For three months, beginning in November of 2018, Jim DiEugenio did one-hour-long interviews on Dave Emory’s syndicated radio show For the Record. Emory has been broadcasting for 40 years. These 25 programs constitute the longest continuous interview series he has ever done. The subject was a sustained inquiry into DiEugenio’s second edition of Destiny Betrayed. Emory was very impressed by the author’s use of the declassified record excavated by the Assassination Records Review Board and how it altered the database of Jim Garrison’s New Orleans inquiry into the assassination of President Kennedy. This series is also the longest set of interviews DiEugenio has ever done about the book. Emory read the book and took extensive notes, which made for an intelligent and informed discussion of what the present record is on the Garrison inquiry.
Tag: JFK ASSASSINATION
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Jim DiEugenio’s 25-part series on Destiny Betrayed, with Dave Emory
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Mal Hyman, Burying the Lead: The Media and the JFK Assassination
I
Burying the Lead is an exceptionally readable history of the half-century of deception and propaganda surrounding the JFK assassination that has been promulgated by the mainstream media, who as Hyman aptly demonstrates, were instrumental in maintaining the “Big Lie”. Chronologically structured, Hyman centers his survey of the media on their coverage of events immediately after President Kennedy’s death and extends his analysis to the later congressional probes into the CIA’s dirty tricks bag, the Reagan and Bush administrations’ handling of the declassification of sensitive documents, and the eventual breakthrough event that was Oliver Stone’s 1991 film JFK, which led to a renewed public interest in the psychic trauma of the assassination and, eventually, the further release of thousands of sealed documents. The book succeeds in doing what so many like it have failed to do: 1) It circumscribes the players likely involved in the crime of the century; 2) Provides a cogent and compelling motive that even die-hard true believers in the official version of the JFK narrative will be hard pressed to refute; and 3) Manages to keep the reader not just glued to the page, but emotionally invested in a case whose repercussions directly affect us today.
II
Mal Hyman—former public school teacher, U.N. liaison and U.S. Congressional candidate, and current college professor—draws on a lifetime of reading and primary source research to bring readers one of the most robust and compelling sagas of the United States at mid-century. He is particularly interested in the inclusion of foreign views on both U.S. foreign policy and the conclusions of the Warren Commission. The first chapter, “Crisis Coverage,” is written in a racing, almost stream of consciousness fashion, with Hyman describing AP wires which at first were sending dramatically conflicting reports of the mayhem unfolding in Dallas following Kennedy’s assassination. From the four different rifles cited as the murder weapon—an Argentine Mauser, a .30-30, a British Enfield with a high power scope, and finally the infamous Mannlicher-Carcano; to wildly divergent motives cited (Cold War Soviets, a pathological loner, the Mob sick of harassment, a Castro revenge plot)—Hyman shows that left to their own devices, there were some serious journalists questioning the curious events and findings that afternoon in Dallas. Many accurately cited the dozens of witnesses who heard shots from the grassy knoll or the triple overpass. Some reporters tried to get a closer look at the bullet hole in the limousine’s windshield before being turned away by the Secret Service. But within hours of the assassination and the subsequent arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald, the propaganda and disinformation apparatus spooled up to high gear and successfully silenced any and all opposing narratives of those six fateful seconds in Dealey Plaza.
Consider the following, which Hyman expounds on throughout the opening chapters: FBI Director Hoover immediately phoned a recently sworn in Lyndon Johnson to tell him “we have our man.” This is fascinating given the actual reports flooding FBI headquarters which directly contradicted this. No one, to my knowledge, can also explain unless the obvious setup was already firmly in place, just how or why Lee Harvey Oswald was picked up at the Texas Theater. No reliable witness saw him in the sixth floor window of the Texas School Book Depository building. The excuse that he was the only employee not at his post has also been refuted. The official tip-off for the APB has never been identified. People like Aquila Clemons, who witnessed the later Tippit shooting in nearby Oak Cliff, saw two people shoot the officer, neither of which resembled Oswald; automatic shell casings were first reported at the site of the Tippit shooting, yet Oswald had a .38 revolver, which does not eject shells. Law enforcement paraffin tests concluded Lee had not fired a rifle that day, regardless of his whereabouts. Why did seven police cars rush to the Texas Theater during a presidential assassination to investigate a man who didn’t pay for a movie ticket? None of it makes sense. And yet, despite all of these clearly established facts, which were known that day or shortly thereafter, the mainstream media conveyed almost none of them.
What we got, instead, was a ready-made, Life magazine profile of a lone Marxist weirdo who, in a final disgruntled act of defiance, shot JFK—perhaps the most progressive and pro-détente president in American history—because he … um … well, he was a nut! As Michael Paine, Oswald’s Dallas acquaintance who was part of a State Department/CIA related family, told the Washington Post (a CIA-infiltrated newspaper) in the following few days:
After the assassination there were reports that the killer took his time and aimed his rifle deliberately. That would be characteristic of Lee Oswald … He had little respect for people … He saw them as pawns. (Hyman, Burying the Lead p. 39)
The irony of that statement really can’t be topped considering it was Michael’s FBI friendly wife Ruth Paine and himself who moved the intelligence community pawn Lee Oswald and his wife Marina into the Fort Worth area and helped him find the job in the TSBD. And the list goes on, but this minor vignette showcases what Hyman so well outlines in dramatic fashion: a massive cover-up whose perpetrators reach deep into the corporate, military, intelligence and media organizations of the United States. As he notes:
The CIA has at times owned or subsidized more than 50 newspapers, news services, radio stations, periodicals, and other communications entities, sometimes in the country, but mostly overseas … At least 22 American news organizations had employed, though sometimes only on a casual basis, American journalists who were also working for the CIA. The organizations included ABC, CBS, Time, Life Newsweek, the New York Times, Associated Press and United Press International, the Scripps-Howard chain of newspapers, the Hearst newspaper chain, the Christian Science Monitor, the Wall Street Journal, the Louisville Courier-Journal, Forbes … College Press Service, Business International, the McLendon Broadcasting Organization, and the Copley News Services, among others. (Hyman, p.56)
All of this was part of CIA Deputy Director of Plans Frank Wisner’s Operation Mockingbird, colloquially referred to in the agency as “Wisner’s Wurlitzer”. With this apparatus, he could make the press dance to whatever tunes best fit the intelligence community’s agenda. It’s interesting to note that propaganda was officially outlawed by Congress in the United States under the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948.
Understanding that Cold War tensions might give rise to the continuing expansion of WWII-style propaganda, the Smith-Mundt Act, as it became known, enjoined the State Department to
… tell the truth; explain the motives of the United States; bolster morale and extend hope; give a true and convincing picture of American life, methods, and ideals; combat misrepresentation and distortion; and aggressively interpret and support American foreign policy. (Sarah Nilsen: Projecting America, 1958. p. 4)
And while this thoughtful and prescient legislation had good intentions, little did those signing it understand the monster that was forming right down the block out of the remains of the OSS.
III
Hyman spends a considerable amount of time balancing a fascinating and nuanced history of the formation of the CIA with the media’s contemporaneous reporting on both the agency’s dirty deeds and the critics of the Warren Commission. He also includes some previously—at least to my knowledge—unexplored clippings from international newspapers around the time of the assassination, including some prescient Indian and French takes on things like the ease with which Jack Ruby shot Oswald, the conspicuous lack of Secret Service protection in Dallas that day, and the almost cartoonish serendipity with which CE399 -the pristine magic bullet—was found in Parkland Hospital after the fact. Concurrent with his coverage of this is his survey of the history of the media’s infiltration by, and increasingly close ties with, the CIA. With only a few dissenting voices during the height of the Cold War, Hyman does an excellent job showing readers just how rare it was for anyone in a position of influence in the media to challenge the dominant narratives of the age. John Swinton, Chief of Staff for the New York Times, in a bold gesture at the 1953 New York Press Club gala, told the audience:
There is no such thing, at this date in history, as an independent press. You know it and I know it. There is not one of you who dare to write your honest opinions, and if you did, you know beforehand that it would never appear in print … any of you who would be so foolish as to write honest opinions would be out on the streets looking for another job. (Hyman, pp. 54-55)
The author also cites Walter Karp of Harper’s, who lamented, “It is a bitter irony of source journalism that the most esteemed reporters are precisely the most servile. For it is by making themselves useful to the powerful that they gain access to the ‘best’ sources.” (Hyman, p.46)
And yet the vast majority of the MSM, both then and now, did precisely that. This reinforced the myths promulgated by the power elite and advanced the belief that if any major abuses of power from the top were actually as grotesque and far-reaching as what the evidence surrounding the assassination of JFK suggests, Americans would have turned on the evening news or opened the morning newspaper over breakfast to discover the truth of the matter. Let’s not forget that it was around this time that the CIA, in an internal memo, advised its embedded sources in the press to promulgate the buzzword “conspiracy theory” to discredit anyone challenging the Warren Report. As this declassified 1967 cable explains:
Conspiracy theories have frequently thrown suspicion on our organization, for example by falsely alleging that Lee Harvey Oswald worked for us. The aim of this dispatch is to provide material for countering and discrediting the claims of the conspiracy theorists, so as to inhibit circulation of such claims in other countries.
In other words, legitimate investigations—which by definition seek to expose conspiracies of one sort or another—are to be attacked.
Abraham Lincoln was assassinated by an extensive conspiratorial network involving overseas agents; Austria’s Archduke Franz Ferdinand was shot by conspirators in an open car in broad daylight, which precipitated World War I; secret backroom deals between the OSS, the Vatican, U.S. politicians and other opportunists secured the release and expatriation of thousands of high-ranking Nazi war criminals to South America and the U.S. at the end of World War II. The 1954 overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala was a CIA-planned conspiracy involving hundreds of people sworn to secrecy. An international conspiratorial cabal involving officials from U.S., Belgium, and Katangese rebels planned the capture and murder of Patrice Lumumba seven years later. All of these are demonstrably provable conspiracies. But in the face of all that, the evidence that might erode the great shining lie surrounding the assassination of our nation’s progressive leadership in the 1960s, this evidence is shunted off as “conspiracy theories.” And, of course, no one can prove theories, which in actual scientific discourse are not qualitatively less significant than say “laws,” but actually denote a separate but equally sound paradigm based on complex natural or physical interactions rather than the direct relations of say two objects in a gravitational field. Darwin’s concept of evolution by natural selection is a theory. Newtonian gravity is a law. Einstein’s notion of General Relativity is a theory, but is understood as true. As I’ve always said, I am a proud conspiracy theorist, as should any historian be. It’s our job to investigate the relationships of human beings, some of which have ulterior motives. The above-cited memo is itself proof that conspiracies are real; a secret team of intelligence officers decided to discredit critics of a major American mystery. We were not privy to this meeting and it was intended to obfuscate the truth. A textbook conspiracy if ever there was. But only if you believe in that sort of thing.
Hyman also does a fine job detailing the various congressional committees that during the mid to late seventies first opened Pandora’s box and discovered that the CIA’s surveillance of American citizens’ mail was just the tip of the iceberg. From assassination units, both domestic and foreign, to witch doctors like Sidney Gottlieb—who from a CIA-sponsored laboratory had cooked up his exotic poisons and killing devices—to the CIA’s bizarre but very real trauma-based mind control experiments on unwitting American subjects, it wasn’t looking good for the intelligence community. And yet, as Hyman notes, the fallout was essentially inconsequential. What could and should have been a legal mandate for the Central Intelligence Agency to come forward with its tax-payer-funded ledger of dirty deeds turned into the smug reply of people like Counterintelligence Chief James Angleton, who famously told committee members, “It is inconceivable that a secret arm of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the government.”
IV
Perhaps the most significant achievement of this book, besides its comprehensiveness and exquisite delivery, is Hyman’s treatment of JFK’s foreign policy. Only a handful of authors, I feel, have sufficiently addressed just how much John Kennedy diverged, both practically and philosophically, from his Eastern Establishment colleagues and advisers in the White House and Pentagon. Hyman takes readers through each of the struggles of the Third World that faced a young JFK during his brief tenure in office, from the inherited Congo Crisis, to Sukarno’s bid to nationalize Indonesia’s natural resources, to the infamous thirteen days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war.
There is now enough evidence, both from declassified documents and in the form of fine secondary sources, to adamantly make the case that JFK’s primary antagonism with the power elite– and what ultimately led them to assassinate him—stemmed from his radically progressive views of the developing world. While he and his brother Robert strove to effect tangible street-level change on America’s domestic race issue—and did, to a large extent through things like affirmative action, legal investigations of racist hiring practices and meetings with prominent civil rights leaders—they attempted to apply their visions of a better human future most boldly in the Third World. Consider, as Hyman does, Kennedy’s absolutely prescient analysis of the Middle East in 1951:
The fires of nationalism are ablaze … A Middle East Command operating without the cooperation and support of the Middle Eastern countries … would intensify every anti-western force now active in the area, [and] from a military standpoint would be doomed to failure. The very sands of the desert rise to oppose the imposition of outside control on the destinies of these proud people … Our intervention on behalf of England’s oil interests in Iran directed more at the preservations of interests outside of Iran than at Iran’s own development … Our failure to deal effectively after three years with the terrible tragedy of more than 700,000 Arab refugees [Palestinians], these are things that have failed to sit well with Arab desires, and make empty the promises of the Voice of America.
Already, just years after its creation, the CIA had overthrown the secular democratically elected leader of Iran, Mohammad Mossadeq in their first ever orchestrated coup. This ushered in nearly three decades of violent oppression and torture under Shah Reza Pahlavi, who happened to be future CIA Director Richard Helms’ pal from Swiss boarding school. The proximate motive given was that Iran was exhibiting strange communist tendencies in its decision to keep the profits of its own oil sales from Britain, a nation that had extorted billions from what it essentially viewed as a backwater desert satrapy.
Thus was born a classic CIA playbook: using the mantra of an international communist conspiracy to disguise its ulterior motives of protecting corporate interests. Similarly, Jacobo Árbenz, the 25th president of Guatemala, exhibited these same nationalist economic tendencies in 1954. When he requested a fair return on land owned by the United Fruit Company—which had been ripping off Guatemala to the tune of millions in back taxes for years—the CIA-backed paramilitary army of Carlos Castillo-Armas marched into Guatemala City and staged a coup. With CIA assets going so far as to plant Marxist literature in Árbenz’ private study, later dumping a large crate of Soviet weapons near a beach, just in time for CIA-approved reporters to discover them. President Eisenhower presided over this operation, codenamed PBSUCCESS, which he viewed as a spectacular covert feat. Castillo-Armas, a brutal ex-chief of police who had been living in exile in Honduras, was featured on the cover of Time magazine a year later, with a glowing review of his visit to the United States entitled, “Guest from Guatemala.” (Time, Nov. 7, 1955)
Kennedy had already recognized the folly of this behavior. Consider his 1957 speech on Algeria to the U.S. Senate:
The most powerful force in the world today … is man’s eternal desire to be free and independent … We did not learn in Indochina … Did that tragic episode not teach us that whether France likes it or not, or has our support or not, their overseas territories are sooner or later, one by one, inevitably going to break free and look with suspicion on the Western nations who impeded their steps to independence … The time has come to face the harsh realities of the situation and to fulfill its responsibilities as leader of the free world. (Hyman, p.457)
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, along with brother and Director of CIA Allen Dulles, both suggested to Eisenhower that dropping nuclear bombs on the Vietnamese threatening to overtake the French forces trapped at Dien Bien Phu could win the war. To say that Kennedy’s and the viewpoints of figures like Allen Dulles slightly differed, as is so often regurgitated in the mainstream histories of his presidency, is not just inaccurate but dishonest. They were diametrically opposed. And this played out in dramatic fashion when the two were forced to work together after the 1960 election. Similarly, the author notes this sentiment of solidarity with the Third World was a theme running deeply throughout Kennedy’s tenure as both a senator and as president, not a grandstanding ploy or an appeal to the far-left voter base. As he told the Senate two years later, in 1959, regarding Central African turmoil, “Call it nationalism. Call it anti-colonialism … Africa is going through a revolution … The word is out—and spreading like wild fire in nearly a thousand languages and dialects—that it is no longer necessary to remain forever poor or forever in bondage.”
These words eerily parallel the 1960 victory speech given by president elect Patrice Lumumba to throngs of ecstatic Congolese:
We are deeply proud of our struggle, because it was just and noble and indispensable in putting an end to the humiliating bondage forced upon us. That was our lot for the eighty years of colonial rule and our wounds are too fresh and much too painful to be forgotten. We have experienced forced labor in exchange for pay that did not allow us to satisfy our hunger, to clothe ourselves, to have decent lodgings or to bring up our children as dearly loved ones. (“Speech at the Ceremony of the Proclamation of the Congo’s Independence, June 30, 1960”)
President Eisenhower refused to meet with Lumumba when he flew to Washington, and later signed off on his assassination.
Too often critics of non-mainstream JFK assassination theories smugly resort to arguing lack of motive for a non-Oswald shooter, or intelligence community backing. Why, we’ve heard again and again, would other rich white Eastern Establishment power elites assassinate one of their own? Even I, who have an extensive background in 20th-Century foreign policy, was reminded of this in my graduate training, with a few memorable professors conceding that basically Jack Kennedy was a cooler, younger version of say, Eisenhower, or a more sophisticated version of Johnson with a better tailored suit. But he was not fundamentally any less hawkish than either of his presidential bookends. Yes, Oliver Stone suggested Kennedy’s likely withdrawal of advisers from Vietnam as the contributing cause of the military-industrial complex’s decision to remove him. But, they would remind me, we all know that’s just a theory. Had they read NSAM 263? Did they not also realize there were no combat troops in Vietnam in November 1963 when Kennedy was killed? Kennedy presided over Operation Mongoose and the “failed” exile-invasion of Cuba, they often repeated, so he was no stranger to using gunboat diplomacy.
Let’s examine these claims, as Hyman does to a great extent in his final and excellent last chapters. As authors like James DiEugenio, Richard Mahoney, Col. Fletcher Prouty and others have shown, President Kennedy had an immediate, actionable withdrawal and de-escalation order effective upon his return from Dallas that month. This was not a verbal agreement or handshake over drinks that has been anecdotally passed through the research community. It’s all clearly spelled out in NSAM 263, a National Security Action Memorandum that concretely establishes JFK’s divergence from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency’s cold warrior, Manichean view of the free and communist worlds.
