (p. 1410)

    But after relaying this good information, Horne does something puzzling. He feels he has to justify why the Secret Service did what it did. So he then includes a weird section in which he uses the work of Sy Hersh and his thoroughly discredited hatchet job of a book, The Dark Side of Camelot. He tries to say that the agents resented covering up for Kennedy’s affairs and this caused “deep-seated feelings of disapproval and disloyalty” among the White House detail. (p. 1421) But not only does Horne use the Hersh book, he also uses the pitiful ABC documentary derived from it, Dangerous World. But even worse, he actually takes both of these seriously. All the way down the line.

    Yet, right around when this show was broadcast, Probe did a two part series on this general subject. (Probe, Vol. 4 No. 6, Vol. 5 No. 1) It was entitled “The Posthumous Assassination of John F. Kennedy”. It was one of the most popular and influential essays we ever published. It went directly after both ABC and Hersh. And we exposed Hersh as being the long-term CIA asset he has always been. And we showed the serious flaws in Hersh’s book. But after all that, Horne wades into this dangerous morass and uses the most ridiculous parts of Hersh, e.g., that Kennedy had nude skinny-dipping swim parties at the White House when Jackie was away. It should be noted that some of the show’s charges were so outrageous, that the ARRB investigated them. They found out two interesting things: that one of Hersh’s sources would not testify under oath, and secondly, that he seemed to have been recruited for Hersh by another CIA friendly writer, namely Gus Russo.

    Horne’s indiscriminate use of material is capped by his acceptance of one of the most dubious tales in the literature: the assassination eve gathering at the Murchison ranch. Not only does Horne buy it, but he uses the most updated version of it, that is with J. Edgar Hoover and John McCloy in attendance. (p. 1429) As Seamus Coogan noted in his essay on Alex Jones, this is hard to believe since both men were in Washington the next morning. Horne borrows heavily for this from what I think is Harry Livingstone’s worst book, Killing the Truth. For many of the ‘revelations’ in that book, Livingstone used a nameless man whom he simply called ‘the source.’ Uh-huh.

    But Horne also uses two other questionable source books in the Texas aspect of his overall conspiracy. They are at about the level of the Livingstone book, maybe worse: Craig Zirbel’s The Texas Connection and Barr McClellan’s Blood, Money, and Power. (The latter is part of Alex Jones’ scripture on the JFK case.) To go through all the problems in using these two books would take an essay about half as long as this one. But to be brief, Horne wants to use Zirbel, because he describes an argument between Kennedy and Johnson about who is going to ride where in the motorcade. Allegedly, Johnson wanted to move Ralph Yarborough into the presidential limousine and have Connally ride with him. This would make no sense according to Schlesinger’s view of the whole enterprise, since the objective was to mend over the moderate vs. liberal split. According to Zirbel this happened on Thursday evening when LBJ entered Kennedy’s suite and has a knock-down, drag-out argument with him. One that was so loud that “the First Lady heard the shouting in the next room.” (Zirbel, pp. 190-91)

    There are three problems with this as I see it. First, it must have been really late at night since the entourage did not arrive at the Fort Worth hotel from Houston until after 11: 15 PM. (See William Manchester, Death of a President, pp. 88-89) How would this allow for Johnson to get to the Murchison gathering at any kind of decent hour? And if it was that kind of scene, would not people notice him going out the front or back door afterwards? Or did he really go back upstairs to his room, and then sneak out even later?

    Second, if this was the reason for the meeting, why would LBJ confront JFK with it directly? Wouldn’t it be more clever and less risky to just pull a last minute switch the next day? After all, according to Horne, the Secret Service is part of the plot. If Kennedy would object the next morning, at least it could be chalked up to a Secret Service error and not to LBJ.

    Third, this whole nasty argument takes about a page in Zirbel’s book. Not one sentence is footnoted. But what Zirbel seems to have done is switched a meeting Manchester wrote about on the night before, that is on the 20th, to the 21st. (Manchester, p. 82) I think he failed to footnote it so you would not notice that he had lifted it and switched it from Manchester. Obviously if you switch it to Thursday night, you make it more sinister and it helps explain a conspiratorial problem for the Texas angle. Namely, if Connally and LBJ were part of the plot, why on earth would they allow Connally to be in the direct line of fire, from both the front and back? So by moving it to the night before, Zirbel makes it look like LBJ was trying to prevent that dilemma for his partner, Connally.

    Horne hints at what Zirbel did, but he does not spell it out. (Horne, p. 1428) He also says that Manchester was not forthcoming about the details of this confrontation from the night before. But if you compare the two renditions of the two episodes, it is clear that Zirbel has borrowed much of what he writes from Manchester. Manchester wrote that the discussion was about Kennedy’s concern for Yarborough not being slighted. Zirbel expanded this into the seating arrangement argument. But since he does not footnote his version, we don’t know what his basis was for doing that. But most of the other details seem derived from Manchester.

    Why Horne would source Barr McClellan’s book Blood, Money and Power is a complete puzzle to me. Seamus Coogan was criticized by George Bailey who runs the “Oswald’s Mother” site about his reference to the McClellan book as the worst in the last 15 years. Bailey said that no, Case Closed was the worst. Since the Posner book was published more than 15 years ago, Bailey was off base. Perhaps Reclaiming History could then qualify. But then, how many people have read that whole book? The McClellan book did get some publicity. This is unfortunate since it really is a very bad book. (One must differentiate between the book and the annex by the late Nathan Darby on the fingerprint evidence.)

    One of the problems with it is that there is very little annotation to all of the most sensational charges. For instance, the author states that LBJ went into psychotherapy toward the end of his life and confessed to his doctor that he was behind the murder of President Kennedy. (McClellan, p. 3) What is his source for this? Not the doctor himself, nor any written report. It’s a conversation he said he had with a partner in Johnson’s law firm, Don Thomas. The obvious questions are twofold 1.) Why would the partner reveal this to McClellan? And 2.) Why would LBJ tell the partner? If you can believe it, the author says that Johnson wanted to somehow elevate his reputation out of the Vietnam gutter, and this is why he claimed credit for Kennedy’s murder. (ibid, pp. 283-84)

    The entire text of the book is like this. One gets these sensational disclosures, and then one searches in vain for the backing in the End Notes. We are to believe that LBJ learned about the art of assassination from the attempt on FDR. (ibid p. 39) Thomas told McClellan that he was involved in the famous stealing of the 1948 senatorial election by LBJ from Coke Stevenson. Then you go to the sourcing. This is what it says: “The information came in many ways. Over drinks after work, during the firm parties, at early Saturday morning coffee, and just the daily office talk.” (ibid,p. 350) Sorry, not good enough.

    McClellan later says that his boss, attorney Ed Clark, brokered a deal with Joe Kennedy to put LBJ on the 1960 ticket. When one looks for the sourcing on this, you will find: “The deal was advertised to clients on several occasions…” (ibid, p. 356)

    But this is nothing compared to how McClellan deals with the actual facts of the assassination. He says that Clark started the plot going in 1962 by looking for a second sniper – the first of course being Mac Wallace. And he called Leon Jaworksi for help. When one goes to the footnote for this, you will find: “”Despite several solid leads and close ties to Clark, the better course for the present is to withhold judgment pending further research and strong corroborating evidence. At this time our leads are through Jaworksi and Cofield, and our key suspects fit into the Clark modus operandi. The accomplices may never be identified with certainty.” (ibid, p. 358) In other words, he has nothing to back up this assumption.

    Later on McClellan writes that he doesn’t know how Wallace met Oswald, but they did meet, “and that they were together on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository when Kennedy was shot.” (ibid, p. 179) There is next to no evidence that Oswald was on the sixth floor that day. But further, the author then makes up a scenario for Wallace meeting Oswald. The problem is that it takes place at a print shop in Dallas in late 1962. Yet, Oswald did not print any flyers at that time! So how could it happen? (ibid, p. 267)

    Further, in defiance of the ballistics evidence, the author has Oswald firing at Edwin Walker and killing Tippit. (ibid, pp. 211, 267) And in further defiance of the puzzling postal records, the author says Oswald ordered the murder weapons. (ibid, p. 267)

    Backing up the whole Penn Jones/Madeleine Brown scenario, McClellan goes with the Murchison murder gathering on the eve of the assassination. (ibid, p. 271) During which the infamous ads that ran in the papers were on poster on the walls. And Mr. Clark predicted that very soon LBJ would be the new president. Cheers broke out among the partygoers. So now, even more details have been added to this ever-evolving story about the gathering.

    McClellan says he has found out how Clark was paid for the operation. (p. 234) To say his evidence is unconvincing is to give it too much credit. He then says that although Mac Wallace died in a car accident, he was actually killed by people associated with Clark. (p. 242) This is his evidence: “The medical report shows extensive physical injuries that are not consistent with the damages to the auto.” (ibid, p. 362) This is weird because McClellan says that Wallace was in a weakened state by attempted carbon monoxide poisoning, and this is what caused the accident. How could that attempted poisoning cause “extensive physical injuries”.

    Maybe someday someone will write a convincing and scholarly book on Johnson’s involvement in the JFK murder. But these two fall far short of that mark. And Horne should not have used them, since by doing so he implicitly recommends them. They are not worth recommending. Not by a longshot. In fact, once analyzed, they are the kinds of books that can be used to caricature researchers.

    V

    The last chapter in the book is titled “Inconvenient Truths.” In it, Horne tries to…well…it is hard to say what he is trying to do. I think he is trying to explain why the parts of the government turned on Kennedy. Specifically, the Pentagon, J. Edgar Hoover, and parts of the CIA – he specifically names James Angleton, David Phillip, Dave Morales, and Ed Lansdale as being in on the plot. (pp. 1628-47) And he tries to make it clear that his version is not just a Texas based one. For him, LBJ and Hoover are enablers. (p. 1800)

    In this last chapter, I think Horne was trying to pull off what Jim Douglass did so memorably in his fine book, JFK and The Unspeakable. That is, he tries to define what made Kennedy a marked man in the eyes of some. Considering this section is almost 300 pages long and JFK and the Unspeakable is 393 pages of text, Horne sure had the space to do it in. In my opinion, he doesn’t even come close. As compared to Douglass’ original, smooth, and pungent approach, I thought much of Horne’s analysis was rather trite, dull, and in some places, coarse. For example, apparently still under the influence of Hersh’s trashy book, he writes that Hoover was a closeted homosexual who prosecuted gays yet engaged in “bizarre sex with other men in private that would have destroyed his career immediately if it had become publicly known. He despised John F. Kennedy first of all simply because Jack Kennedy was somewhat of a satyr, and loved being with women.” (p. 1496) Like many things in the book, this is not footnoted. Having read most of the important bios of Hoover, I don’t recall reading this in any of the four standards (by Powers, Theoharis, Gentry and Summers). I don’t even recall it in Tony Summers’ book, which actually concentrates on Hoover’s sex life. Now Horne inserts this questionable data in his text, yet I could not find any place where he mentions Oswald’s likely status as an FBI informant as a real reason for Hoover’s willingness to cooperate in the cover-up.

    In this long last inchoate section, Horne relies almost completely on John Newman for his Vietnam material, even though we now have a small shelf of books on this issue, including books by David Kaiser and Howard Jones. He spends an inordinate amount of space on the Missile Crisis, and in my view, he slights the Bay of Pigs episode. At one point he actually says that JFK seemed “indecisive and unresponsive” during the Bay of Pigs. (p. 1534) I believe this is wrong in and of itself, but beyond that, it does not incorporate the fact that Kennedy did not fully understand what the CIA was doing to him until after the fact. Further, I actually believe that he never really understood that, in fact, if the invasion had succeeded, the Agency was not going to let the Kennedy Cubans take power in a new Cuba. In his discussion of the famous Harry Truman anti-CIA editorial of December 1963, Horne was unaware of the new bombshell revelations about Allen Dulles’ visit to Truman while he was on the Warren Commission. The CIA Director actually tried to get him to retract the essay.

    Some of the elements that Horne throws in here as motivations for the conspiracy are just, well, kind of weird. I mean the Edward Teller-Robert Oppenheimer dispute over atomic energy? Never heard of that one in any JFK book. But somehow, Horne puts it in here. (p. 1680) Kennedy’s directive to seek out cooperation with the Russians on a voyage to the moon? Horne throws that in the mixer also. (p. 1681) And some of the political commentators he uses on the case are just as unusual. Whoever thought that we would see Noam Chomsky quoted in a pro-conspiracy book? Does Gary Hart strike one as being a profound thinker on the gestalt of the JFK case? Well, Horne seems to think so. (pp. 1672-74)

    Then there are the rather jarring and simplistic errors, which betray the author’s need for both a proofreader and an editor. He calls Gaeton Fonzi’s wonderful and invaluable book about the HSCA, The Final Investigation. The author of the quasi-official history of the Bay of Pigs operation is called Dryden, when his last name is Wyden. The legendary CBS journalist – who George Clooney made a whole movie about – becomes William Morrow. And he ends, rather predictably, with an unwarranted slam at the Kennedy family. (p. 1767) The evidence of this last hodge-podge chapter shows that Horne’s reach exceeded his grasp.

    I have been at pains to show what was valuable in this book. And there is much of value, if you are willing to spend a lot of time sifting through five volumes. How many people are willing to do so? After reading this and Reclaiming History, I think there is a message in the nearly 4,500 total pages. No one should ever write another book on this case as long as these. The length of the Bugliosi book was meant to be intimidating. I mean how could a book that long not be valuable? With Horne, I think he desired to spill out almost everything he felt and knew about the JFK case into one book. Unfortunately, that resulted in a rather unorganized and undisciplined approach – an approach that left out the most important person: the reader.

    At the Actor’s Studio in New York there is a famous adage: “Bring it down,” meaning that, the less work expended conveying a thought or emotion, the better. Because, many times, more is not better. It’s just more.

    If Inside the ARRB had been half as long, it might have been twice as good.

  • Donald Byron Thomas, Hear No Evil: Social Constructivism and the Forensic Evidence In the Kennedy Assassination – Two Reviews (1)


    At this late date, it could be fairly asked whether or not we need another book offering a “reconstruction” of the JFK assassination. The official investigations were so poorly conducted, the post mortem inquest so sloppy and incomplete, that concerned and curious citizens were left with many more questions than answers about exactly what transpired in Dealey Plaza. However, as author Don Thomas argues, the problem lies not so much with the evidence itself but with the way in which the forensic scientists tasked with analyzing it allowed political considerations to color their judgement and dictate their conclusions. This Thomas labels as “Social Constructivism.” As he writes, “science is a social process” and “scientific conclusions are social constructs. The consequences of the results, as much if not more than the empirical evidence itself, will often steer the scientist to one conclusion or another.” (Thomas, p. 8) And as Thomas sets forth, when properly analyzed, the forensic evidence in this case demonstrates overwhelmingly that President Kennedy’s murder was the result of a well-executed conspiracy.

    Don Thomas is one of very few experts on the acoustics evidence—the Dallas Police dictabelt recording that forced the HSCA’s conclusion of a “probable conspiracy”—and as would be expected it is this which provides the back bone for his reconstruction. But with Hear No Evil Thomas has greatly broadened the scope of his inquiry to show how all the pieces of the forensic puzzle can be put together to form a cohesive whole. Among the topics covered are the “sniper’s nest,” the fingerprint evidence, Neutron Activation Analysis, the Tippit Murder, Thomas Canning’s trajectory analysis, the paraffin casts and Jack Ruby’s lie detector test. Thomas subjects all of the above, and more, to an intriguing micro-analysis that I am convinced will impress the majority of serious assassination researchers despite the controversial nature of many of his conclusions.

    As is to be expected in a book that totals in excess of 700 pages, Hear No Evil is not without fault and there are occasional errors of fact and omission—some of which will be discussed later in this review. But the objective-minded reader is not likely to find that these impact greatly on the reliability of Thomas’ research or the credibility of his central thesis.

    I

    I’ll begin by discussing what I see as one of the major highlights of Hear No Evil: Thomas’ brilliant and compelling discussion of President Kennedy’s head wound. It is Thomas’ contention that the massive explosion so graphically depicted in the Zapruder film was caused by a single bullet fired from the grassy knoll and that, contrary to official claims, there is no evidence of a rear-entering shot to the head. He rejects claims that the autopsy materials have been fabricated and states “It is not clear to this author why anyone would suppose that the photographs are fakes when in fact they fail to support the official version of the President’s wounds.” (p. 248)

    The official version is depicted in the infamous Rydberg drawings of Kennedy’s head wound which show a small entry hole in the back of the skull and a large exit defect on the right. (CE386 and CE388) As most researchers know, the Rydberg drawings were not based on a study of the autopsy photographs and X-rays but verbal descriptions given by chief prosector, Dr. James J. Humes. Dr. Humes offered the exact same description in his Warren Commission testimony: “…there was a defect in the scalp and some scalp tissue was not available…When we reflected the scalp, there was a through and through defect [emphasis mine] corresponding with the wound in the scalp.” (2H352) Contrary to Humes’ claims, no such “through and through” hole is seen in the autopsy X-rays. As Doug Horne revealed in his recent multi-volume set, Inside the Assassination Records Review Board, the ARRB asked three independent forensic specialists to review the JFK autopsy collection and these experts were unanimous in concluding that the X-rays show no entry hole of any kind in the back of the head. (Horne, pgs. 584-586) In fact, both of Humes’ colleagues at the autopsy, Dr. J. Thornton Boswell and Colonel Pierre Finck, had already admitted that this was not the case. Boswell explained to the HSCA pathology panel that what was actually discovered upon reflection of the scalp was a small, bevelled notch on the edge of the large defect, and that a semicircular notch on a late arriving bone fragment that was detached from the skull was interpreted as completing the circumference of the inferred hole. (7HSCA246, 260) As Thomas points out, (p. 266) confirmation of Boswell’s account can actually be found in the Commission testimony of Dr. Finck (2H379) and the proof that their recollections are correct is found on the back of the autopsy face sheet where, on the night of the autopsy, Boswell provided a drawing of the bone fragment and the notch in the edge of the large defect. (CE397)

    When Dr. Humes “broke his silence” by speaking to the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1992, he claimed that the beveling around this notch in the back of the skull was “proof” that the bullet had entered the back of the head: “It happens 100 times out of 100…It is a law of physics and it is foolproof—absolutely, unequivocally, and without question.” (JAMA, May 27, 1992) Beveling of the skull, as Humes himself explained, is essentially the same as what occurs when a BB is fired through a window: there is a small hole on the outside of the glass where it enters and a larger “crater” on the inside where it exits. But just how “foolproof” is it? Thomas reports that “Contrary to the autopsy doctors assertions, beveling of the bone is not a reliable indicator of an entrance or exit wound.” (Thomas, p. 272) When dealing with a through and through bullet hole, it is usually a valid indicator but even then, as HSCA forensic pathology panel member Dr. John Coe has reported, beveling can often occur on the impact side. (ibid.) And when dealing with fragments or margins of bone, as were JFK’s autopsy doctors, “all bets are off.” As Thomas explains, “This is because the laminate nature of cranial bone lends itself to chipping that can easily be confused with beveling.” (p. 273) The truth is, as the autopsy report essentially reveals, in reaching their conclusion the autopsy doctors relied less on the forensic evidence in front of them and more on reports coming in from Dallas that the gunman was located above and behind the Presidential limousine. Their location of the in-shoot was based on little more than an inference and their “unequivocal proof” never existed.

