Tag: FBI

  • Dale Myers, With Malice (Part 1)


    The following is a review of the 2013 Kindle edition of Dale Myers’ book With Malice.

    Commonly used abbreviations throughout this review:

    DPD = Dallas Police department
    WCD = Warren Commission document
    FBI = Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Sgt. = Seargent
    USSS = United States Secret Service
    Lt. = Lieutenant
    WCE = Warren Commission exhibit


    For the 50th anniversary of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the murder of Dallas Policeman J.D. Tippit, Dale Myers decided to publish an updated version of his book on Tippit’s murder entitled, With Malice. The updated book contains new text, photographs and maps pertaining to Tippit’s death. I had never read With Malice before, and it was only at the insistence of Jim DiEugenio that I decided to review the updated book. As anyone who is familiar with Myers knows, his contention is that Lee Harvey Oswald murdered Tippit in cold blood, after allegedly assassinating the President. As I hope to explain throughout this review, the notion that Oswald shot Tippit is utterly absurd. But before getting to the book itself, it is first important to outline some of the reasons why Dale Myers is not to be trusted when it comes to both Tippit’s murder and President Kennedy’s assassination.

    As most researchers of the JFK assassination are probably aware, Myers has claimed to have proven through his 3-D animation of President Kennedy’s assassination that the single bullet theory is actually true. However, as researchers such as Milicent Cranor, Bob Harris, and Pat Speer have shown, Myers’ work is highly deceptive. Speer’s comprehensive analysis of the statements of the ear/eye witnesses to the assassination has demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the majority of ear/eye witnesses didn’t hear the so-called single bullet shot, and that the shot(s) to Governor Connally did not originate from the sixth floor of the Texas School book depository. Myers is also known for his support of the ludicrous notion that the first shot missed the President’s limousine, and caused the injury to bystander James Tague. Contrary to this belief, Tague always denied that the first shot was responsible for the cut to his left cheek. In fact, following the airing of Max Holland’s utterly fallacious documentary, The Lost Bullet, in which Holland claimed Tague’s injury was caused by the first shot, Tague indignantly exclaimed; “Holland is full of crap. One thing I know for sure is that the first shot was not the missed curb shot. Another thing I am positive about is that the last shot was the missed shot. You may not want to believe the Warren Commission’s final findings, but you can believe the 11 witnesses who state it was the last shot that missed.” (Read Tague’s remark). Although Tague was not always certain whether it was the second or third shot he heard which caused his injury, his confusion is understandable given that like the majority of ear/eye witnesses, he claimed that the next two shots he heard were fired in rapid succession (WCD 205, page 31). The fact that Myers pretends this theory is true in spite of Tague’s adamant denial, speaks poorly for his credibility as a researcher.

    Then there is Myers’ interview with John Kelin in 1982. During that interview, Kelin asked Myers what he thought about Oswald, to which Myers responded with the following remark; “…First off, I don’t think Lee Harvey Oswald pulled the trigger.” Myers also said that as far as saying Oswald is guilty, “…I find that extremely hard to believe”. However, most revealing of all was his denial that Oswald had shot Tippit; namely that “I think I will be able to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Oswald was not the killer of J.D. Tippit.” Researcher and author Jim DiEugenio once asked what had caused Myers to suddenly believe that Oswald hard murdered Tippit? Although we may never know the real answer to that question, it hardly matters. However, in this reviewer’s opinion, it was most likely due to Myers fondness for many of the DPD Officers he had interviewed, such as former DPD dispatcher Murray James Jackson. In fact, as this reviewer demonstrates below, Myers shows favouritism towards these very same officers.

    Although there are some people who believe that With Malice is the definitive book on Tippit’s murder, nothing could be further from the truth. Myers omits many facts and pieces of evidence which tend to exonerate Oswald as Tippit’s killer. Myers also shows favouritism towards witnesses who support Oswald’s guilt (even though, as I will explain, they lack credibility). In the introduction to his book, Myers also quotes many of Tippit’s family members and friends who dismiss the notion that Tippit was somehow involved in a conspiracy to murder either President Kennedy or Oswald. For example, Myers quotes Marie Frances Gasway, Tippit’s widow, who said the following during an interview in 2003: “The conspiracy stuff is so untrue, so totally unfounded.” (With Malice, Introduction). Quoting Tippit’s youngest son, Curtis Tippit, Myers writes: “People want sensationalism. Mom’s been abused by conspiracy theories and tabloid publications… Too many people want to cling to a false history, believing my father was in on something with Jack Ruby… Really it’s all kind of silly and funny” (ibid).

    Although it is perfectly understandable that Tippit’s family and friends want to feel a sense of closure by believing that the man who allegedly murdered Tippit was arrested by the DPD, it is nevertheless important that an honest analysis of the evidence and facts pertaining to his murder be presented to current and future researchers of that case. Furthermore, given the shame and embarrassment any allegation that Tippit was somehow involved in a conspiracy would bring to his family members and friends, it is also perfectly understandable that they would vehemently deny any such allegations. Readers should keep in mind that since writing several articles on Tippit’s murder on my blog, I have since changed my mind on a number of issues, and have come to realize that I had also made a number of mistakes and misjudgements.

    I: The search begins

    Myers begins his above titled Chapter 1 with the following sentences: “Lee Harvey Oswald murdered J.D. Tippit. The Dallas Cops believed it. The newspapers reported it. The Warren Commission made it official and the House Select Committee on Assassinations reaffirmed it.” (With Malice, Chapter 1). Myers and his fellow Warren Commission defenders scoff at the idea that the DPD and the Dallas district attorney’s Office could have helped frame Oswald for the murders of President Kennedy and J.D. Tippit. In fact, Myers snidely writes the following: “It was claimed [by Warren Commission critics] that Oswald was framed by a zealous Police force” (ibid). Thanks to Dallas district attorney Craig Watkins, we now know that with Henry Wade as District Attorney of Dallas, the DPD was one of the most corrupt Police departments in the entire United States; something which Myers and his ilk want to pretend isn’t true. To give the reader one example of just how bad the DA’s Office and the DPD were, let’s take the case of James Lee Woodard. Woodard was an African American man who spent twenty seven years in prison for a murder he didn’t commit. As it turned out, Henry Wade’s Office had withheld evidence from Woodard’s defence attorney which exonerated him as the killer. According to Michelle Moore, the President of the Innocence Project of Texas’ “…we’re finding lots of places where detectives in those cases, they kind of trimmed the corners to just get the case done”. She also added; “Whether that’s the fault of the detectives or the DA’s, I don’t know.” (Readers are strongly encouraged to read through this article, to see for themselves just how corrupt Wade’s Office and the DPD were).

    As for why the DA’s Office and the DPD would want to frame Oswald, just consider the following. The president of the United States of America (the most powerful man in the world) was gunned down in broad daylight and in full public view. Naturally, the entire United States, including the leaders of foreign countries, were anxiously waiting to learn who was responsible for the crime. Since the assassination of a sitting President was not a federal crime in 1963, the DPD had jurisdiction, and were undoubtedly under a tremendous amount of pressure to find those responsible, in order to avoid embarrassment for not being able to identify those responsible. Naturally, the DPD also had to find those responsible for the murder of one of their own policemen. As many researchers of the assassination have pointed out, a wallet bearing identification for Oswald and his alleged alias, Alek James Hidell, was discovered in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene. This allegation first appeared in the book by former FBI agent James Hosty entitled Assignment Oswald. Myers dismisses the idea such a wallet was left behind to incriminate Oswald. But as this reviewer explains later on in this review, there is very good reason to believe that this was the case.

    It’s important to keep in mind that with a wallet left behind to incriminate Oswald, the DPD had a viable suspect for Tippit’s murder. The DPD could then use Tippit’s murder to portray Oswald as a violent man who was capable of assassinating the President. In fact, Warren Commission counsel David Belin once remarked that: “Once the hypothesis is admitted that Oswald killed patrolman Tippit, there can be no doubt that the overall evidence shows that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin of John F. Kennedy”. (ibid). To say that such a belief is narrow-minded would be an understatement. Myers also makes several demeaning comments against those who refuse to believe that Oswald shot Tippit. For example, Myers writes that; “Many eyewitness accounts of the [Tippit] shooting were twisted to exonerate Oswald” (ibid). The readers of this review can make up their own minds on whether or not this is the case. Myers also writes that; “Lee Harvey Oswald murdered Officer J.D. Tippit. There can no longer be any doubt about that”, and that no matter what role Oswald had in the President’s assassination “…Oswald’s guilt in the Tippit shooting must be hereafter considered a historic truth.” (ibid). In light of all the evidence to the contrary, to say that Oswald’s guilt in the Tippit murder must be considered a historic truth is almost absurd. However, Myers can make that claim, because he omits a lot of the evidence which tends to exonerate Oswald.

    II: The quiet cop

    In this chapter, Myers discusses Tippit’s life from his childhood, his high school years, his service in the United States Army as a paratrooper, on to his career as a DPD Officer. Myers portrays Tippit as a good and honest cop, killed in the line of duty. In his discussion of Tippit’s Army experiences, Myers explains that it had “…made deep impressions…” Namely that Tippit’s friends recalled that he would be startled by any loud noise and that he was “…still a little nervous…” (With Malice, Chapter 2). What Myers omits however, is that Tippit’s DPD personnel files contain evidence that he may possibly have been unstable. (Reopen Kennedy case forum, thread entitled: J.D Tippit: the perfect DPD recruit). In his discussion of Tippit’s career as a DPD Officer, Myers explains that since joining the DPD as an apprentice Policeman in July, 1952, Tippit was an “exemplary” Police Officer (With Malice, Chapter 2). However, Myers also mentions that in 1955, Tippit had received several reprimands for not appearing in court as ordered (ibid). In order to bolster his claim that Tippit was a good and honest Police Officer, Myers quotes several of Tippit’s fellow Police Officers, such as Tippit’s supervisor, Calvin “Bud” Owens, who vouched for this (ibid). Even if these claims are true, it has little bearing on whether Tippit was lured to Tenth Street to be shot and killed. The evidence for that lies in the fact that a wallet was left behind to incriminate Oswald for his murder. Furthermore, the DPD would naturally want to avoid making claims to the contrary, as any such claims could lead to speculation that Tippit was somehow involved in a conspiracy; and bring about embarrassment to the DPD.

    III: The final hours

    In this chapter, Myers relates to the readers the final hours of Tippit’s life; from the time he left his home at 6:15 am, to the time he was shot and killed on Tenth Street in the central Oak Cliff area of Dallas (With Malice, Chapter 3). The issues which Myers deals with here include why Tippit was in central Oak Cliff when he was killed, the sighting of Tippit at the Gloco Service station located at 1502 North Zangs blvd., the sighting of a DPD squad car which Earlene Roberts, the house keeper at 1026 North Beckley where Oswald was allegedly living at the time of the assassination, a car she claimed was outside the rooming house when “Oswald” was inside following the assassination, and finally, Tippit’s alleged presence at the Top Ten records store a few minutes prior to his death. Myers writes that; “Tippit wished he could have seen the President, whom he had voted for and admired.” (ibid) Whilst that may be true, it is this reviewer’s belief that it has little (if any) bearing on his death. Myers also relates to his readers the all too familiar tale that Howard Brennan was sitting directly across from the TSBD on Elm Street, when he allegedly observed Oswald firing the shots at President Kennedy (ibid). But what Myers doesn’t tell his readers is that the Zapruder film shows beyond any doubt that Brennan was sitting directly across Houston Street, and that Brennan was lying when he said he sitting directly across from the TSBD.

    In his discussion of whether or not Earlene Roberts had really seen a DPD squad car outside of the rooming house, Myers does everything he can to discredit her story. When Roberts was interviewed by the FBI on November 29, 1963, she told them that the number of the car she observed outside the rooming house was 207 (WCE 2781). As Myers explains, that particular car was assigned to DPD Officer Jim M. Valentine, and which took DPD Sgt. Gerald Hill and Dallas Morning News reporter Jim Ewell to Dealey Plaza from Police headquarters. As this reviewer will explain in an upcoming essay on Gerald Hill, Hill had by all likelihood commandeered car 207 from Officer Valentine, and was one of the two Officers inside the car when it was seen by Roberts outside of the rooming house. In that same essay, this reviewer will discuss Myers’ narrow minded attempt to discredit Roberts.

    On the day of the assassination, Tippit was assigned to patrol district 78 (testimony of Calvin Bud Owens, WC Volume VII, page 80). However, the patrol district in which Tippit was killed (district 91) was assigned to a DPD Officer named William Duane Mentzel (WCE 2645). Tippit and another Officer named Ronald C. Nelson were allegedly ordered to move into the central Oak Cliff by DPD dispatcher Murray Jackson at approximately 12:45 pm (WCE 705/1974). According to DPD chief Jesse Curry, the central Oak Cliff area included patrol district 91 (WCD 1259, page 3). According to the map of the DPD patrol districts, it stands to reason that districts 92, 93, 94, 108, and 109 which were adjacent to district 91 were also part of the central Oak Cliff area (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 7, Folder 10, Item 2). Although Jackson was never called to testify before the Warren Commission, during a filmed interview with Eddie Barker from CBS, he explained that he had ordered Tippit into the central Oak Cliff area because “We [the dispatchers] were draining the Oak Cliff area of available Police Officers….” (See the interview). Myers accepts that this was the case, and writes that Jackson told him during an interview that he had ordered Tippit into the central Oak Cliff area because Tippit had once helped him out during an incident with seven drunk teenagers, and that allegedly feeling that he could once again rely on Tippit, Jackson ordered Tippit into the Oak Cliff area to “help him [Jackson] again…. to cover Oak Cliff” (With Malice, Chapter 3).

    But contrary to Jackson’s claim, there is very good reason to believe that he never ordered Tippit and Nelson to move into the central Oak Cliff area. In the first transcript of channel one of the DPD radio recordings (Sawyer exhibit B), the order to send Tippit and Nelson into the central Oak Cliff area is curiously missing. Myers doesn’t mention this to his readers. In that very same transcript, the channel one dispatchers (Jackson and Clifford Hulse), allegedly broadcast the following message over the DPD radio at approximately 12:43 pm; “Attention all squads in the downtown area code three [lights on and sirens blazing] to Elm and Houston with caution.” (Sawyer exhibit B, page 398). Myers acknowledges this in his timetable of the events which occurred on the day of the assassination, but hides from his readers the fact that according to the next transcript which the DPD had provided to the FBI on March 20, 1964, the dispatchers had actually broadcast the following message: “Attention all squads, report to [the] downtown area code 3 to Elm and Houston, with caution.” (WCE 705).

    Whilst it certainly makes more sense that only the squads in the downtown area would be dispatched to the assassination scene, thereby leaving all the “outer” area squads in their assigned districts in the event a crime such as a robbery were to occur, the exact same transmission appears in the next transcript on the DPD channel one and two radio recordings (WCE 1974). On July 21, 1964, DPD chief Jesse Curry furnished the FBI a copy of the “original” tape recordings of the DPD radio traffic, which were reviewed by an agent of the FBI at the DPD (ibid). If the transmission “Attention all squads, report to [the] downtown area code 3 to Elm and Houston, with caution” was not recorded on the tapes, then the FBI would surely not have allowed it to be placed into the new transcript. Confirmation that the dispatchers had actually ordered all squads and not only the squads in the downtown area to proceed to Elm and Houston comes from DPD chief Curry himself. In a letter to the Warren Commission on July 17, 1964, Curry wrote; “…between 12:37 p.m. and 12:45 p.m., the dispatcher requested all squads to report to Elm and Houston in the downtown area, code 3” (WCD 1259, page 3). Curry then added; “It might further be pointed out that Officer Tippit remained on his district until the dispatcher had requested all squads to report to Elm and Houston…” (ibid). But perhaps most significantly of all, Jackson himself confirmed that all squads had been dispatched to Elm and Houston Streets in his filmed interview with Eddie Barker in 1967. According to Jackson; “…we immediately dispatched every available unit [squad] to the triple underpass where the shot was reported to have come from.” Myers mentions none of this to his readers.

    In light of all of the above, the notion that Jackson was only concerned that the Oak Cliff area was being “drained’ of available DPD Officers when all squads had been ordered to Elm and Houston seems strained. Jackson’s next transmission to Tippit was at approximately 12:54 pm, when he asked Tippit if he was in the Oak Cliff area (WCE 705/1974). Tippit allegedly responded that he was at Lancaster and Eighth. Jackson then allegedly instructed Tippit; “You will be at large for any emergency that comes in.” Keep in mind that the alleged order to Tippit and Nelson was to move into the central Oak Cliff area. On the day of the assassination, districts 93 and 94 were assigned to Officer Holley M. Ashcraft, and districts 108 and 109 were assigned to Officer Owen H. Ludwig (WCE 2645). Although the tape recordings of channel one of the DPD radio reveal that the dispatchers sent Ashcraft to Inwood road and Stemmons expressway to cut traffic (Listen to the recording), and although Ludwig was allegedly guarding the front of the Sheraton-Dallas-Hotel, Jackson never bothered to try and contact William Mentzel on the radio, who was on a lunch break at approximately the time of the assassination (ibid). None of the transcripts of the DPD radio communications show that Jackson had attempted to contact Mentzel; and the notion that Jackson would order Tippit and Nelson to move into the central Oak Cliff without even once bothering to contact Mentzel to ensure that Mentzel was patrolling his assigned districts (91 and 92) is also strained (ibid). Again, Myers does not mention to his readers that Jackson never bothered to contact Mentzel by the DPD radio.

    Finally, there is the fact that despite being allegedly ordered to move into the central Oak Cliff area, Ronald Nelson proceeded to Dealey Plaza, and even told the dispatcher that he had gone there at approximately 12:52 pm (WCE 705/1974). But despite disobeying Jackson’s order, we are supposed to believe that he had the audacity to then ask the dispatchers if they wanted him to go over to the Tippit murder scene (ibid). Myers explains that after Jackson allegedly ordered Tippit and Nelson to move into the central Oak Cliff area, Tippit responded; “I’m at Kiest and Bonnieview”, and Nelson allegedly responded that he is “…going North of Marsalis, on R.L. Thornton” (With Malice, Chapter 3). What Myers doesn’t mention is that the aforementioned alleged responses by Tippit and Nelson do not appear in either WCE 705 or Sawyer exhibit B. They first appear in WCE 1974. Myers also writes that Nelson told the dispatchers that he was at the South end of the Houston Street Viaduct (ibid). However, according to both WCE 705 and WCE 1974, the Officer who made the transmission was actually B.L. Bass; and that Bass had identified himself to the dispatchers by his radio number (101).

    When author Henry Hurt interviewed Nelson in 1984, he asked him; “Did you get the call to go to central Oak Cliff” (Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, page 162). After first telling Hurt that he wasn’t sure what he meant by his question, he then said “I had rather not talk about that” (ibid). According to Hurt, Nelson apparently considered that information to be worth some money (ibid). Myers explains that Nelson had declined a request for an interview with him (With Malice, Chapter 3). Nelson’s reluctance to be interviewed may have been due to the fact that he actually wasn’t ordered to move into the central Oak Cliff area, and that his explanation to Hurt that it was worth some money was just an excuse to discourage Hurt from talking about it with him. Suffice it to say, the notion that Tippit and Nelson were ordered to move into the central Oak Cliff area is dubious, and the transcripts and tape recordings of the DPD radio communications were in all likelihood altered to make it appear as though they actually were sent into the central Oak Cliff area.

    Obviously, the DPD had to provide an explanation for what Tippit was doing there; hence Jackson was coerced into claiming that he had sent them into central Oak Cliff. In this reviewer’s opinion, the DPD claimed that Nelson was also sent into central Oak Cliff so that they wouldn’t make it appear obvious that they were covering up for Tippit’s singular presence there. But did Jackson also have a personal reason for lying about Tippit’s presence in central Oak Cliff? As it turns out, there is. Jackson told Henry Hurt during an interview with him that he was a very close personal friend of both Tippit and his family (Hurt, Reasonable doubt, page 162). As any reasonable person would be able to understand, Tippit’s unauthorised presence in central Oak Cliff would have led to rumours which would probably be upsetting for his family members. Jackson may have thought that by claiming he had ordered Tippit to move into the central Oak Cliff area, he would be sparing Tippit’s family members of these upsetting rumours.

    In his timetable of events which occurred on the day of the assassination, Myers writes that Tippit was at the GLOCO (Good luck Oil Company) service station, located on 1502 North Zangs Blvd., apparently watching traffic “coming out of downtown.”, from about 12:56 pm to 1:06 pm (With Malice, Timetable of events). In the endnotes, Myers cites David Lifton’s interview with a photographer named Al Volkland, who told him that he was well acquainted with Tippit, and that he had seen him at the service station. Volkland’s claim of seeing Tippit there was allegedly confirmed by his wife; and both claimed that they observed Tippit at the service station 10 or 20 minutes following the assassination. Furthermore, J.B. “Shorty” Lewis and Emmett Hollingshead, who were employed at the service station, and Tom Mullins who was the owner of the station at the time of the assassination, also claimed they had seen Tippit there (With Malice, Chapter 3).

    In his endnotes, Myers also cites the Ramparts magazine article by David Welsh, in which Welsh wrote that Lewis, Hollingshead, and Mullins claimed Tippit was at the service station for about ten minutes, between 12:45 pm and 1:00 pm. However, Myers explains that in an interview with him in 1983, Hollingshead claimed that he had seen Tippit at the service station before the President was assassinated. Myers also claims that in an interview with him in 1983, Lewis said that other employees of the service station had seen Tippit there, and not him. Myers offers no source for why he believes Tippit arrived at the service station at 12:56 pm, and as this reviewer explains below, there is compelling evidence that Tippit was actually shot at about 1:06 pm. If Tippit really was at the service station, his presence there is a mystery. Whilst Myers doesn’t believe that Tippit was at the service station by 12:45 pm, and that he only moved into the central Oak Cliff area following the alleged order by Murray Jackson to do so, he nevertheless ignores all of the compelling evidence that Jackson didn’t order Tippit to move into the central Oak Cliff area.

    According to the DPD radio transmission transcripts, Murray Jackson asked Tippit for his location at approximately 1:03 pm, but received no response (WCE 705/1974). However, Myers writes that as the dispatchers were trying to determine the location of Officer A.D. Duncan, a garbled transmission was made that had the tonal characteristics of other “known” transmissions made by Tippit (With Malice, Chapter 3). In his endnotes, Myers explains that the transcripts describe the alleged transmission by Tippit as “more interference”, which is true (WCE 705/1974). In fact, according to the transcripts of the DPD radio communications, the interference was due to “…intermodulation similar, according to [the] Dallas Police Department, to that most often originating from the Dallas Power and light company” (ibid). Given Myers skewed conclusion driven agenda , as demonstrated throughout this review, readers are cautioned against believing much of what Myers writes. According to Myers, Tippit was at the Tip Top Records store at 1:11 pm, where he was allegedly trying to place a phone call to someone (With Malice, Chapter 3). However, given that Tippit didn’t respond to Jackson at 1:03 pm, Tippit was probably in the store at this point in time. If Tippit really was in the store trying to call someone, it remains a mystery as to who it was, and why he was trying to call him/her.

    IV: Murder on Tenth Street

    Myers now discusses Tippit’s murder on Tenth Street, and the events that followed. It is Myers contention that Tippit was shot at approximately 1:14.30 pm (With Malice, Chapter 4). Myers writes that the tape recordings of the DPD radio communications show that Domingo Benavides had attempted to inform the DPD dispatchers of Tippit’s death at 1:16 pm, as the tape recordings show that he began “keying” Tippit’s microphone at that time; and had been doing so for about one minute and forty one seconds. Based on the eyewitness account of Ted Callaway , Myers then speculates that Tippit was probably shot ninety seconds prior to Benavides attempt to contact the dispatcher (ibid). However, let’s look at all the evidence that Myers ignores to reach his conclusion that Tippit was shot at about 1:14.30 pm. To begin with, Myers never informs his readers that according to WCE 705, T.F. Bowley, who had arrived at the murder scene shortly following Tippit’s death, reported Tippit’s death just prior to 1:10 pm! In WCE 1974 however, the time of Bowley’s transmission was noted as being made at about 1:19 pm.

    Bowley claimed in his affidavit to the DPD that when he arrived at the Tippit murder scene, he looked at his watch and it read 1:10 pm. He also claimed that the first thing he did was to try and help Tippit, and then informed the DPD dispatchers that Tippit was shot (Dallas municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 14). Assuming that Bowley took no more than a minute to try and help Tippit before informing the dispatchers of the shooting, the actual time of Bowley’s arrival would have been approximately 1:09 pm. Nevertheless, both WCE 705 and Bowley’s watch place Tippit’s death sooner than Myers time of 1:14.30. Myers deals with Bowley’s watch reading 1:10 pm in his endnotes, where he writes that no one determined whether Bowley’s watch was accurate on the day of the assassination. Whilst we will probably never know just how accurate Bowley’s watch was, WCE 705 places Bowley’s transmission at about 1:10 pm, which is fairly consistent with Bowley’s claim his watch read 1:10 pm after he arrived.

    In his endnotes, Myers also deals with the allegation by Mrs. Margie Higgins, who lived 150 feet east of and across the street from where Tippit was shot. As Myers writes, Mrs. Higgins told author Barry Ernest that she was watching the news, when the announcer stated that the time was 1:06 pm (Ernest, The Girl On The Stairs, page 90). Mrs Higgins told Ernest that she then checked the clock on top of the TV, which confirmed that the time was 1:06 pm, and that it was at that point when she heard the shooting. Myers tries to discredit Mrs Higgins’ claim by telling his readers that, “A review of archival recordings of all three networks broadcasting that afternoon in Dallas failed to verify her [Mrs Higgins’] recollection.” Myers then adds “In fact, none of the networks broadcast a time check at 1:06 p.m. as she claimed.” Although this review cannot verify whether this is true or not, readers are once again cautioned against taking Myers word for it, for this reviewer demonstrates throughout this review that Myers is not a candid or balanced researcher. Readers should also keep in mind that Mrs. Higgins’ claim is consistent with Helen Markham’s claim in her affidavit that she was standing on the corner of Tenth and Patton Streets at approximately 1:06 pm when Tippit was shot (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Item 18).

    Both Markham’s and Mrs Higgins’ claims are also consistent with the fact that Markham told FBI agent Robert M. Barrett that when she left the Washateria of her apartment to catch her bus, she noticed the time shown on the clock of the Washateria was 1:04 pm (WCD 630). Markham explained to Barrett that she was attempting to call her daughter on the Washateria phone (ibid). The FBI determined that it would have taken Markham about two and a half minutes to reach the intersection of Tenth and Patton Streets, which means Markham would have arrived at the intersection close to 1:07 pm (ibid). Myers acknowledges in his book that Markham reportedly left the Washateria at 1:04 pm, but claims that Markham “probably” didn’t leave the Washateria before 1:11 pm, and speculates that this was perhaps the case because of her “eagerness” to contact her daughter by phone (With Malice, Chapter 4). In his endnotes, Myers snidely writes that in order to believe the statements by Markham, Higgins, and Bowley of when Tippit was killed; “…one would have to believe that Tippit lay dead in the Street for eight to twelve minutes before anyone notified [the] Police.” But only by ignoring the fact that WCE 705 places the time of Bowley’s radio transmission at approximately 1:10 pm can Myers make this claim and think that he can get away with it.

    Myers writes that the Dudley Hughes Funeral home, which had dispatched the ambulance which took Tippit’s body to Methodist hospital, was informed of the shooting at 1:18 pm by the DPD, and that Dudley M. Hughes Junior, who took the call from the DPD at the funeral home, allegedly filled out an ambulance call slip which was time stamped 1:18 pm (With Malice, Chapter 5). Myers references this call slip to an essay by researchers George and Patricia Nash in The New Leader entitled: The Other Witnesses (John Armstrong Baylor collection, tab entitled: George & Patricia Nash). However, the call slip itself doesn’t appear to be amongst the Dallas Municipal archives collection, and taking into account all of the evidence which contradicts the notion that the funeral home received the call at 1:18 pm, this piece of evidence should be considered unreliable. Of course, it is entirely likely that if the ambulance call slip actually exists, the DPD had falsified it in order to bolster the notion that Tippit was shot close to 1:18 pm; and thereby allowing Oswald plenty of time to reach Tenth and Patton in order to shoot Tippit after he allegedly left the rooming house at 1026 North Beckley.

    Readers should keep in mind that justice of the peace, Joe B. Brown, filled out an authorisation permit for an autopsy to be performed on Tippit’s body, and in that permit, Brown noted that Tippit was pronounced dead on arrival at Methodist hospital, and noted the time of death as 1:15 pm (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 24, Item 2). Although there is conflicting evidence for the time Tippit was pronounced dead at Methodist hospital, researcher Martin Hay discovered that in a supplementary offense report by DPD Officers R.A. Davenport and W.R. Bardin, Dr. Richard Liguori pronounced Tippit dead at Methodist Hospital at 1:15 pm (ReopenKennedycase forum, thread entitled: Question Concerning Time). Given the fact that (according to WCE 705) T.F. Bowley’s transmission to the DPD dispatchers was at approximately 1:10 pm, and given all of the aforementioned evidence which supports the notion that Tippit was shot prior to 1:10 pm and then taken to Methodist Hospital where he was most likely pronounced dead at 1:15 pm, Myers assertion that Tippit was shot at 1:14.30 pm is simply not tenable.

    According to WCE 705, Tippit allegedly tried to contact the DPD dispatchers twice at approximately 1:08 pm. However, these alleged transmissions are curiously missing from WCE 1974; and instead, there appears to be two garbled transmission from DPD Officers with the radio numbers 58 and 488. Although some researchers believe that the alleged call by Tippit at circa 1:08 pm is proof that Tippit was still alive at that time, and that he was attempting to report that he had just encountered a suspect, there is good reason to believe that this alleged call was added into the transcript by the DPD. Consider that with Helen Markham’s first day affidavit, the DPD would have realised that Tippit was killed at approximately 1:06 pm. It is this reviewer’s opinion that the DPD took advantage of the fact that there were two garbled transmissions at about 1:08 pm, and claimed that it was Tippit to make it appear as though he was alive after 1:06 pm.

    As far as Tippit’s alleged attempts to report that he had just encountered a suspect are concerned, the discovery of the wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene strongly implies that Tippit was lured to Tenth Street to be shot. With this in mind, the last thing the conspirators would surely have wanted was for Tippit to become suspicious. Therefore, it seems very unlikely that Tippit actually attempted to report that he had encountered a suspect. Myers never mentions that WCE 705 shows that Tippit attempted to contact the dispatchers, writing instead that: “A check of the Dallas Police tapes revealed that Tippit did not notify the dispatcher that he was stopping to question the man on Tenth Street” (With Malice, Chapter 4). It is this reviewer’s belief that Myers never mentions Tippit’s alleged attempts to contact the dispatchers, because he was probably concerned that his readers would think that Tippit had stopped “Oswald” at about 1:08 pm; and by implication, was also shot at this time.

    This reviewer would also like to point out that when T.F. Bowley reported the shooting to the DPD dispatchers, Murray Jackson allegedly responded by calling out Tippit’s radio number (78), because according to Myers, Tippit was “…thought to be the only available patrol unit in the Oak Cliff area.” (ibid) By ignoring all the evidence that the DPD radio traffic tape recordings have been altered, Myers can pretend that Jackson really did call for Tippit.

    Furthermore, in an apparent attempt to explain why Jackson immediately thought of calling for Tippit instead of William Mentzel, Myers writes in his endnotes that Mentzel, and another officer named Vernon R. Nolan, were sent to a traffic accident at about 1:11 pm. Curiously, there is nothing within WCE 705 and WCE 1974 that Mentzel was sent to a traffic accident.

    Another issue which Myers discusses in this chapter is the direction in which the killer was walking when he was spotted by Tippit. Based on the observations by William Lawrence Smith, Jimmy Burt, Jimmy Brewer, and William Scoggins, Myers concludes that Tippit’s killer was initially walking west (ibid). This reviewer agrees. However, readers should keep in mind that in his interview with the FBI on December 15, 1963, Burt made no mention of seeing Tippit’s killer at all (WCD 194, page 29). Based on the statements of witnesses Helen Markham and Jack Ray Tatum, Myers speculates that Tippit’s killer then turned around and was walking east when he observed Tippit’s squad car approaching, and that this is what caused Tippit to pull over to the curb and question his soon to be killer (ibid). According to Myers: “The eyewitness accounts depict the suspect traveling in two conflicting directions, with the key moment of change occurring just east of Tenth and Patton” (ibid). But as even Myers ironically notes at the end of this chapter, Helen Markham told the USSS on December 2, 1963, that she first observed Tippit’s killer on the sidewalk after Tippit had pulled his squad car to the curb (ibid). Myers also notes that on March 17, 1964, Markham told FBI agent Robert M. Barrett that she had first seen Tippit’s killer as Tippit passed the intersection of Tenth and Patton (ibid). When Markham testified before the Warren Commission, she claimed that she saw Tippit’s killer crossing Patton street (heading east), and about to step up onto the curb (WC Volume III, page 307).

    Not only do Markham’s statements directly contradict Myers assertion that the killer changed direction just east of Tenth and Patton, but given her overall unreliability as a witness, her claim that she had observed Tippit’s killer walking east should not be considered credible. Also, consider that in her affidavit to the DPD, she made no mention of which direction Tippit’s killer was walking when she first observed him (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Item 18). According to researcher John Armstrong, a barber named Mr Clark claimed he had also seen Tippit’s killer walking west along Tenth Street, and that he would bet his life that the man he saw was Oswald However, Clark does not count as a witness to seeing Tippit’s killer walking west along Tenth Street, because he claimed he saw the man in the morning, whereas Tippit was most certainly there after 1:00 pm in the afternoon (John Armstrong Baylor research collection, tab entitled: 10th St. Barber shop).

    Myers also explains to his readers that a Mrs Ann McCravey (believed to be Mrs Ann McRavin who allegedly lived at 404 east Tenth Street) claimed that she had seen Tippit’s killer running (With Malice, Chapter 4). Although McRavin didn’t specify which direction she had seen Tippit’s killer running, Myers writes that given her vantage point; “…Tippit’s killer could only have been running in a westerly direction [when she saw him]…” (ibid). But contrary to McRavin’s claim, no other witness is on record saying that Tippit’s killer was running, and given the evidence that Tippit was lured to Tenth Street to be shot, it seems highly unlikely that his killer would have been running and making himself appear suspicious to Tippit. Therefore, if she really did see Tippit’s killer, her claim that he was running should not be considered credible.

    As far as Jack Tatum is concerned, there is good reason to believe that he may be a phony witness used not only to help incriminate Oswald for Tippit’s murder, but to also help explain the presence of a suspicious red Ford at the Tippit murder scene. When Tatum was interviewed by HSCA investigators on February 1, 1978, he claimed that after he witnessed Tippit being shot in the head, he sped off in his car, and made no mention of having returned to the murder scene (HSCA report, Volume XII, page 41). In fact, when Tatum was asked if there was anything he wished to add to the statement he made to investigators Jack Moriarty and Joe Bastori, he replied; “At this time I can’t think of anything.” (John Armstrong Baylor research collection, tab entitled: Jack Tatum). However, when Myers interviewed Tatum in 1983/84, Tatum now began to aggrandize his story and his importance in it. He now claimed that he had gone back to the Tippit murder scene, and had taken Helen Markham to a policeman (With Malice, Chapter 4). Evidently, by the time Myers had interviewed him, Tatum had experienced a case of memory improvement. It is also noteworthy that during a telephone interview on March 18, 1986, Tatum allegedly stated that he had taken Markham to the police station to give evidence (John Armstrong Baylor research collection, tab entitled: Jack Tatum). However, this allegation is dubious. As Myers acknowledges in his book, Markham was taken to DPD headquarters by an officer named George W. Hammer (With Malice, Chapter 7). According to the transcripts of the DPD radio communications, Hammer was indeed the officer who took Markham to DPD headquarters (WCE 705/1974).

    Whilst Myers and his ilk will probably argue that the interviewer was in error, the truth is that no intellectually honest researcher should assume that this was the case, and then argue that Tatum definitely didn’t make such a claim. Readers should also bear in mind that Tatum didn’t come forward as a witness shortly following Tippit’s murder because he allegedly thought that there were enough witnesses, and that he didn’t think he could “add anything” (John Armstrong Baylor research collection, tab entitled: Jack Tatum). During his aforementioned telephone interview, Tatum also claimed that he was concerned about rumors of a conspiracy, and in particular a Mafia one; and that this may have been another reason for him remaining quiet (ibid). Perhaps the most significant detail about Tatum is that he was employed by the Baylor Medical Centre in Dallas, which, according to researcher William Kelly, had received funds from both the U.S. Army and the CIA for the heinous MK/ULTRA research, between the years 1963 and 1965 (John Simkin’s education forum, thread entitled: Frank Kaiser). As many researchers have pointed out, the CIA has been involved in the cover-up of Oswald as President Kennedy’s assassin. Therefore, the possibility exists that the CIA may have been involved in coercing Tatum into identifying Oswald as Tippit’s killer in order to bolster the notion that he was President Kennedy’s assassin. Whilst this reviewer feels certain that Myers will dismiss this as ridiculous, it nevertheless remains a possibility.

    When Domingo Benavides testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that a man in a red colored Ford had stopped and pulled over following the shooting, and that he never saw him get out of his car (WC Volume VI, page 463). During his interview with John Berendt from Esquire magazine, Benavides claimed that the car he had seen was red colored Ford with a white top, and that it came back to the Tippit murder scene a few minutes following the shooting (John Armstrong Baylor research collection, tab entitled: Igor Vaganov). Jack Tatum claimed that the car he was driving in when he arrived at the Tippit murder scene was a red colored 1964 model Ford Galaxie 500 (With Malice, Chapter 10). Whilst Myers readily accepts that the car Benavides had seen belonged to Jack Tatum, several researchers are of the opinion that it actually belonged to Igor Vaganov, who quite possibly played a role in Tippit’s murder (see the thread entitled Igor Vaganov on John Simkin’s Education Forum). Whilst this reviewer believes that the driver of the red Ford was quite possibly Igor Vaganov, it is also this reviewer’s opinion that Tatum was quite likely pushed into saying that he was the man driving the red Ford to help dispel the notion that the car belonged to Vaganov. As for why Tatum wasn’t coerced into coming forward sooner with his tale, this reviewer cannot offer an explanation. On a final note, Tatum may have been coerced into saying that Oswald was walking east to make it appear as though Tippit had stopped “Oswald” because he had turned around after seeing Tippit approaching in his squad car; just as Myers contends.

    V: Search for a killer

    Myers now explains to the readers the search for Tippit’s killer by the DPD, beginning with the discovery of the spent shell casings on the sixth floor of the TSBD by Dallas County deputy Sheriff, Luke Mooney (With Malice, Chapter 5). Myers believes that DPD Sgt. Gerald Hill was on the sixth floor when Mooney discovered the spent shell casings. But as this reviewer will explain in an upcoming essay on Hill, there is very good reason to believe that Hill was on the sixth floor of the TSBD before Mooney discovered the spent shell casings. Myers writes that the first officer to arrive at the Tippit murder scene was Kenneth Hudson Croy, who was a sergeant in the DPD reserves (With Malice, Chapter 5). According to Myers, the next Officer to arrive at the scene was Howell W. Summers, arriving about one minute after Kenneth Croy, circa 1:20 pm. However, according to the transcripts of channel one of the DPD radio transmissions, Officer Summers informs the dispatchers that he is at the murder scene after 1:25 pm, and after Officers Joe M. Poe, Leonard E. Jez, and Sgt. Calvin “Bud” Owens report that they have arrived at the murder scene (WCE 705/1974).

    Now if Summers was the second Officer to arrive, he waited for over five minutes before telling the dispatchers he arrived, which seems ridiculous. Although this reviewer doesn’t know why Myers doesn’t point this out to his readers, the fact that he doesn’t speaks poorly for his credibility. But in order to bolster the notion that Summers was the second Officer to arrive, Myers writes in his endnotes that Officer Roy W. Walker, who broadcast the first description of Tippit’s killer at about 1:22 pm, told him during an interview in 1983 that when he (Walker) arrived at the murder scene, there were two Officers already there. One of the Officers would undoubtedly have been reserve Sgt. Kenneth Croy. However, the identity of the second Officer to arrive (if Walker’s recollection was accurate) remains an open question.

    According to both WCE 705 and 1974, at approximately 1:32 pm, DPD Officer Jerry Pollard informs the dispatchers on channel one of the DPD radio that; “They [witnesses] say he [the killer] is running west in the alley between Jefferson and Tenth [Streets]”. Myers explains that the two witnesses who gave this information to the DPD Officers were Jimmy Burt and William Arthur Smith (With Malice, chapter 5). In his endnotes, Myers sources this claim to Burt’s interview with Al Chapman in 1968. According to Burt’s interview with the FBI on December 16, 1963, Burt claimed that “…he ran to the intersection of 10th and Patton and when he [Burt] was close enough to Patton Street to see to the south he saw the man running into an alley located between 10th and Jefferson Avenue on Patton Street. The man ran in the alley to the right would be running west at this point.” (WCD 194, page 29). However, Burt was most certainly lying, as no less than four witnesses; Warren Reynolds, B.M. “Pat” Patterson, L.J. Lewis, and Harold Russell, claimed they observed the gunman turn west from Patton Street onto Jefferson Blvd. (With Malice, Chapter 4). When Burt was interviewed by Al Chapman in 1968, he claimed that he and William Arthur Smith “…got to the alley [between Tenth and Jefferson] and we kind of come to a stop and looked down the alley and we saw this guy down there. He was down almost to the next street.” (With Malice, Chapter 4). Myers then writes that Burt and Smith may have been the last two witnesses to see Tippit’s killer fleeing west along the alley behind the Texaco Service station located on Jefferson Blvd. (ibid).

    In his endnotes, Myers acknowledges the discrepancies between Burt’s remarks to the FBI and his remarks to Al Chapman, but tries to explain the discrepancy by stating that because of his police record, his trouble with the U.S. Military, and his alleged desire to withhold his identity from the DPD, Burt possibly “altered” his 1963 interview with the FBI to avoid “deeper” involvement in the case. However, this appears to be nothing but a pathetic attempt at trying to conceal the fact that Burt lied during his interview with Al Chapman, and that the so-called radio transmission by Officer Pollard was probably added into the recordings/transcripts of the DPD radio transmissions to dismiss the possibility that Tippit’s real killer was hiding inside the Abundant Life Temple, located on the corner of Tenth and Crawford Streets (this reviewer will elaborate on this in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill). Now if Burt really was concerned about all of the above as Myers claims, then why the heck would he lie to the FBI when he surely would have realized that he would be getting himself into more trouble? Myers also acknowledges in his endnotes that William Arthur Smith informed both the FBI and the Warren Commission that he and Burt did not follow the gunman, and also acknowledges that when he (Myers) interviewed Smith in 1997, Smith was unable to recall if they had followed the killer or not. Given all of the above, and despite what Myers wants his readers to believe, Burt should not be considered a credible witness.

    VI: Closing in

    Myers begins this chapter with a discussion of the false alarm at the Jefferson branch Library located on Marsalis and Jefferson streets, and concludes the chapter with Oswald’s arrest inside the Texas Theater. The person who triggered the false alarm at the library was Adrian Hamby, who worked there as a page (With Malice, Chapter 6). Hamby was approached by two plainclothes DPD “detectives”, and was allegedly told to go into the Library and inform management that a Police Officer was shot, and to have them lock all the doors and to not let anyone enter the Library until they secured the area (ibid). As Hamby was entering the Library, he was allegedly spotted by DPD Officer Charles T. Walker, after which Walker put a broadcast on the DPD radio that the suspect was in the library (WCE 705/1974). In his report to DPD Chief Jesse Curry, detective Marvin Buhk wrote that there were “Secret Service” men at the Jefferson Branch Library who informed DPD Officers at the Library that after Adrian Hamby came out of the Library, one of them claimed that Hamby was not the suspect (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 56).

    In his endnotes, Myers writes that detective Buhk was the only officer to mention Secret Service agents being at the Library. As far as this reviewer in concerned, Myers is correct. Myers also writes that the “Secret Service” man referred to by Buhk in his report was actually one of the two “lawmen” who instructed Hamby to go into the library and have all the doors locked. The fact of the matter is that there is no known evidence that any genuine Secret Service agents were present at the Jefferson Branch Library on the day of the assassination. Furthermore, the identity of the two men who spoke to Hamby has never been determined, and if they were DPD detectives, then surely their identity would be known to Buhk and others, and surely Buhk would not have referred to them as Secret Service agents. One alternative explanation is that the so-called Secret Service men may have been conspirators, who may have deliberately triggered the false alarm at the Library to pull the DPD Officers away from the Abundant Life Temple, where Tippit’s actual killer was perhaps hiding (this reviewer will be discussing this theory in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill). The possibility that these “Secret Service” men were conspirators is bolstered by the fact that several men who identified themselves as Secret Service men were present in Dealey Plaza shortly following President Kennedy’s assassination (readers are encouraged to read through this article on this reviewer’s blog). In his dismissal of the “Secret Service” men at the Library as being nothing sinister, Myers never mentions the fact that men identifying themselves as Secret Service men were present in Dealey Plaza.

    As perhaps every researcher of the JFK assassination is aware, Oswald was apprehended inside the Texas Theater after he allegedly tried to shoot Officer M. Nick McDonald with the revolver he supposedly used to murder Tippit. Myers’ discussion of the scuffle inside the theater with Oswald is perhaps the low point of his book, a considerable negative achievement. The author deliberately ignores evidence which contradicts the notion that Oswald had pulled out the revolver and tried to shoot Officer McDonald. Before entering the theater, Oswald was allegedly spotted by shoe store owner Johnny Calvin Brewer outside the lobby of his store on Jefferson Blvd., as he was allegedly trying to avoid the DPD (With Malice, Chapter 6). Brewer then allegedly observed Oswald duck into the theater behind Julia Elizabeth Postal, who was the cashier at the theater (ibid). Myers explains that Oswald had not paid for a ticket, and that Postal had seen Oswald “out of the corner of her eye” as he was coming towards the theater from the east (ibid). During her testimony before the Warren Commission, Postal claimed that she informed the DPD over the telephone that she hadn’t heard of Oswald’s description, but then described him as “ruddy looking.” (WC Volume VII, page 11).

    Towards the end of her testimony, counsel Joseph Ball showed Postal the shirt Oswald was wearing (WCE 150), when he was arrested inside the theatre. He asked her; “when he went in [to the Theater] was it [the shirt] tucked into his pants when he went in?” to which Postal responded; “No, sir; because I remember he came flying around the corner, because his hair was and his shirt was waving.”, and that “It [the shirt] was hanging out”! (ibid). So if Postal had merely seen “Oswald” out of the corner of her eye, how on Earth was she able to describe all of the above? The simple answer is that she did not see “Oswald” out of the corner of her eye, but actually got a good view of him. But, ironically, she also testified that she did not see him enter the theatre.

    Another pertinent piece of information which Myers omits is that when researcher Jones Harris allegedly interviewed Postal in 1963, Harris asked her if she had sold Oswald a ticket for the theater. Upon hearing the question, Postal burst into tears. When Harris asked her again if she had sold him a ticket, he received the same response. The obvious implication of Postal’s reaction is that she did sell a ticket to Oswald. Although this reviewer discusses evidence further on in this review which casts doubt on Harris’s credibility as far as the wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell is concerned, Postal’s own testimony as described above suggests that she did in fact sell Oswald a ticket. In fact, in both her affidavit to the DPD and in her interview with the FBI on February 29, 1964, she claimed that she had seen/noticed Oswald duck into the Theater (WCD 735, page 264), (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 21) . As the reader can see, Postal is a problematic witness. And it appears to be that she did sell Oswald a ticket.