As we know through John Kenneth Galbraith’s biographer Richard Parker, Kennedy had previously tried for an appeal to Hanoi for a neutralist diplomatic solution to the Vietnam problem with Nehru of India playing the broker. As Gareth Porter showed in his book The Perils of Dominance, this effort was sabotaged by the State Department’s Averill Harriman. Similarly, we know, from a variety of his foreign policy dealings in the Third World, that President Kennedy was entirely more nuanced in his understanding of nationalism than most people in the room during briefings. Kennedy correctly understood that the quick and sloppy conflation of liberation, decolonization, or resource-redistribution movements in places like the Congo, Indonesia and ultimately, Vietnam, with Soviet Communism, was a dangerous game to play. Because it dismissed the forces of nationalism.
The fallout from the intelligence and military communities’ efforts to prop up pro-U.S. dictators has been much explored by authors like William Blum, (Killing Hope), David Schmitz (Thank God They’re On Our Side), and Max Friedman (Rethinking Anti-Americanism), and is beyond the scope of this review to accurately survey. Suffice it to say, Hyman does an excellent job of unpacking these critical departures between an increasingly isolated John and Robert Kennedy during times like the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Or to use another example, in a June 20th, 1961 meeting, General Lemnitzer and Allen Dulles “proposed an official plan for a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.” (Hyman, p. 424.) Like he did before and would do again, Kennedy, according to aides present, walked out in disgust. Around this same time, people like General Lucius Clay in West Berlin were mobilizing their tanks to make a move against the Soviets. Strategic Air Command, without the president’s authority, began deploying nuclear-equipped long-range bombers, even going so far as to cross established international airspace parallels which essentially signaled to the Soviets that this was not a routine drill. It’s amazing, at least to me, that not only did the nuclear-armed superpowers not destroy humanity during the Missile Crisis, but that the world’s most important two-week vigil landed in the lap of figures like John and Robert Kennedy. Replay the events with Eisenhower/Nixon in power. It doesn’t end well. We now know that had a full blown invasion with U.S. air support taken place it would have faced over a quarter of a million Cuban and Soviet ground troops who had dozens of tactical nuclear missiles poised to repel an amphibious invasion.
It also cannot be stressed enough that the Bay of Pigs invasion was both thrown in his lap due to its delayed planning during the Eisenhower/Nixon administration, and designed to fail without full-blown U.S. naval and carrier-based air support—and likely the landing of 100,000 ground troops. The myth that Kennedy got “cold feet,” as my grandpa Marcel used to tell me back in Florida, was a pure creation of … wait for it … the CIA! Allen Dulles and E. Howard Hunt paid a CIA-cleared journalist to ghostwrite their completely honest, objective, 100-percent transparent evaluation of President Kennedy’s failure of nerve in Fortune magazine, a journal run by … wait for it … a CIA asset on payroll! We know this through documents revealed in Allen Dulles’ personal papers at the Princeton University collection. And Kennedy knew this intuitively. As Hyman cites him telling his friend, Undersecretary of the Navy Paul Fay:
Now in retrospect, I know damn well they didn’t have any intention of giving me the straight world on this … Looking back at the whole Cuban mess, one of the things that appalled me was the lack of broad judgment by the heads of the military services. They wanted to fight and probably calculated that if we committed ourselves part way and started to lose, I would probably give the OK to pour in whatever else was needed. (Hyman, p. 424)
We are arguably all still here because of JFK’s acumen during the Cuban Missile Crisis, yet this is almost never explored by the media, who portray the harrowing events and their unspectacular, negotiated resolution as somehow inevitable. Nothing could be further from the truth, and Hyman spends considerable time hammering this point home in his final chapters. Which, I should add, follow a lengthy and extremely interesting unpacking of Lyndon Johnson’s behavior after the events of Dealey Plaza, which should appeal to those on the fence regarding his culpability and seeming complicity at times with the conspirators.
Philosophically, as Hyman conclusively shows readers, John F. Kennedy represented a psychic break from the entrenched corporate/military/industrial power elites, whose post-traumatic irrationality, myopic reductionism and retrograde colonial opportunism dominated American politics at mid-century. Shaken to the core by the implications of Soviet dominance over vast reaches of Europe and Asia in the wake of the Second World War, and seeking a much-needed bogey man to fulfill their Hegelian negative-identity criteria, by which national worth can only be defined in opposition to a foreign adversary or internal enemy, U.S. policy makers at the height of the Cold War largely viewed the Kennedys as traitors. Traitors to the great mantle of tremendous military might fortuitously bequeathed to an otherwise backwater new nation called the United States in the wake of the Second World War’s global carnage. Traitors to the corporate interests who cared little what a million Congolese suffered under CIA-backed dictators like Mobutu, so long as their diamond and cobalt mines in Katanga poured forth abundance. Traitors to the then-as-now accepted postwar view that the United States is an exceptional nation with an exceptional, quasi-religious historical mission which despite hundreds of overthrows, embargoes, assassinations, lies, and disinformation campaigns by its politicians and intelligence officers, is fundamentally well-meaning and just.
Anyone interested in tracing the origins of this dark legacy will be doing themselves a favor by picking up Burying the Lead. It is one of those rare things: a balanced, engaging, fascinating look at the slimy underbelly of the American power structure. And the hired guns of the media who cover up for them.
Addendum, May 30, 2019
The John Swinton quote used in the above review is misattributed in time. John Swinton passed away in 1901. He made the statement in 1880, after he had concluded his employment with the New York Times and was working at the New York Sun. Please see the following for more information: https://www.constitution.org/pub/swinton_press.htm
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CBS and their 1964 JFK Cover-Up
As most people who read this site understand, the MSM has not been trusted or admired for their work relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. In fact, one can effectively argue that the major media bastions—newspapers, magazines, and broadcast media—were so biased in favor of the official story that they have little or no credibility on the case today. This began almost from the start, and continues to the present.One of the worst instances of the media’s obeisance to the Powers That Be concerning the JFK case occurred upon the issuance of the Warren Report. If the reader will recall, this happened in late September of 1964. The report was handed to President Lyndon Johnson on Thursday, September 24. There was an official photograph taken on that day in the Oval Office. All seven commissioners, plus Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin, were pictured. Chief Justice Earl Warren handed LBJ the 888-page report. This was, for all intents and purposes, a photo op, as the report was not released to the public until Sunday evening, the 27th.
A funny thing happened that Sunday evening. Both the CBS and NBC networks broadcast specials on the JFK case. Both were based upon, and endorsed, the Warren Report. This was odd in two respects. First, how could anyone have read the quite lengthy and complicated report that fast? What makes that even harder to understand is that the Warren Commission worked in almost complete secrecy. Their hearings were closed to the press and the public. The only exceptions among the approximately 500 witnesses the Commission itself interviewed were the two depositions of Mark Lane. They were excepted for the simple reason that Lane insisted his appearances be done in the open. (Walt Brown, The Warren Omission, p. 244)
As author Seth Kantor notes, inside the Commission itself, the working staff of attorneys was pretty much kept away from the seven commissioners and the chief counsel. (Seth Kantor, The Ruby Cover-Up, p. 163) This information above leads to the conclusion that the two broadcast programs were produced by directed leaks from the top level of the Warren Commission. The only other logical possibility would be that they were done with the help of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, since he did the great majority of the investigative work for the Commission.
It was very soon discovered that, although the Warren Commission tried to label itself a fact-finding committee, that rubric is not really accurate. After one studies their deliberations, their conduct of interviews, and their methods of investigation, it is quite obvious that there were significant holes in their fact-finding quest; for instance: Oswald in New Orleans, Oswald in Mexico City, Kennedy’s autopsy, Jack Ruby’s entry into the Dallas Police basement. But even with their foreclosed database, the Commission clearly produced a prosecutor’s brief. (Mark Lane, Rush to Judgment, p. 378) For two reasons, that end result was almost inescapable. First, the Commission decided that Oswald had been the lone gunman before they interviewed their first witness. (Lane, pp. 365-66) Secondly, the Commission refused to grant Marguerite Oswald the right to appoint a counsel to represent her deceased son’s interests. (Lane, p. 9) On the issue of fairness to the alleged assassin, the Commission tried to cover itself by saying that they had enlisted the services of one Walter Craig, the president of the American Bar Association, to find if the “proceedings conformed to the basic principles of American Justice.” (Sylvia Meagher, Accessories After the Fact, p. xxix) Craig only attended hearings from February 27 to March 12, 1964. Any suggestion he made in deference to Oswald’s rights is not visible in the record. As Sylvia Meagher concluded in this regard, “The whole sorry arrangement was a mockery that further compromised the Commission’s claim to impartiality.” (p. xxix)
What is so fascinating in reading and viewing the immediate endorsement of the MSM upon issuance of the report is that none of the commentators even mentions this large lacunae in the Commission’s procedure. As any attorney will state, the whole basis of the American justice system is the adversary procedure. One of the fulcrums of that adversary procedure is the cross-examination of witnesses, the right to examine documents, the right to make objections, etc. Even in fact-finding procedures done for Congress (e.g., Watergate or Iran/Contra), there was a majority and minority counsel, so one gets something resembling an adversary procedure. To put it mildly, that did not happen with the Warren Commission. But somehow, in their eagerness to embrace the official story, the press ignored this issue with a completeness that is almost astonishing. It is made even worse by the fact that the reporter who did the immediate endorsement for the New York Times, Anthony Lewis, had just written a best-selling book on the subject. Lewis’ book was called Gideon’s Trumpet. It was about the 1963 Gideon v. Wainwright Supreme Court case. In that case, the court ruled that defendants in criminal cases must be supplied an attorney even if they could not afford one. How Lewis could turn his back on his own book is puzzling.
The press did not just accept the Warren Report, it did not just embrace it, but as the evidence above indicates, they colluded with its creators to present it to the public as the ultimate truth about the murder of President Kennedy. Near the end of the 1964 CBS special, Walter Cronkite goes so far overboard in this regard that today it is almost embarrassing to view. Cronkite says that it is hard to imagine a more thorough inquiry could have been done, and that Oswald lied about every major point he was questioned on.
What makes these pronouncements patently absurd is the fact that the 26 volumes of testimony and evidence the Warren Report based their conclusions on would not be published for two months: that is, November 23, 1964. Those volumes contained over 17,000 pages to inspect. With that paradox, we are left with two alternatives to ponder. Either someone on the Commission leaked both the report and its evidentiary volumes to the media, or someone associated with the inquiry gave them advance summaries of what that evidence would say. I should not have to add the serious journalistic problem in this collusion. As demonstrated above, the Commission was extremely biased in their presentation. They would not even allow a representative for Oswald. Since they worked in secret, there was no way to cross check their procedures or methodologies. So to accept at face value the Commission’s presentation was a huge gamble. People like Cronkite and Lewis risked losing the trust of the public in both the government and the media if they were wrong.
The CBS special that was broadcast on the night of September 27 was longer than the NBC rendition. It ran for two hours. The producers interviewed a number of witnesses who the Commission relied upon for its guilty verdict: Ruth Paine, Marina Oswald, Howard Brennan, and so forth. The story about how Brennan was included on the CBS special bears mentioning. At first, he was not going to appear. This probably owes to the fact that there was a debate inside the Commission as to whether or not the man was credible, or whether his liabilities outweighed his probative value. (Edward Epstein, Inquest, p. 136) When CBS first announced its schedule of over twenty witnesses, Brennan was not included. But when the Commissioners decided that Brennan was necessary, the CBS script was revised and Brennan was sent to New York to be interviewed before the program’s deadline. This is how close the ties were between CBS and the Commission. (Mark Lane, A Citizen’s Dissent, pp. 77-78)
In 1964, Emile de Antonio had released a cinema-vérité-style documentary about the fall of Senator Joseph McCarthy. For Point of Order de Antonio relied largely on film from the CBS kinescope archives. (Lane, A Citizen’s Dissent, p. 75) In 1966, de Antonio was working with Mark Lane on a documentary about the Kennedy assassination. It would eventually take the same title as Lane’s book, Rush to Judgment. The director got in contact with the CBS library and proposed to repeat the process of purchasing film from that network. The response from librarian Virginia Dillard was positive. (Washington Journalism Review, Sept-Oct, 1978, article by Florence Graves; hereafter referred to as Graves in WJR) Lane and de Antonio arranged to go to the CBS archives after hours and sit in front of a movieola to view the outtakes from that 1964 production.
As Lane writes in A Citizen’s Dissent, he and de Antonio were unprepared for the interviewing techniques they saw being used. If a witness was asked where he thought the shots came from and answered with “the knoll area”, the interview was halted. There was an interim that was not accounted for and now the witness would reply that although he originally thought the shots came from the knoll, he now thought they came from the Texas School Book Depository. On the third take, the witness would be asked where he thought the shots came from and he would reply, the depository building. This would be presented as the interviewee’s answer. (Lane, A Citizen’s Dissent, p. 78)
De Antonio described the same pattern in an interview he did for journalist Florence Graves in 1978. He said that what he recalled was people in these outtakes saying things that did not get on the program since they contradicted the official story. He then said that it was clear that the interviewer was leading the subjects to a predetermined conclusion. He summed it up with, “The interviewer was more like a prosecuting attorney leading a witness to support the state’s case.” In other words, CBS not only served as an outlet for the Commission, they even did their dirty work for them. (Graves in WJR)
Lane and de Antonio now ordered up the outtakes they wished to use. But the next day Dillard told them the deal was cancelled. She said that CBS never sold outtakes. (Graves in WJR) This, of course, was pure malarkey. They had done so with Point of Order, and they had just agreed to do so in the JFK case. This reversal must have come down from the executive suites at the network. Either Dillard or the movieola operator had informed them what was happening. Someone like CBS president Richard Salant then overruled the Dillard agreement and the previous de Antonio precedent. The Kennedy case was that important.
In the 1978 Florence Graves article, it is revealed that one of the producers of the 1964 CBS program, Bernard Birnbaum, admitted there were leaks from the Commission for that special. He added that some of the interviews went on for as long as an hour. But further, and perhaps most importantly, he said the production was months in the making.
Why did Graves write her piece in 1978, 14 years after the original special aired? Because in the fall of that year, there was a controversy in the press about whether or not the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) had tried to secure these important pieces of film that had been denied to Lane and de Antonio. The Washington Post reported at the time that the HSCA had not tried to secure the 70 hours of film that CBS still had. (Washington Post, 9/17/78, report by Larry Kramer) And they used Robert Blakey, chief counsel of the HSCA, as their source. That article quoted witnesses landlady Earlene Roberts and cab driver William Whaley as saying things to CBS that contradicted what was reported by the Commission. The Post reporter speculated, as did Graves, that what the witnesses said could back up the concept of a Second Oswald, an idea that some critics had postulated as far back as 1966.
For the Post article, the pretense that Salant was using to keep the outtakes away from Lane, de Antonio and the HSCA evolved into comparing the film with an investigative reporter’s notes. Which is hard to comprehend. The latter is tied in with the whole idea of a reporter’s need to keep certain sources secret in order to develop information that would benefit the public. Usually, arrangements are made prior to the interview about these special circumstances. Nothing like that would exist in the CBS example. Birnbaum told Graves that the only guarantee he made to the witnesses was the broadcast would not be aired until the Warren Report had been released. Also, why could a witness agree to go on camera if there was anything dealing with personal secrecy involved? In the CBS case, clearly, the value of the transmittal would greatly outweigh the value of keeping the information secret. Or as de Antonio said to Graves for the WJR article, “Does CBS have an Official Secrets Act like the CIA? What is it afraid of?… What is CBS hiding? I won’t guess.”
For the Graves article, Salant contradicts what Blakey said about the matter. Salant told her that the HSCA did make such a request for all film, including outtakes, in both the JFK and Martin Luther King cases. This was done both orally and in writing. Graves found out from other sources that the HSCA did want the outtakes but CBS would not surrender them. Realizing that this would be a long legal battle that would detract from the investigation, the Committee decided not to issue a subpoena.
As this site had explored before, CBS was and is one of the worst media agencies to ever broadcast on the assassination of President Kennedy. Through former employee Roger Feinman, we showed that the upper level of management vetoed and then reversed the desire of the reporters and lower managers to honestly investigate the JFK case in their 1967 four night special. In that article we intricately demonstrated how the CBS cover-up of the facts worked and how it pervaded that special. We also showed how CBS then denied that it had done the things it did, such as employing Warren Commissioner John McCloy as a secret advisor to the program. Based on Feinman’s inside information, plus the testimony of Lane and de Antonio, it is not unwarranted to suspect the worst about 1964, and Salant’s refusal to admit it in 1978. After all, Salant refused to admit the role of McCloy in the 1967 special as late as 1977, just one year before the Graves article appeared. Salant finally did admit to the McCloy role in 1992 when Jerry Policoff confronted him with written evidence of the memos McCloy wrote. (Go here for that story) In other words, Salant covered up what he knew to be true for 25 years about what McCloy had done in 1967.
With that record, who would believe his protestations in 1978 about what had happened in 1964?
(The author would like to thank Bart Kamp and Malcolm Blunt for the sources used in this piece.)
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Paul Blake Smith, JFK and the Willard Hotel Plot
When I was asked to do a review of this book, I was quite hesitant. I do not like to comment on other people’s work, especially when a lot of effort has been put into it. The reason I accepted this time is that it was related to research I have been doing over the last two years on prior plots to assassinate JFK and the framing of other potential patsies.
Some who have read my articles wondered why I had not included an attempt in Washington in my analysis. Paul Blake Smith’s book subtitles itself as The Explosive Theory of Oswald in D.C. I felt this could perhaps add yet another plot to the long list of those already exposed. However, Blake Smith’s pitch that he would present compelling evidence that Oswald was in Washington as part of a squad of shooters taking aim at Kennedy from the Willard Hotel is just one of the things he promises to deliver. He states that his book is unique in that it “utilizes the revealing treasury report on Oswald-at-the-Willard”, and many other small clues: “The document is the lynchpin that holds together a solid conspiracy theory and is nearly a Rosetta Stone for deciphering the overall scope of the historic mystery.” The book would also reveal how Mafia chieftain Carlos Marcello was behind this plot and the eventual, successful Dallas assault plan. Extravagant promises, tempered by his admission that we need more facts and that a lot of his evidence is circumstantial.