    The hole in the scalp was accurately described in the autopsy report as a “lacerated wound.” The cause of this laceration, as Thomas explains it, is tied in with another mystery that has baffled researchers for decades: The large round fragment attached to the outer table of the skull. The official explanation for this fragment is that it represents a cross-section of the bullet that sheared off on impact but this,as the majority of experts agree, is an impossibility. Thomas writes that such “shavings” are “not uncommon, with soft lead bullets not jacketed bullets…such shavings are characteristically lunate, or C-shaped, following the typically circular margin of the entrance hole.” (p. 282) The implausibility of a completely round cross section of a fully-jacketed bullet attaching itself to the outer table of the skull has been dismissed by even Warren Commission devotee and ballistics expert Larry Sturdivan who now claims it must be an “artifact” on the X-ray. This, of course, is akin to conspiracy buffs who label every piece of evidence that doesn’t fit their pet theory as “fake” or “altered.” But Thomas provides a real explanation for the presence of this fragment: Shrapnel that broke off from the bullet which struck the street behind the limousine and pancaked against the bone. “Once it is understood that the metal on the outside of the President’s skull is a shrapnel fragment,” he writes, “one realizes that there is no evidence that a bullet entered the back of the President’s head. Moreover it explains the anomalous fracture pattern noted by researchers [Cyril] Wecht and [Randy] Robertson which suggested a second hit.” (p. 283)

    Properly interpreted, the evidence shows that the bullet struck the right temple and exited “through the right posterior parietal region of the head near the midline.” (p. 290) The path of the bullet is established by the track of “bullet dust” on the lateral X-ray and it shows a bullet travelling from front to back. (p. 283) The entrance hole in the temple, seen by witnesses like mortician Tom Robinson, is actually visible as a “lesion in the skin” in the autopsy photographs and lines up with the notch in the frontal bone seen in photograph No. 44. It is here that the track of bullet dust begins and it it extends to a point above both officially proposed entrance locations. Little wonder, then, that the HSCA pathology panel was”unable to totally explain the metallic fragment pattern.” (7HSCA224)

    In a separate chapter, Thomas deals with the argument often proposed by Warren Commission defenders that a bullet fired “from the direction of the grassy knoll entering the right quadrant of the President’s head must of necessity exit the left rear quadrant of the head.” Thomas argues that such a proposition “is not based on an understanding of terminal ballistics.” (p. 437) A bullet will usually continue on a straight-line trajectory until it strikes a hard surface at which point it will deflect. The amount of deflection is difficult to predict, “but a basic rule of thumb for any object in motion is that it will tend to take the path of least resistance.” (p. 435) In the JFK case, with a bullet fired from the knoll “and coming at a high, close to 60° angle, with a tangential strike in the temple near the hairline where the surface of the skull slopes strongly backwards and leftward, one would expect the bullet to deflect upwards and leftward as well (the path of least resistance).” (p. 436) In short, Thomas shows that the forensic evidence is perfectly consistent with the suspicion most JFK researchers hold after their first viewing of the Zapruder film: The President’s fatal wound was delivered by a bullet fired from behind the picket fence atop the grassy knoll.

    II

    Over the past decade, no single researcher has worked as hard as Don Thomas at bringing the acoustics evidence back into the assassination debate and, as would be expected, it is a focal point of Hear No Evil. Many of the details involved in an analysis of the dictabelt recording are highly technical in nature and the average reader will, like myself, find this section of the book a little hard to absorb at times. Thankfully, as he has done in previous papers and lectures, the author shows that the most compelling reason to accept the acoustics is not particularly technical at all. This Thomas refers to as “the order in the data.”

    On the day of the assassination, the microphone on a police motorcycle travelling in the Presidential motorcade had become stuck in the “on” position and the sounds had been recorded on a dictabelt machine at Dallas police headquarters. When the dictabelt was brought to the attention of the HSCA in 1978, it asked the top acoustics experts in the country to analyze the recording to see if it had captured the sounds of the assassination gunfire. James Barger and his colleagues at Bolt, Baranek & Newman (BBN) discovered six suspect impulses on the tape that occurred at approximately 12:30 p.m.—the time of the assassination—and reported that on-site testing needed to be conducted at Dealey Plaza. There, microphones were placed along the parade route on Houston and Elm Streets and test shots were fired from the two locations witnesses had reported hearing shots; the Texas School Book Depository and the grassy knoll. BBN found that five of the impulses on the dictabelt were found to acoustically match the echo patterns of test shots fired in Dealey Plaza. One of these, the fourth in sequence, matched to a shot fired from the grassy knoll. As Thomas explains, “the mere fact that the suspect sounds had matched to some of the test shots is not particularly significant. However, the order and spacing of the matching microphone positions followed the same order as the sounds on the police tape.” (p. 583)

    If the sounds on the dictabelt were not the assassination gunshots, “a match would be as likely to appear at the first microphone as the last…And if all five happened to match, as these had, they would fall in some random order…But the matches were not random. They fell in the exact same 1-2-3-4-5 topographic order as they appear chronologically on the police recording.” (ibid)

    • The first impulse matched to a test shot recorded on a microphone on Houston Street near the intersection with Elm.
    • The second to a microphone 18 ft north on Houston.
    • The third to a microphone at the intersection.
    • The fourth to a microphone on Elm.
    • And the fifth to the next microphone to the west.

    On top of all this, the distance from the first matching microphone to the last was 143 feet and the time between the first and last suspect impulse on the tape was 8.3 seconds. In order for the motorcycle with the stuck microphone to cover 143 feet in 8.3 seconds it would need to be travelling at a speed of approximately 11.7 mph which fits almost perfectly with the FBI’s conclusion that the Presidential limousine was averaging 11.3 mph on Elm Street. (ibid)

    Finally, the gunshots on the dictabelt synchronize perfectly with the visual evidence of the Zapruder film. There are two visible reactions to gunshots on the Zapruder film. One of these occurs at Z-frame 313 with the blatantly obvious explosion of President Kennedy’s head. The other occurs between fames 225 and 230 when the Stetson hat in Connally’s hand flips up and down, presumably as a result of the missile passing through his wrist. This is preceded at Z-224 by the flipping of Connally’s lapel which has been cited by many as pinpointing the exact moment the bullet passed through his chest. When the fourth shot on the dictabelt, the grassy knoll shot, is aligned with Z-frame 313, the third shot falls at precisely Z-224! (p. 604) This perfect synchronization of audio and visual evidence is either one heck of a coincidence or the final proof that the suspect impulses on the dictabelt really are what the HSCA experts claimed there were. Unfortunately, this remarkable concordance was hidden from the public when HSCA chief counsel, Robert Blakey, in a “socially constructive” move, convinced the experts to label the third shot as a “false alarm.”

    Former HSCA staff investigator, Gaeton Fonzi, wrote in his brilliant book The Last Investigation, that, “Chief Counsel Blakey was an experienced Capitol Hill man. He had worked not only at Justice but on previous Congressional committees as well. So he knew exactly what the priorities of his job were by Washington standards, even before he stepped in.” (Fonzi, p. 8) Blakey, who later admitted that before he took the job he had found the idea of a conspiracy in the JFK case “highly unlikely,” (ibid. p. 259) was destined not to stray too far from the Warren Commission’s conclusion that only three shots were fired and all were fired by Lee Harvey Oswald. As such, the acoustics evidence presented him with a big problem. As Thomas puts it, “The acoustical evidence simply did not mesh well with the Warren Report…Blakey’s problem was not just that a total of five putative gunshots were detected by BBN’s test procedures, but that these shots came too close together.” (Thomas, p. 584) In 1964, the FBI established that “Oswald’s” rifle required 2.3 seconds between shots and, as Special Agent Robert Frazier testified, this was “firing [the] weapon as fast as the bolt could be operated.” (3H407) But the first three shots on the dictabelt had all come from the general vicinity of the book depository and came only 1.65 and 1.1 seconds apart. To “solve” the problem, Blakey acquired a Mannlicher Carcano similar to the one found on the sixth floor and, together with a group of Washington police officers, practised firing the rifle as fast as possible. Apparently, by “point aiming”—which means not really aiming at all—Blakey and HSCA counsel Gary Cornwell were able to squeeze off two rounds in 1.5 and 1.2 seconds respectively. (8HSCA185) This farcical display was enough to satisfy Blakey about the “probability” that Oswald fired the first two shots on the tape. He then told the acoustics experts that the third shot, coming only 1.1 seconds after the second, could not be what their analysis told them it was. And in another socially constructive move, the scientists played along.

    The truth is that all three matches were as valid as each other and what the acoustics evidence actually showed was that there may have been a second rearward assassin and a triangulation of crossfire—just as critics like Josiah Thompson had been saying since 1967. But a Washington man like Blakey was not about to admit that the “buffs” had been right all along. In a conversation with Thomas in 1999, “Blakey confided that he knew he would take a lot of heat for the grassy knoll shot and he didn’t want to dilute his case with the weak evidence for a fifth shot.” (Thomas, p. 590) By putting political considerations before the evidence, Robert Blakey did history a huge disservice and helped obscure the truth about the assassination. By cutting out the crucial third shot, he had essentially hidden the perfect synchronization between the dictabelt and the Zapruder film and it was for this very reason that many JFK researchers rejected the validity of the acoustics evidence. One can only wonder what reception the Dallas police dictabelt would have received had Blakey had the courage to stand up for the truth.

    III

    There are a number of points in Hear No Evil that are likely to be controversial among critics and conspiracy theorists and chief among these is the author’s acceptance of the single bullet theory. But for Thomas there is a distinction to be made between the single bullet theory and the “magic bullet theory.” According to Thomas, the single bullet theory is the hypothesis that only one bullet caused all seven non-fatal wounds to JFK and Governor Connally and the magic bullet theory is the belief that this bullet was CE399—the near pristine round allegedly found on a stretcher at Parkland hospital. He finds it necessary to make this distinction because he accepts the former and rejects the latter.

    The majority of the book is firmly rooted in the forensic evidence so it was a surprise to see the author engaging in a great deal of speculation as he does when attempting to explain the origin of CE399. Thomas advances the hypothesis that the magic bullet was actually recovered from the turf in Dealey Plaza and FBI agent, Doyle Williams carried it over to Parkland where, after being refused access to the room in which Kennedy’s body was being held, he left it on an unattended stretcher. The problems with this theory are numerous, and to the author’s credit he does emphasize that it is just a theory, (p. 416) but for me its biggest flaw is that it does not account for the vast body of evidence indicating that CE399 was not the bullet found at Parkland.

    In 1964, the Warren Commission asked the FBI to establish chains of custody for various items of evidence including CE399. On July 7, the Bureau provided a 3-page report laying out the bullet’s chain of possession and claiming that on June 12, FBI agent Bardwell Odum had shown CE399 to the two Parkland hospital witnesses who found the bullet, Darrell Tomlinson and O.P. Wright, and neither man could “positively identify” it. (24H412) Additionally, the same report notes that the next two men in the chain, Secret Service agent Richard Johnsen and Secret Service chief James Rowley “could not identify this bullet as the one” they handled. (ibid) Two years later, Josiah Thompson interviewed O.P. Wright and asked him what the bullet he had handled that day looked like. He showed Wright a photograph of CE399 and he “rejected” it “as resembling the bullet Tomlinson found on the stretcher.” Wright, a former police officer experienced in firearms, explained that the bullet he saw had a “pointed tip” and even showed him a similar .30 caliber round from his own desk. (Six Seconds In Dallas, p. 175) When interviewed, Tomlinson was less certain saying “only that the bullet found resembled either CE572 (the ballistics comparison rounds) or the pointed, .30 caliber bullet Wright had procured for us.” (ibid)

    The fifth link in the chain, FBI agent Elmer Todd was in the White House when he purportedly received the bullet from Rowley. Todd marked the bullet with his initials (24H412) and then passed it along to Robert Frazier at FBI HQ. The problem is, Todd’s initials are not on CE399! In 2003, meticulous JFK researcher John Hunt proceeded to “track the entire surface of the bullet using four of NARA‘s preservation photos.” The following year, he visited the National Archives where he was able to inspect the assassination materials for himself. Hunt discovered that there were only three sets of initials on CE399: RF (belonging to Robert Frazier), CK (FBI Agent Charles Killion), and JH (which was the mark used by FBI Agent Cortlandt Cunningham to avoid confusion with “cc,” the notation for carbon copy). Todd’s mark was nowhere to be found. And Hunt discovered yet another problem. Frazier marked the time he received CE399 on his November 22 laboratory worksheet as “7:30 PM.” He wrote the same time on a handwritten note he titled “History of Evidence” and likely used as a memory aid during his Commission testimony. The problem is, Todd also made a note of the time he received a bullet and according to the handwritten notation he made on the original envelope that contained it, he received the stretcher bullet at “8:50 PM.” So how could Frazier receive a bullet from Todd at FBI HQ one hour and 20 minutes before Todd was handed the same bullet at the White House by Chief Rowley? He could not. When considered alongside the fact that Todd’s initials do not appear on CE399 and the fact that the four men preceding him in the chain of possession did not recognise it when shown, there is only one plausible explanation: There were two bullets in Washington that day; CE399 and the pointed-tip missile found on a stretcher at Parkland Hospital. CE399 was used to pin the blame for Kennedy’s assassination squarely on Lee Oswald’s shoulders. The stretcher bullet was made to disappear.

    I find it hard to believe that Thomas was unaware of the problems wit CE399’s chain of possession and it is a shame that he chose not to address them. But it is possible that he may have hit on something important by contending that the magic bullet was originally found in Dealey Plaza. A Dallas police officer, Joe W. Foster, told the Commission he had “found where one shot had hit the turf” after striking a manhole cover (6H252) and, in fact, a series of photographs taken by Black Star photographer, Jim Murry, show Foster and other officers inspecting the lawn.” (Thomas, p. 403) In these pictures a sandy-haired man in a suit, later identified by Dallas police chief Jesse Curry as an FBI agent, is seen apparently picking a bullet out of the grass and putting it in his left pocket. Could this bullet actually be CE399? As Thomas notes, “Two contingencies make the story even more compelling. First, CE399 is in the minimally damaged condition one would expect of a fully jacketed bullet having buried itself into the soggy turf…Second, the manhole cover is in a direct line with the center lane of Elm Street and the southeast corner window of the sixth floor of the book depository.” (p. 402) It is, of course, pure conjecture but it could just be that this unidentified FBI agent carried the bullet straight to FBI HQ in Washington. This would explain how Robert Frazier could have CE399 in his possession over an hour before Elmer Todd received the stretcher bullet in the White House.

    IV

    Thomas omits a number of important details when suggesting what role Oswald might have played in the conspiracy and it was surprising to discover that he accepted the Warren Commission’s claim that Oswald had carried the Mannlicher Carcano rifle into the building in a brown paper bag disguised as curtain rods. Far more shocking, however, was to find him making the claim that there is “little reason to doubt that the weapon found on the sixth floor belonged to Lee Harvey Oswald.” (p. 25) On the contrary, as recent research has shown, there is plenty of reason to doubt. The Commission claimed that Oswald had ordered the rifle (serial no. C2766) from Klein’s Sporting Goods of Chicago on March 20, 1963. He had ordered the rifle in the name of A. Hidell and it had been shipped to PO Box 2915, Dallas, Texas, Oswald had ordered the weapon using a coupon from American Rifleman magazine and paid the $24.45 with U.S. Postal Order no. 2,202,130,462. FBI document examiners testified that the handwriting on the order form, postal order and envelope was Oswald’s and Marina Oswald testified that the rifle in question did indeed belong to her husband. It appeared to be an open and shut case—but appearances can be deceiving. In fact, there is no evidence that Oswald ever received the rifle.

    To begin with, when Oswald opened PO Box 2915 in October, 1963, he listed “Lee H. Oswald” as the only person authorized to receive mail. (17H679) U.S. Postal regulation no. 355.111 clearly states that “Mail addressed to a person at a PO Box who is not authorized to receive mail shall be endorsed ‘addressee unknown’ and returned to sender.” How then could Oswald have received a rifle ordered in the name of A. Hidell? The Warren Commission dealt with this problem by having Postal Inspector Harry Holmes testify that “when a package is received for a certain box, a notice is placed in that box regardless of whether the name on the package is listed on the application.” Holmes also claimed that the person would not be asked for identification “because it is assumed that the person with the notice is entitled to the package.” (R121) Although the commission chose to interpret it differently, what Holmes essentially stated was that anyone with a key to Oswald’s box could have picked up the package. However, it should still have been possible to discover exactly who picked up the rifle because that person would have been required to sign postal form 2162. In 1963 it was legal to sell firearms through the mail as long as strict regulations were followed. Postal regulation 846.53a required that both the shipper and the receiver fill out and sign form 2162, which was to be retained for four years. The Commission gave no indication that they ever looked for the form and there is no indication that Postal Inspector Harry Holmes ever volunteered it. The most likely reason that Holmes withheld this important information is that he was helping out his friends at the Bureau. He was, after all, an active FBI informant.

    As it turns out, Holmes and other inspectors at the Dallas General Post Office (GPO) were well aware of Oswald long before the assassination and had informed the FBI about Oswald receiving “subversive materials.” On April 21, 1963, Holmes himself advised FBI Special Agent James Hosty that Oswald had been in contact with the Fair Play For Cuba Committee. (CD11, Report of SA Hosty, 9/10/63) And this in itself gives us further reason to doubt that Oswald had ever received the rifle. Is it reasonable to believe that Postal Inspectors felt it was important to report that Oswald was receiving subversive materials and literature written in Russian, but did not feel it was worth informing the bureau that an alleged communist had ordered a rifle?

    Finally, just as there was no paper evidence of Oswald receiving a rifle when there should have been, there was no eyewitness either. As researcher John Armstrong noted, “In 1963 the GPO in Dallas had a stable work force of employees who were loyal…worked the same job for years…and knew many of their customers by name. There is little doubt that that postal employees were aware of Oswald because of the unusual nature of material he was receiving…But, according to Holmes, Postal Inspectors in Dallas made exhaustive inquiries in an attempt to locate employees who remembered handling or delivering a large package to Oswald, but without success” (Harvey & Lee, p. 453)

    With the above in mind, I believe it is reasonable to ask whether or not Oswald had even ordered the rifle in the first place. In this regard, it would appear that the Warren Commission presented a pretty solid case. But again, appearances can be deceiving. Postal order no. 2,202,130,462 was postmarked “Mar 12, 63 Dallas, Tex. GPO” and the envelope in which it was sent was postmarked “Mar 12 10:30 am Dallas, Tex. 12.” (17H635) This means that the money order was purchased between 8:00 am (when the office opened) and 10:30 am on March 12. Records show that from 8:00 am to 5:15 pm of March 12, Oswald was working at Jaggers-Chiles-Stovall, 11 blocks away from the GPO. Therefore, Oswald could not have purchased the money order. Even more problematic, the postmark on the envelope establishes that it was dropped in a mail box in postal zone 12—several miles west of downtown Dallas. Could Oswald have walked 11 blocks to the GPO, purchased the money order, travelled several miles west (for no apparent reason) to mail it before 10:30 am, and then made his way back to work without anyone noticing he was gone? No, he could not. The evidence establishes, therefore, that Oswald neither purchased nor mailed the money order used to purchase the assassination weapon.

    What this means is that the entire case for Oswald ordering the Mannlicher Carcano rests on analysis of the handwriting on the order form, postal order and envelope. The question is, is handwriting analysis an exact science? The answer is no. For example, during the 1969 trial of Clay Shaw, a question arose as to whether or not Shaw had signed an airline guest book as “Clay Bertrand.” The prosecution produced a handwriting expert who said he did. The defence produced one who said he did not. What this illustrates, in my opinion, is the tendency of such “experts” to side with whoever is paying for their time. And given that the analysts testifying for the Warren Commission were government employees, in conjunction with what we’ve learned above, I see no reason to trust their “expert opinions.”