    Which makes Johnny Brewer problematic. Brewer testified that he had seen Oswald duck into the theater without paying for a ticket (WC Volume VII, page 4). However, he also testified that he had asked Postal if she sold him a ticket (ibid). When Counsel Joseph Ball enquired why Brewer had asked Postal if she sold Oswald a ticket, he said that he didn’t know! (ibid, page 5). The notion that Brewer would have to ask Postal if she had sold a ticket to Oswald, when he already knew the answer is far fetched. Brewer, along with Warren “Butch” Burroughs, who worked behind the concession stand inside the theater, then allegedly searched the theater to find Oswald (With Malice, Chapter 6). After they were unable to find him, Postal called the police (ibid). One important detail which Myers never mentions in his book is that Brewer told author Ian Griggs during an interview in 1996 that when he allegedly observed Oswald standing outside his store, there were two men from IBM in the store with him (Griggs, No Case to Answer, page 58). According to researcher Lee Farley, one of the two so-called “IBM men” was quite possibly Igor Vaganov (see the thread entitled Igor Vaganov on John Simkin’s education forum). This reviewer believes that Vaganov was likely one of the two “IBM” men in the store, and that the purpose of these two men was to alert Brewer that they had seen a man enter the theater with a gun looking like he was trying to hide from the police, so that Brewer would then alert the theater staff to call the DPD in order for Oswald to be arrested.

    Readers should keep in mind that when Warren Commission counsel David Belin asked Brewer how he found out about President Kennedy’s assassination, he testified that; “We were listening to a transistor radio there in the store…” (WC Volume VII, page 2). Belin however, didn’t both to ask Brewer who was in the store with him. Although Postal and Brewer were the two people who purportedly led the DPD to the Theater, the DPD never bothered to take affidavits from them on the day of the assassination. In fact, Postal and Brewer provided their affidavits to the DPD on December 4 and 6, 1963, respectively (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Items 16 and 21). On the other hand, George Applin, who witnessed Oswald’s arrest inside the Texas Theater, provided the DPD an affidavit on the day of the assassination (Ibid, Folder 2, Item 3). Similarly, many of the people who witnessed the President’s assassination provided affidavits on the day of the assassination. Yet, incredibly, Postal and Brewer provided affidavits to the DPD over a week following the assassination. Curiously, there doesn’t appear to be an affidavit from Warren “Butch” Burroughs amongst the Dallas Municipal archives. Furthermore, according to both Warren Burroughs and a theater patron named Jack Davis, Oswald may have been inside the theater much sooner than when Brewer allegedly saw him outside his store at about 1:36 pm looking “funny/scared”

    After the police arrived at the Theater, the first Officer to approach Oswald as he was sitting down was Nick McDonald. Although Johnny Brewer was credited with pointing Oswald out to the DPD Officers inside the theater, Myers writes in his endnotes that the Dallas Morning News and the Dallas Times Herald published an article two days after the assassination, in which McDonald was quoted as saying; “A man sitting near the front, and I still don’t know who it was, tipped me [that] the man I wanted was sitting on the third row from the rear on the ground floor and not the balcony.” However, Brewer testified that he pointed Oswald out to the officers as he was standing on the stage of the theater (WC Volume VII, page 6) If McDonald’s account is true, then the obvious implication is that Brewer wasn’t the man who pointed Oswald out to the police. Myers evidently wants his readers to believe that the man was in fact Johnny Brewer, but doesn’t mention that Brewer was standing on the stage when he allegedly pointed Oswald out to the Officers.

    When Officer McDonald testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed he ordered Oswald to stand up, after which Oswald raised both of his hands and then allegedly yelled out “Well, it is all over now” (WC Volume III, page 300). Although McDonald also wrote in his arrest report to DPD Chief Jesse Curry that Oswald said “Well, it’s all over now”, this is not what McDonald initially claimed Oswald had said to him (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 32). When McDonald was interviewed by WFAA-TV on the day following the assassination, he explained that Oswald said “This is it” (See the video). What’s most telling about the interview is that McDonald looks down to the table and sounds nervous (both of which are indications of lying) as he explains that Oswald said “This is it”. Myers doesn’t mention this discrepancy to his readers. Furthermore, when McDonald was interviewed by Lloyd Shearer, he told Shearer that he heard Oswald say “Now, it’s all over” (Oakland Tribune Parade, March 8, 1964). When Gerald Hill testified before the Warren Commission, he informed Counsel David Belin that he thought McDonald and Officer Thomas Hutson (who was also involved in Oswald’s arrest), said that they heard Oswald say “This is it”; but that he didn’t hear this himself (WC Volume VII, page 51). However, when Hutson was asked by Counsel David Belin if he remembered hearing Oswald say anything, Hutson said that he didn’t (WC Volume VII, page 32). It would therefore seem that Hill may have been embellishing.

    When Ian Griggs interviewed Johnny Brewer in 1996, Brewer told him that he heard Oswald shout out “It’s all over”; or words to that effect (Griggs, No Case to Answer, page 64). But when Brewer testified before the Warren Commission, Brewer merely claimed that he heard some hollering, and that he couldn’t make out exactly what Oswald said (WC Volume VII, page 6). Contained within the John Armstrong Baylor collection is an interview with a little known witness named David. According to David, he was with a friend named Bob in the theater when Oswald was arrested (John Armstrong Baylor collection, tab entitled: ‘David’). Evidently, David and Bob are the two young boys spotted by Officer Thomas Hutson sitting at the rear of the theater (WC Volume VII, page 31). David claimed that when McDonald approached Oswald and asked him to stand-up, the only thing he recalled Oswald saying was words similar to “All right”, and made no mention of him saying anything else The reader should bear in mind that there doesn’t appear to be any direct corroboration for the presence of Bob and David in the theater when Oswald was arrested. Yet, none of the above is even mentioned by Myers.

    In his report to Dallas Sheriff Bill Decker, Deputy Sheriff Buddy Walthers, who also allegedly witnessed Oswald’s arrest, wrote that the only thing he heard Oswald say was “It’s all over” (WC Volume XIX, Decker exhibit 5323). However, after reading through Walther’s report, it isn’t clear whether Walthers was saying Oswald said “it’s all over” before or after he was arrested; and as this reviewer will explain in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill, former Dallas deputy sheriffs Bill Courson and Roger Craig have disputed Walther’s claim that he was inside the theater when Oswald was arrested. Readers should keep in mind that none of the other officers involved in Oswald’s arrest, or theater patrons John Gibson and George Applin who witnessed his arrest, claimed they heard Oswald shout out either “This is it” or “Well, it’s all over now” as McDonald claimed.

    As Myers writes in his book, FBI agent Robert M. Barrett, who also witnessed Oswald’s arrest, claimed in the report he wrote out on the day of the assassination that Oswald shouted in a loud voice; “Kill all the sons of bitches!” (With Malice, Chapter 6). But what Myers doesn’t tell his readers is that no other witness to Oswald’s arrest said that they heard him shout out words similar to what Barrett claimed he did; and that Barrett was almost certainly lying. In conclusion, it is readily apparent that McDonald was lying when he claimed that Oswald said; “This is it” or “Well, it’s all over now”. It is utterly inconceivable that McDonald could have confused the expressions “This is it” with “Well, it’s all over now” as they sound nothing alike. But Myers cannot admit that McDonald (and Barrett for that matter) were lying; as their agenda is to convince researchers that Oswald was guilty of killing Tippit beyond any doubt. Readers are encouraged to read through this article on this reviewer’s blog, which further demonstrates that McDonald was a liar.

    We now come to the question of whether or not Oswald tried to shoot Officer McDonald after McDonald ordered him to stand up; and whether Oswald did in fact have a gun when he was arrested. Although Myers admits in his endnotes that McDonald told Eddie Barker from CBS that he prevented “Oswald’s” gun from firing when his hand was allegedly jammed between the primer of the gun and the hammer, he nevertheless omits that when detective Paul Bentley was interviewed by reporters on the day following the assassination, he claimed that he prevented it from firing! (WCE 2157). However, Bentley also claimed that “…we [evidently referring to McDonald] got a thumb or something in between the hammer and the firing pin so that it mashed the firing [of the gun]…” and that the hammer of the gun “just snapped slightly” (ibid). But despite being allegedly confused about who had prevented the gun from firing, Bentley then almost humorously said; “…my hand was across to prevent it from firing…we don’t know if it was my thumb, finger or hand. I got a bruised hand from it. I don’t know if it was the thumb or the finger.” (ibid). Even though a photograph taken inside the Texas theater shows Bentley standing to the right of Oswald as he is apparently being handcuffed, there is no corroboration from McDonald or anyone else that Bentley prevented the gun from firing as he described (see Gerald Hill Exhibit A). It is therefore probable that Bentley was lying.

    Myers writes in his endnotes that WFAA-TV cameraman, Tom Alyea, claimed that he had seen a bandaged wound on McDonald’s hand during a filmed interview, but that when Alyea wanted to film it, McDonald objected. Although this would seem to corroborate McDonald’s claim that his hand had been jammed between the hammer and the firing pin of the revolver, Alyea described it as looking like someone had jabbed an ice-pick into it. In other words, it didn’t appear as though it was caused by the hammer of a revolver. If McDonald already had this injury before the scuffle with Oswald, then perhaps this is what gave him the idea later on to claim that the hammer of the gun had struck the fleshy part of his hand. Also, given that McDonald made no mention of his hand preventing the gun from firing in either his report to DPD chief Jesse Curry or during his testimony before the Warren Commission, it is apparent he has a credibility problem. McDonald also testified that the four inch scar on his left cheek was made by “Oswald’s” revolver during the scuffle inside the theater (WC Volume III, page 300). However, according to FBI agent Robert M. Barrett, McDonald told him that the graze on his left cheek was caused by Oswald punching him in the face, and knocking him against the seat; and not by the gun (WCD 5, page 84). Myers does not mention this contradiction in his book.

    Although McDonald implies in his report to DPD Chief Jesse Curry that officers Ray Hawkins, Charles Walker, and Thomas Hutson were with him when Oswald allegedly pulled out the revolver from his belt, during his testimony before the Warren Commission, he claimed that he had already disarmed Oswald by the time the aforementioned Officers had arrived to assist him (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 32, WC Volume III, page 300). However, Hawkins, Walker, and Hutson all testified that Oswald had pulled the revolver out of his belt after they had arrived (WC Volume VII, pages 32, 39, and 94). Although McDonald took full credit for disarming Oswald, officer Hutson testified that McDonald and “somebody else” had taken the gun out of Oswald’s hand, but added that he “couldn’t say exactly” (ibid, page 32). Walker also testified that as several hands were on the gun, a detective “…reached over and pulled the gun away from everybody, pulled it away from everyone, best I can recall” (WC Volume VII, page 40). However, McDonald told the Warren Commission that after he had disarmed Oswald, he handed the gun to detective Bob Carroll (WC Volume III, page 301). When Carroll testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that he saw a gun pointing at him (towards the south aisle of the theater) and then grabbed it and jerked it away from whoever had it (WC Volume VII, page 20).

    Myers selectively quotes from the testimony of Officer Charles Walker before the Warren Commission, during which Walker claimed that after Oswald pulled the revolver from under his shirt, it was about waist high and pointed at about a forty-five degree angle (With Malice, Chapter 6). Walker also wrote in his report to Chief Curry that the gun was being waved around approximately waist high (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 47). Although Walker also testified that one the Officers had commanded Oswald to “let go of the gun”, to which Oswald allegedly responded “I can’t” (With Malice, Chapter 6). Whilst Myers has no problem using this claim by Walker, he nevertheless neglects to tell his readers that there is no corroboration for Walker’s claim; let alone that no officer is on record claiming that he had ordered Oswald to let go of the gun. Officer Hutson told the Warren Commission that Oswald was pointing the gun towards the theater screen when he allegedly heard the snap of the gun’s hammer, and that Oswald wasn’t aiming the gun at any Officer in particular (WC Volume VII, page 32). However, when McDonald was interviewed by Eddie Barker from CBS in 1964, he demonstrated to Barker that Oswald had allegedly aimed the gun at him (towards the south aisle of the theatre), and then the gun allegedly snapped as he and Oswald were down in the theater seats scuffling (See the footage).

    Hutson also testified that the only officer who could have come between the line of fire of the gun as it was allegedly aimed towards the screen was Ray Hawkins (ibid). Although Charles Walker testified that; “…Hawkins was in the general direction of the gun”, and that the gun was pointing slightly towards the theater screen, this is not what Hawkins claimed during his own testimony (WC Volume VII, page 39). Hawkins, who had approached Oswald and McDonald from the row of seats in front of them, testified that when the gun came out of Oswald’s belt “…it was pulled across to their right, or toward the south aisle of the theatre” and made no mention of the gun being aimed in the direction of the theater screen or towards him (WC Volume VII, page 94).

    When Johnny Brewer testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that he observed a gun in Oswald’s hand aimed “up in the air” (WC Volume VII, page 6). During his interview with Ian Griggs in 1996, he now claimed that Oswald was trying to shoot McDonald in the head (Griggs, No Case to Answer, page 64). Yet, none of the other witnesses and the arresting Officers, let alone Nick McDonald, claimed that this is what they had seen during the scuffle. Moreover, Brewer’s claim is directly contradicted by Charles Walker, who stated that the gun was pointed about waist high. In his report to Chief Curry, detective John B. Toney wrote that Oswald had a pistol in his right hand, with his right arm “pinioned” across McDonald’s left shoulder (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 43). It is also worth noting that Toney told author Larry Sneed many years later that he had seen a gun in “…someone’s hand over someone’s shoulder, and someone was holding the arm.” (Sneed, No More Silence, page 308). Not only do Toney’s remarks contradict what McDonald demonstrated to Eddie Barker in the aforementioned film footage, but none of Toney’s fellow officers offered corroboration for this claim.

    John Gibson, who was a witness to Oswald’s arrest, testified before the Warren Commission that as the DPD Officers walking along the aisles of the theatre, Oswald was standing in the aisle with a gun in his hand! (WC Volume VII, pages 71 and 72). When Counsel Joseph Ball asked him if any of the DPD Officers had a hold of it that time, Gibson testified that he didn’t believe so (ibid, page 72). Gibson’s account of what he allegedly witnessed is bizarre, for not one DPD Officer or any other witness claimed that Oswald was standing in the aisle with the gun in his hand as the Officers were walking along the aisles! Readers should keep in mind that the aforementioned self-proclaimed witness named David, claimed that Oswald pulled a gun, but didn’t see it until it was “taken away from him” It would therefore seem that David had merely assumed that Oswald pulled a gun, and as this reviewer will explain in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill, this was by all likelihood the case. As for Dallas deputy Sheriff Buddy Walthers, he wrote in his report to Sheriff Bill Decker that when he reached the scuffle with Oswald; “…I could see a gun on the floor with 2 or 3 hands on it…” (WC Volume XIX, Decker exhibit 5323). Walthers also wrote that he thought it was detective Bob Carroll who reached down to the floor and got the gun. But when Walthers testified before the Warren Commission, he was now “real sure” that it was Carroll who got the gun, and curiously left out that the gun was on the floor (WC Volume VII, pages 547 and 548).

    Let’s now look at the statements by witness George Jefferson Applin. In his first day affidavit to the DPD, he allegedly wrote that Oswald “…had his arm around the officer’s left shoulder and had a pistol in his hand” (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 2, Item 3). But in his affidavit to the USSS on December 1, 1963, Applin claimed that during the scuffle between Oswald and McDonald “…one of the two had a pistol in his right hand” (WCD 87, page 558). In other words, Applin was saying that he wasn’t sure who had a hold of the gun. In his interview with the FBI on December 16, 1963, Applin allegedly claimed that Oswald pulled out a gun and aimed it at McDonald’s head, and that he thought the gun was on McDonald’s shoulder when Oswald allegedly pulled the trigger (WCD 206, page 69). Aside from what Johnny Brewer told Ian Griggs in 1996, there is no corroboration for the claim that Oswald pointed the gun at McDonald’s head. By the same token, apart from what John Toney wrote in his report to DPD chief Jesse Curry and what he told author Larry Sneed, there is no corroboration from anyone, let alone from McDonald, that Oswald had placed the gun on McDonald’s shoulder. Therefore, the aforementioned statements Applin allegedly made to the FBI should be taken with a grain of salt.

    When Applin testified before the Warren Commission, he made no mention of seeing the gun on McDonald’s shoulder or that he had seen Oswald aim the gun at McDonald’s head. In fact, when Counsel Joseph Ball asked him who pulled out the revolver, Applin claimed; “I guess it was Oswald, because -for one reason, that he had on a short sleeve shirt, and I [had] seen a man’s arm that was connected to the gun.” (WC Volume VII, page 89). Although it isn’t clear, it seems that Applin thought that the man with the short sleeved shirt was the one who had the gun, and that he thought Oswald was wearing a short sleeved shirt. However, Oswald was arrested wearing a long sleeved shirt (WCE 150). Similarly, on the day of the assassination, McDonald was photographed wearing a long sleeved shirt as he was talking to Dallas Morning News reporter Jim Ewell. As far as Applin’s claim (in his first day affidavit) that he had seen Oswald with his arm around McDonald’s shoulder and with a gun in his hand is concerned, the reader should keep in mind that according to DPD Lt. E.L. Cunningham, the officer who took Applin’s affidavit was detective John Toney; the same John Toney who claimed that he had seen a gun in his Oswald’s hand with his right arm pinioned across McDonald’s left shoulder (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 15). Given the similarity between what Toney wrote in his report to Chief Curry and what Applin allegedly claimed in his affidavit, it is entirely conceivable that Toney altered what Applin actually told him.

    None of these many contradictions and inconsistencies between the statements by the aforementioned officers and witnesses is ever mentioned by Myers. Given the fact that he is a rabid advocate of Oswald’s guilt in the Tippit murder, Myers will probably dismiss all of the above contradictions and inconsistencies as being irrelevant. However, the truth is that no intellectually honest researcher would (or should) dismiss them as being irrelevant; and when they are taken in conjunction with all of the evidence discussed in this review that the DPD framed Oswald for Tippit’s murder, there is reason to believe that Oswald never had a revolver with him when he was arrested inside the theater. In a caption to one of the photographs taken outside the theater by Stuart Reed, as Oswald is being dragged towards a police car with his face covered by Charles Walker’s hat, Myers writes that detective Bob Carroll is holding onto Oswald’s revolver (With Malice, Chapter 6). Whilst the photograph does show Carroll holding onto a gun, his own statements rule out that this was “Oswald’s” revolver.

    In his report to DPD chief Jesse Curry, Carroll wrote that; “I grabbed the pistol and stuck it in my belt and then continued to assist in the subduing of Oswald” (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 12). When Carroll testified before the Warren Commission, he confirmed that; “…I saw a pistol pointing at me so I reached and grabbed the pistol and jerked the pistol away and stuck it in my belt and then I grabbed Oswald” (WC Volume VII, page 20). He further added that; “The first time I saw the weapon, it was pointed in my direction, and I reached and grabbed it and stuck it into my belt… At the time, I was assisting in the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald” (ibid, page 24). By omitting these statements from his book, Myers deceives his readers. In the report he wrote out on the day of the assassination, FBI agent Robert M. Barrett stated that; “One of the Officers took a .38 Calibre snub nose revolver out of Oswald’s right hand and handed it to detective [Bob] Carroll”. However, as discussed previously, Barrett lied when he wrote in his report that he heard Oswald yell in a loud voice “Kill all the sons of bitches”, and therefore, his claim that someone handed Carroll “Oswald’s” gun should be taken with a grain of salt (WCD 5, page 84).

    On a further note, the gun which Carroll was photographed holding outside of the theater appears to have a longer barrel than “Oswald’s” revolver, with what appears to be sunlight reflecting off of the barrel towards the muzzle end. As for whose gun Carroll was holding outside of the theater, this review will discuss this issue in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill. In that same essay, this reviewer will be arguing that Hill framed Oswald for Tippit’s murder after he (or possibly one of his co-conspirators from the DPD) obtained the revolver Oswald allegedly had in his possession when arrested from Tippit’s real murderer. The reader should keep in mind that theater patron Jack Davis, told author Jim Marrs that Oswald had first sat next to him, but then got up and sat next to another person. (Crossfire, p. 353) In fact, Davis told Marrs that he thought it was strange that Oswald would sit right next to him inside a big theater with many seats to choose from (ibid). Warren “Butch” Burroughs told Marrs that Oswald had also sat next to a pregnant lady. Oswald’s actions imply that he thought he was to contact someone inside the theatre. And as many researchers, such as Greg Parker have noted, when Oswald was arrested, he had in his possession a torn box top with the label “Cox’s Fort Worth” printed on it, and that Oswald may have been using this to identify himself to the person he thought he was to meet inside the theater (see thread entitled Neely St Questions on John Simkin’s education forum).

    On a further note, the DPD took a list of the names of all the witnesses inside the theater after Oswald was arrested, but the list is now nowhere to be found. And the only two patrons who were interviewed concerning what they witnessed were John Gibson and George Jefferson Applin (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 35). In this reviewer’s opinion, the reason the list was made to disappear was to conceal the identity of any would be conspirators inside the theater. Keep in mind that officer McDonald was quoted by the Dallas Morning News and the Dallas Times Herald as saying that a man sitting in the front row of the theater pointed Oswald out to him as the man he was seeking. It is also worth keeping in mind that George Applin testified that he had told a man sitting in the back row of the theater; “Buddy, you’d better move. There is a gun”, and that after doing so, the man calmly remained seated and didn’t budge (WC Volume VII, page 91). Given the man’s behaviour, the possibility exists that he too may have had some involvement in Oswald’s frame-up.

    Let’s now examine what Oswald allegedly said after he was removed from the theater, words which disinformation shills like David Von Pein have used against him. The five officers who took Oswald to DPD headquarters were Bob Carroll, Kenneth E. Lyon, Gerald Hill, Paul Bentley, and Charles T. Walker. Oswald was sitting in the rear seat, with Bentley sitting to his left and Walker sitting to his right. Myers quotes from K.E Lyon’s reports to DPD chief Jesse Curry in which he claimed that whilst en route to Police headquarters, Oswald admitted to carrying a gun inside the theater (With Malice, Chapter 6). Detective Bob Carroll made this same claim in his own report to Chief Curry (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 12). Myers also quotes from Charles Walker’s Warren Commission testimony, where he claimed that Oswald admitted to carrying a gun inside the theater (ibid). However, Walker didn’t mention this in his report to Chief Curry.

    When Paul Bentley was interviewed by WFAA-TV on the day following the assassination, he also claimed that Oswald admitted to carrying a gun inside the theater. Given all the evidence presented in this review for Oswald being framed for Tippit’s murder, these statements should not be considered credible. The reader should also bear in mind that when Gerald Hill was interviewed by reporters shortly following Oswald’s arrest, he made no mention of Oswald admitting to carrying a gun inside the theater (WCE 2160). In fact, Hill complained that Oswald “…wouldn’t even admit he pulled the trigger on the gun in the theatre” (ibid). When Hill was interviewed by Bob Whitten of KCRA radio on the day of the assassination, he again neglected to mention that Oswald admitted to carrying a gun inside the theater; even though he did claim that Oswald allegedly said “This is it” after Officer McDonald approached him, and that Oswald admitted to being a communist (WCD 1210).

    Myers also quotes from Charles Walker’s testimony before the Warren Commission, during which Walker claimed that after Oswald was told that he was suspected of killing Tippit, Oswald made the remarks; “I hear they burn for murder” and “Well, they say it only takes a second to die” (With Malice, Chapter 6). Although Gerald Hill testified that Oswald made a statement similar to “You only fry for that” or “You can fry for that”, Hill made no mention of this to reporters on the day of the assassination, or during his interview with Bob Whitten (WC Volume VII, page 58). In fact, Hill told Whitten that when they had questioned Oswald inside the car about Killing Tippit, Oswald allegedly made the remark; “I don’t have to tell you all anything”, and made no mention of Oswald saying what both he and Walker claimed he did when they testified before the Warren Commission (WCD 1210). Furthermore, Hill made no mention of Oswald saying the above when he was questioned by reporters on the day of the assassination, telling them instead that Oswald “…did not make any definite statement other than demanding to see a lawyer and demanding his rights…” (WCE 2160).

    When detective Paul Bentley was interviewed by reporters on the night of the assassination, he told them that after Oswald was arrested, he just said “This is it, it’s all over with now” (WCE 2157). Similarly, when Bentley was interviewed the following day by WFAA-TV, he stated that Oswald was advised in the car that he was being placed in jail for suspicion of murdering Tippit; but made no mention of Oswald saying what Walker and Hill told the Warren Commission he did. There was also no mention of these alleged comments by Oswald in the arrest reports by Carroll, Lyon, Hill, Bentley, and Walker to Chief Curry (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Items 4 , 12, 22, 28, and 47). During his testimony, Walker claimed that they never put the conversations they had with suspects in their reports to Chief Curry (WC Volume VII, page 42). However, the evidence discussed throughout this book suggests that Walker was deceptive.

    VII: A bird in the hand

    In this chapter, Myers discusses the events subsequent to Oswald’s arrival at DPD headquarters after his arrest. Myers writes that shorty following Oswald’s arrival at DPD headquarters, he was interrogated by detective Jim Leavelle; the homicide detective who was placed in charge of investigating Tippit’s murder (With Malice, Chapter 7). This is based on Myers’ interview with Leavelle, and was probably one of the most dishonest statements made in the book. When Leavelle testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that the first time he had ever sat in on an interrogation with Oswald was on Sunday morning, November 24, 1963 (WC Volume VII, page 268). In fact, when Counsel Joseph Ball asked Leavelle if he had ever spoken to Oswald before this interrogation, he stated; “No; I had never talked to him before”! (ibid) Leavelle then stated during his testimony that; “…the only time I had connections with Oswald was this Sunday morning [November 24, 1963]. I never had [the] occasion to talk with him at any time…” (ibid, page 269).

    There is also nothing in Leavelle’s own report to DPD chief Curry about him interrogating Oswald shorty following Oswald’s arrival at DPD headquarters on Friday (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 8, Items 1 and 2). Myers is undoubtedly aware that Leavelle testified that he didn’t speak to Oswald before Sunday, but chooses instead to deceive his readers. But let’s understand why Myers does this. It is evident throughout his book that Myers’ agenda is to portray Oswald as the man who killed Tippit, and that the DPD did not frame him for Tippit’s murder. Since Leavelle was the homicide detective put in charge of investigating Tippit’s murder, the last thing Myers would want to admit is that Leavelle was unreliable, or an outright liar. It should also come as no surprise that Myers cannot tell the truth about Leavelle, as he is not even capable of telling readers the truth about where Howard Brennan was sitting when he allegedly witnessed Oswald firing his rifle at the President. Whilst Myers never questions Leavelle’s integrity as a DPD Officer, the reader should keep in mind that when author Joseph McBride interviewed Leavelle, Leavelle told him that the President’s assassination was no different than a South Texas “nigger” killing (McBride, Into the Nightmare, page 240). This remark reveals that Leavelle was a racist who was not really concerned about who killed President Kennedy.

    Myers also deceives his readers by omitting that DPD detectives, Gus Rose and Richard Stovall, wrote in their report to Chief Curry that they had briefly spoken to Oswald after he had been brought into the homicide Office (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 1, Item 3). Rose and Stovall confirmed that they had briefly spoken to Oswald shortly following his arrival, when they testified before the Warren Commission (WC Volume VII, pages 187 and 228). In his report to Chief Curry, Lt. T.L. Baker wrote that Oswald was brought into the interrogation room, from where he was “being held” by detectives Rose and Stovall, and made no mention of Leavelle having interrogated Oswald (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 5, Folder 5, Item 4). Suffice it to say, this reviewer knows of no reason to believe that Leavelle had interrogated Oswald shortly following his arrival at DPD headquarters.

    Myers explains that following Oswald’s arrest, Lt. Colonel Robert E. Jones of the U.S. Army’s 112th Military intelligence group (MIG) learned that a man named A.J Hidell “…had been arrested or come to the attention of law enforcement agencies.” (With Malice, Chapter 7). Myers writes that colonel Jones checked the MIG indices and discovered that there was an index on Hidell which “cross-referenced” with a file on Oswald; who allegedly used the name Alek James Hidell as an alias (ibid). Jones then allegedly pulled the file on Hidell, and notified the San Antonio FBI Office that he had some information (ibid). Colonel Jones testified before the HSCA that military intelligence officials had opened a file on Oswald after they allegedly received a report from the New Orleans Police department that Oswald had been arrested in connection with his activities associated with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (ibid). Whilst Myers apparently considers this to be the gospel truth, Australian researcher Greg Parker has pointed out that Mrs. Marcelle Madden, who worked for the identification division of the New Orleans Police department, informed the FBI agent John Quigley on November 26, 1963, that she had no identification record for a man named Alek James Hidell (Reopen Kennedy case forum, thread entitled Hidell: The frame was bold and ruthless). Although Myers doesn’t mention this to his readers, he does explain in his endnotes that Army intelligence “routinely” destroyed Oswald’s file.

    Myers then moves onto a discussion of DPD Captain Will Fritz, in which he praises Fritz’s legacy as the long-time Captain of the DPD’s Homicide and Robbery bureau. Myers writes that Fritz ran his department “with an iron fist”, and that under his command, the homicide bureau had a 90% success rate at solving murders (With Malice, Chapter 7). What Myers doesn’t mention to his readers is the horrible legacy of the DPD with Henry Wade as the district attorney of Dallas and Fritz as the department chief (as discussed previously). Myers also writes that; “For Captain Fritz, modern technology had no place in his squad room. A calm, disarming manner was his weapon.” (ibid). Evidently, this is Myers’ explanation for why Fritz never tape recorded any of his interrogations with Oswald. As the man who was charged with murdering the President of the United States of America, Fritz; along with the FBI and USSS agents who interrogated Oswald, should have tape recorded the answers Oswald gave to the various questions he was allegedly asked. There is simply no excuse for why the interviews were not tape recorded. Instead, researchers must rely on the typed summary reports by the interrogators, and their testimonies before the Warren Commission. Naturally, Myers doesn’t point this out to his readers.

    In his discussion of the credibility of Helen Markham as an eyewitness to Tippit’s murder, Myers admits that her statements are “…laced with inaccurate and inconsistent details” but omits other pieces of evidence which cast doubt on Markham’s reliability as a witness (ibid). For one thing, Myers writes that when Markham testified before the Warren Commission, she identified Oswald as the number two man in the line-up; but omits that Warren Commission Counsel Joseph Ball had asked her the following leading question during her testimony; “Was there a number two man in their [the line-up]” (WC Volume III, page 310). Ball asked Markham this question after she claimed that she didn’t recognise the men in the line-up from their faces, and had never seen any of them before. But after he asks her this question, she now testifies that she recognised Oswald “Mostly from his face.” (ibid, page 311). Markham also testified that she thought Ball wanted her to describe their clothing, which is allegedly why Markham claimed that she hadn’t previously seen any of the men in the line-up; even though he had not yet asked her that question! (ibid). It is obvious from reading Markham’s testimony that she was an unreliable witness. In fact, during a debate with Mark Lane, Joseph Ball once famously remarked that he thought Markham was “an utter screwball”. Myers does not note this to his readers.

    Myers also omits that when Markham was interviewed by FBI agent Bardwell Odum on the day of the assassination, she told him that the killer was about 18 years old, with black hair, and had a red complexion (WCD 5, page 79). However, Markham denied during her testimony before the Warren Commission that she told Odum the killer had a ruddy complexion. But despite her denial, during a filmed interview for the program The Men who Killed Kennedy, Markham explained that the killer had a ruddy (red) complexion (View Markham’s interview). Curiously, when Domingo Benavides testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that the killer’s skin looked “…a little bit ruddier than mine” (WC Volume VI, page 451). He also testified that the killer’s complexion was “…a little bit darker than average” (ibid). Yet, Oswald’s complexion did not appear to be ruddy/red or what can be described (in this reviewer’s opinion) as a little bit darker than average. The reader should also keep in mind that when Julia Postal testified before the Warren Commission, she claimed that the man who ducked into the theater looked ruddy to her (WC Volume VII, page 11). As Myers writes in his endnotes, Bernard Haire, the owner of Bernie’s hobby house which was located a few doors east of the Texas Theater, claimed he saw a man with a “flushed” appearance. This raises the distinct possibility that the man Haire saw was the same man Julia Postal observed ducking into the theatre. This reviewer will elaborate on this in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill.

    Myers also takes a swipe at Mark Lane for (what he calls) badgering Helen Markham by asking her three times if she had ever told anybody that Tippit’s killer was short/stocky and had bushy hair (With Malice, Chapter 7). But at the same time, Myers apparently has no qualms about Warren Commission counsel David Belin repeatedly asking Virginia Davis if her sister-in-law, Barbara Davis, had telephoned the DPD before or after they had seen Tippit’s killer cut across their lawn (WC Volume VII, pages 455 to 468). Myers also never mentions that in the aforementioned film interview for The Men who Killed Kennedy program, Markham claimed that the killer was “a short guy”.

    Following his discussion of Markham, Myers moves on to a discussion of the identification of Oswald as Tippit’s killer in a line-up viewed by Ted Callaway and Sam Guinyard. Myers considers Callaway to be a reliable witness, writing that; “Ted Callaway has been one of the few Tippit witnesses whose story has remained accurate and unwavering for more than thirty-three years.” (With Malice, Chapter 8). Myers can pretend that Callaway is a reliable witness because he never notes the contradictions between the observations of Callaway and Guinyard, both of whom allegedly observed the killer fleeing south on Patton Street after Tippit was shot. At the time of the assassination, Callaway was the manager of the Harris Bros Auto sales at 501 East Jefferson Blvd, located on the northeast corner of the Patton Street/Jefferson Blvd. intersection (WC Volume III, page 352).

    Sam Guinyard testified that he worked there as a porter, and was polishing a car when he heard the shooting (WC Volume VII, page 395). According to Callaway’s testimony, Tippit’s killer crossed from the east side of Patton Street over to the west side of the street at a point just south of where William Scoggins cab was parked when Scoggins witnessed the shooting (Callaway marked this on WCE 537). In Chapter four of his book, Myers illustrates the killer’s flight path, along with the locations of Callaway and Guinyard when they allegedly saw him walking south on Patton Street; and the location of a third man named B.D. Searcy, who according to Callaway, was standing behind him when Tippit’s killer went by them (WC Volume III, page 354). Evidently, Myers based the killer’s flight path on WCE 735.

    According to Myers’ illustration, the killer had already crossed over to the west side of Patton Street when he went passed Sam Guinyard’s position. However, Guinyard testified that when he observed the gunman, he was on the east side of Patton Street, and he was about ten feet away from him when he observed him! (WC Volume VII, page 398). Guinyard further explained that the killer crossed over to the west side of Patton Street when he got to about five feet from the corner of the intersection of Patton Street and Jefferson Blvd. (ibid, page 397). Yet, Callaway testified, and illustrated on WCE 735, that the killer was already on the west side of Patton Street when he went by him (WC Volume III, page 353). Obviously, both men can not be correct.

    Callaway testified that he hollered at the gunman; “Hey man, what the hell is going on”, after which the gunman turned to look at him, shrugging his shoulders, and said something to him which Callaway claimed he couldn’t understand (ibid, pages 353 and 354). Callaway stated that he then told B.D. Searcy to keep an eye on the gunman and to follow him, after which he ran to the Tippit murder scene (ibid, page 354). On the contrary, Guinyard testified that it was Callaway who followed the gunman; “…trying to see which way he was going”, after which they allegedly went to the Tippit murder scene together (WC Volume VII, page 398). Furthermore, Guinyard made no mention of Callaway hollering at the killer, and the killer looking at Callaway and then saying something to him. When counsel Joseph Ball showed Guinyard the dark brown shirt Oswald was wearing when he was arrested at the Texas theatre, he testified that he saw Oswald wearing it as he came down Patton Street (ibid, page 400). Callaway on the other hand, testified that he couldn’t see this shirt! (WC Volume III, page 356). When Counsel Joseph Ball asked Guinyard if all the men in the line-up were about the same color, Guinyard exclaimed twice that; “…they wasn’t all about the same color.” (WC Volume VII, page 399). However, Oswald and the three men who were with him in the line-up; DPD detective Richard Clark, DPD detective William Perry, and DPD jail clerk Don Ables, were all Caucasians (see WCE 1054). If one is to believe that Guinyard’s eye sight was such that he was able to observe small differences in the skin tones of the four men in the line-up, one must simultaneously ignore all of the above contradictions between Callaway’s observations and his own.

    None of the above contradictions between the observations of Callaway and Guinyard, which raises serious questions about their credibility as witnesses, (and if they actually viewed Oswald in a line-up), are ever mentioned by Myers. Although the line-up allegedly seen by Callaway and Guinyard was conducted at approximately 6:30 pm on the night of the assassination, when Callaway was interviewed by FBI agent Arthur E. Carter on February 23, 1964, he told Carter that he recalled the line-up was conducted on the night after Tippit’s murder (WCD 735, page 262). In other words, Callaway was implying that the line-up was held on the night of November 23, 1963. However, Callaway would go on to testify that it was held on the night of the assassination. The reader should also bear in mind that when Domingo Benavides testified before the Warren Commission, he explained that after Callaway had gotten into William Scoggins cab to look for the killer with Scoggins, he asked him (Benavides) which way the killer went, but found out later on from Callaway that he did see the killer (WC Volume VI, page 452). If Callaway really did see the killer, he obviously had no reason to ask Benavides which way the killer went. Therefore, Benavides testimony strongly implies that Callaway never actually saw Tippit’s killer.

    Although Myers acknowledges in his endnotes that Benavides testified that Callaway asked him which way the killer went, he then uses Callaway and Jim Leavelle to discredit Benavides as a witness. According to Myers, during an interview in 1996, Callaway told him that Benavides confided to him that he didn’t actually see the gunman as he told the Warren Commission that he had (With Malice, Chapter 7). Myers also quotes from Jim Leavelle’s testimony where Leavelle claimed that; “I think he [Benavides] said he never saw the gunman actually…either that or he [Benavides] told me he could not recognise him, one or the other.” (ibid). Readers should also keep in mind that in his supplementary report on Tippit’s murder (evidently written on the day of the assassination), Leavelle wrote that Benavides didn’t see the killer (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 1, Folder 4, Item 3). Myers can pretend that Callaway and Leavelle are both trustworthy on this issue, because he never explains to his readers the serious credibility issues of both of these men It is apparent to this reviewer that Myers wants to discredit Benavides because he wants to maintain that both Callaway and Leavelle are credible witnesses.

    There are some issues with Benavides own credibility as a witness. For one thing, when Benavides testified before the Warren Commission, Counsel David Belin asked him if WCE 163 (the dark greyish blue jacket which Oswald allegedly wore to the TSBD on the morning of the assassination) was the jacket Tippit’s killer was wearing. To which Benavides responded; “I would say this looks just like it.” (WC Volume VI, page 453). However, Benavides had previously testified that the killer was wearing what appeared to be a light-beige jacket (ibid, page 450). In this reviewer’s opinion, Benavides could conceivably have mistaken the light gray jacket which the killer was wearing (WCE 162) as being a light beige color. Furthermore, the possibility that Belin was misquoted by the court reporter when he allegedly asked Benavides if WCE 163 was the jacket the killer was wearing cannot be ruled out.

    Benavides is also known for taking credit for notifying the DPD radio dispatchers that Tippit had been shot, when in fact it was T.F. Bowley who notified the dispatchers. Although this may seem as if Benavides lied to put himself in the spotlight, the fact is that T.F. Bowley was never called to testify before the Warren Commission. Many researchers, including myself, believe Bowley was avoided because according to his affidavit to the DPD, it was about 1:10 pm when he reported the shooting over the DPD radio; which was much too soon for the “official” time at which Tippit was shot (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 14). Therefore, it seems likely that Benavides was coerced into taking credit for reporting the shooting over the radio. Although Benavides never positively identified Oswald as Tippit’s killer when he testified, he nevertheless claimed the killer looked like Oswald (WC Volume VI, page 452).

    Although it is this reviewer’s belief that Ted Callaway and Sam Guinyard never actually observed Tippit’s killer, there is one mystery concerning Callaway that remains. According to the DPD radio transcripts, Officer Howell W. Summers reports that he has an “…eyeball witness to the get-away man; that suspect in this shooting.” (WCE 705/1974). Summers then broadcasted the description of the suspect given to him by the witness over the radio. Although Myers claims that this witness was Ted Callaway, the distinct possibility exists that the witness was in fact B.D. Searcy, who worked at Harris Bros Auto Sales (WCD 735, page 261). Searcy is somewhat of an enigma, as there doesn’t appear to be any FBI and USSS interviews with him, and there also doesn’t appear to be an affidavit by Searcy to the DPD on what he heard and saw. Even though Ted Callaway told the FBI that both he and Searcy were standing on the front porch of the car lot, and even though Callaway was photographed standing on the front porch, there are no photographs depicting Searcy standing on the front porch (ibid, WCD 630, page 38). It is this reviewer’s opinion that Searcy was avoided because, unlike Callaway and Guinyard, he refused to be coaxed into identifying Oswald as Tippit’s killer. The reader should also bear in mind that even though Guinyard identified Oswald as the killer, there doesn’t appear to be an interview of him by the FBI and the USSS, and there doesn’t appear to be any photographs by the FBI showing where Guinyard was standing when he allegedly observed Oswald (WCD 630).

    Following his discussion of the identification of Oswald as Tippit’s killer by Callaway and Guinyard, Myers now moves onto the Davis sister-in-laws, Barbara and Virginia. Both of them allegedly identified Oswald as the killer in a DPD line-up on the evening of the assassination (With Malice, Chapter 7). The Davis sister-in-laws allegedly witnessed Tippit’s killer cut across the lawn of their apartment house, located on the southeast corner of the tenth and Patton Street intersection; emptying shells from the revolver as he did so. Myers writes that some critics have questioned the powers of observation of the two women because Barbara Davis testified before the Warren Commission that she observed the killer wearing a dark coat; even though he was actually wearing a light gray jacket (With Malice, Chapter 7). What Myers omits is that when counsel Joseph Ball asked her if Oswald was dressed the same in the police line-up as he was when she allegedly observed him after Tippit was shot, she replied; “All except he didn’t have a black coat on when I saw him in the line-up” (WC Volume III, page 347). In other words, Davis claimed that Tippit’s killer was wearing a black coat. It is incomprehensible to this reviewer that she could have mistaken or misremembered the light gray jacket (WCE 162) to be a black coat; and when she was shown the light gray jacket during her testimony, she refused to identify it (ibid). Contrary to what Myers wants us to believe, Davis’s testimony that the killer was wearing a black coat raises serious doubts about her credibility as a witness.

    Although Barbara and Virginia Davis allegedly observed the gunman together, they contradicted each other on a number of points. Barbara Davis testified that she called the DPD after the killer had gone out of sight (ibid, page 345). On the other hand, Virginia Davis was confused during her testimony as to whether Barbara called the DPD before or after they had seen the killer. Although Myers acknowledges this in his book, he nevertheless omits several other contradictions between their observations and recollections (With Malice, Chapter 7). For one thing, Barbara Davis testified she was standing on the front porch when the killer went by, whereas Virginia Davis testified that they both observed the killer through the front screen door; only to later on acknowledge that they were standing on the front porch when they saw the killer, just as she claimed in her affidavit to the USSS on December 1, 1963 (WCD 87, page 555). In that same affidavit she claimed that the killer was holding the gun in his left hand and unloading it into his right, and that she was lying down in bed with Barbara and her two children when she heard the shots (ibid).

    However, when she testified before the Warren Commission, she now claimed that the killer was holding the gun in his right hand and unloading it into his left, and that she was actually lying down on the couch when she heard the shots. Barbara Davis testified that she saw the killer cut across the middle of the yard of their apartment house, and illustrated this on WCE 534 (WC Volume III, page 344). However, Virginia Davis testified that the killer cut across the yard only about three feet from the sidewalk on Tenth Street (WC Volume VI, page 458).

    As far as the identification of Oswald in the line-up is concerned, Virginia Davis testified that she was the first to identify Oswald as the killer, and also testified that there were five men in the line-up; when in actual fact there were only four in total (WC Volume VI, page 462). However, when Barbara Davis testified, she took credit for being the first to identify Oswald as the killer (WC Volume III, page 350). Virginia Davis also testified that she went to the DPD to identify Oswald “…probably about 5:30”, which is ridiculous since according to the DPD, the line-up she and her sister-in-law allegedly viewed was conducted at approximately 7:55 pm (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 5, Folder 5, Item 4). Although Warren Commission defenders might argue that the contradictions between the two women’s recollections was due to one or both of them being nervous when they testified, the fact remains that all of the above raises doubts that they had seen the killer; or that they even viewed Oswald in a line-up, as both they and the DPD claimed. Myers actually writes in his book that Virginia Davis told him during an interview in 1997 that she was nervous when she testified before the Warren Commission (With Malice, Chapter 9)

    There is yet another piece of evidence which casts serious doubt on the credibility of the Davis sister-in-laws. Contained within the list of contacts for Jack Ruby is the name Leona Miller, with the telephone number WH3 – 8120 (WCD 717, page 6). When Barbara and Virginia Davis gave their affidavits to the DPD (allegedly on the day of the assassination), they listed their phone number as WH3 – 8120 (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Items 20 and 22). Myers acknowledges this fact in his book, but dismisses its significance by writing that; “…apart from the phone number, there is no known connection between Leona Miller, Barbara Jeannette and Virginia Davis, and Jack Ruby.” (With Malice, Chapter 9). Contrary to what Myers would like us to believe, the fact that the phone number of two witnesses who contradicted each other on their observations of Tippit’s killer (despite both of them being certain that Oswald was the killer), and the fact that Barbara Davis believed that Tippit’s killer was wearing a black coat, raises the distinct possibility that the Davis sister-in-laws were ersatz witnesses used to implicate Oswald as Tippit’s killer. According to the testimony of Curtis Laverne Crafard (a.k.a Larry Crafard), Miller was apparently a girl who had phoned Ruby seeking employment at the Carousel club as a waitress (testimony of Curtis Laverne Crafard, WC Volume XIV).

    Curiously, there was a Leona Miller (married name Leona Lane) with whom Ruby was acquainted (WCD 1121, page 35). However, it is not known whether Miller (Lane) ever lived at the address the Davis sister-in-laws were living at when they allegedly observed Tippit’s killer. In my upcoming essay on Gerald Hill, this reviewer presents evidence that Tippit’s killer could in fact be Larry Crafard; which gives credence to the possibility that the Davis sister-in-laws were fake witnesses used to implicate Oswald. Though, truth be told, there is absolutely no solid connection between Jack Ruby, Larry Crafard, and the Davis sister-in-laws.