I had been expecting to read a tightly knit exposé of a Washington cabal. Instead, when the book arrived, I was faced with 433 pages that covered so much ground about not only the alleged plot, but a whole parallel look into the Lincoln assassination, the similarities between the two, and the author’s analysis of who was behind JFK’s assassination—from the orchestrators to the shooters.
In the introduction (p. 5), the author takes precautions not to be labeled a conspiracy theorist: “In other historic dramas, like the RFK or MLK murders in mid-1968, there doesn’t seem to have been any conspiracy at all, just a true lone gunman responsible. I certainly do not see conspiracies behind every bush …”
This is really too bad because the author has blocked himself off from potential comparative case analysis where the conspiracies behind them are perhaps as easy to demonstrate as with the JFK assassination. The MLK assassination was also judged a conspiracy by the HSCA and the RFK assassination was proven one by the autopsy alone. Even the late Vincent Bugliosi was greatly troubled by the RFK investigation. By negating these plausible conspiracies, the author has blocked off a source of information that relates to the JFK assassination—certainly when it comes to analyzing motive, media cover-up and shoddy investigations. Many of the authors Blake Smith lists in his bibliography have just signed a petition to have these cases, along with Malcolm X’s murder, re-opened. Lisa Pease just launched her book about RFK’s assassination, A Lie Too Big to Fail, which has received excellent reviews from no less than the Washington Post. In it, she presents Robert Maheu’s and John Roselli’s links to that case. Sound familiar?
Also on the back cover, the author promotes another of his books, MO-41: The Bombshell Before Roswell. I took the time to do a little web research and found Amazon comments on it: some good and some less so. This comment got my attention:
The narrative flows along, but there are no footnotes; and there is too much hearsay reported, especially from online chat rooms and email, which is not substantiated. More needs to be done, before I’ll buy this book’s premise/theory. The Roosevelt information is another matter altogether. The author asserts that F.D.R. shot himself due to his knowledge of the aliens, etc. of the UFO events previously described in the previous chapters.
I had to put the book down many times and fight off my instincts to pre-judge it because I could see that it quickly staked out positions that were diametrically opposed to where I stand on the case. By the time I was through the first chapter I was dejected and regretted my decision to accept this mandate. However, a promise is a promise, so I read on. The more I read, the less I regretted taking on this endeavor, not because this was by any means a masterpiece. It is not. However, there is useful information which the author deserves credit for underscoring.
After thinking somewhat about how to evaluate his work, I decided to focus on three basic theories that he advances: 1) That there was a plot in the works to terminate JFK in Washington in early October 1963; 2) That Oswald was in Washington leading this mission at around this time; and 3) That Carlos Marcello was the leading figure behind this plot and the eventual assassination in Dallas, “with some insider help”.
So before analyzing the author’s evidence, let’s first get an idea of what some of his key positions are, which I must admit is not easy, as many seem to evolve from chapter to chapter and sometimes from page to page. We will first look at his views on the nature of the conspiracy.
A Mob-led conspiracy
At the beginning of chapter 1, Carlos Marcello’s famous rant is quoted: “Yeah I had that Sonuvabitch killed”, and then the author states shortly after: “This book aims to tell more precisely how Carlos got just what he wanted”.
As for motive, we are given the usual litany of mob frustrations with the Kennedys. They helped get JFK elected and instead of having their guy in the White House, they were double-crossed when Bobby aggressively went after them; Marcello had been exiled to Guatemala by Bobby in 1961, etc.
Therefore, “Carlos was determined to pay back the young president (and his cocky brother) in the most violent and extreme way he could think of: By having John F. Kennedy gunned down right at his precious White House, maybe even from the very same attractive Willard Hotel of 61”. He explains the importance of choosing cold-blooded, scummy killers that were not traceable to the Mafia: “It was just a matter of finding the most greedy, unprincipled persons” (p. 22) Remember this last line when we explain why Blake Smith believes the assassins had Kennedy in their sights from the Willard Hotel but decided not to shoot.
He goes on to state that Carlos got buy-in from a few of the top hoodlums and came to realize he needed to hire a guilty-looking oddball who could not be tied directly to the Marcello “outfit”. By page 31, Blake Smith begins presenting a Mafia/KKK partnership since they also shared a hatred of Kennedy.
On page 33, he makes the following statement: “Thus it seems pretty accepted today that Marcello recruited his oldest Mafia contacts, Giancana and Trafficante, to help him rub out the president.”
The author has taken it upon himself to identify Marcello, Giancana and Trafficante as “the Big Three” of the Mafia in the early sixties. This seems both arbitrary and questionable, as it eliminates men like Meyer Lansky, and all the heavy hitters from the East Coast. In fact, none of these men were members of the governing commission of the Mafia at this time. (HSCA, Volume 9, p. 18) Marcello was not particularly tight with Giancana. He was actually in competition with Trafficante for the drug traffic in the Gulf area. Why propose a hit to someone who will have leverage over you?
The CIA in all this? In 1960, the Big Three:
… accepted CIA cash in exchange for assassinating Castro, but instead they took the money, gave lip service in return but no real effort and then chocked up [sic] another marker to call in for future schemes. A kind of blackmail to expose unless the CIA cooperated on certain future Mafia proposals: Like murdering their own commander in Chief. (p. 37)
Actually, they did not give lip service. As the CIA Inspector General Report shows, there were three different attempts to poison Castro and the last one may have worked had the CIA not screwed it up by putting Tony Varona on ice during the Bay of Pigs landings. (These are described in the CIA Inspector General Report, pp. 31ff, and are termed the Phase 1 plots.) In addition, the mobsters refused to take any payment for their efforts. (p. 16)
Blake Smith then broadens out to say a rotten apple was recruited from within the Secret Service to help in the plot. However, the number grows significantly in a couple of later chapters.
When it comes to describing Lee Harvey Oswald, the author is consistent, direct and does not pull any punches.
Blake Smith takes everything negative ever said about the alleged assassin and kicks it up a notch: “rat-faced fellow from Marcello’s New Orleans”; “Perpetually unemployed Marxist-spouting, ex-Marine defector”; “Had problems getting along with others, the high-strung abusive oddball, was obsessed with the anti-American hero … pro Fidel Castro”; “Lonely Lee”; “Lazy Lee”; “Handed out pro-Marxist sheets making a fool of himself”; “Arrogant L.H. Oswald was of course the same southern-fried, rifle-clutching, wife-beating school drop-out”; “Miscreant Lee in the summer of 63 was so obsessed with Soviet-linked Castro he spoke only Russian at home”; “LHO often padded around “The Big Easy” with his old military training manual … and around house with his .38 caliber pistol … plus his Mannlicher Carcano …”; “a lazy little mouse who wanted to roar”; “Lee really didn’t have the size, education, the guts and strength to accomplish anything positive”; “Puny Lee craved money, recognition, respect”… “Chronic Creep Lee had to get out of Dallas that mid-April to escape the heat from his brazen attempted assassination of retired General Edwin Anderson Walker”; “Lee had himself photographed by his wife posing with a pistol and a rifle and communist literature”; “Anyone who criticized and threaten his beloved Castro was an imperial fascist who deserved to be shot …” The author also shows us some of his prowess in psychiatry by diagnosing Oswald as semi-psychotic: a qualifier he uses throughout the book. This comes in handy, because now he can explain almost anything Oswald does henceforth in his exposé, no matter how illogical.
According to the author, Oswald was brainwashed into killing Kennedy by figures connected to Marcello, by telling him the president wanted Castro dead and the American Mafia out of power for good.
The Warren Commission could not find any motive for Oswald. Blake Smith spells out what it missed: Oswald would “help kill Kennedy to save Castro and expect rewards including legal passage to Cuba as an accepted resident there outside of extradition.”
Blake Smith opines that Oswald did fire twice at Kennedy and then once at Connally, nailing both men in the back (page 324). His third shot hit the curb. He then killed Officer Tippit before Marcello had Ruby rub him out. And there is this peculiar statement: “Lee’s shots were in reality only to get people—especially JFK’s Secret Service Agents—to look the wrong way, a distraction for the knoll gunman’s crucial kill shot.” Never mind that it appears the throat shot from the front preceded the back wound shot.
Lee Harvey Oswald in Washington
Concerning this aspect of the Willard Hotel plot, the author does not waste any time summarizing ten clues in Chapter 1 that “reveal the reality of Lee Oswald in Washington and some aspects of the two planned “Willard Hotel Plots” in Washington.
These include:
- What he calls a formerly buried Willard Hotel Secret Service report.
- The Joseph Milteer tape where the white supremacist can be heard predicting the assassination.
- Richard Case Nagell’s letters warning the FBI of a Washington plot towards the end of September.
- Lee Harvey Oswald’s letters talking about moving to Washington at this time.
- J. Edgar Hoover’s memos stating that Oswald had been in Washington.
- David Ferrie’s rants about killing Kennedy in Washington.
- Statements made by a Cuban exile made in Miami before the assassination.
- Documents retrieved from a pile of burned leaves in Pennsylvania.
- A scorched memo sent to a researcher that “supposedly” was retrieved from James Angleton’s fireplace.
- A Secret Service report on Marina Oswald.
After reading the whole book, my opinion is that there is a good argument to be made that there were many contingency plans in place to kill JFK at locations he visited throughout the last three quarters of 1963 and perhaps even earlier. That Washington was on the list is probable and can be based not only on the author’s (and others) writings, but by the numerous other plots that have been documented. The idea that Oswald was being maneuvered to be a patsy there is plausible. However, Oswald’s pro-Marxist behavior was a matter of sheep-dipping by intelligence and not, as the author writes, an expression of his ideology. Washington was not the original plot to bump off JFK as claimed by the author, as cabals in L.A. and Nashville preceded it. Finally, the proof that Oswald was in fact in Washington in late September and early October 1963, as laid out in this book, is a lot weaker than what the author argues. We will discuss this later, as well as the case made about the Willard Hotel being a place that the shooters actually occupied when they had Kennedy in their sights.
Summary
I don’t think kennedysandking readers need me to find arguments against much of the author’s often debunked and rehashed mob-led conspiracy theory. Many of the arguments the author presents in his “Marcello mastermind” scenario only demonstrate mob involvement as a very junior partner in the conspiracy. As a matter of fact, he could have put more emphasis on Ruby’s probable visit to Trafficante in Cuba, the analysis of his phone calls during the days leading up to the assassination, as well as the fact that one of Ruby’s first visitors while in jail was alleged Dallas mobster Joe Campisi. Other arguments the author presents are on shaky ground. When it comes to the hierarchal structure of the coup, his pecking order needs revising. If he is looking for arguments to do so, I will refer him later to his own sources.
In this day and age, the fact that the author does not even want to entertain the notion that Oswald may not have been a commie nut is faintly ludicrous, and has been ever since the following famous statement was published:
We do know Oswald had intelligence connections. Everywhere you look with him, there are fingerprints of intelligence.
~ Senator Richard Schweiker, The Village Voice, 1975
From 1975 to 1976, Schweiker was a member of the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. According to Blake Smith, Oswald would kill any who would dare threaten Fidel Castro. Yet Oswald spent the latter years of his life in the Marines, with White Russians, and right wing extremists like David Ferrie and Guy Banister, Cuban exiles hostile to Castro, perhaps with Mafiosi who wanted the island back, CIA contacts … the crème de la crème of Castro hostiles. When he was arrested on Canal Street, Oswald asked to meet with FBI agent Warren de Brueys, who was responsible for monitoring the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and Cuban exiles. This may be why Gerald Ford wrote about a Warren Commission meeting presenting information that Oswald was a government informant.
One would also wonder whom from the Mafia, or the Secret Service, would even risk exposing themselves and their roles in a plot by conferring so much responsibility to such a loose cannon. Blake Smith also speculates Oswald is capable of quite the accomplishments for such a loser: sending one or two of his doubles down to Mexico City to set up an alibi, receiving inside information from Secret Service agents in Washington, placing two shots in the back of both JFK and Governor Connally with a terrible weapon …
Schweiker was not alone in having his doubts about Oswald’s Warren Commission persona, and who was really behind the assassination. HSCA Chief Counsel Richard Sprague, attorney Mark Lane, investigator Gaeton Fonzi and New Orleans DA Jim Garrison all expressed similar opinions. These later snowballed into a consensus that we can now read in the recently written Truth and Reconciliation joint statement, signed by many of the researchers Blake Smith refers to. In it, you will not see a whiff of consent around a mob-led conspiracy scenario. You will see that these writers think the mob figures were themselves being led! The first paragraph speaks for itself:
In the four decades since this Congressional finding, a massive amount of evidence compiled by journalists, historians and independent researchers confirms this conclusion. This growing body of evidence strongly indicates that the conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy was organized at high levels of the U.S. power structure, and was implemented by top elements of the U.S. national security apparatus using, among others, figures in the criminal underworld to help carry out the crime and cover-up.
We will return to flaws in the author’s logical construction later. I did find some positive contributions in this work, at least points useful in my own investigative objectives. Here is what I feel are some of the stronger points of the book:
- The author does cover either numerous areas that reminded me of interesting anecdotes or issues I had read a while back but I had forgotten about, and some I had not heard of.
- He presented arguments around the work of some reliable researchers that have convinced me that there could well have been a plot to assassinate Kennedy in Washington that would have framed Oswald. This is of strong interest to me because of my research in the prior plots to assassinate Kennedy.
- Related to this point, the author presents some context on the goings on in D.C. during the period Oswald was scheduled to be there.
- While his attempts to link the KKK to a Mafia-led plot are weak, his writings allowed me to better understand some of the history and structure of American hate groups and the arguments others have put forth about their alleged contribution to the coup.
- Some of the writings around the mob, and I say some, could be interesting to novice readers.
- I, along with a growing number of researchers, concur with his conclusions that Oswald never visited Mexico City. I also applaud his attempt to answer the obvious question that arises because of this: Where was Oswald during these crucial dates? This is an important debate that researchers must have.
- While his writings about Secret Service participation are at times contradictory, he did a smart thing in relying heavily on Vince Palamara in his research, which resulted in two of his best chapters.
Unfortunately, these also included two major negatives. He contaminated them somewhat with some of the worst of the Dark Side of Camelot and other TMZ-style gossip about Kennedy’s private life. And then, for some very weird, unexplained reason, he decided to use the pseudonym Trip-Planner Perry to identify (or hide) one of his leading suspects from the Secret Service. I will speculate later on why I think he chose this very unfortunate writing strategy. Whatever the reason, as a reader I felt very manipulated and frustrated.
I also have written about how the CIA, Mafia and Cuban exile network involved in the assassination had roots going back many decades. I am now interested in how the Secret Service could have logistically worked with this network. Blake Smith does present some good leads to follow up on.
My philosophy about reading in general is that if, at the end of a book, I have learned something new and important, or my view about an issue has evolved, there has been progress. However, the struggle to get there can be often very demoralizing—talk about mixed emotions!
Research and analysis
One of my frustrations with Blake Smith’s book was trying to make sense of the author’s sources. His footnote management is very inconsistent; his exhibits, especially the documents, are poorly identified and made almost impossible to read because of poor reproduction; his sources are difficult to consult and he is often guilty of citation malpractice. Trying to figure out the soundness of his research was quite time-consuming and represented a heavy burden for readers like me who like to evaluate the solidity of the argument or dig to find out more. Throughout the book, I felt the author was playing a game of hide-and-seek with his primary data. I will give a few examples later. If you are going to make a case on circumstantial evidence, you really need to back up your observations with solid, easy to consult references.
Blake Smith’s sources and evidence are often so scrambled, mysterious and sketchy that the real sleuthing related to this work is trying to figure out what they are. All too often, you cannot try to expand your knowledge or verify the authenticity of the evidence. We are left to trust his evaluation of evidence that we cannot explore. On many occasions, he uses the National Enquirer technique of presenting an unidentified source as his basis for making a claim. We are left guessing who-the-heck said what and how credible this informer is.
Here are some examples of the vagueness and lack of sourcing that goes on throughout the book: “On May 15th, 2006, five knowledgeable JFK assassination experts were invited to a special conference …” (we never find out who); exhibit on page 17—FBI report about Marcello that is illegible; page 17, incriminating quotes made by Marcello with no footnotes. Then there is this citation: “He wanted that particular American leader dead in 1963 and hired others to do the job. (source: an FBI report dated the following 3/7/85); “Some legal and media investigations have shown that Marcello had upset the Kennedys; At one point in 1963, researchers have now learned, the devious Mafia plan was becoming so increasingly whispered; According to biographers, for a few weeks spiteful, unstable Oswald ran wages and numbers to gamblers for Murrett; Undoubtedly some Cuban refugees and two key private investigators also worked on Lee Oswald that summer, hammering away at his psyche”—with not one footnote to the entire passage. This is just chapter one. Sometimes, when we are lucky, a whole book is mentioned as the source.
The author could have profited from a reliable editor, one who would have helped with grammar, fact checking and general guidance. I cannot say how many times this has helped me for articles I have written that are less than one tenth the length of his book. Even though the author has an energetic, whimsical style that can be entertaining, the number of punctuation errors, faulty page breaks, misspelled words (assasin, guiilt, coup d’eta to name but a few) and especially name identification errors (Dan Hardway becomes Don Hardaway, Douglas Dillon is at times Douglass, Douglas Horne is also spelled Douglass, Hersh is Hirsh, Harold Weisberg is Weisburg, ZR Rifle is at times just Rifle, and Robert Maheu is misspelled Mahue throughout). This laxness permeates the entire book.
A good editor would have also helped with fact checking and helped avoid blunders, or strongly urged the author to provide the evidence for some of the questionable claims that are often made. The next two sections furnish examples.