    V

    For more than three decades, lone nut believers have been citing Vincent Guinn’s Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA) of the JFK ballistic evidence as proof that Oswald was the lone gunman. Guinn told the HSCA that he had demonstrated through the use of NAA that a fragment of lead from Connally’s wrist did in fact come from CE399 and that “one of the two fragments recovered from the floor of the limousine and the fragment removed from the President’s brain during the autopsy were from a second bullet.” (HSCA Report, p. 45) There was, he claimed, “no evidence of a third bullet among those fragments large enough to be tested.” (ibid) In short, Guinn claimed to have scientifically proven that only two bullets struck the occupants of the limousine and both came from Oswald’s rifle. Following in the footsteps of Erik Randich, Pat Grant, Cliff Spiegelman and William A. Tobin, Don Thomas shows that there is absolutely no validity to Guinn’s claims and that examination of the data “leads one to conclude that Guinn’s opinions derived more from his personal views than from the metallurgical evidence.” (Thomas, p. 452)

    To begin with, Dr. Guinn’s objectivity was always open to question. As Thomas writes, “Guinn denied under oath that he done any work in connection with the Warren Commission investigation.” (ibid) But this was a bald-faced lie. Guinn was “one of three scientists who had conducted tests in consultation with the FBI for gunshot residues on Lee Harvey Oswald’s paraffin casts. When those tests seemed to exculpate Oswald, Guinn had agreed to keep the results secret…Guinn’s dishonest denial that he had performed analyses in connection with the investigation of Kennedy’s death in 1964 must be considered in determining the credibility of his congressional testimony in 1978.” (pgs. 452-453) On top of this, the integrity of the evidence Guinn tested was also in doubt. When he came to weigh the fragments, Guinn found that their individual weights did not correspond to the weights of the fragments tested by the FBI in 1964 despite the fact that the FBI test was not destructive. Speaking to press reporters after his HSCA testimony, Guinn hypothesized, “Possibly they would take a bullet, take out a few little pieces and put it in the container, and say, ‘This is what came out of Connally’s wrist.’ And naturally if you compare it with 399, it will look alike…I have no control over these things.” (Henry Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, p. 83)

    Thomas quotes from a number of scientific studies that cast serious doubt on the reliability of NAA. One such study by a team of scientists from Gulf Atomic Corporation of San Diego reported in 1970 that “the application of NAA to the comparison of two bullet leads can show two samples to be different…but it cannot show two samples to be the same in most cases.” (p. 454) In fact, the two most popular manufacturers of the time, Remington and Winchester, were making bullets that were “practically indistinguishable from one another.” (ibid) A more recent review in 2004 by the National Research Council found that “Available data do not support any statement that a crime bullet came from a particular box of ammunition.” (p. 455) This is in direct contradiction to Guinn’s claims that not only were Carcano bullets unique but that each Carcano bullet was distinguishable from all others.

    In 1964, the FBI had conducted NAA tests on the assassination bullet fragments with inconclusive results. In his HSCA testimony, in an obvious attempt to explain how he was able to succeed where the Bureau failed, Guinn claimed that he had more information to go on. Specifically, “a great deal of background data…on WCC Mannlicher Carcano bullet lead.” (7HSCA566) But what background data was that? As Thomas explains, “Only he and the FBI had ever analyzed Carcano bullets.” (p. 476) For his study, Guinn acquired 14 Western Cartridge Company Carcano bullets and took four samples each from three bullets to test for homogeneity. He reported, “…you simply don’t find a wide variation in composition within individual WCC Mannlicher Carcano bullets.” But, Thomas informs, “contrary to Guinn’s assertion, the antimony levels within individual Carcano bullets do have a wide variation, and moreover, a close reading of the appendix to his report reveals Guinn admitting that he knew these samples were not homogeneous.” (p. 470)

    As normal scientific practice dictates, in order to make any meaningful claims about the relationship between the bullets and the fragments, “one first has to know the degree of variation within bullets, not just the reliability of single measurements of a single sub-sample.” (p. 480) To this end, the analyst needs “replicated readings from multiple samples to account for heterogeneity and reproducibility. Guinn never conducted such tests.” (pgs. 480-481) Dr. Guinn expected researchers to take on faith “that a single reading of a single specimen from the core of CE399 was all the data one needed.” (p. 481) What Guinn did not reveal in his testimony was that the FBI had sub-sampled CE399 and the results showed that “All of the Dallas specimens were generally somewhat similar to one another in their Sb and Ag concentrations, but there was a wide spread in the values for individual samples and among the groups of samples.” (ibid) This again directly contradicted Guinn’s claim that there was little variation among bullets but great variation within individual rounds.

    Thomas states that Guinn’s HSCA report stands alone in the field because no single study of bullet metal either before or since “has ever claimed to be able to distinguish individual bullets from within the same production batch. There was no scientific basis for Guinn’s claim that Carcano bullets are unique, or that individual Carcano bullets are materially different from one another.” (p. 472) As metallurgist, Erik Randich, and chemist, Pat Grant, reported in the Journal of Forensic Science in 2006 after reviewing the JFK bullet evidence, “The lead core of the bullets [Guinn] sampled…contained approximately 600-900 ppm [parts per million] antimony and approximtely 17-4516 ppm copper…In both of these aspects the…MC bullets are quite similar to other commercial FMJ [full metal jacket] rifle ammunition.” Therefore, the Kennedy assassination fragments, “need not necessarily have originated from MC ammunition. Indeed, the antimony compositions of the evidentiary specimens are consistent with any number of jacketed ammunitions containing unhardened lead.”

    VI

    Over recent years, the JFK assassination literature has come to be dominated by claims that evidence has been altered or outright fabricated in order to conform to the official story. If we are to believe everything we read, the President’s body was hijacked and his wounds were manipulated, his brain was switched before it went missing from the archives, the autopsy photos and X-rays have been altered, the Zapruder film is a fabrication, Oswald’s body was switched with that of an imposter…the list goes on. In fact, one prominent researcher went so far as to suggest that there were actually two complete sets of evidence—one real and one fake! Undoubtedly there are legitimate areas of concern but at some point we have to step back and realize that the problem may not be with the evidence so much as it is with the researcher. It is for this very reason that Don Thomas’ Hear No Evil is a breath of fresh air.

    One area that has baffled critics for decades is the medical evidence. The autopsy record has undoubtedly been altered in the sense that crucial materials such as the President’s brain, microscopic tissue slides and autopsy photographs known to have been taken have been removed from the archive. But does it necessarily follow that what we are left with is fake? The answer, as Thomas demonstrates, is no. The fact is, the autopsy X-rays of the skull completely contradict the official account of the President’s head wound. So why would conspirators go to the trouble of fabricating evidence that contradicts the story they wish to promote? The same can be said for the Zapruder film which shows Kennedy being slammed backwards and leftwards by the impact of a shot from the right front. In this regard, Thomas shows how people like Luis Alverez, John Lattimer and Larry Sturdivan all constructed dubious theories “for the purpose of explaining away the obvious reason for the head snap, and all suffer, not only from implausibility, but from a failure to fit the evidence.” (p. 370)

    This is the true strength of the book and the reason why I believe it will be such a valuable contribution to the literature. Thomas shows that the problem is not the evidence but how it has been interpreted in the cause of “social constructivism.” He explains how Alverez knowingly “rigged” his experiment to produce a “jet recoil effect.” (Chapter 10) And how NASA rocket scientist, Thomas Canning, fudged the data and moved the President’s wounds to make it appear that the bullet trajectories were consistent with a gunman in the sixth floor window. (Chapter 12) He proves that Vincent Guinn lied under oath and cherry-picked the ballistic data in order to pin the blame on Oswald. (Chapter 13) And he shows how the HSCA forensic pathology panel deliberately misrepresented JFK’s head wound. (Chapter 8) In short, he demonstrates that there is no need to doubt its veracity because “the overwhelming weight of the evidence indicates that there was a conspiracy.” (p. 728) And he fits it all into a sound reconstruction of events that is sure to spark at least the occasional heated debate—but you’ll have to buy the book to find out the details!


    Links to information mentioned in this article:


    Review of Hear No Evil by David Mantik

  • Rodger Remington, Biting the Elephant


    Rodger Remington is a retired history professor. He taught for over thirty years at Aquinas College in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Which, ironically, happens to be the home of former Warren Commissioner Gerald Ford. I say ironically because Remington is a relentless and acute critic of the Commission and their work.

    After Rodger retired from teaching, he began to copy large segments of the Warren Commission volumes at a library. He brought them home and studied them minutely. Shocked and surprised by what he studied, he then started to write a series of books on the Commission’s findings. They are titled, in order: The People v. the Warren Report, The Warren Report, and Fallings Chips. All three were published between 2002 and 2005. He published his latest work, Biting the Elephant, in 2009. This last largely consists of his attempted correspondence with three Commission supporters: Gerald Posner, Ken Rahn, and Vincent Bugliosi. In each case, the author tried to convince the Commission supporters to co-write a book with him that would consist of a point-counterpoint of specific issues in the JFK case. In each instance, the official supporter ultimately declined. In an amusing Roger and Me kind of narrative, the author closely chronicles his prolific but futile attempt to engage the “Warrenati” in his literary enterprise.

    Biting the Elephant also deals with a minute examination of some of the key witnesses the Commission used to place the shots from the upper floors of the Texas School Book Depository. These four are Howard Brennan, Amos Euins, Arnold Rowland, and James Worrell. His examination of the testimony of these four men is searching, nuanced, and thorough. This is important, of course, since the Commission and its supporters rely extensively on these four men – especially Brennan – to pin the murder of President Kennedy on Lee Harvey Oswald. Remington shows just how problematic their testimony is in that regard.

    I

    Remington begins his first chapter with the unwise words of Gerald Ford in Life magazine of 10/2/64. With a mixture of laughter and tears, the reader will recall that Ford described Howard Brennan like this: “The most important witness to appear before the Warren Commission in the 10 months we sat was a neat, Bible-reading steam fitter from Dallas. His name was H. L. Brennan, and he had seen Lee Harvey Oswald thrust a rifle from a sixth floor window of the Texas School Book Depository and shoot the President of the United States.” (Remington, p. 22)

    Immediately afterwards, the author shows just how biased Ford must have been to write this. For Brennan told assistant counsel David Belin, “Well, as it appeared to me he was standing up and resting against the left window sill, with gun shouldered to his right shoulder, holding the gun with his left hand and taking positive aim and fired his last shot.” (ibid)

    In his discussion of Vincent Bugliosi’s Reclaiming History, Remington points out that this is very hard to believe since it would necessitate a bullet going through a glass window. (Remington, p. 352; see also Mark Lane, Rush to Judgment, p. 83) Further, the author shows that, during his visit to Dallas for reconstruction purposes, Belin almost certainly falsified the positioning of Brennan in CE 477. Belin placed him on the wrong ledge of a retaining wall and facing the wrong street. As Rodger points out, the Zapruder frames featured on the cover of Reclaiming History show that Belin was wrong in this. Yet Bugliosi fails to point this out. (ibid, Remington)

    The author points out something else worth noting about this curious witness that Ford was so enamored with. Brennan admitted that he didn’t see the first shot. He actually thought it was a firecracker. But he also admitted that he did not see the rifle explode for the second and third shots either. (WC Vol. III, p. 154) The author deduces that if we are to take this seriously, then Brennan must have been jerking his head back and forth between Kennedy being killed and the shooter in the TSBD – and with miraculous speed and anticipation. In reality, Brennan is not to be taken seriously. As Rodger writes, given these qualifications, “…there is absolutely no factual basis for identifying Howard Brennan as an eyewitness to the shooting…” (pgs. 35-36) Amen.

    But I should add, there may be a reason that Brennan said what he did, in the way he did. As attorney Bob Tanenbaum has stated, if one goes with the Commission’s version of the so-called sniper’s nest, Brennan’s testimony is weird. He is supposed to be the source of the original description of the assassin’s height and weight. But as Tanenbaum notes: If Oswald was kneeling down behind that stack of boxes, how could Brennan have determined his clothing color, height and weight? (WC Vol. III p. 144) This may be why Brennan depicted him standing. But, if that was so, then why did he build the “sniper’s nest”? (It is true that Brennan also said he saw the man before the shooting, but then he said he was sitting on the sill. He later seemed to contradict himself by saying he did not see the window until after the first shot. WC Vol. III, pgs. 144, 154)

    Remington leaves out another dubious point about this strange witness. After the assassination, Brennan went home and said he watched television. During which he viewed Oswald’s face twice. (WC Vol. III, p. 148) Although the Warren Report is confusing on this issue, it seems to say that he then viewed a line-up the evening of the murder and failed to pick out Oswald. (Warren Report, p. 145) David Belin realized this was a problem for boss Gerald Ford’s star witness. So when Brennan testified before the Commission, an excuse was forthcoming. He failed to make the identification that night because he was afraid a communist plot would endanger his family. (ibid,) It was that fear which held him back from making the positive ID at police headquarters the night of the 22nd.

    In his book, No Case to Answer, Ian Griggs has made a detailed and valuable analysis of the Oswald line-ups (pgs. 81-91). In this regard, it is important to note some of the comments made by Brennan on the issue of the line-ups to the Commission. When asked by Belin if he recalled how many people were in the line-up, Brennan answered that he was not sure, possibly “seven more or less one.” (WC Vol. III, p. 147) Which would mean anywhere from 6-8. According to Griggs, there were never more than four men in any line-up. And in fact, there could not have been either 7 or 8. Why? Because the placement allotment allowed for only six people. (Griggs, p. 91) Belin then asked the “star witness” about the ethnic makeup of the line-up, “were they all white, or were there some Negroes in there, or what?” Brennan replied with, “I do not remember.” (ibid) Which is a startling answer. Why? This is 1963, at the height of King’s civil rights movement. The March on Washington occurred several months previous. The Klan was blowing up buildings and buses. Yet Brennan does not recall if there were any black men in the only line-up he ever saw in the most important murder ever in Dallas?

    In this regard, Mark Lane and Harold Weisberg made two brief but telling comments about Brennan’s alleged presence at an Oswald line-up. Harold Weisberg wrote in Whitewash, “It is true that Brennan ‘viewed’ the line-up, although he appears to be the one person of whose presence the police have no written record.” (p. 90) Mark Lane echoed this in Rush to Judgment: “The Dallas police submitted to the Commission a document which they said incorporated the name of every person who attended any of the four line-ups at which Oswald was shown to witnesses. Brennan’s name, however, does not appear therein.” (Lane, p. 91) Odd that the Commission’s star witness should be notable by his absence.

    Griggs thought all the above more than just odd. So the former British detective followed up on it. Griggs found out that although he could find particular times assigned to the four line-ups the police listed, there was no time that the Commission assigned to the one Brennan was allegedly at. (Griggs, p. 90) Griggs found a book – Judy Bonner’s Investigation of a Homicide – in which the author said that Brennan was at the same line-up as Barbara and Virginia Davis, who were witnesses to the Tippit murder. This line up took place on the 22nd at 7:55 PM. (Griggs, p. 88) Yet, when Griggs checked this out with Barbara Davis, she said she did not recall Brennan being there. (ibid, p. 92) Griggs also discovered that no other line-up witness mentioned seeing Brennan. (Griggs, p. 94)

    The detective also found the police notes used to make up the official reports on the four line-ups. Brennan’s name is not listed there either. (ibid, p. 93) Neither is his name in any of the affidavits or testimony of the police officers who supervised the line-ups. (ibid)

    I’ve saved the best for last. John McCloy asked Capt. Will Fritz if he was at the line-up attended by Brennan. Fritz said the following: “I don’t think I was present but I will tell you what, I helped Mr. Sorrels find the time that that man – we didn’t show that he was shown at all on our records, but Mr. Sorrels called me and said he did show him and wanted me to give him the time of the showup. I asked him to find out from his officers who were with Mr. Brennan the names of the people that we had there, and he gave me those two Davis sisters, and he said, when the told me that, of course, I could tell what showup it was and then I gave him the time.” (ibid, p. 94, italics added) This is the man directly supervising the police investigation. Yet he doesn’t know that 1.) Barbara Davis didn’t see Brennan, and 2.) He doesn’t care if Brennan is not listed by his own men as being at that line-up. If someone can find a piece of Commission testimony more openly indicating the cops cooperating with Washington in aid of a cover-up, I would like to see it.

    Like Mary Bledsoe, Wesley Frazier, and others, the weight of the evidence indicates that Brennan was one of the Commission’s manufactured witnesses. If Oswald had participated in a real trial – which the Warren Commission did not even resemble – a skilled and knowledgeable defense attorney would have dismantled Brennan piece by piece. Which is probably why Oswald was killed.

    One of the most interesting parts of Biting the Elephant is that Remington actually proffers a method as to how this happened. He writes of a little noted debate within the Commission over “preparation” of witnesses. This occurred in January of 1964. According to Remington the lawyers who were in favor of witness preparation were Arlen Specter, Joe Ball, and David Belin. They were opposed by assistant General Counsel Norman Redlich. Ultimately, Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin stepped in and decided the dispute in favor of the three assistant counsels. (Remington, p. 53) The understanding arrived at was that “preparations would be summarized in memoranda to be submitted to Redlich. Apparently, somewhere along the way, the requirement for memoranda gave way to the demands of limited time and they were not always provided.” (ibid) I can attest that Remington is right on this. I have seen some of the memoranda at the Dallas Public Library. Before a witness testified the Commission had notes arranged like bullet points as to what the witness would say on specific evidentiary points. It would seem that this is why witnesses were pre-interviewed – sometimes repeatedly – by the FBI, the Secret Service, and sometimes both. One can argue that this preparation occurs at trials today all the time. But at an actual trial, the witness is also cross-examined by the opposing lawyer. No rigorous cross-examination on Oswald’s behalf ever happened during the Commission hearings.

    II

    The three other witnesses that Remington minutely examines are Amos Euins, Arnold Rowland, and James Worrell.

    Euins was a fifteen-year-old high school student in 1963. (p. 36) There are three serious problems his testimony contains for those who use him as a prosecution witness against Oswald. First, when one follows the course of his testimony from the day of the assassination, it is confusing as to whether or not he believes the man he saw in the Texas School Book Depository was white or black. (ibid, p. 39, p. 118) Second, Euins heard four shots. (p. 115) Third, the man he saw in the window had a bald spot in the back of his head – something hard to pin on Oswald. (pgs. 116, 118)

    On the first point, Remington digs deeper into the record and finds out why Arlen Specter treated Euins rather gently. It turns out that on the day of the assassination, Euins told news director James Underwood that the man he saw in the TSBD with a rifle was black. Underwood pressed him on this point by asking him if he was certain. Euins replied that he was. (p. 126) Later on that day, he told the Dallas County Sheriff’s office that them man he saw was a white man. (ibid) Still later, when he was informally questioned by Secret Service agent Forrest Sorrels, he said he was not sure if he was white or black. When he was asked if he could identify the man he saw if he viewed him again, Euins said, “No I couldn’t.” (ibid, p. 127)

    Euins was apparently “prepared” in advance for his Commission appearance. In addition to being handled rather gingerly by Specter, he had a rationale for his jumping back and forth. He now said that the sheriffs’ office had not transcribed what he said accurately. He said he did not tell them the man was white. Only that he had a white spot on his head. (p. 118) He now told Specter that he could not really tell if the man was black or white. (ibid) The problem with this is that, right after the assassination, he told Sgt. Harkness that the man was black. (p. 125) This, of course, would pose serious problems for the Commission since it would eliminate Oswald as the man Euins saw.

    But Remington goes further with Euins. He questions how Euins could have seen a “white spot” on top of the gunman’s head from his vantage point on the ground? (p. 127) The author thinks that Euins picked up this detail from another witness, perhaps James Worrell. For Remington, the capper in all this is an FBI report filed about a week after the shooting. The boy’s stepfather told the agent that the boy had told him what he saw but that “he was not sure whether Euins had seen the shooting or whether he had just imagined it.” (pgs. 126-27)

    Although a bit older than Euins, Arnold Rowland was also a high school student. But as Remington points out, Specter did not treat him nearly as gently as he did Euins. Why? Because Rowland’s testimony posed serious problems for the Commission, in more ways than one. First, he said he saw a person with a rifle in a window other than the designated Sniper’s Nest window. Second, he said he saw a person other than Oswald in the Sniper’s Nest window prior to the assassination.

    Star witness Brennan said he saw a man with a rifle in the southeast corner of the TSBD. Since this was the window on the sixth floor which also contained the peculiar box arrangement and in which the expended three shells were found, the Commission insisted that the assassin fired from there. But Rowland said that he saw a man with a rifle in the opposite window, the southwest one. Further, he said he saw a black man in the southeast corner window, the one the Commission and Brennan said Oswald was firing from. (pgs. 54-55) Consequently, the Commission decided to start an FBI inquiry into Rowland’s background in order to discredit him. To poke holes in his credibility, they first said that although Rowland pointed out the man in the opposite window to his wife, she said she did not see him. The actual reason for this was that she was near-sighted and did not have her glasses on (p. 63) Another way the Commission went after him was to say that he did not tell the police about the African-American man in the “Oswald” window. Yet, as Remington points out, Rowland did tell the FBI about him the next day. The FBI told him this detail was not important. (p. 74) In all, the FBI visited him seven times and he signed four different hand-written notes. (ibid) This included visiting him at work and at his mother-in-law’s house. (pgs. 75, 79) Specter even questioned Rowland about his grades and his IQ, obviously in hope of tripping him up.