    On the day following Tippit’s murder, cab driver William W. Scoggins, along with cab driver William W. Whaley, were brought to the DPD to view Oswald in a line-up (With Malice, Chapter 7). Myers’ book contains a photograph by Jack Beers showing what he claims to be Scoggins and Whaley leaving the DPD homicide office to view the line-up (ibid). Scoggins told the Warren Commission that as the killer went past his cab, the killer looked back over his left shoulder, and that; “It seemed like I could see his face, his features and everything plain, you see.” (WC Volume III, page 327). Although Scoggins testified before the Warren Commission that he identified Oswald as Tippit’s killer in the line-up, he doesn’t mention this in his affidavit to the DPD on November 23, 1963 (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Item 24). Myers doesn’t mention this to his readers. Myers also doesn’t mention that although DPD Lt. T.L. Baker wrote in his report to Chief Curry that Scoggins positively identified Oswald as Tippit’s killer in the line-up, detectives Marvin Johnson and L.D. Montgomery made no mention of this in their own reports to chief Curry. In fact, neither Johnson nor Montgomery mention in their reports that Scoggins viewed a line-up of Oswald (Dallas Municipal archives Box 5, Folder 5, Items 4, 26, 28, and 35).

    Although Myers admits that Scoggins told the Warren Commission that he had seen Oswald’s picture in the newspaper before he allegedly identified Oswald in the line-up as Tippit’s killer, he nevertheless omits that when Scoggins was reinterviewed by the FBI on November 25, 1963, he claimed that after viewing a photograph of Oswald, he was not certain that the man he observed fleeing from the Tippit murder scene was actually Oswald (WCD 5, page 77). The reader should bear in mind that when Scoggins testified, he claimed that some of the photos of Oswald shown to him by the FBI/USSS didn’t resemble Oswald, and that he may have picked the wrong photo (WC Volume III, page 335). However, according to his aforementioned interview with the FBI, Scoggins was only shown one photograph. Therefore, Scoggins was either lying, mistaken, or was actually referring to another interview.

    Scoggins also testified that he overheard William Whaley telling one (or more) of the cab drivers at the Oak Cliff cab company, for whom they were both employed, that he picked Oswald up at the Greyhound bus station, and then dropped him off at the 500 block of Beckley avenue in Oak Cliff (ibid, page 340). However, as researcher Lee Farley has demonstrated, Whaley did not give Oswald a ride to Oak Cliff in his cab, and that Scoggins was lying (see the thread entitled Oswald and cab 36 on John Simkin’s Spartacus education forum). It is also worth keeping in mind that despite hearing Tippit’s killer mumble either “Poor dumb cop” or “Poor damn cop” as he went by his cab, Scoggins never claimed that the killer’s voice was identical to Oswald’s (ibid, page 327), (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Item 24). Finally, perhaps it’s also worth keeping in mind that even though Scoggins testified that he was “kind of crouched” behind his cab; and observed the killer through the windows of his cab, in his affidavit to the USSS on December 2, 1963, he claimed that he saw the killer after he (Scoggins) ran to the west side of Patton Street, opposite to his cab (WCD 87, page 553). In conclusion, much like Ted Callaway, Sam Guinyard, and the Davis sister-in-laws, William Scoggins is a witness whose credibility has question marks around it. Not that it matters to Myers.

    Many conspiracy advocates, past and present, have claimed that the Oswald line-ups were unfair. Although this reviewer shares that opinion, once it has been established that the witnesses were unreliable, and by implication, coaxed by the DPD to identify Oswald as the killer in the line-ups, the issue of whether the line-ups were fair or unfair becomes irrelevant. The contradictions between the alleged observations of Ted Callaway and Sam Guinyard are perhaps the best indication that witnesses were coaxed by the DPD to identify Oswald as Tippit’s killer, and once it is accepted that one or two witnesses were coaxed to identify Oswald as the killer, then logically, every eyewitness identification of Oswald as the killer in the DPD line-ups must be considered suspect. If Oswald was framed for Tippit’s murder by those responsible for the President’s assassination, then it only makes perfect sense that Tippit’s killer resembled Oswald, as they certainly would want any witness who saw the killer to think that it was Oswald.

    Towards the end of this Chapter, Myers discusses the paraffin tests used by the DPD to determine whether or not Oswald had fired a gun on the day of the assassination. Myers writes that; “…the lab report on the paraffin cast from Oswald’s right hand showed that the nitrate traces were not only positive, but ‘typical of the patterns produced in firing a revolver’. Such a finding suggests that, in this case, the presence of nitrates was the direct result of firing a handgun, and not due to the handling of some unknown nitrate-laced product.” (With Malice, Chapter 7). However, once again, Myers deceives his readers. For one thing, although he prints a sketch of the nitrates on Oswald’s right hand, he never explains that most of the nitrates were found on the palm side of the hand, and not on the back side of the hand where the nitrates from the revolver would have been deposited. Myers also omits that the FBI’s agent John Gallagher, who worked in the FBI’s laboratory in the physics and chemistry section, testified that; “No characteristic elements were found by neutron activation analysis of the residues which could be used to distinguish the rifle from the revolver cartridges.” (WC Volume XV, page 748 ). This further undermines the “finding” that the nitrate traces on the paraffin cast of Oswald’s hand are typical of the patterns produced by firing a revolver.

    In his discussion of the paraffin test, Myers also writes that the chemicals used in processing the nitrates will also react to nitrates found in urine, tobacco, cosmetics, kitchen matches, fertilizers and many other common items (ibid). Although Myers believes the paraffin tests applied to Oswald’s hands were valid, he never mentions that according to the report by DPD detectives Elmer Boyd and Richard Sims to Chief Curry, Sgt. W.E. “Pete” Barnes and detective John Hicks of the DPD crime lab applied the paraffin test to Oswald’s hands after Hicks had taken fingerprints from him! (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 4, Item 5). This was confirmed by Lt. T.L. Baker in his own report (ibid, Box 5, Folder 5, Item 4). Now if this true, it casts serious doubt on the validity of the tests, as Oswald’s hands would have been contaminated from the fingerprint ink, and washed afterwards to remove all ink. When Sgt. Barnes testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that that he took palm prints from Oswald’s hands immediately before applying the paraffin test; only to quickly correct himself stating that it was done immediately after the paraffin test (WC Volume VII, page 284). However, Barnes’ correction should not be taken seriously, as evidence discussed below demonstrates that Barnes is not a credible witness. Readers should also keep in mind that when counsel David Belin asked Barnes during his testimony “Suppose I were to wash my hands between the time I fired it [WCE 143] and the time you took the paraffin test?”, Barnes claimed that this would “hurt the test” (WC Volume VII, page 280).

    In spite of all of his deceptions, Myers then has the audacity to write the following; “Every aspect of Tippit’s murder became the focus of relentless – and often unfair – criticism.”, adding that “Some doubters [critics] sought to exonerate Oswald of Tippit’s death by challenging the eyewitness accounts” (With Malice, Chapter 7). Yes, Dale. Shame on those of us who, unlike you, actually want to honestly point out the contradictions between the eyewitness accounts which raise serious doubts about their credibility. Suffice it to say, the readers can judge for themselves whether or not I have made unfair criticisms of the witnesses.


    Go to Part Two

  • James DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland


    When I first heard that Jim DiEugenio would be turning his ten part review of Vincent Bugliosi’s overblown tome, Reclaiming History, into a book, I was happy to endorse him. Ever since I first discovered DiEugenio’s website CTKA.net, I knew that he was a devoted and honest researcher. Prior to his writing Reclaiming Parkland, DiEugenio completely rewrote the first edition of his 1992 book, Destiny Betrayed. In this reviewer’s opinion, Destiny Betrayed (the second edition) was an exceptionally well written and sourced book. This reviewer can honestly state that after reading Reclaiming Parkland, it is in the same league with DiEugenio’s previous book. However, Reclaiming Parkland. isn’t just a review of Bugliosi’s book. The book is divided into three sections. In section one, the author discusses Bugliosi’s past, from his childhood and career as assistant district attorney of Los Angeles County, to his participation in the utterly shoddy mock trial of Oswald in London. Section two of the book is the author’s very long review of Reclaiming History. In section three of the book, the author mainly discusses the failure of Hollywood heavyweight, Tom Hanks as a true historian, and how much influence the CIA and the Pentagon have today on how Hollywood produces films, and therefore what the American public sees on their movie and TV screens.

    Introduction

    The author begins his book by telling the reader that Bugliosi was once a subscriber to the excellent Probe magazine, which the author edited along with the esteemed Lisa Pease back in the nineties. The author then moves onto explaining how the mainstream media in the United States have praised Bugliosi’s book without reservation,or as the author put it directly in his book;

    Any book that supports the original Warren Commission verdict of Lee Harvey Oswald as the lone assassin of JFK is not going to be roundly criticized in the mainstream media (hereafter referred to as the MSM). (DiEugenio, Introduction).

    One such review which the author uses as an example to demonstrate this point is the review of Reclaiming History, in The Wall Street Journal by journalist Max Holland. As the author explains to the reader, Holland is a vehement defender of the Warren Commission’s conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin (ibid). Readers of this review may already be aware of the fact that DiEugenio provided a critical review of Holland’s deceptive documentary on the assassination, The Lost Bullet, on his website (read that review). The author reveals that in the year 2001, Holland became the first author outside of the Government to be given the Studies in Intelligence award by the CIA (ibid).

    On the issue of why he decided to write such a long review of Reclaiming History, the author more or less explains that it was because the negative reviews of the book which he had read were narrow in focus (ibid). In other words, the previous reviews were not based on the entire book. How the author could undertake such a feat, is in this reviewer’s opinion, is a testament to his commitment to exposing the lies and the omissions of facts. Traits which all too common amongst Warren Commission defenders.

    One of the most truly ridiculous claims that any researcher of the JFK assassination could make, is that the Kennedy murder is a simple case. Yet, this is precisely what Bugliosi told the author in an interview with him (ibid). To demonstrate the absurdity of this statement, the author provides several examples of complex issues pertaining to the assassination. The author begins by explaining how the seven investigations into the President’s murder, from 1963 to 1998, differed in opinions on various pieces of evidence, such as whether or not the single bullet theory was true, and how the Church Committee in the 1970’s came to the conclusion that the FBI and the CIA had withheld important documents from the Warren Commission (ibid). Although Bugliosi has nothing but scorn for the critics of the Warren Commission, he is on record for believing that Senator Robert Kennedy was the victim of a conspiracy. As the author writes, Bugliosi said the following during a civil trial of the RFK assassination:

    We are talking about a conspiracy to commit murder … a conspiracy the prodigious dimensions of which would make Watergate look like a one-roach marijuana case. (ibid).

    In the introduction to Reclaiming History, Bugliosi gave his readers the pledge that he would not knowingly omit or distort anything about President Kennedy’s assassination, and that he would set forth the arguments of the Warren Commission critics the way they would want them set forth, and not the way Bugliosi wanted (ibid). However, as DiEugenio demonstrates throughout his nine chapter long review of Reclaiming History, this was not the case. Not by a long shot. (The nine chapters include one which was excised.) The author concludes the introduction to his book by briefly explaining the purchase of the film rights to Reclaiming History. by the Tom Hanks and Gary Goetzman owned production company, Playtone (ibid). As mentioned previously, what the reader will learn by reading this book is that, contrary to what he likes to proclaim, Tom Hanks is not in any way a true historian.

    I: The prosecutor

    Aptly titled The Prosecutor, this first chapter explores Vincent Bugliosi’s career as assistant DA of Los Angeles County, where he shot to fame for his prosecution of Charles Manson and several of his followers for the August, 1969, Tate/LaBianca murders (ibid). The reader will also read about Bugliosi’s indictment for perjury following the Manson gang convictions, his two attempts to become the District attorney of Los Angeles County, and his run for the Attorney General of California. The Author begins the Chapter with the following quote by Bugliosi during an interview with Playboy magazine in 1997:

    “People say I’m an extremely opinionated person. If opinionated means that when I think I’m right I try to shove it down everyone’s throat, they are correct … As for arrogant, I am arrogant and I’ m kind of caustic … The great majority of people I deal with are hopelessly incompetent, so there’s an air of superiority about me.” (DiEugenio, Chapter 1).

    As anyone who reads Reclaiming Parkland. will understand, Bugliosi was being candid when he described himself as arrogant and extremely opinionated. After a brief introduction into Bugliosi’s childhood, family background, and service in the United States Army prior to joining the Los Angeles county District attorney’s office, the author moves onto a discussion of the two murder cases which helped bolster Bugliosi’s reputation as a prosecutor more than any others. The first case was the murder convictions of former Los Angeles Police Officer Paul Perveler and his girlfriend Kristina Cromwell. Bugliosi had successfully convicted them in February, 1969, for conspiring to murder Cromwell’s husband Marlin, and Perveler’s wife Cheryl (ibid).

    As most people who have heard of him are aware, Bugliosi co-authored the bestselling book Helter Skelter with Curt Gentry. The book was based on the murders of Sharon Tate, Jay Sebring, Abigail Folger, her boyfriend Victor Frykowski, Steve Parent, and Leno LaBianca and his wife, Rosemary. Bugliosi had successfully convicted Charles Manson and several of his followers, such as Tex Watson and Susan Atkins, for these horrific murders. Curiously, like Reclaiming History, Helter Skelter was published by W.W. Norton, and following its publication in 1974, it went on to become the number one best-selling true crime book to date (ibid).

    The author spends several pages in his book explaining why Bugliosi’s motive for the crimes is not supportable today. The author also spends several pages comparing Bugliosi’s views on the investigation of the Tate/LaBianca murders, to those of President Kennedy’s assassination. According to Bugliosi, the murders were inspired in part by Manson’s prediction of Helter Skelter, a so-called apocalyptic war which he allegedly believed would arise from tensions over racial relations between whites and blacks. However, as the author explains, the more likely motive for the murders was to get a friend of Manson’s named Bobby Beausoleil out of jail for murdering Gary Hinman in July, 1969 (ibid). Hinman was stabbed to death by Beausoleil, after Manson sliced Hinman’s ear due to a dispute over a bad batch of mescaline (ibid). As the author writes, Manson once actually said that the real motive for the murders was to get Beausoleil out of jail. This was confirmed by Susan Atkins (ibid). In fact, the Los Angeles Police had actually thought the Tate and LaBianca murders were copycat murders (ibid). All of this would seem to undermine Bugliosi’s motive for the crimes.

    The author also scores Bugliosi by showing how Bugliosi’s opinions on the investigations of the Tate/LaBianca murders contradict his opinions on the investigation of President Kennedy’s assassination. For one thing, Bugliosi spent many pages in Helter Skelter complaining about how the Los Angeles Police had initially failed to connect the Tate murders to the LaBianca murders; because of the similarity of the crimes. However, in Reclaiming History, Bugliosi refuses to acknowledge the similarities between the attempted plot to assassinate President Kennedy in Chicago, and his eventual assassination in Dallas (ibid). Bugliosi also complains in Helter Skelter about the length of time it took for the gun used by Tex Watson during the murders to arrive at the San Fernando Valley Police station, but doesn’t have any qualms about the Dallas Police departments delay in sending three of the four bullets removed from the body of J.D Tippit, to the FBI lab in Washington for ballistics tests.

    The author goes on to explain that following the prosecution of Tex Watson for the Tate/LaBianca murders, Bugliosi was indicted for perjury. This came about after someone leaked a transcript of Susan Atkins’ discussion about the murders with Virginia Graham, a fellow inmate of Atkins in the Sybil Brand jail (ibid). The transcript was leaked to Los Angeles Herald Examiner reporter, William Farr. Bugliosi was one of two lawyers involved in the Manson trials to be indicted for perjury, the other being Daye Shinn. Bugliosi’s assistant, Stephen Kay, testified at his perjury trial that William Farr had asked him (Kay) to hand Bugliosi a manila envelope (ibid). Kay had also testified that Farr was in Bugliosi’s office during the afternoon that Bugliosi accepted copies of Graham’s statement for storage, and that Bugliosi had threatened to remove him and a fellow assistant named Don Musich from the Tate/LaBianca cases, if either he or Musich asked for a hearing into the passing of the manila envelope between Farr and himself. (These proceedings had been covered by the LA Times in June and October of 1974. The reader can also read about this incident.)

    Then there’s Bugliosi’s two time campaign to become the DA of Los Angeles in 1972 and 1976, and his run for Attorney general of California in 1974 (ibid). As the author explains, all three campaigns were personal and rabid in nature. For instance, in his 1976 run for DA against John Van de Kamp, Bugliosi accused Van de Kamp of not prosecuting 7 out of 10 felony cases when he was District attorney; whereas in actual fact, Van De Kamp had the highest prosecution rate in the whole of California, at an 80% prosecution rate (ibid). Bugliosi also stated that Van De Kamp had never prosecuted a murderer or rapist. But in actual fact, Van De Kamp had successfully prosecuted two murder cases (ibid).

    If all of the above isn’t enough to convince the reader that Bugliosi has a tendency for hyperbole, then consider each of the following. Bugliosi had harassed his former milkman, Herbert H. Wiesel, after Bugliosi suspected him of having an affair with his wife (ibid). Bugliosi later broke into the home of a woman named Virginia Caldwell, who claimed that Bugliosi was having an affair with her, after Caldwell refused to have an abortion at Bugliosi’s request. After striking her, he then convinced Caldwell to concoct a cover story that the bruise on her face, was actually caused by her child hitting her with a baseball bat (See Fact Check Vincent Bugliosi).

    To my knowledge, no one has ever put all of these quite pertinent facts about Bugliosi into one place before.

    II: The Producers

    Following his long discussion of Bugliosi’s character, and his career as a prosecutor, the author moves onto a discussion of how Playtone producers Tom Hanks and Gary Goetzman, along with actor Bill Paxton, conceived the idea of turning Reclaiming History. into a television mini-series; which thankfully never came to fruition. Included in this chapter is a biography of Hanks, which serves as a prelude to the author’s discussion of why Tom Hanks is not a true historian. The author actually begins this chapter with the following statement by Gary Goetzman in the Hollywood trade magazine Daily Variety, in June, 2007: “I totally believed there was a conspiracy, but after you read the book, you are almost embarrassed that you ever believed it.” (DiEugenio, Chapter 2). For Goetzman to say that he was “almost embarrassed” to believe that President Kennedy’s assassination was a conspiracy after reading Reclaiming History. is, in this researcher’s opinion, utterly absurd. In this day and age, the evidence that there was a conspiracy is simply overwhelming.

    According to the author’s sources, the idea to produce a mini-series based on Reclaiming History, actually originated with actor Bill Paxton. As it turns out, Paxton had an interest in the assassination, because on the morning of the assassination, at the age of just eight, Paxton’s father took him to see President Kennedy in Fort Worth, Texas, as the president emerged from a Texas hotel (ibid). As Paxton told Tavis Smiley on Smiley’s talk show, he (Paxton) wondered whether anyone had told the story of the assassination without bias, without an agenda, and without a conspiracy (ibid). It is apparent to this reviewer that Paxton had an agenda from the beginning: namely that Oswald had acted alone. And as the author put it, Paxton was; “…uniquely unqualified to inform any prospective buyer about the merits of Reclaiming History. .” (ibid).

    The author then goes on to explain how the positive reviews of Reclaiming History. had influenced Tom Hanks and Gary Goetzman to purchase the film rights to the book. Within a period of just three months after Hanks and Goetzman had purchased the rights to the book, the President of HBO films, Colin Callender, announced that HBO would be producing a ten part mini-series based on the volume (ibid). And as the author painstakingly explains in the book, the film which came out of all this, entitled Parkland, does not even resemble Reclaiming History. . The author asks the reader, how did a man like Tom Hanks ” … get into a position to make such momentous public decisions about highly controversial and very important historical issues?” (ibid).The author tells us that in order to understand all of that, we must understand who Tom Hanks is (ibid). Whilst I will spare the reader every sordid detail about Tom Hanks’ past, from his childhood, to his career as an actor and producer, I will briefly give the reader an overview of what, in this reviewer’s opinion, is the essential information to understanding why Tom Hanks bought into Reclaiming History.

    Born in Concord, California, in 1957, Tom Hanks began his screen acting career in the 1980 slasher film, He Knows You’re Alone (ibid). Hanks, of course, starred in the multi awarded film, Forrest Gump, and in the Ron Howard directed film, Apollo 13. Reading through Reclaiming Parkland, it is this reviewer’s opinion that the three productions in which Hanks was an actor and/or producer, which are essential in understanding the type of historian that Hanks is, are From the Earth to the Moon, Saving Private Ryan and Charlie Wilson’s War (the author discusses the latter film in Chapter 12 of the book).

    From the Earth to the Moon was a 12 part television mini-series by HBO, which was co-produced by Hanks (ibid). As Hanks’ biographer David Gardner wrote, Hanks believed the NASA space missions of the 1960’s ” … were amongst the few lasting, happy memories he had of the era” and ” … he [Hanks] wanted to reclaim the ’60’s for his own generation by giving the space program a context he felt it had been denied.” (ibid). Reading through these quotes, it immediately struck this reviewer that Hanks was much more concerned about the space programs than the four political assassinations of the era. Worse still, as the author explains, towards the end of part 4 of From the Earth to the Moon, the script says that a person had wired into NASA during the Apollo 8 space flight in 1968 and the script now said that the flight ” … redeemed the assassinations of King and RFK that same year since, a woman named Valerie Pringle said so.” (ibid). That quote almost made this reviewer’s eyes pop out of their sockets. For how could any true historian contemplate that a manned space mission had somehow “redeemed” the RFK and MLK assassinations? In this reviewer’s opinion, such a notion is completely ridiculous.

    In 1998, Hanks starred in the Steven Spielberg directed film Saving Private Ryan; which, as the author writes, was a fictional film, with Hanks’ goal being to “…commemorate World War II as the Good War and to depict the American role in it as crucial.” (ibid) The author states that the film was actually 90% fiction, and that Tom Hanks had to have known it was so (ibid). But in spite of this, Hanks made the following remarks:

    When I saw the movie for the first time I had the luxury of being in a room by myself, so I wept openly for a long time. I have never cried harder at a movie, or almost in real life, than at the end of this one-it was just so painful. I think an absolutely unbelievable thing has occurred here, and I am part of it, and I sort of can’t believe it. (ibid).

    It is quite curious that Hanks actually said the above. For why would an alleged true historian cry over a fictional film? The author tells the reader that the story of Frederick “Fritz” Niland (portrayed as James Ryan in the film) was first reported in the book Band of Brothers, authored by Stephen Ambrose (ibid). As the author explains, Ambrose is Tom Hanks’ favorite historian. Hanks first met him when Ambrose worked as a consultant on Saving Private Ryan (ibid). Ambrose was also instrumental in influencing Hanks and Gary Goetzman to launch Playtone. What’s important to bear in mind, is that Ambrose was critical of Olive Stone’s film JFK, and demeaned several Warren Commission critics such as Jim Garrison and Jim Marrs in the New York Times, following the release of JFK. (ibid). But Ambrose didn’t just demean the critics of the Warren Commission. He also made the comment that ” … it seems unlikely at best that he [Kennedy] would have followed a course much different from the one Lyndon Johnson pursued” (ibid). But as the author writes this is “completely fatuous”, as books such as James Blight’s Virtual JFK have utilized declassified documents (such as President Kennedy’s National Security Action Memorandum # 263) to show that Kennedy was withdrawing from the Vietnam War at the time of his death (ibid). Ambrose was also exposed as a liar and a serial plagiarizer (ibid). For one thing, Ambrose lied when he said that it was Eisenhower’s idea for him to write Eisenhower’s official biography (ibid). Ambrose also lied when he said he spent hundreds of hours with Eisenhower to write his biography. In reality, Ambrose had merely met with Eisenhower three times; which totalled only five hours (ibid). With someone like Ambrose as Tom Hanks’ favorite historian, it comes as no shock to this reviewer that Hanks decided to produce a film upholding the Warren Commission’s conclusion that Oswald acted alone in murdering President Kennedy.

    There is also one other important detail about Hanks which is not in Reclaiming Parkland, but which the author told this reviewer about on Greg Parker’s research forum, Reopen the Kennedy case. Apparently, Tom Hanks named his sons, Truman and Theodore Hanks, after the American presidents Harry Truman and Theodore Roosevelt. As most of us know, it was Truman who had two atomic bombs dropped on Japan during World War Two. However, this reviewer wasn’t aware that Roosevelt helped force Colombia out of its northern province when they voted not to sell it to use for the Panama Canal. Roosevelt then helped fake a rebellion (with help from the French), sending ships into the Caribbean to prevent the Colombian Army from restoring order. As anyone who has a true understanding of the sort of President that John F. Kennedy was should know, Kennedy would never have contemplated the aforementioned acts by Truman and Roosevelt. But it would seem that Tom Hanks is quite unaware of these differences. So how can we say that Tom Hanks is someone who admired President Kennedy, and therefore, is someone we can trust to tell the truth about his assassination? In this reviewer’s opinion, we cannot.

    III: You call this a trial?

    What follows next is the author’s masterful discussion of the shameful London Weekend Television mock trial of Oswald in 1986. Vincent Bugliosi was the mock prosecutor at this trial. According to the author, it was this trial which inspired Bugliosi to write his overgrown tome, Reclaiming History. (DiEugenio, Chapter 3). Since the trial can be viewed online on YouTube, it is not this reviewer’s intention to spend a considerable amount of time discussing it here. Suffice it to say, the author meticulously explains to the reader just how biased the trial was in Bugliosi’s favor, and also illuminates the incompetence of Gerry Spence, the acting defense attorney, in defending the deceased Oswald.

    In the opening paragraphs of his discussion, the author makes a number of astute observations of just why the trial was strongly biased against Oswald, and how this ultimately led to the jury finding Oswald guilty. First of all, obviously, Oswald was not present at the trial. As the author soundly explains, Oswald would have been the most important witness to his defense, as he would have been able to inform the jurors of his connections to extreme right wing figures such as David Ferrie, Guy Bannister, and Clay Shaw (ibid). Shockingly, Bugliosi actually wrote in Reclaiming History. that it was probably better for the cause of pursuing the truth behind Kennedy’s assassination that Oswald died. (ibid). In this reviewer’s opinion, this is one of the most bizarre statements that Bugliosi has made concerning the assassination.

    Furthermore, the author notes that the following important witnesses were also absent from the trial: Marina Oswald, who, amongst other things, testified before the Warren Commission that her husband owned the alleged murder weapon. The three autopsy doctors who performed the autopsy on the President’s body at Bethesda Naval hospital were also absent. Also, Sylvia Odio, the young Cuban woman who testified before the Warren Commission that Oswald and two Latin looking men had visited her at her apartment in Dallas, was also absent from the trial (DiEugenio, Chapter 3). Odio’s testimony was crucial, as it strongly implied that Oswald was being framed for the assassination.

    The author also makes several other sharp observations, such as the fact that the prosecution called a total of fourteen witnesses, whereas the defence called a total of only seven witnesses (ibid). The prosecution had also used scientifically false evidence against Oswald, namely, the Neutron Activation Analysis tests, which Bugliosi’s witness, Vincent Guinn, presented to the jury as evidence that CE 399 (the magic bullet) went through both President Kennedy and Governor John Connally. This was allegedly accomplished by showing that the lead from the core of CE 399, was identical to the lead fragments embedded in Governor Connally’s wrist (ibid). Neutron Activation Analysis has since been thoroughly debunked as a valid scientific method for identifying the origin of lead fragments.

    Another key point the author makes is that the jurors (unlike in an actual trial) were not allowed to view the actual exhibits located in the National Archives in Washington. As an example of why this is important, the author states that the marksman who originally tested the rifle in evidence, said it had a defective telescopic sight and the bolt was too difficult to operate, but the jurors wouldn’t be able to know that for themselves since they weren’t allowed to actually handle the rifle. Furthermore, the defense was limited, as the 2 million pages of documents declassified by the Assassination Records Review Board, following the passing of the JFK act were not yet available. (ibid

    In his discussion of each of the witnesses, the author first introduces them by describing who they were, and how they were involved with the assassination, and/or its aftermath and the investigations which followed. The author then provides an evaluation of how the witnesses were questioned by both Vincent Bugliosi, and Gerry Spence. For the purpose of this review, I will discuss the author’s evaluation of one of the prosecution witnesses, and one of the defense witnesses. Let’s begin with Ruth Paine, in whose house Oswald allegedly stored the rifle the Warren Commission concluded was used to assassinate President Kennedy. As the author introduces her, Ruth Paine testified at the London trial that she had helped Oswald obtain his job at the TSBD prior to the assassination (ibid). During the trial, Bugliosi attempted to make a major issue out of the fact that Oswald had normally visited the Paine home (where his wife was staying) on weekends after obtaining the job at the TSBD, but had broken that so-called routine by instead arriving on the Thursday night prior to the assassination (ibid). The author scores Bugliosi by pointing out that Oswald had broken that so-called routine the previous weekend, since he didn’t turn up at the Paine home (ibid). The author also scores Gerry Spence by pointing out that Spence failed to mention that Oswald’s “routine” was only one month old (ibid).

    Bugliosi also tried to make a big deal out of the fact that Ruth Paine claimed someone had left the light on in the Paine garage on Thursday evening. Bugliosi asked Paine if she thought that it was Oswald who left the light on, and she responded that she thought it was him. The author scores Spence and the presiding judge for not objecting to the question, as it called for a conclusion not based on observable facts (ibid). It was an opinion which was contradicted by the testimony of Marina Oswald who said Oswald was in their bedroom at the time. The author also scores Spence for not objecting to Bugliosi’s question to Ruth Paine about how Oswald viewed the world around him, since Paine had limited contact with Oswald (ibid). In this reviewer’s opinion, the author could also have criticized Spence by noting, for example, that during his cross-examination, he didn’t ask Paine about the metal file cabinets which contained what appeared to be the names of Cuban sympathizers. The information about these metal file cabinets was contained in the report by Dallas deputy Sheriff, Buddy Walthers, to Bill Decker, who at the time of the assassination was the Sheriff of Dallas County. (See Warren Commission, Volume 19, p. 520 for Walthers’ report).

    In his discussion of reporter Seth Kantor, the author gives credit to Spence for using Kantor, as Kantor discussed Ruby’s phone calls with Mafia enforcers such as Barney Baker, Lenny Patrick, and Dave Yaras, in the latter part of 1963 (ibid). Kantor also testified that he had seen Ruby at Parkland Hospital, just as he testified that he had before the Warren Commission (ibid). However, the author criticizes Spence for not using Kantor more effectively on how Ruby had entered the basement of the Dallas Police Department, where he shot Oswald as Oswald was being transferred to the County jail (ibid). As a matter of fact, throughout the entire discussion of this sordid trial, the author rightly criticized Spence for not calling many of the key witnesses to the assassination to testify. For example, Victoria Adams and Sandra Styles (both of whom were on the rear stairs of the TSBD when Oswald was allegedly coming down the stairs, but never noticed him) were not called to testify. In the reviewer’s opinion, reading the author’s takedown of this trial was delightful.

    IV: On first encountering Reclaiming History

    Since it was the London trial’s guilty verdict which inspired Bugliosi to write Reclaiming History, what naturally follows, in Chapter 4, is the beginning of the author’s meticulous discussion of just why Bugliosi’s book is nothing but a cover-up tome for the Warren Commission. The author begins his discussion of Reclaiming History. with the following quote by Bugliosi in the U.S. News and World Report:

    The conspiracy theorists are guilty of the very thing they accuse the Warren Commission of doing … There is no substance at all for any of these theories, they’re all pure moonshine … I’m basically telling them that they’ve wasted the last 10 to 15 years of their lives. (DiEugenio, Chapter 4)

    But in reality, as the author shows, it was Bugliosi who had wasted twenty years of his life writing a specious book defending the utterly ridiculous Krazy Kid Oswald concept. In the opening paragraph of the chapter, the author actually writes that Bugliosi has the personal attributes of humour, self-effacement (emphasis added) and intelligence (ibid). Whilst Bugliosi may be both funny and intelligent, this reviewer couldn’t help but think that the author had erred in describing him as a self-effacing person, as Bugliosi’s arrogance in upholding the Oswald acted alone theory, and demeaning the critics of the Warren Commission, is simply palpable. (In discussions with the author, Mr. DiEugenio has informed me that this quality is one Bugliosi displays in private.)

    DiEugenio begins his long discussion of Reclaiming History. by first complementing Bugliosi on three of his previous books: No Island of Sanity, The Betrayal of America, and The Prosecution of George W. Bush for Murder. The author recommends all three of these books, and writes that compared with Reclaiming History, all three of these books were brief, and were actually based on facts, the law, and morality (ibid). The author writes that Reclaiming History. is essentially divided into two separate books, which Bugliosi smugly entitled “Matters of fact: What happened” and “Delusions of Conspiracy: What did not happen” (ibid). Book one covers topics such as the autopsy, the Zapruder film, evidence of Oswald’s guilt, and Oswald’s possible motive. Book two is comprised of nineteen chapters, and covers topics such as the various groups suspected of being involved in the assassination, including the Sylvia Odio incident, and a ferocious attack on Oliver Stone’s film JFK, and critics such as Mark Lane and David Lifton (ibid). Bugliosi also makes an abundance of negative remarks throughout his overblown book, such as “…simple common sense, that rarest of attributes among conspiracy theorists…” and “But conspiracy theorists are not rational and sensible when it comes to the Kennedy assassination.” (ibid).

    Perhaps one of the most interesting revelations about Reclaiming History. is that it was actually co-authored by two other Warren Commission defenders; namely, Dale Myers, and the late Fred Haines. DiEugenio credits this discovery to David Lifton (ibid). Haines apparently wrote most of the section of the book on Oswald’s biography. Dale Myers apparently wrote a lot about the technical aspects of the assassination in the book, such as the photographs taken during the assassination, and the acoustics evidence (ibid). However, Bugliosi and Myers had a falling out, so Myers’ name wasn’t mentioned on the front cover of the book (ibid).

    The author devotes a large section of this chapter to a discussion of Oswald’s alleged ownership of the Mannlicher Carcano rifle discovered on the sixth floor of the TSBD. Like every Warren Commission defender before him, Bugliosi states that Oswald owned the rifle, and the author describes the rifle as the centrepiece of Bugliosi’s case against Oswald (DiEugenio, Chapter 4). According to Bugliosi: “If there is one thing that is now unquestionably certain, it is that Lee Harvey Oswald ordered and paid for one Mannlicher Carcano rifle that was found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository.” (ibid). In light of all the compelling evidence DiEugenio presents to the contrary, to say that it is now unquestionably certain that Oswald owned the rifle is a rather unjustified statement to make, and the book specifically demonstrates why that is so.

    But first, the author explains that the first type of rifle reported as being found on the sixth floor of the TSBD, was a 7.65 mm German Mauser bolt action rifle (ibid). To bolster his argument, the author cites the affidavits and reports by Dallas Deputy Sheriff, Eugene Boone, and Dallas Deputy Constable, Seymour Weitzman, in which they reported that the rifle discovered was a 7.65mm German Mauser (ibid). In this reviewer’s opinion, the Mauser discovered was probably one of the two rifles owned by TSBD employee, Warren Caster, and that Caster then participated in a cover-up to dispense with the Mauser story. (Read through this reviewer’s discussion of this pertinent issue.) It is perhaps also worthwhile noting that Sam Pate told HSCA investigators that he observed DPD detective, Charlie Brown, carrying two rifles outside the TSBD following the assassination (click ).

    Oswald allegedly purchased and mailed the money order for the rifle on the morning of March 12, 1963, during his work hours (ibid). However, Oswald’s time sheet at work for March 12 shows that Oswald was working when he allegedly purchased and mailed the money order (ibid). Furthermore, the money order allegedly arrived and was deposited by Klein’s sporting goods at the First National Bank of Chicago (a distance of approximately 700 miles), received by the Chicago Post Office, then processed and deposited in the bank by Klein’s all within a period of 24 hours! As the author states, this supposedly happened before the advent of computers, and that he; ” … sends letters within the county of Los Angeles that do not arrive the next day” (ibid). So this is truly exceptional.

    To make matters worse for Bugliosi (and Warren Commission defenders alike), the date of the duplicate deposit slip for Klein’s bank deposit on the rifle reads February 15, 1963; whereas the money order for the rifle was allegedly deposited on March 13, 1963. There were also no financial endorsements on the back of the money order, which Robert Wilmouth, the Vice President of the First National Bank of Chicago, claimed there should have been (ibid). Worse still, Oswald allegedly ordered a 36 inch long Mannlicher Carcano rifle, using a coupon from The American Rifleman magazine, but he was instead shipped a 40.2 inch long rifle (ibid). This reviewer could go on, but to do so would take too long, and I would refer the reader to Gil Jesus’s website for even more details on this topic. This reviewer can state that DiEugenio leaves Bugliosi standing on nothing but quicksand on this issue. And further, contrary to the above noted pledge made by the prosecutor, Bugliosi does not state the critics’ case on this point as they themselves would make it.

    V: Oswald’s Defense

    Throughout this entire chapter, the author proves that Bugliosi’s claim that; “There was not one speck of credible evidence that Oswald was framed,” is preposterous (DiEugenio, Chapter 5). The issues discussed by the author include the provenance of CE 399, the Neutron Activation Analysis tests used to allegedly determine that the lead fragments embedded in Governor Connally’ wrist originated from CE 399, the Tippit shooting and the Walker shooting (both of which the Warren Commission concluded Oswald was responsible for), Oswald’s alibi at the time President Kennedy was assassinated, Marina Oswald’s credibility and so forth.

    As far as CE 399 is concerned, the author notes the familiar fact that Darrell Tomlinson, who allegedly discovered the bullet on a hospital stretcher in Parkland Hospital, testified to the effect that the bullet was not found by him on Governor Connally’s stretcher (ibid). The author also cites the interview of Parkland Hospital security chief, O.P Wright, by Josiah Thompson, during which Wright told him that Tomlinson gave him a sharp nosed, lead colored bullet (ibid). This is not at all what CE 399 looks like. As the study by statistics professor Cliff Spiegelman and metallurgist Bill Tobin showed, Neutron Activation Analysis was useless as a means of identifying lead fragments as originating from a particular bullet (ibid). This finding was supported by a separate study by statistician Pat Grant and metallurgist Rick Randich, which was actually released before Reclaiming History. was published (ibid). Yet in spite of this finding, Bugliosi tried to argue in his book that Neutron Activation Analysis was still reliable (ibid).

    As far as the Tippit shooting is concerned, the author argues that the four shell casings recovered after the shooting were two Remington Peters and two Winchester Western casings, whereas the bullets removed from Officer Tippit’s body were three Winchester Westerns and one Remington Peters, and therefore, the shell casings had been switched (ibid). Furthermore, the author also cites the discovery of a wallet in the vicinity of the shooting, which contained ID for both Oswald and his alleged alias, Alek James Hidell. This reviewer discussed this pertinent issue on his blog in an article entitled Oswald and the Hidell ID. Regarding the Walker shooting, which occurred on the night of April 10, 1963, the author cites the fact that the bullet recovered in Walker’s home was originally reported as a 30.06 being steel jacketed bullet, and that a witness named Walter Kirk Coleman, told the FBI that he observed two men driving away from the Walker home following the shooting in separate cars, whereas the Warren Commission concluded that Oswald had acted alone. Furthermore, Michael Paine (Oswald’s friend and Ruth Paine’s husband) actually testified before the Warren Commission that he had dinner with the Oswalds on the night of April 10, 1963; which tends to exonerate Oswald as the shooter. (This was amended later by Ruth Paine.)

    Like every other Warren Commission defender, Bugliosi discounts the testimony of TSBD employee Victoria Adams before the Warren Commission, where she testified that both she and her co-worker, Sandra Styles, had taken the rear stairs to the first floor from the fourth floor shortly following the assassination and they didn’t encounter Oswald coming down the stairs (ibid). Adams allegedly told David Belin during her testimony that she saw William Shelley and William Lovelady on the first floor, as soon as she stepped off the stairs (ibid). Shelley’s and Lovelady’s testimony indicates they had gone to the railroad tracks, and then returned to the TSBD. This was then used to discredit Adams’ testimony that she had arrived on the first floor shortly following the assassination (ibid). The author scores Bugliosi and the Warren Commission, by noting that neither Shelley nor Lovelady made any mention of going towards the railroad tracks in their first day affidavits. Furthermore, the author notes that Sandra Styles was not called to testify before the Warren Commission, and neither were Dorothy Ann Garner or Elsie Dorman, both of whom were with Adams and Styles on the fourth floor viewing the President’s motorcade (ibid). Relying on Gerald McKnight however, the author errs in stating that the FBI kept Sandra Styles interview with them separate from the other TSBD employees, for in Warren Commission exhibit 1381. Styles interview is included amongst the interviews of 73 TSBD employees.

    It would take an entire essay on its own to thoroughly discuss all of the problems with Marina Oswald as a witness. For the purpose of this review, I will limit my discussion. The author scores Bugliosi by noting the many contradictions Marina Oswald made concerning the so-called backyard photos, Oswald’s rifle practice, the so-called Walker note which Oswald allegedly left her, and the Warren Commission’s own doubts about using her as a witness. For example, Alfredda Scobey, a member of Richard Russell’s staff, claimed that she lied directly on at least two occasions (ibid). Warren Commission lawyers Joseph Ball and David Belin described her to be; “at best and unreliable witness” (ibid). Furthermore, Norman Redlich told the FBI and the Secret Service that she was a liar (ibid).

    Chicago and Mexico City

    As most researchers of the assassination are aware, in early November, 1963, the Secret Service had discovered a plot to assassinate President Kennedy in Chicago. In fact, the author opens this chapter with the following quote from Edwin Black, who wrote about this plot in the Chicago independent, in November, 1975:

    There are strong indications that four men were in Chicago to assassinate John F. Kennedy on November 2, 1963, twenty days before Dallas. Here’s how it happened.

    The designated patsy for the assassination plot in Chicago was a disgruntled ex-Marine named Thomas Arthur Vallee (ibid). As the author explains to the reader, there are many similarities between the Chicago plot and the assassination in Dallas, and between Oswald and Vallee. There are so many that no objective researcher (which Bugliosi is not) could possibly dismiss all of them as meaning nothing. For example, as James W. Douglass, the author of the fine book JFK and the Unspeakable discovered, the President’s motorcade in Chicago would have taken him past the building in which Vallee was working, in a similar slow turn in which his motorcade made in Dallas from Houston Street onto Elm Street (ibid). As far as Oswald and Vallee are concerned, both of them had been US Marines, and both of them had been stationed in a U2 base in Japan while in the Marines. Also, just like Oswald, the cover unit for Vallee’s probable CIA recruitment was allegedly called the Joint Technical Advisory Group. Like the Oswald who appeared at Sylvia Odio’s, Vallee had actually spoken bitterly about President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs invasion failed (ibid). Yet Bugliosi never mentionsd any of the above in Reclaiming History. . He does however, snidely describe Black’s magazine article as follows; “For a long magazine article trying to make something of the Vallee story … see HSCA record 180-10099-10279…” (ibid). This about what is perhaps the most crucial essay written on the JFK case at that time.

    One of the most important events related to the assassination was the impersonation of Oswald at the Russian and Cuban embassies in Mexico City. Just as the Warren Commission concluded before him, Bugliosi believes that Oswald actually was in Mexico City attempting to get a visa to travel to Cuba (ibid). Whilst DiEugenio is amongst those researchers who believes it unlikely Oswald ever went to Mexico City in late September, 1963, this reviewer has not made up his mind on the matter yet. However, there is little doubt that Oswald was being impersonated. Referring to the so-called Lopez Report, written by HSCA investigators Eddie Lopez and Dan Hardway, Bugliosi calls it “A giant dud” (ibid). But this came as no shock to this reviewer, since it was CIA Officer David Philips (one of the CIA Officers involved in the Mexico City cover-up and who lied under oath before the HSCA on this matter) who helped encourage Bugliosi to write a book on the assassination! (ibid)

    The author spends many pages discussing the numerous problems with Oswald’s alleged trip to Mexico City; in fact, it is one of the longest sections of the book. Whilst Bugliosi is fond of referring to the assassination as a simple case, the author thoroughly demonstrates that the entire Mexico City debacle on its own destroys that utterly absurd belief. For instance, the author scores Bugliosi on this crucial issue by noting the fact that it has never been firmly established how Oswald allegedly went to Mexico City, after first travelling to Houston from New Orleans (ibid). However, Sylvia Odio testified before the Warren Commission that two Mexican looking Cubans had visited her apartment with Oswald in Dallas, in late September on either Thursday the 26th or Friday the 27th; whereas Oswald allegedly boarded a bus to Houston on the 25th (ibid). Bugliosi actually believes Oswald was at Sylvia Odio’s apartment with the two Cubans, but claims that it actually occurred on either the 24th or the 25th of September (ibid). Bugliosi also believes Marina Oswald’s testimony before the Warren Commission, where she testified that Oswald went to Mexico City, even though she initially denied that he did! (ibid).

    The impersonation of Oswald in the Russian consulate in Mexico City is one of the most significant factors pertaining to the assassination. For Oswald allegedly spoke to Valery Kostikov, a man suspected by the CIA of being the KGB agent in charge of assassinations in the Western Hemisphere (ibid). In fact, the information about Kostikov was quite conveniently revealed on the day of the assassination. As the author explains, Oswald’s alleged meeting with Kostikov implied that Oswald had conspired with the communists to assassinate President Kennedy (ibid). This then forced President Lyndon Johnson to cover-up the assassination, because, as he told Senator Richard Russell on the phone; “… they’re testifying that Khrushchev and Castro did this and did that and kicking us into a war that can kill forty million Americans in an hour.” (ibid) However, if the reader can comprehend it, Bugliosi didn’t think that this was important enough to mention in Reclaiming History.

    VI: Bugliosi on the Zapruder film and the Autopsy

    Here, the author discusses Bugliosi’s opinions on both the famous Abraham Zapruder film, and Kennedy’s utterly horrendous autopsy. As the author writes, in defiance of common sense and logic, Bugliosi actually believes the Zapruder film is not really all that important in understanding the assassination. Why? Because according to him, physical evidence such as the three spent shell casings discovered on sixth floor of the TSBD provide conclusive evidence that only three shots were fired at the President (DiEugenio, Chapter 6). The author scores Bugliosi by pointing out that one of the shell casings discovered on the sixth floor (CE 543) had a dented lip, and could not have been fired at the time of the assassination (ibid).

    Just like the overwhelming majority of Warren Commission defenders, Bugliosi believes in the single bullet theory, and actually writes in his book that President Kennedy and Governor Connally were aligned in tandem when the same bullet allegedly went through both men (ibid) However, he then doubles back on himself in a subsequent page in his book when he writes that they were not actually aligned in a straight line. DiEugenio argues that Bugliosi was actually misinformed on this matter by his ghost writer, Dale Myers (ibid). Myers says Connally was six inches inboard of JFK. Yet, as Pat Speer has pointed out, the HSCA said the distance was less than half of that. Bugliosi actually included in his book Senator Richard Russell’s objection to the single bullet theory in the Warren Commission’s executive session hearing on September 18, 1964, in which he wanted his objection to the single bullet theory described in a footnote (ibid). However, Bugliosi discounts the fact that Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin fooled Russell into believing there would be a stenographic record made of his objection, when in actual fact, there wasn’t (ibid).

    As far as the autopsy is concerned, Bugliosi doesn’t believe it was botched; even though he actually acknowledged on the same page of his book that his own primary expert, Dr Michael Baden, claimed that it was (ibid). As the author writes, Baden claimed: “Where bungled autopsies are concerned, President Kennedy’s is the exemplar.” (ibid) This reviewer finds this to be incredibly ironic. Adding further to the irony, Bugliosi tries to defend the autopsy doctors by stating that the HSCA medical panel’s critique of the autopsy was “considerably overstated”. But at the same time, he agrees with the HSCA medical panel that the autopsy doctors had mislocated the bullet entry hole in the back of President Kennedy’s skull! (ibid) As the author writes, “What he [Bugliosi] seems to be trying to do is to soften the critique of the autopsy and actually vouch for the competence and skill of the pathologists.” (ibid) This reviewer couldn’t agree more.