The Sylvia Odio incident (page 90):
Blake Smith: (at Odio’s residence on September 25) “Leopoldo and Angelo spoke in Spanish on his (Oswald’s) behalf around sundown, talking about how loco he was in his pro-Castro, anti-Kennedy views.”
Now compare this to what Sylvia Odio said in her testimony to Wesley Liebeler in 1964:
He (Leopoldo) did most of the talking. The other one kept quiet, and the American, we will call him Leon, said just a few little words in Spanish, trying to be cute, but very few, like “Hola,” like that in Spanish.
… I unfastened it after a little while when they told me they were members of JURE, and were trying to let me have them come into the house. When I said no, one of them said, “We are very good friends of your father.” This struck me, because I didn’t think my father could have such kind of friends, unless he knew them from anti-Castro activities. He gave me so many details about where they saw my father and what activities he was in. I mean, they gave me almost incredible details about things that somebody who knows him really would or that somebody informed well knows. And after a little while, after they mentioned my father, they started talking about the American.
He said, “You are working in the underground.” And I said, “No, I am sorry to say I am not working in the underground.” And he said, “We wanted you to meet this American. His name is Leon Oswald.” He repeated it twice. Then my sister Annie by that time was standing near the door. She had come to see what was going on. And they introduced him as an American who was very much interested in the Cuban cause. And let me see, if I recall exactly what they said about him. I don’t recall at the time I was at the door things about him.
I recall a telephone call that I had the next day from the so-called Leopoldo, so I cannot remember the conversation at the door about this American.
I asked these men when they came to the door—I asked if they had been sent by Alentado, became I explained to them that he had already asked me to do the letters and he said no. And I said, “Were you sent by Eugenio,” and he said no. And I said, “Were you sent by Ray,” and he said no. And I said, “Well, is this on your own?”
And he said, “We have just come from New Orleans and we have been trying to get this organized, this movement organized down there, and this is on our own, but we think we could do some kind of work.” This was all talked very fast, not as slow as I am saying it now. You know how fast Cubans talk. And he put the letter back in his pocket when I said no. And then I think I asked something to the American, trying to be nice, “Have you ever been to Cuba?” And he said, “No, I have never been to Cuba.”
And I said, “Are you interested in our movement?” And he said, “Yes.”
This I had not remembered until lately. I had not spoken much to him and I said, “If you will excuse me, I have to leave,” and I repeated, “I am going to write to my father and tell him you have come to visit me.”
And he said, “Is he still in the Isle of Pines?” And I think that was the extent of the conversation. They left, and I saw them through the window leaving in a car. I can’t recall the car. I have been trying to. …
So Blake Smith has the residence meeting all wrong. Let us see how he does with the follow-up call (which he speculates was made from the Willard Hotel) where he states: “That on the evening of the 27th (48 hours later), one of the two Cubans with Oswald called Sylvia Odio and said Oswald wanted to shoot the president.”
Here is Odio’s testimony:
The next day Leopoldo called me. I had gotten home from work, so I imagine it must have been Friday. And they had come on Thursday. I have been trying to establish that. He was trying to get fresh with me that night. He was trying to be too nice, telling me that I was pretty, and he started like that. That is the way he started the conversation. Then he said, “What do you think of the American?” And I said, “I didn’t think anything.”
And he said, “You know our idea is to introduce him to the underground in Cuba, because he is great, he is kind of nuts.” This was more or less—I can’t repeat the exact words, because he was kind of nuts. He told us we don’t have any guts, you Cubans, because President Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs, and some Cubans should have done that, because he was the one that was holding the freedom of Cuba actually. And I started getting a little upset with the conversation.
And he said, “It is so easy to do it.” He has told us. And he (Leopoldo) used two or three bad words, and I wouldn’t repeat it in Spanish. And he repeated again they were leaving for a trip and they would like very much to see me on their return to Dallas. Then he mentioned something more about Oswald. They called him Leon. He never mentioned the name Oswald.
Mr. LIEBELER. He never mentioned the name of Oswald on the telephone?
Mrs. ODIO. He never mentioned his last name. He always referred to the American or Leon.
Mr. LIEBELER. Did he mention his last name the night before?
Mrs. ODIO. Before they left I asked their names again, and he mentioned their names again.
Mr. LIEBELER. But he did not mention Oswald’s name except as Leon?
Mrs. ODIO. On the telephone conversation, he referred to him as Leon or American. He said he had been a Marine and he was so interested in helping the Cubans, and he was terrific. That is the words he more or less used, in Spanish, that he was terrific. And I don’t remember what else he said, or something that he was coming back or something, and he would see me. It’s been a long time and I don’t remember too well, that is more or less what he said.
And then there is this:
Mr. LIEBELER. Now, a report that we have from Agent Hosty indicates that when you told him about Leopoldo’s telephone call to you the following day, that you told Agent Hosty that Leopoldo told you he was not going to have anything more to do with Leon Oswald since Leon was considered to be loco?
Mrs. ODIO. That’s right. He used two tactics with me, and this I have analyzed. He wanted me to introduce this man. He thought that I had something to do with the underground, with the big operation, and I could get men into Cuba. That is what he thought, which is not true.
When I had no reaction to the American, he thought that he would mention that the man was loco and out of his mind and would be the kind of man that could do anything like getting underground in Cuba, like killing Castro. He repeated several times he was an expert shotman. And he said, “We probably won’t have anything to do with him. He is kind of loco.”
When he mentioned the fact that we should have killed President Kennedy—and this I recall in my conversation he was trying to play it safe. If I liked him, then he would go along with me, but if I didn’t like him, he was kind of retreating to see what my reaction was. It was cleverly done.
In a nutshell, the author in just a few lines of copy, confuses who spoke, what was said during the meeting at the residence, when the follow-up call took place, the claim that Oswald was described as pro-Castro, and while Leopoldo claimed that Oswald said that the Cubans should have killed Kennedy because of the failed Bay of Pigs, he did not say Oswald wanted to shoot the president.
In fact, he is depicted as one who could kill Castro. (WC Vol. 11, p. 377) On the surface, why would three persons seeking (or pretending to seek) to collaborate with an organization that has as its objective the overthrow of Castro, and talk to a person whose father is languishing in a Cuban prison, present Leon as pro-Castro? It is more likely that they were hoping to link the future patsy with JURE an organization favored by the Kennedys for when a potential overthrow took place, but clearly despised by the intelligence apparatus and the other stakeholders.
Throughout the book, the author often distorts evidence, to the point that it appears he has not examined the primary data closely and wants it to point to Oswald being pro-Castro at the Willard Hotel in late September. This tendency is recurrent to the point that the presentation becomes biased and exaggerated.
Jack Ruby and the Mob
On page 376, he makes the claim that Ruby’s motivation to kill Oswald (in part) was his own impending death: “Oswald’s stalker—murderer had been diagnosed with cancer before Kennedy came to Dallas”. His source: talk show host Morton Downey Jr. (1932-2001), who claimed to have interviewed Dr. Alton Ochsner, who would have diagnosed Ruby with cancer in August 1963. Consequently, he knew his time on earth was limited. Never mind that Ruby was based in Dallas and Ochsner in New Orleans, or that there is no corroboration in the literature for this information. Need I also point out that Downey is known for having pioneered Tabloid TV?
In addition, a solid editor would have suggested that he leave out many of his stories that were based on hearsay, outdated evidence and are often irrelevant. I believe that his focus should have been a 200-page analysis of the Washington plot instead of 420 pages on every anecdote there is about the assassination, no matter how wild.
In reading his bibliography, I began to understand why his writings are skewed towards the discredited Mafia-did-it theory. It contains a long list of some 60 books. Among the authors referred to, you will find Waldron, Stone, Chuck Giancana, Shenon, Davis, Hersh, Janney, Aynesworth and Bugliosi. Having read some of the work he includes such, as JFK and the Unspeakable, The Devil’s Chessboard and Survivor’s Guilt, I could not understand his conclusions about the assassination motive or logistics. If he did read them, he seems to have very little regard for the evidence they put forth, since it is at odds with his theories of the crime. Books that seemed to have made a strong impression on him include Double Cross, some of Robert Morrow’s work and Ultimate Sacrifice, since these are among the most referenced. The Robert Blakey (HSCA) quotations he uses are the ones that most support his theory, certainly not the ones Blakey made after coming to terms with the fact that the CIA had duped him by placing obfuscator George Joannides as CIA liaison during the HSCA investigation. This probably goes a long way in explaining his “the Mafia killed Kennedy” view of things.
That bibliography is also notable for what it does not include: None of the work by Newman, Prouty, Simpich, Hancock, DiEugenio, Mellen, Davy, Armstrong, Fonzi, McBride, Ratcliffe, or Lane is listed! How most of these highly respected researchers are not in one’s top sources is difficult to fathom. It explains, in my opinion, why this author’s analysis is mired in the past.
The author’s key theories under the microscope: A Marcello-led Plot
On page 23, the author relates this old tale to us: “You must get a nut to do it.” Marcello allegedly told an FBI informant, who reported those words back to the Bureau and eventually to the press. On page 25, he quotes Marcello as saying he wanted it done so that it could not easily be traced back to him. “If you cut off the tail of a dog, he lives. But if you cut off his head he dies,” Marcello famously explained to his trusted visitor.
For some reason, as he often does, the author presents no footnotes, does not tell us who the informant was and accepts this story at face value. I wondered why a Mafioso would incriminate himself so pointlessly.
According to a 1993 Washington Post article, the informant alluded to here was Las Vegas “entrepreneur” Ed Becker. The following lines prove this: Ed Becker was told by Marcello in September 1962 that he would take care of Robert Kennedy, and that he would recruit some “nut” to kill JFK so it couldn’t be traced to him, according to several accounts. Marcello told Becker that “the dog (President Kennedy) will keep biting you if you only cut off its tail (the attorney general)” but the biting would end if the dog’s head was cut off. Becker’s information that Marcello was going to arrange the murder of JFK was reported to the FBI, though the FBI says it has no records of the Marcello or the Trafficante threats, nor of wiretapped remarks of Trafficante and Marcello in 1975 that only they knew who killed Kennedy.
Becker, who became a key source in Ed Reid’s 1969 book, The Grim Reapers, was shown to be problematic by the HSCA. Here are a few key lines that seriously undermine Becker (follow the link for the whole report on the debunked Marcello threats):
ALLEGED ASSASSINATION THREAT BY MARCELLO
- As part of its investigation, the committee examined a published account of what was alleged to have been a threat made by Carlos Marcello in late 1962 against the life of President Kennedy and his brother, Robert, the Attorney General. The information was first set forth publicly in a book on organized crime published in 1969, “The Grim Reapers,” by Ed Reid. (160) Reid, a former editor of the Las Vegas Sun, was a writer on organized crime and the coauthor, with Ovid Demaris, of “The Green Felt Jungle,” published in 1963.
- In a lengthy chapter on the New Orleans Mafia and Carlos Marcello, Reid wrote of an alleged private meeting between Marcello and two or more men sometime in September 1962. (161) His account was based on interviews he had conducted with a man who alleged he had attended the meeting. (162)
- According to Reid’s informant, the Marcello meeting was held in a farmhouse at Churchill Farms, the 3,000-acre swampland plantation owned by Marcello outside of New Orleans.(163) Reid wrote that Marcello and three other men had gone to the farmhouse in a car driven by Marcello himself. (164) Marcello and the other men gathered inside the farmhouse, had drinks and engaged in casual conversation that included the general subjects of business and sex. (165) After further drinks “brought more familiarity and relaxation, the dialog turned to serious matters, including the pressure law enforcement agencies were bringing to bear on the Mafia brotherhood” as a result of the Kennedy administration. (166)
Reid’s book contained the following account of the discussion:
It was then that Carlos’ voice lost its softness, and his words were bitten off and spit out when mention was made of U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who was still on the trail of Marcello. “Livarsi na petra di la scarpa!” Carlos shrilled the cry of revenge: “Take the stone out of my shoe!” “Don’t worry about that little Bobby, son of a bitch,” he shouted. “He’s going to be taken care of!” Ever since Robert Kennedy had arranged for his deportation to Guatemala, Carlos had wanted revenge. But as the subsequent conversation, which was reported to two top Government investigators by one of the participants and later to this author, showed, he knew that to rid himself of Robert Kennedy he would first have to remove the president. Any killer of the Attorney General would be hunted down by his brother; the death of the president would seed the fate of his Attorney General. (167)
No one at the meeting had any doubt about Marcello’s intentions when he abruptly arose from the table. Marcello did not joke about such things. In any case, the matter had gone beyond mere “business”; it had become an affair of honor, a Sicilian vendetta. Moreover, the conversation at Churchill Farms also made clear that Marcello had begun to move. He had, for example, already thought of using a “nut” to do the job. Roughly 1 year later President Kennedy was shot in Dallas—2 months after Attorney General Robert Kennedy had announced to the McClellan committee that he was going to expand his war on organized crime. And it is perhaps significant that privately Robert Kennedy had singled out James Hoffa, Sam Giancana, and Carlos Marcello as being among his chief targets.
FBI investigation of the allegations:
- The memorandum goes on to note that a review of FBI files on Reid’s informant, whose name was Edward Becker, showed he had in fact been interviewed by Bureau agents on November 26, 1969, in connection with the Billie Sol Estes investigation. (185) While “[i]n this interview, Marcello was mentioned * * * in connection with a business proposition * * * no mention was made of Attorney General Kennedy or President Kennedy, or any threat against them.” (186)
- The memorandum said that the agents who read the part of Reid’s manuscript on the meeting told the author that Becker had not informed the Bureau of the alleged Marcello discussion of assassination. (187) In fact, “It is noted Edward Nicholas Becker is a private investigator in Los Angeles who in the past has had a reputation of being unreliable and known to misrepresent facts.” (188)
- Two days later, in an FBI memorandum of May 17, 1967, the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Los Angeles office reported some additional information to Hoover. (194) In the memorandum, the Los Angeles office set forth some alleged information it had learned regarding Becker, who, the memo noted, claimed to have heard “statements supposedly made by Carlos Marcello on September 11, 1963, concerning the pending assassination of President Kennedy.”(195) The FBI memo stated that 1 day after the Bureau first learned of the Reid information, its Los Angeles office received information regarding Edward Becker which was allegedly damaging to his reputation. (196) According to the information, Sidney Korshak had been discussing Becker and:
Korshak inquired as to who Ed Becker was and advised that Becker was trying to shake down some of Korshak’s friends for money by claiming he is the collaborator with Reid and that for money he could keep the names of these people out of the book. (197)
- The memorandum also stated that Sidney Korshak had further stated that “Becker was a no-good shakedown artist,” (198) information which in turn became known to the Bureau. (199)
- Where Becker is referred to as an “informant,” it should be noted that this applies to his relationship to Reid and not to a Federal law enforcement agency.
- On May 31, 1967, according to the same memorandum, a special agent of the Los Angeles office was involved in a visit to Reid’s (208) in a further effort to persuade him of Becker’s alleged untrustworthiness. (209) During this visit, the Bureau’s possible confusion over the time periods involved in the matter was further evidenced in the memorandum, which said that “in November 1969” Becker had “not mentioned the reputed * * * statements allegedly made by Marcello on September 11, 1963.” (211) Again, both Reid and Becker have maintained consistently that they made clear that the meeting was in September 1962, rather than September 1963 (212), and that the specific reference in the Reid book stated “September 1962.” (213) Additionally, the Bureau’s own files on Becker (while not containing any references to assassination) clearly indicated that Becker had been interviewed by agents in November 1962, following a trip through Louisiana that September. (214) Committee investigation of the allegation.
- Becker was referred to in a second FBI report of November 21, 1962, which dealt with an alleged counterfeiting ring and a Dallas lawyer who reportedly had knowledge of it. (222) This report noted that Becker was being used as an “informant” by a private investigator in the investigation (223) and was assisting to the extent that he began receiving expense money. (234) The Los Angeles FBI office noted that the investigator working with Becker had “admitted that he could be supporting a con game for living expenses on the part of Becker * * * but that he doubted it,” as he had only provided Becker with limited expenses. (225)
- The November 21, 1962, Bureau report noted further that Becker had once been associated with Max Field, a criminal associate of Mafia leader Joseph Sica of Los Angeles. (226) According to the report, “It appears that Becker * * * has been feeding all rumors he has heard plus whatever stories he can fit into the picture.” (227)
- On November 26, 1962, Becker was interviewed by the FBI in connection with its investigation of the Billie Sol Estes case on which Becker was then also working as a private investigator. (228) Becker told the Bureau of his recent trips to Dallas, Tex., and Louisiana, and informed them of the information he had heard about counterfeiting in Dallas. (229) At that point Becker also briefly discussed Carlos Marcello:
He [Becker] advised that on two occasions he has accompanied Roppolo to New Orleans, where they met with one Carlos Martello, who is a long-time friend of Roppolo. He advised that Roppolo was to obtain the financing for their promotional business from Marcello. He advised that he knew nothing further about Marcello. (230)
- Becker was briefly mentioned in another Bureau report, of November 27, 1962, which again stated that he allegedly made up “stories” and invented rumors to derive “possible gain” from such false information. (231)
- Three days later, on November 30, 1962, another Bureau report on the Billie Sol Estes case made reference to Becker’s trip to Dallas in September and his work on the case (232). The report noted that Becker was apparently associated with various show business personalities in Las Vegas (233). Further, a man who had been acquainted with Becker had referred to him as a “small-time con man.” (234)
And the report goes on and on in undermining this entertaining but dubious saga.
Becker’s reliability took another sharp turn for the worse just recently when in December 2018, on BlackOp Radio, a show Blake Smith should listen to in order to evaluate his sources, Len Osanic interviewed Geno Munari. Geno knew someone who met Carlos Marcello with a very nervous Edward Becker. In that interview, Geno explains how his acquaintance met Marcello and got to interview him years after the assassination, how he was accompanied by Becker and how it was quite obvious that Becker and Marcello had never met before.
In itself, this casts much doubt on the Marcello accusations which have circulated for decades and that Blake Smith has rehashed as one of his foundational arguments. This analysis, along with the Sylvia Odio section, point to another problem I have with the author’s research efforts: He does not seem to seek corroboration from primary sources when this is easily available. Furthermore, neither Reid nor Becker (who later co-wrote a book on John Roselli) are in his bibliography. So one must ask, with this many layers between the author and the primary data, where does he get his information?