    The point Remington is making in all this is the one made many years ago by Sylvia Meagher: the Commission had a clear double standard in their investigation. If a witness told them something helpful with their preconceived verdict, he was treated gently. If what he said was not helpful to them, he was treated roughly. And if that witness did not get the message from the constant visits of the FBI and Secret Service, then Arlen Specter gave him a prolonged third degree grilling. As he did with Rowland.

    James Worrell was more of a mixed bag for the Commission. Like Euins, Worrell said he heard four shots. (pgs. 101, 115) Like Euins, he said he heard them from the upper floors of the TSBD, either the fifth or sixth. (p. 111)

    But here begins the serious official problems with Worrell as a Commission witness. As Remington points out, in the Doubleday version of the Warren Report, there is a photo of Worrell in Washington walking to the Commission HQ to be questioned. He is with three other eyewitnesses: Robert Jackson, Euins, and Rowland. In the picture, Worrell is holding a pair of glasses in a position that suggests he took them off at the photographer’s request. (p. 112) What makes this incident even more fascinating is a fact the author notes next. During the hearings that day, when Worrell’s companions were questioned, each one was asked about the quality of their eyesight. Jackson replied his vision was a perfect 20/20. Rowland said his was better than 20/20. Euins said “I can see real good at a distance, but I can’t see at real close range.” (p. 112. This, of course, would be fine for the Commission’s purposes.) As the author notes, Worrell was not asked about the quality of his eyesight.

    The final problem with Worrell was contained in his affidavit executed on November 23rd. There he said that during the shooting, he “got scared and ran from the location. I ran from Elm Street to Pacific Street on Houston.” There, he stopped to catch his breath and looked back at the building: “I saw a w/m, 5’8″ to 5′ 10″, dark hair, average weight for height, dark shirt or jacket open down front, no hat, didn’t have anything in hands come out of the building and run in the opposite direction from me.” (p. 111) In other words, it appears that Worrell saw someone running out of the back of the Depository right after the shooting. Which would seem to suggest a conspiracy. As does his testimony about hearing four shots.

    So what is the net sum of these four witnesses? The answer is: very little, if anything. Only an inveterate Commission zealot could still believe in Howard Brennan today. As I said, he is a manufactured witness. Euins said he could not identify the man he saw if he saw him again, and did not even know if he was white or black. And his own stepfather doubted his word. Rowland’s testimony actually exonerates Oswald. Worrell’s testimony indicates a marksman in the fifth or sixth floor firing four shots. And then suggests either he, or an accomplice, escaped out the back of the building. Needless to say, at a real trial, in a true adversary proceeding, the defense would look forward to cross-examining these four witnesses.

    III

    The second part of the book is about the author’s interactions with three Magic Bullet fantasists: Gerald Posner, Ken Rahn, and Vincent Bugliosi. Remington outlines his attempts to get any of the three to co-write a book with him debating the merits of the evidence in the JFK case. In the case of Posner, the Case Closed author never wrote him back. He and Rahn had a rather interesting correspondence before the former college professor decided to back out.

    The most interesting communications Remington had with the Magic Bullet crowd was with Bugliosi. Remington notes that in his bloated tome Reclaiming History, the former prosecutor complains that Warren Commission assistant counsel Arlen Specter never answered a letter he wrote to him. Remington then asks us to consider the following in light of that complaint. In February of 2008, after digesting Bugliosi’s giant volume, he penned a letter to the Single Bullet backer. He asked him to cooperate in his book venture. He also listed six pertinent questions they could debate. A couple of these were: 1.) Why was Dr. George Burkley never examined as a witness by the Warren Commission? And 2.) Why were the media records of the 11/22/63 Parkland Hospital press conference never entered into evidence by the Commission? Bugliosi never responded in writing. But he did call Remington on February 20th. (pgs. 304-05) He said he had no time to answer in writing. And during his twenty minutes on the phone, the former prosecutor never directly answered any of his queries. He tried to discount them with a classic lawyer’s brush off: He said they “didn’t go anywhere”.

    After this rather dismissive call, Remington wrote the attorney again on March 3rd. He got no reply. He then wrote him five more times in April and May. There was no reply to any of these. (ibid, p. 309) So, on the evidence of this record, the Single Bullet Fantasy crowd has severe reservations about confronting its critics on a level field.

    In relation to this, I must bring up a point that Remington uncovered about the ersatz London trial that Bugliosi unwisely chose to participate in. Unwise in two senses. First, because it did not in any way resemble a real trial. And secondly, because in spite of that fact, the author took it seriously. And that misjudgment started him down the path to Reclaiming History. Jerry Rose commented after seeing the program that the roster of witnesses was heavily loaded in favor of the prosecution. (The Third Decade, Vol. 3 No. 1 pgs. 16-24) The producers found room for people like Tom Tilson and Paul O’Connor, yet they could not find room for crucial people like Sylvia Odio and James Humes. Further, as Rose notes, the prosecution presented 14 witnesses, twice as many as the defense’s seven. But in spite of all that, Remington reveals that the jury’s first verdict was 7-5 for acquittal. And he got this right from the source, producer Mark Redhead. (p. 303)

    Having been in the jury room for more than one trial, I understand that when you have that kind of vote, it is very hard to overcome each and every juror and get a unanimous verdict. Which was reportedly done here. Clearly, someone in the jury room had to have been riding herd, or there may have been outside interference. (It is clear from all the above, plus what Bugliosi revealed in his book, that the show was slanted for the prosecution.) Remington reveals that the man riding herd may have been the foreman. Because when he interviewed him, he disagreed with the producer Redhead. He said the first vote was 10-2 in favor of conviction. (ibid)

    In fact, the highlight of this second part of the book is the careful but major surgery the author performs on Reclaiming History. Rodger’s approach is different from mine in my multi-part series on the same subject. Remington goes little further than the established record of the Warren Commission. He incorporates little or nothing that was discovered in later years. But even on that ground, he scores some heavy blows against Reclaiming History. One case in point is Bugliosi’s taking to task Mark Lane’s depiction of the famous Katzenbach memorandum. This was the document issued by the acting Attorney General on 11/25 which essentially said that Oswald was the sole killer and the official story must enunciate that clearly. This was before any official Washington inquiry was in process.

    Bugliosi scores Lane for not quoting the first part of the document. The prosecutor then says that this part of the memo states that: “It is important that all of the facts surrounding President Kennedy’s assassination be made public.” The implication being that the memo is not as one sided against Oswald as Lane makes it out to be. Remington notes that the italics are Bugliosi’s, not Katzenbach’s. (Remington p. 324) Bugliosi does not specifically note this, and therefore uses it to hammer home his point against Lane. But even worse, although it is true that the above words are the first in the memo, they are not the only words in the sentence. The full sentence reads as follows: “It is important that all of the facts surrounding President Kennedy’s assassination be made public in a way which will satisfy people in the United States and abroad that all the facts have been told and that a statement to this effect be made now.” The very next sentence is: “The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin: that he did not have confederates who are still at large: and that the evidence was such hat he would have been convicted at trial.” The rest of the five paragraphs in the memo are in the same vein as statement two. (See page 326) Remington thus shows that Bugliosi has quoted selectively in order to make a manufactured point against the man he calls the “dean of distortion”. (p. 324) In any full reading of the memo, it can be fairly said that it was Bugliosi, not Lane, who was doing the distorting. And the tendency to selectively quote, as I have stated and shown elsewhere, is a very serious problem with Reclaiming History.

    Remington also brings out another absolutely puzzling point about Bugliosi’s rather weird attitude toward central evidence in the JFK case. Ever since Cyril Wecht revealed it, the fact that President Kennedy’s brain is missing from the National Archives has posed a real mystery as to this case. And on two levels. First, there is no real explanation as to how and why it is absent. Several authors have made educated guesses as to how this disappearance occurred. But no one has come close to proving their case. The other point that makes this so tantalizing is that, as Wecht has noted, the missing brain is absolutely central to solving the mystery as to what precisely happened to President Kennedy. In a real autopsy, the brain would have been properly sectioned and the path of any bullets through it could have been discerned. In other words, a skilled and experienced pathologist – like say Wecht or Milton Halpern of New York – could have done much to show us how many bullets hit Kennedy’s skull and from which direction(s). Because the brain is absent and because the autopsy was so deficient in this regard, this fundamental point is in hot dispute.

    But it’s even worse than that. As authors like David Mantik and Doug Horne have pointed out, it is hard to believe that the brain depicted by artist Ida Dox in the House Select Committee volumes is actually Kennedy’s brain. Why? Because her renditions depict a brain that is almost fully intact. Yet, many witnesses at the Bethesda autopsy testified to seeing a brain that was blasted away, and therefore did not in any way present an intact brain. Further, on the evening of the 22nd, the brain withdrawn from Kennedy’s skull was not weighed. Which is startling, since it is standard autopsy procedure to weigh the major organs after they are withdrawn. Yet, days later, when a weight was assigned to Kennedy’s brain, it weighed in at 1500 grams. This is also startling. Because the top end weight is about 1400 grams. Autopsy fantasists like Michael Baden try to explain this discrepancy by saying the fixing mixture the brain was soaked in could have added the weight. What he does not allow for is the fact that what was being soaked, by most accounts, was a partial brain. (For a good short treatment of this subject see David Mantik’s essay in Murder in Dealey Plaza, pgs. 261-64).

    Now in any serious, intelligent, and honest discussion of this matter, all these points would have to be enumerated to the reader. And, considering the nature of the evidence, one would have to seriously lament the absence of the brain and the serious failings of the pathologists in this regard. Finally, putting the best face on it, one would conclude that the evidentiary record is hard to decipher.

    How does Bugliosi handle this crucial matter? Like this: “One of the very biggest mysteries concerning missing evidence in the Kennedy assassination, one that continues to fascinate, and one that may never be solved, but fortunately, one that doesn’t’ need to be – since it has mostly academic value – is what happened to President Kennedy’s brain?” (p. 335, Bugliosi’s italics.)

    Is Bugliosi saying what I think he is saying here? That the opportunity to actually dissect bullet tracks through the brain, to photograph those tracks, to preserve tissue slides containing both tissue and lead etc. – that this was all an academic matter? Is he really saying that it had no forensic value in a murder case at all? Even though the murder was accomplished by gunfire and the fatal wound was in the head? How does one explain such a stance? Except that if this is what he is saying, no wonder he would not answer Rodger’s questions in writing.

    In the midst of his discussion of these two important matters – the Katzenbach memo, and the missing brain – Rodger digresses into an enlightening discussion of different modes of finding truth in a complex matter. (Which, if you can believe it, Bugliosi believes the Kennedy case is not. He says the case is simple. If you can reduce the importance of the missing brain to an academic matter, then one can say the case is simple.) Quoting modern philosopher Richard Rorty, the author delineates two ways of pursuing the truth. If we believe that such a thing is attainable, one must grant that the truth is something that must be found. Yet, what men do with this truth is then made by the words one assigns to it. As we have seen in these two instances with Reclaiming History, Bugliosi does a lot more in making the truth than in finding it.

    IV

    For me the high point of the section on Bugliosi, perhaps the peak of the entire book, was the author’s analysis and takedown of Bugliosi’s 53 evidentiary points with which he convicts Oswald. In my series on Reclaiming History, I ignored these since I thought many of them to be – as we will see – rather silly. But academic historian that he is, Remington actually had the discipline and patience to analyze them all.

    One of the things he immediately comes up with is rather startling. Bugliosi’s first nine evidentiary points rely upon the testimony of either Wesley Frazier, Marina Oswald, or Charles Givens. For instance, for his first point, Bugliosi says that prior to 11/21, Oswald had hitched a ride with Wesley Frazier to see his wife only on Fridays. Yet, on the 21st, he did it on Thursday. The prosecutor’s inevitable conclusion is that Oswald went to the Paines on Thursday to pick up the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle. As Rodger points out, the car-sharing idea did not originate with Oswald, but with Frazier inviting Oswald to join him. If that invitation had not been extended, the car rides may not have happened. (p. 341) And the total number of rides previous to the 21st was only four. Not a great sample to establish a defining pattern with. Third, Oswald had missed the previous weekend visit and then quarreled with his wife over the phone on Monday night. Therefore he may have been trying a surprise visit to patch things up with his wife. (ibid).

    Now, if you read Part 6 (especially sections 2 and 3) of my Reclaiming History review, you will see that Wesley Frazier and his brown paper package story has become highly questionable today. And its questionable just about every step of the way. And because of other information about how the Dallas Police searched his house, detained him, and then gave him a midnight polygraph that had him on the brink of hysteria, Frazier has now been exposed as a compromised witness. Which explains why he is guarded today by the likes of Hugh Aynseworth and his colleague in cover up Dave Perry. None of the myriad points I enumerated in that review matters a whit to Bugliosi. He uses Frazier’s coerced testimony and the dubious brown package story for six of his first nine points of indictment. When, in reality, any intelligent , objective observer would tell the prosecutor that if he presented Frazier, Marina, and Givens as his first three witnesses at a real trial, with a defense lawyer like Carol Hewett waiting for them, there would be three extremely long faces exiting the witness chair after she got done with them. Four if you counted Bugliosi’s.

    At point number ten, Bugliosi says that Oswald was play acting when he asked Junior Jarman on 11/22 why there was a crowd gathering below them. Here, the prosecutor is indulging himself in mind reading powers in order to transform something exculpatory into something culpable. Then it gets worse. For point number eleven is none other than Howard Brennan! Point thirteen is this: that Oswald was purchasing a Coke on the second floor when Officer Baker encountered him shows he descended from the sixth floor because he usually drank Dr. Pepper there! (Bugliosi, p.958. I looked this one up in Reclaiming History, since I had a hard time believing the prosecutor took it seriously. He actually does.)

    But further, Bugliosi here says that Oswald placed himself on the sixth floor at the time of the shooting. I didn’t recall anyone saying this before, although perhaps they did. So, like Rodger, I looked up Bugliosi’s source note. I then understood why no one else had used it. The prosecutor was using a summary of one of Oswald’s interrogations while in custody. So for Bugliosi to say that Oswald himself said this is s real stretch. For the simple reason that there is no stenographic record or tape in evidence for these sessions. What we have is Dallas Police, FBI or Secret Service agents’ renditions. But in this case, it’s worse. Harry Holmes was a postal inspector who doubled as an FBI informant. Which is why he was the only non-law enforcement officer there with Oswald. Holmes is the guy who did a lot of cover for the Commission as to how Oswald could have picked up his rifle without the proper papers being signed in order to receive a firearm under an alias. (See John Armstrong, Harvey and Lee, p. 452) Armstrong actually thinks it was Holmes who helped put together the phony money order for the rifle, a money order that is severely out of numerical order for the date it was allegedly purchased. (ibid, pgs. 463-64)

    Holmes’ Oswald interrogation summary was not submitted until December 17th, almost a month after the murder. Then, under oath, he said he heard Oswald say things that others did not hear him say. For when he was examined by the Commission, Holmes said Oswald had admitted he had gone to Mexico before returning to Dallas. (ibid, p. 480) Even David Belin was taken aback by this. He asked Holmes if this was something he picked up from reading the papers, or did Oswald say it himself. Holmes said Oswald stated it. The obvious question, which was not asked by Belin, then becomes: Why is that rather salient fact not in your report, especially since it was finalized on December 17th? And why did no one else hear Oswald say it when you said he did? Holmes also lied about Oswald discussing his postal money order that day. For neither Will Fritz nor two Secret Service agents in his presence on 11/24 recalled Oswald saying anything about a postal money order. (ibid) Yet, Holmes is the man that Bugliosi relies upon for Oswald’s allegedly self-incriminating statements. Without telling us that Holmes appears to have made up other self-incriminating statements.

    But it’s even worse than that. For one when turns to Holmes’ summary as printed in the Warren Report, it does not say Oswald was on the sixth floor. It specifically says he did not indicate the floor he was on at the time of the shooting. (WR, p. 636) And then comes the clincher. When one reads this section of the Holmes report, it becomes clear that the FBI informant is embroidering his story to jibe with the evolving tale of the infamous Charles Givens. For the whole thing about “You go on down and send the elevator back up…” is there in Holmes’ summary. This whole Givens flip-flopping charade was exposed by Sylvia Meagher back in 1971 in the Texas Observer. (8/13/71) On the day of the assassination, the TSBD worker said he had seen Oswald around 11:50 in the so-called domino room on the first floor. Ten days later, on December 2nd, he changed his story for the Secret Service. He now said he saw Oswald upstairs with a clipboard on the sixth floor at around 11:45. As Givens left, Oswald told him to send an elevator back up for him. After that, he never saw Oswald again. Both stories cannot be true. But clearly, Holmes heard about the second story through his FBI grapevine. And he is now trying to create posthumous corroboration by Oswald, which again, no one else heard. Yet Bugliosi uses this obvious concoction as evidence against Oswald.

    Remington summarizes the entire list as follows: of the 53, seven of them are of the “we know” variety. (Remington , p. 438) That is, things that Bugliosi assumes to be a fact, which actually are not e.g. like Oswald owning the rifle in evidence. Another 27 instances consist of the “he said she said” variety (including expert testimony that would have been challenged in court.) With the above general and specific sampling of the 53 points, so much for Bugliosi’s claim of Oswald’s guilt beyond all doubt. (Reclaiming History, p. 953)

    V

    Remington’s critiques of Rahn and Posner are not quite up to his discussion of Bugliosi, but they are still worthwhile. Posner’s pile of junk Case Closed, has been so riddled full of holes that it’s almost not worth the effort to attack anymore: it’s like making the rubble bounce. But still, Rodger makes some interesting and telling points. He notes that, in his defense of the single bullet theory, Posner spent much more time explaining away the timing problem i.e. getting off the three shots in the space of a few seconds, than he did on the ballistics and trajectory problems involved. In fact he spent more time on the former than the latter two combined. (Remington, p. 135) Rodger is also good with the alchemy Posner pulls off with the Willis sisters. If one will recall, Posner built part of his ridiculous theory about an early shot – one before the limousine disappeared behind the sign – around Rosemary Willis turning at the sound of a first shot. A shot that missed. Posner sourced this to an interview Rosemary Willis did in 1979 with one Marcia Smith-Durk. Yet no particular venue is given for this interview. (ibid p. 163) Another source given is from a newspaper that had gone out of business by the time Case Closed was published. But that interview was also from 1979. (ibid) Why nothing in 1963 or 1964? What Posner does not tell you is that Phil Willis had two daughters who were with him in Dealey Plaza that day. And it was Linda Kay Willis who testified in 1964 before the Commission. When she did so testify, she told Wesley Liebeler that it was the second shot that missed. Which effectively kills Posner’s theory, since Oswald could not have hit Kennedy before he went behind the sign since the branches of an oak tree interfered with his sight. Which is probably why Posner didn’t mention the 1964 Willis testimony.

    Finally, Remington points out a rather artful use of ellipsis by Posner. In his discussion of Howard Brennan, Posner consulted the posthumously published memoir by the Commission’s star witness. This was done with a co-author and was entitled Eyewitness to History. In describing a man Brennan saw by looking up at the sixth floor of the TSBD, Posner quotes the following: “His face was almost expressionless…He seemed preoccupied.” Ellipsis can be used and defended if there are only a few words left out of a quote, or even a couple of sentences. But Remington notes that, in this instance, Posner eliminated five paragraphs! But further, what he eliminated mildly suggests a conspiracy. For in what is left out, Brennan is describing a sealed off area of Dealey Plaza toward a side entrance of the TSBD. This side entrance is described as being off Houston Street, toward the rear of the building. The police had sealed the area off with saw horses and forced all cars to move out. Yet Brennan observed a car in that vicinity with a white male driver behind the wheel. As he looked, he wondered why that car was allowed to stay there. What made Brennan even more curious was that the front wheel of the car was pulled sharply away from the curb and the driver had his door partly open. Brennan wondered if this was so the car could make a quick U turn while departing. Brennan closes the five paragraphs cut by Posner with this: “As I was watching the man in the car, I saw a policeman who was on foot walk over towards the car and began talking to the man in a friendly, laughing manner. So far as I could see, there was no attempt to get the man to move his car, and after chatting for a minute or so, the policeman walked back to his post.” (ibid p. 173)

    Brennan closed out this segment by saying that he never saw any accounting of this “mystery car” anyplace. And thanks to Posner’s editing, the reader of Case Closed would not know about it either. Thanks to Rodger, we do.