    What’s worse, in this reviewer’s opinion, is that Bugliosi actually tries to pin the blame about the limited autopsy on the President’s own family. The author scores Bugliosi on this assertion by informing the reader that both Drs. Humes and Boswell told the Assassination Records Review Board that this was not true (ibid). In fact, Dr Humes actually told a friend that he was given orders not to perform a complete autopsy, but this order did not come from Robert Kennedy (ibid). But perhaps the final blow to Bugliosi’s absurd assertion comes from Admiral Galloway, who was the commanding Officer of the Bethesda Naval Center. Galloway claimed that; “…no orders were being sent in from outside the autopsy room either by phone or by person.” (ibid). Bugliosi can blame the Kennedy family all he wants for the botched autopsy, but Reclaiming Parkland proves that they were not responsible.

    VII: Bugliosi vs. Garrison and Stone

    Former New Orleans District Attorney, Jim Garrison is, without a doubt, one of the most – if not the most – vilified Kennedy assassination investigator ever. Garrison has been berated by Warren Commission defenders for prosecuting prominent New Orleans businessman, and CIA agent, Clay Shaw, for conspiring to assassinate President Kennedy. By the same token, Oliver Stone, the director of the controversial film JFK, has been berated by Warren Commission defenders for what they conceive to be a distortion of facts in his film about the assassination JFK. Being the zealous Warren Commission defender that he is, Bugliosi pummels both Garrison and Stone (DiEugenio, Chapter 7).

    As the author reveals, Bugliosi uses Harry Connick, who was Garrison’s successor as district attorney, as a witness against Garrison in Reclaiming History. (ibid) But what Bugliosi omits is that Connick had destroyed many of the court records and investigative files pertaining to Garrison’s investigation and the prosecution of Clay Shaw (ibid). Connick also fought the Justice Department for over one year before he was finally ordered by a federal court to turn over Garrison’s file cabinets to the Assassination Records Review Board (ibid). As any objective minded person can understand, using such a man as a witness to berate his predecessor does not make for a convincing argument. Incredibly, in spite of all the evidence which surfaced prior to his writing Reclaiming History, Bugliosi also does his best to deny that David Ferrie and Oswald knew each other. The author scores Bugliosi with the famous photo of Oswald and Ferrie in the Civil Air Patrol, which surfaced in the nineties. Bugliosi also tried to discount the fact that six witnesses claimed that Ferrie and Oswald knew each other (ibid). Even worse in this reviewer’s opinion, Bugliosi tried to deny that Oswald was ever associated with the notorious Guy Banister at Banister’s office at 544 Camp Street in New Orleans. Bugliosi does so in spite of the fact that Oswald had 544 Camp Street stamped on the flyers he was passing out in August, 1963; and despite the fact that no less than thirteen witnesses indicated that Oswald was either at 544 Camp Street or seen with Banister. Amongst the witnesses who saw Oswald there were Banister’s secretary, Delphine Roberts, and two INS agents named Wendell Roache and Ron Smith (ibid). This reviewer could also go on about, for example, Bugliosi’s denial that Clay Bertrand was in reality Clay Shaw, but to do so would take a very long essay. Suffice it to say, by going through the declassified files of the ARRB, DiEugenio has supplied a surfeit of witnesses for that fact also.

    Bugliosi refers to Oliver Stone’s film JFK, as being a “Tapestry of Lies” (ibid). Reclaiming Parkland provides a detailed discussion of the film. There are certain scenes that are not entirely accurate as far as the historical record is concerned. However, the author argues that in any movie a certain amount of dramatic license is allowed, and that a film has to allow for “…the ebb and flow of interest and emotion in order to capture and sustain audience interest.” (ibid). One issue for which Bugliosi pummels both Stone and his screenwriter, Zachary Sklar, is whether President Kennedy was withdrawing from the Vietnam War. Bugliosi actually writes that the evidence President Kennedy was withdrawing from the Vietnam War is at best conflicting and ambiguous (ibid). Yet, as the author explains, books such as Jim Blight’s Virtual JFK and Gordon Goldstein’s Lessons in Disaster, which were based on the many declassified documents pertaining to this issue, show beyond a doubt that President Kennedy was in fact withdrawing from Vietnam (ibid). Bugliosi also writes that President Johnson’s intentions in Vietnam were not really certain. The author scores Bugliosi by noting that in Reclaiming History, there is no mention of Fredrick Logevall’s book Choosing War, which proves that from the moment he became President, Johnson’s intention was to escalate the war in Vietnam. (ibid). Furthermore, Bugliosi leaves out the fact that back in 1961, Johnson urged Ngo Dinh Diem to ask Kennedy to send combat troops to Vietnam! (ibid). The author proves that Bugliosi was clearly being less than comprehensive about the Vietnam War.

    VIII: Bugliosi on the first 48 hours

    The first Official investigation of the President’s assassination was by the Dallas Police department. As the author puts it, Bugliosi has nothing but fulsome praise for the DPD’s investigation of the assassination (DiEugenio, Chapter 8). Throughout this entire chapter, the author chronicles what he terms ” … some of the unbelievable things done by the first official investigators of the John F. Kennedy assassination.” (ibid). Whilst Bugliosi happily praised the DPD and former Dallas district attorney, Henry Wade, it was later revealed that Wade and the DPD had been responsible for framing African Americans, e.g. James Lee Woodard, for crimes which they didn’t commit (ibid). The investigation into wrongful convictions was undertaken by Craig Watkins, who was elected the district attorney of Dallas in 2006. As the author writes, Watkins claimed that most of the convictions by Wade, “were riddled with shoddy investigations, evidence was ignored and defense lawyers were kept in the dark.” (ibid).

    The author also spends several pages discussing the brown paper sack which Oswald allegedly used to carry the rifle into the TSBD, on the morning of the assassination. The only two witnesses who allegedly saw Oswald carrying a package on the morning of the assassination were Buell Wesley Frazier (Oswald’s co-worker who drove him to work on that very morning) and his sister, Linnie Mae Randle. Not only do both witnesses have serious credibility problems, but Jack Dougherty, the only TSBD employee who saw Oswald enter the building, claimed he didn’t see Oswald carrying any package. Nor did any other TSBD employee, besides Frazier (ibid). When the FBI tested the paper bag, they found no abrasions or gun oil on its interior surface. (ibid) Oswald allegedly made the bag using paper and tape from the TSBD shipping department. However, no TSBD employee, including Troy Eugene West, who worked as a mail wrapper using the tape and paper the bag was made from, ever recalled seeing Oswald with any paper or tape (ibid). Furthermore, no photographs of the bag were taken by the DPD where it was allegedly discovered (ibid). The reader is encouraged to read through Pat Speer’s work on the paper bag.

    According to the Warren Commission and Bugliosi, Jack Ruby entered the basement of the DPD where he shot Oswald, by coming down the ramp from Main Street. This ramp was guarded by Dallas Policeman, Roy Vaughn (ibid). But what Bugliosi discounts is that Vaughn, reporter Terrance McGarry, cab driver Harry Tasker, and DPD Sgt Don Flusche (among others) all denied that Ruby came down the ramp (ibid). As the author explains, although former DPD Officer Napoleon Daniels said he saw Ruby come down the ramp, he claimed this was when no car was going up the ramp (ibid). Yet, Ruby allegedly came down the ramp when the car driven by Lt Rio Pierce and Sgt James Putnam was exiting the ramp, and neither one of them saw him (ibid). Bugliosi also claims that if Ruby had planned to kill Oswald in advance, he would have been in the basement well ahead of the transfer (ibid). However, the author scores Bugliosi by pointing out that a church minister claimed he was on an elevator with Ruby at Police headquarters at 9:30 am, with the transfer occurring at about 11:20 am (ibid). The author also points out that three TV technicians named Warren Richey, Ira Walker, and John Smith all claimed they saw Ruby outside the Police station before 10:00 am, standing near their broadcast van (ibid). Like Ruby, Bugliosi claims that Ruby’s motive for killing Oswald was to spare Jacqueline Kennedy the ordeal of a trial, but he also writes that Ruby liked to be in the middle of things no matter what it was (ibid). However, Bugliosi again minimizes the instances where Ruby placed himself as part of a larger apparatus. For example, the fact that Ruby had given former Dallas deputy Sheriff Al Maddox a note in which Ruby claimed he was part of a conspiracy, and that his role was to silence Oswald (ibid).

    IX: Bugliosi and the FBI

    Just as he defends the Dallas Police department’s investigation of the assassination, Bugliosi also defends the utterly shoddy investigation of the assassination by the FBI. At the time of the assassination, the man who was at the helm of the FBI was J. Edgar Hoover, who’s sordid past the author spends page after page exposing, and to whom he refers to as an “ogre” (DiEugenio, Chapter 9). In his book, Bugliosi wrote; “J. Edgar Hoover, since his appointment as FBI director in 1924, at once formed and effectively ran perhaps the finest, most incorruptible law enforcement agency in the world.” (ibid). In this reviewer’s opinion, for anyone to claim that Hoover ran the finest and most incorruptible law enforcement agency in the world, is a rather startling comment to make. In upholding Hoover’s professional integrity and character, Bugliosi ignores or heavily discounts, for example, the Palmer raids of 1919/1920, the deportation of Emma Goldman, the FBI’s campaign against Martin Luther King and the Black Panthers, and the framing of Bruno Hauptmann. The important thing to keep in mind is that Hoover was directly involved in all these heinous acts (ibid).

    In upholding the FBI’s investigation, Bugliosi also ignores the fact that Warren Commissioner Hale Boggs once famously said; “Hoover lied his eyes out to the Commission – on Oswald, on Ruby, on their friends, the bullets, the gun, you name it.” (DiEugenio, Chapter 9). Bugliosi also ignores what the Warren Commission’s own chief counsel, J. Lee Rankin, said of the FBI’s investigation. Namely that; “They [the FBI] are concluding that Oswald was the assassin … that there can’t be a conspiracy. Now that is not normal … Why are they so eager to make both of these conclusions.” (DiEugenio, Chapter 9). Several former FBI agents and employees, such as Laurence Keenan, Harry Whidbee, and William Walter, provided information that Hoover had determined from the beginning that Oswald was the lone assassin (ibid). Finally, on the very next day following the assassination, instead of investigating the assassination from his office, Hoover was at the racetrack running the inquiry between races . (ibid). Yet, this is the man Bugliosi, and Warren Commission supporters alike, defend as an investigator into the Kennedy murder.

    X: Bugliosi hearts the Warren Commission

    Of course, no defence of the Oswald acted alone theory would be complete without defending the Warren Commission itself. Here, the author explains why the Warren Commission’s investigation was spurious from the start. For one thing, there was no defense team representing Oswald (DiEugenio, Chapter 10). The author also argues that since Oswald had been essentially convicted by the national media, the pressure was on the Warren Commission to find Oswald guilty. As a matter of fact, in a document dated January 11, 1964, and titled “Progress report”, J. Lee Rankin prepared a work outline, with subheadings titled “Lee Harvey Oswald as the Assassin of President Kennedy”, and “Lee Harvey Oswald: Background and Possible Motives” (ibid). Therefore, before the first witness was called to testify, the Warren Commission decided that Oswald was the assassin. In fact, Earl Warren didn’t even want to call any witnesses to testify before the commission, or have the power to subpoena them. (ibid). One must ask how the Commission was to investigate the assassination, if they weren’t going to subpoena any witnesses? The author also spends much time discussing Senator Richard Russell’s internal criticisms of the Commission. He then does something that very few, if any, writers in the field have done. He fills in, at length, the sordid backgrounds of the commission’s three most active members: Allen Dulles, John McCloy, and Gerald Ford. Besides being interesting and revelatory on its own, this helps us understand why the Commission proceeded as it did. For the author collectively refers to these three men as the Troika , as Reclaiming Parkland. shows, it was they who controlled the Commission proceedings. (ibid). It is amazing that in the over 2,600 pages of Reclaiming History, Bugliosi could not bring himself to do such a thing. Probably because he knew that it would seriously hurt his attempt to rehabilitate the Commission’s effort.

    XI: The DA acquits everyone

    As one can easily guess, what the author discusses here is how Bugliosi dismisses any involvement of suspect groups in the assassination. This includes President Johnson, the Mafia, the FBI, the CIA, the KGB, Fidel Castro, and the radical right-wing (DiEugenio, Chapter 11). As the author meticulously demonstrates, two of Bugliosi’s most ridiculous denials are that Jack Ruby had no connection to the Mafia, and that the CIA was not at all complicit in the assassination. On Ruby and the Mafia, Bugliosi wrote in his book that Ruby “was no more of a Mobster than you or I…” (ibid). The author explains that although this may be true in a purely technical sense, Ruby was associated with Mafia figures such as Joe Campisi and Joseph Civello (ibid). Further, Ruby also idolized Lewis McWillie, the Mafia associate who was involved in transporting guns to Cuba with Ruby. And according to British journalist John Wilson, Ruby had visited an American gangster named Santo, in a Cuban prison. Wilson was almost certainly referring to Mafia don, Santo Trafficante. (ibid). But perhaps most significantly, Ruby was in contact with Mafia figures such as Lenny Patrick and Barney Baker leading up to the assassination (ibid). As the author writes, Bugliosi believes this was over a labor dispute, something which the even the anti-conspiracy advocates of the HSCA didn’t believe. (ibid)

    The author refers to Bugliosi’s section on possible CIA involvement in the assassination as one of the worst in Reclaiming History. (ibid). Bugliosi argues that there is no evidence that Oswald had any relationship with the CIA. However, the author scores him by pointing out that Oswald was a member of the Civil Air Patrol with the CIA affiliated David Ferrie (ibid). And Ferrie had recruited many of these young men for future affiliation with the military. And it was at this point that Oswald began to show an interest in Marxism and in joining the military. A contradiction that Bugliosi acknowledges but never explains. As DiEugenio also notes, there is very little, if anything, in the section dealing with the role of James Angleton. Which is quite odd given all the work that serious analysts have done on the Oswald/ Angleton relationship due to the ARRB declassification process.

    Bugliosi actually writes that once Oswald was in Mexico City, the CIA initiated background checks on Oswald, and informed other agencies of Oswald’s possible contacts with the Soviets (ibid). The author refutes this claim by stating that the CIA had sent the wrong description of Oswald to other agencies, and that Angleton had bifurcated Oswald’s file so that only he had all the information about him. This then resulted in no investigation of Oswald by the CIA before the assassination. (ibid)

    Shockingly, Bugliosi also tries to minimize any antagonism between the CIA and the President Kennedy. The author scores Bugliosi by noting that after President Kennedy realized the CIA had deceived him with the Bay of Pigs invasion, he fired CIA director Allen Dulles, deputy director Charles Cabell, and Director of Plans Richard Bissell (ibid). The author also explains that CIA officers who are suspected of being involved in the assassination, such as David Philips, Howard Hunt, and James Angleton, were all close to Dulles (ibid). To further undermine Bugliosi, President Kennedy issued National Security Action Memoranda 55, 56, and 57, to limit the CIA’s control over paramilitary affairs (ibid). He also issued orders that the CIA would not be able to supersede the charges of American ambassadors in foreign countries (ibid). In sum, what the author has shown here is that Bugliosi’s belief that President Kennedy was warm and friendly towards the CIA is simply unfounded.

    XII: Hanks as Historian: A Case Study

    From this stimulating and comprehensive discussion of the many shortcoming of Reclaiming History. the book now shifts to focus to a review of Tom Hanks’ qualities as a historian, the CIA’s influence in Hollywood today, and a review of an early script of the film Parkland.

    The discussion of Hanks as a historian is keyed around a review of his purchase of the book by George Crile called Charlie Wilson’s War. That film was a Playtone production which Hanks had control over and which tells us much about his view of what makes good history. Therefore, DiEugenio entitles his chapter about the film, A Case Study. In the film, Hanks starred as Charlie Wilson, the conservative Democrat from Texas who was a member of the United States House of Representatives (ibid). As the author explains, Wilson was a staunch supporter of the CIA’s policy of arming the Afghan rebel groups, such as the Mujahideen, to fight the Soviets after they invaded Afghanistan (ibid). The author spends time here discussing Wilson, Crile’s book, and the film of the book. In fact, it is hard to point to another discussion of this adaptation which is as multi-layered and as comprehensive as this one. DiEugenio does this because, in his own words it, “…reveals all we need to know about his [Tom Hanks’] view of America, and also what he sees as the function of history.” (ibid). In this reviewer’s opinion, once you read through this illuminating chapter, it’s hard to disagree with the author on either observation. And that is not very flattering to Hanks.

    In both Crile’s book and Hanks’ film of the book, Wilson is portrayed as a hero of the Afghan refugees (ibid). But the author shows that there are many omissions and distortions of facts to support this image of Wilson. For one thing, in his book, Crile only gives a brief mention about the opium trade out of Afghanistan, and about the dangers of supplying weapons to radical Muslim fundamentalists (ibid). As the author also reveals, Wilson was an admirer of Central American dictator, Anastasio Somoza. And Wilson’s closest partner in the Afghan operation was CIA Officer Gust Avrakotos, a man who backed the coup orchestrated by the Greek colonels in 1967 (ibid). The author also reveals that Wilson used his position as a member of the House appropriations committee and its sub-committee on defense to raise the funds for CIA director William Casey who, in turn, allowed General Zia, the Pakistani dictator and Islamic fundamentalist, to have complete control over all weapons and supplies the CIA brought into Pakistan (ibid). Through General Zia, Charlie Wilson and the CIA ended up working with Muslim extremists such as Jalaluddin Haqqani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and finally, Osama Bin Laden (ibid.) These all turned out to be disastrous associations, since these men all turned out to be anti-American terrorists who the USA ended up combating later.

    In this reviewer’s opinion, perhaps worst of all, Wilson persuaded the United States Congress not to take retaliation against Pakistan for building nuclear bombs. Which eventually resulted in about eighty nuclear warheads being built by Zia and Pakistan (ibid). Yet, this is the sort of man Playtone decided to produce a movie about, and whom Tom Hanks himself portrayed as a hero in the film. Go figure. As DiEugenio notes, in and of itself, that decision tells us much about Hanks the historian. Especially since, by the time the film was released, Steve Coll’s much better, more honest, and comprehensive book, Ghost Wars, had been in circulation for three years. There is no evidence that Hanks ever read Coll’s award winning book on the subject. Which tells us a lot about his qualities as an amateur historian.

    XIII: Where Washington Meets Hollywood

    In this chapter, the author gives the reader a true understanding of just how closely the CIA is associated with Hollywood. This reviewer vividly remembers watching Michelle Obama announce the winner of the 2013 Oscar awards from the State Room of the White House. From there, she announced Ben Affleck’s CIA inspired film, Argo, as the winner of the Best Picture Oscar. (DiEugenio, Chapter 13). My initial response to this was something like, “Well, that’s interesting”. It was only after reading through this chapter of the book that the reality of this event hit me like a ton of bricks. The author discusses two people who, unknown to this reviewer, have had an enormous influence on how films are produced in the United States. These two people are Phil Strub, the Pentagon’s liaison to Hollywood, and Chase Brandon, a twenty five year veteran of the CIA’s clandestine services branch before becoming the CIA’s first chief of their entertainment liaison office, in 1996 (ibid).

    Reading about the influence these two men have had in film production was, to say the least, rather startling. As the Pentagon’s liaison to Hollywood, Phil Strub has the power to actually make film producers to alter their screenplays, eliminate entire scenes, and can even stop a film from being produced. (ibid) As the author explains, for film producers to be able to rent military equipment, such as tanks and jet fighters, they must first seek approval from Strub and his colleagues (ibid). But even if the producers are finished shooting the film, and then editing it for release, the film must first be screened in advance by the generals and admirals in the Pentagon (ibid). In other words, in a very real way, with military themed projects, the Pentagon decides what the public is allowed to see. One example the author uses to demonstrate this point is the film Thirteen Days, which was based on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Strub and the Pentagon didn’t cooperate with the film’s producer, Peter Almond, because the film portrayed Air Force General Curtis Lemay in a realistic manner (ibid). Therefore, Strub refused to cooperate with Almond, even though the negative portrayal of LeMay in the film was accurate (ibid). However, most shocking of all, the author reveals that the Unites States Congress never actually gave Strub the power to curtail free speech or to limit artistic expression (ibid). However, by doing so, Strub and the Pentagon have the ability to exercise influence on the cinematic portrayal of historical events, such as the Missile Crisis.

    Equally enlightening was the author’s discussion of Chase Brandon. Since becoming the CIA’s first chief of its entertainment liaison office, Brandon has been astonishingly effective in influencing film producers to portray the CIA in a positive light. For example, Brandon provided the writers of the film, In the Company of Spies, with ideas of what should go into the script, and both the film-makers and the actors met with high officials of the CIA (ibid). And the film actually premiered at CIA headquarters in Langley (ibid). Brandon also worked on the TV series entitled, The Agency. Michael Beckner, who was the producer and writer of the show, submitted drafts of each script to Brandon, which Brandon then forwarded to his CIA superiors (ibid). The production team were then allowed access to shoot the film at CIA headquarters, and an original CIA assigned technical advisor actually became an associate producer of the series! (ibid). Brandon used the show to deflect criticism of the CIA for its negligence in predicting and combating the Islamic terrorist threat, which so surprised the Bush administration. Aiding Brandon in this Hollywood endeavor was Bruce Ramer, who is one of the most influential entertainment lawyers in the film industry. One of Ramer’s clients is the legendary director and producer, Steven Spielberg (ibid). Spielberg and Hanks are best friends. They even drive each other’s kids to private school. What’s noteworthy in this reviewer’s opinion is that Spielberg was an early proponent of George Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003. He and Hanks are friends with both Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, and Spielberg has donated close to $700,000 to political candidates (ibid). With all of the above in mind, and much more, this reviewer now understands how it came to be that Michelle Obama, from the White House, presented the Oscar to a CIA inspired film. But as the author notes, this incestuous relationship furthers the tyranny of the two party system in America. Which leaves the public with little choice at the ballot box.

    XIV: Playtone and Parkland

    Following on from his discussion of the CIA’s influence on film production, the author moves onto a discussion of the movie Parkland, co-produced by Tom Hanks and Gary Goetzman, and directed by Peter Landesman (ibid). But prior to discussing the film itself, the author provides the reader with an insight into Tom Hanks’ own relations to the Agency. For one thing, Hanks is a close working associate of Graham Yost, a man who worked with Hanks on Playtone’s two mini-series, Band of Brothers and The Pacific (DiEugenio, Chapter 14). Yost is the executive producer of the FX series entitled The Americans, which was created and produced by a former CIA agent named Joe Weisberg (ibid). For the film Charlie Wilson’s War, Hanks and Playtone hired Milt Beardon as a consultant, the former CIA station chief in Islamabad who was involved in the US-backed Mujahedeen war against the Soviets. (ibid). In this regard it is interesting to note that although it was revealed too late to be included in the book, director/writer Landesman had consulted with infamous intelligence asset Hugh Aynesworth on the script of Parkland. (Dallas Morning News, August 28, 2013)

    As for the film Parkland, the author writes that he was able to obtain an early draft of Peter Landesman’s script for the film (ibid). Oddly, Landesman had no experience in directing or writing a produced screenplay prior to this assignment (ibid). But apparently, this didn’t bother Tom Hanks. Essentially, the film depicts the time period of a few hours before, and 48 hours following the assassination. The main locations in the film are Parkland Hospital, the Dallas FBI station, Dallas Police headquarters, and Abraham Zapruder’s home, office, and the film labs where his film was developed and copied (ibid). As the author explains, the script omits any mention by Dr. Malcolm Perry (who was played by Hanks’ own son, Colin Hanks) that the wound to President Kennedy’s throat was one of entrance (ibid). Hanks and Landesman also omit from the script any mention of the backwards movement of the President’s body, after he is shot in the head (ibid). The script also has Oswald’s brother, Robert, recognize the rifle shown to him at DPD headquarters as Oswald’s; even though the last time Robert saw him was before Oswald allegedly purchased it in March, 1963. (Wisely, this last howler was omitted from the edited film.)

    Landesman and Hanks also tried to demean Marguerite Oswald in the script simply because she thought Oswald was some kind of intelligence asset and wanted him to be represented by an attorney. (ibid) As the author writes: “Maybe Hanks forgot: in America the defendant is innocent until proven guilty.” (ibid) Perhaps even worse is the script treatment of James Hosty, the FBI agent who was assigned to keep an eye on Oswald after his return from the Soviet Union (ibid). According to the script, when someone asks Hosty why he has been keeping an eye on Oswald, he replies; “I couldn’t tell. Just a sorry son of a bitch.” (ibid). Evidently, someone, perhaps Aynesworth, later told Landesman that there was a lot more to Oswald than just that. Like, for example his defection to the USSR at the height of the Cold War. So, again, this was incorporated into the completed film. (ibid).

    Although the film has already been released and is headed to home video, the author reviewed the early draft of the script to show that Hanks had an agenda. Namely, as with Reclaiming History, the book it was adapted from, from the start, it was meant to uphold the Warren Commission’s conclusion.

    XV: My Dinner with Giorgio

    What the author has demonstrated thus far is that Vincent Bugliosi and Tom Hanks are not genuine historians. In Chapter 15, the author discusses his meeting with Giorgio DiCaprio (the father of actor Leonardo DiCaprio). The author met with DiCaprio after it was announced by Entertainment Weekly, that Leonardo DiCaprio’s production company, Appian Way, had purchased the film rights to Lamar Waldron and Thom Hartmann’s bizarre book, Legacy of Secrecy (DiEugenio Chapter 15). This reviewer has never read Legacy of Secrecy, and after reading DiEugenio’s review of it on CTKA website, I felt that it would be a huge waste of time. At the meeting at Appian Way, with the author and Giorgio were Paul Schrade, a witness to Robert Kennedy’s assassination, documentary film producer Earl Katz, and Waldron himself (ibid). Essentially, what the author demonstrates here is that much like Tom Hanks, Giorgio DiCaprio and Katz did not do their homework either on the JFK , or the book they decided to adapt.

    After briefly discussing Waldron and Hartmann’s theory that the Mafia had the President assassinated, the author explains what specifically transpired at the meeting with Giorgio, Katz, and Waldron, and how loud and argumentative Waldron was when challenged by both the author and Shrade. For example, when the author and Schrade brought up the importance of John Newman’s work on the entire Mexico City charade, Waldron shouted the following weird remark, “What does he [Newman] know about Mafia!” As the author writes, as he sat in stupefied silence, neither Giorgio nor Katz asked Waldron what the Mafia had to do with Mexico City (ibid). As most informed researchers are aware, the Mafia had nothing to do with Mexico City. Furthermore, when the author and Schrade brought up the issue of how Waldron and Hartmann incorrectly referenced Edwin Black’s essay on the Chicago plot to assassinate Kennedy, to a book called the The Good Neighbour, by George Black in their footnotes, Waldron accused the error on his footnote editor (ibid). DiEugenio notes, he has never heard of a footnote editor, and this reviewer has never heard of one either. Incredibly, Giorgio DiCaprio then also blamed this error on the footnote editor (ibid). Suffice it to say, after reading through the author’s discussion of this meeting, it is readily apparent that Giorgio DiCaprio is a novice on the subject of President Kennedy’s assassination.

    Afterword

    In the interesting Afterword, DiEugenio tells us that, just like the book Reclaiming History, the film Parkland is irrelevant today. And for the same reasons. Neither work tells us anything about how President Kennedy was killed or what that event means to America today. He then intertwines two subjects: The decline of the USA after Kennedy’s death, with the decline of American cinema after 1975. This reviewer has never seen this done before. It is quite a fascinating subject in and of itself. And it tells us something about the scope of the book.

    The author also tells the reader that Oliver Stone’s decision to produce and direct the film JFK, for which he was exoriated in the national media, was a gutsy and patriotic act which resulted in the declassification of two million pages of documents pertaining to the President’s assassination. But yet, after the impact of Strub and Brandon, the conditions in Hollywood today are so poor, that the public knows little or nothing about those discoveries of the ARRB. Furthermore, the author pays a tribute to John Newman for his milestone books, JFK and Vietnam and Oswald and the CIA. As the author put it, a real historian like John Newman is worth a hundred Vincent Bugliosis, a hundred Tom Hanks, and a thousand Gary Goetzmans (p. 384). Because an author like Newman liberates the public from a pernicious mythology about the past. One that, as with Vietnam, helped gull the country into a huge and disastrous war in Southeast Asia.

    In this reviewer’s opinion, the American public owes a debt to Jim DiEugenio, an ordinary, everyday American citizen, who through his dedication, courage, and above all, patriotism, produced an insightful book explaining why Reclaiming History is a sham, and explaining the influence the CIA and the Pentagon have on what the public is allowed to see on their theater and television screens. Perhaps the biggest lesson to be learned from reading this book is that no one should be afraid to voice their opinions against those who have attained fame, power, and prestige.

    Let me put it this way; if Jim DiEugenio can do it, then I think the rest of us can as well.


    This review was based on the unexpurgated, uncorrected proof version of Reclaiming Parkland. Interested readers can see the expurgated sections.

  • Don Adams & Harrison E. Livingstone, From an Office Building with a High-Powered Rifle: One FBI Agent’s View of the JFK Assassination

    Don Adams & Harrison E. Livingstone, From an Office Building with a High-Powered Rifle: One FBI Agent’s View of the JFK Assassination


    Don Adams’ book is something of a landmark. We now have an ex FBI agent coming clean with his suspicions of a conspiracy to kill President Kennedy. This has happened before with guys like Bill Turner. But Adams is a rarity in that he was an active agent in 1963 who actually investigated a part of the Kennedy case…that being the Joseph Milteer angle. Further, in an era where a number of individuals have come forth to bear false witness to their involvement that day—as either government employees or civilians – Adams, like H. B. McClain, Abraham Bolden and Roger Craig, has a compelling and credible story. Also, due to the lack of his being unfairly compromised by his story he waited until after his retirement to tell it. He thus comes without a lot of baggage.

    What worked for me was that Adams does not seek, in any discernible way, to increase his standing. He is remarkably open and honest about being inexperienced on the Milteer assignment and about his being unaccustomed in terms of research on the JFK case. Therefore, when he comes to naming who he thinks are the ‘players and the patsies”, he readily acknowledges that other, more informed, researchers have worked the beat before. This selflessness, once again, is something of a rarity. Often when people claim “inside info”, their statements concerning participants come with a definitive air of “so-and-so said this” and/or “he said this to me”. Thankfully, Adams has his ego and imagination well in check. While in the FBI, he also resisted the temptation to capitalize personally and professionally upon his father’s relationship with Cartha “Deke” DeLoach, an opportunity that a less honest individual would have utilized.

    The Investigation Begins

    For myself, the highlights of the book are Adams’ deductions between pages 25 to 85 where we learn of his assignment to investigate Milteer. We also learn about two figures that become the bogeymen of the book his boss, Jim McMahon, Special Agent in Charge of the Atlanta office and McMahon’s pal, Royal McGraw, who ran the Thomasville bureau some 240 miles away. The story is this: McMahon had flattered a naïve Adams to work for McGraw in Thomasville, many miles away from his family in Atlanta, by saying McGraw had personally requested his transfer. What Adams found out prior to his departure was that Adams was actually the fourth person McMahon had requested. Adams’ sense of duty saw him take the job in Thomasville, much to his regret. McGraw, it turns out, was a micro-management Nazi, who regularly stomped over FBI procedure keeping Adams out of the loop. Adams also found him to be something of a redneck.

    McMahon pulled Adams, along with Bill Elliot, the Chief of Police in Quitman Georgia, into the case on November 13, 1963 to interview one Joseph Milteer a resident, who had caused something of a flap in mid October with a number of his comments. While we all know about Milteer, it’s often forgotten that he was surrounding himself with some serious pipe hitting, right wing nutters prior to the assassination. On the 18th of October, in Indianapolis, he had met with some 30 individuals who planned on creating a terrorist underground cell to combat the communists infiltrating the U.S. Government. More meetings took place between Milteer and other individuals over the next few days. Including the infamous meeting recorded by informant Willie Sommersett… but we’ll get to that later. President Kennedy’s life had clearly been threatened and so our intrepid FBI agent tracked him down. Adams finally found Milteer while he was handing out leaflets on Quitman Street on the 16th of November. After a brief discussion with the rightwing zealot, from whom he received a number of leaflets, Adams quickly discovered Milteer’s vehement hatred for the president. He returned to Thomasville and filed his report expecting it to be routed to the Secret Service, local police and FBI nationwide. While this appears to have happened at first, he would later check back on his report only to discover no reference of either it, nor the leaflets in evidence.

    Shockingly, Adams later found out that McGraw and Elliot had conducted an investigation into Milteer a little over a year before his own interaction with him. Yet, even this is incidental to the odd things that happened soon after. The assassination occurred, and McMahon ordered Adams back on the Milteer beat. Merely two days after the assassination, a woman who went by the name of Vereen Alexander and had studied at Tulane University in New Orleans, appeared at Adams’ house. She said she had encountered Oswald at a bar discussing the attempted assassination of Charles De Gaulle. She clearly remembered Oswald also raising the question of Kennedy being assassinated earlier that year. This story was a plausible one, for Oswald, or an imposter, indeed visited the Tulane campus. Further, Jim Garrison, John Newman, Bill Davy, Lisa Pease and Jim DiEugenio have all covered in some depth how Oswald, and other denizens of the 544 Camp Street office in New Orleans targeted that university’s students and faculty. This effort, of course, was led by Guy Banister.

    Later, on page 143, Adams, after making some well observed comments on Oswald’s ease of return to the United States, his communist beliefs, and his association with Banister, states that Oswald had to have been some form of intelligence agent and this was nicely hidden. Adams’ simple “no BS” take on this issue is refreshing, especially coming from a former agent of J. Edgar Hoover. But it could have been even better. He could have then tied in Vereen Alexander’s story of seeing Oswald at Tulane with Banister’s other activities of infiltrating student and leftist groups with young recruits like Dan Campbell. This additional information would have lent more relevancy to Oswald’s interaction with Alexander. Indeed he could have placed the interaction in the section in which he deals with Banister. For although the Alexander event is pivotal, his inclusion of it upsets the flow of his narrative in the chapter, which is focused in finding out where Milteer was after the assassination. If Adams felt he had no choice but to include it at the point mentioned, he should have had a mind to refer to it accurately in his text later. The problem is the Alexander report actually says nothing about Oswald discussing the assassination of JFK. The Somersett report on Milteer does allude to an assassination attempt. At the beer drinking party where Alexander saw Oswald, it appears JFK was never discussed and Alexander merely recollected Oswald being there. This is a notable mistake because later on Adams discusses the absence of his reports in the National Archives, not just their rewording and newly fraudulent replacement accounts by his superiors. Adams unfortunately makes himself look as if he is the one guilty of hyperbole and his editors should have been wise to this.

    Regardless of this technical hitch, Adams eventually caught up with Milteer – who was absent from his environs in Quinton and Valdosta, Georgia in the days immediately after the assassination – on the 27th of November. The problem for Adams was that, incredibly, he was only allowed to ask Milteer five questions, and was not permitted to ask follow-ups of his own. The questions were hardly the type of in-depth ones we would anticipate seeing in an investigation dealing with the murder of President Kennedy. (Which, as the author points out, is unsurprising, since the entire FBI investigation was based on avoiding the hard questions). Yet there were two intriguing questions Milteer fielded, and some equally interesting answers he gave. Milteer denied he had been involved in the horrific fire bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham Alabama on the 15th of September 1963. That he was considered a suspect in a state full of it’s own racist loony tunes at the time certainly says something about his reputation. He also denied being in Dallas on the day of the assassination, mentioning he had been there in June of ’63. He then denied he had ever made any threats about the President. As we all know (as did Adams), this was a lie as the FBI had recordings of him saying this to a good informant. Adams notes that, after this meeting, he never saw the man again.

    The Dallas FBI Office

    The book then goes on to explain Adams’ later stint in the summer of 1964 at the Dallas FBI office. Few books have actually detailed the comings and goings of the Dallas authorities at the time of the assassination. Ian Griggs’ excellent breakdown on the DPD in his tome, “No Case to Answer” (JFK Lancer, 2011) is a must read on the topic. Also, Jim Hosty’s accounts of the day to day activities in the office are also required reading for those seeking an inside track into the Dallas FBI personnel of the era. (“Assignment: Oswald” by James P. Hosty Jr. and Thomas Hosty, 1995) Adams’ entry into the foray is small but much appreciated as he is honest about Hosty and the Dallas office covering their behinds over the “Oswald threat” caper. Indeed, he voices the concern long held by conspiracy advocates, if Oswald’s note was a threat, it would have been used against him and not covered up for years. He also notes that he saw the Zapruder film In Dallas with other agents. He told his colleagues that it clearly denoted crossfire in Dealey Plaza. They understood that. But they said that Hoover had already molded the investigation around Oswald as the only suspect. His take on the dour, chain-smoking SAIC Gordon Shanklin also matches Hosty’s recollections. Nonetheless, once again, Adams could have scored even more points, but fails to get the bonus point. The chapter needed more details of the office and the personnel, the tone of the field office and so on. While this sort of detail could be boring, I find this sort of thing extremely readable, and it increases a book’s use as a reference for the period if handled well. As it stands, the chapter can barely be called that as it only consists of seven pages of type. This is a problem all the way through the book; the chapters should have been sub headed under a certain theme or topic which would have helped the book’s flow and organization.

    A classic example of this is that instead of waiting until page 138, he should have put SA Robert Gemberling in the mix during this passage in Dallas. Gemberling is a little disclosed figure in the assassination cover up. Thanks to Adams the man now enjoys a little more time in the sun. Gemberling and Adams enjoyed good relations during his stint with the Dallas branch of the FBI, and as it turns out, we all know that Gemberling’s role after the assassination was to help write the initial 800 page FBI account of the crime. He later became the FBI’s JFK “go to man” in the seventies, studiously towing the official line he had helped create. Anyhow, he took umbrage with Adams, who had gone public with his opinions in late 1998 on the eve of the 35th anniversary of the Kennedy assassination. This started an exchange between the two. Gemberling who already denounced Oliver Stone’s “JFK” in 1997, in the FBI’s official ex-special agent publication “The Grapevine”, would then go on to further denounce Stone, and others like Adams in 2003. Adams attempted to have his side of the argument put into the publication, but his article was pulled. This did not faze him. He knew it would never see the light of day in an FBI publication.

    Was Milteer in Dallas That Day on Houston Street?

    As stated, there is some strong material in the book. But as previously noted, the organization of the book is awkward. It details Adams’ life and interactions with his cohorts well enough. But when it comes to the significant aspects of the case, e.g. a witness meeting a potential Oswald impersonator, the conduct of the Dallas FBI office and Gemberling, or fully describing his chief target Milteer, he is not layered, or in depth enough. The editors could have helped make even more impact with his cogent and firsthand observations. As it stands, his more in depth points are confused and needlessly convoluted for such a relatively small book.

    One of the things I looked forward to was an analysis of whether or not the images taken by Dealey Plaza photographers James Altgens and Chuck Bronson captured Milteer in Dealey Plaza that day. Adams didn’t disappoint with regards to discussing this angle. What the book failed to do was (A) explore this avenue in more depth and (B) organize the chapter dealing with this subject in a concise and, dare I say, rational manner. Let us deal with (A) first. The debate about Milteer being in the crowd has been around for a very long time. Its patron has long been Bob Groden. Groden believes that a figure standing on Houston Street resembled Joseph Milteer. The allegation caused such a stir that even the House Select Committee on Assassinations became involved in examining the photographic evidence. They commented thusly:

    The only available height record of Milteer gives his stature as 64 inches. This corresponds to about the seventh statural percentile of American males. That is, about 93 out of 100 adult American men would be taller than Milteer. Also, about 35 percent of adult American females would exceed Milteer’s reported height. In contrast, the spectator alleged to be Milteer is taller than 4 of the 7 other males and all of the 16 females in the line of spectators shown in the motorcade photograph. Based upon Milteer’s reported height, the probability of randomly selecting a group of Americans where so many are shorter than Milteer’s reported height is .0000007. Moreover, an analysis based upon actual measurements of certain physical features shown in the photograph yields a height estimate for the spectator of about 70 inches — 6 inches taller than Milteer’s reported stature. (HSCA Volume 6, pp. 242-257)

    Milteer?

    This is rather specious and unconvincing. Like Jim DiEugenio, I am an agnostic on the Milteer photographs myself, as I am for the majority of image identification taken that day e.g. Lucien Conein. But it still makes for a fascinating discussion, in particular when Adam’s challenges the official height given for Milteer—he puts his height at about 5′ 8”— as opposed to FBI reports at 5 ft 4 inches. Thus he single handedly brings into question the dubious height analysis of the HSCA’s panel. But he could have done more here. The HSCA previously pointed out that the individual pictured has few of the matching characteristics of Milteer. Yet anyone who is knowledgeable nowadays knows how compromised the HSCA itself was when dealing with practically any type of physical evidence. In this regard, I would ask anyone to check out the embarrassing performance of Dr. Michael Baden who, as demonstrated by Pat Speer, detailed the head wound to an awaiting public, while continually using an upside down picture of the skull. Bob Groden and others have done some nicely presented photo comparisons over the years that have given the notion of the figure being Milteer a fighting chance. On the other hand, Jerry Rose, who did some excellent work on Milteer, reported that the suspect was not actually in Texas on that day. Unfortunately, this kind of analysis was not present in the book. Some thrust and counter thrust concerning the images would have made this an important and, dare I say, entertaining part of the story. Instead, it’s very much an opportunity lost.

    The Pristine Bullet: The Dangers of Nutters Lurking

    Jim DiEugenio’s interview with Len Osanic on the 590th Black Op Radio show was an eye opener. I learned that James Tague, the witness struck on the right cheek by a fragment or piece of concrete fired by an assassin’s bullet whilst standing by the overpass, had released a weighty book. While the title, “Survivor” was slightly melodramatic, Tague has long believed there had been a conspiracy that day. Nonetheless, a witness or somebody directly involved in resultant events often has no more insight than any researcher. Indeed, it’s sometimes worse because they are often out of touch with the ebbs and flows of new information, not to mention who and what is credible and what is not. Tague, clearly ignoring these problems, has a new book on the horizon and it details the evil mechanics behind the plot. Early reports indicate that Tague is essentially going with the questionable LBJ did it theorems discussed in a new article posted here, and on forums like Deep Politics and Lancer. This is terribly dangerous territory for any credible researcher to go down nowadays. And it exhibits the serious problems witnesses have when they go beyond the realms of their experience.

    It has become clear to CTKA and places like the Deep Politics in particular, that there is quite clearly an abundance of disinformation gurus operating nowadays. And they insist, in large part on ignoring the discoveries of the ARRB (not to mention the type of significant research based on those discoveries respected by serious students of the case). And these people would be eager to get an endorsement from someone like Tague, or as it turns out an old hand, but new kid on the block, like Don Adams. Leading up to the 50th anniversary of the assassination and the danger is that these opportunists will try to grab the limelight in anyway possible by attaching themselves to people like Tague and Adams, and thereby discrediting them by association. This is not idle speculation, individuals like Gary Mack, John McAdams and others will seize upon ways to discredit Tague and Adams. An easy way to do this is if they are already in the arms of specious theories or researchers. Tague is a hugely valuable witness. He can be caricatured if he begins to spout specious information, about which he has no firsthand knowledge. While one senses that Tague may be a lost cause, Adams will hopefully avoid the pitfalls of this real danger. I truly hope he does not succumb to that beckoning siren for he too is a key witness, one from the inside, for next year.

    While Adams is clear in his book that he does not see Johnson and Hoover being involved in the conspiracy to kill Kennedy, he does believe they were involved in an active cover up of the facts. Which is true. But he goes too far. He buys into the false idea that it was Johnson’s idea to create the Warren Commission. This piece of folklore is dangerous as the bogus “Johnson in charge of the Commission” line that is often picked up and bandied about. Even though it is not true or accurate. Adams should have read Warren Commission authors like Gerald McKnight more carefully before penning such stuff.(See also,

    Adams does buck that trend slightly by mentioning the admirable work of Jim Douglass in his estimable ” JFK and the Unspeakable”, and he does make mention of the up and down tome edited by Jim Fetzer, “Murder in Dealey Plaza”. However, we also know that “High Treason” made an enormous impact on him. “High Treason” is a decent enough book. But like a lot of Adams’ seven books he discusses in Chapter Ten, “The Pristine Bullet”, his seven publications all date from well before the creation of the Assassination Records Review Board. And four of the titles are actually periodicals. Adams uses articles from Life” magazine from 1966, like the well thought out, but lukewarm “Did Oswald Act Alone?” He also uses the famous cover story, “A Matter of Reasonable Doubt” by Josiah Thompson, Dick Billings and Ed Kearns. He even uses the “Globe’s” article from 1991 entitled “Shocking Autopsy Photos Blow Lid of Kennedy Cover-Up”. If I were to list notable pre-ARRB material to read, my list would be substantially different. I say this not to lash out at Adams, but to point out that he needed to seriously reconsider bringing out a slightly more comprehensive and organized book, with more up to date research. Again, his editors should have helped guide him more. And perhaps have furnished him with a ghostwriter, one who knew more about the JFK case, and also the overall structure and behavior of the FBI at the time. This would have filled out the book more, and given it more depth, texture, nuance and professionalism. Don Adams’ story is an immensely pertinent one, and it deserved to be presented with first class furnishings.

    Conclusion

    For the faults I have noted. Adams is a key and welcome figure and the documents he presents show a number of problems for the “Oswald did it” hypothesis.

    1. The book shows how lax the reportage of threats to the President’s life was via the FBI. There was no due diligence done on the Milteer threat.
    2. Additionally, it shows how inexperienced agents were given tough assignments, and then had their work hijacked by senior staffers and twisted for their own purposes.
    3. Many Special Agents down South were often sympathetic towards Southern right-wing targets like Milteer.
    4. The Bureau’s forbidding Adams to ask any questions and cross check about where Milteer was that day went against basic FBI procedure. To my mind, this is the most valuable part of Adams book. It shows two things: (a) The FBI did not want to know anything about the possible involvement of Milteer with the JFK case, and (b) The Bureau had negated an crucial step in standard agent procedure, the step called by Bill Turner, “lead follow through”. This was not accidental and it had to be approved from on high.

    Another important aspect of the book is the question of Milteer’s role in the scheme of things. Oddly enough Harrison Livingstone deals with this question in an “Afterward” of sorts, and for me, Livingstone did it surprisingly well. My experience with Harry has been that some of his output of late has been often unreadable. But overall, his general work on the medical evidence has always been intriguing, and at times, valuable e.g. his 1995 book “Killing Kennedy”. As mentioned before, his work with Bob Groden in “High Treason” is another high point of his efforts. Nonetheless, it’s been an awful long time between drinks. Livingstone’s well-reasoned final summation puts the onus on Milteer being something of a red herring by actually being an attractive diversion created by the perpetrators to soak up investigative time. Was Milteer privy to some undercurrents? Most definitely. Could he have been in Dealey Plaza that day after being fed disinformation that a bunch of “patriots” were going to “get” the President? If he were there it would certainly be in keeping with the use of decoys that day. Adams had real courage and integrity printing this viewpoint. All too often interesting peripheral figures become the focus of an author’s attention, like Milteer, in this instance, invariably makes them all-powerful figures central to or organizing a plot. Livingstone gives the book some perspective.