It is very difficult to recount what the author’s position on a subject can be, because he speculates in so many directions that it can leave your head spinning. Here are some examples:
- If Marcello wanted to create distance between the assassination and the Mafia, you would think this would be reflected in the hit-team that was put together. In his top ten suspects in Dallas, the author names in fourth place Johnny Roselli, in fifth place Sam Giancana’s top enforcer Charles Nicoletti and Trafficante’s personal bodyguard Herminio Garcia Diaz is in third.
- Blake Smith expresses doubt that Alpha 66 leader Antonio Veciana ever met David Phillips because he only confirmed this after Phillips passed away. He does not believe the Veciana claim of having seen Oswald with Phillips in Dallas (p. 105). However, to prove that Oswald was never in Mexico City, he relates how Veciana said that Phillips offered him a large sum of money to lie about Oswald visiting a relative in Mexico City, and concludes that if Oswald were in Mexico City, why would one need to bribe someone to lie about it?
- And remember Marcello’s short list of cold-blooded, scummy killers that would be recruited to do the job? Here is one of the author’s reasons the hit team decided not to fire when they had Kennedy in their sights with his family close by: “one would think that women and children would be off limits to any shooter with an ounce of self-respect, when pondering firing a kill shot at the president, from afar or just from the sidewalk, behind the fencing. A sniper with a clear shot could not very well plant a bullet into the skull of a president in front of his loving spouse and offspring and expect safe quarter from any citizen or sympathetic anti-Kennedy supporter in the aftermath, when trying to escape capture. The whole country would have turned on such a heartless, coldblooded villain. Thus the “South Lawn Plot” was a total flop.” (p. 398)
- On page 164, he further confuses matters by writing: “But it had to be the president who had to be lured into place too, into the open somehow, in this scenario. Perhaps at an outdoor welcoming ceremony, or concert, or playtime with the children.”
- The author also states that a reason for the failure was that Oswald chickened out (page 321). Question: Did all the shooters chicken out simultaneously? Other question: What made Marcello think that he would not chicken out again firing from his place of work in Dallas?
- Then we have the October Surprise: “anyone who longed to gun down the president, at the White House or in his Washington parade. And it was all due to the power of chlorophyll: a healthy bright green. Nature’s green leaves and thick shrubbery saved the day” … ”Very large, full trees lined the South Lawn in particular, blocking the view from the sturdy Willard Hotel, and even in some locations the ground-level views from the sidewalk.” … “foiled by foliage.”
I do not even know where to begin with this one. How long did it take for these Keystone-Cops plotters casing the joint since September 26 to figure this out? Would the leaves having begun to turn orange improved the view that much? Not where I come from! Finally, living significantly farther north than Washington D.C., I highly doubted that the leaves begin changing colors a full two weeks before those in Quebec City. This is what is confirmed on any website for autumn tourists: “Fall is especially beautiful in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia. Leaves begin to turn red and yellow in the middle of October. The timing and intensity of colour depend on temperature and rainfall. The peak of fall colors can be seen till the end of October, and then the trees start losing leaves.”
- As for his one bad apple in the Secret Service: this is a point he makes in his relatively good work in his Secret Service chapters and elsewhere. But the list kept growing to include Trip-Planner Perry, Kellerman, Greer and possibly others. And even here, the author tends to fall into the trap of using debunked sources, something that happened to me in some of my early writings.
Way back, I too fell for the Mafia-connected Judith Campbell hoax. Campbell claimed to be Kennedy’s mistress who acted as courier between Sam Giancana and Kennedy. One of the persons who edited my work convinced me to put a stop to this because she simply could not be trusted. In a list of ten outrages, the author explains why some in the Secret Service turned on JFK, including his alleged affairs with Mary Meyer and Judith Campbell, involvement in group sex and homemade porn, hotel hookers, the president’s gay lover, and drug abuse. While he does use the word “alleged” at times and also the qualifier “according to”, he rarely shows an inclination to explore the debunking of these sensationalistic claims. Not to say that JFK was a choirboy, but after reading “The Posthumous Assassination of John F. Kennedy—Judith Exner, Mary Meyer and Other Daggers” by Jim DiEugenio, I realized how much I had fallen for some of the worst exaggerations out there. Blake Smith continues to do so.
- In his chapter 4, on hate groups, he underscores links between them and the Mafia-linked persons of interest, such as the alleged ones between Joseph Milteer and Guy Banister that we will talk about below. Since I had not looked into this area very closely in the past, I found myself interested in the anecdotes presented. But here again the author provides little primary data when it comes time to proving meaningful links between them and the Marcello gang. It all becomes tenuous and fragile.
- Sometimes the author uses a source and then candidly puts on the brakes to point out serious credibility problems with the source. But he then keeps coming back to it. On page 196, he tells us about how Terri Williams, in a small town in Mississippi, remembered her classmates and teachers whooping it up after learning of the JFK assassination. The excited principal went from class to class proudly announcing his death. The principal even singled out a ten year-old boy’s father’s expert marksmanship in Dallas. And the Williams family was also congratulated for their Uncle Albert Guy Hollingsworth being part of the team. Terri’s story goes on to implicate the unstable, ex-marine uncle. She claims he became the Zodiac Killer. Since the Zodiac Killer was never caught, the author opines, “Who knows? Miss Williams might be right”. Terri did, however, “concede that her uncle was in reality a lousy shot, having once blown off one of his own toes.”
This goes on for seven pages, then eventually the author transparently states: “Her tale is compelling but she has not produced a shred of evidence to back it up … Some other online allegements [sic] by Terri Williams seem to become more suspect and farfetched-sounding [sic].”
Seven pages on an online source like that … Really! What’s worse is that after completely undermining her credibility, he still goes back to her at least twice in later sections to emphasize points. Now guess who makes it on to his list of top ten suspects in Dallas? In eighth place: Al Hollingsworth!
- His attitude towards the CIA’s involvement with this whole cabal is difficult to pin down. Sometimes we get the feeling that they are just a little bit pregnant, but then he will anecdote-drop key points that he leaves undeveloped and fluffs over their significance. On page 296, he dabbles a little bit in William Harvey, who helmed the ZR Rifle assassination program and who was close to John Roselli and hated the Kennedys. However, he then comes to a sudden stop around this intelligence subject. On page 248, he uses The Devil’s Chessboard to allude to Dulles perhaps conniving with Treasury Department head Douglas Dillon, but does not develop it much further. He alludes to some suspicious behavior by the CIA’s David Phillips around the Mexico City charade (p.81).
It now appears that Jim Garrison has been vindicated with respect to Clay Shaw, whose role as a well-paid CIA asset has been confirmed; moreover, many witnesses, judged credible by the HSCA, saw him in the company of Oswald and David Ferrie. Yet Clay Shaw is barely mentioned. He does describe the Bethesda military autopsy room on the night of the assassination as being filled with military men, but without understanding the implications.
Had he taken a little trouble to reflect on these important observations and added to them a consideration of both the timely propaganda efforts conducted in the blink of an eye by key CIA assets such as Hal Hendrix, Ed Butler and DRE members, all in synch with one another, as well as the ensuing cover-up, he would have seen that there is little probability this conspiracy was Marcello-led.
The Willard Hotel Plot
It goes without saying that I have issues with the author’s overall scenario. However, my interest in his book had more to do with his theory that there was a planned Washington plot in the works and that Oswald was there with a team of shooters who were in position at and around the Willard Hotel to fire away at the president. Let us see how he does in these areas.
We do not have to wait very long for the author to make his case. The author deserves credit for describing the goings-on in the Capital during the time that Oswald was scheduled to move there. The fact that there was a motorcade on October 1 with Ethiopia’s Haile Selassie is important. The discussion around the Kennedy use of the South Lawn for ceremonies, playtime with the children and other activities is also useful. The descriptions of what the two possible Willard Hotel plots —one involving triangulated firing at the motorcade, the other involving sniping at JFK on the South Lawn from the Willard Hotel and locations close to it—these deserve our attention and are a first step for us to debate a potential Washington plot.
One area that I found interesting was the actual description of the Willard Hotel and its potential for such plots. The author sometimes uses vague expressions like “potentially” or “in theory” in ways that made me believe he had not done much groundwork in sizing up the feasibility of actually carrying out an assault from a place in proximity to the White House. I was skeptical about the mere notion that a president could be picked off like a sitting duck from a hotel window near his home. I would have liked to see more pictures of the hotel and the views it offered as well as diagrams and distance measurements. I would have welcomed more information about the standard security arrangements to counter such an obvious, omni-present threat. I would have appreciated knowing more about the getaway challenge. It would have been good if the author had conducted his own interviews of hotel workers and even current Secret Service representatives. Steps like these are what made James Douglass’ description of the Chicago plot persuasive. The author visited potential patsy Thomas Arthur Vallee’s place of work and covered Secret Service agent Abraham Bolden’s account of security sabotage in detail. When you consider that the Willard Hotel figures prominently in the title and throughout the book, you would think that the geography and spatial relationships of the edifice deserved more scrutiny.
In chapter one he provides his list of ten clues. Let us look at some of the main ones:
(1) The Joseph Milteer tape (Page 47)
Here the author quotes the following passages from this right wing extremist when he talked to an informant (William Somersett) about the assassination he predicted: “It’s in the works” “with a high powered rifle” “in Washington” from “a hotel across from the White House” … “when he steps out on the veranda”.
Then he follows up on this by alluding to possible links with Guy Banister through their common links to brutal extremist groups. The problem is that no one has ever been able to produce any direct link between the two men. Jeffrey Caufield wrote a 700 page book on his inquiry into a Radical Right plot to kill Kennedy. He never even touched the subject of a direct link between the two.
Instead of talking about Terri Williams for seven pages or providing a bonus chapter, the author really should have reproduced the complete exchange:
Somersett: … I think Kennedy is coming here on the 18th … to make some kind of speech … I imagine it will be on TV.
Milteer: You can bet your bottom dollar he is going to have a lot to say about the Cubans. There are so many of them here.
Somersett: Yeah, well, he will have a thousand bodyguards. Don’t worry about that.
Milteer: The more bodyguards he has the easier it is to get him.
Somersett: Well, how in the hell do you figure would be the best way to get him?
Milteer: From an office building with a high-powered rifle. How many people does he have going around who look just like him? Do you now about that?
Somersett: No, I never heard he had anybody.
Milteer: He has about fifteen. Whenever he goes anyplace, he knows he is a marked man.
Somersett: You think he knows he is a marked man?
Milteer: Sure he does.
Somersett: They are really going to try to kill him?
Milteer: Oh yeah, it is in the working. Brown himself, [Jack] Brown is just as likely to get him as anybody in the world. He hasn’t said so, but he tried to get Martin Luther King.
Milteer: Well, if they have any suspicion they do that, of course. But without suspicion, chances are that they wouldn’t. You take there in Washington. This is the wrong time of the year, but in pleasant weather, he comes out of the veranda and somebody could be in a hotel room across the way and pick him off just like that.
Somersett: Is that right?
Milteer: Sure, disassemble a gun. You don’t have to take a gun up there, you can take it up in pieces. All those guns come knock down. You can take them apart.
Milteer: Well, we are going to have to get nasty …
Somersett: Yeah, get nasty.
Milteer: We have got to be ready, we have got to be sitting on go, too.
Somersett: Yeah, that is right.
Milteer: There ain’t any count-down to it, we have just go to be sitting on go. Countdown, they can move in on you, and on go they can’t. Countdown is all right for a slow prepared operation. But in an emergency operation, you have got to be sitting on go.
Somersett: Boy if that Kennedy gets shot, we have got to know where we are at. Because you know that will be a real shake …
Milteer: They wouldn’t leave any stone unturned there. No way. They will pick somebody within hours afterwards, if anything like that would happen, just to throw the public off.
Somersett: Oh, somebody is going to have to go to jail, if he gets killed.
Milteer: Just like Bruno Hauptmann in the Lindbergh case, you know.
Not only does this admittedly eerie conversation take place on November 9th after the purported Washington plot; you can see that Milteer knows nothing about Oswald, Dallas, Marcello, or any definite plans about Washington. Washington is simply name-dropped as a hypothetical example of where it could potentially be done.
(2) The FBI memos
Most researchers by now are aware of Hoover’s communications to Lyndon Johnson and other information that has emanated from the Lopez Report, which has convinced most of us that Oswald was impersonated in Mexico City and that he quite possibly never even went there. But with this clue, the author makes an incredible claim: In another memo from hours after the assassination, Hoover dropped an even bigger bombshell: “Oswald has visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington D.C.” He repeats this claim on page 98. “And finally the coup de grace: It was learned in that an unsigned FBI memo was sent to new President Lyndon Johnson in the hours after the murder … One of those stunning facts was that Lee H. Oswald had visited the embassy in Washington D.C.”
No timing, context or peripheral info about the purported meeting, nor anything around the document itself. Question: As was the claim in Mexico City, were the cameras pointed on the Washington embassy also malfunctioning?
If ever a detailed footnote, or a full memo exhibit, or a link to a bombshell piece evidence was needed, this was it. But the author decided to leave out a cornerstone of his argument. He does not even print a full transcript. Out of the hundreds of points he tries to make in his book, this would have been the most important to cover in a serious, detailed fashion.
Why had I not ever heard of this memo? I went into a mad scramble trying to find it—without success. I did find reports that spoke of Oswald making contact with the embassy by mail in 1962 to take care of issues pertaining to Marina; another report about a likely fake letter implicating Oswald and the Russians sent to the Russian embassy just a few days before the assassination. This letter was shown to be suspect by Russian representatives who correctly argued that it was the only typed letter Oswald ever sent them (Douglass, JFK and the Unspeakable, page 231). I had no luck confirming, or coming close to confirming, that Hoover had made such an explosive claim.
So I tried networking. I got in contact with Larry Hancock, one of the top experts in documentary analysis in connection with this case and a writer of noted books on the assassination, communicated the following to me:
Hi Paul, I’m afraid I can’t help you on the Soviet embassy visit; personally I would be very suspicious of such a document for a variety of reasons, including the fact that Hoover would have loved to tie Oswald to the Commies and actually asked LBJ to let him put something of that nature in the FBI report on the assassination. Johnson just ignored him. I think if he had a document as described we would have seen it … and there is nothing terribly suspicious about it given that Oswald had written them and was clearly trying to get Marina back into Russia (or at least give that impression, not sure how much she knew about his efforts).
Forgive me for not taking this documentary clue for granted. If the author, or someone out there, can produce this document, I am certain it will be much appreciated by the research community.
(3) The Nagell letters
Before analyzing this clue, let me begin by quoting a passage from Dick Russell’s The Man Who Knew Too Much:
Who was Richard Case Nagell? A decorated Korean War veteran, Nagell was in a plane crash in 1954 which left him in a coma for weeks. Despite this, he was subsequently granted a Top Secret clearance and served for several years in Counter-Intelligence in the Army. Was Nagell’s later strange behavior a sign of brain damage or psychological difficulties, or was he sheep dipped for a role in undercover work?
The Nagell story is truly one of the strangest in the JFK assassination literature. Critics of it point to Nagell’s inconsistencies, his failure to ever come up with the hidden-away evidence he claimed he had, and his tendency to “let out” information just at a time where he might have acquired it through public channels. But some of his knowledge remains unexplained. The FBI inquired of the CIA about seven names found in a notebook in Nagell’s possession at the time of his arrest. A review determined that all of them were involved in intelligence, and the CIA wrote back to the FBI asking “How the above names came into the possession of Nagell.” The question was never answered.
Dick Russell is certainly the author who knows the most about Nagell, having interviewed him a number of times. There is compelling evidence that links Nagell to Oswald. Nagell even fired shots in a bank to have himself arrested and protected from being implicated in the JFK assassination. He then waited around to make sure he was arrested.
Blake Smith recounts how Nagell claimed to have tried to talk Oswald out of the Washington plot and how he typed up warning letters sent by registered mail in mid-September stating that “Lee Harvey Oswald of New Orleans” was currently taking part in a scheme “to shoot the president”, probably “in Washington” “in late September”.
This is important information to argue that there was a plan in the works, but this should be tempered by what Dick Russell confirmed to me just recently: These letters were never seen by researchers.
(4) Oswald’s letters
Here the author refers to LHO letters stating his intention to move to Washington. He refers to a September 1 letter to the American Communist Party inquiring about how to contact “the Party in the Baltimore/Washington area, to which I will locate in October” (page 92). Another letter was sent to the SWP saying he wanted to get in touch with “their representatives in the Baltimore/Washington area,” where “I and my family are moving in October.”
These letters dovetail with the Nagell claims and are significant in arguing that a plot for Washington was being planned. To many it smacks of Oswald being set up to leave traces of his fake Marxist persona that could tie the SWP, ACP and FPCC to him if something went down.
Therefore, while these last two clues are evidence of a possible plot brewing for Washington, they in no way prove that Oswald ended up there.
(5) Marina’s Secret Service report
This clue is interesting in that the documents do exist and the Secret Service asked Marina about Oswald’s trips to Washington and Mexico City. Her response, according to the author, showed no knowledge of his journey to the capital.
Here are some judicious comments from Larry Hancock on this issue:
What we do know is that Oswald wrote a series of letters at the end of August to CPUSA and SWP, maintaining he was moving to the DC area and offering his services, even volunteering to do photographic and layout work for publications, brochures etc. Beyond that, he actually asked CPUSA for advice on going underground. Based on those letters we certainly know he was at least thinking about Washington. Another item of documentation is that in the very first FBI interview with Marina after the assassination, specific questions were asked about Oswald’s travel to both Washington D.C. and Mexico City. We have no concrete idea of what prompted the questions but it may have been that they came from the FBI’s having obtained one or more of the letters.
More than one author, including James Douglass, who Blake Smith admires, agree with the following denouement of the planned Washington plot as described on page 154 of JFK and the Unspeakable:
Nagell’s shots in the El Paso bank gave his FBI letter a public exclamation point … Up to that point Oswald had apparently been scheduled to be moved into position in the Washington D.C.—Baltimore area … After Nagell was arrested in El Paso, Oswald was redirected to Dallas.