    The discussion of Rahn is wryly funny. Rahn had by far the longest correspondence with Rodger about co-writing the book on the Warren Commission. They actually exchanged a number of written communications. But ultimately, Rahn backed out. (Remington, p. 211) Rahn, of course, is the man who has always advocated Oswald’s guilt through the now discredited Neutron Activation Analysis test. Rodger wants him to answer one simple question: “How can it be determined that the famous CE 399 was fired that day?” (ibid, p. 201) In all their communications, Rahn never directly answered this question. He tried to build a negative argument that it would have been difficult to plant another bullet. But he never directly answered Rodger’s question. So Rodger asked the question a different way: “How can NAA establish that the bullet in the Single Bullet Theory was actually fired at the time of the assassination?” (ibid, p. 209) This question was never directly answered either.

    From here, the author details the rather weird attempt by Rahn and his partner Larry Sturdivan to get an article about NAA published in an academic journal. They could not get one published in an American journal. Probably because the controversy over the issue was now heating up with the work of men like Pat Grant and Cliff Spiegelman. So they got their work published in a journal based in Budapest, Hungary. And they did it in 2004, the year before the FBI announced they were discontinuing the NAA test. (ibid p. 252)

    The main part of Remington’s discussion of Rahn, deals with his attempt to get a counter-article published in the same journal. Which he ultimately failed to do. He was only allowed to write a brief letter to the editor. And Rahn was allowed to answer it. Then, in 2006, Eric Randich and Pat Grant got their milestone essay published in the Journal of Forensic Sciences. This was followed in 2007 by the work of Cliff Spiegelman and Bill Tobin, for which Spiegelman won an award. (See here.) So in retrospect, the desperate attempt by Rahn and Sturdivan to get their paper published in Budapest, seems like a Hail Mary pass with time expired in the game. And as Rodger points out, the issue in which Sturdivan and Rahn were published in was a tribute to Vincent Guinn! The man who first used (actually misused) the test to convict Oswald for the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

    As to the quality of the scholarship within, Rodger gives us a taste of it through some quotes attributed to Sturdivan. These are some of his points:

    1. NAA eliminates all conspiracy theories that involved additional shooters.
    2. NAA proved the rifle was not planted
    3. NAA proved that the precise locations of JFK’s head wounds and back wounds were not needed to solve the case
    4. It supported the Single Bullet Theory
    5. It knit together the physical evidence into an airtight case against Oswald, thereby putting the matter to rest.

    Quite a series of claims in light of the fact that the alleged science of NAA was soon be negated by the two teams of researchers named above. To the point that the FBI and courts will not use it again. It is further rendered ridiculous by the work of John Hunt, Gary Aguilar, and Josiah Thompson, which proves that CE 399 was not fired that day, and the bullet found at Parkland Hospital was later switched. (See my review of Reclaiming History, part 7, Section 3) All this shows just how out of touch with the facts Rahn and Sturdivan really are.

    Rodger Remington’s work is not for everyone. He is a classic type of researcher in that he stays within the boundaries of the Warren Commission materials. There is no discussion of Kennedy and Vietnam, of Oswald and the CIA, of Ruby and the Mafia etc. There is no development of the revelations of the ARRB. But if you can allow for that, it’s a rewarding book. As for me, there is no amount of dirt that can cover the withering corpse of the Warren Commission. So any further burial is always welcome.

  • David Aaronovitch, Voodoo Histories


    An Incurious Man: David Aaronovitch’s Voodoo Histories


    On June 10, 1963, John F. Kennedy explained the foreign policy of the United States like so:

    World peace, like community peace, does not require that each man love his neighbor – it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement. And history teaches us that enmities between nations, as between individuals, do not last forever. However fixed our likes and dislikes may seem, the tide of time and events will often bring surprising changes in the relations between nations and neighbors. [1]

    On November 26, 1963, Lyndon Johnson expressed American foreign policy a little differently:

    It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy …

    We should concentrate our own efforts, and insofar as possible we should persuade the Government of South Vietnam to concentrate its efforts, on the critical situation in the Mekong Delta. This concentration should include not only military but political, economic, social, educational and informational effort. We should seek to turn the tide not only of battle but of belief, and we should seek to increase not only the control of hamlets but the productivity of this area, especially where the proceeds can be held for the advantage of anti-Communist forces. [2]

    As historians, we might ask ourselves if there were any significant events that occurred in between these two events that might explain the difference. And we might, after a moment, think of the Kennedy assassination. However, if we were to do so, as logical as that might seem, we would be placing ourselves in opposition to most mainstream history of the last 47 years. Mainstream historians tend to ignore the significance of these changes, and some (like Noam Chomsky) have even argued that Kennedy was simply lying on June 10th and that JFK’s foreign policy would have been the same as Johnson. Recent revelations from various members of Kennedy’s cabinet have given the lie to this viewpoint, however.

    There is another possible position to take on this issue. One could, in principle, say that it is simply insanity to even ask the question. Asking the question is already to take leave of one’s senses, to lose touch with reality. That is David Aaronovitch’s position.

    His book Voodoo Histories: the Role of Conspiracy Theory in Modern History has a contradiction built right into the title. According to Aaronovitch, conspiracy theories play no role in modern history, except as diversion and nonsense. In order to make his case, the author discusses several different conspiracy theories from all over the world. And it is here where we find the real problem of his book.

    ORGANIZATION

    Books of this type (Gerald Posner’s Case Closed, Vincent Bugliosi’s Reclaiming History and so forth) generally rely on amateur psychology, failure to address the evidence, omission and falsification, and just plain illogic. Voodoo Histories has elements of all these things, although it far surpasses those works in terms of literary execution. However, the most important thing to note about the book is its organizational structure. In succession, the main topics of each chapter are the following: (1) The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, (2) Leon Trotsky and the Moscow Trials; (3) McCarthyism; (4) JFK; (5) the murder of Hilda Murrell; (6) the Da Vinci code; (7) 9/11 Truth; (8) the suicide or murder of Dr. David Kelly; and (9) the Obama birth certificate flap.

    Let us first note that these topics are, to put it mildly, eccentric. Mixed into these various broad topics are: the alleged murder of Princess Diana, the moon landing hoax, Holocaust denial, etc. He does show restraint in not discussing UFOs or Elvis, but virtually every other conspiracy theory gets addressed at some point. This is quite clever. With an assortment like this, one’s head is likely to be nodding in agreement at some point – maybe most of them. And there is the occasional fact that one might find intriguing; for example, I was surprised to learn that two-thirds of alien abduction “victims” are women. Granted, I’d never given the matter any thought before, but that is sociologically interesting.

    Most of these chosen targets are easy. The Protocols, among other things, were enthusiastically endorsed by Henry Ford. Ford’s anti-Semitism was such that he received the Grand Cross of the German Eagle, the highest honor that could be given to a non-German, by Adolf Hitler in 1938. [3] Unfortunately, this document remains relevant in our time, as there are some right-wing groups who cling to it, sometimes with the caveat that they don’t really mean the Jews as such, or not all Jews, or only the international banking Jews. People like Henry Makow and Alex Jones take the documents seriously, as did the late William Cooper. [4] In a case like this, the “conspiracy” plays second fiddle to the real issue, which is pure anti-Semitism. And though Aaronovitch’s discussion of the Protocols brings nothing new to the table, the subject matter is certainly worthy of attention.

    However, of the other topics addressed in his book, there are really only two that concern the vast majority of political researchers: JFK and 9/11. The Obama birth certificate flap is an extension of various right-wing fantasies, although calling this a “conspiracy theory” is a bit of a stretch. I’m not sure how many people believed that the birth certificate had been manipulated with the foreknowledge that one day Obama would be a presidential candidate – hopefully very few. The Moscow Trials, while interesting historically, are not terribly relevant to today’s world. McCarthyism is a curious topic for the author to address, but dealing with it in any detail would require a much longer essay in itself. However, there are many contradictions and problems in dealing with McCarthy, and Aaronovitch doesn’t really go into them; he takes the standard position that McCarthy’s delusionary conspiracy theory ran out of control. There are two British murder investigations, into Hilda Murrell, an activist, and Dr. David Kelly, who had inconvenient information. While the interest in both cases is understandable (Murrell’s body was allegedly in her garden for four days before being found, and Dr. Kelly’s death had numerous curious details), the historical impact of these deaths (with all due respect) is minimal. Meanwhile, the Da Vinci code is shoehorned incongruously into the book, a topic for which the author has only disdain (his title for this chapter is “Holy Blood, Holy Grail, Holy Shit,” which sums up his attitude).

    We can therefore see, looking at this organization, that there is an immediate flaw in the conception, for there are an infinite number of ways to organize any given dataset. Aaronovitch, for his part, has selected a structure with two great benefits: (1) much of the material will superficially appear to support his thesis, and (2) it guarantees that readers will find some things to agree with, even if they dispute other sections of the book – an excellent marketing strategy.

    Unfortunately, his decision is hardly satisfactory to anyone serious. Most political researchers, in doing analysis of certain significant events, discuss JFK, MLK, 9/11, and numerous other incidents of major world importance. But if one were to take the approach of, say, People magazine, one might write a book and include JFK alongside Marilyn Monroe and Princess Diana. That is, to say, in the world of commercial tabloids, or a star-obsessed perspective, the connection between the people or events involved ceases to be political. It rests, instead, on the fact that they are famous. “What makes the deaths of JFK, Marilyn Monroe, and Princess Diana so fascinating is the victims’ iconic status and their youth,” writes the author. [5]

    Note how reductive this point of view becomes. All information exists, in the word chosen by John McAdams, as a series of “factoids.” Aaronovitch’s book, by endorsing this structure, is a Procrustean Bed equalizing all inquiry. As in the game Trivial Pursuit, the questions “Who Shot J.R.?” and “Who Shot JFK?” are worth the same piece of pie. No one whose interest is truth can afford to take this approach to what amount to the most serious historical subjects of our time.

    JFK

    By and large, this is not an evidential book. He doesn’t address the major assassinations in any detail, apart from Kennedy. His entire take on RFK is summed up as: “And if you thought JFK had been killed by ‘them,’ then why not his brother, gunned down in California in 1968?” [6] Alas, in his chapter on the JFK assassination, although he does not rely on simple rhetoric for his attacks, the evidence he sites is vastly out of date. There is nothing new in his discussion, particularly in light of Bugliosi’s recent Reclaiming History. If Bugliosi can’t prove the Warren Commission thesis in 2600 pages, then Aaronovitch will not be able to do so in 30 or so. However, he at least gives it a try, which is more than we can say about his assessment of the other political murders.

    Aaronovitch’s point of view on Oswald is as follows:

    If one reads the Warren Report, the circumstantial evidence that Oswald was the lone gunman seems overwhelming. He worked at the Texas School Book Depository, where, on the sixth floor, after the shooting, his rifle was discovered inside an improvised sniper’s nest. People had seen a man at the sixth-floor window, had seen the rifle barrel, had heard the shots. Oswald was the only employee unaccounted for after the shooting, and he was picked up shortly afterward in a cinema, having just shot a policeman looking for someone of his description. The words ‘slam dunk’ come to mind. [7]

    Did I say the author was trying? OK, maybe not so much.

    Without going into the evidence for all of this (see Jim DiEugenio’s book on Bugliosi [8] for a detailed rundown, as arguing with Aaronovitch is both redundant and silly given the scale of the other battle), note that he just restates the Warren Commission’s conclusions. When one looks into the detailed evidence, the case falls apart. Aaronovitch isn’t going to volunteer that the rifle was ordered under a different name, that the FBI initially failed to get prints off the rifle, that the FBI’s own nitrate test cleared Oswald of the murder, that the rifle changed shape three times before settling into the form of a Manlicher-Carcano, and that the State would never have been able to make a case against Oswald for shooting the policeman J.D. Tippit, much less JFK. “The detail is overwhelming,” he complains. [9] Yes, it is; such is the price for doing the investigative work. Unfortunately, if you don’t do the work, you are going to end up ineffectually repeating the same balderdash that nobody believed in 1963.

    And, of course, he does. He calls the idea that Oswald shot at General Edwin Walker “an incontrovertible fact,” an embarrassing statement which he may want to delete in future editions. [10] He says of Norman Mailer’s book Oswald’s Tale that “It is suggestive that one of the eminent Americans who initially advocated the notion of conspiracy changed his mind when he began to study Oswald the man.” [11] It is indeed suggestive of the fact that Mailer desperately needed money to help him with the IRS, but apart from that it is unclear just how liberal Mailer was in the first place. Having gone through a substantial amount of personal correspondence located at the Harry Ransom Center at the University of Texas, I can say that his political views were not consistent with his public statements; among other things, one of his best friends was G. Gordon Liddy.

    The rest of his short JFK discussion, encased in a chapter entitled “Dead Deities,” will convince no one but the already convinced. And anyone convinced by his evidence doesn’t understand the concept.

    9/11

    Aaronovitch’s take on 9/11 is somewhat depressing. It is depressing because I am in the unfortunate position of having to agree with much of it. This is less a triumph on the author’s part and more a reflection on how disastrous the various truth movements have become. As a result of the large-scale illiteracy infecting those who would question the events of 9/11, many ridiculous notions have become commonplace memes. Aaronovitch goes right for them.

    He describes a conversation with the alleged MI5 whistleblower David Shayler, who has been promoted by Alex Jones and Webster Tarpley, among others, in which he makes the absurd statement that a “cigar-shaped missile” struck the World Trade Center. [12] He invokes Dylan Avery’s popular film Loose Change, itself an easy target because of numerous factual errors and its endorsement of the no-plane-hit-the-Pentagon theory. This leads naturally into the work of Thierry Meyssan, who invented the no-plane theory, and then Aaronovitch uses this same theory to undermine David Ray Griffin, who gave and continues to give credence to it. Meyssan, of course, has been linked to Michael Collins Piper, and to the right-wing American Free Press and Christopher Bollyn. [13] The anti-Jewish nature of AFP is apparent to anyone familiar with the publication, which is also a trait of Eric Hufschmid, who produced one of the first films about 9/11 called Painful Questions. There are a couple of pages dedicated to Tarpley, who although he has reportedly left the LaRouchies behind, continues to believe in a worldview indistinguishable from LaRouche, with a powerful and controlling central government producing Star Wars defense systems and nuclear plants.

    Now Aaronovitch doesn’t do a particularly good job of attacking these people – it is, for the most part, guilt-by-association – but in fact there is little I can say in their defense. I have dealt with a couple of these folks personally, and from my reading of the situation they arguably have done more damage than help in the 9/11 investigation. However, this could not have happened without the hordes of eager followers who read too little and watch too much. Aaronovitch doesn’t even exploit what may be the most incredible person to emerge from all this – Ace Baker – whose theory includes holographic planes at the Pentagon and WTC. As Horatio once said to Hamlet, “T’would be to consider too curiously to consider so.” And people continue to eat it up, not recognizing the contradiction in uniting behind a charismatic leader to oppose fascism.

    The author does not deal with Peter Dale Scott’s The Road to 9/11 nor with the more credible sections of Mike Ruppert’s Crossing the Rubicon because in doing so he would come up against the real questions of 9/11: the lack of military response, Norman Mineta’s testimony about Dick Cheney and the Pentagon plane, the fact that the Patriot Act was written prior to 9/11, the various business interests that gained from the attacks much the way Bell Helicopter profited from Vietnam. He doesn’t deal with these issues and he doesn’t have to, because the 9/11 movement has given him holograms and holes to fight instead.

    OCCAM’S RAZOR AND THE ‘TRIUMPH OF NARRATIVE’

    At some point in all of these books, there comes a point where the author must assert that conspiracists are psychologically damaged in comparison with the well-adjusted author. That happens a few times over the course of the book in different guises.

    One tool that the author uses is to bring in Occam’s Razor. I have written about this particular device at length elsewhere, [14] but the main point is to remember that Occam’s Razor is a bit of advice that may or may not be useful depending on the context. It is entirely useless in biology, for example. It also depends heavily on what one means by the “simplest explanation.” For example, in the 9/11 attacks, the “simplest explanation” is said to involve a man on kidney dialysis who trains and inspires a team of devout Muslims from a cave in Afghanistan and never mind his long ties with the CIA, the Bush family, the fact that his followers apparently enjoyed drink and drugs, [15] wrote suicide notes that appeared to contradict Islam, [16] and so on. Trying to find the simplest model for something may or may not be a fruitful approach depending on circumstances.

    The other tool is best exemplified by his discussion of a British biologist (yes, a biologist, but leave that aside for the moment) called Lewis Wolpert who theorizes that human beings have a “cognitive imperative” to attribute causes to the events of the world. The biologist tells us that all human beings have “a strong tendency to make a causal story to provide an explanation … ignorance about important causes is intolerable.” This represents, says this biologist, the “triumph of narrative.” [17]

    There is little more than a restatement of Hume (and a pinch of Foucault) in this, but we should first note that if we take Wolpert seriously, we not only destroy religious belief but undermine science as well. Wolpert proposes a torch, but his torch is actually a flamethrower, burning down all possibilities of understanding the world. If he is correct, we will always be projecting our private consciousness onto everything like the conspiracies proposed by the heroes of Umberto Eco’s hilarious novel Foucault’s Pendulum.

    What Aaronovitch wants to do, of course, is assert that opposition to the state will always follow a fantastical pattern desired by the conspiracists. Once again, however, his perspective on the issue has unintended consequences. In his chapter on the Moscow Trials, he reports how people were convinced of the guilt of the parties in the dock, and how the German novelist Lion Feuchtwanger gradually became convinced of the reverse. Feuchtwanger describes how he heard “what they said and how they said it,” and that “I was forced to accept the evidence of my senses and my doubts melted away …” [18] Does Aaronovitch take this opportunity to explain that Feuchtwanger is a conspiracy theorist, in opposition to consensus reality, and that his certainty is simply a symptom of his derangement? He does not. What is the difference? The identity of the state apparatus. Aaronovitch, like the Western press generally, is willing to accept conspiracy theories as they appear in other countries. Think back to when there was much speculation about Vladimir Putin’s role in the assassination of a political rival or Gerald Posner himself when discussing a possible Saudi conspiracy. [19]

    TO THE MAN

    To his credit, Aaronovitch does not engage in specific name-calling the way some have done in identifying certain people as idiots or lunatics. He is far too subtle for that. He works at creating associations to undermine the serious by lumping them in with the unserious. I will do him the same credit here. However, since he does decide to psychoanalyze conspiracy theorists, albeit with the assistance of a biologist, permit me to place him on the couch for a moment.

    The son of a well-known Communist and anti-American comic book activist, Aaronovitch grew up as a Communist himself. He staged a protest in 1975 as part of the Manchester team on a UK television show called University Challenge, in which he and his fellows answered every question with the name of a revolutionary. [20] However, like Christopher Hitchens, after 9/11 he ceased being a leftist gadfly and became a raving warmonger, arguing that the Iraq War was justified simply to remove Saddam even if no WMDs were found. [21] Even when the scale of the disaster was evident, he refused to back down:

    The government has lost a great deal of trust precisely because the weapons haven’t been found, and because the Gilliganesque charge that Number 10 somehow lied about their presence, has stuck. The trouble is that I find – partly as a result of the Hutton inquiry (the evidence, not the report) – that I don’t believe the government did lie. As the MoD intelligence dissident, Brian Jones, wrote to the Independent last week, “I cast no doubt on Mr Blair’s integrity. He evidently believed that Iraq possessed a significant stockpile of chemical or biological weapons and expected them to be recovered during or soon after the invasion… such a discovery would have enhanced, rather than undermined, ‘the global fight against weapons proliferation’.” [22]

    Of course this was nonsense, and the Blair government made no errors in analysis. They lied, as did the Bush administration. [23] And eventually Tony Blair resigned his position to take a job at J.P. Morgan. [24] We should not, of course, draw any conclusions from this.