    If utilized correctly, Don Adams’ book is a necessary first step for the man. Let us hope that come next year, he stays his own man and does not get grasped into the clutches of those who will not use him correctly. In this regard I hope he reads this review and spends some time going over the articles here at CTKA and viewing the discussions at places like the DPF and Lancer.

  • The Connally Bullet

    The Connally Bullet


    One of the most contentious issues of the JFK debate has always been the question of the validity of CE-399, the bullet which the government claimed, passed through President Kennedy and Governor Connally. Critics have argued that it was not possible for the bullet to have passed through both victims and emerged in near pristine condition. Perhaps more significantly, CE-399 contained no traces of blood or tissue when examined under a microscope.

    CE399side

    Government defenders countered with the argument that tests have proven that it was not impossible for a bullet to remain in good condition under such circumstances and that it was also possible that there would be no evidence of blood or tissue. As such, the debate has remained in stalemate for nearly half a century. But in more recent times, a far stronger case against the legitimacy of CE399 has emerged. As we shall see, it also happens to be a conclusive indictment of the integrity of J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI.

    Our study begins at Parkland hospital with the discovery of a bullet by orderly, Darrell Tomlinson. Tomlinson told the Warren Commission that he returned Governor Connally’s stretcher from the second floor back to the ground floor, and then parked it behind another stretcher that was in front of the door to a rest room. During his testimony, he illustrated the positions of the two stretchers, producing the following diagram:

    stretcherdiagram

    Tomlinson labelled the two stretchers, “A” and “B”, in response to Specter’s request:

    Mr. SPECTER. Will you mark with a “B” the stretcher which was present at the time you pushed stretcher “A” off of the elevator?

    Specter also asked him to label the rest room in the diagram as “C” and explain how he acquired the bullet,

    Mr. SPECTER. Where is the men’s room located on this diagram?

    Mr. TOMLINSON. It would be right there (indicating) beside the “B” stretcher.

    Mr. SPECTER. Would you draw in ink there the outline of that room in a general way?

    Mr. TOMLINSON. Well, I really don’t know.

    Mr. SPECTER. And would you mark that with the letter “C”?

    Mr. SPECTER. That’s fine. What happened when that gentleman came to use the men’s room?

    Mr. TOMLINSON. Well, he pushed the stretcher out from the wall to get in, and then when he came out he just walked off and didn’t push the stretcher back up against the wall, so I pushed it out of the way where we would have clear area in front of the elevator.

    Mr. SPECTER. And where did you push it to?

    Mr. TOMLINSON. I pushed it back up against the wall.

    Mr. SPECTER. What, if anything, happened then?

    Mr. TOMLINSON. I bumped the wall and a spent cartridge or bullet rolled out that apparently had been lodged under the edge of the mat.

    Mr. SPECTER. And that was from which stretcher?

    Mr. TOMLINSON. I believe that it was “B”.

    Clearly, Tomlinson was stating that the bullet was on a different stretcher than the one he brought down on the elevator. Nonetheless, Specter repeatedly badgered him to change his story, but could only manage to get his inconvenient witness to say that he wasn’t sure. But Tomlinson further confirmed what happened, in this NOVA documentary, narrated by Walter Cronkite. (move the timeline to 30:10)

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cvqCtaBkyyE

    Tomlinson passed the bullet to his supervisor, Mr. O.P. Wright who also examined it and in an interview with Josiah Thompson, was adamant that it was shaped much differently than CE-399. This is from Josiah Thompson’s classic book, Six Seconds in Dallas.

    Before any photos were shown or he was asked for any description of #399 (Wright) said:

    ‘That bullet had a pointed tip.’ I said, ‘Pointed tip?’ He said, ‘Yeah, I’ll show you.  It was like this one here,’ he said, reaching into his desk and pulling out the .30 caliber  bullet pictured in Six Seconds.  After Thompson showed Wright the various bullet photos  and finally #399, Wright asked, “Is that the bullet I was supposed to have had?”.

    Wright’s and Tomlinson’s unanimous rejection of CE-399 was further confirmed by this top secret FBI airtel, which was never shown to the Warren Commission.

    WFO (FBI Washington Field Office), neither DARRELL C. TOMLINSON, who found bullet at Parkland Hospital, Dallas, nor O. P. WRIGHT, Personnel Officer, Parkland Hospital, who obtained bullet from TOMLINSON and gave to Special Service, at Dallas 11/22/63, can identify bullet.

    Instead, the FBI told the commission that the two civilians had been interviewed by special agent Bardwell Odum, who was told by the men, that the stretcher bullet “appears to be the same one”. But when Josiah Thompson and Dr. Gary Aguilar contacted the National Archives, they found no record of such an interview, in spite of the fact that the FBI was required to document interviews like that. And when they contacted Bardwell Odum in person, he denied ever conducting such an interview and stated that he had never even seen CE399.

    Wright gave the bullet to Secret Service agent, Richard Johnson, who in turn, passed it on to his supervisor, James Rowley. Not surprisingly, both of those men also refused to corroborate CE399, a fact which even the FBI had to admit, stating in Commission exhibit 2011, that the two agents “could not identify” it. It is interesting that the FBI never reported the reason why the two agents refused to corroborate this dubious piece of evidence. Like FBI agents, Secret Service agents were required to initial forensic evidence, and it is hard to imagine them being negligent in such an important case. By far, the best explanation for their denial is that not only did the stretcher bullet look much different than the original, but their initials were nowhere to be found on CE-399. And they were not the only ones whose initials were missing.

    The next step in the chain of possession took place when Rowley passed the bullet to FBI agent, Elmer Todd. Todd was adamant that he initialed the stretcher bullet, as he was required to do. But when researcher, John Hunt examined extreme closeup photos of CE-399, he was able to identify initials that were written in later, but could find no trace of Todd’s. This is from his article on the subject:

    There is no question but that only three sets of initials appear on CE-399. There is likewise no question that they have all  been positively identified: RF was Robert Frazier, CK was Charles Killion, and JH was Cortland Cunningham. (See Figure 5.) It can be stated as a fact that SA Elmer Lee Todd’s mark is not on the historical CE-399 bullet.

    The entire article can be found here: http://www.jfklancer.com/hunt/phantom.htm

    The only logical conclusion which can be drawn from this evidence is that the bullet Tomlinson found on the stretcher in front of the rest room door had nothing to do with the assassination. Parkland was (and is) the largest hospital in Dallas and processes hundreds of gunshot victims every year. Doctor McClelland testified that Parkland,

    “receives all of the indigent patients of this county, many of whom are involved frequently in shooting altercations, so that we do see a large number of that type patient almost daily”.

    But it appears that the FBI didn’t think about that when they received the stretcher bullet at their labs on Friday night. And when they discovered that the bullet didn’t match Oswald’s rifle, they panicked. It was quite simple to fire a round from the alleged murder weapon into water or cotton wadding and use that bullet to replace the one that Tomlinson found. That would explain the near pristine condition of the bullet, the absence of blood and tissue, the missing initials of SA Todd, and those of the two Secret Service agents, as well as the adamant rejection of that bullet by Tomlinson and Wright.

    But there is an even better reason why we can be quite certain that CE399 was not the bullet that wounded Governor Connally. The real bullet was found on the second floor and recovered by a nurse, who then passed it on to officer Bobby Nolan, who then delivered it to the Dallas Police department. The confirmation of this begins with Governor Connally. This is from his autobiography entitled, “In History’s shadow”.

    “..the most curious discovery of all took place when they rolled me off the stretcher, and onto the examining table. A metal object fell to the floor, with a click no louder than a wedding band. The nurse picked it up and slipped it into her pocket. It was the bullet from my body, the one that passed though my back, chest and wrist and worked itself loose from my thigh.

    There was enormous significance to that scrap of metal, but I can’t be certain how many years later I understood the importance of it. I have always believed that three bullets found their mark. What happened in the hospital demonstrated how easily a bullet could have been swept aside and lost..

    What the governor obviously didn’t realize however, is that the bullet was not “swept aside”. Certainly, the nurse who recovered it would not have just discarded the most important piece of forensic evidence she had ever handled. As it turned out, the Dallas District attorney arrived at the hospital, eager to find out how his old friend, Governor Connally was doing. It seems that he arrived at about the same time that the surgery on the governor was completed, when he ran into that same nurse who found the bullet. This is from an interview of Dallas District attorney, Henry Wade, by the Dallas Morning News.

    I also went out to see (Gov. John) Connally, but he was in the operating room. Some nurse had a bullet in her hand, and said this was on the gurney that Connally was on. I talked with Nellie Connally a while and then went on home.

    Q: What did you do with the bullet? Is this the famous pristine bullet people have talked about?

    A: I told her to give it to the police, which she said she would. I assume that’s the pristine bullet.

    The nurse promptly carried out the district attorney’s instructions, passing the bullet to the nearest uniformed officer in sight, who happened to be Dallas Hwy Patrolman, Bobby Nolan, who was standing in the hallway talking to Connally aide, Bill Stinson. This is from my interview of Nolan in 2010.

    I was talking to a man who was one of governor Connally’s aides. His name was – I think it was either Stinton or Stimmons (Bill Stinson). And he was an aide to the Governor. And she came up and told him that she had the bullet that came off of the gurney. Now I don’t know what gurney. I think they meant Governor Connally’s gurney. And she said, “What do you want me to do with it?” He and I were just sitting there in the hallway talking to me and said, “Give it to him”

    Q. Was it a bullet fragment or a complete bullet?

    Nolan: I don’t know. It was a  – they told me that it was a bullet. And I don’t know if it was a fragment of a bullet or a whole bullet because it was in a little, small brown envelope. And it was sealed and it was about, I’d say 2 by 3 inches. And it was in that envelope when I got it and I never did look at it or anything.”

    Q. Now when the nurse gave it to you, did she describe it as a bullet fragment or as a bullet.

    Nolan: Uh no. She just said it was a bullet. That’s all.

    Nolan delivered the bullet to the Dallas Police department that evening, and the next morning, was interviewed by the FBI, who reported (emphasis is mine), Bobby M. Nolan, Texas highway patrolman, Tyler district, was interviewed relative to a bullet fragment removed from the left thigh of Governor Connally, which was turned over to him at Parkland Hospital in Dallas for delivery to the FBI.

    Nolan stated his instructions were apparently not clear at the outset and that following contact with his superior officers while at the Dallas Police Department, he turned the bullet fragment over to Captain Will Fritz [Dallas Police Department.] at approximately 7:50 p.m. He stated he had no further information concerning the matter and that his only participation in this series of events was the acceptance of the fragment and delivery of same to Captain Fritz.
    Obviously, Nolan told the FBI, exactly what the nurse told him – that the envelope contained a bullet from Governor Connally’s gurney, which as the Governor himself stated, had fallen out from the wound in his “thigh”.

    So, by Saturday, the FBI had already received the bullet that Tomlinson found and had plenty of time to analyze it and confirm that it was not from Oswald’s rifle. A second Connally bullet would provide indisputable proof of multiple snipers.

    At roughly the same time that this nurse was passing the bullet from Connally’s leg to Nolan, nursing supervisor, Audrey M. Bell was processing four tiny fragments that were removed from the governor’s wrist by Dr. Gregory. She told the HSCA and later, the ARRB that she removed the fragments from a container on the scrub nurse’s desk and placed them into an envelope, which she filled out and then gave to two plain clothed agents who came into her office. She was unsure whether they were from the Secret Service or the FBI, but was certain they were not in uniform. She said that both she and one of the agents, initialed the envelope and that the two of them then signed a receipt. All of this was standard operating procedure at Parkland, which Bell had carried out hundreds of times in the past.

    Audrey Bell was interviewed the next day (11/23/63) by the FBI, as she herself confirmed in her ARRB interview. But when she was shown a copy of the associated FBI report, she was adamant that the FBI was wrong. This is from ARRB document MD184, which summarized her interview,

    When shown an FBI FD-302 dated November 23,1963 (Agency File Number 000919, Record # 180-l 0090-10270), she felt it was inaccurate in two respects: it quotes her as turning over “the metal fragment (singular),” whereas she is positive it was multiple fragments – it says she turned over the fragment to a Texas State Trooper, whereas she recalls turning it over to plainclothes Federal agents who were either FBI or Secret Service.

    To corroborate her denial, Bell suggested that they look at the receipt she was required to fill out, which she had passed on to Parkland administrator, Jack Price. Of course, that receipt had to have been confiscated by the FBI, since it was critical to confirming the chain of custody. This is more from MD184,

    She independently recalled filling out a receipt on 1l/22/63 for the fragments, on half-page sized paper with red lettering in the letterhead, which was signed for by one of two men in civilian clothes (whom she thought were Federal agents) who accepted the fragments. She said she personally delivered the original of this receipt to Parkland Hospital Administrator Jack Price. (ARRB staff promised to try to locate this document, and promised that if located, we would mail her a photocopy for verification purposes.)

    But according to the National Archives, there is no record of the ARRB ever finding that receipt and the Archives were not able to find it either. So Bell’s receipt, which would have confirmed the name of at least one of the men she gave the envelope to, and which had to have been taken by the FBI, seems to have evaporated.

    This is the FBI report, allegedly from their interview dated, 11/23/63 with Audrey Bell.

    FBI report bell

    One thing that is beyond dispute is that the FBI’s references to a single fragment, could not be true. It makes no sense that Bell told them that. Even if we speculate that she was hopelessly confused, the envelope which the FBI tells us was filled out by Bell, clearly states that it contained “Bullet fragments” from Connally’s “Right arm”. And we can easily see that the clear plastic container that was in the envelope, contained four tiny particles.

    ce842

    The only logical explanation for why the FBI would have deliberately misrepresented Bell by claiming she reported only a single fragment is that the interviewer was not really concerned about the envelope that she actually handled. They were much more concerned about another envelope which did indeed, contain a single bullet or fragment (very likely, a badly mangled bullet) from Governor Connally’s thigh. In order to make that inconvenient bullet and envelope go away, they only needed to claim that the envelope Bell gave to one of their agents, was the one that Nolan received. All that was missing was the three capital letters from Nolan’s initials, which could be easily forged and copied onto CE-842.

    The other FBI claim that Bell denied, was that she passed the envelope to the fully uniformed officer Nolan. If we believe the FBI, then we must believe that Bell not only forgot that she gave her envelope to Nolan on 11/22, but that she also forgot that she told the FBI that, the next day. She also would have to have suffered the delusion that she gave the envelope to plain clothed officers who came into her office.

    All of these discrepancies have to have been the result of either deliberate deception by the FBI or a hopelessly incompetent and forgetful Audrey Bell. If Bell was the problem, then she not only forgot virtually every aspect of how she processed those bullet fragments on 11/22/63, but during the minutes between filling out that envelope and her encounters with DA Wade and officer Nolan, she forgot that she had just written “bullet fragments” from the “Right arm” and told both of those men that it contained a single bullet from Governor Connally’s gurney, that originated in his left thigh. And then Nolan somehow didn’t notice that the envelope he carried around the rest of the day and turned in to the DPD, was clearly labelled as containing multiple fragments from the right arm.

    As we ponder the possibility that this was a scam on the part of the FBI, we might think that the people who worked with nurse Bell would provide an answer for us. Surely, if she had really told the FBI that she gave the fragments to Nolan, others would have known about it. But as I looked at the statements by those who should have known, I found absolutely no one who claimed either first hand knowledge, one way or the other, or even a second hand claim that Bell told them who she gave them too. This is what Dr. Charles Gregory told the Warren Commission,

    Mr. SPECTER – What did you do, Dr. Gregory, with the missile fragments which you removed from his wrists?

    Dr. GREGORY – Those were turned over to the operating room nurse in attendance with instructions that they should be presented to the appropriate authorities present, probably a member of the Texas Rangers, but that is as far as I went with it myself.

    And this is the HSCA’s report of what Dr. Gregory told them,

    He (Doctor Gregory) stated he did not on his own knowledge know, however, but he had been advised [that] Miss Bell obtained a receipt from State Trooper Bob Nolan [a State of Texas highway patrol officer] and transferred the metal fragment to him in accordance with instructions from the Governor’s office at Parkland Hospital.

    As a full time emergency room physician, at Parkland, it seems strange that he could never provide a straight answer, regarding this nurse who worked with him every day. Why is it that he could only answer that he “had been advised”? And why was the source of his advice, unnamed?

    At the request of Dr. Burkley, the President’s physician, Parkland Doctor, Kemp Clark researched and prepared a report on 11/23/1963, describing events at the hospital related to the treatment of Connally and President Kennedy. For many years, it was filed away as “Top Secret”. In this section, he describes what Drs. Shires and Duke, who assisted Gregory, told him. In the first sentence of the cited segment, “he” refers to Shires.

    pricereport

    It seems that Shires’ initial statement, which was later altered, was that officer Nolan was given a single fragment from the “thigh”, since the word was later crossed out and replaced by “wrist”. But look at the oblique description of how Dr. Clark and Dr. Duke, came to the politically correct conclusion that Nolan was given wrist fragments:

    “I called Dr. Duke, the resident who was present when I talked with Dr. Shires. He had  heard our conversation, and had assisted Dr. Shires with this part of the surgery. Two of us conferred, and together agreed to release to Mrs. Wright the information that according to Dr. Shires, only one bullet was involved in Governor Connally’s injury and that the fragment of this bullet which was removed by Dr. Gregory from the wrist was in the possession of Ranger Nolan.”

    The wording here is fascinating and much more informative for what it doesn’t say than what it does. Notice that there is no straightforward declaration that Bell passed the wrist fragments to Nolan – only that the doctors, “agreed to release to Mrs. Wright the information that..”.

    And why was there, just one day after the assassination, this concern that “only one bullet was involved in Governor Connally’s injury”?

    That sounds much more like something the FBI would be worried about than the doctors.

    And why were they parroting the FBI’s mistaken claim that this was just a single fragment, rather that multiple fragments, as was clearly written on the envelope Bell was supposed to have filled out?

    And why is there no mention anywhere in the report about what supervisor, Audrey Bell had to say? She was on duty that day and just a buzz on the intercom, away. Why wasn’t she asked? Had she actually said what the FBI claimed she said, she would have been eager to confirm that she gave the wrist fragments to Nolan.

    It would not have been possible for the FBI to have pulled this scam, without the help of a least a doctor or two and probably, the nurse who actually recovered the Connally bullet. Of course, the notion that Parkland doctors or nurses were involved in a sinister coverup, is absurd. What is not so absurd however, is that like many others, they were told that if the investigation proved that there was a conspiracy, it would point to Fidel Castro and lead us into a crisis that could incite a nuclear, world war. In 1963, nuclear war was a fear that we all had to live with, every day of our lives. It was powerful enough to make even the most honest person, tell a little white lie if he was convinced that it was for the benefit of humanity.

    The notion that Bell handed over an envelope containing Connally’s wrist fragments to officer Nolan, fails in pretty much every conceivable way. Not only does that contradict what both Bell and Nolan told us, but there is no statement on record by any of her coworkers that she did such a thing, and no record of any of them even claiming that she said she did such a thing. But perhaps, what is stranger yet, is that no one claims to have even asked her. What is easily proven however, is that the FBI falsely claimed that Bell was processing only a single fragment. It is preposterous to think that she told them such a thing. What makes infinitely more sense is, that they needed to make an envelope go away, which really DID contain a single, large fragment or bullet. But they could not do that if her envelope only contained tiny, almost microscopic particles. And so they falsely quoted her, saying that she dealt with a single, metal fragment. And of course, their claim that she stated that she turned her single fragment over to officer Nolan, is equally preposterous.

    Nolan’s envelope was turned in at approximately 8:30PM on 11/22/63. From then on, the FBI had unrestricted access to the evidence and the right to open and inspect it. Whatever was really in Nolan’s envelope, had to have been known to the FBI, prior to their interviews of Nolan and Bell. If it had really contained tiny particles, they certainly would have said so, instead of referring to what could only have been, the singular content of the envelope Nolan delivered.

    The nurse who spoke to district attorney Wade and gave an envelope to Nolan could not have been Audrey Bell. Three men, Governor Connally, DA Henry Wade, and officer Bobby Nolan, all confirmed that this nurse recovered a bullet from Connally’s gurney and then showed it to Wade, before turning it over to officer Nolan. The envelope Bell processed, was given to an FBI agent, which is why it was never delivered to the Dallas police department, or at least, why there is no surviving record that it was.

    In contrast to all of these very solid corroborations, we have 100% denial by the four men who examined the bullet that Tomlinson found, that it was CE399. Unlike many other issues related to the case, this one is not a tough call. It seems that J. Edgar Hoover agreed, because in recordings of telephone conversations between him and LBJ, he suggested that Connally was wounded because he came between the President and an assassin, and that if Connally had not come between them, JFK would have taken his bullet.

    LBJ: How did it happen they hit Connally?

    JEH: Connally turned to the President, when the first shot was fired and I think that in turning.. it was where he got hit.

    LBJ: If he hadn’t turned he probably wouldn’t have gotten hit?

    JEH: I think that is very likely.

    LBJ: Would the President’ve gotten hit by the second one?

    JEH: No, the President wasn’t hit with the second one.

    LBJ: I say, if Connally hadn’t been in his way?

    JEH: Oh, yes, yes. The President would no doubt have been hit!

    Today, we know that that scenario was not correct, but it is hard to imagine Hoover believing that Connally was hit by a different assassin, unless he had seen evidence for such a thing. The bullet or large fragment that Nolan turned in, was obviously, not from Oswald’s rifle. If it was, the FBI would have flaunted it as absolute proof of the accused assassin’s guilt. Instead, it provided absolute proof that Connally was hit by a bullet from a different assassin. Until recently, only Hoover and a handful of others, were aware of that.

    (proofing and other assistance by Alan Dale.)

  • The Impossible One Day Journey of CE 399


    (with a little help from J. Edgar Hoover)

    In 1966, Ray Marcus wrote a very important monograph called The Bastard Bullet. It detailed the journey of the bullet found by hospital attendant Darrell Tomlinson and chief of security O. P. Wright at Parkland Hospital to FBI headquarters on the evening of November 22, 1963. Marcus’ work was exemplary for that time. But since then, and with help from the Assassination Records Review Board, more information has emerged that fills in some of the cracks and crevices in that incredible journey. Specifically this is the work of Gary Aguilar and Josiah Thompson in the essay entitled “The Magical Bullet of the Kennedy Assassination” (The Assassinations, edited by James DiEugenio and Lisa Pease) and two essays at the JFK Lancer site by John Hunt: “Phantom Identification of the Magic Bullet” and “The Mystery of the 7:30 Bullet”.

    With this new work in mind, let us update the work of Ray Marcus in regard to the impossible journey of CE 399 on the day President Kenendy was shot. Keeping in mind, that as Dr. Cyril Wecht has noted, the Single Bullet Theory is the “sine que non” of the Warren Commission. Without it, the Commission’s verdict collapses and you hae a conspiracy. And without the Commission’s shiny copper coated, virtually pristine CE 399, there is no Single Bullet Theory.

    1. CE 399 begins its magical journey at Parkland Hospital. A bullet rolls out from under a mat and lodges against the side of the gurney. (Mark Lane, Rush to Judgment, p. 79) Question: How did it get under the mat? Remember, the Commission will later say this bullet was in John Connally’s body last. No one has ever answered this question.
    2. Even Vincent Bugliosi admits that the stretcher it originated from is under question. (Reclaiming History, End Notes, p. 426) But Bugliosi understates the problem here. The weight of the evidence says that the gurney it was found on belonged to neither President Kennedy nor Governor John Connally. (Sylvia Meagher, Accessories After the Fact, pgs. 174-176; Josiah Thompson, Six Seconds in Dallas, pgs. 154-64) It would be a physical impossibility for the bullet to somehow jump from Ron Fuller’s stretcher—where Thompson concludes it was found on- to someone else’s.
    3. When hospital attendant Darrell Tomlinson notices it, the bullet has no blood or tissue on it. (Meagher, p. 173) Yet the Commission will say that this bullet went through two men and caused seven wounds.
    4. But yet, it’s even worse than that. Why? Because the Commission will eventually say that the last resting place of this bullet was in the thigh of Governor Connally. How could 1.) The bullet reverse trajectory and work its way out? 2.) How could it emerge out of a wound it already made? Most pathologists will tell you that entry wounds slightly shrink afterwards. 3.) Further, how could it have no blood or tissue on it if it traversed backwards?
    5. Tomlinson picks up the bullet at about 1:45 PM and takes it to security officer O. P. Wright. (Thompson, p. 156) Wright is very familiar with firearms since he was with the sheriff’s office previously. (ibid, p. 175) Wright gets a good look at the bullet, he notes it as a lead colored, pointed nosed, hunting round. (ibid) This is extremely important since this bullet will change shape and color by the end of its journey.
    6. This bullet will be passed through to Secret Service officers Richard Johnsen and Jim Rowley. (Hunt, “The Mystery of the 7:30 Bullet; http://www.jfklancer.com/hunt/mystery.html) Yet neither of them will initial the bullet. (Hunt, “Phantom Identification of the Magic Bullet”; http://jfklancer.com/hunt/phantom.htm) And later, neither positively identified it. (Aguilar, p. 282)
    7. At the White House, Rowley turns a bullet over to FBI agent Elmer Todd. They sign a receipt. The time of the transfer is 8:50 PM on the 22nd. (Hunt, “The Mystery of the 7:30 Bullet”)
    8. Yet as John Hunt shows, agent Robert Frazier at the FBI lab enters the stretcher bullet’s arrival into his notes at 7:30! (ibid) As Hunt notes, if Frazier and Todd can both tell time, something is really wrong here. Frazier has received a bullet that Todd has not given him yet.
    9. But it’s even worse. For in an FBI document it says that Todd’s initials are on the bullet. (CE 2011, at WC Vol. 24, p. 412) Yet as Hunt has amply demonstrated, they are not there. (Hunt, “Phantom Identification of the Magic Bullet”) In other words, no one who carried this bullet in transit for law enforcement purposes–Johnsen, Rowley, Todd–put their initials on it. When that is what they are trained to do.
    10. Later on, J. Edgar Hoover realizes he has a problem. So he writes up a document saying that agent Bardwell Odum visited Parkland, and Wright and Tomlinson did identify the bullet in June of 1964. (Aguilar, p. 282)
    11. But later, when visited by Gary Aguilar and Tink Thompson, this is exposed as another in the long line of Hoover generated lies in this case. For Odum did no such thing, and he says he would have recalled doing so since he and Wright were friends. (ibid, p. 284)
    12. The night of the assassination, the FBI calls Tomlinson about midnight. They tell him to be quiet about what he found that day. Since what he found that day was a lead colored, sharp nosed hunting round, they must not want him to tell anyone about the bullet. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, p. 365; David Lifton, Best Evidence, p. 591) A natural question to ask is: Why? A natural answer is: Because they have realized that the original bullet will not match the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle now attributed to Oswald.
    13. When Wright composes his affidavit for the WC, incredibly, he leaves out his co-discovery of the bullet and his giving it to the Secret Service. (Lifton, ibid) Even though Johnsen recorded this and its in the volumes. (Thompson, p. 155) Since he was a former law enforcement officer, to leave something like that out, he was probably directed to.
    14. When it comes time to write the Warren Report, Wright’s name is not in it. And there is no evidence Arlen Specter interviewed him.
    15. In late 1966, we find out why Specter avoided him. Thompson interviews him and he rejects CE 399 as the bullet he gave Johnsen. Twice. (Thompson, p.175) Interestingly, in Reclaiming History, Vincent Bugliosi leaves this powerful incident out of his discussion of the issue. (Bugliosi, End Notes, pgs. 426-27, 544-45)

    To say that the chain of evidence rule has been violated in this case is a monumental understatement. Former Chief of Homicide in New York, attorney Bob Tanenbaum once said that it would be embarrassing to present this material to a jury for the prosecution. For me, the most incriminating elements is the evidence that the FBI knew that CE 399 was not the original bullet i.e. the call to Tomlinson, the fake Odum document, possibly the influence over Wright to leave it out of his affidavit, Specter avoiding Wright in the Commission inquiry.

    So from the beginning, with its reverse trajectory out of the thigh of Connally, to its incredible tunneling under a mat, to its leaping out of Ron Fuller’s stretcher and magically knowing it has to be on the governor’s, to its shocking ability to alter its form and color, and then to actually crack the time barrier and be in Frazier’s office before Todd gives it to him, the Impossible Journey of CE 399 is even more magical than anyone ever could imagine.

    What is truly incredible about the above demonstration is that I have left all the other arguments about the Magic Bullet out i.e. weight and trajectory etc. To me, in the face of the above, they are irrelevant. The CE 399 we know was not found at Parkland. And that ends this argument.

    Everything else—the computer simulations, the drawings etc.—is irrelevant. As Shakespeare said, it is sound and fury signifying nothing. At the time of the assassination, CE 399 as we know it today, did not exist.

  • Russ Baker, Family of Secrets


    This book has a rather deceptive title. In two ways.

    First, although it says it will be about the Bush family, strictly speaking, it really is not. There are only a few pages about Prescott Bush, father of George H. W. Bush, the man who really started off the whole regime. But further, there is next to nothing on important figures in George’s brood like Neil, Marvin, and especially, Jeb Bush. Which means that the book really examines the careers of two men only: George Bush Sr. and Jr.

    But it’s even more constricted than that. From a careful reading of the volume, the book spends over 40% of its text on just three events in the lives of those two men. In order they are: Senior’s alleged involvement in the JFK case and Watergate; and Junior’s much debated service in the Texas Air National Guard. That’s it. Check for yourself. Think for a moment of all the rather dark and deadly things those two men have been involved with. Its hard to believe that Baker makes short work of the following: the Iran/Contra affair, the elimination of the Sandinistas through lethal means, the October Surprise, Gulf War I, Oliver North’s drug running, the election heists of 2000 and 2004, the incredible intelligence failure that resulted in 9-11, the phony pretenses for Gulf War II, and the 2007 collapse of the American economy. That list is, of course, selective and reductive. But Baker gives all of these matters the once over. In fact, some are not dealt with at all. It is an odd choice.

    Baker would probably say that there have been reams written about the above topics. Which is true. Yet, there are two salient points to be made in that regard. First, one can always do more digging into matters like the above. For the simple reason that they are very large and complex subjects that have yet to be exhausted. One great comparison is what Jim Hougan did with Watergate. By the time he issued Secret Agenda in 1984, there had been scores of books written on the matter. Yet his book made you reconsider the whole affair from Step 1. Secondly, the Bush family role in the above events I listed is certain. It is not a matter of manufacture, conjecture or speculation. As we shall see, that is not the case with two of the three areas that Baker has chosen to concentrate his book on.

    I

    Let us start with what I perceive to be the strength of the book. This would be the discussion of George Bush Jr. and his rather weird and spotty service in the Texas Air National Guard. Baker had written about this subject previously and at length in publications like The Nation. So this is clearly something he had followed through time as the issue gradually mushroomed in importance. The climax of its public debate was the veritable explosion that erupted at CBS in 2004-05. As Baker describes it, Dan Rather and others were dragged over the coals when they used some questionable copied documents to explain the gaps in President Bush’s service in the Guard.

    The problem all began in 1968, after Bush Jr. graduated from Yale. Once out of college, George would lose his student deferment and almost certainly be eligible for a tour in Vietnam. The problem was this: although the Bush clan supported the war in public for political fodder, they secretly understood it was a terrible mistake that was not worth fighting in, much less dying over. So they had to finesse George W. Bush dodging his impending service in Indochina. The clan decided on an exit ticket: W. would join the National Guard.

    Specifically, George would join the 147th Fighter Wing of the Texas Air National Guard. The trouble was that, understandably, many young men in Texas wanted to join this group at the time. It was nicknamed the “Champagne Unit” because many of the offspring of wealth and power joined up to dodge combat in Vietnam (p. 139) In fact, special positions were created to accommodate the many demands for entry. (ibid)

    The Bush story has been that George talked to unit commander Lt. Col. Walter Staudt and Staudt told him positions were open. (p. 138) In reality, strings were pulled by state Speaker of the House, Ben Barnes, to get Bush Jr. into the unit. (p. 139) But, once in, W. got even more special treatment. Usually, to be commissioned a second lieutenant, one has to either attend officer training school, pull 18 prior months of service, or have 2 years of ROTC. Bush did none of these, but he still got the commission. (p. 140) Secondly, the unit paid to train Bush to be a pilot from square A. Which was another exception to procedure. The unit usually either borrowed trained pilots from the Air Force or further trained those who had had some experience. Bush had none. (p. 139)

    And then there were the strange interludes, let us call them vacations. After George Jr. took six weeks of basic training in San Antonio, he got a two-month leave to work on Ed Gurney’s Senate campaign in Florida. (p. 140) Gurney’s campaign was being run by a friend of Bush Sr. named Jimmy Allison. It was after this episode that Bush Jr. took his first training lessons, on both a Cessna and a simulator, in Valdosta, Georgia. That took about a year. (p. 141) He then returned to the Houston area and Ellington Field for the “more daunting task of learning to fly a real fighter jet.” (ibid)

    In the summer of 1970, having completed his jet pilot training, his full-time obligation now transformed to a part-time status, usually referred to as a “weekend warrior”. But after this, in early 1972, something began to go wrong with Bush’s flying career. For some reason that has never been fully explained, he was taken out of the cockpit and placed in a two-pilot training plane. (p. 148) From which he had already graduated. Sort of like going back to trainer wheels after one has learned to ride a bicycle. On these regressive two-seater flights, his friend Jim Bath sometimes accompanied him. It didn’t seem to work. Because back in the F-102, he needed three passes before he made a landing. In fact, he had become such a liability in the air that, according to the author, the last documented record of him flying alone is April 16, 1972. (ibid) He then left both the unit and the state. The problem is he had not fulfilled his time obligation yet. This now begins the second stage of murkiness to the Bush National Guard saga: in addition to not flying again, did he or did he not fulfill the rest of his service obligation?

    The latter question is partly covered up by another political campaign. George Jr. said he now was going to work on another Allison managed enterprise. This one was the senate run of Red Blount in Alabama. So George Jr. requested a transfer to the 187th Tactical Reconnaissance unit in Montgomery at Dannelly Field. The question then became: Did Bush Jr. then fulfill his service at Dannelly? Well, the former base commander said the following: “I’m dead certain he didn’t show up.” (p. 150) And in fact, as Baker writes, “no credible records or eyewitnesses ever emerged to back” his claim of fulfilling his weekend service requirement in Alabama. (ibid) In fact, former members of the Dannelly unit ran ads offering monetary rewards in a Guard periodical to anyone who had any evidence that George Jr., had fulfilled his service. No one replied to the ads. (ibid) But Baker did find a number of witnesses who testified to Bush being a rather boisterous drunk during the Blount campaign, and two who said he combined his alcohol intake with illicit drugs. (p. 151)

    And this angle perhaps links to why George had to get out of flying, and also the 147th. According to a witness who talked to Jerry Killian, Bush’s wing commander, Bush was getting the jitters about flying. Killian said he “was having trouble landing, and that possibly there was a drinking problem involved.” (ibid)

    After Blount’s loss in November of 1972, George Jr. packed his bags and returned to Texas. But he did not return to Ellington as he was supposed to do so. He first went to Washington DC and then to Florida for the holidays. He then returned to Dannelly in Alabama for a routine x-ray, except, oddly, it was done by a dentist. (p. 153) He also called a former female Blount worker and invited her to dinner. Over dinner, he told her he was there for guard training. As Baker notes, this sure sounds like George Jr. was laying in a future CYA trail to disguise the facts that a.) he had not served in Alabama and b.) he was not returning to Ellington.

    Junior now went back to Texas to try to allegedly fulfill his service requirement. Except his superiors did not want him back. (p. 154) In fact, there is no record of him serving back at Ellington after Alabama. Further, no paperwork for alternative service in Alabama was ever sent to Ellington. (p. 156) As Baker logically deduces, “Just about all the evidence suggests that George W. Bush went AWOL from National Guard duty in May 1972 and never returned, thus skipping out on two years of a six-year military obligation.” (ibid) Clearly, someone was pulling strings for Bush Jr. As Texas reporter Jim Moore wrote, if Guardsmen missed drills or were late they were hunted down and arrested. If they missed a second exercise you could be made eligible for the draft. (p. 157) Who was doing the pulling for W.? Well, at around this time, George Bush Sr. was becoming head of the Republican National Committee.

    From the beginning of Junior’s political career his handlers knew this National Guard episode was going to be a problem. When Moore first questioned W. about it during a debate for the Texas governorship in 1994, he was later accosted by campaign advisers Karen Hughes and Karl Rove. (pgs. 407-08) They wanted to make it clear that these questions were somehow out of bounds. But as Bush’s career advanced along to the point that he was now considering running for president, the issue would not go away. And it appears that when the presidency got on their radar screens, the Bush team fiddled with the files.

    According to Guard manager Bill Burkett, this began in 1997. After a call from a Bush staffer, he saw some Guardsman in a room with Bush’s file. It was being pilfered. One of the documents discarded was a ‘counseling statement’. This explained why George was being grounded and the changes in assignment, slot, and his wages. (p. 411) Burkett first made these claims at that time. He then wrote letters to state legislators. He then phoned Bush adviser Dan Bartlett. (ibid) Burkett was then sent to Panama in 1998. He got sick on his way back and had problems getting his medical benefits. People who tried to help him in the Guard were fired.

    As Baker summarizes it, whatever one thinks of Burkett, there are documents missing from Bush’s Guard file that should be there. For instance, on how Texas handled his transfer to Alabama, and also a panel report that should have been written up after Bush stopped flying. (p. 412) Further, “microfilm containing military pay records for hundreds of Guardsmen, including Bush, was irreversibly damaged”. (ibid) This also occurred in 1997, the year when Burkett’s reported pilfering incident allegedly happened.

    What is so utterly fascinating about this whole sorry tale is that no MSM source did any real reporting on it until late May of 2000. This was when W. had more or less vanquished the GOP field and was closing in on the presidential nomination. Only then did reporter Walter Robinson of the Boston Globe break a story , which included interviews with Bush’s former commanders who did not recall seeing him in Alabama or Texas in 1972 or ’73. (ibid)

    Mickey Herskowitz made this saga even more interesting. Herskowitz was a longtime Texas sportswriter who also co-wrote several biographies of celebrities e.g. John Connally and Mickey Mantle. The writer knew George Bush Sr. and he suggested that he co-write a book with his son in time for the 2000 presidential campaign. Karl Rove OK’d the project and W. said he would do it if he didn’t have to work too hard. He also wanted to know how much money was in it. (p. 420) But W. also worried if there was enough material there for a book since he thought he had not really accomplished all that much. Therefore he felt it might be a good idea to focus on his policy objectives. When Herksowitz asked what those would be, W. replied, “Ask Karl.” (ibid)

    The pair had about twenty meetings about the book. Herskowitz said that although Bush was reserved about his National Guard service, he did say some interesting things. The writer asked him what he did about his obligation once he went to Alabama and served on the Blount campaign. Bush replied, “Nothing. I was excused.” (p. 420) This may or may not be true. But it contradicted the cover story that was already out there, and also later cover stories to come. Bush also told the author that he never flew a plane again after he left the Texas Guard in 1972, either military or civilian.

    There was one other tantalizing thing that W. told Herskowitz. He said that his father “had all this political capital built up when he drove the Iraqis out of Kuwait, and he wasted it … If I have a chance to invade … if I had that much capital, I’m not going to waste it. I’m going to get everything passed that I want to get passed…” (p. 423)

    This is a very important statement of course. For the attacks of 9-11 gave W. the opportunity to invade Iraq. And to complete the job that he thought his father had not. Even if Saddam Hussein had nothing to do with 9-11! That is how predisposed W. was on this issue before the 2000 campaign even began. And the fact that he had dodged his military service in Vietnam, and then gone AWOL in the Air National Guard personally made it easy for him to commit tens of thousands of young men to an awful war, since he had never come close to fighting in one. Therefore, with the terrible war in Iraq as a backdrop, Bush Jr. and his Guard service should have loomed large in the debate over sending young men into a questionable war. That the national media never pursued this angle with any relish or consistency tells us all we need to know about the state of the MSM at that time. Especially since W. was now sending National Guard troops to serve in Iraq. (p. 440)

    In 2004, right before the re-election campaign, things did heat up. Burkett appeared on Hardball and made his accusation about seeing Bush aides clean up the Guard records. This story had some bounce, as it later appeared on the CBS News and in the New York Times. (p. 447) Then two things happened to suck any helium left out of the balloon.

    First John Kerry, and his campaign manager Bob Shrum, made one of the biggest miscalculations in the history of presidential races. Rather than attacking the first four years of W.’s presidency, they decided to center Kerry’s nominating convention, and a large part of his early campaign, on his service in Vietnam. Baker properly scores them for this. It was a misguided strategy, especially in light of the fact that there was so much in the Bush presidency to go after. But we all know what made it worse. Karl Rove created the whole phony Swift Boat Veterans for Truth mirage. And, unchallenged at first by the Kerry campaign and the press, this Rove manufacture was allowed to disseminate through rightwing outlets like Fox News.

    The second event that helped bury the issue was the Dan Rather-Mary Mapes-CBS News bloodbath. Most of us know this story by now. Burkett got hold of some documents about George’s service in the Texas Guard. One seemed to depict a transfer from Killian due to George’s inability to meet standard on his pilot training, and his failure to get a physical. (p. 456) This, and 3-4 other documents whetted Mapes’, Rather’s 60 Minutes producer, appetite. She wanted to use the documents for a 60 Minutes segment on the issue.

    There were two problems with this. First, Burkett got them from a source who did not want his name divulged. In fact, this mysterious source did not even turn them over to Burkett. A go-between named ‘Lucy Ramirez’ did so. Consequently, the provenance of the documents was under a cloud. Second, the documents themselves were copies. Further, Mapes had Burkett fax them to CBS in New York. (p. 457) This resulted in further distortion of the lettering on the papers.

    Everyone knows what happened next. Via what appeared to be some GOP operatives who just happened to view the show, the Bush allies on the Internet began to question whether the documents were real or fakes. This created a tempest in the midst of an election campaign i.e. the whole phony issue of whether or not the “liberal media” was out to get a sitting GOP president. CBS management did a bad job in meeting this challenge. They eventually gave in and authorized an “independent panel”. Which, of course, was not really independent. Their job was to essentially get rid of or demote everyone involved with the program. How bad was this panel? They never even investigated or ruled on whether the documents were actually genuine.

    If Bush Jr. had planned it all in advance, it could not have turned out better for him. Through the Swift Boat mirage, his military service backfired on Kerry. And because of the Web attack, Bill Burkett, and the whole Texas Guard issue was taken out like a machete had cut it away.

    Beyond any doubt, this is the high point of the book. Baker combines some original reporting with work by people like Moore and Mapes to put together a good, juicy, and factually solid summary of this whole sorry episode. What it all says about W., and even worse, the national media, seems to me to be of the utmost importance and interest. The former abdicated his responsibility to the Guard. And the latter abdicated its responsibility to the public.

    II

    If the rest of Family of Secrets was as sound as this section, the book would have been a good and valuable effort. In my view, such is not the case. In fact, it’s not even close. And the bad part is that the rest of the book really means upwards of 90% of it. Baker’s reporting on Bush Sr. does not reveal anywhere near the amount of factual data, reliable testimony, logical inference, and investigative reporting that he does on the Texas Guard story. And since, as I note above, these other areas take up much more space than this first story, the overall effort suffers mightily for that.

    A clear objective of the book is to counter and modify the work of Joseph McBride for the Nation. In two essays done in 1988, McBride unearthed documents and interviews that indicated that Bush Sr. was involved in providing cover for Cuban exiles for the CIA. McBride did not go any further than what the documents indicated. He came to the conclusion that Bush’s actual CIA status-whether he was an agent or asset– could not be really evaluated. But it looked like he was a businessman used as an asset. One of the main objectives of Baker’s book is to somehow show that Bush Sr. was much more than just a CIA asset at the time of the Bay of Pigs. In fact, Baker tries to insinuate that Bush Sr. was a CIA officer from the fifties onward. In fact, his chapter on Bush Sr. becoming CIA chief in the mid-seventies makes this objective clear. It is entitled “In From the Cold”.

    Generally speaking the argument is made through three steps: 1.) Bush’s alleged service as an agent in the fifties 2.) His alleged role in the JFK case, and 3.) His alleged role in the Watergate effort to bring down President Nixon.

    I cannot do any better than Seamus Coogan did in his brief discussion of the import of the 1988 McBride articles. (Click here to view his essay.) The relatively brief McBride articles are also reprinted on pages 371-78 of Mark Lane’s book Plausible Denial. McBride does not pass judgment on what Bush actually was up to in the Agency. But he did interview a trusted source who said Bush had probably helped with the Bay of Pigs. Which would make sense. For as Seamus noted, Bush’s oil company operated off of Cay Sal island, about 40 miles off the coast of Cuba.

    Now, inexplicably, Baker writes that the McBride articles elicited a collective yawn from the media at the time of publication. (p. 11) Not really so. As McBride notes in his second piece, his story “received wide coverage in the media.” The Bush team’s initial denials, and the CIA’s break with tradition to issue a formal reply were extraordinary. It was made worse when, in a dumb stroke, the Agency tried to say the document actually referred to a different George Bush. McBride tracked down this second George Bush, who did work for the CIA at the time. From the interview, it is very hard to believe the memo from J. Edgar Hoover, warning of a possible exile attempt to attack Cuba in the wake of JFK’s death, referred to him. (Lane, pgs. 376-78) All this mucking about created a buzz in the press. Especially considering the fact that, back then, there was no Internet to speak of at all. But I think Baker wants to characterize it as much less than it was in order to somehow portray himself as a pioneer in uncovering the long ignored clandestine career of Bush Sr. In other words, McBride’s work was the tip of the iceberg and it greatly understated who Bush Sr. was and what his ties to the Agency really were. It took Baker to reveal it. Let us evaluate his case for the long withheld clandestine career of George Bush Sr.

    He begins his excavation on page 12. He says that researcher Jerry Shinley has found a document that places Bush’s service with the CIA back into the early fifties. The problem is that the phrasing in this document is quite ambiguous. It says that through a Mr. Gale Allen the CIA had learned in 1975 that Bush had knowledge of a terminated project dealing with proprietary commercial projects in Europe. Bush learned of them through CIA officer Tom Devine. Now, the fact that Devine told his sometime oil business partner about a since deceased CIA project does not mean that Bush Sr. was in the CIA. In the memorandum’s terms, at least as Baker presents it, the wording suggests what I just wrote: Bush had acquired the knowledge through Devine. Another problem is that Bush’s commercial projects were not in Europe, but in America and the Caribbean. So I got the feeling that, unlike with the Air Guard story, the author was stretching his data thin.

    That impression was strengthened when I discovered that, Baker was relying largely on one source for the rest of his information about Bush and the CIA prior to the Bay of Pigs. That source was the same one that John Hankey used in an online discussion with me, namely Joseph Trento’s 2005 book entitled Prelude to Terror. Let me explain why this creates a problem.

    Trento is a longtime writer on intelligence matters. In fact, he figures importantly in Lane’s Plausible Denial. But it’s the way he figures in that book that should have given Baker and Hankey pause. Trento is not an intelligence writer in the way that say Jim Hougan is. Hougan is a digger, a man who does not accept the world of intelligence by its surface measures or by what its maestros tell him. And it’s that skepticism that makes him a trusted and valuable source.