Another problem around the Oswald in Washington theory between September 26 and October 2 comes from the recollections of Sylvia Odio’s friend and confidant, Father Walter Machann, who was interviewed by Gayle Nix Jackson and who places the date of the Leon visit with his Cuban colleagues to Odio on September 27. Machann said:
The one thing I did tell them was that I remember that date because Sylvia and Lucille were going to a celebrity party with that actress (Janet Leigh) … and I felt slighted. I wondered why they didn’t ask me to go. I would have liked to have gone. I just remembered when she called and told me … I connected it to that party I didn’t go to … I do know she told me the day she said they came was the day they were going to the party.
Gayle found a Tuesday, September 24, 1963, newspaper report on the Galaxy Gala Ball that was scheduled for the following Friday, September 27, setting the date of the visitors with some precision.
Even this account requires inspection, as the Odio encounter was supposed to have happened at around 9 in the evening and Odio believed that Leopoldo’s call was the next day after she had come back from work. More would have to be known about the gala hours and if Odio worked on Saturdays.
(6) David Ferrie’s rant
Here the author refers to what he saw in the movie JFK by Oliver Stone where, after a night of drinking, David Ferrie rants at a party, with Oswald, Clay Shaw, and some Cuban exiles. Ferrie says, “I’ll kill him! Right in the (expletive) White House.” This is based on the recollections of Garrison witness Perry Russo. I don’t think we can base too much on a drunken rant about where he would kill Kennedy from this account. The more important point was the intention of murder being discussed with a person of interest like Clay Shaw present. This hardly constitutes a plan, and does not even come close to placing Oswald in Washington D.C.
Now let us look at the clue that gets top billing, used on the back cover of his book to promote it:
The Treasury Department report
(7) The Willard Hotel Secret Service report
This particular document is reproduced in the book in its entirety (page 44). It is quite difficult to read because of small font size, blurriness and poor contrast. I wonder how many readers would take the time to go through it. After buying a magnifying glass, I did. I later found it on a website. It seems to have been originally posted by Vince Palamara on his website on September 14, 2017. In an Education forum exchange he says it is courtesy of Bill Simpich.
This document is important in my view, but for very debatable reasons. Reasons that many readers cannot figure out because of a very confusing writing strategy the author uses which we will discuss later. This almost caused me to overlook a critical element of information that the author could have pounced on. However, by doing so he would undermine the argument that Oswald was in fact in Washington D.C. in late September 1963.
I strongly suggest that the reader take the time to read and interpret the article in the following link, before going on. We will see what is said by the author about the document, compare it to what is written and I will propose what I think it really means.
- The author identifies it as the Willard Hotel Secret Service report on page 43. Much later he says the file is named Harvey Lee Oswald (page 141), whereas the actual name is:
Comment: Note the word alleged.
- He describes the witness as a trusted chauffeur (Bernard Thompson) for a Kennedy Cabinet Secretary.
Comment: Kennedy’s chauffeur Greer, and other Secret Service people of interest, were also “trusted.”
- The witness describes an encounter where an agitator stuck out as very high-strung:

- Blake Smith then states that the chauffeur even selected Lee Harvey Oswald’s photo from a stack of suspect pictures, convinced he was the stranger in question, nearly in the shadow of the U.S. Treasury Building. He then speculates that this strongly indicates that Oswald or one of his handlers was being tipped off with insider information.
Comment: The last point is very speculative and presumes that this is in fact Oswald. There is nothing surprising that he picked out Oswald because when he saw Oswald’s picture after the assassination he thought he recognized him.

On page 141 Blake Smith states that “President Kennedy’s accused and slain assassin was once seen by three different government employees on a street in Washington D.C. on Friday afternoon, September 27” of 63. A government chauffeur. A policeman. And a Secret Service agent—(not certain how he knows the occupation). This really gives the impression that three people identified Oswald in front of the Willard Hotel. Now read the report:

Comment: The description of the incident should state that the chauffeur thought he recognized Oswald and thought that a picture of Oswald shown to him closely resembled the agitator. This claim would also be more accurate: though Thompson knew of two people he felt closely saw the agitator (a Policeman and a possible Secret Service agent)—no one is known to have corroborated that the agitator was in fact Oswald in Washington D.C. on November 27, 1963.
So while this document is important, the author gives it his usual bend by cherry-picking and distorting what it relates instead of just letting the facts speak for themselves. On why the author is certain this agitator could not have been an impostor: “A fake Lee Oswald, a double, would likely have fit the pattern of overt bragging about money he was going to come into soon, or how much he loved Russia and or Cuba over America and how much he wanted to kill the president … This was the real Lee Harvey Oswald alright.”
Question: Why would the real Oswald, a person who, according to the author, may have been getting inside information in this area from Secret Service traitors, make himself so visible in front of the very place he planned to shoot the president from?
Blake Smith makes a point “that agent Floyd Murray Boring took this information on LHO in D.C. very seriously in early December of 63, interviewing the main eyewitness. (Agent Boring has been described as an extremely serious, experienced lawman, wanting to be like his two older brothers, who patriotically served their country in the military)”…“The witness was a U.S. government chauffeur and also a trusted friend to agent Boring.” We can see that it was important for the author to establish the credibility of the interviewer and the interviewee. Like the author, I am a fan of Vincent Palamara; his studies on the Secret Service are unmatched. I remembered vaguely an article he wrote about Boring: not a very positive one, but it was vague. I decided I would explore this later.
The author did not have much else to say about him … or did he?
Let us flash forward to the two best chapters of the book. Those that focus on the Secret Service. In these chapters I felt he was on more solid ground referring often, and rightly so, to Palamara’s excellent work. Here, he talks about how Kennedy came to suspect people close to him were plotting against him. He takes us through ten steps that were taken to weaken security. He chronicles how the Russians suspected there was a conspiracy involving weakened security. He references previous plots, how the FBI cancelled special security surveillance of Oswald, how Oswald was seen getting packages from possible agents in New Orleans, how the Secretary of the Treasury, Douglas Dillon, was in communication with Allen Dulles. He summarizes how Secret Service agents manipulated evidence.
He also points out the roles of persons of extreme interest. Greer, Kellerman and, tum ta ta tum, Our Number One Suspect, “in collaborating with the Mafia-based public assassination plan”. Here is where something really weird happens: the author decides to exclusively use the pseudonym Trip-Planner Perry to identify him! The only time he does something like this in the entire book.
He clearly does not trust Trip-Planner Perry:
- He was very much involved in setting up the president like a bowling pin;
- His motivation was likely patriotism, to remove the “National Security threat”;
- This was a very real Treasury Department employee;
- A high-ranking 48-year-old Secret Service man who had close access to the president and agency files in planning JFK motorcades;
- … had served Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower;
- … had been aghast at the adulterous president;
- Had used his .38 to shoot and kill a man in defense of a past president;
- He sure seems to be the main federal agent who arranged John F. Kennedy’s complete lack of safety in Dallas;
- He even makes it on the top ten list as possible shooters in Dallas;
- The author suggests Perry is misleading in saying that he found “nothing unusual” to protect Kennedy in his Texas visit;
- He also volunteered to protect Kennedy in Washington D.C.;
- He also handled security in Chicago;
- Perry denied totally he had anything to do with security in Dallas—a blatant lie;
- The author suspects Perry of getting the FBI to scale back security;
- He believes that he may have been contacted by someone like Banister;
- He led the cover-up efforts;
and so on and so forth.
So who was this lying, murderer, key plotter, traitor? I think that if you rely on Vince Palamara’s research or read the Wikipedia profile, you can only conclude that Trip-Planner Perry and Floyd Boring are one and the same: One of the people whose credibility is crucial in the whole Secret Service report about Oswald in D.C.!
By hiding the real identity of Trip-Planner Perry, most readers are left with the impression that the agent who interviewed the chauffeur was reliable, as he is portrayed when identified as Floyd Boring. This artificially augments the perceived value of Boring’s acquaintance’s testimony. It blocks all critical thinking one can have around this whole scenario which perhaps was another of many ruses to frame the supposed Marxist Oswald.
The significance of this masked information seems to have been on the mind of none other than Vince Palamara during his online exchange:
As I detail in my first and third books, there were credible threats to JFK’s life on 3/23/63 (Chicago), 11/2/63 (Chicago again), and Florida on 11/18/63 (technically, 11/9/63 onward—the Joseph Milteer prediction/threat, etc.). This statement—ORIGINATED BY AGENT FLOYD BORING, of all people—just adds more grist for the mill, so to speak.
Was this the real Oswald?
Was it an impostor setting an Oswald trace, in a plan that had been aborted?
Was it a miss-identification?
Was it a fabricated story made by an acquaintance under the direction of Boring?
Was Boring trying to close up loose ends when the W.C. was fully in lone-nut mode? For now, this is open to interpretation.
Was Oswald in Washington on September 27, 1963? Perhaps—since he was most likely not in Mexico City, we do not know where he was. As the author points out (p. 407): LHO “told no one about his Washington D.C. trip.” There are no photos, film footage, documents or witnesses that can corroborate what an acquaintance of a suspicious Floyd Boring recollected. To go from the clues the author puts forth and opine that there was a plot in the works for Washington is logical, to actually place Oswald there is a long stretch but possible, to go on and describe a full-fledged aborted attempt on October 1, 1963 from the Willard Hotel is pure speculation at its wildest.
A new lead?
When I tried to find the FBI memo the author referred to, I came upon a report that underscored a startling piece of information I had not seen before. Jim Douglass did write about how a singularly-typed letter (supposedly by Oswald) had been sent to the Washington Soviet embassy that contained incriminating writings that could serve as evidence to show that Oswald was guilty, had met the head of assassinations (Kostikov) in the Soviet consulate in Mexico City, and how the Russians were complicit.
This recently released report adds even more meat to the frame-up strategies and for a second time connects Oswald to a Soviet assassination operative. According to this FBI memo—the letter was addressed to the “man in the Soviet Embassy in charge of assassinations”:

This, over and above the Mexico City hoax, seems like a brazen attempt to connect Russia to the assassination as per the ZR Rifle assassinations template.
For now, I am just throwing this out there. At the time of this writing, I have not been able to confirm its authenticity or whether it has been analyzed in the past. I am currently awaiting comments from some esteemed researchers. Perhaps the readers can weigh in.
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Clue to When JFK Was Shot in Back
Previously I posted an article here on the significance of S.S.A. Glen Bennett’s statement: He saw Kennedy shot in the back—and, as you will see from the story, this had to have happened at least two seconds after he was hit in the throat (see the link above).
This could explain the puzzling nature of JFK’s back wound—the way its abrasion collar suggests a shot coming from below. Some have explained it by insisting JFK was hit while he was leaning over.
As anyone can see from films, JFK was not leaning over at the time he first began to react.
But if Glen Bennett was telling the truth when he said he was looking at JFK’s back the instant he was struck in the back, photographic evidence shows this had to have happened after Kennedy was already hit.
The interesting thing is, seconds after that first hit, Kennedy actually did begin to lean forward. And so no wonder the abrasion collar was on the bottom edge of the back wound.
This is further proof that Kennedy was first hit in the throat, then in the back, but only after he began to sag in his seat.
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Suppressed Evidence of JFK Throat Entry
For years, distinguished pathologist Cyril Wecht, MD, JD has expressed doubts that Kennedy’s throat wound was an entry because no one could tell him where the bullet went. “The throat is all soft tissue, where did it exit?”
Good question, but it’s based on the premise that if the bullet had been found … we would know about it.
Well, we don’t know where that bullet went, but we do know about another bullet that was found—but never mentioned in the official record.
A Navy doctor published an obscure memoir in which he reports that petty officers sent to retrieve bone fragments from JFK’s car also found a misshapen, but whole bullet in the back of the car. (Official reports only mention bullet fragments, and they were found in the front of the car.)
That doctor, James Young, briefly inspected it, then gave it back to the petty officer who gave it to James Humes, the lead pathologist. Then where did it go? Humes made a big show of looking for bullets that night.
Young was puzzled when, years later, he could find no report on that bullet. He wrote to President Gerald Ford asking about it, and got a useless response. We have researcher Randy Robertson to thank for this discovery. (To see more on this, please go here.)
Maybe you can’t quite believe the above story, but you should be even more skeptical of anything you are told by the government. And you should wonder about what you are not told.
Humes et al Suppressed Fundamental Evidence:
(1) Kennedy’s cerebellum. You will not find one word about it in the main autopsy report, which only describes the upper brain, as well as organs not even relevant to the murder. Nor will you find mention of it any of Humes’s testimony. (The supplementary report mentions a microscopic analysis of a small piece of it.) The Parkland Hospital doctors described massive damage of this organ, damage inconsistent with the official narrative. (For more on this, go here and here.)
(2) Kennedy’s throat wound. Humes et al pretended they were completely unaware of it on the night of the autopsy, when the body was still available. And so they did not document it or explore it further. Years later, a pathologist who assisted Humes, said they saw the remains of the bullet hole itself, “part of the perimeter of a bullet wound in the anterior neck.” (For the complete story on this, go here.)
And so again I ask, why assume no bullet entered JFK’s throat because you don’t know where it went?
Throat Wound: Abrasion/Contusion Collar
Not long ago, I saw an email in which a researcher said Kennedy’s throat wound had no abrasion collar. He didn’t say that he saw no report of one, or that blood obscured the wound so that none was seen (a lone nutter claim). He just omnisciently asserted that none had existed. People are entitled to their opinions, but they should be given along with all the facts readers need for making up their own minds.
Here is probably the most relevant fact of all: When Malcolm Perry—the Parkland Hospital doctor who worked on the throat wound—was specifically asked by the HSCA to describe the wound’s edges, he included these words: “The edges were bruised.” A bruise is a contusion. Perry seems to have been referring to a contusion collar—which, like an abrasion collar, is definitive of an entrance wound.
Some authors use the expressions “abrasion” and “contusion” rings or collars interchangeably. But though related, they are not the same. Both are said to be caused by temporary over-stretching of the skin. And the skin on the perimeter of the bullet hole is abraded. A few millimeters away, damaged blood vessels in the dermis bleed beneath the skin, resulting in a visible bruise. Here’s an illustration from an article on the characteristics of entrance wounds by jacketed bullets, fired at a distance.

Note: Jacketed bullets from centre fire rifles do not always cause abrasion collars. Also, entrances can have slightly ragged edges. (Gunshot Wounds Aspects of Firearms, Ballistics, and Forensic Techniques, Second Edition, by Vincent J.M. Di Maio, MD, CRC Press, 1999.)
To the Warren Commission, Perry had described a typical entrance wound: “approximately 5 mm in diameter…exuding blood slowly which partially obscured it. Its edges were neither ragged nor punched out, but rather clean.”
Later he was again asked about the wound, and this time Commissioner Arlen Specter clarified something significant. Perry seems to have said the wound was “not punched out,” but he also said it was “not pushed out.” Specter specifically asked if the wound was “pushed out”—“everted” in the language of forensics—and characteristic of an exit. Perry said it was not. (Nor did he say it was pushed in.)
Don Thomas: Throat Wound Was an Exit
In his book Hear No Evil. Politics, Science & the Forensic Evidence in the Kennedy Association (Mary Ferrell Foundation Press, 2010), Donald Byron Thomas promotes the idea that the wound was an exit.
The author seems to believe the back and throat wounds were proven to be connected when in fact there was no proof. This was an inference based on incomplete information. Very few researchers claim the back wound was anything but an entrance, but we cannot explain where that bullet went. Since it created such an apparently shallow wound, it may have fallen out. It may have been the slightly bent bullet found in the limousine.
As for explaining what happened to the bullet that we say entered the throat, we cannot. But, based on all the other key evidence that went unreported, it’s not unreasonable to assume that if it had been found during the autopsy, it would not have been reported. (Thomas does not mention any of the known suppressed key evidence described above.)
Thomas also seems to believe the pathologists who performed the autopsy saw no evidence of the bullet wound in the throat. On page 238 of his book, he said “The precise nature of the wound cannot be determined because the wound was obliterated.” In fact, it was only bisected, not obliterated and, as mentioned above, one of the pathologists reported seeing part of it.
The author does not report any of the telling details Perry described, aside from the wound’s smallness. And instead of providing recent information on wounds, Thomas quoted from a not very informative book written in the early 1920s:
Provided no bone lesion is present, the exit aperture is often difficult to discriminate from the entrance wound. The two wounds maybe [sic] equal in size, the entrance wound may show inverted edges, while in the exit wound the edges are generally everted [pushed out]. When the bullet has passed through soft parts alone, the exit wound is apt to be circular in shape. (Thomas, p. 238) [Emphasis added.]
But Perry had specifically said the edges were not everted, that is, not pushed out. More important, Thomas said nothing about the bruised edges.
An Invalid Explanation for Wound’s Smallness
Thomas said that, though the wound was small, it was still an exit, and its size could be explained by the phenomenon of “shoring” or “buttressing.” Meaning the skin was held in place by Kennedy’s collar and necktie. And he quoted experts who say that when the skin is held in place by something, like a wall, floor, chair back, or supportive clothing, the bullet can’t stretch the skin outward until it tears (one reason why exits are small and star-shaped)—and a small “shored” wound is created.
But for this to be possible, the wound has to be right behind the shoring material.
Parkland Hospital’s Charles Carrico, MD—who saw the wound while Kennedy was still fully dressed—said the wound was “right above” the neck tie. And Malcolm Perry, the doctor who cut across the wound, said the bullet struck at the level of the second or third tracheal ring, just below the Adam’s apple.
Instead of deferring to these doctors who provided facts, Thomas gave his opinion, based on a photo showing JFK in an unnatural position with his neck hyperextended: “… it would seem more likely that the bullet passed below the necktie.” (p. 236)
Below the necktie? As you can see from this photo, his Adam’s apple is well above his collar and necktie.

Though Thomas disagreed with what Carrico said about the wound’s location, he argued the idea of shoring even if Carrico was right: The amount of buttressing would still be appreciable whether just above or just below the exiting bullet’s path.” (p. 236) He did not buttress this assertion with any references.