    If we wanted to be amateur psychoanalysts, we could say that Mr. Aaronovitch is protesting too much; that is, that the former Communist is now bending over to prove his moderate credentials. And that he has become so blinded in his confusion that he now refuses to conform to reality in drawing his conclusions, continuing to defend the insanely corrupt Blair government despite voluminous physical evidence showing it to be a cesspool. He also reaches to defend the decision to remove Saddam because of the leader’s inherent evil, while not dealing with any of the geopolitical consequences in any sort of serious fashion. He thus transmutes himself into a less masculine version of Ann Coulter.

    Q.E.D.

    At one point in his book, Aaronovitch points out that “from 1933 to 1963, only Eisenhower was not the target of assassins.” [25] He doesn’t count the attempted overthrow of the Roosevelt government in this analysis, although one easily could. [26] He also doesn’t draw the conclusion that the U.S. is some sort of banana republic, given this history; instead, he notes how it provides ample evidence that America produces unmotivated psychopathy at a rate unparalleled in the Western world.

    And this really gets us to the crux of the matter. In order to believe Aaronovitch, you have to take a long string of incidents and pretend they are of no consequence in American history. JFK orders withdrawal from Vietnam, fires Allen Dulles, and is murdered on November 22, 1963. In 1965, Malcolm X is shot to death, shortly after the pilgrimage to Mecca that greatly changed his views on racial conflicts in society. On April 4, 1967, MLK begins to attack the Vietnam War directly in a great speech called “A Time to Break Silence.” On April 4, 1968, King is shot to death. Bobby Kennedy is running for President at the time. In June of 1968, he is shot to death. Fred Hampton and Mark Clark of the Black Panthers are shot to death in December of 1969. Huey Newton goes to prison, Bobby Seale goes through his infamous trial, Stokely Carmichael is forced out of the country during the 1970s. The Democratic National Convention of 1968 is a disaster, paving the way for both Kevin Phillips’s Southern strategy and a Nixon administration that changes the face of politics. There is no one for the left to unite under, although there is a lukewarm coalition behind Allard Lowenstein. Lowenstein was certainly not in the class of these former men, and in fact was a CIA informant, [27] but he was nonetheless shot to death himself in 1980. Also murdered in 1980 was John Lennon, not a political figure as such but greatly feared by the Nixon administration, and hated by an FBI that tried to deport him numerous times. Harvey Milk, the first openly gay man to receive public office in the United States, is shot to death in 1978.

    Now at the same time that this is happening, we have an insane war in Vietnam, the oil shocks of the 1970s, and a vast wave of rightward movement culminating in Reagan’s “morning in America” in the 1980 election campaign. After that, the right-wing has enough momentum to continue demolishing the left to such an extent that even when Bill Clinton is elected President, Clinton’s liberalism can hardly be said to exist in comparison to people like Dr. King or the latter-day Bobby Kennedy. Liberalism, in effect, is wiped out. Aaronovitch invokes the book The Assassinations but fails to deal with the evidence in favor of its basic premise, which is that there was an internal war against the Left to prevent what would have been a revolution.

    In order to decry this as some sort of conspiratorial fantasy, you have to say that none of this matters, that none of it had any real effect on history (the Chomsky structuralist interpretation), and to hold that believing otherwise makes you crazy. But look at what this means. In an ordinary criminal investigation, the closest parties to a murdered person become suspects. That is, if a woman is killed and she is married, all things being equal, the husband most likely did it. Children, overwhelmingly, are molested, beaten, and killed by their parents and not by strangers. That is because human beings operate from internal motives; they generally don’t kill at random or from a sociopathic perspective.

    But it’s even worse than this. This line of reasoning suggests that the higher the stakes, the more likely it is that a murder is committed for no motive. In other words, it is reasonable to suggest that a guy who desperately needs money to pay rent might rob a liquor store, but to suggest that Lyndon Johnson (for example) had Kennedy killed in order to become President of the United States is unreasonable. This is illogical. Obviously, the greater the stakes, the more attractive criminal undertakings become. The history of Europe is filled with the devious murders of kings for the purpose of usurpation; just read Shakespeare.

    The inherent lie in Aaronovitch’s work is that it is in any sense an honest review of “conspiracy theory.” I have many problems with this phrase in general, but putting those aside for the moment, the reason that there are conspiracy theories is because those models fit reality better than other models. For example, in the JFK case, there is a Warren Commission model that has been falsified by thousands of pieces of evidence out together in painstaking fashion by those who care about truth. In the course of this arose other models that attempt to better explain what happened, and some are no doubt closer than others. This is normal science. The distinction is that the WC model has a political value attached to it which is not dependent on its truth value.

    If the author had truly been serious about writing an overview of conspiracies, he might have left behind the large package of straw men gathered in this book. He might have instead chosen from any number of real historical events, such as the 1846 invasion of Mexico led by Zachary Taylor, the 1898 bombing of the Maine leading to the Spanish-American War, Operation Paperclip, Operation Gladio, the Manhattan Project, the coup of Salvador Allende, the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Iran Contra … there are endless examples, of which these are but a few. In doing so, he might have been to construct a model of how such things are done and thus produced some valuable work.

    It’s obvious why he doesn’t go into these other cases. For example, he doesn’t say anything about the RFK case in his book, because if you simply list the agreed-upon facts in order, any idiot can see that Sirhan didn’t kill RFK. It’s physically impossible. Aaronovitch has produced a book that resembles talk radio, in that it speaks in a mocking tone designed to appeal to an audience confident in their conclusions and unacquainted with evidence. In so doing he produces another in a long assembly line of tomes purporting to enlighten but instead steeped in a smear campaign.

    In a final bit of irony, Aaronovitch ends his book by using a long quote by the historian Stephen Ambrose, in which Ambrose complains that conspiratorial thinking led to the conditions that created McCarthy. [28] Why is this ironic? Because, rather like the disingenuous hack Gerald Posner, Ambrose was a serial plagiarist. [29] He, also like Posner, was heavily criticized for the shoddy research work that went into his books. [30] There was also the ugly incident involving James Bacque, for whom Ambrose had been a mentor. Bacque discovered evidence in the Soviet archives that Dwight Eisenhower had allowed Russian soldiers to starve to death while outside in prison camps. Ambrose initially supported the work, but then later denounced it, as Ambrose’s best known work was his allegedly definitive biography of Eisenhower. [31] Aaronovitch’s use of Ambrose is therefore very apt indeed. He was the perfect example of the modern American historian, a plagiarist maintaining the consensus by means of covering his eyes and ears.

    Aaronovitch learned his lessons well. Ultimately, Voodoo Histories is a perfect illustration in the art of not paying attention.


    Notes

    1. John F. Kennedy, speech at American University, 10 June 1963.

    2. National Security Action Memorandum No. 273.

    3. Neil Baldwin, Henry Ford and the Jews (Public Affairs: NY 2001), 284.

    4. For Jones and Makow, see http://www.prisonplanet.com/121504makow.html; for Cooper, see his book Behold a Pale Horse (Light Technology Publishing: Flagstaff, AZ: 1991), where he instructs the reader to replace the word “Jew” with “Illuminati” and the word “goyim” with “cattle.” No joke.

    5. David Aaronovitch, Voodoo Histories: The Role of Conspiracy in Shaping Modern History (Penguin: NY 2010), 268.

    6. Ibid, 131.

    7. Ibid, 127-128.

    8. James DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland.

    9. Aaronovitch, 129.

    10. Ibid, 134.

    11. Ibid, 136.

    12. Ibid, 249.

    13. Ibid, 260-261.

    14. http://wp.me/pPsLn-b

    15. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1340519/FBI-tracks-down-the-Florida-lair-of-flying-school-terrorists.html

    16. http://www.commondreams.org/views01/0929-07.htm

    17. Aaronovitch, 354.

    18. Ibid, 65.

    19. http://www.satribune.com/archives/sep7_13_03/P1_slept.htm

    20. http://www.newstatesman.com/society/2008/11/david-aaronovitch-hoggart-abba

    21. http://www.guardian.co.uk/Columnists/Column/0,5673,945551,00.html

    22. http://www.buzzle.com/editorials/2-16-2004-50627.asp

    23. http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23803734-french-accuse-tony-blair-of-soviet-style-propaganda-in-run-up-to-iraq-war.do

    24. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7180306.stm

    25. Aaronovitch, 132.

    26. See The Plot to Seize the White House by Jules Archer & War is a Racket by Smedley Butler. The story is also retold in the superb documentary The Corporation.

    27. See The Pied Piper by Richard Cummings (Imprint.com, 1985).

    28. Aaronovitch, 356.

    29. http://www.forbes.com/2002/05/10/0510ambrose.html

    30. http://hnn.us/articles/504.html

    31. http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/24/books/ike-and-the-disappearing-atrocities.html?pagewanted=1

  • Lamar Waldron, with Thom Hartmann, Legacy of Secrecy


    Ultimate Legacy: A Book Review by William Davy


    Legacy of Secrecy (Updated Edition)
    The Long Shadow of the JFK Assassination
    By Lamar Waldron with Thom Hartmann
    Counterpoint. 922 pp. $24.95


    Attention JFK researchers: You can fold up the tents and go home. The case has been solved! Yep, Lamar Waldron (and presumably co-author Thom Hartmann) have closed the case for us. According to the revised edition of Legacy of Secrecy (the sequel to the equally absurd Ultimate Sacrifice), the grassy knoll shooter has been identified. And he is none other than (drum roll please) … Watergate burglar Bernard Barker. That’s right; one of Howard Hunt’s handpicked Cuban operatives was the perpetrator of the dirty deed. You see, he was hired by Mafia boss Santos Trafficante who was working with fellow Mobsters Roselli and Marcello, the Teamsters, Cubans, assorted racists and some rogue CIA officers who all coalesced to ,,, ah, forget it. I’m confused too.

    As we head into 2010, the “Mafia did it” theory grows exponentially in asininity. (In light of Jim Douglass’ JFK and the Unspeakable, “extinct” would be the better word). Yet these forays into the bizarre ether of Waldron’s fantasies should now be familiar to readers of his logically challenged volumes. For those who aren’t already painfully aware of Ultimate Sacrifice‘s central thesis, it is thus: JFK and RFK had planned an invasion of Cuba led by Cuban exiles (which would also require a massive full-scale military invasion of the island) for December 1 of 1963 to coincide with an American planned and supported coup d’Ètat led by one of Fidel Castro’s closest associates. This bloody coup was to also include the assassination of Castro. Of course, these invasion plans were postponed by JFK’s death at the hands of the Mafia in Dallas on November 22nd.

    That these central premises fail to pass even the basic of smell tests is an understatement. Let’s review: The supposed Kennedy invasion plan would have required a military commitment (according to Joint Chiefs’ estimates) of roughly 100,000 troops – approximately our military footprint in Iraq today. Waldron would have us believe that the Kennedys withheld this critical bit of information from Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of State Rusk, Vice President Johnson, the Joint Chiefs, NSC head McGeorge Bundy and a host of others for fear that it would “leak out.” Yet Waldron would have his credulity-strained audience also believe that bottom feeders like David Ferrie, Jack Ruby, the Mob and the most notorious blabbermouths of all, the anti-Castro Cubans, all had advance knowledge of the plan! The Mafia, apparently as confused as Waldron, decided to bump off JFK instead of waiting a couple of weeks for the coup plan to commence, which would have secured their former toehold on gambling and vice on the island. However, not even his brother’s assassination was going to stop RFK from proceeding with the deadly plan. Waldron claims further that the gung ho Bobby was prepared to reactivate the coup plan within weeks of his brother’s murder. That RFK was in no condition or position to do so is blatantly obvious to anyone who has read (and processed) David Talbot’s book Brothers. On top of all of this, Castro’s guy, Juan Almeida, who was to lead the treasonous coup against Fidel, is still a high ranking official in the Castro government today. (Of course, the actual reasons for the subsequent cover-up are rendered senseless by Waldron’s thesis).

    Ultimate Sacrifice, first published in 2005, took 904 pages to lay out its half-baked theory. In 2009 Waldron and Hartmann followed up their magnum opus with the sequel Legacy of Secrecy where their inane theorizing was applied to the MLK and RFK assassinations. And yes, the Mafia was responsible there too. You see, New Orleans Mob boss Marcello was a racist and wanted King bumped off because MLK supposedly declared war on the Mafia (I’m not making this up folks). A purported third volume will pin the assassination of Trotsky on the Mafia as well (just kidding). With Legacy weighing in at 922 pages, the combined goofiness reaches a whopping 1,826 pages, rivaling Vincent Bugliosi’s overblown mess, Reclaiming History.

    Now we have the obligatory “revised edition” of Legacy of Secrecy. Released in soft cover, the revision includes an addendum where Waldron lays out his shocking new Barker “revelation.” Of course, as in the earlier volumes, the nonsense is presented with a patina of scholarship – copious footnotes referencing newly released documents that supposedly support Waldron’s contentions. I say supposedly because in most cases they don’t. For instance, in Ultimate Sacrifice Waldron refers to a key document purportedly titled “Plan for a Coup in Cuba”. In fact the document is titled “State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba” which takes on a totally different relevancy given its full title. Other documents apparently ignored by Waldron include a Defense Department document that refers to the invasion plan as a “sexy” contingency and not a concrete plan. Another document from the JMWAVE CIA station in Miami dated February 9th, 1964 claims the coup plot “may be nothing more than pure rumor or wishful thinking.”

    During his short tenure in office, Kennedy and his advisors crafted numerous contingency plans. SIOP-62, the plan to launch the entire American nuclear arsenal in one massive pre-emptive strike, was one such contingency. But by Waldron’s logic, JFK was on the threshold of initiating Armageddon. This trend continues in the revised Legacy of Secrecy. Waldron states that New Orleans private detective Guy Banister was originally considered as the CIA cutout for the CIA/Mafia Castro assassination plots (a role that ultimately did fall to former FBI man, Robert Maheu). This is supported by a footnote that references two CIA documents. So far, so good. Fortunately for the reader (and unfortunately for Waldron) both documents are available on-line at the Mary Ferrell website. Waldron could actually have been on to something here, but the documents he cites are too equivocal to make that leap. The closest they come is that Banister’s detective agency was being considered as a business cover (under Project QKENCHANT) and that he was subsequently not utilized. But as we’ve seen, this peculiar interpretation of the written record is standard operating procedure in Waldron’s oeuvre. Other questionable conclusions are Barker’s affiliation with David Ferrie due to their mutual pedophilia(!), and the aforementioned “Barker on the grassy knoll revelation.”

    Barker’s presence in Dealey Plaza adds to an already bloated cast of characters. Apparently in an effort to cover all of his bases, Waldron also has on hand in Dealey Plaza: Eladio del Valle, Herminio Diaz, Michel Victor Mertz, Charles Nicoletti, Gilberto Policarpo Lopez, and an unnamed Roselli assassin. Whew! Waldron’s grassy knoll has become more crowded than a Wal-Mart on Black Friday.

    Just as ludicrous is Waldron’s contention that two attempts on the President’s life occurred earlier in November in Chicago and Tampa (both Mob sponsored of course). While there is convincing evidence of a Chicago plot (presented decades ago by Edwin Black and not the one proposed by Waldron), the Trafficante backed Tampa plot has its problems as well. The St. Petersburg Times reported in its November 23rd, 2005 edition that a Florida Department of Law Enforcement special agent, Ken Sanz was working as a consultant on a book about Trafficante. Asked about the Tampa/Trafficante plot, Sanz replies, “In all the research I’ve done on the matter, I’ve never heard of such things. Never. And quite frankly, it’s fresh on my brain.” But straining the bounds of credibility even further, Waldron would have us believe that JFK and RFK were fully cognizant of the two attempts, yet proceeded with the fateful Dallas motorcade on November 22nd!

    Further, there is an almost pathological use of conditionals; may have, perhaps, could have, if, etc. Conversely, there is an overabundance of hackneyed declaratives where conditionals should have been used, as well as an over-reliance on unnamed sources. And yet this dogged pursuit and elucidation of the documentary record is supposed to be the sine qua non of these two books. (Along with the dubious information they gleaned from interviewing Cuban exile Harry Ruiz Williams).

    Unlike my previous, lengthier review of Bugliosi’s swollen tome which inspired me to invoke Shakespeare at its conclusion, I’ve purposely kept this review mercifully short as James DiEugenio has already done yeoman’s work in revealing the fallaciousness of Waldron and Hartmann’s two main volumes. Besides, it’s difficult to make much ado about nothing. (Oops, there I go again).

  • Dick Russell, On the Trail of the JFK Assassins – Richard Case Nagell: The Most Important Witness, Part 2


    In reviewing Dick Russell’s new anthology book, On the Trail of the JFK Assassins, I noted how it revealed just how long the author had been writing about the JFK assassination. It goes back to at least 1975. And in my review I noted the multiplicity of subjects Russell had covered in that regard. These two factors, hitherto not fully revealed, shed backward light on his earlier JFK book, The Man Who Knew Too Much, in both its incarnations (1992 and 2003).

    Nagell1
    Richard Case Nagell
    Nagell2
    Richard Case Nagell

    When I first read Russell’s 1992 version of the book I was disappointed in the work. That book got a lot of exposure and was strongly pushed by its publisher. Russell got TV exposure and also an article in the LA Times. I thought the book was bloated, confusing, maddeningly meandering, and – most of all – wasteful.

    Why the last? Because, like others e.g. Jim Garrison, I have always believed that Richard Case Nagell was one of the most important witnesses there was in the JFK case. The only two rivals he has in regard to a conspiracy before the fact are Sylvia Odio and Rose Cheramie. Yet in the 1992 version of the book, Nagell’s story got lost. Actually, the better phrase would be it got buried. And today, in the aftermath of the current anthology, I think we can see why. In 1992 Russell was so eager to put so much of what he had been working on in the last 17 years into that book that he lost sight of the forest for the trees. This was unfortunate since, as anyone can see from reading On the Trail of the JFK Assassins, nothing else Russell wrote about in the JFK case ever approached the importance of Nagell. I could have easily foregone every sentence about Mark Gayn, and the Japanese International House etc. in the 1992 book for just one more section about Nagell. Russell did not understand this. And neither did his original publisher. This is what editors are for. To give a book wholeness and perspective. To tell a writer when he is wrong.

    Lachy Hulme finally did that. Hulme is an Australian actor who Russell is lucky enough to have as a friend. Hulme has a strong interest in the JFK case. And he understood the mistake Russell made in his first book. He convinced Russell to reissue the book in 2003 and he helped him edit out a lot of the pork. As we shall see, not quite all of it. But a very large portion of it. The text now comes in at a much more manageable 466 pages. The appendices and footnotes are about another hundred. The important thing is that now the Nagell story stays on center stage. It is not frequently consigned to sideshow status. Or, at times, completely absent. And that is the way it should be. Nagell should be the star – the name above the title. Sharing it with no one.

    Russell explains why right at the start. A most compelling piece of evidence that Nagell had at the time of his arrest in September of 1963 was a near duplicate of Oswald’s Uniformed Services Identification and Privileges Card. (See p. xvii) As Russell notes, it had the picture and the apparent signature of Oswald on it. Russell did not recall this card in the Warren Commission volumes. Neither did two other researchers he consulted with at the time. (ibid) The only other place the card had appeared was in an obscure book by Judy Bonner called Investigation of a Homicide. Bonner had gotten the card from the Dallas Police. But there is something even more interesting about the mystery. In the card seized by the Dallas Police, there is an overstamp that appears which says “October 1963”. In the version that Nagell had, the imprint does not appear. Why? Because Nagell was in jail after September 20, 1963. Also, the photo of Oswald in the Nagell version is different. That photo is from a different ID card. And on that card, Oswald used his Alex J. Hidell alias. As Russell notes, this second card is believed to have been fabricated by Oswald himself, including the added picture. In other words, Nagell had to have been very close to Oswald prior to his September 1963 arrest. For he actually had access to Oswald’s identification cards. Some versed in espionage would say that this indicates Nagell might have been either a “control agent” or a “surveillance operative” for Oswald. (The cards are pictured in the photo section of this book.)