    Trento is not a digger. And he trusts what most of his sources tell him. To the point that sometimes he just writes their declarations out in sentence form. A good example of this would be his previous 2001 book, The Secret History of the CIA. Which, to put it mildly, did not live up to its title. Since two of Trento’s most trusted sources were CIA operators like James Angleton and Robert Crowley, the book has a definite spin to it. For example, in spite of much contrary evidence, it says that it was not Henry Cabot Lodge who spawned the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam, but President Kennedy. (Trento, p. 252) Trento, listening unswervingly to Angleton, characterizes Lee and Marina Oswald as Russian agents, and the Kennedy assassination as a KGB plot. (pgs. 258ff) Trento mentions the fact that George DeMohrenschildt said he had been told by the CIA to contact Oswald. But Trento, quoting Angleton writes, “Angleton, however, maintained that DeMohrenschildt worked for the KGB and that he was the Oswalds’ control officer.” (ibid, p. 258) He also adds that DeMohrenschildt took his own life in 1983, when in fact he died mysteriously in 1977. (ibid) Angleton tells Trento that Oswald’s cavorting around with Cubans in New Orleans was a KGB charade to blame the assassination on Cuba and not Russia. (ibid, p. 260)

    I could go on and on in this vein but let me just add this: Trento tells us that another of his sources, William R. Corson, was dispatched to Dallas by President Johnson to begin his own investigation of the case. (Trento, p. 267) And that Corson ended up working for the Warren Commission. Corson told Trento that Cuban DGI agents convinced Jack Ruby to kill Oswald. (ibid) Need I say that this last is right out of a Gus Russo disinformation script. And for the same reason. Just as Russo is ‘oh so trusting’ of his CIA sources, so is Trento.

    But what makes this last bit even more interesting is that of his three major sources, Corson is probably the most trustworthy. Corson was a military intelligence officer who served in Vietnam and wrote a highly critical book on US involvement in that struggle. But part of the problem is that Corson died in 2000. The two Trento books under discussion were both published afterwards. So whatever corrective influence Corson could have had on these last two books was probably weakened.

    In spite of all the compromising elements I have listed, its from Trento’s Prelude to Terror that Baker gets the large part of the rest of his information about George Bush and his previously secret ties to the CIA. In light of all I have outlined above, here is a question that Baker should have asked himself: “If this information about George Bush is true and viable, then why didn’t Trento use it in his previous book? After all, it was titled The Secret History of the CIA. Wouldn’t George Bush be part of that?”

    What makes this even worse is that in the area of Prelude to Terror where the early CIA employment of Bush is discussed, virtually every endnote is to an interview with a CIA officer. (See Prelude to Terror, pgs. 362-64) In other words, it’s all anecdotal. But furthering my original point, these interviews were almost all done many years ago. So why didn’t Trento use them in the previous book? It doesn’t help matters that almost all these interview subjects are now dead, so they can’t be cross-checked. Why should they be? Consider this: “It was in the late 1950’s that the covert operations culture called upon George H. W. Bush’s talents. Bush was at first a tiny part of Operation Mongoose, the CIA’s code name for their anti-Castro operations.” (ibid, p. 16) Baker didn’t seem to notice that the CIA could not have first called on Bush in the late 50’s to be part of Mongoose because Mongoose did not begin until 1962.

    Finally, let me add one last word about why the use of this book seems suspect to me. The general message of Trento’s tome is that the use of private intelligence networks, set up by people like Ted Shackley, has led to our present problems in places like Afghanistan. (ibid, pgs. 316-17). The book blames some of this on George Bush Sr. because of his well-known ties to the Saudi Arabian monarchy. It is also highly critical of this network’s Saudi ties to Pakistan and the death of President Zia. In fact, it blames the Saudis inability to keep control of Pakistan’s atomic weapons quest as the reason why the quest became Islamicized, that is, anti-Israel in intent. Who is a major source for Trento’s view of Bush and the Saudis in all this: Angleton’s scribe Edward Epstein. (See p. 324) I should note that one of Angleton’s later responsibilities in the CIA was supervising the Israeli desk and interfacing with Mossad.

    Baker writes not a word of caution, qualification, or warning about any of the above. That’s how much he wants to make Bush Sr. a longtime CIA operator. And the drive does not stop there. Not by any means.

    III

    As most commentators on the life of George Bush Sr. acknowledge, by the early sixties, he was trying to transition out of his previous petroleum business life style. He wanted to get into national politics-a goal at which he later succeeded in a big way. So in 1963 he was living in Houston and became chairman of the Harris County Republican Party. As such he was supporting Barry Goldwater for president. He also decided to run for the senate against liberal Democratic incumbent Ralph Yarborough. An important point to enumerate here, as Webster Tarpley and Anton Chaitkin do in George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography, is this: Bush was in on the beginning of the revival of the GOP in the south. And, unlike Dwight Eisenhower’s GOP version, it was a particularly virulent strain of the GOP. One that would eventually and naturally evolve into the Newt Gingrich slash and burn version, whose intent would be to essentially raze the New Deal.

    According to Tarpley, Bush had run hard for the county office in 1962, with his wife in tow. They went from meeting to meeting telling listeners that there had to be a viable two party system in Texas. It was from this county position that Bush decided to scaffold his run against Yarborough. He announced his candidacy on September 10, 1963. He would have to win a primary first before he took on the populist Yarborough.

    Just about all the above is missing from Baker’s treatment of Bush’s first senatorial run. To Baker, all this rather interesting drama takes a back seat to what he perceives as the real and hidden importance in that run: George Bush’s role as a covert CIA operative in the killing of John F. Kennedy. In fact, Baker devotes more pages to this subject than any other. (About 90 of them.) He begins his Chapter 4 on a rather unusual note, one that will establish his creeping solipsistic view. He actually implies that Bush became chair of the Harris country party not for the above stated political ends. Oh no. He did it so he could travel all over Texas. Why? Because “Bush’s political work, like his oil work, may have been a cover for intelligence activities.” (Baker, p. 49 By the way, the supposition about his oil work being a cover is largely from Trento.)

    A few pages later, on page 52, Baker introduces what will clearly be the main entrée for his theory of Bush the covert operator in the Kennedy hit. This is the Parrott memorandum. It is to Baker what the above-mentioned Hoover memorandum about Cuban exiles was to John Hankey in his film JFK 2. That is, Baker is going to drag every single piece of nuanced meaning he possibly can out of it. If the Parrott memo were a cow, Baker would have worked every last drop of not just milk–but blood, water, and tissue from it. To the point that someone would have had to kill the cow to put it out of its misery.

    To provide the background: on 11/22/63, George H. W. Bush called the FBI. He said that he had heard in recent weeks that a member of the Young Republicans named James Parrott had been talking about killing Kennedy when he arrived in Houston. The FBI characterized Parrot as rightwing, a quasi-Birchite, a student at University of Houston, and active in politics in the area. Further, that a check of Secret Service indices revealed that they had a report that Parrott had threatened to kill Kennedy in 1961. The FBI interviewed Parrott’s mother and then Parrott himself. They found out that Parrott had been discharged from the Air Force for mental reasons in 1959. Parrott said that he had been in the company of another Republican activist at the time of the shootings. Bush at first denied making the call, and then he said he did not recall making it. (See Tarpley, Chapter 8b.)

    In light of the above basic facts, let us watch what Baker does with this. First of all, if you were a covert CIA operator in on the Kennedy plot, would you announce in advance that you would be in Dallas to give a speech on the evening of 11/21? Further, would you put that announcement in the newspapers? Well, that is what Bush did in the Dallas Morning News on 11/20.

    At the actual time of the assassination, Bush was in Tyler, Texas. The author says he made the FBI call about Parrott to establish an alibi. This makes no sense. Why? Because Bush already had an alibi. As Kitty Kelley established, the vice-president of the Kiwanis Club-a man named Aubrey Irby-was with Bush at the time of Kennedy’s murder. Along with about a hundred other people. For Bush was about to give a luncheon speech at the Blackstone Hotel. He had just started when Irby told him what had happened. Bush called off the speech. (Baker, p. 54) Question for the author: With about 101 witnesses, why would you need a phone call to establish your alibi?

    The author then writes that Bush told the FBI he would be in Dallas later on the 22nd, and that he would be staying at the Sheraton that night. Baker finds it suspicious that he did not stay the night as he said he was going to. Or as Baker writes in his full Inspector Javert-or John Hankey-mode: “Why state that he expected to spend the night at the Dallas Sheraton if he was not planning to stay?” (p. 59) Well Russ, maybe he was planning to. But because he later realized that Dallas would not be a real good place to campaign in that night, he changed his mind. I mean don’t you think the populace was mentally preoccupied?

    What Baker does with the figure of Parrott is just as odd. As Tarpley wrote, the man had been discharged from the Air Force for psychiatric reasons. He was from the rabid right in Texas, which is pretty rabid. And the Secret Service had a source that said he had made a threat against Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs. Baker soft pedals all this to the max. He tries to make Parrott into a sweet misunderstood lad who Bush somehow magically picked out to provide him an alibi he didn’t need. I could find no mention in Baker of the previous Secret Service file threat by Parrott which Tarpley mentions. And because that is not here, an important part of the story get jumbled.

    In Bush’s report to the Bureau, he mentioned a man named Keary Reynolds as someone who may have told him about Parrott. From Parrott and his mother, Baker says that Reynolds actually came to Parrott’s house to ask him to paint some signs for the GOP campaign. So this now becomes Reynolds giving Parrott an alibi. (Which, like Bush, he did not need. Because, as I wrote above, he had been with another Republican activist.)

    Baker then interviews Reynolds. Reynolds does not recall making the paint job offer or visiting the Parrot house. (pgs. 61-63) He says he vaguely recalled the name because a young man had come around HQ previously and someone told him that he had threatened JFK. He also recalled escorting Parrott to the Secret Service office on 11/22 because of that. So what Reynolds does is back up the Secret Service having a threat file on Parrott. He also seems to back up Bush hearing about this reactionary around HQ. Finally, he seems to undermine the whole “visit to Parrott’s house to offer a job” thesis. Reynolds says he was never at the Parrott home. Parrott and his mom may have fibbed about that to conceal the fact that the Secret Service called him in that day because of his past history. And also perhaps because of the Bush phone call.

    But Baker is still not done. Barbara Bush is apparently part of the plot, or at least the cover up. Barbara Bush wrote a note about her activities on 11/22/63. Addressed just generally to members of her family, it talks about her being at a beauty parlor when she heard the news on the radio of Kennedy being shot. (Baker, pgs. 53-54) Again, Baker gives the letter the Javert-Hankey going over. First, he asks where was George? Russ, Kitty Kelley already established where George was. Did you expect him to be at the hairdresser’s with his wife during a primary campaign? Back then, guys used combs and Brylcreem. Baker then asks why the letter had not surfaced earlier. Maybe because this was Barbara’s first book of personal memoirs? As far as I can see, that was the case. Barbara Bush did write one book previously called Millie’s Book, but that was really a children’s book about the White House, wryly written from the point of view of her dog. Baker/Hankey then asks for the original, which he says he cannot get since Bush and his wife would not talk to him for the book. I wonder why.

    What I think Baker is getting at-and he’s always getting at something or other– is this: Somehow Barbara faked this letter years later to establish another alibi. But again, for who? Her husband already had one. (I really hope Baker does not mean for herself.) Further, back in 1994 when her book was published, who harbored any suspicions about Bush Sr. and the JFK case? Hankey and Baker were years off.

    The rest of this overlong JFK section is, for me, even worse than the above. It basically amounts to what I scored Lamar Waldron and Thom Hartmann for in their two bad books: guilt by name association. A friend of the Bushes was letting them use their plane during the campaign. I think Baker means us to believe that this was not a friendly gesture between friends: Mr. Zeppa was really an accessory to the plot as he squired Bush around. Don’t ask me how or why. Jack Crichton was a pal of Bush’s in the Texas GOP. But Crichton, in turn, was a friend of Deputy Police Chief Lumpkin who was driving the pilot car in Kennedy’s motorcade. What that means is never made clear. But Baker also brings up the fact that Crichton provided a translator for Marina Oswald who wrongly worded her Russian phrases. What Baker leaves out is that Marina had a few translators, and they were all questionable.

    In spite of the speciousness of the above, Baker caps it off with Jack Ruby’s famous speech in an empty courtroom about people in “very high positions” putting him in the place he was in after his conviction for murder. (p. 118) I actually think Baker wants to imply that Ruby was referring to Bush.

    If he was doing that, all I can say is, Baker has as much unearned chutzpah as John Hankey. And in regards to the JFK case, he also has about as much balance and judgment as his soul brother does. Let us note just how misguided the guy is. For the sake of argument, let us grant him one of his premises in regards to the Parrott episode: That it was a charade meant to divert attention. (And with all I pointed out above, that is a very generous grant of credit.) Here’s my question: What would be the point of a diversion if both Bush and Parrott had credible alibis? Which they did. This is what the author says: “Poppy Bush was willing to divert the investigative resources of the FBI on one of the busiest days in its history.” (p. 65) When I read that I had a Hankeyian moment: I didn’t know whether to laugh or cry. Can Mr. Investigative Journalist Russ Baker really be this ignorant about the FBI and the Kennedy murder? As Tony Summers discovered long ago, J. Edgar Hoover was “working” on the Kennedy case from the racetrack the next day. (Summers, Official and Confidential, p. 315) As everyone except perhaps Baker knows, Hoover had closed the case against Oswald within about 2-4 hours. (Vanity Fair, 12/94, p. 90) He did so for many reasons, including the strong possibility that Oswald was an FBI informant. So the fix was in almost immediately. And it never let up. The idea that somehow Hoover was actually going to investigate 1.) Who Oswald really was, and 2.) What the true circumstances of the murder were is a preposterous tenet. But that is somehow what Baker is proposing: the Parrott episode somehow upset Hoover’s apple cart.

    Concerning J. Edgar Hoover and the JFK case, Baker is only slightly less silly than John Hankey.

    IV

    As was established in The Unauthorized Biography of George Bush, from their days in the oil business in Texas, Bush Sr. knew George “the Baron” DeMohrenschildt. This was probably because the Baron partnered an oil investment firm with Eddie Hooker. (Baker, p. 75) Hooker had been Bush’s roommate at Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts. (ibid, p. 72) And they had stayed friends through the years.

    After giving a brief but serviceable overview of the Baron and his brother Dimitri, plus the development of the White Russian community in Dallas, the author begins to describe why the Baron was in Haiti at the time of Kennedy’s assassination. According to Baker, it was only the Baron’s distance from Dallas at the time of the murder that allowed his actions to escape the purview of the Warren Commission. (p. 113) Again, this shows how shallow Baker is on his view of the Kennedy case. Can he really be serious? Who the heck did not escape the purview of the Warren Commission? You can make a pretty good list of all those they had myopia about. In addition to DeMohrenschildt, there was Ruth and Michael Paine, David Ferrie, Clay Shaw, Guy Banister, Kerry Thornley, Sergio Arcacha Smith, Sylvia Duran, and even Sylvia Odio (who the Commission never took seriously). And that’s just those dealing with Oswald’s direct associations. The Commission was a set-up from the start. And it was meant to be so. Whether DeMohrenschildt was in Haiti or not.

    He then compounds the above with this thundering truism: “The bottom line is that the Warren Commission did not assign a seasoned criminal investigator to figure out DeMohrenshildt’s relationship with Oswald and his larger circle of connections.” (p. 127) Oh really Russ? Maybe Baker doesn’t know that the Commission had no private ‘seasoned criminal investigators’ on their staff. They relied on the FBI, CIA and Secret Service. Who, as most informed observers realize, were covering things up. Baker didn’t know this? Maybe that’s why they publish him in the New York Times.

    The author found out the real reason that DeMohrenschildt was able to escape scrutiny. It wasn’t actually because of the above. It was the blinding obfuscation of the sisal plant. Hold on a moment. Let me explain this Bakeresque idiom. See, once DeMohrenschildt handed off Oswald to the Paines, he left Texas for Haiti. Before departing he and his partner had a couple of meetings with government agents i.e. the CIA and Army intelligence. He and his business partner Clemard Charles were then paid almost $300,000 by the Haitian government for geologic testing and a prospective sisal plantation. There has always been a question about whether or not this money was really a disguised reward for his mission with Oswald.

    As far as I can see, Baker ignores the money angle. He then says that the sisal proposal was a cover to disguise what DeMohrenschildt was really doing. (pgs. 104-105) I am assuming Baker means what he already did with Oswald. But here’s my question: Who was the sisal motif supposed to fool? Critics of the Commission have always been suspicious of the Baron and his Haiti payoff. The money may have been for his Oswald duties, or it may have been for a role in a later coup against the Duvaliers in Haiti. Which attempt did take place, and Charles was jailed for his perceived role in it. But the point is, what did Baker think was going to be discussed and put on paper before the two left? Did he really think the CIA or Army intelligence was going to write that the Baron was now coming off his clandestine assignment with the future patsy in the upcoming JFK murder? Or that the interviewers were going to outline the upcoming overthrow attempt? These kinds of thing do not get written about in memoranda.

    About 140 pages later, the DeMohrenschildt story gets picked up again. This time it’s in the midst of the hurricane created by the Church Committee, the Pike Committee, and the formation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations to reopen the JFK case. In September of 1976, the Baron wrote a short letter to the new CIA Director, George Bush. (p. 268) In it the Baron described the painful situation he now found himself in: he said his phone was bugged, he was being followed, and the FBI would not help him. He thanked his old acquaintance and asked him if he could do something to help.

    If anything, the Baron was underestimating his drastic situation. He did not describe two other elements. First, the psychological treatments he was getting, actually electroshock. This may have been from the loss of his daughter three years hence; or, as Jim Marrs has written, a mysterious doctor may have inflicted it on him. (Baker, p. 271) Secondly, the weird figure of Willem Oltmans was pursuing him, trying to get him to “confess” to his role in the Kennedy murder.

    Oltmans was a Dutch journalist who knew DeMohrenschildt from a few years back– 1968 to be exact. (HSCA testimony of Oltmans, p. 10) Just precisely what he was up to, or why he pursued George insistently over the years, these have never really been explained. But its interesting that after George suddenly died on 3/29/77-allegedly a suicide-Oltmans began to spread the news that the Baron had confessed to him before he supposedly took his life. It was a bizarre plot that involved Russian KGB agents with Texas oilmen. But, according to Oltmans, the Baron himself was also involved and Oswald had acted on his instructions in this plot. (ibid, p. 28). Oltmans began his campaign to tell the world of this right after his former friend died. He testified before the HSCA in closed session on April 1, 1977. When one reads this deposition you will note that the longer Oltmans talks, the less Deputy Counsel Bob Tanenbaum believes him.

    At around this time, reporter Jerry Policoff of New Times met with Oltmans in New York. Policoff had secured notes DeMohrenschildt had made while working on a manuscript left with his lawyer. The notes expressed his considerable fear of Oltmans and the reason he had fled from him in Amsterdam. He felt the journalist was trying to drug him in order to get him to say things he did not want to say. He also thought Oltmans was bisexual and was making a homosexual pass at him. Oltmans had heard that Jerry had secured the notes and got in touch with him to meet. Oltmans reacted to the notes by saying they were forgeries. Policoff said he was confident they were genuine. Oltmans then made some thinly disguised threats on his health. Policoff left. Oltmans’ behavior left Policoff with the strong suspicion he was some kind of intelligence asset. (Communication with Policoff, 6/24/10)

    Yet Oltmans was only one side of a pincers movement. Once George ran away from Amsterdam to escape him, Edward Epstein awaited him in the USA. And he promised the Baron thousands of dollars to just sit and talk with him about Oswald. In fact, Epstein was the last person to see him before DeMohrenschildt died. On the morning of his death, he had been subpoenaed by the HSCA. Epstein wanted to talk to George since he had been working on a biography of Oswald for Reader’s Digest. Epstein’s unofficial adviser was James Angleton. The book that derived from this effort, Legend, insinuates that the Baron was a KGB control agent for Oswald. The reader should note here the rough parallel with what Oltmans eventually was selling.

    Bush made two replies to the 9/76 missive by the Baron. One was to his staff, which had forwarded the letter to him. These are rough bullet notes saying the following: that he did know DeMohrenschildt, that the Baron got involved with dealings in Haiti, that his name was prominent in the Oswald affair, that the Baron knew Oswald prior to the JFK murder, at one time DeMohrenschildt had money, Bush had not heard from him in years, and he was not sure what his role was in the JFK matter. (p. 267)

    On the whole this is accurate. But Baker takes issue with the last two points. Concerning the first, he says that Bush was in contact with the oil geologist in 1971, and that DeMohrenschildt had written Bush a note when he became GOP County Chair in 1973. Bush may or may not have gotten that note. If he did not, he had not heard from him in about six years. Concerning the last, if Bush was not in on the JFK plot, then in 1976, that was a quite defensible stance.

    Bush wrote the Baron a brief letter back saying he sympathized with his situation. But although there was media attention to his case, he could not find any official interest right then. He then said he wished he could do more, and then signed off. Considering the fact that Epstein and Oltmans were likely working off the books for Angleton, his observation about “official interest” was probably correct. Thus ended the Bush/Baron relationship. Almost like he knows he has very little here, Baker tags on some meandering scuttlebutt about a man named Jim Savage who delivered the Baron’s car to him in Palm Beach on his return from Amsterdam. Its another of his Scrabble type name association games: Kerr-McGee, the FBI, Sun Oil, even the Pew family. (pgs. 275-277)

    The above two sections are pretty much the sum total of Baker’s work on Bush Sr. and the JFK murder. If anyone can find anything of significance here, something that somehow changes how we look at the case, please let me know. In all honesty, I can’t.

    V

    As threadbare as Baker’s work is on the JFK case, his two chapters on Bush Sr. and Watergate are probably worse (pgs. 175-252). In fact, having read much on the contemporary political scandals that have rocked the American scene, I would rank Baker’s work on Watergate with some of the most pretentiously empty political reporting I can recall. It’s so bad that it made me think he had a desperate rationale behind it all. (Which I will discuss later.)

    Baker begins his section on Watergate with a discussion of a scandal that is not even normally associated with Watergate. In fact, it may not even be a scandal. In early 1970, Richard Nixon authorized H. R. Haldeman to funnel funds from White House contributors to some 1970 congressional campaigns. The idea was to reward Nixon loyalists with campaign cash and ignore those who were not perceived as such.

    There are two important things to remember about the so-called Townhouse Operation. First, the machinations behind it occurred before any of the planning of the crimes associated with Watergate began. This would be the missions done by the infamous Plumbers units who did burglaries and surveillance operations. The planning of Townhouse predates the summer 1970 hiring of Howard Hunt by Charles Colson by about six months. (Jim Hougan, Secret Agenda, pgs. 32-33) Hunt did not start recruiting members of his Plumbers Unit until April of 1971. (Hougan, p. 29) Their first operations did not formulate until two months later with the NY Times exposure of the secret Pentagon Papers. (ibid) It was then that things like the burglary of Dan Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office and the forgery of documents linking President Kennedy with the death of Ngo Dinh Diem began. (ibid, p. 33) In fact, in the rather lengthy three articles of impeachment against Nixon prepared by the House of Representatives, you will not find any specific mention of the Townhouse Operation. (Click here)

    Further, none of the money funneled into Townhouse was used to finance the Plumbers illegal capers. Third, in a technical sense, it is hard to argue that Townhouse was illegal. For the simple reason that laws regulating campaign funds, and their eventual usage, were not enacted until after the Watergate scandal. In other words, although it was a ‘slush fund’, it was not a violation of law. For these reasons I was curious as to why the author began with Townhouse, an event which you seldom see even mentioned in chronicles of Watergate-either conventional or revisionist.

    And make no mistake, Baker has drunk deep the revisionist history of Watergate. So in an effort to set up a Nixon vs. CIA backdrop, he mentions Nixon’s desire to attain secret CIA files that Richard Helms was reluctant to turn over. (p. 181) He says that Nixon wanted CIA files on the days near the end of the Kennedy administration. Hmm, maybe dealing with the Kennedy assassination? Problem: the paragraph where he mentions this is not footnoted. But the next paragraph is. In that paragraph Baker has John Ehrlichman telling Bob Haldeman that the CIA is holding something back and the way they are acting, it must be dynamite. The problem with this quote is that when I looked it up in the source Baker named, The Haldeman Diaries, I couldn’t find it where he said it was. I then searched that book for all references to CIA Director Richard Helms, who Baker said Nixon demanded the documents from. Still no luck.

    Now, most informed observers know that there are two sources for this ‘secret file” tale. Haldeman wrote about a meeting with Richard Helms in which he was instructed by Nixon to mention the whole “Bay of Pigs thing”. Helms came unglued when he did. So Haldeman came to believe that the phrase was a code term for the JFK murder. (See pgs. 38-39, of Haldeman’s The Ends of Power. But oddly, in those pages, Haldeman writes that although he actually wanted to do a private inquiry into the JFK case, Nixon turned it down.)

    Another source for this is Ehrlichman’s roman a clef novel, The Company. In that work, Ehrlichman is referring specifically to the secret Bay of Pigs Inspector General report. But what Baker writes here is simply confusing. He refers to “[relevant files] … regarding the turbulent and little-understood days leading up to the end of the Kennedy administration”. These secret CIA documents do not exist anywhere that I know of in file form. So what Baker is referring to, and why he uses it, are things never really made clear. And the author reveals his own confusion when he later contradicts himself by saying the files Nixon was seeking were about the Bay of Pigs. Which, of course, was at the beginning of the Kennedy presidency. (Baker, p. 200)

    The reader should note: with Townhouse, which is not really part of Watergate, and these nebulous “secret CIA files”, Baker is off to a rather unpromising start. He never recovers.

    As I said, Baker has read much of the Watergate revisionist library. He will now cherry pick from it in a way worthy of the likes of Lamar Waldron in order to fulfill his own agenda. Incredibly, the author writes the following: “My independent research takes … the facts in a completely new direction. It leads to an even more disturbing conclusion as to what was really going on, and why.” (Baker, p. 204) As we will see, Baker did next to no new research on Watergate. And his new direction is a fabricated one that I can guarantee no one will follow in the future since it is based upon quicksand.

    It was under Nixon that George Bush actually became a player on the national stage. In fact, one can argue that it was Nixon who salvaged Bush’s political career. Bush had tried to break into that national theater in two runs for the senate from Texas. He first lost to Ralph Yarborough and then to Lloyd Bentsen. Afterwards, Nixon gave Bush a job first as United Nations Ambassador and then as chair of the Republican National Committee. Nixon made it clear that although he perceived Bush to be part of the Eastern Establishment-of which he was not-he liked and trusted him. And no serious commentator whether of a conventional or a revisionist stripe-e.g. Stanley Kutler or Jim Hougan-has ever proffered that George Bush had anything to do with what happened to Nixon during Watergate. Like most Republicans, he supported him through the crisis as long as he could. His advice basically consisted of advising Nixon to tell his whole part of the story as truthfully as possible. One can read any number of Watergate books and this is what will come through.

    Baker can’t settle for that. Why? Because if Watergate was a CIA operation, it doesn’t fit his agenda of defining George Bush as this super duper Agency Black Operator from way before the Bay of Pigs. So as with the Kennedy assassination, he has to create a function for him in this labyrinthine plot. At first he dredges up Townhouse. And at first he does not tell the reader that Bush himself was a prime recipient of those funds-that is how much Nixon liked him. He then links this at the end with a call Bush made as RNC chair to Lowell Weicker. (p. 233) Weicker was a Republican member of the Senate Watergate Committee, which investigated those crimes in televised hearings. Bush, now chair of the RNC, asks Weicker if he should destroy the Townhouse records. Baker, in super conspiratorial high gear, casts this as being a ploy to get Weicker mad, knowing that Weicker was also a recipient of some of the funds, though in a much smaller way.

    To me this is ridiculous. First, Weicker needed no egging on to be outraged against the crimes of Watergate. From the beginning of his career, which goes back further than Baker outlines, Weicker has always been 1.) An independent minded politician who defies easy categorization, and 2.) Against corruption in government. For a Republican, he is so independent minded that Ted Kennedy actually presented him with a Profiles in Courage award. The idea that a character like him needed egging on, or else his actions would have been different , is completely unjustified in light of his record. Both before Watergate and after.

    Second, far from Baker’s spin, the purpose of the call seems to be for Bush to keep himself out of Townhouse, since he was the largest beneficiary of the funding. This may be why Baker soft-pedals this fact until near the end of the discussion. In fact, in his discussion of this phone call, he never reveals that Bush ranked first in Townhouse funding. (pgs. 232-33)

    To me, this angle yields about zero. But Baker has a fallback.

    As I said, the author has drunk deep in the literature of Watergate revisionism. So he is familiar with the books, Secret Agenda and Silent Coup. But you will see very little of the revolutionary discoveries about the Watergate break-in from the former in this book. This is at first seemingly odd. Why? Because it was those actions that 1.) Made the scandal front-page news 2.) Sprung a trap on Nixon which he did not at first understand and from which he could not escape 3.) Is the clearest indication that the break-in was deliberately sabotaged by CIA operatives masquerading as Nixon campaign workers.

    The above is undeniably true. But the problem for a guy with an agenda the size of Baker’s is this: there is no evidence that Bush had anything of any substance to do with any of it, in any aspect.

    So what does the ever-inventive author do? He goes over to the inferior revisionist book on the subject, Silent Coup. He borrows their aggrandizement of the role of John Dean in the scandal. Why? Please sit down before I write this. Its because in March of 1973, in a phone call with Nixon, Bush-at the urging of others– suggested sending Dean to testify before the Watergate Committee. (p. 213) That’s about it.

    The reader should understand something: in March of 1973 Nixon was being attacked in the media because of his stonewalling of the Watergate Committee. (Stanley Kutler, The Wars of Watergate, p. 268) In fact, he was being specifically pilloried over this issue that Bush is talking to him about. That is, his invoking blanket executive privilege over public testimony by members of his staff. Nixon even said that the doctrine of executive privilege was not subject to question by the other branches of government. (ibid) What made it worse was that Dean was supposed to be writing a report on Watergate for the White House at the time. So he should have been an important witness. (ibid) Further, because Dean had cooperated with acting Director of the FBI Patrick Gray on Watergate, the threat was that if Dean did not testify, Gray would not be approved. (ibid, p. 269) So this made the issue Bush was addressing important booth in Congress and in the media. How bad did it get? It got so heated that three conservative GOP senators, Jim Buckley, John Tower, and Norris Cotton all implored the president to get Dean before congress. (ibid, p. 270) Weicker even wanted Haldeman to testify at this rather earl date. (ibid)

    So Bush was doing what several other Republican leaders were. By not informing you of that, by not specifically mentioning the circumstances and acts of many others, Baker tries to make what Bush did into some covert conspiratorial act. Which it is not. And that’s bad journalism. In fact, this whole section on Watergate is really a confession of bankruptcy on Baker’s part. Failing to find anything to implicate Bush in either the conventional or revisionist versions of Watergate, he concocted something that, for all intents and purposes, doesn’t exist. And then, after he produces nothing, he has the Hankeyan chutzpah to state that Bush was actually behind it all. (p. 232) Which is nothing but pretentious and bombastic balderdash.

    I almost don’t want to go on. But I should mention that what Baker does with the JFK and Watergate episodes is symptomatic of the rest of the book. He wants to somehow implicate the Bushes in crimes for which there is next to no evidence, while not reporting on the ones for which there is plenty of evidence. Therefore, somehow the Bushes are also involved in BCCI, the stealing of the Marcos Gold, and even the Phoenix Program. And there is about as much evidence in those instances as what Baker produces in the JFK and Watergate cases. My question then is: Why stop there? Why not involve them in the King and RFK cases Russ? (I hope I didn’t give him any ideas.)

    The overall poor quality of this book worries me. We are at a crossroads in America between the fall of the Old Media and the rise of the New. (See here for a view of that.) We know what we got from the Old Media, which is still hanging on. But if the New Media means a choice between the likes of The Huffington Post and The Daily Beast on the one hand, and the unfounded conspiracy mongering of the likes of Alex Jones and Family of Secrets on the other, then are we really any better off than we were before?

    I’m not sure.

  • Robert Maheu Dies at 90


    Robert A. Maheu, who was a powerful aide to reclusive tycoon Howard Hughes and whose cloak-and-dagger exploits included involvement in a CIA and Mafia plot to assassinate Fidel Castro, died Aug. 4 at Desert Springs Hospital in Las Vegas. He was 90 and had cancer and heart ailments.

    Mr. Maheu (pronounced MAY-hew) was a onetime FBI agent who ran a Washington company that he said carried out secret missions for the Central Intelligence Agency.

    Mr. Maheu’s first jobs for Hughes in the 1950s included private-eye snooping on Hughes’s past and prospective girlfriends in Hollywood. Later, as Hughes’s chief adviser, he helped make his boss Nevada’s third-largest landowner, after the federal government and the state power company. After becoming Hughes’s director of Las Vegas operations in 1966, Mr. Maheu was the most influential member of the billionaire’s inner circle and acted as his liaison to leading political figures and the world at large.

    “If he wanted someone fired, I did the firing,” Mr. Maheu wrote in his 1992 autobiography, Next to Hughes. “If he wanted something negotiated, I did the bargaining. If he had to be somewhere, I appeared in his place. I was his eyes, his ears, and his mouthpiece.”

    Before he was abruptly fired in 1970, Mr. Maheu spoke with Hughes as many as 20 times a day on the telephone. But in all their years together, he never met the eccentric mogul face to face. Hughes lived in seclusion on the top floor of the Desert Inn Hotel, with only a few private aides admitted to his presence.

    “He finally told me that he did not want me to see him because of the way in which he had allowed himself to deteriorate, the way in which he was living, the way he looked,” Mr. Maheu said on Larry King Live in 1992. “He felt that if I ever in fact saw him, I would never be able to represent him.”

    Mr. Maheu earned $520,000 a year and was living in one of the largest houses in Las Vegas when Hughes had two other aides fire him in December 1970. In 1972, Hughes broke a long silence by speaking in a telephone news conference, seeking to prove he had nothing to do with a purported autobiography by Clifford Irving, which was later confirmed a hoax.

    During that news conference, Hughes called Mr. Maheu “a no-good son of a bitch who robbed me blind.” Mr. Maheu sued him in federal court for defamation. He initially won a $2.8 million settlement from Hughes, but the decision was overturned.

    The four-month trial revealed many engrossing details about Hughes’s business dealings, his political contributions and his increasingly bizarre private life. Mr. Maheu disclosed that in 1970 he delivered $100,000 to Charles G. “Bebe” Rebozo, a close friend of President Richard M. Nixon’s, in return for possible future favors for Hughes. Mr. Maheu entertained Nixon’s vice president, Spiro Agnew, on his yacht and regularly played tennis with then-Nevada Gov. Paul Laxalt (R), who became a U.S. senator.

    But Hughes spread his political largess to both parties, contributing $100,000 to 1968 Democratic presidential candidate Hubert H. Humphrey. Mr. Maheu said he personally placed a briefcase containing $50,000 cash — from receipts at the Hughes-owned Silver Slipper casino — in Humphrey’s limousine. The contributions were legal at the time because they were considered private donations from an individual, not corporate contributions.

    Mr. Maheu said he twice turned down requests from Hughes to arrange $1 million payments to Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Nixon — payable after they left office — if they would agree to stop underground nuclear testing in Nevada, where Hughes lived until moving to the Bahamas in 1970. (He died at age 70 in 1976.)

    “In ’57, when I agreed to be his alter ego,” Mr. Maheu told the San Diego Union-Tribune in 1992, “I thought it would be very challenging: representing him at presidential inaugurals, handling multimillion-dollar deals in his behalf … In reality, you’re living a lie.”

    Robert Aime Maheu was born Oct. 30, 1917, into a French-speaking family in Waterville, Maine. After he graduated from the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, Mass., he analyzed aerial photographs for the Department of Agriculture before joining the FBI.

    During World War II, the FBI assigned him to monitor a French spy who became a double agent and helped deceive the Nazi high command with false radio transmissions. By the mid-1950s, Mr. Maheu said he did undercover work for the CIA — “those jobs in which the agency could not officially be involved,” he wrote in his autobiography.

    Recently declassified CIA files confirm that Mr. Maheu was present at a 1960 meeting in Miami Beach, Fla., between organized crime bosses Sam Giancana and Santo Trafficante Jr., as part of an abortive CIA effort to assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro. The plan was dropped after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.

    “If anything went wrong,” Mr. Maheu wrote in his memoir, “I was the fall guy, caught between protecting the government and protecting the mob, two armed camps that could crush me like a bug.”

    After leaving Hughes, Mr. Maheu became a successful real estate investor but was admittedly careless in his bookkeeping.

    “Most people, I have observed, spend 90 percent of their time scribbling notes and keeping records to justify their existence,” he said in 1974. “I prefer to use that time getting things done.”

    Mr. Maheu had expensive tastes and helped found a Las Vegas chapter of a French gourmet society, and as time went on, he reveled in chances to tell of his colorful life.

    His wife of 62 years, Yvette Doyon Maheu, died in 2003. A daughter also preceded him in death. Survivors include three sons; 10 grandchildren; and 10 great-grandchildren.

  • Gerald McKnight, Breach of Trust


    I was rather predisposed against reading Gerald McKnight’s Breach of Trust. Most of the recent books on the JFK case had been disappointing. Not just the horrible and ridiculous Ultimate Sacrifice, but others like the efforts of Jaime Escalante and Michael Kurtz. In addition, McKnight’s book was on the Warren Commission. So I thought, quite naturally: Who needs another book on that subject in this day and age? But then I saw that writers like David Talbot and Jim Douglass recommended it. So I reconsidered and decided to pick it up. I am glad I did.

    This is an extraordinarily worthwhile effort. What the author has done is not repetitive. He has collated the most up to date information, much of it released by the Assassination Records Review Board, and taken us deeper into the inner workings of the Commission than any other writer I know. Previously, writers like Mark Lane and Sylvia Meagher showed us some of the rather odd conclusions the Warren Commission came to in light of the evidence before it. What Breach of Trust does is not just show us how wrong the Commission was, but why and how they did what they did. In this regard, I cannot imagine a future author going much further.

    I

    One of the things Breach of Trust does that is singular in the field is to demonstrate just how J. Lee Rankin was put in place as Chief Counsel, and how influential he really was. Previous authors have noted how Earl Warren had tried to insert his friend and colleague Warren Olney III as Chief Counsel, how certain commissioners thwarted this, and how Rankin was then substituted. But no author has explained at this length and depth just why Olney was so objectionable, how and why he was shot down, and why Rankin was the replacement choice. This part of the book begins on page 41 with a description of the Warren Commission’s first executive session of December 5, 1963. McKnight briefly describes Warren’s professional relationship with Olney from his days in California, showing just how effective and collegial they were in pursuing some of Warren’s progressive goals. In the next paragraph, McKnight provides the transition to the opposition with three pungent sentences:

    As head of Justice’s Criminal Division Olney also had a shared history with FBI Director Hoover that was altogether different. Hoover despised Olney. As one FBI agent remarked, “Olney was the only guy who had balls enough to stand up to Hoover.” (p. 41)

    Among Olney’s sins on Hoover’s scorecard were his public pronouncements about the presence and influence of the Mafia. Second was the fact that he was a liberal on the civil rights issue. It turns out that both Hoover and Nicholas Katzenbach from Justice were determined to strike preemptively so Olney would not take office. Their source for Warren’s plans for chief counsel was the FBI informant on the Warren Commission: Congressman Gerald Ford. (Another achievement of the book is the demonstration of just how big an informant Ford was for Hoover. It is more than what was hinted at before which, in turn, shows how brazenly Ford lied about this in televised interviews.)

    Katzenbach wanted Olney out because he perceived him as a maverick who he would not be able to control. And since he already had written his famous memorandum about convincing the public as to Oswald’s role as lone gunman, he did not want Olney straying off the range on this issue. In fact, as the author notes, Katzenbach was so worried about this possibility that he installed his man from the Justice Department, Howard Willens, on the Commission to keep an eye out if Olney did become counsel. (p. 42)

    It was overkill. Hoover and Katzenbach unleashed a lobbying campaign on the Commission to head off Olney. The point man for Hoover on this was Cartha DeLoach. DeLoach’s prime inside asset for the “Dump Olney” program was Ford. (McKnight does a nice job penciling in the long “give and take” relationship between Hoover and Ford that made them such amiable chums.) Considering what was at stake, there is little doubt as to why this troika went into overdrive to accomplish their mission. For as McKnight states, “Had Olney served as Chief Counsel it is very likely that the Warren Commission Report would have been an entirely different historical document.” (p. 44)

    When Warren tried to push Olney through at the second executive session, it was Ford and John McCloy who joined forces to obstruct him. And McCloy just happened to have a short list of alternative choices on hand, one of which was J. Lee Rankin. An impromptu sub-committee was formed consisting of Ford, McCloy, Allen Dulles, and Warren. In a matter of hours, Rankin became the consensus choice. Warren really had no option in the matter since, as Ford told DeLoach, both he and Dulles threatened to resign if Olney was chosen. (p. 45)

    II

    Why was Rankin an easy choice? In addition to being a friend and colleague of McCloy, he was the opposite of the anti-Christ Olney in one central regard: he was almost as cozy with Hoover as Ford was. As McKnight describes it: “The choice of J. Lee Rankin, a conservative Republican, was greeted at FBI headquarters with elation.” (Ibid) As Solicitor General, Rankin had defended the FBI in court. He was on a first name basis with Hoover. To quote the author again, “Rankin was a supremely cautious bureaucrat, a consummate insider, not a boat-rocker like Olney.” (Ibid) The choice of Rankin was crucial for the FBI and Katzenbach since it greatly improved their chances of having both the initial FBI report on the assassination and Katzenbach’s premature memo validated with little friction or confrontation.

    As general counsel his management style was rigidly centralized. One former assistant counsel complained that staff contact with the Commission members “was all done through Rankin.” All staff contact and communication with the FBI had to be approved or was channeled directly through Rankin’s office… Rankin proved resourceful at every turn…successfully guiding the whole enterprise toward the predetermined destination laid down in the November 25 Katzenbach memo. The heading that Rankin followed for nine months…was lifted right off Hoover’s chart, and it pointed to Oswald…as the assassin. (Ibid)

    As McKnight states, as an evidentiary brief, the FBI report is an embarrassment in and of itself. He writes, “The report was largely a vilification of Oswald.” (p. 27) Since it was done so quickly (submitted to the White House on December 5th), and so haphazardly it can only be called a Rush to Judgment, in the worst sense of that term. For instance, even though it ended up being five volumes long with almost nine hundred pages, it did not describe all of Kennedy’s wounds, list the cause of death, did not mention Governor John Connally’s wounds, and did not account for all the known shots. Incredibly, it devoted all of 10 words to the JFK shooting and only 42 words to his wounds. This was done because the FBI did not have the official autopsy report. The Bureau rejected an offer by the Secret Service to lend it the autopsy protocol, the X rays, and the photos.

    In spite of all these failures, Katzenbach called the FBI report “spectacular”. (p. 27) He then distributed it to high officials of agencies of government. Why? Because it vilified Oswald’s character, named him as the assassin, and stated that he had no cohorts. This had been preordained of course. Orders had been given not to investigate a conspiracy, and evidence of Oswald’s innocence — like the Bronson film — was discarded. (Pgs. 16-18) By November 26th, just two days after Ruby shot Oswald, the FBI had reached its main conclusions. Yet, this was the event that provoked many people to consider thoughts of a conspiracy. McKnight writes that one of the reasons for the headlong hurry was to stamp out “conspiracy allegations” from Mexico City. (p. 25) Hoover sent an agent there to get Ambassador Mann and CIA Station Chief Win Scott “on message, to alert them to the ‘facts’ of the case: that the White House and the FBI were convinced of Oswald’s guilt and that there had been no conspiracy.” (Ibid)

    In a revealing November 29th conversation with President Johnson, Hoover showed that he knew little of what actually happened even a week after the fact. He told LBJ that one bullet rolled out of Kennedy’s head. That CE 399 was found on Kennedy’s stretcher after heart massage. That the alleged weapon could fire three shots in three seconds. (p. 28) These statements were all grossly mistaken. But that did not matter to Hoover or the fate of the Bureau’s report. The FBI began to leak its conclusions to the media anyway. And by doing this before the Warren Commission held its first executive session meeting, the Bureau began to entrap the Commission in its own faulty conclusions.

    But the FBI report differs in some crucial regards from the Warren Report. For example, although the Bureau was aware of the hit on James Tague, it ignored this and said that all three shots struck either Kennedy or Connally. The Bureau also had the shot entering Kennedy’s back at a much steeper angle. At this angle, it would be impossible for the bullet to exit at the throat level. For these and other reasons, the Commission ended up not publishing the FBI report (CD 1) in the 26 volumes. As the author notes, “That the Commission, given its own deplorable record…felt compelled to suppress the FBI report…was a resounding rebuke indeed.” (p. 144) Yet the Commission had to do this or they would be admitting that the government came to two different versions of the same crime within ten months. And the two versions were incompatible with each other. But because the FBI report was not published or released yet, this fact was not evident.

    Actually, it’s even worse than that. Why? Because the Secret Service also agreed with the Bureau’s shooting sequence. (p. 3) Further, in 1966, when the discrepancy between the FBI and the Commission became public, Hoover insisted that his version was correct. (p. 4) But, there was still a third government version of the crime that was not known. Within days of the assassination, the CIA had the Secret Service copy of the Zapruder film. The Agency’s analysis of the film concluded that the first shot did not come from the sixth floor. Second, more than one gunman was involved. (p. 6) In reality, there were three official versions of the crime within ten months. But the public was unaware of any except the Commission’s.

    III

    This was the precarious position that the Commission found itself in essentially from the start. With no independent investigative staff, they were largely at the mercy of the FBI, Secret Service, and CIA for their information. But mostly the Bureau, and the Bureau had already come to their verdict. For instance, to further incriminate Oswald and to show he had a sociopathic predisposition toward violence, the FBI report asserted that Oswald had tried to shoot General Edwin Walker on the evening of April 10, 1963. (When I talked to FBI agent Warren DeBrueys in New Orleans, he told me this was based on the testimony of Marina Oswald and the fact the assailant in both cases aimed at the victims’ head.) But there were serious problems with this second case against Oswald:

    1. The Dallas Police never considered him as a suspect in over seven months.
    2. The evidence indicated more than one man was involved.
    3. The ammunition was steel-jacketed, not copper-jacketed as in the Kennedy case.
    4. Walker was a rightwing extremist who Kennedy had removed from his command for distribution of Birchite propaganda. So the political calculus behind the shootings was confused.
    5. The conspirators had access to a car which, officially, Oswald did not.
    6. The police deduced the weapon was a high-powered rifle, which the Mannlicher-Carcano was not.
    7. Walker and his private investigators suspected a former employee, William M. Duff, as the sniper. (pgs. 48-50)

    But as McKnight shows, the capper in this regard is CE 573, the mutilated remainder of the bullet recovered from Walker’s home. When assistant counsel Wesley Liebeler deposed Walker for two hours in April of 1964, he never mentioned it. This seemed odd since Walker held the bullet in his hands afterwards. Fifteen years later Walker was watching a televised hearing of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Chief Counsel Robert Blakey held up CE 573 for the camera while discussing the firearms evidence in the JFK case. As McKnight notes:

    Walker, a thirty-year career army officer with extensive combat experience in World War II, and with more than a passing familiarity with military weaponry, was stunned. According to Walker, what Blakey represented as the bullet fired into his home bore no resemblance to the piece of lead the police had recovered, which he had held in his own hand and closely examined. (p. 52)

    So there was no real ballistics evidence to connect Oswald to the Walker shooting. This left a mysterious note that Oswald, according to Marina, had left her that night. Even though Marina said she placed the note in a Russian book, it did not show up in the two day DPD search through Oswald’s room or the Paines’ household, where Marian was staying. It was not until November 30th that Ruth Paine sent the book to Marina through the Irving County police. After the police turned over the book to the Secret Service, the note was finally discovered on December 2nd. It was not signed or dated. When FBI fingerprint specialist Sebastian Latona was questioned by the Commission, he was not asked about the “Walker note”. Perhaps because staff attorney Melvin Eisenberg had learned that Latona had found neither Lee nor Marina’s fingerprints on the note.