Here’s another good reason to doubt the wound was buttressed. Take a close look at what actually happens: Skin between the outgoing bullet and the buttressing material is crushed, and it becomes stuck to the material. When that material is pulled away, it creates a wide abrasion collar consisting of skin tags that resemble a peeling sunburn. More important—grossly visible skin is left behind on the material. (Am J Foren Med Path 1983; 4(3): 199-204)
The FBI closely inspected Kennedy’s shirt and tie, and did not report seeing skin on either garment.
Relevance of Bullet Velocity
What Malcolm Perry said about the internal damage in the neck reveals that if a bullet entered the throat, it was probably traveling at medium velocity (as defined circa 1963.).
There’s some concussive damage to surrounding organs—these are the kind of things one sees with gunshot wounds, in a blast injury … And with high velocity, we do see a lot. Now the low velocity stuff, it’s often just a track, a wound track, with very little concussive or blast injury. This one was in between. There was evidence of some blast injury, but not like, say, what one sees with a high velocity rifle, like a 3006 or 223 …
A bullet traveling that fast would have left a much larger exit wound. And this was proven by Army experiments involving the assassination of goats.
Yet other experiments proved that when non-deformed jacketed bullets exit straight out—as opposed to sideways—the size of the wound created is directly proportional to their exiting velocity. (J Trauma 1963; (March) 3(2): 120-128, p. 122) (Gunshot Wounds: Aspects of Firearms, Ballistics, and Forensic Techniques, Second Edition, by Vincent J.M. Di Maio, CRC Press, 1999.) (Thomas did not report this, but possibly he was unaware of these experiments.)
Translated: When all other things are equal, the slower the bullet, the smaller the exit wound. Put another way, the smaller the exit, the slower the bullet.
Translated further: If a bullet really did exit the president’s throat, it would not likely have had the energy to make it through Connally’s mohair jacket, let alone his chest and wrist.
And there goes the Single Bullet Theory.
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John Newman, Countdown to Darkness, Volume 2
John Newman has just released the third part of his series on the murder of John F. Kennedy. Titled Into the Storm, we are running an excerpt from it on our site, while linking to another excerpt. This review deals with the second volume, Countdown to Darkness. It is indefinite as to how long this series will be. I originally heard it would be a five-volume set. But now I have heard from other sources it may be six. (I will comment on this length factor later.)
Countdown to Darkness assesses several subjects. Some of these the author deals with well. Some of his treatments disappoint. The point is the book is wide-ranging in scope, as I imagine the rest of the series will be. It does not just deal with topics relating to the JFK murder. There are subjects dealt with that are more in keeping with a history of Kennedy’s presidency. Therefore, the book is broad based.
Countdown to Darkness begins with the peculiar arrangement surrounding the dissemination of Oswald’s file at CIA. This valuable information is a combination of Newman’s examination of the file traffic, plus insights gained by the estimable British researcher Malcolm Blunt. Those insights were achieved through Blunt’s discussions with the late CIA officer Tennent Bagley. In this analysis, Newman repeats his previous thesis that although the first Oswald files went to the Office of Security, they should have gone to the Soviet Russia Division. (p. 3; all references to the e-book version) He expands on this by saying this pattern appears to have been prearranged. The mail distribution form was altered in advance to make this happen. (p. 2) One effect of this closed off routing was that there was little chatter about Oswald’s implied threat to surrender radar secrets. When Blunt talked to Bagley, Malcolm told him about this dissemination pattern. Bagley asked Blunt if he thought this was done wittingly. When Malcolm said he was not sure, the CIA officer replied he should be—because it was set up that way in advance. Blunt said that this disclosure was “a significant departure from Bagley’s normal cautious phrasings.” (p. 30)
II
From here, the book turns to Cuba and President Dwight Eisenhower’s intent to overthrow Castro. CIA Director Allen Dulles with Vice President Richard Nixon first discussed this idea in 1959. The initial planning on the project was handed to J. C. King and Richard Bissell; the former was Chief of the Western Hemisphere, the latter was Director of Plans. (p. 32) The author traces the familiar story of how the original idea—to integrate a guerilla force onto the island to hook up with the resistance—began to evolve into something larger in January of 1960. This was coupled with the Allen-Dulles-inspired embargo, which extended to include weapons from England. This was meant to force Castro to go to the Eastern Bloc and the USSR for arms. (pp. 36-37) Dulles also wanted to sabotage the sugar crop, but Eisenhower turned that request down.
Bissell turned over the architecture of the overthrow plan to CIA veteran officer Jake Esterline. (p. 48) Esterline had been a deputy on the 1954 task force in the coup against Arbenz in Guatemala. Like David Talbot before him, the author points out the fact that warnings about the overall design problems, and how the objective differed from Guatemala, were deep-sixed. (p. 55) By March of 1960, Eisenhower started talking about a different approach, a strike force type invasion. The president wanted OAS support for this plan. And here the author introduces something new to the reviewer: his concept of Eisenhower’s Triple Play. That is, in order to achieve such outside support, the White House and CIA would rid Latin America of a thorn in its side, namely, the bloodthirsty dictator of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo. (p. 90) This will later expand into an attempt to also get NATO behind the overthrow. Hence, Ike’s Triple Play will include the assassination of Patrice Lumumba of Congo.
One of the contingencies upon which Eisenhower based his overthrow of Castro was the establishment of a government in exile. This consisted of the banding together of several individual groups of Cuban exiles under an umbrella called the Revolutionary Democratic Front, or FRD. (p. 127) This endeavor ended up being quite difficult, for two reasons. First, some prominent exile members, like Tony Varona, did not want to join. Second, a principal officer involved for the CIA, Gerry Droller (real name Frank Bender), had rather poor organizational skills. The author gives us more than one example of this trait. (pp. 129-32)
As the operation morphed from a guerilla-type incursion into a brigade invasion concept, more managers were grafted onto the project. The author first names Henry Hecksher. (p. 140) Hecksher worked with David Phillips on the Arbenz overthrow, then went to Laos, and then was assigned to Howard Hunt’s favorite exile, Manuel Artime, in 1963-64. (pp. 142-44) Another person named by the author as part of this expansion is Carl Jenkins.(p. 147) Jenkins worked at the Retalhuleu military base in Guatemala. A base was also set up in Nicaragua and some of the Alabama National Guard pilots were enlisted.
As the brigade concept was escalating, false information was entered into the information flow. Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon said only 40% of the Cuban populace would end up supporting Castro. (p. 170) Which, to put it mildly, turned out to be almost ludicrously wrong. Castro now began to import a flow of Eastern Bloc arms through Czechoslovakia. (p. 171) As this occurred, Eisenhower, through Dulles, began to activate the Trujillo aspect of the Triple Play. This appears to have been set in motion between February and April of 1960. (p. 172)
When Castro began to seize oil companies like Texaco, Esso and Shell, Vice President Nixon began to urge Eisenhower into action. He recommended “strong positive action” to avoid becoming labeled, “uncle Sucker” throughout the world. (p. 174) National Security Advisor Gordon Gray said much the same thing: “… the U.S. has taken publicly about all it can afford to take from the Castro government ….” (p. 174)
On July 9, 1960, Nikita Khrushchev threatened the USA with ICBMs over Cuba. Eisenhower replied that America would not be intimidated by these threats. (p. 176) The author mentions that at this time there was an attempt by the Agency to solicit a Cuban pilot to assassinate Raul Castro. Newman scores author Evan Thomas for distorting this as the pilot’s idea, when the impetus was clearly from the CIA. (p. 182) General Robert Cushman, working on the staff of Richard Nixon, urged Howard Hunt to use as much skullduggery as possible to get rid of Castro. (pp. 184-85)
But as the Inspector General report by Lyman Kirkpatrick later revealed, the attempt to arm and supply the dissidents on the island was not working. In fact, at times, it was counter-productive, since Castro’s forces would recover the supplies and arms. As the threat grew, Russia sent in more arms to the island: tanks, mortars, cannons. With these advantages Castro began to close in on the resistance. And this was another reason the original guerilla plan was modified into a brigade-sized invasion. (p. 185)
III
We now come to what this reviewer feels is probably the highlight of the first two books in the series: the author’s work on the assassination of Patrice Lumumba of the Congo. Newman devotes four chapters to this subject. In my opinion the result is one of the best medium-length treatments of the Congo crisis I have read. As noted above, Eisenhower felt that by getting involved in Belgium’s colonial problems, this would encourage NATO allies to stand by him in his attempt to overthrow Castro. After all, the NATO alliance began in 1948 with the Brussels Treaty.
As early as May 5, 1960 Allen Dulles was aware that Belgium was attempting to set up a breakaway state in the Congo called Katanga. This was two months before the ceremony formalizing the Belgian withdrawal from its African colony. (p. 153) Katanga was the richest region in Congo, and perhaps one of the richest small geographical areas in the world. If the Katanga secession were successful, it would do much to benefit Belgium and its covert ally England, at the same time that it would damage the economy of the new state of Congo.
Dulles was predisposed to favor Belgium because of his prior career as a corporate lawyer with the global New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. That firm represented many companies that benefited from low wage conditions in the Third World. Therefore Dulles and his deputy Charles Cabell began to smear independence leader Patrice Lumumba at National Security meetings in advance of his assuming power. Combined with the fact that the Belgian departure was not total, this pitted Lumumba against both the former imperialists and the growing malignancy of the USA. (p. 154)
Lumumba’s stewardship was not just hurt by the Katanga secession, but also by the fact that Belgium had removed Congo’s gold reserves and placed them in Brussels prior to independence being declared. (p. 155) With little cash on hand, Lumumba’s army mutinied and spun out of control. This created the pretext for Belgium to send in paratroopers. The Belgians now began to fire on the Congolese. On July 11th, Katanga declared itself a separate state. By July 13, 1960, two weeks after independence, the Belgians occupied the Leopoldville airport and Lumumba decided to break relations with Brussels. The next day the United Nations, under Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, passed a resolution to send troops to Congo. In the meantime Allen Dulles was working overtime to tell anyone on the National Security Council and in the White House that Lumumba would tie Congo to Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, Castro and the Communist Bloc. (pp. 162-63)
This tactic worked. When Lumumba arrived in Washington to ask for supplies, loans and aid in expelling the Belgians, Eisenhower was not on hand to greet him. Instead, Lumumba talked to Secretary of State Christian Herter and Under Secretary Douglas Dillon. They lied to him by saying they were working through Hammarskjold. (p. 220) This left Lumumba little choice but to ask Russia for supplies. The USSR sent him transport planes and technicians. (p. 222)
When the Russians sent Lumumba the military aid, it sealed his fate. On August 18, 1960 Leopoldville station chief Larry Devlin sent a cable that was drawn in the most hyperbolic terms imaginable. Devlin told CIA HQ that Congo was now experiencing a classic communist takeover, and there was little time to avoid another Cuba. (p. 223) This was clearly meant as a provocation. It worked. On the day this cable arrived, Eisenhower instructed Dulles to begin termination efforts against Lumumba. This was kept out of the meeting record. It was not revealed until the investigations of the Church Committee. The recording secretary to the meeting, Robert Johnson, told the committee that it was too sensitive to be included in the minutes. (p. 227)
The plot began the next day. Director of Plans Dick Bissell told Devlin to begin action to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western leader. On August 26, Allen Dulles sent an assassination order to Devlin that authorized a budget of $100,000 to terminate Lumumba, the equivalent of close to a million dollars today. (p. 236) Bissell now called in the head of the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy, and they began to assemble a list of assets they could employ in order to do the job. (p. 246) One of these was the infamous Dr. Sydney Gottlieb, who began to prepare poisons for use in the assassination. Devlin also got President Joseph Kasavubu to remove Lumumba from his position as prime minister. At this point Hammarskjold sent his own emissary, Rajeshwar Dayal, to Congo to protect Lumumba.
This was necessary because, in addition to Gottlieb, Devlin now bribed the chief of the army, Josef Mobutu, to also assassinate Lumumba. (p. 265) At around this time, two CIA-hired killers, codenamed QJ WIN and WI ROGUE, both arrived in Leopoldville. Not knowing each other, they both stayed at the same hotel. Gottlieb then arrived in Congo. (p. 268) In September of 1960, with a multiplicity of lethal assets on hand, Tweedy now cabled Devlin to produce an outline of how he planned on terminating Lumumba.
The use of the two codenamed assassins in Congo marks the beginning of the ZR/Rifle program. This was the CIA’s mechanism for exterminating foreign leaders. It began under Eisenhower in September of 1960. (p. 280) The next month it was taken over by CIA officer William Harvey. ZR/Rifle was sort of like the reverse side of Staff D, which was a burglary program to break into embassies and steal codebooks. Harvey and his assistant Justin O’Donnell recruited safe crackers, burglars and document forgers for that part of the program. (pp. 284-85) When Harvey testified before the Church Committee, he lied about the use of ZR/Rifle in the Lumumba case. He was fully aware of what the two men were doing in Congo. (p. 290)
Mobutu now tried to arrest Lumumba, but Dayal blocked the attempt. Three things happened in November of 1960 that penned the final chapter. CIA officer Justin O’Donnell arrived in Congo to supervise the endgame. John Kennedy, who the CIA knew sympathized with Lumumba, was elected president. And third, America and England cooperated in seating Kasavubu’s delegation at the United Nations. This last event provoked Lumumba into escaping from Dayal’s house arrest. O’Donnell had decided that the CIA should not actually murder Lumumba. But they would help his enemies do the deed. Therefore, Devlin cooperated with Mobutu to cut off possible escape routes to Lumumba’s base in Stanleyville. He was captured, imprisoned and transferred to Elizabethville in Katanga. (p. 295) Lumumba was executed by firing squad and his body was soaked in sulphuric acid. When the acid ran out, his corpse was incinerated. (p. 296) Thus was the sorry end of the first democratically elected leader of an independent country in sub-Saharan Africa.
As I said, for me, this section on Lumumba is the highlight of the first two volumes.
IV
Another topic that the author spends significant time on is the CIA/Mafia plots to kill Castro. The author traces this idea from Allen Dulles to Dick Bissell. He believes that Eisenhower gave his tacit approval to the plots. He also believes that Bissell dissembled in his testimony on how the plots were hatched, and he mounts several lines of evidence to demonstrate this. (p. 327) Bissell dissembled in order to conceal the fact that it was he who approved of giving the assignment to the Mafia through CIA asset Robert Maheu. By mid-August of 1960, the CIA’s Technical Services Division was at work manufacturing toxins to place in Castro’s cigars.
Maheu offered gangster Johnny Roselli $150, 000 to kill Castro. (p. 331) Both Allen Dulles and his deputy Charles Cabell were briefed on this overture in late August by Chief of Security Sheffield Edwards, who was part of the Mafia outreach program. Meetings were arranged with Roselli in Beverly Hills and New York City. Maheu and CIA support officer Jim O’Connell masqueraded as American businessmen who wanted to protect their interests by getting rid of Castro. But Maheu eventually told Roselli that O’Connell was CIA. Therefore, the veneer of plausible deniability was lost. (p. 333) Roselli now began to recruit Cubans in Florida for the murder assignment. He also arranged a meeting in Miami for Maheu to be introduced to Sam Giancana and Santo Trafficante, respectively the Mafia dons for Chicago and Tampa. When this occurred the author writes that, because of the reputations and history of these two men, the plots and the association should have been reassessed and approval cancelled. They were not.
They should have been. Because the recruitment of Giancana was a huge liability. Not just because of his history of being a hit man; but also because of his inability to keep a secret. Feeling emboldened, since he was now in the arms of the government, he bragged about his role in the plots to at least two people. From there the word spread to others, including singer Phyllis McGuire. Giancana revealed both the mechanism of death—poison pills—and the projected date of the assassination—November of 1960. (p. 334-35) Through his network of informants, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover found out about Giancana’s dangerous chatter. But Hoover did not know that the CIA had put him up to it. The Director told Bissell about it, but Bissell did not inform Hoover about his role as recruiter.
Maheu now arranged to have McGuire’s room wired for sound in Las Vegas. This was done for two reasons. First, to see if she was talking about the plots; and second, as a favor to Giancana, who suspected she was cheating on him with comedian Dan Rowan. The police discovered this illegal bugging. In addition to the security problem, this all had disturbing repercussions when Attorney General Robert Kennedy began his crusade against organized crime in 1961. (p. 336)
Along with these assassination plots, on November 3, 1960, National Security Officer Gordon Gray came up with the idea of using Cuban exiles dressed as Castro soldiers to stage an attack on Guantanamo Bay as a pretext for an invasion. (p. 346) As the author suggests, the very fact that the murder plots and this false flag operation were contemplated show that those involved in managing the strike force invasion understood that its chances for success were low. (pp. 345-46) To further that miasma of doubt, at this same meeting, a question was asked about “direct positive action” against Fidel, his brother Raul and Che Guevara.
There was good reason for both the doubt and the fallback positions, because about two weeks later, CIA circulated a memo admitting that there would not be any significant uprisings on the island due to any incursion, and also that the idea of securing an air strip on the island was also not possible unless the Pentagon was part of the attempt. (p. 348) This memo was not shared with the incoming President Kennedy. The author deigns that it was not shared because the internal uprising myth was used to manipulate Kennedy into going along with the operation. It thus became part and parcel with the new “brigade strike force” concept. (pp. 352-53)
On January 2, 1961, Castro broke relations with the United States. The favor was returned two days later. These actions caused the training of the exiles in Central America to be expanded, and also for the action against Trujillo to be accelerated. (p. 355) On January 4th, Chief of the CIA paramilitary section wrote a memo to one of the operation’s designers, Jake Esterline. The memo said the invasion would be stuck on the beach unless an uprising took place or there was overt military action by the USA. (p. 355) As the author notes, this is another indication that the people involved at the ground level understood that, left to its own devices, the prospects for the invasion were fey. Hawkins added that Castro’s military forces were growing. They would soon include featured tanks, artillery, heavy mortars and anti-aircraft batteries. Given those facts, Hawkins warned that:
Castro is making rapid progress in establishing a communist-style police state that will be difficult to unseat by any means short of overt intervention by US military forces. (p. 356, Newman’s italics)
Since Bissell was a supervisor of both the assassination plots and the invasion, one wonders if he was banking on the murder of Castro to bail out what looked like an upcoming failure on the beach. In fact, as the author notes, at NSC meetings of January 12 and also January 19, the idea of overt intervention was brought up again. What made the time factor even more pressing was that the CIA had information that the shiploads of these munitions would reach Cuba in mid-March and continue with daily arrivals after that. This is why Hawkins urged that the invasion be launched in late February and no later than March 1. (p. 356) This would not happen, since Kennedy rejected the first proposal for the operation, namely the Trinidad landing site.