    From this information in the Preface, Russell cuts to chapter one of the text. It is aptly titled, “The Man Who Got Himself Arrested”. At this time, Nagell had other things in his possession similar to what Oswald had in November: names in their notebooks, Cuba-related leaflets, and miniature spy cameras. (p. xviii)

    Russell details Nagell’s actions in El Paso on the morning of 9/20 better than anyone ever has. Nagell first went to a nearby post office before entering the bank. He mailed five hundred dollar bills to an address in Mexico. He then mailed two letters to the CIA. (p. 1. Later on, the author reveals that one was addressed to Desmond Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald was heavily involved in both Clandestine Services and Cuban operations at the time.)

    From the post office, Nagell walked over to the State National Bank. There was a young police officer in plain sight. Nagell walked over to a teller and asked for a hundred dollars in American Express traveler’s checks. (ibid) But before Nagell could retrieve the checks, he turned and fired two shots into a wall right under the ceiling. He calmly returned the revolver to his belt and walked out the front door into the street. He stepped into his car and waited. When no one came out, he pulled his car halfway into the street. He saw the policeman from inside and stopped his car. When the policeman came over to his car with his gun pulled, Nagell put his hands up and surrendered.

    The arresting officer was one Jim Bundren. When Bundren searched Nagell one of the odd things he found on him was a mimeographed newsletter from the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). (p. 2) When Bundren notified the FBI, lest the arresting officers forget, Nagell asked them to get the machine gun out of the trunk of his car. Of course, there was no machine gun. But there was a suitcase, two briefcases filled with documents, a 45-rpm record box, two tourist cards for entry into Mexico (one in the name of Aleksei Hidel), a tiny Minolta camera, and a miniature film development lab. As previously noted, the personal effects Nagell had uncannily resemble Oswald’s.

    On the way to the El Paso Federal Building, Nagell issued a statement to the FBI: “I would rather be arrested than commit murder and treason.” (ibid)

    Now, to anyone familiar with the JFK case, just the above would be enough to certify that Richard Case Nagell was in the know about who Oswald was and what was going to happen. But Bundren related to Russell an incident that makes it all even clearer. At a preliminary hearing for Nagell, the defendant related to the officer the obvious: that he wanted to be caught. To which Bundren replied that he knew Nagell was not out to rob the bank. The following colloquy then occurred:

    Nagell: Well, I’m glad you caught me. I really don’t want to be in Dallas.

    Bundren: What do you mean by that?

    Nagell: You’ll see soon enough. (p. 3)

    When Kennedy was assassinated, the full impact of Nagell’s prediction did not hit Bundren. But when Jack Ruby shot Oswald, it did. Bundren exclaimed to himself, “How the hell would he have previous knowledge of it? How would he know what was coming down in Dallas?” (ibid) When Bundren went to the FBI to try and talk about Nagell’s stunning prognostication, the agent he knew there told him he was not at liberty to discuss it. Bundren concluded from the experience that “Nagell know a lot more about the assassination then he let on, or that the government let on. Its bothered me ever since.” (ibid) Indicating Bundren was right about what the government knew, Russell notes at this point that one of the notebooks seized from Nagell that day was not returned to him for eleven years. The other notebook was not returned at all.

    As Nagell told Russell, the CIA was not the only government agency he tried to notify in advance of the murder. He also was in contact with the FBI. In fact, an FBI agent’s phone number was in his notebook. But that wasn’t all. He also had written down the names of two Soviet officials, six names under the rubric of CIA, a LA post office box for the FPCC, and an address and phone number for one Sylvia Duran of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico. This last was in Oswald’s notebook also. (p. 6) And not revealed until many years later, Nagell had a Minox miniature spy camera in the trunk of his car upon his arrest. The same kind of spy camera that the FBI tried to deny Oswald had for many, many years. (p. 6)

    I think it’s important to note: If the above was part of the contents of the notebook that the FBI finally returned to Nagell, imagine what was in the notebook they never returned to him.

    On March 20, 1964 Nagell wrote a note to Warren Commission Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin. In that correspondence Nagell revealed his warning to the FBI. But he also revealed that he had made a request through the prison authorities for the Bureau to get into contact with the Secret Service about an upcoming assassination attempt. The date: November 21, 1963. Incredibly, Nagell’s name does not appear either in the Warren Report or in the accompanying 26 volumes.

    But probably the most interesting correspondence to survive is a letter that Nagell wrote to Senator Richard Russell. Russell was the former Warren Commissioner who had expressed doubts about what the Commission was doing. So much so, that he had conducted his own mini-investigation using his own investigators. Apparently, Nagell had heard of this. And in this letter Nagell, for the first time, revealed some of the specifics of what he knew about Oswald. He began by saying that he had been monitoring Oswald in both 1962 and 1963. This surveillance, plus information gathered from others, led him to conclude that: 1.) Oswald had no real relations with the FPCC 2.) He also had no real relations with pro-Castro elements, but he was gulled into believing he did 3.) He had no real relations with any Leftist or Marxist group 4.) He was not an agent or informant, in the generally accepted sense of the word. 5.) He was involved in a conspiracy to murder President Kennedy which was not communist inspired or instigated by a foreign government. (p.7, Russell’s italics.)

    The date of this letter is January 3, 1967. Before any of the discoveries of the Garrison investigation were made public. Before the domestic publication of the works of Mark Lane or Sylvia Meagher. In fact, Nagell was still in prison when he wrote it. And he had yet to be visited by any investigator for Jim Garrison.

    Later on, in a letter to Representative Don Edwards, Nagell revealed that his letter of warning to the FBI was specifically addressed to J. Edgar Hoover. He wrote it using one of his aliases, Joseph Kramer. In it he said that Oswald was part of a conspiracy to murder President Kennedy which he thought would take place in late September of 1963. (The mistaken date is why Nagell did what he did in El Paso on September 20th.) He gave the Bureau a complete description of Oswald including his true name, physical description, two aliases and his residential address. He conveyed certain data about the plot including one overt act which was a violation of federal law. And he used the name Kramer because two FBI agents in Miami knew him by that alias at the time.

    No wonder Garrison called Nagell the most important witness there is.

    II

    Russell reveals in his anthology that he first discovered Nagell through his meeting with Richard Popkin. He had gone to California to meet Popkin while on assignment for the Village Voice. But before actually meeting the most important witness, the author decided to stop in El Paso to do some research through the local papers.

    He discovered some interesting facts. When he appeared before the court on November 4, 1963 Nagell told the judge, “I had a motive for doing what I did. But my motive was not to hold up the bank. I do not intend to disclose my motive at this time.” (p. 13) Russell also discovered something that is interesting because it did not happen. Even though two FBI agents were in on his arrest, and the Bureau confiscated his belongings, no FBI representative testified at his trial. (p. 14) This is especially intriguing since, in a newspaper story of 1/24/64, Nagell revealed that the FBI had asked him about Oswald and Oswald’s activities. (p. 14) After he was convicted, Nagell leaped to his feet and shouted, “Why weren’t the real issues brought out in court!” Later adding, “They will be some time.” (p. 16)

    After his trip to El Paso in October of 1975, Russell then traveled to Los Angeles to meet Nagell for the first time. At this meeting Nagell was not really forthcoming but he did reveal that he had a photo of Oswald in his trunk at the time of his arrest, which the FBI never returned to him. (p. 26) That his mother and sister were both interviewed by the FBI after the assassination. (Which, of course, is strange since Nagell is not in the 26 volumes of the Commission.) Researching Nagell’s appeals case, Russell discovered a filing made in 1974 which was quite revealing about Nagell’s monitoring of Oswald. He wrote that although he was under contract to the CIA in 1962-63, he came to the conclusion that his inquiries in the time period which concerned not just Oswald but people like Manuel Artime and Vaughn Marlowe, were also being done for a “foreign nation”, that is the Soviets. (p. 29) This holds out the possibility that someone in the CIA was working with the original KGB agents who hired Nagell to prevent the assassination of JFK.

    As mentioned above, the FBI interviewed Nagell’s sister after the assassination. It is clear from reading this book that Nagell was quite close to her. Right after he was arrested, but before the assassination, he wrote to her that “I have refused to offer an explanation as to certain overt acts … Someday I shall explain everything in detail to you pertinent to this apparent disgrace.” (p. 37) His sister’s widower said that Nagell’s mission was to eliminate Oswald before the assassination. (p. 39) He also told Russell that the FBI visited them in 1965 to see some of the papers Nagell had sent to them. While they were on vacation, the FBI broke into their home and stole some of the documents. (p. 40)

    Nagell’s career in the armed forces was distinguished. In 1953, during the Korean War, Nagell attended the Monterey School of Languages. In 1954, he suffered through a plane crash. And although many have said that somehow this impacted him psychologically forever, the army cleared him of any kind of personality change afterwards. (p. 46) In fact, less than a month after the crash he was approved for a new intelligence assignment. (ibid) Working for Army Intelligence, Nagell opened the mail of suspected communists with postal inspectors right next to him. They broke into the offices of suspected communist organizations and stole whole file cabinets. (p. 47) It was in the winter of 1955-56 that the CIA first recruited Nagell. (p. 48) And in fact, the names of his two recruiters were found in his notebook. Russell called one of them and he confirmed that he had worked in the LA office of the CIA. (ibid) Later in 1956, Nagell was transferred to another intelligence agency called in the Far East called Field Operations Intelligence (FOI). FOI was involved in black ops: assassinations, kidnappings, blackmail etc. (p. 54)

    While in the Far East, Nagell worked in Japan. He used the aliases of Joe Kramer and Robert Nolan, and the CIA has certified this. (p. 61) It was at this time and place, Japan in 1957-58, that Nagell first met Oswald. This was after Oswald was observed outside the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo. (p. 72) Curious about what he was doing there, Nagell arranged to be introduced to the young Marine under an assumed name. (ibid) Also, Nagell told the author that both he and Oswald had girlfriends at the Queen Bee, a famous nightclub in Tokyo. (p. 76) Further, Nagell raised the possibility that Oswald was involved with him and a Japanese local in an attempt to get a Soviet intelligence officer named Eroshkin to defect. (p. 73)

    When Nagell left his Far East assignment in late 1959, he moved to Los Angeles, and a he got a job working for the state of California. But, he told the author, that he was still working for the CIA. Specifically, in the Domestic Intelligence unit, which would later be formalized under Tracy Barnes as the Domestic Operations Division. (p. 263) This is quite interesting of course since this part of the CIA was an illegal unit that was doing all kinds of weird things and it employed people like Howard Hunt, and according to Victor Marchetti, probably Clay Shaw. (William Davy, Let Justice be Done, p. 196) What makes it even more interesting is that former CIA agent Robert Morrow later revealed that in 1963, Barnes told him that he was aware of a plot to kill President Kennedy which included Shaw. We will refer to this fascinating aspect of the Nagell story later.

    After a shooting incident on the job, Nagell left his state employment. He secured a Mexican tourist card from the consulate in LA. From there, he went to visit a friend of his at the Hotel Luma in Mexico City. And this is where Nagell’s tale takes on a large and sinister dimension.

    III

    In 1966, Nagell hinted at what had happened to him in Mexico in 1962. He wrote his dear sister, “If it does eventually become mandatory for me to touch upon the events leading to my sojourn in Mexico in 1962 … (where and when it began), I shall do so, but only subsequent to being granted immunity from prosecution …”( p. 145) Nagell was now purely under the employment of the CIA. And a friend of his in Mexico, Art Greenstein, went to a party with him once where he later referred to someone he had talked to, his contact there, as a typical CIA agent. (p. 147) His mission was to serve as a double agent for the Agency in an operation against the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. The timing of this “disinformation project” was near the outset of the Cuban Missile Crisis. And since these kinds of operations were the domain of David Phillips–who had a Cuban desk in Mexico City–Nagell hinted to Greenstein that Phillips had been an accomplice in this project. It was after the completion of this mission, when the Missile Crisis was over, that Nagell first learned of a plot to kill JFK. And he learned of it in his double agent status through the KGB. (p. 152)

    In October of 1962, a Soviet contact of his told him that he had heard that a Cuban group named Alpha 66 had been talking about a plot to kill JFK. The reason being that they had gotten wind of Kennedy’s no invasion of Cuba pledge made to close the crisis. The contact asked him to investigate the rumor to see if it was true. If it was to try and ascertain those involved, the method to be used etc. (p. 154) Nagell had barely begun his inquiry when he was called to the Soviet Embassy. Something that had never happened to him before. He was told there that it was not just a rumor. He was briefed further, furnished a number of pictures, and told to return to the USA and continue his investigation in earnest. (ibid) Alpha 66, of course, was a violent Cuban group backed by the CIA. In fact, Antonio Veciana was probably its most famous member. And Veciana famously told investigator and author Gaeton Fonzi that David Phillips was his CIA handler, and he had seen Phillips meeting with Oswald in Dallas in the late summer of 1963. And before he left Mexico, Oswald’s Soviet contact showed him a photo of Oswald since they were suspicious of him from his Soviet sojourn. (p. 155) Though, at this time, not in relation to the plot to kill Kennedy. On October 21st, 1962 Greenstein saw Nagell off from the Hotel Luma. He asked Nagell if he would be hearing from him in the future, or if he would read about him in the papers. Nagell said that he would. Greenstein then said, “Something big?” To which Nagell replied, “Yes … something big.” (p. 160)

    He first journeyed to Dallas to inquire about the status of Oswald. At this time, Oswald had been back in Texas for about five months and was carefully ensconced in the White Russian community. This had been done with the help of George DeMohrenschildt. But only after the approach to Oswald had been approved by local CIA Station Chief J. Walton Moore. After doing this, Nagell then went to both Washington DC and New York City. While in Washington he was approached by what he thought was a Soviet agent and he reported this to his CIA handlers. He was then told to go to Miami and wait in a bar to be approached by a Soviet agent. (p. 163) At this time, not sure whom he was working for, caught up in a web of intrigue, Nagell journeyed both west to Tallahassee, and south to St. Petersburg. There he checked into a Bay Pines VA Hospital complaining of headaches, blackouts, and amnesia. This was on December 20, 1962. Some commentators have used this incident, and another to be described to discredit Nagell as being neurotic or worse. But what they always leave out is what Nagell told Russell about what he learned in Florida. He had penetrated a Cuban exile group who had planned on blowing up the Miami stadium where Kennedy was to speak to the prisoners released from Cuba in the Bay of Pigs exchange. (p. 164) Nagell was trying to keep a safe distance from the plot. So far from discrediting his story, this is consistent with what he did in El Paso in September of 1963. And Russell furnishes evidence of the plot. There is an intelligence report from the Miami Police Department that says that a local Cuban was overheard saying on the night JFK spoke in the Orange Bowl that “Something is going to happen in the Orange Bowl.” (ibid) Nagell was right. But the FBI and the VA tried to smear him anyway. The FBI file on Nagell excerpted the first line of the Bay Pines report which said, “Chronic brain syndrome associated with brain trauma…” (p. 179) The FBI left out the final line of the report which declared Nagell competent upon his departure. Further, the VA exaggerated his so-called “brain trauma”. It was actually diagnosed from his previous injury as “brain concussion, cured.” (p. 180) With a witness as good as Nagell, the Bureau pulled out all the stops. Especially when he blamed Hoover for not heeding his letter of warning previous to the assassination.

    Nagell then did some work in Miami. He was checking on an alleged relationship between Eladio Del Valle and New Orleans Cuban Revolutionary Council representative and former Batista official Sergio Arcacha Smith. (p. 182) He also was checking on an associate of Dave Ferrie. This is all extraordinary of course since Smith and Ferrie will soon figure prominently in Oswald’s life, in a most intriguing manner. Nagell was one heck of an investigator.

    In April of 1963, Alpha 66 announced the opening of a Los Angles chapter. (p. 208) Consequently, Nagell decided to move to LA temporarily in order to monitor this new branch opened up with much fanfare. Nagell picked up the scent of another plot to kill JFK when he arrived in LA in June of 1963. The man the plot focused around was Vaughn Marlowe, an executive officer with the LA FPCC. (p. 210) Marlowe had written a letter to Jim Garrison in 1967 telling him about Nagell and how, for reasons unknown, he had been tailing him back in 1963. Nagell revealed in 1964 that he was watching Marlowe since he was being scoped out by an Alpha 66 Cuban who would later visit Sylvia Odio in September of 1963. (p. 211) According to Nagell, the plot was to take place during JFK’s visit to the Beverly Hilton hotel for the premiere of the film PT 109.

    When Russell found Marlowe he told the author that Nagell approached him like some kind of double agent would. He told him he was a former Army Intelligence officer who actually wanted to help Marlowe in his social causes. (p. 213) Nagell later filed a report on Marlowe that was 23 pages long. Which he kept on microfilm. (ibid) The reason Marlowe was such an attractive candidate was that he was a stern critic of JFK from the left. He had a critical poster of JFK in his bookstore front window and he organized a demonstration against him around the time of the Missile Crisis. Finally, and this made him a better candidate than Oswald–Marlowe was an ace rifleman from his days in the service. After the assassination, Nagell wrote Marlowe a letter from prison telling him not to tell anyone that he mentioned the name of Oswald in his talks with him. Marlowe then got in contact with Nagell’s mother and told him he thought Nagell was somehow involved with the JFK murder. When she dodged the point he asked her if someone had told her not to talk about the JFK assassination with anyone and she replied they had. Many years later, in 1975, Marlowe finally located Nagell and wrote him a letter. He apologized for not doing more to help inform the public of why Nagell was in jail back in 1964. (p. 218)

    On June 4, 1963, three days before JFK was to arrive in LA, Nagell did what he had done in Miami. He attempted to check himself into a VA Hospital. This time, the resident psychiatrist apparently saw through the sham and he was not admitted. (p. 219) Meanwhile, one of the groups demonstrating around the Hilton was the civil rights group named the Congress of Racial Equality. A group that Marlowe had once worked with.

    Repeat: Nagell was a good investigator.

    IV

    From here, that is around July of 1963, Nagell began to monitor the plot that finally was enacted in Dallas. But when Oswald stepped onto center stage that summer, Nagell felt that something about the motivation behind the plot had changed. Why? Nagell wrote his friend Mr. Greenstein that the Cubans had gotten wind by now of the back channel Kennedy had been working on to effect a rapprochement with Castro. (p. 239) Two of the Cubans, Angel and Leopoldo, had convinced Oswald they were actually pro-Castro. And that they wanted to involve him in a plot to kill JFK. This was in reaction to plots enacted by the USA against Fidel. If he did so, Oswald would be furnished a “safe conduct” pass into Havana by the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Nagell told Russell he had been in Mexico City with Oswald, but not at the time of the notorious trip discussed in the Lopez Report. Nagell had told a friend of his, John Margain, about this trip. Russell later interviewed Margain and he confirmed certain details about it. (pgs. 240-241) Including the fact that Nagell told Margain that Oswald was being set up by the CIA and the Cuban exiles.

    From here, Russell describes some of the characters and events from Oswald’s last summer on earth. Which he spent in New Orleans with a now famous cast of characters. He quotes William Gaudet saying he saw Oswald leafleting and Oswald did not know what he was doing. Guy Banister had put him up to it. (p. 253) Russell also tells us that Nagell too had the famous Corliss Lamont flyer, “The Crime Against Cuba”, but he does not tell us which edition it was. Russell produces witnesses who say they saw Oswald and Ferrie at a Cuban exile training camp that summer. (p. 256) Interestingly, Russell discusses one Carlos Quiroga, a colleague of both Carlos Bringuier and Sergio Arcacha Smith. Quiroga has often been accused of acting as a double agent. That is of posing as a pro-Castro sympathizer. Which of course, is what Nagell described as what the plotters were doing around Oswald. When Garrison aide Frank Klein interviewed Quiroga in 1967, he tried to pin the assassination of JFK on Castro. At the end of his memo, Klein wrote “This man knows a lot more than is telling us.” (p. 261) Apparently, Klein was correct. Quiroga later took a polygraph test. He indicated deception on, among others, two key questions: did he know in advance JFK was going to be killed, and had he seen the weapons to be used in the assassination beforehand. (ibid)

    The above dovetails perfectly with a memo that another Garrison investigator wrote. This was one William Martin who was the first person Garrison sent to interview Nagell in prison. Nagell told Martin that in his work infiltrating the conspiracy, he was able to “make a tape recording of four voices in conversation concerning the plot, which ended in the assassination of President Kennedy.” (Garrison Memorandum of 4/18/67) When Martin questioned Nagell about who was on the tape, Nagell replied that one of them was named “Arcacha”, and another he only identified as “Q”. (ibid) (Although later, Nagell told Russell that Arcacha was discussed on the tape, not one of the actual speakers he had recorded. P. 275)) The first person referred to must be Sergio Arcacha Smith, and the second is very likely Quiroga. Further, when Garrison tested Quiroga with the question, “According to your own knowledge, did Sergio Arcacha know Lee Oswald?”, the criteria indicated a deception. (Davy, pp287-88) It very much seems that Quiroga was hiding his advance guilty knowledge. Of course, Martin turned out to be one of the several CIA agents who helped capsize Garrison. He may be the reason the tape never surfaced. (Or that may be due to new information to be discussed later.)