    McKnight finalizes this section by doing what he usually does. He takes us behind the scenes and shows us what was happening at the Commission and in the field. By doing this he cracks open the superficial front presented by both reports and shows us that in reality, the authorities themselves knew that there were serious problems with what they presented to the public and the media. On May 20, 1964 Rankin had written Hoover complaining that Marina’s testimony on the Walker case “was riddled with contradictions”. (p. 57) FBI agent Gordon Shanklin then assigned two agents to Marina because he agreed that “her statements just don’t jibe.” (Ibid)

    In fact, the report that Shanklin commissioned to resolve Marina’s “contradictions” did nothing but deepen them. The agents, Ivan Lee and Robert Barrett, interviewed two witnesses who both confirmed there were two suspects, that neither resembled Oswald, and they had access to a Ford. Their main witness, Walter Kirk Coleman, never testified before the Commission. What was left in the case against Oswald was the photo found in his possessions of the back of Walker’s home. In light of the above, this now became as suspect as the infamous backyard photographs.

    Yet despite all of the above, the Warren Report states that the Walker episode demonstrated Oswald’s “disposition to take human life” and it “was considered of probative value in this investigation.” (pgs. 56, 58) McKnight explores the Walker case at length and it is one of the best discussions of the incident that I have read. He concludes that it has value not just in and of itself, but that it “was just a microcosm of what was to follow in the government’s investigation into the Kennedy assassination.” (p. 58) He is correct.

    IV

    Three of the most important chapters in the book (Chapters 7-9), deal with the medical and ballistics evidence. The Bethesda pathologists — James Humes, Thornton Boswell, and Pierre Finck — did not see the clothes or photos in preparation for their post-mortem report. Further, as the author details, the autopsy of the century lasted approximately from 8-11 PM. Yet, according to Dr. Michael Baden, it should have gone at least twice that long. And perhaps as long as 8-10 hours. (p. 155)

    One of the arresting aspects of the book is McKnight’s characterization of Humes. Whereas many Warren Commission critics have treated him, and the other two, with a modicum of respect — perhaps in the misguided hope that they would eventually see the light — McKnight is anything but kind. (Since Humes has now passed away, the author may feel that he can take the gloves off.) He exposes as a canard the idea that Humes burned his original autopsy draft and “bloodstained” notes out of respect for the dead president. McKnight writes that this could not have been the case since this draft was prepared in the unbloodied comfort of the doctor’s own home. (p. 165) When interviewed by the ARRB’s Jeremy Gunn on this point, Humes became flustered and angry. He said it “might have been errors in spelling, or I don’t know what was the matter with it, or whether I even ever did that.” (Ibid) Later he added, “I absolutely can’t recall, and I apologize for that.” (Ibid) McKnight suggests that assistant counsel Arlen Specter recognized this problem at an early date and met with the doctors approximately 8-10 times prior to their testimony in March. Subsequently, when Specter elicited the rather startling revelation about burning the first draft, no one batted an eyelash. As the author puts it: “Not a single commissioner was moved to ask Humes what right he had to destroy these papers or even why he felt compelled on his own initiative to consign them to archival oblivion.” (p. 158)

    But with this established, Specter and Humes moved on to a second deception. Namely that Commission Exhibit 397 was the documentary record upon which the official autopsy report was based. This exhibit consisted of a set of notes, and the handwritten revision of the incinerated draft of the autopsy report. One of the note pages was the autopsy “face sheet” (body diagram with wounds marked), and the others were notes of Humes’ talk with Dr. Malcolm Perry of Parkland Hospital about the tracheotomy he had performed on President Kennedy in Dallas. But this cannot be the entire record since the final, single-spaced, 6-page autopsy report contains many facts that are not contained in these documents. After a thorough analysis, McKnight concludes:

    There are, give or take, about eighty-eight autopsy “facts” in the official prosectors’ report. About sixty-four of these “facts” or pieces of medicolegal information (almost 75%) cannot be found in either the published notes or CE 397. Some fifteen of these pieces of information involve measurements and numbers that are not found in the published record. (p. 162)

    So where did these other “facts” come from? The author makes the argument that, contrary to the Humes-Specter fabrication about the burning of the original autopsy draft, this report actually survived. He believes it was around until about November 26th. That it began to be revised and altered in the office of Admiral C. B. Galloway on Sunday afternoon after Jack Ruby killed Oswald. (I should add here that McKnight is not appreciative of the efforts of Jeremy Gunn in what turned out to be the last examination of Humes. He feels Gunn did not press him hard enough.)

    The chapter on the autopsy concludes with a quite interesting discussion of the cipher of Dr. George Burkley, Kennedy’s personal physician. As others have noted, Burkley was in the presidential motorcade, in the Parkland emergency room, with the body on Air Force One, in the Bethesda morgue, and in the ambulance returning the body back to the White House. He was the one physician who was with the body the entire time after the shooting. Hopefully, this would have put him in position to resolve some of the conflicts over the medical evidence, or at least explain how they came about. Realizing his importance, what did the Commission do with him?

    Incredibly, JFK’s personal physician was never called to testify. Commission assistant counsel Specter never interviewed Burkley or asked him to prepare a statement on his observations of the president’s wounds or any information he might have relating to the assassination. The FBI and the Secret Service never mentioned him before or after they submitted their respective reports…to the Warren Commission. (p. 177) One of the reasons that may have given Specter pause before deposing Burkley was the fact that he had signed President Kennedy’s death certificate. This document placed the back wound at the level of the third thoracic vertebra. Which is much lower than where the Gerald Ford-revised Warren Report placed it: at the base of back of the neck. And at this level, a bullet headed downward would not be able to exit the throat. Since Specter’s main function was to enthrone the single bullet theory, the last thing he wanted was to place in the record a debate over this document. What makes the document even more interesting is the point of reference used for the wound placement. It is more accurate than what the pathologists used. Dr. Finck located the point in an odd way. He measured from the mastoid process to the acromin, or tip of the right shoulder. These are not fixed body landmarks. In his ARRB interview, Finck stated that “JFK’s spine, a fixed landmark, was the correct and only point of reference to determine the accurate location of this posterior wound.” (p. 179) Like Burkley did. As the author notes, one has to wonder if Finck’s measuring points were deliberately chosen in order to disguise just where the posterior entrance was. If so, then Burkley was not in on this obfuscatory design. Which made him a most valuable witness. Further, Burkley’s placement is corroborated by much more evidence than the Warren Report’s, e.g. the holes in Kennedy’s shirt and jacket, observations by both FBI and Secret Service agents, the autopsy face sheet, and, as we shall see, the FBI reenactment in Dallas. Ultimately, what the death certificate does is not just call into question the magic bullet theory, but also the number of shots, and whether the back wound exited at all. In sum, it had the potential to scuttle the Warren Report. Which is probably why it does not appear in either the report or the 26 volumes of evidence. McKnight ends his discussion of Burkley by noting that when author Henry Hurt called the doctor to arrange an interview he replied that he felt the Kennedy case was a conspiracy. When the writer tried to follow up this conversation with a full-length interview, Burkley promptly refused.

    McKnight’s two chapters on the ballistics evidence are equally compelling. For months of its existence, the Commission tried to ignore the ricochet hit to bystander James Tague off the curb. Even though they were aware of it, as late as June of 1964, Specter was trying to discount its importance. (p. 185) Tague was not deposed until July 23, 1964. This only occurred because Dallas reporter Tom Dillard asked the U.S. attorney for north Texas a question about Tague during a public appearance. The attorney then sent a registered letter, including a photo, to Rankin. So now, in July, the drafts of the report finally included the curb strike. And now, since he was down to two bullets for Kennedy and Connally, Specter had the unenviable task of stitching together the single bullet theory. As with the medical evidence and Burkley, Specter ignored his best witness.

    Dr. Joseph Dolce had spent three years as a battlefield surgeon in the Pacific Theater during World War II. He retired as a full Colonel. In 1964 he was chairman of the army’s Wounds Ballistic Board. As McKnight describes his stature in the field:

    When the Commission asked the army for its top ballistics man, it sent Dolce. He was regarded so highly as an expert on wounds from high-velocity weapons…that in the event of a serious injury to any VIP in Congress or in the administration, he was to “be called to go over the case.” (p. 186)

    The problem for Specter was that Dolce concluded Connally was hit by two shots. He also stated that the magic bullet, CE 399, could not have shattered the governor’s wrist and remained pristine. Dolce later recalled a meeting with several experts and Commission staff. He said it was Specter who battled hardest for the viability of CE 399.

    Dolce then participated in experiments conducted at Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland. These were done with Oswald’s Mannlicher-Carcano, a hundred 6.5 mm bullets, and ten cadaver wrists. Dolce told film-maker Chip Selby that in each and every instance the bullet was “markedly deformed” after firing. (p. 187) Dolce was never called as a Commission witness. And Specter never questioned any of the ballistics experts about the above experiment. (p. 189) Specter then requested a reenactment in Dealey Plaza. Yet on the FBI stand-in for President Kennedy, the chalk mark signifying the back wound is at the point where Burkley described it: the third thoracic vertebra. And this appears in Chapter 8 of the report, photograph 12. (p. 192)

    In his draft report, Specter ignored all of the above. He wrote that “all medical findings established” that a single bullet caused Connally’s wounds. Dolce’s name did not appear in his June 10th report. In fact, the actual report on the Edgewood firing experiments did not appear in the Warren Report or in any of the 26 volumes. It was not declassified until 1972. (p. 197)

    Dolce was upset by what the Commission had done with these experiments. Years later, he wanted to talk to the House Select Committee on Assassinations. He wished to testify that the actual report on the experiment had been altered before it was submitted to the Commission. He wanted to share the original report with the new investigating body. He conveyed this wish to his senator Lawton Chiles, who passed it on to a congressional representative on the committee. Yet Dolce was never called as a witness by the HSCA. Dolce has been mentioned before in the literature on the case. But as with other matters outlined above, McKnight goes further in both length and depth about this crucial witness than anyone before him.

    V

    Another major aspect of Breach of Trust are McKnight’s sections dealing with Oswald’s activities that intersected with the CIA and FBI. The author rightly discounts the remarkably feeble Warren Commission report on Oswald in Mexico City. This rather brief essay by David Slawson and William Coleman shrivels like a crushed grape in comparison to the volume prepared by Dan Hardway and Ed Lopez for the House Select Committee. As McKnight notes, the Warren Commission’s given itinerary for Oswald — Mexico City to Cuba to Russia — made little sense. Prior to this, “He had shown no interest in returning to Russia, and by all indications the Soviet state had no interest in allowing the anti-Soviet Oswald back into the country. (p. 61)

    Oswald’s attention and activities had now turned from Russia to Cuba, and he now actually denigrated the Soviet system when asked about it. Also, Oswald had no funds to stay in Cuba for any extended period of time, let alone go on to Russia. He had been out of work for nearly two months prior to going south of the border. As the author notes, the Slawson-Coleman report was based almost exclusively on information originating with the CIA. (p. 63) Because of this reliance, all the intelligence tradecraft in Mexico City — later revealed in the Hardway-Lopez Report — went unnoticed in its predecessor: the false phone calls attributed to Oswald, the missing photos and audiotape recordings, the survey of the infallible surveillance system the CIA had in place, the human sources inside the Cuban consulate, the key but questionable roles played by David Phillips and Ann Goodpasture. And, above all, the question of an imposter posing as Oswald. In relation to all this, the author writes of the Slawson-Coleman Report:

    The Commission must be credited, at least, for correctly reporting that Oswald was in Mexico City from September 27 to October 2, 1963. Much of the rest of the Warren Report’s treatment of Oswald in Mexico City cannot be safely assumed to be an accurate account. (p. 64)

    From here, the book goes on to note all the inconsistencies and oddities in the documentary record that should have indicated to any honest inquiry that something was wrong with the CIA’s story. A story which on 11/23 the CIA was pushing on President Johnson, particularly, “his alleged contact with the Soviet consular official Valery V. Kostikov” who the CIA reported “was a sabotage and assassination expert.” (p. 66)

    At this point the author shrewdly and forcefully points out that there was one person in Washington who had reservations about this tale as early as the 23rd. He was J. Edgar Hoover. McKnight summarizes a phone conversation the president had with the director on that day about Oswald in Mexico City:

    …Hoover admitted that the evidence so far was “not very strong.” Hoover then related some news that must have captured the president’s attention — there was evidence that someone in Mexico City had been impersonating Lee Harvey Oswald, the charged assassin of President Kennedy. (p. 67)

    The Commission’s main investigating arm was on the verge of uncovering an ersatz trail, with all the ramifications that unmasking could entail, including who Oswald was and what his purpose in Mexico really concerned. (Hoover’s doubts about this part of the story grew as time went on. He later scribbled in his famous marginalia that the CIA had handed them a “snowjob” about Oswald in Mexico City.) The CIA now realized it was on thin ice about this aspect and it began to forcefully crowd out the Bureau with the Commission on Mexico City. Director of Plans Richard Helms actually wrote the Bureau and the Commission letters making this clear. And when the Bureau discovered that other CIA reports trying to blame Castro for the murder, e.g. the Gilberto Alvarado tale, were also diaphanous, the Agency now switched its story:

    Eventually the CIA would drop the pretense of any Oswald-Kostikov connection when the White House unmistakably signaled that it was not interested in any “Red plot”, real or manufactured. In July…Richard Helms…disclosed to Rankin that…Oswald met with Pavel A. Yatskov not Kostikov. (p. 70)

    President Johnson was so against the “Oswald as a Red agent” line that he removed a diplomat who was pushing it from office, Thomas Mann, the American ambassador to Mexico. Needless to say, none of this extraordinarily relevant and compelling information made it into the Warren Report.

    The intelligence strand between Oswald and the FBI that gets lengthy treatment here is the infamous Hosty note. This is a written communication left by Oswald in the Dallas FBI office for James Hosty who was attempting to interview Marina Oswald. Reportedly a violent threat, the note was kept by the Bureau and then destroyed after the assassination by Hosty on orders from office chief Gordon Shanklin. The Commission had heard of this note through the testimony of Ruth Paine. (p. 260) Again, this incident should have raised the investigatory antennae of the Commission a few feet in the air. If it was a threat of a violent nature, the FBI should have reported it to the Secret Service. Oswald would then have been passed on to the Protective Research Section (PRS) headed by Robert Bouck. They would have found out he worked along the motorcade route and he likely would have been surveilled or detained that day.

    Yet, as noted here, before 11/22/63, “Oswald’s name was not known to the PRS.” (p. 250) What makes this even more curious is that Hosty was handling the Oswald file in Dallas. (Ibid) Hosty had information about Oswald’s trip to Mexico and his visits to the two communist embassies. Finally, as Hosty revealed later, he believed that Marina was some kind of KGB-planted “sleeper agent” (p. 254) In November, when he attempted to interview Marina, it was about Oswald’s calls to the Soviet Embassy. It was this visit to the Paine household in search of Marina that prompted Oswald to deliver the note to the FBI office. So the Bureau had 2-3 weeks to convey this important information to the Secret Service. They did not. Further, Oswald had written a letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington in which he mentioned Hosty and the FBI. (p. 258)

    Finally, Hosty had found out himself that Oswald worked at the Texas School Book Depository on the motorcade route. When the man running the Oswald inquiry at the Bureau, Alan Belmont, learned all this he realized what a blow the note and Hosty’s inaction would be to the Bureau’s image. He relayed his displeasure to Shanklin and Shanklin told Hosty to ditch the note, which he did by flushing it down the toilet. When Hosty was questioned, the Commission did not mention the note or its fate, nor did Hosty volunteer any information about it. Hosty’s testimony, excerpted by Knight, borders on the comical. When asked if he even thought about Oswald in relation to Kennedy’s upcoming visit or the motorcade route, Hosty replied with a simple “No.” (p. 261)

    The author’s discussion of this episode is thorough, detailed, and provocative. In passing, he mentions some clear questions it all poses:

    1. Would someone contemplating killing the president leave a threatening note in the office of the local FBI?
    2. If Hosty suspected either of the Oswalds as communist sleeper agents, why did he not alert the Dallas Police beforehand?
    3. Why did the Commission go along with Hoover’s decision to strike a citation to Hosty in Oswald’s address book?
    4. Was Oswald some kind of informant to the Bureau, and did this explain Hosty’s negligence?

    The author ends this chapter on Hosty by showing how accommodating Rankin was to Hoover. Rankin told the Bureau that the Secret Service was angry with them about this clear lapse. The Bureau went to the top level of the Secret Service and got them to rein in the testimony of Robert Bouck before the Commission. Bouck never mentioned Hosty. (p. 280) The FBI was pleased with Rankin’s efforts. As assistant director Alex Rosen wrote, the Commission seemed satisfied with Hosty’s presentation. (p. 281)

    VI

    The real achievement of Breach of Trust is this: as much of it as I have described, there is still as much that I have left out. To write at length about all of it would make this review much too long. But to briefly mention some samples:

    1. It was Rankin’s idea to classify the executive sessions Top Secret. (p. 89)
    2. The Sibert-O’Neill report on the autopsy was so disturbing that neither of the agents was called to testify. (pgs 91-92)
    3. Hoover and James Angleton discouraged any move toward an independent staff. (p. 93)
    4. McKnight presents the best case for Oswald not being on the sixth floor that I have seen, with corroborating witnesses that I did not recall. (pgs. 115-116)
    5. There is no evidence that the FBI did a cotton swab test to see if the Mannlicher- Carcano was fired that day. (p. 121)
    6. The Commission conspired with the FBI to keep the exculpatory results of the spectrographic tests out of the record. (p.125)
    7. The Commission was so sensitive to the rumors of Oswald’s government agent status that Rankin tried to falsify the record of the January 22, 1964 meeting. (pgs 128-135)
    8. Rankin covered up the information the Commission had that Oswald may have been given a CIA source number. (pgs. 137-140)
    9. According to the FBI analysis of the Zapruder film, the first shot came at frame 170, when the limousine was hidden by the branches of an oak tree. (pgs. 150-153)
    10. Rankin plotted in advance to avoid an accurate stenographic record of the 9/18/64 executive session in order to disguise Sen. Russell’s dissent about the single bullet theory. Thereby falsely presenting it as a unanimous decision. (pgs. 294-95)

    And even this still does not do complete justice to this extraordinary, magisterial book. One that should serve as a model for what can be achieved in the field with the new declassifications by the ARRB. What McKnight has done has deepened our understanding of just how badly the Warren Commission served the public. But by explaining also how and why it happened, he gives us a new version, one in stereo and high definition. At the end of Rush to Judgment, Mark Lane wrote that the Warren Report dishonored “those who wrote it little more than those who praise it.” This book makes you feel the sting of that dishonor more than any other book that I know. But, as with the best work in the field, it helps us transcend that shame with the beauty and power of pure understanding. And with that achievement, this volume joins my list of the top ten ever written in the field.

  • William Turner, Rearview Mirror


    Is Bill Turner the most valuable journalist now writing? Is he the most underrated? His new book certainly seems to advance those arguments. Rearview Mirror is a memoir of Turner’s professional career since his enlistment into the FBI as a young man in 1951. It then takes us through his resignation about ten years later and his attempt to expose J. Edgar Hoover’s inefficient and public-relations minded FBI regime. The book then highlights Turner’s journalistic career, first at Ramparts and then as an independent journalist and author. When one looks at the books and articles that have come from that career, Turner’s stature seems to me to be quite high. In an era when the left values such people as Alex Cockburn and right exalts writers like Bill Kristol, Turner seems an undervalued jewel. Consider some of his achievements. Hoover’s FBI was one of the earliest and best exposures of the hollowness of J. Edgar Hoover’s tyranny of the Bureau. Power on the Right was an early look at the then eccentric and relatively sparse religious right that would later, under men like Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, become a political juggernaut. His book, The Police Establishment, showed how conservative and connected to the FBI your supposedly independent local police force was and is. His two major articles on Jim Garrison in Ramparts were perhaps the two finest short pieces written on the investigation at the time. (And his unpublished book on that probe is also a quite creditable effort.) The Fish is Red (later reissued as Deadly Secrets) is still the best volume on America’s extended aggression against Castro’s Cuba. And his 1978 book The Assassination of Robert F. Kennedy is also the finest volume yet produced on that tragically ignored political murder. Can any other living journalist equal such a record of high achievement on so many divergent and important topics? If so, I can’t think of one. And I should add that in my view it is one of the top ten books written on any of the assassinations of the sixties, a comment that takes in a lot of ground.

    And when one considers the fact that most of the volumes above stand independent of Turner’s newspaper/magazine output, his achievement is even more impressive. And I for one cannot ignore the fact that Turner is a fine writer whose phrasing is always smooth, easily digestible, and, at times, quite felicitous. This quality makes the, at times, complex issues he discusses e.g. the Manchurian Candidate aspects of the RFK case, much more easy to understand and even assimilate. In a field where one has to wade through the obstructionist prose of some, to be kind, untalented writers, Turner’s books are like driving on a California freeway at four in the morning. Cruise control.

    Rearview Mirror is structured as a chronological memoir. It begins with his unsuccessful battle to expose Hoover’s hollowness, a battle that secured turner’s eventual departure from the Bureau. Turner was one of the earliest insiders to complain about Hoover’s blindness to the powers and influence of organized crime in America. Turner and a friend of his, Skip Gibbons, did all they could to get a public hearing to air their gripes about Hoover. They tried at a Civil Service Commission hearing, they tried for an audience with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, they tried to get to political stalwarts like Estes Kefauver and Jacob Javits in the senate. Almost of necessity, because of Hoover’s long reach and unseemly tactics, it was fruitless. And because there were no whistleblower laws at the time–laws designed to protect government employees who report malfeasance–Turner left his job, at considerable personal sacrifice.

    And this is where one of the outstanding features of the book appears. For it is not only a memoir. Turner has provided the reader with a stereophonic view of the past. He has decked it out with archival releases that retrospectively illuminate events and actions. For instance, Turner now knows that John Mohr of the FBI discussed his civil service appeal with Civil Service Staff Chief Ed Bechtold. Bechtold told Mohr that they would sustain the Bureau’s discharge of Turner.

    When Turner wrote his 1964 article on John Kennedy’s murder for Saga, Hoover’s assistant Cartha DeLoach monitored his every move both pre and post-publication, and then retaliated through his press flacks like Drew Pearson. Turner also details the attempts by CIA to undermine Ramparts after that now legendary magazine exposed the agency’s use of universities in support of the Vietnam War and the later exposure of its program to infiltrate the National Students Association. Codenamed Operation CHAOS, the program actually seems to have started as an attempt to wreck that magazine although it later spread out to much of the antiwar underground press. CHAOS is another program suspected by Turner at the time, but only confirmed much later.

    Another retroactive perspective is an appearance made by Turner on “The Joe Pyne Show” in 1968. Pyne was an earlier version of the now all too common right-wing yokel who liked to make a lot of noise without generating much light: a sixties Rush Limbaugh. His producer called the local office of the FBI for information to counter the derogatory writing by Turner on the Bureau. The request reached all the way up to Hoover’s desk. Another fascinating episode has Turner penning an article on Hoover’s nonexistent war against the Mob. Playboy was interested in featuring it but they passed it on to Sandy Smith of the Time-Life circuit. Smith took the piece to his pals at the Bureau and then told the magazine not to run the story because it was too error-strewn. How obsessed was the Bureau with Turner? When the author was on tour to push his book Hoover’s FBI, the Bureau faked a phone call as “John Q. Citizen” to an earlier version of the Tom Snyder show.

    For me, and for most of his longtime admirers, the highlights of this distinguished and fascinating book were the chapters on the Garrison inquiry and the one on the Robert Kennedy murder. The first is done as a dual look at both the inquest and the press coverage of it (the latter is appropriately titled The Media’s Circus.) Again Turner has updated his previous work with much newly released material on both Garrison and the press. So the pieces form a good short summary of what we now know about that ill-fated and sandbagged probe. The chapter on the RFK case is basically a truncated magazine version of his extraordinary book (co-authored with Jonn Christian). But as they say at the racetrack, that is an admirable sire. As many have said, the RFK case is a more provable conspiracy than the JFK case.

    Turner closes his book with an overview of developments since 1975. He discusses the CIA/Contra-Cocaine connection. He delves into the fey inquiry into the JFK-MLK murders, the House Select Committee on Assassinations. He updates the King case by noting the pro-conspiracy verdict in the 1999 King family civil lawsuit and the subsequent Justice Department report on that case. Turner warns us of the encroaching and insidious power of “the dark parapolitics of the FBI, CIA, and private intelligence triad.” He needn’t have. He’s a crusader nonpareil who’s been at it for 40 years. Bravo Bill.

  • The Murder and Martyrdom of Malcolm X

    The Murder and Martyrdom of Malcolm X


    Has anyone ever been more conscious, from birth to death, of his coming murder? Malcolm X saw his own violent death in advance just as clearly as his mother Louise Little saw the imminence of his father’s death, on that afternoon in 1931 when her husband Earl left their house and began walking up the road toward East Lansing, Michigan.

    “If I take the kind of things in which I believe, then add to that the kind of temperament that I have, plus the one hundred percent dedication I have to whatever I believe in … These ingredients would make it just about impossible for me to die of old age.”

    “It was then,” Malcolm says in his autobiography, “that my mother had this vision. She had always been a strange woman in this sense, and had always had a strong intuition of things about to happen. And most of her children are the same way, I think. When something is about to happen, I can feel something, sense something.”1

    His mother rushed out on the porch screaming. She ran across the yard into the road shouting, “Early! Early!” Earl turned around. He saw her, waved, and kept on going.

    That night Malcolm awakened to the sound of his mother’s screaming again. The police were in the living room. They took his mother to the hospital, where his father had already bled to death. His body had been almost cut in two by a streetcar. Earl Little had been an organizer for Marcus Garvey’s United Negro Improvement Association, the largest black nationalist movement in American history. Malcolm was told by blacks in Lansing that his father had been attacked by the white racist Black Legion. They put his body on the tracks for a streetcar to run over.

    Malcolm believed that four of his father’s six brothers were also killed by white men. Thus the pattern of his own life seemed clear. “It has always been my belief,” he told his co-author Alex Haley, “that I, too, will die by violence. I have done all that I can to be prepared.”2 Malcolm prepared for death by living the truth so deeply that it hastened death. This is the theme of Malcolm X’s autobiography. “To come right down to it,” Malcolm said to Alex Haley, “if I take the kind of things in which I believe, then add to that the kind of temperament that I have, plus the one hundred percent dedication I have to whatever I believe in … These ingredients would make it just about impossible for me to die of old age.”3

    As the story neared its end, with Malcolm more and more totally surrounded by forces that wanted him dead, he no longer saw himself as among the living. “Each day I live as if I am already dead … I do not expect to live long enough to read this book in its finished form.”4 And he was right: he died in Harlem on the same day he had originally intended to visit Alex Haley in upstate New York to read the final manuscript.


    The assassination of Malcolm X on February 21, 1965, at the Audubon Ballroom in New York City was carried out through the collaboration of three circles of power: the Nation of Islam (NOI), the New York Police Department (NYPD), and U.S. intelligence agencies. Malcolm was, as he knew, surrounded at the end by all three of these circles. In terms of their visibility to him and their relationship to one another, the circles were concentric. The Nation of Islam was the nearest ring around Malcolm, the less visible NYPD was next, and the FBI and CIA were in the outermost shadows. The involvement of these three power circles in Malcolm’s murder becomes apparent if we trace his pilgrimage of truth through his interactions with all three of them.

    Malcolm X and Alex Haley
    Malcolm X and Alex Haley

    In writing this essay, I have been guided especially by the works of five authors. The first three are Karl Evanzz, Zak Kondo, and Louis Lomax. Washington Post online editor Karl Evanzz is the author of The Judas Factor: The Plot to Kill Malcolm X5 and The Messenger: The Rise and Fall of Elijah Muhammad.6 Evanzz’s two books complement each other brilliantly in presenting a full picture of Malcolm’s assassination, the first emphasizing the U.S. government’s responsibility and the second, that of Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam. Zak A. Kondo, a professor at Bowie State College, does it all in one book, Conspiracys: Unravelling the Assassination of Malcolm X,7 which follows an unusual (though strangely accurate) title with a complex analysis of the three murderous circles: NOI, NYPD, and U.S. spy agencies. His self-published, out-of-print book that is almost impossible to find has 1266 endnotes, all of which deserve to be read. Then there is Louis Lomax’s To Kill a Black Man,8 first published in 1968, two years before Lomax’s own death in a car accident. As both a faithful friend to Malcolm and a writer wired to what was happening, Lomax already pointed to a solution of Malcolm’s assassination.9 I said I have five guides. The last two are Malcolm X and the man who lived to tell his tale, Alex Haley.

    The Autobiography of Malcolm X is the transforming work of both. Haley in his epilogue hints at what Malcolm in his last days realized and was on the verge of shouting—that it was the government, not Elijah Muhammad, and Malcolm’s African connection, not his NOI rejection, that were the primary agent and motivation behind the plot. Malcolm is the ultimate guide to understanding his own murder.

    In a memorandum, written four years after Malcolm’s death, the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Chicago office stated that:

    Over the years, considerable thought has been given and action taken with Bureau’s approval, relating to methods through which the NOI, could be discredited in the eyes of the general black populace. … Or through which factionalism among the leadership could be created … Factional disputes have been developed—the most notable being MALCOLM X LITTLE.10

    Malcolm X and Elijah Muhammad
    Malcolm X and Elijah Muhammad

    The FBI developed the factional dispute that led to Malcolm’s death by first placing at least one of its people high within the Chicago headquarters of the Nation of Islam. Its infiltrator then worked to widen a division between Elijah Muhammad and Malcolm X. To the FBI’s alarm, this process was inadvertently described, and the FBI man identified, in the 1964 book When The Word Is Given, written by Louis Lomax.

    In the paragraph that gave away the FBI’s game, Lomax began by observing that Elijah Muhammad had moved from Chicago to Phoenix, Arizona, for the sake of his health. Lomax then described a significant shift of power. Elijah he said had delegated to his Chicago office not only the NOI’s finances and administration, but also “the responsibility for turning out the movement’s publications and over-all statements,” thus taking away from Malcolm X his critical control over the NOI’s flow of information.

    “at one time carried some of these responsibilities, particularly the publishing of the Muslim newspaper..,. And many observers thought they saw an intra-organizational fight when these responsibilities were taken from him and given to Chicago.11

    The thing that dismayed the FBI most was the paragraph’s final sentence, which disclosed a hidden factor in this abrupt transfer of power away from Malcolm. The sentence stated that “this decision by Muhammad was made possible because John X, a former FBI agent and perhaps the best administrative brain in the movement, was shifted from New York to Chicago.12

    Lomax’s sentence about “John X, a former FBI agent” set off alarm bells in FBI counterintelligence, especially in the office of William C. Sullivan. Assistant FBI Director Sullivan was in charge of the illegal Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) designed to develop a “factional dispute” between Elijah and Malcolm. Sullivan was a high-level commander of covert action. Among his projects was an all-out FBI campaign “aimed at neutralizing [Dr. Martin Luther] King as an effective Negro leader,” as Sullivan put it in a December 1963 memorandum.13

    Malcolm X and Elijah Muhammad
    COINTELPRO chief
    William C. Sullivan

    On March 20, 1964, COINTELPRO chief Sullivan was alerted by an “airtel” from the FBI’s Seattle field office to the objectionable passage in When The Word Is Given.14 The hardcover edition of the book had been published in late 1963, only a few months before what Sullivan must have regarded as a COINTELPRO success story, Malcolm’s March 8, 1964 announcement of his split with Elijah Muhammad. The problem was that to a discerning reader of both the Lomax paragraph and the news of the split, the FBI could be recognized as a key disruptive factor.

    John X Ali Simmons
    John X Ali Simmons announcing
    Malcolm X suspension from
    the Nation of Islam

    An FBI official recommended in a memorandum to Sullivan that “the New York Office should be instructed to contact Lomax to advise him concerning the inaccurate statement contained in this book regarding [John X Ali] Simmons. … And that he be instructed to have this statement removed from any future printings of the book.”15 FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover added his personal “OK” to this recornmendation.16 Lomax, however, ignored the FBI’s pressure as well as John Ali’s anger at his having made the statement. He never retracted it. In his later book, To Kill a Black Man, he repeated it, and said that John Ali knew it was true.17 In the six years leading to his death, Lomax never clarified what he meant by the term “former FBI agent.” He may have been giving Ali the benefit of a doubt as to his having severed his FBI connection by the time Lomax mentioned it in 1964. In any case, the FBI had other informants in the Nation of Islam to take his place.

    Wallace Muhammad, Elijah Muhammad’s independent-minded son, also believed that FBI informants were manipulating NOI headquarters at the time Malcolm and Elijah became antagonists:

    The FBI had key persons in the national staff, at least one or two maybe. They were preparing for the death of the Honorable Elijah Muhammad [in terms of determining his successor]. I believe that the members of the Nation of Islam were influenced to do the things that they were doing not just by the national staff and my father but also by the intelligence department.18

    Wallace Muhammad was in a position to know at first hand the FBI’s process of working with NOI informants. The FBI considered him one of them. Karl Evanzz, in researching his biography of Elijah Muhammad entitled The Messenger, discovered from FBI documents that in addition to John Ali, at least three other people were regarded by FBI agents as “reliable sources” close to Muhammad. The first man was Abdul Basit Naeem, a Pakistani journalist who served as an NOI publicist. Then there is Hassan Sharrieff, Elijah Muhammad’s grandson and Wallace Muhammad. Evanzz concludes that the FBI thought “Wallace and Hassan fit the bill because they had provided the Bureau with information it considered crucial to inciting violence between Muhammad’s camp and Malcolm X.”19 Wallace’s and Hassan’s reasons for talking with the FBI seem to have been simply to seek protection from members of their own family, who threatened to kill them for going against Elijah. The FBI then recycled their information for its own use in plotting against Malcolm and Elijah.

    “I believe that the members of the Nation of Islam were influenced to do the things that they were doing not just by the national staff and my father but also by the intelligence department.” ~Wallace Muhammad

    It was Louis Lomax’s revelation of the FBI’s covert process within the NOI that so concerned the Bureau. Lomax’s statement had given his readers a glimpse into a critical part of the FBI’s COINTELPRO strategy to divide and destroy the Nation of Islam, thereby silencing as well its most powerful voice, Malcolm X.

    FBI documents show that the Bureau had been monitoring Malcolm X as far back as 1950, when he was still in prison.20 The Bureau began to focus special attention on Malcolm in the late ’50s, when it realized he had become Elijah Muhammad’s intermediary to foreign revolutionaries. From Malcolm’s Harlem base of operations as the minister of the NOI’s Temple Number Seven, he was meeting regularly at the United Nations with Third World diplomats. In 1957 Malcolm met in Harlem with visiting Indonesian President Achmed Sukarno, whom the CIA had targeted for removal from power. Sukarno was extremely impressed by Malcolm.21 As early as eight years before Malcolm’s death, the FBI and CIA were watching the subversive international connections Malcolm was making.


    Abdul Basit Naeem
    Abdul Basit Naeem

    In 1957 when Malcolm X was becoming the NOI’s diplomat to Third World leaders, Abdul Basit Naeem was developing into Elijah Muhammad’s public relations man in the same direction.22 Naeem was a Pakistani journalist living at the time in Brooklyn. His first project with Elijah was a 1957 booklet that combined international Islamic affairs with coverage of the Nation of Islam.23 Evanzz discovered that Abdul Basit Naeem became extremely cooperative. Not only was he cooperative with the FBI but also with the New York Police Department’s intelligence unit, “BOSSI” (the acronym for Bureau of Special Service and Investigation).24 BOSSI would later succeed in planting one of its cover operatives in Malcolm’s own security team. The FBI and BOSSI would prove to be linking agencies in the chain of events leading up to Malcolm’s assassination.

    At this time Malcolm had also become the apparent successor to Elijah Muhammad, who then loved and respected his greatest disciple more than he did his own sons. Accordingly, the FBI’s Chicago field office, which was monitoring all of Elijah’s communications, told J. Edgar Hoover in January 1958 that Malcolm had become Elijah’s heir apparent.25 Evanzz has described the impact of this revelation on the FBI’s COINTELPRO section:

    The secret to disabling the [NOI] movement, therefore, lay in neutralizing Malcolm X.26

    Evanzz suggests the FBI began its neutralizing of Malcolm in 1957 by utilizing a police force with which it worked closely on counterintelligence, the New York Police Department.


    Hinton incident
    Malcolm in NYC (1957)
    “No man should have that much power”

    The NYPD was already in conflict with Malcolm. In April 1957 in Harlem, white policemen brutally beat a Black Muslim, Johnson X Hinton, who had dared question their beating another man. The police arrested the badly injured Hinton and took him to the 28th Precinct Station on 123rd Street. When the station was confronted by a menacing but disciplined crowd, Malcolm X demanded on their behalf that Hinton be hospitalized. The police finally agreed, and were shocked by Malcolm’s dispersal of the 2,600 people with a simple wave of his hand. They concluded with alarm that he had the power to start as well as stop a riot. The city and police also had to pay Hinton $70,000 as a result of an NOI lawsuit.27 A police inspector who witnessed Malcolm’s dispersal of the crowd said, “No man should have that much power.”28


    On May 24, 1958, four months after Hoover was told that Malcolm was Elijah’s successor, two NYPD detectives and a federal postal inspector invaded the Queens apartment house in which Malcolm and his wife, Betty Shabazz, lived in one of the three apartments. They shared the house with two other NOI couples, including John X Ali and his wife, Minnie Ali. In 1958, John Ali was not only the secretary of Malcolm’s Mosque Number Seven but also his top advisor, his close friend, and his housemate.29

    Brandishing a warrant for a postal fraud suspect who did not live there, the detectives barged into the house and ran directly to Malcolm’s office on the second floor. They fired several shots into it. Fortunately Malcolm was away from the house, but the bullets narrowly missed the terrified women and children in the next room. One detective arrested Betty Shabazz, who was pregnant, and Minnie Ali. He threatened to throw the women down the stairs if they didn’t move faster. The detectives, on the first floor, were confronted and beaten by a crowd of angry neighbors. Police reinforcements arrested six people, including Betty Shabazz and Minnie Ali, who were charged with assaulting the two detectives.30

    In response to the attack, an enraged Malcolm X employed a brilliant media strategy against the NYPD that he would develop later against the U.S. government. To expose this case of New York police brutality against blacks, he drew on the support of his new friends at the United Nations. Malcolm wrote an open letter to New York City Mayor Robert Wagner in which he promised to shame the city unless it redressed the grievance:

    Outraged Muslims of the African Asian World join us in calling for an immediate investigation by your office into the insane conduct of irresponsible white police officers … Representatives of Afro-Asian nations and their press attachés have been besieging the Muslims for more details of the case.31

    Betty Shabazz
    Betty Shabazz

    In their March 1959 trial that lasted two weeks, the longest assault trial in the city’s history, Betty Shabazz, Minnie Ali, and the other defendants were all found not guilty by a Queens jury. They filed a $24 million suit that was settled out of court.32

    In a first effort to kill or intimidate Malcolm X, the New York Police Department (and perhaps the FBI as instigator) had failed. As in the beating of Hinton, the NYPD was once again discredited by Malcolm. Both the FBI and the city police had come to regard Malcolm increasingly as their enemy. It may also have been through the pressures of this ordeal that the FBI succeeded in establishing its covert relationship with John Ali. At the time Malcolm was unaware of any such development. To Elijah Muhammad he recommended his friend John Ali for the next position he would hold as national secretary in Chicago of the Nation of Islam.


    By 1963 conflicts between Elijah Muhammad and Malcolm X were becoming obvious. When Louis Lomax had the courage to ask Malcolm about a news report of a minor difference between himself and Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm denied it:

    It’s a lie. Any article that says there is a ‘minor’ difference between Mr. Muhammad and me is a lie. How could there be any difference between The Messenger and me? I am his slave, his servant and his son. He is the leader, the only spokesman for the Black Muslims.33

    As Malcolm knew, the news report was understated. There were more differences than one between “leader” and “servant,” and they were becoming major. A root conflict was the question of activism. During the creative turmoil of the Civil Rights Movement, more and more black people were heard questioning the Nation of Islam’s inactivity. They would say, “Those Muslims talk tough, but they never do anything, unless somebody bothers Muslims.”34 Malcolm cited this common complaint to Alex Haley, because he agreed with it. He was pushing for the NOI to become more involved. Elijah Muhammad was committed, however, to a non-engagement policy.

    While continuing his response to Lomax’s vexing question, Malcolm resorted to NOI theology to admit that there was in fact a difference:

    But I will tell you this, the Messenger has seen God. He was with Allah and was given divine patience with the devil. He is willing to wait for Allah to deal with this devil. Well, sir, the rest of us Black Muslims have not seen God, we don’t have this gift of divine patience with the devil. The younger Black Muslims want to see some action.35

    A second difference between Malcolm and Elijah arose from Malcolm’s increasing celebrity status. Although Malcolm always prefaced his public statements with “The Honorable Elijah Muhammad says,” it was Malcolm who more often proclaimed the word and gained the greater public attention. Elijah Muhammad coined a tricky formula to reassure Malcolm that this was what he wanted: “Because if you are well known, it will make me better known.”36 But in the same breath, the Messenger warned Malcolm that he would then become hated, “because usually people get jealous of public figures.”37 Malcolm later observed dryly that nothing Mr. Muhammad had ever said to him was more prophetic.38

    Malcolm’s rise in prominence as NOI spokesperson, while Elijah Muhammad retreated to Arizona for his health, caused a backlash in Chicago headquarters. When John Ali was appointed to National Secretary, the office was managed by members of Elijah’s family. It was already becoming notorious for its wealth and corruption at the expense of NOI members. In the name of Elijah, John Ali and the Muhammad family hierarchy moved to consolidate their power over Malcolm’s. Herbert Muhammad, Elijah’s son, had become the publisher of the Nation’s newspaper, Muhammad Speaks. He ordered that as little as possible be printed about Malcolm and finally nothing at all.39 With Elijah’s consent from Arizona, Malcolm was being edged out of the picture.

    The most serious conflict between the two men occurred when Malcolm became more conscious of rumors concerning his mentor’s affairs with young women. Malcolm conferred with a trusted friend, Wallace Muhammad. Wallace said the rumors were true. Malcolm spoke with three of Elijah Muhammad’s former secretaries. They said Elijah had fathered their children. They also said, as Malcolm related in the autobiography,

    Elijah Muhammad had told them I was the best, the greatest minister he ever had, but that someday I would leave him, turn against him—so I was ‘dangerous.’ I learned from these former secretaries of Mr. Muhammad that while he was praising me to my face, he was tearing me apart behind my back.40

    W D Muhammad
    Wallace W.D. Muhammad with Malcolm X

    All these developments were being monitored closely by the FBI through its electronic surveillance and undercover informants. The Bureau’s COINTELPRO was also using covert action to destroy Elijah Muhammad in a way it would develop even further against Martin Luther King Jr. On May 22, 1960, Assistant FBI Director Cartha DeLoach approved the sending of a fake letter on Elijah’s infidelities to his wife, Clara Muhammad, and to NOI ministers.41 The rumors Malcolm heard were being spread by the FBI.

    On July 31, 1962, COINTELPRO director William C. Sullivan approved another scheme whereby phony letters on Elijah’s philandering would be mailed to Clara Muhammad and “selected individuals.” He cautioned the Chicago Special Agent in Charge: “These letters should be mailed at staggered intervals using care to prevent any possibility of tracing the mailing back to the FBI.”42 While Malcolm X was investigating the secretaries’ charges against Elijah Muhammad, the FBI was trying to deepen his and the Messenger’s differences so as to finalize their split, assuming at the time that their divorce would weaken the power of both men.

    “It doesn’t take hate to make a man firm in his convictions. There are many areas to which you wouldn’t give information and it wouldn’t be because of hate. It would be your intelligence and ideals.”

    Malcolm struggled to remain loyal to the spiritual leader who had redeemed him from his own depths in prison, but it was only a matter of time before the two men would split over all these issues. The occasion for their break was John F. Kennedy’s assassination. Elijah Muhammad ordered his ministers to refrain from commenting on it. On December 1, 1963, after a speech Malcolm gave in New York City, he was asked his opinion on the President’s murder. He later described his response:

    Without a second thought, I said what I honestly felt—that it was, as I saw it, a case of ‘the chickens coming home to roost.’ I said that the hate in white men had not stopped with the killing of defenseless black people, but that hate, allowed to spread unchecked, finally had struck down this country’s Chief of State. I said it was the same thing as had happened with Medgar Evers, with Patrice Lumumba, with Madame Nhu’s husband.43

    On the day he saw the headlines on Malcolm’s remark, Elijah Muhammad told his chief minister he would have to silence him for the next 90 days to disassociate the Nation from his blunder. Malcolm said he would submit completely to the discipline. The FBI saw this period as its golden opportunity.

    Two FBI agents visited Malcolm on February 4, 1964.44 Malcolm knew they were coming. He had a tape recorder hidden under the sofa in his living room, and recorded the conversation.

    The agents admitted that the FBI had chosen that particular time to contact Malcolm because of his suspension by Elijah Muhammad. They hoped that bitterness on Malcolm’s part might move him to become an informant. Such bitterness was understandable, they said sympathetically. The agents even handed Malcolm a facile rationalization for cooperating in their undercover crime of undermining Elijah, while compromising him:

    It would not be illogical for someone to have spent so many years doing something, then being suspended.45

    Malcolm: No, it should make one stronger. It should make him realize that law applies to the law enforcer as well as those who are under the enforcement of the enforcer.46

    After failing to get anywhere with Malcolm, one of the agents said, “You have the privilege [of not giving the FBI information]. That is very good. You are not alone. We talk to people every day who hate the Government or hate the FBI.” Then he added, with a stab at bribing Malcolm, “That is why they pay money, you know.”47

    Malcolm ignored the bribe and went to the heart of the question: “That is not hate, it is incorrect to clarify that as hate. It doesn’t take hate to make a man firm in his convictions. There are many areas to which you wouldn’t give information and it wouldn’t be because of hate. It would be your intelligence and ideals.”48

    Malcolm had learned that he was forbidden by Elijah Muhammad even to teach in his own Mosque Number Seven, and that the Nation had announced further that he would be reinstated “if he submits.” The impression was being given that he had rebelled.

    Looking back at the announcement, he said to Haley, “I hadn’t hustled in the streets for nothing. I knew when I was being set up.”49 Malcolm realized the ground was being laid by NOI headquarters to keep him suspended indefinitely. A deeper realization came when one of his Mosque Seven officials began telling the men in the mosque that if they knew what Malcolm had done, they’d kill him themselves. “As any official in the Nation of Islam would instantly have known, any death-talk for me could have been approved of, if not actually initiated, by only one man.”50 Malcolm knew that Elijah Muhammad, the spiritual father whom he had revered and served for 12 years, had now sanctioned his murder.