V
Kennedy had two meetings on the subject during his first week in office. At neither did he appear enthusiastic about it. On February 3, 1961 the Joint Chiefs wrote a ten-page report in which they viewed the plan favorably. This was something of a reversal from their previous assessments. But they cautioned that the plan was reliant on indigenous support from the island, meaning defections from Castro. They foresaw that if the force retreated to the mountains it might need overt American intervention. But even with these reservations, the executive summary at the end was positive. (pp. 363-64) Newman comments that one way to explain this reversal is that the Joint Chiefs felt that if the CIA plan failed, they would be called in to save the day and collect the glory.
Kennedy now chimed in with his reservations about having the operation look too much like a World War II amphibious assault. He asked if it were possible to configure it more like a guerilla operation. (p. 366) This was a harbinger of what was to come from the president, who clearly never liked the operation in the first place. Knowing this, those pushing the plan tried to convince Kennedy that the strike force would ignite a rebellion on the island, even though they knew that such was not the case. (p. 383) Newman writes that this manipulation was done so that JFK would not cancel the operation—the gamble being that he would feel obligated to send in the Pentagon once he saw the invasion faltering. This hidden agenda to the Bay of Pigs episode was pretty well established in 2008 by Jim Douglass in his fine book JFK and the Unspeakable.
At White House insistence, the location of the plan was moved away from Trinidad, 170 miles southeast of Havana, at the foothills of the Escambray Mountains. (p. 389) The reason for the switch was that Trinidad had a population of about 26,000 people. This decreased the odds of surprise and opened up the possibility of civilian casualties. Trinidad also did not have a proper length airfield for B-26 bombers. For these reasons, the locale was shifted to the Bahia de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs), east of the Zapata Peninsula. The CIA now went to work tailoring a plan for the new location.
There was a serious problem with these delays. The longer it took to launch the operation, the more time Castro had to import weaponry from the USSR. The arms supplies began arriving in earnest on March 15. After that, one or two ships would unload per day. (p. 392) At this point, both Esterline and Hawkins wanted to leave the project.
As the author notes, another important alteration was that the air cover and assaults were gradually whittled down in frequency and scope. This was owed to the reluctance of Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk to reveal the hand of American involvement. The first Hawkins-Esterline plan featured well over one hundred sorties in five different waves. (p. 390) When Kennedy asked Bissell how long it would take for the invasion force to work its way off the beachhead, he replied about ten days. In light of what actually happened, this was absurd, since no beachhead was ever established to break out of.
As late as an April 4 meeting, Kennedy was still trying to argue for an infiltration plan. Inserting groups of 200-250 men and developing a build-up from there. Kennedy was trying to make it appear less as an invasion and more as an internal uprising. The CIA replied that this would only alert Castro, and each group would then be eliminated. (p. 394) The next day Kennedy asked assistant Arthur Schlesinger what he thought of the project. Schlesinger said he opposed it. He felt that Castro was too entrenched to be displaced by a single landing force. And if the landing did not cause uprisings, logic would dictate American intervention. The author notes the late date of this cogent observation: ten days before the launch from Central America. Newman also notes the fact that no one from the Pentagon pointed this out at the meeting; just as there was no real discussion of the air cover plan. Making it all the worse: Kennedy had instructed Bissell to tell the brigade leaders that no American military forces would participate or support the invasion in any way. (p. 393)
But further, Kennedy drastically cut back on the amount of air sorties he would allow. And this is what had Esterline and Hawkins ready to depart the project. (p. 396) As stated previously, they insisted there had to be five waves of air strikes and over 100 individual sorties. Kennedy and Rusk opposed this aspect. Newman blames the Joint Chiefs for not stepping in and pointing out the difference between the Esterline/Hawkins design and what was happening to it. The author, citing Bissell, now says that what was left was the strikes scheduled the day before, and also the D-Day air strikes. Newman, citing Bissell, says that Kennedy then cancelled the latter the day before they were scheduled. (pp. 399-400) I was surprised to see the author adopt this interpretation of the controversial issue. This is a point of dispute which I will delve into later.
The invasion was an utter failure and the battle was decided within the first 24 hours. There was no surprise. There were no defections. And in the first 24 hours there was no Allen Dulles. Bissell had encouraged him to keep a speaking engagement in Puerto Rico. Dulles did keep it. Newman makes an interesting observation about this. Dulles kept the engagement to give the appearance that the operation was really Bissell’s. Therefore, after the Navy saved the day, he should be forced to resign while Dulles kept his job. (p. 402)
What no one thought would happen did happen at midnight on April 18. Joint Chiefs Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer and Navy Chief Arleigh Burke tried to convince the president that he must intervene. (p. 403) Kennedy turned down this last attempt to get him to commit American power into the failed beachhead. Dulles’ plan to overthrow Castro and save his position had failed.
Burke was relieved of duty in August of 1961. Later in the year, Dulles, Bissell and Cabell were also terminated. Lyman Lemnitzer was moved to NATO command and replaced by General Maxwell Taylor. In a conclusion, the author writes that after doing the research for this book, he has now downgraded his opinion about Eisenhower as a president. (pp. 404-405) After doing my own work on the man, I would have to agree. But I would make this judgment not just on foreign policy but also with civil rights. Eisenhower had some remarkably good circumstances accompanying his presidency; for instance, a growing economy, positive net trade balance in goods and services, a great military advantage over the USSR, and a unified populace behind him. In retrospect, he had a lot of political capital to make some daring decisions with, both abroad and on the domestic scene. For whatever reason, he chose not to. He passed those decisions on to his successor.
VI
I might as well begin the negative criticism with the subject of the Bay of Pigs. As the reader can see from my above synopsis, the author advocates for the stance put forth by Allen Dulles and Howard Hunt in their Fortune magazine article, saying that Kennedy cancelled the D-Day air strikes. (September, 1961, “Cuba: The Record Set Straight”) And that somehow this was the fatal blow delivered to the enterprise. (Newman, p. 400)
I would have thought that by now, this stance would have been discredited. In the penetrating report delivered by CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick, he poses the hypothetical: Let us assume that Castro’s air corps had been neutralized. That would have left about 1,500 troops on the beach against tens of thousands of Castro’s regular army, reinforced by a hundred thousand or more men in reserve. And the Russians had been delivering shiploads of artillery, mortars and tanks every day for over a month, the very weapons one uses to stop an amphibious invasion on the ground. (Peter Kornbluh, Bay of Pigs Declassified, pp. 41, 52. This book contains most of the Kirkpatrick Report and its appendixes.) What made this aspect even worse is something Newman barely mentions: the element of surprise. One reason Kennedy moved the operation out of Trinidad is that the area was too populated, which would mitigate against that element. The Zapata peninsula was sparsely populated and the CIA said there was no paramilitary patrol there. This turned out to be false. There was a police force at Playa Giron beach the night of the landing. (Kornbluh, p. 37) They alerted Havana. Castro had his troops, with armor and artillery, on the scene within ten hours. But it’s actually worse than that. Castro had so thoroughly penetrated the operation by his intelligence sources that he knew when the last ship left Guatemala. (Kornbluh, p. 321) Therefore, on high alert, he was literally waiting for the landing. To top if off, the other element that the CIA said would be important to the invasion’s success, mass defections from the populace, was non-existent. In fact, Castro later crowed about how even the small number of people on the scene had backed him against the exiles. (Kornbluh, pp. 321-22) Therefore, with no defections, no surprise, being massively outnumbered, and with mortars, tanks and artillery shelling the force on the beach, as Kirkpatrick wrote: What difference would it have made with or without Castro’s air corps in operation?
But I would further disagree with the author’s presentation. There is today an ample body of evidence that the so-called D-Day air strikes were not actually cancelled. They were contingent on being launched from an airfield on the island, which is one reason the Zapata Peninsula was chosen. Prior to the invasion, the CIA had agreed to this in their March 15th outline of the plan. In fact, they mention the issue three times in that memo. (Kornbluh, pp. 125-27) Further, both the Kirkpatrick Report and the White House’s Taylor Report mention this stipulation. (Kornbluh, p. 262; Michael Morrisey, “Bay of Pigs Revisited”, The Fourth Decade, Vol. 1 No. 2, p. 20) In the latter, the report states that National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy explicitly told CIA Deputy Director Charles Cabell that such would be the case. (p.23)
This speaks to another issue directly related to the alleged cancellation of the D-Day air strikes. Newman says that both Cabell and Bissell went to the office of Dean Rusk and pleaded their case for the strikes. Rusk was against it and he then got Kennedy on the line and he was also against it. This disagrees with both Dan Bohning’s book, The Castro Obsession, and Peter Kornbluh’s fine volume, Bay of Pigs Declassified. Both of those works say that Rusk offered to get Kennedy on the line, but the offer to talk to JFK in person was turned down. (Bohning, p. 48, Kornbluh p. 306) There is a good reason why Cabell would not want to talk to Kennedy about this subject. It comes from an unexpected source, namely Howard Hunt. In his book on the subject, Give Us this Day, he describes being at CIA headquarters monitoring the operation. He writes that Cabell actually stopped the D-Day strikes from lifting off. Cabell did so because he knew this was not part of the final plan! (Hunt, p. 196)
Newman’s source for much of this rather controversial material is Dick Bissell’s memoir, Reflections of a Cold Warrior. To put it mildly, between his role in the CIA/Mafia Castro plots and the Bay of Pigs—and his dissembling about both—one would think that any author would look at what Bissell had to say about those topics with an arched eyebrow. Larry Hancock, who is quite familiar with the Bay of Pigs, actually called Bissell an inveterate liar on the subject. For instance, he kept on lying to Esterline and Hawkins about his meetings with Kennedy and about the cutting down of the air strikes. He also told them that if there was too much cut back, he would abort the project. He did not. (e-mail communication with Hancock, 2/23/19)
If for some reason the author feels all of this information is wrong and Bissell was correct, then he should have at least acknowledged the discrepancy and explained why he felt such was the case.
But probably worse than this are the two chapters Newman devotes to Judith Exner, Sam Giancana and Kennedy. Before I read this book, I would have thought I would have never seen anything like that topic in a book penned by Newman, for the simple reason that he has almost always been circumspect about the sources he uses for his writing. What caused him to drop his guard on this topic is inexplicable to this reviewer. But whatever the reason, he did.
And he dropped it all the way down. He buys into just about everything Exner ever authored. To the point that he actually writes that the Church Committee allowed her to get away with lying to them. But that somehow, some way, she did tell the truth to—of all people—Seymour Hersh for his hatchet job on JFK, The Dark Side of Camelot. (p. 203) And I should add, it is not just Hersh. The author’s sources for these two chapters include people like Tony Summers on both Exner and Frank Sinatra, and Chuck Giancana on Sam Giancana. I don’t know how he missed the likes of Randy Taraborrelli and Sally Bedell Smith.
If one is going to buy Exner’s stories, one has to examine them in order and be complete about the inventory, or relatively so. The first time she ever spoke in public about her affair with JFK was in her book, My Story, published in 1977. That book was co-authored by Ovid Demaris, an experienced crime author who wrote a fawning book about J. Edgar Hoover called The Director. He also co-wrote a book called Jack Ruby, which pretty much takes the stance toward Oswald’s killer that the Warren Commission did. In that work, he also went out of his way to criticize the Warren Commission critics, like Mark Lane. So right from the beginning, one could at least find evidence that Exner was being used as a vehicle.
My Story was 300 pages long. Demaris was anti-JFK, and he made this clear in his own introduction. If Exner had anything significant to say beyond her Church Committee testimony, she had the opportunity and, in Demaris, the correct author to do it with. She did not. But eleven years later, she did. In a February 29, 1988 cover story for People magazine, Exner was now billed as “the link between JFK and the Mob.”
What did that title signify? Exner was now telling America that, since she knew both Giancana and Kennedy, they were using her as a messenger service for things like buying elections and also the CIA/Mafia plots to kill Castro. But this was all done with Exner being unaware of what she was doing. Newman writes that Exner likely first talked about this in 1992 with talk show host Larry King. (Newman, p. 203) The author apparently never looked up this 1988 story. This allows him to miss some important aspects of the Exner saga.
There was another key point in the Exner tales. This came in 1997 with a double-barreled blast from both Liz Smith in Vanity Fair and Hersh in his hatchet job. All one needed to do is compare the installments for an internal analysis to see if they were consistent with each other. One easily finds out they are not. For instance, in 1977 Exner said the idea that she had an abortion was a lie spread about her by the FBI. She denies it in the most extreme terms. She actually said she wanted to kill the agent for slandering her. (The Assassinations, edited by James DiEugenio and Lisa Pease, p. 336) But in 1997, she now said she did have an abortion and beyond that, it was JFK who impregnated her. Major revisions like that should raise serious doubts in anyone’s mind about Exner and how she was being used.
But that’s not all. For People magazine, Exner said she was not cognizant of her role as a message carrier. She never bothered reading any of the messages between Giancana and Kennedy, or opening any of the containers. But as Michael O’Brien later wrote, this was contradicted in 1997 for Smith, to whom she said that Kennedy showed her what was in one of the large envelopes. Supposedly it was $250,000. Somehow, in 1983, she forgot about being shown that much money. (Washington Monthly, December 1999, p. 39)
There is another whopper in this trail of horse dung. In 1992, when asked by Larry King if Bobby Kennedy had anything to do with this message-carrying service or if she had any kind of relations with him at all, she said no she did not. Either Exner lost track of all the lies she told, or her handlers didn’t give a damn, because in 1997 this was reversed. Now she said that when she was at the White House having lunch with JFK, Bobby would come by and pinch her on the neck and ask if she was comfortable carrying those messages back and forth to Chicago for them. (Washington Monthly, p. 39)
If Newman had done his homework on this, he would have discovered just how and why the 1983 fantasy version started. Exner knew she could make money off her story. Contrary to what Newman writes, she ended up making hundreds of thousands of dollars selling her tall tales to the anti-Kennedy press. (DiEugenio and Pease, p. 330) She was paid $50,000 to sit down with Kitty Kelley for the People story in 1983. (O’Brien, p. 40)
As biographer George Caprozi later revealed, the two did not get along at all. The problem was that Kelley kept on trying to pump Exner for information about Frank Sinatra. She was preparing one of her biographies about him at the time. Exner did not like this and so the two fought like cats and dogs. Nothing productive came out of the meetings. Since they had to pay both women, the editors decided that they themselves would pen the story. (DiEugenio and Pease, p. 334) I should not have to ask Newman, or anyone reading this review, who owns People magazine. The purview of the cover story would come under the aegis of Time-Life. The people who hid the Zapruder film for eleven years; who edited the stills from the film so as not to reveal the head snap; the same people who, on February 21, 1964, placed a dubious photo of Oswald on their cover with the alleged weapons he used to kill Officer Tippit and JFK. In 1983, the time of the story’s publication, the principals were all dead: Sam Giancana, John Roselli and John F. Kennedy. With Exner bought off, the story was libel-proof.
Finally, to prove that Exner was being used as an anti-Kennedy vehicle, consider the Martin Underwood appendage to the saga. By 1997, Exner had gone hog-wild with her mythology. She now said she was carrying money and messages to Chicago from the White House and she would deliver them to a train station with Giancana waiting for her. This was so silly on its face that Hersh knew he needed a corroborating witness for it. So apparently, with help from Gus Russo, he tried to recruit Martin Underwood to accompany Exner in this film noir scenario. Underwood had worked for Mayor Richard Daley in Chicago and then did some advance work in 1960 for the Kennedy campaign. But the Exner follies now collapsed. Under questioning from the Assassination Records Review Board, Underwood would not go along with the scheme and said he knew nothing about such train travel or Judith Exner. (O’Brien, p. 40; see also “ Who is Gus Russo?”)
I could go on and on. But I think the above is enough to expose Judy Exner for what she was: a lying cuss. Someone who would sell her soul for money and tinsel to the likes of Hersh, Smith and Time-Life. She did not deserve one sentence in this book, let alone two chapters.
Let me make one final overall criticism. I have reviewed parts one and two of the series. Countdown to Darkness ends with the debacle at the Bay of Pigs. That took place in April of 1961. Kennedy had been in office for all of three months. I don’t have to tell the reader how long this series could be if the author keeps up this pace. The overall title of the series is The Assassination of President Kennedy. That is not what the series is really about. The book is really about the Kennedy administration. For instance, Volume 3, Into the Storm, features chapters on the association of the Kennedy administration with Martin Luther King. Unless the author is going to say the Klan killed Kennedy, I fail to see how that fits the overall rubric.
When I was talking about and reviewing Vincent Bugliosi’s elephantine Reclaiming History, I wrote that because something is bigger does not make it better. In my opinion, with an astute and sympathetic editor, these first two volumes could easily have been collapsed into one—with the Exner garbage completely cut. More does not automatically connote quality. Sometimes it’s just more. I had the same complaint about Doug Horne’s five volumes series. Our side does not have to compete with the late Vince Bugliosi to exhibit our knowledge or bona fides. This is a long way of saying that I really hope Newman contains himself, or finds a decent editor who he respects and will listen to. He should stop at five volumes.
There is a saying among actors: Sometimes, less is more.
SEE ALSO:
- Our review of volume 1, Where Angels Tread Lightly
- “Berlin 1961—The Most Dangerous Place on Earth” (excerpt from Chapter 5 of volume 3, Into the Storm)
- “When Fiction is Stranger Than Truth: Veciana and Phillips in Cuba — 1959-1960” (excerpt from Chapter 3 of volume 3, Into the Storm), at WhoWhatWhy