    As Russell notes, most of Nagell’s time from July to his arrest in September was spent on Oswald. And although Nagell was deliberately vague about exactly what he was doing, another source, besides Garrison, shed some backward light on those activities. In 1976, former CIA agent Robert Morrow wrote Betrayal, a fictionalized account of his days in the Agency leading up to the murder of Kennedy. In that account, he named a man who was almost eerily resembled Nagell. Except in that book, he was called Richard Carson Fillmore. It was not until many years later, in the nineties, that Morrow discussed openly who the actual people in the 1976 book represented. As we have noted, Nagell revealed he worked in the forerunner of the DOD from 1959 onward. In 1962, Tracy Barnes exercised control over this newly named and organized unit. With both Nagell and very likely Clay Shaw under him. Interestingly, Morrow knew that “Joe Kramer” was one of Nagell’s pseudonyms. (p. 264) Barnes told Morrow that he had sent Nagell to New Orleans to investigate certain goings-on with the Banister-Ferrie group in the summer of 1963. As Russell notes, Nagell corroborates this part of Morrow’s story in a letter to Greenstein he wrote in 1967. There he mentioned that he had received instructions from someone at CIA HQ to join a Cuban exile affiliate of Alpha 66 in New Orleans to “find out if things were real.” (ibid) Further, Nagell later told Garrison that “Angel” and “Leopoldo” both had worked with the group Movement to Free Cuba which was supervised by Barnes. Nagell also said at the time that Ferrie knew both of these men who, of course, ended up at Sylvia Odio’s home in late September of 1963. (p. 265)

    Let me mention another fascinating linkage between Nagell, Odio, and the Garrison inquiry. Sylvia Odio always maintained that the Caucasian who accompanied the two Cubans was referred to as one “Leon Oswald”. This, of course, corresponds with the name given to the man at Ferrie’s apartment discussing some kind of assassination plot as testified to by Perry Russo. Nagell told Russell that he knew both Oswalds, Lee and Leon. (p. 287) And he said the latter showed up on the fringes of the nascent conspiracy. Nagell added that Leon Oswald worked only with the anti-Castro Cubans and made no attempt to appear pro-Castro. He also said that this second Oswald was in Mexico City somewhere between July and September of 1963. Nagell wrote to Russell that Leon Oswald was eliminated in the latter part of September by mistake. (Russell surmises that it was probably by the KGB.) This new Nagell aspect now makes three witnesses who met someone referred to as “Leon Oswald”. All of the meetings taking place in a clearly conspiratorial aspect and pre-assassination. (I should add, there is a fourth witness to this Leon Oswald. It is Ferrie’s friend Ray Broshears who said Leon resembled the real Oswald. p. 367) It sounds very much like someone was trying to confuse things about multiple Oswalds before the fact. For instance, Nagell says that the Leon Oswald he knew was killed around the third week of September. If so, Angel and Leopoldo were still using that name with what was probably the real Oswald. Further, both the KGB and Barnes strongly suspected a conspiracy to kill Kennedy forming in New Orleans with Cuban exiles like Smith, and with CIA agents like Ferrie.

    Russell implies that by the end of August and in early September, Nagell realized he was in the middle of something very big and very evil. In late August Nagell communicated to Desmond Fitzgerald of the Clandestine Services that something was clearly transpiring. (p. 275) Except at this point Nagell apparently thought the actual assassination attempt would take place in the East, in the Washington-Baltimore area. In fact, he actually tried to join Communist Party cells at the time in those areas. (p. 276) Journeying to Mexico for further instructions, Nagell could not meet with his CIA contact there. But his KGB contact told him to try and separate Oswald from the conspirators by telling him he was being duped. And if this did not work, and the plot appeared to be heading forward, to eliminate him. (p. 278) Later, Nagell told the author “If anybody wanted to stop the assassination, it would be the KGB. But they didn’t do enough.” (ibid)

    From Russell’s narrative it seems that Nagell failed in his KGB mission. He could not convince Oswald to admit he was being used. Therefore the plot proceeded. Nagell describes a meeting with Oswald in Jackson Square where this confrontation occurred.( p. 282) What seems to be happening in this incident is that you have two agents from different parts of the CIA taking orders from different chiefs. Oswald connects through officers like David Phillips and Howard Hunt through to James Angleton. Nagell works through his Mexico City contact named Bob up to Tracy Barnes. I have never seen any evidence that connects Barnes to the conspiracy. I have seen a lot of evidence that connects Hunt, Phillips, and Angleton. Because of that unseen gulf, Nagell could not fulfill his mission. What made his dilemma worse is that he also could not bring himself to kill Oswald. Feeling lost and helpless, Nagell used his old stand by trick. He tried to check into a VA Hospital. This time in Los Angeles. Again, he couldn’t pass muster. (p. 278) Because of his failure, it appears that Nagell expected to be killed. For when he visited a friend in LA, he informed him of what to do with some of his possessions in case of his demise.

    I must note here that Russell insinuates an absolutely diabolical possibility in a chapter called “The Setup”. One of the reasons Nagell may have panicked is because the CIA was freezing him out. (p. 283) He got no reply from his communication with Fitzgerald. While in Mexico, his contact failed to meet him. His only communication about the plot was now with the KGB. Russell holds out the possibility that Nagell had been duped into thinking that he was working on this mission for both sides. When in fact the CIA was using him to both monitor and confuse the KGB effort to thwart the plot. This may be why Leon Oswald was mistakenly eliminated and why Nagell was confused about the conspiracy’s ultimate location. (Although, as seen by his conversation with Bundren, he ultimately found out its actual destination.) Another possibility is that someone in the know learned about Barnes’ efforts and told him to back off.

    Nagell became so confused that he actually thought of leaving the USA and going to Eastern Europe. And his KGB contacts agreed he should. Around September 17th, he mailed a letter to the FBI alerting them to the conspiracy. He then drove to El Paso. He was supposed to meet a contact across the border, in Juarez. (p. 290) Nagell was thinking of going from Mexico to Cuba. He cruised the streets for awhile and decided against crossing over and meeting his contact. He went to the post office, and as related above, mailed the money to Mexico and wrote the letters to the CIA. (Later on in the book, Nagell reveals to Russell that the five hundred dollars was for Oswald’s expense money on his Mexico trip. p. 290) He then walked over to the bank to purchase the American Express checks. Nagell told Russell there was a reason for this. As revealed in On the Trail of the JFK Assassins, Nagell was being paid by the CIA through this company. And there is strong evidence that Oswald was also. Since there was no robbery, Nagell believed he would be tried on a misdemeanor. And that all the things in his car, plus the purchase of the American Express checks would allow him to reveal the machinations of the plot in court. But as also revealed in the previous book, the prosecution vehemently objected to any mention of American Express. And many of the things in his car were disposed of. In his first interview with the FBI Nagell actually said, “all of my problems have been solved for a long time, and now I won’t have to go to Cuba.” (p. 292)

    Oh ye of too much faith.

    V

    While Nagell was in jail, the plot he monitored proceeded forward. Russell does an OK job of outlining it. For instance, he describes the incredibly important Hunt memorandum. This was an internal 1966 CIA memorandum describing the need for an alibi for Howard Hunt for November 22nd since he was in Dallas at the time. It came from James Angleton’s office. And as anyone knows who has read Mark Lane’s Plausible Denial, Howard Hunt never did have an alibi for where he was on 11/22/63. Yet people who worked with Angleton tried to give him one at the legal proceedings depicted in Lane’s book. (Lisa Pease probably did the best short treatment of this issue. See The Assassinations, pgs. 195-198) Russell also relates the information about David Phillips’ deathbed confession admitting he was in Dallas on the day of Kennedy’s murder. (p. 272) This comes through Shawn Phillips, David Phillips’ nephew. Shawn’s father was the writer James Phillips, David’s brother. The brothers had been estranged for a number of years. James had told his son that from conversations with his brother, he understood that David did not care for JFK at all. James also suspected that his brother had a serious role in his demise. After a period of estrangement, David called up James when he knew he was dying. At the end of the call, James asked his brother if he was in Dallas the day of JFK’s murder. The CIA officer started to weep and said that yes, he had been. Since this confirmed what he had long suspected, James hung up on him. (ibid)

    While in custody, Nagell wrote a letter to the FBI again. He stated that what he did on September 20th in El Paso came from a love for his country no matter how inappropriate or incomprehensible it appeared. This note was sent by air-tel to Washington the next day. Two days after, President Kennedy was killed. (p. 347)

    To complete the cover up, Nagell was sent to Springfield prison as part of his incarceration. He was part of their behavior modification program. (p. 385) As was also-and I suppose this was just a coincidence– Secret Service agent Abraham Bolden. (See James W. Douglass’ JFK and the Unspeakable, p. 216) It just happened that both men were intelligence officers who, based on their privileged knowledge, tried to blow the whistle on the Kennedy plot. The FBI fully took advantage of Nagell’s Springfield predicament by telling the Warren Commission that Nagell was psychologically disturbed and could not be trusted. (p. 386)

    The first judge at Nagell’s trial retired before the trial actually began. He was replaced by Homer Thornberry, a close friend of President Johnson’s. Further, the CIA friendly Texas attorney Leon Jaworski recommended Thornberry. (p. 391) After his conviction and sentencing, Nagell was dragged from the courtroom screaming that the FBI had allowed Kennedy to be shot. And further that they had questioned him about Oswald before the murder. (p. 393) The FBI agents on the scene made sure that Hoover was alerted to this fact. When he was sent to Springfield, Nagell wrote a letter to his sister saying he understood why he had been sent there: “If the American people think that only the Chinese are experts at brainwashing … I am afraid someday they will be in for a big surprise when it is discovered that the FBI is not too far divorced from Hitler’s Gestapo …” (ibid) While in jail, Nagell was visited by the CIA who told him to stop talking about Oswald. (p. 401) Nagell was then transferred to Leavenworth where he was tortured. (p. 404) On trips back to El Paso for hearings on his appeal, he was beaten up.

    Nagell’s attorney, Joe Calamia, was so intent on getting Nagell freed that he got his client to cooperate with the government in a psychological ruse. An army doctor named Edward Weinstein had once treated Nagell after an airplane crash in the service. Nagell actually told the FBI about Weinstein himself. But the court made it clear that Nagell now had to lie about this in order to have any chance upon appeal. In other words, Thornberry and the FBI were striking a deal with the defendant: We will give you a chance to go free if you go along with our deceitful discreditation of you as a witness. Urged on by Calamia, Nagell went along with this ploy, but he did so kicking and screaming. (p. 408) Eventually this is how Nagell was finally released. Weinstein said Nagell had suffered brain damage from his plane accident and therefore had “confabulated” his story about Oswald and what he did in the bank. Here is the problem with Weinstein’s thesis: Nagell underwent an EEG and psychological testing at Springfield. The examining doctor wrote: “I did not find any evidence or finding suggestible of brain damage.” (p. 407) This report was deliberately kept out of Nagell’s second trial. By both the defense and prosecution. Calamia made a deal with the devil to get his client out of jail. Nagell got out in April of 1968.

    When Nagell was released the CIA gave him $15,000. He then left for East Germany on a mysterious mission. Russell believes this may have been to be debriefed by the KGB. And Nagell has also written to Greenstein hinting at this possibility. (p. 427) The context of this debriefing would have been his meetings with Jim Garrison and his volunteering to appear as his witness at the trial of Clay Shaw. And if anyone doubts how important Nagell’s testimony would have been, consider this: On February 12, 1969 while in New York, a hand grenade was thrown at Nagell from a speeding automobile. After this, Nagell went to New Orleans. He told the DA he did not think it would be a good idea for him to testify at the Shaw trial. He then turned over the remnants of the grenade to Garrison and his staff. (p. 436)

    But this game worked both ways. Nagell’s ex-wife had split and taken his two children with her. As part of his dealings with the CIA upon his release, they told him the State Department would help locate his children who he thought were in Europe. While searching for them in Spain he told a consulate officer that if they did not keep their part of the bargain, he would reveal the whole story about President Kennedy’s murder to the media. (p. 437) The CIA took this very seriously and now had the press monitored to see if Nagell was talking. (p. 438) They also began tracking Nagell throughout Europe. Further, Russell checked every CIA name in Nagell’s notebook and they all were really with the Agency. A number of them were from Angleton’s staff. (p. 439)

    In the spring of 1970, Nagell was finally alerted to the whereabouts of his children. In a rather incredible revelation to Russell in 1993, Nagell’s son told him that he recalled being in East Germany as a small child with his sister. When he revisited Germany as an adult, he recalled some of the places he had been. But he added about the earlier sojourn, “It was not with our mother. We went by plane, with some blonde woman … A very strange situation.” (p. 445) Was the CIA using Nagell’s children as bartering chips for his silence?

    The other chip the CIA used was Nagell’s retirement benefits. Which he finally received after a protracted struggle. (p. 446) But the rest of his life was very much controlled. The government was not satisfied with smearing him as being “disturbed”. His files had him pegged as a racketeer “and associated with people I never even heard of.” (ibid) His mail was monitored and stolen. Many letters Russell wrote to Nagell during the writing of The Man Who Knew Too Much never got to him. (p. 449) His handlers ordered him to stay completely clear of Russell. When he would not they ordered him to clear any talks with the author beforehand. (p. 448)

    The day after the Assassination Records Review Board sent Nagell a letter requesting a deposition, he died. When the authorities broke into Nagell’s home they found a key ring with 19 keys on it. Six of them were for footlockers in which Nagell had stored his valuables concerning his CIA service and monitoring of Oswald. While living with a niece, Nagell had told her of the contents of one of these foot lockers. Pointing at a purple one, he said “This one contains what everybody is trying to get hold of.” (p. 451)

    Nagell’s son Robert found out the location of the foot lockers was Tucson. He went there and found five of them. The one that was missing was-no surprise– the purple one. And the day Robert went to Tucson, his house was ransacked while he was gone. Someone was definitely worried about what Nagell would leave behind. When the niece was shown the inventory of what was in the other lockers she said Nagell told her about a couple of audio tapes and a couple of photos. None of these articles survived.

    The new edition of The Man Who knew Too Much closes with some compelling information not available to Russell in 1992. First, the author talked to a former military intelligence officer named Jim Southwood. Southwood actually saw the 112th Military Intelligence file on Oswald. The one that was famously destroyed after the assassination. (p. 456) While stationed in the Far East, he received a request from the 112th to do some research on Oswald and the DeMohrenschildts. Southwood told Russell that he discovered Oswald was under surveillance by both ONI and Army Intelligence while in Japan. One of the reports had Oswald frequenting gay bars. And one of them had him intimately involved with a Soviet Colonel named Eroshkin. Which, of course, would confirm Nagell’s story about his first encounter with Oswald. From perusing the file Southwood was convinced Oswald was some kind of intelligence operative. And although he could find no new info on the DeMohrenschildts, he did find out something quite interesting. All the info the 112th already had on Oswald came from that couple. And it was all of a prejudicial nature: he was a strange personality, he had weird sexual habits, and he needed to be watched at all times. As I noted in the review of On the Trail of the JFK Assassins, this contrasts dramatically with what the DeMohrenschildts toward Russell in 1975. And it is further evidence that they had been used earlier and felt badly about it later.

    Russell, with the help of Hulme, did a much better job of telling the above story in 2003 than he did in 1992. If anything, Hulme did not go far enough with the editing scissors. I would have cut out about sixty or so more pages. For example, the chapters on General Walker and the material on Charles Willoughby seem to me to have almost no relation to the Nagell story. Further, it seems that Russell never read the declassified Lopez Report, one of the crown jewels of the ARRB. Because in his discussion of Mexico City in late September, he makes some statements that are contradicted by that adduced record.

    But finally the Nagell story is in a manageable and understandable narrative form. To me it is one of the crucial and most powerful stories in the Kennedy literature. And for anyone to deny it, one must believe in something of a wild conspiracy theory. Witnesses like Art Greenstein, Nagell’s sister, his niece, his son-in-law, and his son must all be lying. And they all must be lying to the same effect. Jim Bundren and John Margain are lying and the lies just happen to coincide with what Nagell screamed out to the crowd after his conviction. When he was arrested, Nagell just happened to have all that paraphernalia in his car that was so similar to Oswald’s. And he then just happened to guess right at the mutual American Express payment method for the two spies. And Nagell just happened to have the phone number for Sylvia Duran before anyone knew how she figured in the plot. And he had a version of Oswald’s Uniformed Services Privilege Card before Oswald altered it. And somehow, what Nagell knew about the conspiracy just happened to partly coincide with what both Sylvia Odio and Rose Cheramie knew, down to the actual Cubans involved.

    Oh, really? Who is wearing the tin foil hats now? But that’s how good a witness Richard Case Nagell was.

    Appendix: Corroborating Evidence for Richard Case Nagell

    Exhibits


    Mexico tourist cards for Nagell and Aleksei Hidell (hard cover edition of Dick Russell’s The Man Who knew Too Much, p. 113)

    Nagell’s letter to J. Lee Rankin of March 20, 1964, about his prior attempts to warn FBI and Secret Service of an assassination attempt on President Kennedy (Russell, second trade paper edition, p. 7)

    Nagell and Oswald both had Sylvia Duran’s phone number at the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City (ibid, p. 6)

    Nagell had a duplicate of Oswald’s Uniformed Services Identification and Privileges card (ibid, p. xvii)

    Nagell had a copy of Oswald’s signed Social Security card (Ibid, p. 252)

    Witnesses


    Arthur Greenstein: Nagell’s friend in Mexico who he left while on assignment in late October of 1962. At that time, Nagell told him he would probably read about him in the papers since he was on to something big. (Russell, p. 160)

    Eleanore Gambert: Nagell’s sister, who he wrote to before the assassination about the bank robbery being a charade. (Letter of October 10, 1963) FBI interviewed her and her family after the assassination (ibid, p. 37–39)

    Louis Gambert: Eleanore’s husband at the time, present during the FBI interview, where a copy of Nagell’s warning to the FBI was produced (ibid, pp. 38–39)

    Roger Gambert: their son, who told Russell there was a break in at their home afterwards and some of the items from this file were now gone (ibid p. 40)

    John Margain: Nagell’s military and personal friend; a CIA acquaintance sent him an article about Nagell in 1968. Nagell had told Margain about his warning letter to the FBI and his visiting Mexico with Oswald. (ibid, 100–02, 240–41)

    Jim Bundren: Oswald’s arresting officer in El Paso in September. Nagell was waiting for him, and he told Bundren he “would rather be arrested than commit murder and treason.” He later told the guard that he really did not want to be in Dallas; when Bundren asked him what he meant by that, he said, “You’ll see soon enough.” (Russell, pp. 2–3)

    Prior attempts on JFK


    Vaughn Marlowe: Nagell tracked him as a member of the FPCC, and Marlowe later talked about Nagell visiting him before the assassination. Russell, p. 215)

    Bomb in Miami: In December of 1962, Nagell was in Florida penetrating a Cuban exile plot to bomb the Orange Bowl on December 29, 1962. There is a Miami Police report of January 3, 1963, on how certain Cubans did discuss such a bombing.

    Cross References in declassified Databases:


    Joe Kramer was the name Nagell said he used in his warning letter to Hoover in September of 1963. In a 1994 CIA release, it was revealed the CIA had Nagell files kept under this name.

    In Japan, Nagell said he saw files concerning Oswald’s relationship with a Russian colonel named Eroshkin. It was later revealed that military intelligence had files about Oswald in some kind of relationship with Eroshkin. (Russell, pp. 455–57)