    Joseph Gravitts
    Captain Joseph X Gravitts
    (to the left of Elijah Muhammad)

    Then came a first death plot. One of Malcolm’s own Mosque Seven officials, Captain Joseph X Gravitts, following higher orders, told an assistant to Malcolm to wire his car to explode when he started the engine. The man refused the assignment, told Malcolm of the plot, and saved his life.51 He also freed Malcolm from his attachment to the Nation of Islam. Malcolm was forced to recognize that the NOI’s hierarchy and structure, extending right down into his own mosque, was committed to killing him. He could already see a first ring of death encircling him, comprised of the organization he had developed to serve Elijah Muhammad. From that point on, Malcolm said, he “went few places without constant awareness that any number of my former brothers felt they would make heroes of themselves in the Nation of Islam if they killed me.”52


    On March 8, 1964, with less than a year to live, Malcolm X announced his departure from the Nation of Islam. He said he was organizing a new movement because the NOI had “gone as far as it can.” He was “prepared to cooperate in local civil-rights actions in the South and elsewhere. “53 Malcolm also passed out copies of a telegram he had sent to Elijah Muhammad, in which he stated:

    Despite what has been said by the press, I have never spoken one word of criticism to them about your family … 54

    In spite of everything, Malcolm was trying not to split the NOI, and therefore muffled his criticisms of Elijah Muhammad.

    Two days later, the Nation of Islam sent Malcolm a certified letter telling him and his family to move out of their seven-room house in East Elmhurst, Queens. The Elmhurst house had been home for Malcolm, Betty Shabazz, and their growing family (now with four daughters) since the early days of their marriage when Malcolm and Betty were in the house with John and Minnie Ali. One month after the certified letter, the secretary of Malcolm’s old Mosque Number Seven filed suit in a Queens civil court to have Malcolm and his family evicted. Malcolm would fight for the legal right to stay in the only home he had to pass on to his wife and children, especially since he might soon be killed by the same forces trying to take their house away.55

    On March 12, Malcolm held a press conference in New York and said internal differences within the Nation had forced him out of it. He was now founding a new mosque in New York City, Muslim Mosque, Inc. With a conscious effort to avoid repeating the mistakes of Elijah Muhammad, he said in his “Declaration of Independence” that he was a firm believer in Islam but had no special credentials:

    I do not pretend to be a divine man, but I do believe in divine guidance, divine power, and in the fulfillment of divine prophecy. I am not educated, nor am I an expert in any particular field—but I am sincere, and my sincerity is my credentials.56

    He opened (wide) the door to working with other black leaders, with whom he had traded criticisms, most notably with Martin Luther King Jr. “As of this minute, I’ve forgotten everything bad that the other leaders have said about me, and I pray they can also forget the many bad things I’ve said about them.”57 He then immediately chased King away by saying black people should begin to form rifle clubs to defend their lives and property.

    He concluded:

    We should be peaceful, law-abiding—but the time has come for the American Negro to fight back in self-defense whenever and wherever he is being unjustly and unlawfully attacked. If the government thinks I am wrong for saying this, then let the government start doing its job.58

    Malcolm was aware that the government might think it was its job to silence him.


    Much more threatening to the government than Malcolm’s rifle clubs, which never got off the ground, was the visionary campaign he then initiated to bring U.S. violations of African-Americans’ rights before the court of world opinion in the United Nations. In his April 3, 1964, speech in Cleveland, “The Ballot or the Bullet,” Malcolm began to articulate his international vision:

    We need to expand the civil-rights struggle to a higher level—to the level of human rights. Whenever you are in a civil-rights struggle, whether you know it or not, you are confining yourself to the jurisdiction of Uncle Sam … Civil rights comes within the domestic affairs of this country. All of our African brothers and our Asian brothers and our Latin-American brothers cannot open their mouths and interfere in the domestic affairs of the United States. … But the United Nations has what’s known as the charter of human rights, it has a committee that deals in human rights … When you expand the civil-rights struggle to the level of human rights, you can then take the case of the black man in this country before the nations in the UN. You can take it before the General Assembly. You can take Uncle Sam before a world court. But the only level you can do it on is the level of human rights.59

    In the spring of 1964, Malcolm X had come up with a strategy to internationalize the Civil Rights Movement by re-defining it as a Human Rights Movement, then enlisting the support of African states. Malcolm would proclaim to the day of his death the nation-transcending word of human rights, not civil rights, for all African-Americans. He would also organize a series of African leaders to work together and make that word flesh in the General Assembly of the United Nations. In breaking his bonds to Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm had freed himself to unite African and African-American perspectives in an international coalition for change. For the rest of his life, he was on fire with energy to create that working partnership spanning two continents.

    In breaking his bonds to Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm had freed himself to unite African and African-American perspectives in an international coalition for change.

    The FBI began to realize it had made a major miscalculation. Its COINTELPRO that helped precipitate the divorce between Malcolm X and Elijah Muhammad had, it turned out, liberated Malcolm for a much larger mission than anything he could conceivably have accomplished under Elijah Muhammad. He was suddenly stepping onto an international stage in what could become an unwelcome scenario to the U.S. government. Nevertheless, the Chicago NOI connections that the Bureau had made so carefully in John Ali and other informants could still salvage the COINTELPRO goal of neutralizing Malcolm. Since Malcolm had “rebelled” against Elijah and Chicago, he could now, with Chicago’s help, be forced into silence forever.

    The FBI had a second, growing concern. Despite Malcolm’s offputting talk of rifle clubs, his evolving strategy for an international ballot, not the bullet, was catching the attention of a potential ally whose power went far beyond that of Elijah Muhammad: Martin Luther King Jr.


    Malcolm and Martin met for the first and only time in the nation’s capital on March 26, 1964. They had both been listening to the Senate’s debate on civil rights legislation. Afterwards they shook hands warmly, spoke together, and were interviewed. He grinned and said he was there to remind the white man of the alternative to Dr. King. King offered a militant alternative of his own, saying that if the Senate kept on talking and doing nothing, a “creative direct action program” would start. If the Civil Rights Act were not passed, he warned, “our nation is in for a dark night of social disruption.”60

    Malcolm and MLK
    Malcolm and Martin (March 26, 1964)

    Although Malcolm and Martin would continue to differ sharply on nonviolence and would never even see each other again in the 11 months Malcolm had left, there was clearly an engaging harmony between the two leaders standing side by side on the Capitol steps. Given Malcolm’s escalation of civil rights to human rights and King’s emphasis upon ever more disruptive, massive civil disobedience, their prophetic visions were becoming more compatible, even complementary. The FBI and CIA, studying the words and pictures of that D.C. encounter in their midst, could hardly have failed to recognize a threat to the status quo. If Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr. were to join efforts, they could ignite an explosive force for change in the American system. The FBI and CIA had to face a question paralleling that of the New York police who had witnessed Malcolm’s crowd dispersal. Should any two men have that kind of power against the system?

    On the same day Malcolm and Martin shook hands in Washington, the FBI’s NOI connections were proving to be an effective part of an action in Chicago to further isolate Malcolm, setting him up for his murder.

    Philbert X Little, Malcolm’s brother, was Elijah Muhammad’s minister in Lansing, Michigan. The Messenger and his NOI managers ordered Philbert to report to Chicago, where they arranged a press conference for him on March 26 of 1964. John Ali then handed Philbert a prepared statement. Ali told Philbert to read it to the media. Philbert had never seen the text before. As he read it for the first time (aloud and in a monotone) he heard himself denouncing Malcolm in terms that threatened Malcolm’s converts from the Nation of Islam.

    I see where the reckless efforts of my brother Malcolm will cause many of our unsuspecting people, who listen and follow him, unnecessary loss of blood and life.61 … the great mental illness which beset my mother whom I love and one of my brothers … may now have taken another victim … my brother Malcolm.62

    Malcolm responded to the news of his brother’s apparent attack on him by saying,

    We’ve been good friends all our lives. He has a job he needs; that’s why he said what he did … I know for a fact that they flew him in from Lansing, put a script in his hand and told him to read it.63

    Philbert himself confirmed years later that “the purpose of making that statement was to fortify the Muslims. That’s why I was brought to Chicago. When I got ready to make my statement, John Ali put a paper in front of me and told me I should read that. So I read the statement that was very negative for my mother. And it was negative against Malcolm. I wouldn’t have read it over the air, you see, if I had looked at it. I asked John Ali about it and he says, ‘That’s just a statement that was prepared for you to read.’ He said, ‘I know the Messenger will be very pleased with the way you read it,’ and that was it.”64

    The vision to which Malcolm X was converted by his experience at Mecca determined the way in which he would meet his death. He called that vision ‘brotherhood’.

    Elijah Muhammad’s vengeance toward Malcolm was still being fueled by the FBI’s COINTELPRO. At the time of “Philbert’s statement,” the FBI sent Elijah one of its fake letters complaining about his relationships with his secretaries. The letter succeeded in making Elijah suspect Malcolm had written it. On April 4, 1964 an FBI electronic bug recorded Elijah telling one of his ministers, who had also received a copy of the letter, that the presumed writer Malcolm “is like Judas at the Last Supper.”65

    In recognition that his 12 years proclaiming the word of Elijah Muhammad had left him poorly prepared for his new mosque’s ministry, Malcolm decided to re-discover Islam by making his pilgrimage to Mecca.

    Malcolm at Mecca
    Malcolm at Mecca (1964)

    In a life of changes, Malcolm’s most fundamental change began at Mecca. At the conclusion of his pilgrimage, he was asked by other Muslims what it was about the Hajj that had most impressed him. He surprised them by saying nothing of the holy sites or the rituals but extolling instead the multi-racial community he had experienced.

    “The brotherhood!” he said, “The people of all races, colors, from all over the world coming together as one! It has proved to me the power of the One God.”66

    The vision to which Malcolm X was converted by his experience at Mecca determined the way in which he would meet his death. He called that vision “brotherhood.” Had he lived a while longer, he would have added “and sisterhood.” In his final months, Malcolm also began to change noticeably in his recognition of women’s rights and leadership roles. His conversion at Mecca was to a vision of human unity under one God. From that point on, his consciousness of one human family, in the sight of one God, sharpened his perceptions, deepened his courage, and opened his soul to whatever further changes Allah had in store for him. Consistent with all those changes, Malcolm’s experience of the truth of brotherhood radicalized still more his resistance to racism. His conversion to human unity was not to a phony blindness to the reality of prejudice, but on the contrary, to a greater understanding of its evil in God’s presence. He was even more determined to confront it truthfully. Concluding his answer to his fellow pilgrims on his Hajj, Malcolm returned to his lifelong focus on racism, set now in the context of the experience he had at Mecca of his total acceptance by pilgrims of all colors.

    “To me,” he said, “the earth’s most explosive and pernicious evil is racism, the inability of God’s creatures to live as One, especially in the Western world.” 67

    Malcolm, Nkrumah, Faisal
    Malcolm & Kwame Nkrumah; with Prince Faisal

    Following his pilgrimage to Mecca, Malcolm met with two influential heads of state, Prince Faisal of Arabia and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. They acknowledged Malcolm as a respected leader of black Americans, who now represented also a true Islam. Prince Faisal of oil-rich Arabia made Malcolm a guest of the state. Ghana’s anti-colonialist Kwame Nkrumah, a leader of newly independent African states, told his African-American visitor something Malcolm said he would never forget:

    Brother, it is now or never the hour of the knife, the break with the past, the major operation.68

    Nkrumah’s sense of the hour of the knife was right, but his hope that it would be a knife of freedom cutting through a history of oppression would go unfulfilled. Only nine months later, Malcolm would be murdered.

    A year after that, Nkrumah, upon publishing his book Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, dedicated to “the Freedom Fighters of Africa, living and dead,” would be overthrown by a CIA-backed coup.69


    “The case to be presented to the world organization … would compel the United States Government to face the same charges as South Africa and Rhodesia.”

    Malcolm also visited Egypt, Lebanon, Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal, Morocco, and Algeria. Upon his return to the U.S. on May 21, 1964, the New York Times published an article on his trip that further alerted intelligence agencies to Malcolm’s quest for a UN case against the U.S. Malcolm told reporters he had “received pledges of support from some new African nations for charges of discrimination against the United States in the United Nations.”

    The case to be presented to the world organization,” he asserted, “would compel the United States Government to face the same charges as South Africa and Rhodesia.”70

    While Malcolm was working abroad to put the U.S. on trial at the UN, the New York Police Department was infiltrating his new Muslim Mosque with its elite intelligence unit, the Bureau of Special Service and Investigation (BOSSI). To the cold warriors in the ’60s who knew enough beneath the surface to know at all about BOSSI, the NYPD’s undercover force was regarded as “the little FBI and the little CIA.” The accolade reflected the fact that the information gathered by BOSSI’s spies was passed on regularly to federal intelligence agencies.71

    Tony Ulasewicz
    BOSSI operative
    Tony Ulasewicz

    The BOSSI men who ran the deep cover operation in Muslim Mosque were detectives Tony Ulasewicz and Teddy Theologes. Four years after Tony Ulasewicz’s undercover work on Malcolm X, “Tony U,” as he was known, would retire from the NYPD to go to work as President Richard Nixon’s private detective. He would then take part in a series of covert activities that would be brought to light in the Senate Watergate Hearings and memorialized in his own book, The President’s Private Eye,72 which is also a valuable resource on BOSSI. Both in his book and his life, Tony U moves with ease between the overlapping undercover worlds of the New York Police Department, federal intelligence agencies, and the White House. In the BOSSI chain of command, Tony U was a field commander. He had to keep his operators’ identities totally secret as he ran their surveillance and probes of various sixties organizations ranging from the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) to the American Nazi Party. Equally important, he had to keep his own behind-the-scenes identity completely separate from theirs, with his name never linked to the report of any agent of his. Otherwise he might be called to testify in court, opening up an operation, an event to be avoided at all costs.73 Tony U’s deep cover men were therefore, in the last analysis, on their own.

    Teddy Theologes acted in the BOSSI command, in Tony U’s words, “as a cross between a drill sergeant and a priest.”74 Reflecting on his career decades later in an interview, Theologes said some of the BOSSI deep cover recruits “needed constant attention. I would have to sit down with them, and almost be a father, brother, psychiatrist, and doctor.75 From the standpoint of agents risking their lives who knew their superiors would never admit to knowing them, the need for such a relationship can be understood.

    Gene Roberts
    Gene Roberts

    On April 17, 1964, four days after Malcolm left New York on his pilgrimage to Mecca, Ulasewicz and Theologes sent their newly sworn-in, 25-year-old, black detective Gene Roberts on his undercover journey into the Muslim Mosque, Inc. Gene Roberts had just completed four years in the Navy. Roberts was interviewed by Tony Ulasewicz and Teddy Theologes when he passed the police exam. He was asked to become a deep cover agent in a militant organization under Malcolm X. Roberts had heard of Malcolm X but knew little about him. As a military man, he accepted the order to infiltrate Malcolm’s group without questioning it. On April 17, he was sworn in as a police officer and given his badge. A few hours later, Teddy Theologes took the badge away from him. He was on his own. Then his BOSSI superiors sent Roberts out on his mission in Harlem.76

    Gene Roberts has described how he proceeded step by step into becoming one of Malcolm’s bodyguards:

    Basically they said, go up to 125th Street—where Malcolm had his headquarters—and get involved. And that’s what I did. I ended up getting involved in a couple of riots. The main thing was I was there. I met members of his organization. They accepted me. My cover was I worked for a bank. I told them about my martial arts experience, so I became one of Malcolm’s security people. When he came back from Mecca and Africa, I went wherever he went, as long as it was in the city.77

    Since he was supposedly a bank worker, Roberts followed a schedule of typing up his BOSSI reports, at his Bronx home during the day. He typed reports on what he had learned by being “Brother Gene” with Malcolm and his community during the night.78 As Roberts suspected and would later confirm, he was not the only BOSSI agent in the group, although he had gained the greatest access to Malcolm. When Ulasewicz and Theologes received his and other deep cover dispatches, they passed them up the line to BOSSI Supervisor Barney Mulligan. It was Lieutenant Mulligan’s responsibility to file all the undercover information (without ever identifying the informants) at BOSSI headquarters. While there, BOSSI’s secret fruit was shared generously with the FBI.

    On May 23, 1964, Louis Lomax and Malcolm X took part in a friendly debate at the Chicago Civic Opera House. As Lomax began his opening speech and looked down from the stage, he was struck with fear. For there in the audience staring back up at him was John Ali, accompanied by a group of NOI men who were being deployed at strategic locations in the hall.79 Ali had become the nemesis of Lomax as well as Malcolm because of Lomax’s having written about Ali’s FBI connection. Malcolm’s, Ali’s, and Lomax’s lives were intertwined. When John Ali was Malcolm’s top advisor and housemate, he had arranged the first meeting between Malcolm and Lomax. The three men had then worked together on the first issues of the NOI newspaper. When Malcolm’s and Ali’s home was invaded by the New York police, Louis Lomax had written the most thorough story on it.80

    In his Chicago speech, given only two days after his return from Mecca and Africa, Malcolm sounded open to white people as well as blacks, as impassioned as ever, and in the terms he used, even radically patriotic:

    My pilgrimage to Mecca … served to convince me that perhaps American whites can be cured of the rampant racism which is consuming them and about to destroy this country. In the future, I intend to be careful not to sentence anyone who has not been proven guilty.

    I am not a racist and do not subscribe to any of the tenets of racism. In all honesty and sincerity it can be stated that I wish nothing but freedom, justice and equality: life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness—for all people. My first concern is with the group of people to which I belong, the Afro-Americans, for we, more than any other people, are deprived of these inalienable rights.81

    However, in his post-Mecca life, this radically open Malcolm X was once again a target, as he and Lomax could see when they looked down into the eyes of John Ali and his companions. At the debate’s conclusion, Malcolm and Lomax departed from the rear of the hall under a heavy Chicago police escort.82 It was one in a series of occasions when Malcolm would gladly accept the protection of a local police department that was genuinely concerned about his safety.

    Also near the end of May 1964, the five men who would kill Malcolm X in the Audubon Ballroom nine months later came together for the first time. We know the story, thanks to the confession of the only one of the five who would ever go to jail for the crime, Talmadge Hayer. According to Hayer’s affidavit, sworn to in prison in 1978 to exonerate two wrongly convicted co-defendants,83 it all began when he was walking down the street one day in Paterson, New Jersey. A car pulled up beside him. Inside it were two men who, like Hayer, belonged to the Nation of Islam’s Mosque Number 25 in Newark—Benjamin Thomas and Leon Davis, known to Hayer as Brothers Ben and Lee. They asked Hayer to get in the car so they could talk. “Both of these men,” he said, “knew that I had a great love, respect, and admiration for the Honorable Elijah Muhammad.”84

    While the three men drove around Paterson, Hayer learned from Thomas and Davis that “word was out that Malcolm X should be killed.” Hayer said in his confession he didn’t know who had passed that word on, but he thought Ben knew. He in fact had good grounds for thinking Ben knew, inasmuch as Benjamin Thomas was the assistant secretary of the Newark Mosque and knew well the NOI chain of command. Hayer also said it was Ben who had spoken first to Leon, before the two of them spoke with him. After hearing from them how Malcolm X was spewing blasphemies against Mr. Muhammad, he said what they wanted to hear, “It’s just bad, man, something’s got to be done,”85 and agreed to take part in the plot.

    As Hayer told Malcolm biographer Peter Goldman in a prison interview,

    I didn’t ask a whole lot of questions as to who’s giving us instructions and who’s telling us what, because it just wasn’t a thing like that, man. I thought that somebody was giving instructions: ‘Brothers, you got to move on this situation.’ But I felt we was in accord. We just knew what had to be done.86

    Thomas, Davis, and Hayer soon got together with two more members of the Newark Mosque who also knew what had to be done, William X and Wilbur X. As male members of the Nation of Islam, all five men belonged to the Fruit of Islam (FOI), a paramilitary training unit.87 FOI training was meant ideally for self-defense. However, with its combination of discipline, obedience, and unquestioning loyalty to the Messenger, it had degenerated into an enforcement agency for the will of Elijah Muhammad and the NOI hierarchy. Malcolm X, with his certain knowledge that FOI teams like the five men in Newark were being organized to kill him, said sharply in a June 26, 1964, telegram to Elijah Muhammad:

    Students of the Black Muslim Movement, know that no member of the Fruit of Islam will ever initiate an act of violence unless the order is first given by you. … No matter how much you stay in the background and stir others up to do your murderous dirty work, any bloodshed committed by Muslim against Muslim will compel the writers of history to declare you guilty not only of adultery and deceit, but also of Murder.88

    In his affidavit, Talmadge Hayer said the five men from the Newark Mosque began meeting to decide how to carry out the killing. Sometimes, he said, they would just drive around in a car for hours talking about it.89 Since Malcolm was on the verge of making another even longer trip to Africa, they would have to bide their time. In the meantime, there were other killing teams who were united in the same purpose. Several would almost succeed. But in the end, it would be the five Newark plotters who would finally do what had to be done at the Audubon Ballroom.


    It is a temptation to sentimentalize Malcolm, but Malcolm did not sentimentalize himself. He knew what he was capable of doing, what he had done, and what he had trained the Fruit of Islam to do. They were now prepared to do it, as he knew, to him.

    On June 13, 1964, the NOI’s suit to force Malcolm and his family out of the East Elmhurst house began to be heard in Queens Civil Court. The courtroom was divided into two hostile camps, Malcolm’s supporters and the NOI contingent. At this point the police department clearly acknowledged in action the immediate danger to Malcolm’s life. It had 32 uniformed and plainclothes officers present, “surrounding him so impermeably,” as reporter Peter Goldman put it, “that he could barely be seen from the gallery.”90 Some of the press remained skeptical of the threat to Malcolm. He insisted to reporters that he knew the NOI men were capable of murder “because I taught them.”91

    This statement that Malcolm repeated about his NOI past was apparently no exaggeration. Dr. Alauddin Shabazz, who was ordained by Malcolm as an NOI minister, told me in an interview: “Malcolm had had people killed. When Malcolm found a guy in the nation who was an agent, Malcolm didn’t hesitate to do something to him. I have seen Malcolm take a hammer and knock out the bottom bridges of a guy’s teeth.

    [An undercover police agent] was once caught setting up an [electronic] bug in the wall of the office. Malcolm was questioning him. And Malcolm had a funny way of questioning people. He would stand with his back to you, like he didn’t want to look at your disgusting face—if he thought you were doing something to aid BOSSI or the agencies. And this guy had been caught. Malcolm turned around. He had a hammer on the desk. He turned around with the hammer and hit him in the face. I was there. It was in the early ’60s.92

    It is a temptation to sentimentalize Malcolm, but Malcolm did not sentimentalize himself. He knew what he was capable of doing, what he had done, and what he had trained the Fruit of Islam to do. They were now prepared to do it, as he knew, to him.


    The Queens eviction hearing was especially significant for what Malcolm chose to reveal during his June 16 testimony: “[T]hat the Honorable Elijah Muhammad had taken on nine wives.”93 At about the same time as Malcolm made the issue public, one of Elijah Muhammad’s sons made a statement that was in effect a warrant for Malcolm’s death. It was prompted by a phone call from someone claiming to be “Malcolm.” This person told the NOI that Elijah Muhammad would be killed while giving his speech the following day.94 In response to this provocation (in conflict with the real Malcolm’s pleas to his followers to avoid a confrontation), Elijah Muhammad Jr. told a meeting of the Fruit of Islam at a New York armory:

    That house is ours, and the nigger don’t want to give it up. Well, all you have to do is go out there and clap on the walls until the walls come tumbling down, and then cut the nigger’s tongue out and put it in an envelope and send it to me, and I’ll stamp it approved and give it to the Messenger.95

    The judge would rule three months later that the house belonged to the Nation of Islam, and that Malcolm and his family had to leave. Malcolm appealed, which delayed the eviction until the final week of his life.

    On June 27, 1964, the FBI wiretapped a phone call in which Malcolm X asked an unidentified woman (an office worker … Betty Shabazz?) if Martin Luther King’s attorney Clarence Jones had called him.96 The woman said, yes, she had a message from Jones asking Malcolm to call him back. The reason Jones wanted to speak with Malcolm, she said, was “that Rev. King would like to meet as soon as possible on the idea of getting a human rights declaration.” She then emphasized to Malcolm, “He is quite interested.”97

    However, in the 12 short days left before Malcolm departed again for Africa, he and King were not able to arrange a meeting to explore their mutual interest in a human rights declaration. Nor would they ever manage to see each other again in the three months remaining in Malcolm’s life once he returned to the U.S., though they would just miss doing so in Selma, Alabama. Nevertheless, through its electronic surveillance of both men, the FBI knew that Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr. were hoping to connect on the human rights issue that could put the U.S. on trial in the United Nations.

    On June 28, 1964, Malcolm announced his formation of the Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU), with its headquarters at the Theresa Hotel in Harlem. Whereas the Muslim Mosque, Inc. was faith-oriented, the OAAU would be politically oriented.98 The OAAU would be patterned after the letter and spirit of the Organization of African Unity established by African heads of state the year before at their meeting in Ethiopia. The OAAU’s founding statement emphasized that “the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Constitution of the U.S.A. and the Bill of Rights are the principles in which we believe.”99 The intended outreach of Malcolm’s organization was transcontinental, including “all people of African descent in the Western Hemisphere, as well as our brothers and sisters on the African continent.”100 Yet the organizing would also be local and civic:

    The Organization of Afro-American Unity will organize the Afro-American community block by block to make the community aware of its power and potential; we will start immediately a voter registration drive to make every unregistered voter in the Afro-American community an independent voter.101

    Thanks to Mecca, Malcolm had broken free from his old allegiance to Elijah Muhammad’s idea of a separate black state. He was now organizing an international campaign for Afro-American liberation based on the principles of the U.S. Constitution and the UN Charter. He had become a faith-based organizer on an international scale. His OAAU founding statement, while consistent with the Civil Rights Movement, took the struggle into a new arena, the United Nations. Malcolm would now seek further support for his UN human rights campaign by a July-November barnstorming trip through Africa.

    In addition to NYPD and FBI surveillance, the Central Intelligence Agency was also following Malcolm. The Agency knew Malcolm planned to appeal to African leaders at the second conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

    At 11:37 p.m., on July 3, 1964, Malcolm phoned the New York Police Department to report that “two Black Muslims were waiting at his home to harm him. … But he sped off when they approached his car.”102 Malcolm knew the name of one of the two men, and gave it to the police.103

    The NYPD refused to believe Malcolm. They passed on their official skepticism in a July 4 teletype to the FBI: “Police believed complaint on an attempt on Malcolm’s life was a publicity stunt by Malcolm.”104 By its phone tap, the FBI had heard Malcolm make his report at the same time the NYPD did. The Bureau summarized the event with its own judgment on Malcolm: “Information [on 7/4/64] that MALCOLM and his followers were attempting to make a big issue out of the reported attempt on Macolrn’s life in order to get the Negro people to support him.105


    Thus began the official NYPD and FBI line that Malcolm was fabricating attempts on his life for the sake of publicity. This disclaimer would be made publicly by the NYPD in the week before Malcolm’s murder, in an effort to justify the withdrawal of police protection at the time of escalating threats on his life.

    On July 9, Malcolm departed from New York on the African trip that would consume four and a half of the remaining seven and a half months of his life. It was to be the final, most ambitious project of his short life. As his plane lifted off from JFK Airport on its way to Cairo, Malcolm was happily unaware of what John Ali was saying that same night on a Chicago call-in radio program:

    Malcolm X probably fears for his safety because he is the one who opposes the Honorable Elijah Muhammad. The Holy Koran, the book of the Muslims, says “seek out the hypocrites and wherever you find them, weed them out.” … There were people who hated Kennedy so much that they assassinated him—white people. And there were white people who loved him so much they would have killed for him. You will find the same thing true of the Honorable Elijah Muhammad … I predict that anyone who opposes the Honorable Elijah Muhammad puts their life in jeopardy … 106

    “… after every one of my trips abroad, America’s rulers see me as being more and more dangerous. That’s why I feel in my bones the plots to kill me have already been hatched in high places. The triggermen will only be doing what they were paid to do.”

    In addition to NYPD and FBI surveillance, the Central Intelligence Agency was also following Malcolm. The Agency knew Malcolm planned to appeal to African leaders at the second conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which he was attending in Cairo in July as an honored observer. No other American was allowed in the door. In a July 10 CIA memorandum, an informant stated that Malcolm X was “transporting material dealing with the ill treatment of the Negro in the United States. He intends to make such material available to the OAU in an effort to embarrass the United States.”107


    In Cairo, Malcolm was constantly aware of agents following him. They made their presence obvious in an effort to intimidate him. Then on July 23, as Malcolm prepared to present his UN appeal to Africa’s leaders, he was poisoned. He described the experience later to a friend:

    I was having dinner at the Nile Hilton with a friend named Milton Henry and a group of others, when two things happened simultaneously. I felt a pain in my stomach and, in a flash, I realized that I’d seen the waiter who served me before. He looked South American, and I’d seen him in New York. The poison bit into me like teeth. It was strong stuff. They rushed me to the hospital just in time to pump the stuff out of my stomach. The doctor told Milton that there was a toxic substance in my food. When the Egyptians who were with me looked for the waiter who had served me, he had vanished. I know that our Muslims don’t have the resources to finance a worldwide spy network.108

    The friend who witnessed this event, Detroit civil rights attorney Milton Henry, warned Malcolm that his UN campaign could mean his death. Henry later felt in retrospect that it did: “In formulating this policy, in hitting the nerve center of America, he also signed his own death warrant.”109 Malcolm, being Malcolm, recognized the truth of Henry’s warning, and went right on ahead with his campaign.

    At the OAU conference, Malcolm submitted an impassioned, eight-page memorandum urging the leaders of Africa to recognize African-Americans’ problems as their problems and to indict the U.S. at the UN:

    Your problems will never be fully solved until and unless ours are solved. You will never be fully respected until and unless we are also respected. You will never be recognized as free human beings until and unless we are also recognized and treated as human beings. Our problem is your problem. It is not a Negro problem, nor an American problem. This is a world problem, a problem for humanity. It is not a problem of civil rights but a problem of human rights. In the interests of world peace and security, we beseech the heads of the independent African states to recommend an immediate investigation into our problem by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.110

    Malcolm at OAU
    Malcolm at OAU

    Malcolm was encouraged by the response he received from the OAU. Although the resolution the conference passed in support of the African-American struggle used only moderate language, Malcolm told Henry that several delegates had promised him their official support in bringing up the issue legally at the United Nations.111

    OAU founders
    OAU Founders

    Malcolm then built on the foundations he had laid at the African summit. For four months he criss-crossed Africa, holding follow-up meetings with the leaders who encouraged him most in Cairo. He held long discussions with President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Prime Minister Milton Obote of Uganda, President Azikiwe of Nigeria, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Prime Minister Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, and President Sekou Toure of Guinea.112 There were other African heads of state Malcolm talked with, he said, “whose names I can’t mention.”113 At the height of the Cold War, Malcolm X had gained access to Africa’s most revolutionary leaders on a politically explosive issue.

    Neutralist leaders
    The neutralist leaders
    (Nehru, Nkrumah, Nasser, Sukarno, Tito)

    Reflecting on these meetings, Malcolm told a friend in London shortly before his death,

    Those talks broadened my outlook and made it crystal clear to me that I had to look at the struggle in America’s ghettos against the background of a worldwide struggle of oppressed peoples. That’s why, after every one of my trips abroad, America’s rulers see me as being more and more dangerous. That’s why I feel in my bones the plots to kill me have already been hatched in high places. The triggermen will only be doing what they were paid to do.114

    U.S. intelligence agencies were in fact monitoring Malcolm’s campaign in Africa with increasing concern. The officials to whom they reported these developments began to express their alarm publicly. As a New York Times article, written in Washington revealed on August 13, 1964, “The State Department and the Justice Department have begun to take an interest in Malcolm X’s campaign to convince African states to raise the question of persecution of American Negroes at the United Nations.”

    After recapitulating Malcolm’s appeal to the 33 OAU heads of state, the Times article stated:

    [Washington] officials said that if Malcolm succeeded in convincing just one African Government to bring up the charge at the United Nations, the United States Government would be faced with a touchy problem. The United States, officials here believe, would find itself in the same category as South Africa, Hungary, and other countries whose domestic politics have become debating issues at the United Nations. The issue, officials say, would be of service to critics of the United States, Communist and non-Communist, and contribute to the undermining of the position the United States has asserted for itself as the leader of the West in the advocacy of human rights.115

    The Times reported that Malcolm had written a friend from Cairo that he did indeed have several promises of support from African states in bringing the issue before the United Nations. According to another diplomatic source, Malcolm had not been successful, “but the report was not documented and officials here today conceded the possibility that Malcolm might have succeeded.”116

    The article also said somewhat ominously;

    Although the State Department’s interest in Malcolm’s activities in Africa is obvious, that of the Justice Department is shrouded in discretion. Malcolm is regarded as an implacable leader with deep roots in the Negro submerged classes.

    “[He] has, for all practical purposes, renounced his U.S. citizenship.” ~ Benjamin H. Read, assistant to Dean Rusk, insisting the CIA investigate Malcolm X

    These two sentences, which were removed from the article in the national edition of the Times,117 where an oblique reference to concerns about Malcolm then being expressed not only by the State and Justice Departments but also by the CIA, FBI, and the Johnson White House. These concerns are revealed by a memorandum, written two days before the Times article, addressed to the CIA’s Deputy Director of Plans (covert action) Richard Helms. As researchers know, the desk of Richard Helms—a key player in CIA assassination plots—was perhaps the most dangerous place possible for a report on a perceived security risk to end up. According to the August 11, 1964, CIA memorandum to Helms, the Agency claimed it had learned from an informant that Malcolm X and “extremist groups” were being funded by African states in fomenting recent riots in the U.S. The State Department, the CIA memo continued, “considered the matter one of sufficient importance to discuss with President Johnson who, in turn, asked Mr. J. Edgar Hoover to secure any further information which he might be able to develop.”118

    As Malcolm analyst Karl Evanzz has noted,

    In fact, the CIA knew the allegations were groundless. In an FBI memorandum dated July 25, a copy of which was sent to [the CIA’s] Clandestine Services, an agent specifically stated that the informant’ said he didn’t mean to imply that Africans were financing Malcolm X.119

    The CIA’s August 11 memo also stated that Benjamin H. Read, an assistant to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, wanted the CIA to probe both Malcolm X’s domestic activities and “travels in Africa” to determine “what political or financial support he may be picking up along the way.” The CIA memo’s author had told Read, coyly, in response that “there were certain inhibitions concerning our activities with respect to citizens of the United States.” Read had overridden the objection, insisting the CIA act because, “after all, Malcolm X has, for all practical purposes, renounced his U.S. citizenship.”120

    As of no later than August 11, 1964 (and perhaps before), the CIA’s Deputy Director of Plans had been authorized to act on Malcolm X. Malcolm was perceived, for all practical purposes, to have renounced his U.S. citizenship and to have become a touchy problem to the U.S. government if he gained so much as one African state’s support for his UN petition. Malcolm had not read any such CIA documents on himself, but he had seen the August 13 Times article. He could read his future between its lines, just as Milton Henry had already done in terms of the sensitivity of Malcolm’s UN campaign.


    John Lewis
    John Lewis

    John Lewis, a leader in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) who would go on to become a member of Congress, was then touring Africa to connect with the freedom movement there. Lewis and the SNCC friends who were with him knew all too well that Malcolm was also in Africa. As soon as they met anyone in Africa, the first question they would inevitably be asked was: “What’s your organization’s relationship with Malcolm’s?”121 The men discovered that no one would listen to them if they were seen as being any less revolutionary than Malcolm, who seemed to have taken all of Africa by storm. On his return to the U.S. Lewis wrote in a SNCC report: “Malcolm’s impact on Africa was just fantastic. In every country he was known and served as the main criteria for categorizing other Afro-Americans and their political views.”122

    Lewis was startled to run into Malcolm in a café in Nairobi, Kenya, as he had thought Malcolm was traveling in a different part of Africa at the time. Malcolm, recognizing Lewis, smiled and asked what he was doing there. Reflecting on their encounter in his memoir, Walking With the Wind, Lewis thought Malcolm was very hopeful from the overwhelming reception he had received in Africa “by blacks, whites, Asians and Arabs alike.” It “had pushed him toward believing that people could come together.”123

    However, something else Malcolm shared with the SNCC group “was a certainty that he was being watched, that he was being followed … In a calm, measured way he was convinced that somebody wanted him killed.”124 John Lewis’ meeting with Malcolm in Kenya would be the last time he would see him alive.

    Louis Farrakhan
    Louis Farrakhan (1965)

    Malcolm kept extending his stay in Africa. He had planned to be away six weeks. After 18 weeks abroad, he finally flew back to New York on November 24, 1964. He was confronted, soon after his return, with a December 4 issue of Muhammad Speaks. The issue featured an attack upon him by Minister Louis X, of the NOI’s Boston mosque. Louis X had not long before been a friend and devoted disciple to Malcolm. Now calling Malcolm “an international hobo,” Louis X made a statement against Malcolm that would haunt the speaker for the rest of his life, under his better-known name, Minister Louis Farrakhan:

    The die is set, and Malcolm shall not escape, especially after such evil, foolish talk about his benefactor, Elijah Muhammad, in trying to rob him of the divine glory which Allah had bestowed upon him. Such a man as Malcolm is worthy of death, and would have met with death if it had not been for Muhammad’s confidence in Allah for victory over his enemies.125

    Louis Farrakhan has never admitted to having participated in the plot to kill Malcolm. He has acknowledged from 1985 on that his above words “were like fuel on a fire” and “helped create the atmosphere” that moved others to kill Malcolm. Farrakhan made essentially the same carefully worded statement to four interviewers: Tony Brown in 1985, Spike Lee in 1992, Barbara Walters on 20/20 in 1993, and Mike Wallace on 6o Minutes in 2000. His words to Spike Lee were: “I helped contribute to the atmosphere that led to the assassination of Malcolm X.”126

    His clearest statement on Malcolm’s murder may be at question. In a 1993 speech to his NOI congregation, Minister Farrakhan, referring to Malcolm, asked bluntly, “And if we dealt with him like a nation deals with a traitor, what the hell business is it of yours?”127

    Alex Quaison-Sackey
    Alex Quaison-Sackey

    The timing of Malcolm’s late November return to the U.S. seemed providential in terms of his work at the United Nations. On December 1, his close friend, Alex Quaison-Sackey of Ghana, was elected President of the UN General Assembly. Following Malcolm’s lead, Quaison-Sackey was becoming increasingly outspoken against U.S. policies. Quaison-Sackey gave Malcolm’s human rights campaign a further boost by arranging for him to open an office at the UN in the area that was used by provisional governments.128

    The FBI’s New York field office pointed out to J. Edgar Hoover in a December 3 memo the alarming facts that Malcolm X and newly elected UN leader Quaison-Sackey had been friends for four years, and that they had also met several times recently. The New York office, which worked closely with the NYPD’s undercover BOSSI unit, suggested to Hoover “that additional coverage of [Malcolm X’s] activities is desirable particularly since he intends to have the Negro question brought before the United Nations (UN).”129

    During December’s UN debate on the Congo, Malcolm’s influence began to be heard in the speeches of African leaders. For example, Louis Lansana Beavogui, Guinea’s foreign minister, asked why “so-called civilized governments” had not spoken out against “the thousands of Congolese citizens murdered by the South Africans, the Belgians, and the [anti-Castro] Cuban refugee adventurers. Is this because the Congolese citizens had dark skins just like the colored United States citizens murdered in Mississippi?”130


    In a January 2, 1965, article, the New York Times described the Malcolm X impetus behind this challenging turn in African attitudes. It noted that the policy proposed by Malcolm that “linked the fate of the new African states with that of American Negroes” was being adopted by African governments. The article said, “the African move profoundly disturbed the American authorities, who gave the impression that they had been caught off-guard.”131

    Those working behind the scenes were not caught off guard, however, as the knowledgeable author of the article, M.S. Handler, was quick to suggest. Handler had also written the August 13 Times piece from Washington. He went on to repeat what he had reported then, that “early last August the State Department and Justice Department began to take an interest in Malcolm’s activities in North Africa”—accompanied, as we know, by a parallel interest and stepped-up actions by the CIA and FBI. Handler traced the heightened government interest to Malcolm’s opening “his campaign to internationalize the American Negro problem at the second meeting of the 33 heads of independent African states in Cairo, which convened July 17.”132

    When the January 2 Times article appeared, Malcolm had seven weeks left to live. Much of the remaining time was devoted to his constant speaking trips throughout the U.S., up to Canada, and over to Europe. Malcolm lived each day, hour, and minute as if it were his last, for he knew how committed the forces tracking him were to killing him. Within the U.S., Fruit of Islam killing squads were waiting for him at every stop. Malcolm knew it was only a matter of time.

    On January 28, 1965, Malcolm flew to Los Angeles to meet with attorney Gladys Towles Root and two former NOI secretaries who were filing paternity suits against Elijah Muhammad.133 Malcolm felt personally responsible for having put the two women in a position of vulnerability to Elijah Muhammad. He told a friend, “My teachings converted these women to Elijah Muhammad. I opened their mind for him to reach in and take advantage of them.”134 He had come to Los Angeles, in preparation for testimony in support of the women, “to undo what I did to them by exposing them to this man.”135

    From the time Malcolm arrived at the Los Angeles Airport in mid-afternoon until his departure the next morning, he was trailed by the Nation of Islam. The two friends who met him, Hakim A. Jamal and Edmund Bradley, had alerted airport security to a possible NOI attack. As Jamal and Bradley waited at the gate, they noticed a black man seated behind them inconspicuously reading a newspaper. The man was John Ali. Although Malcolm’s Los Angeles trip had been a closely held secret, someone monitoring his conversations was feeding the information to Ali. Malcolm’s arrival gate was switched at the last moment, and security police rushed him and his companions safely through the airport to a car.136

    At his Statler Hilton Hotel, Malcolm repeatedly had to run a gauntlet of menacing NOI men stationed in the lobby. Bradley saw John Ali and the leaders of an NOI mosque in Los Angeles get out of a car in front of the hotel. Malcolm, Jamal, and Bradley left quickly in their own car to meet with the two secretaries and attorney Root. When Bradley drove Malcolm back to the airport in the morning, two carloads of NOI teams started to pull alongside their car. Malcolm picked up Bradley’s cane and stuck it out a window like a rifle. The two cars fell back. Police waiting at the airport escorted Malcolm safely to his plane.137

    During his next three days in Chicago, Malcolm was under the steady guard of the Chicago police. He was also under the watchful eyes of 15 NOI men who lingered at the entrance to his hotel. In their presence, Malcolm whispered to a Chicago police detective, “Those are all Black Muslims. At least two of them I recognize as being from New York. Elijah seems to know every move I make.”138 Malcolm would realize later that it had to be someone more powerful than Elijah who was making it possible for his troops to always be one step ahead of Malcolm.

    Malcolm testified before the Illinois Attorney General, who was investigating the Nation of Islam. The next day in a television interview, Malcolm described efforts to kill him. He said he had a letter on his desk identifying the persons assigned to kill him.139 He was accompanied everywhere by the Chicago police, who finally took him back safely to O’Hare Airport for his flight to New York.

    Later that week, Malcolm X once again almost connected with Martin Luther King Jr. The place was Selma, Alabama. The date was February 4, 1965, 17 days before Malcolm’s death, and three years and two months before Martin’s.

    The night before, Malcolm had spoken to 3000 students at Tuskegee Institute, 75 miles from Selma. Many of the students invited Malcolm to join them in the next day’s demonstration at Selma, where more than 3,400 arrests had already been made in the course of voter registration marches.

    Malcolm at Selma
    Malcolm at Selma AL with Coretta Scott King

    Malcolm’s sudden arrival in Selma on the morning of February 4 panicked the leaders of Martin Luther King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The younger SNCC radicals were urging that Malcolm be allowed to speak to the crowd gathering in the Brown Chapel AME Church for the demonstration. However, the SCLC ministers didn’t even have the voice of Martin Luther King, who was in a Selma jail, to balance the fiery oratory of Malcolm, who they feared would spark a riot. As Malcolm listened in bemusement to what he might be permitted to say, he commented, “Nobody puts words in my mouth.”140 They finally decided to let Malcolm speak, but called in Coretta King to talk after him and put out the fire. Mrs. King was instead inspired by Malcolm to see a transforming hope of convergence between him and her husband.

    In his talk, Malcolm widened the scene of struggle from Selma to the world. He told the crowd that civil rights were human rights, and that the U.S. government by failing to uphold their rights was thereby in violation of the United Nations Charter. Standing in the pulpit, pointing his right index finger at the demonstrators, he said they should “wire Secretary General U. Thant of the United Nations and charge the federal government of this country, behind Lyndon B. Johnson, with being derelict in its duty to protect the human rights of 22 million Black people.”141 He prayed that God would bless them in everything that they did, and “that all the fear that has ever been in your heart will be taken out.”142

    Coretta King followed Malcolm with a short, inspirational talk on nonviolence. He sat behind her, listening intently. When Coretta and Malcolm spoke together afterwards, he gave her a message for Martin. She was impressed by the gentle way in which he said,

    Mrs. King, will you tell Dr. King that I had planned to visit with him in jail? I won’t get a chance now because I’ve got to leave to get to New York in time to catch a plane for London, where I’m to address the African Students’ Conference. I want Dr. King to know that I didn’t come to Selma to make his job difficult. I really did come thinking that I could make it easier. If the white people realize what the alternative is, perhaps they will be more willing to hear Dr. King.143

    She thanked Malcolm, and said she would convey his words to Martin. She did so at the Selma jail that day. She said later that by the time Malcolm was killed, two and a half weeks later, she and Martin had reassessed their feelings toward him:

    We realized that since he had been to Mecca and had broken with Elijah Muhammad, he was moving away from hatred toward internationalism and against exploitation.144

    As the FBI and CIA knew by their close monitoring of both Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, the two catalysts of supposedly opposite revolutions were pondering cooperation.

    A highly placed North African diplomat … told Norden that his country’s intelligence apparatus “had been quietly informed by the French Department of Alien Documentation and Counter-Espionage that the CIA planned Malcolm’s murder, and France feared he might be liquidated on its soil.”

    After Malcolm’s trip to London, on February 9 he flew to Paris for another speaking engagement. At Orly Airport, French police surrounded him and said he was barred from entering the country. Malcolm’s speech, authorities felt, threatened to provoke “demonstrations that would trouble the public order.”145 He turned around and flew back to London.

    Malcolm was shocked. He had thought France one of Europe’s most liberal countries. He had also visited and spoken there three months before without a problem. At first he felt the U.S. State Department must have been responsible for the French decision. However, his exclusion had come from a government whose president, De Gaulle, did not ordinarily cave in to U.S. pressures. Malcolm continued to puzzle over his refusal by France. The day before his death, he would tell Alex Haley that he’d begun to realize that what happened to him in France was a clue to his impending murder.

    Malcolm’s intuition was right. A journalist who investigated Malcolm’s death, Eric Norden, was given an answer to the French puzzle in April 1965. A highly placed North African diplomat, who insisted on anonymity, told Norden that his country’s intelligence apparatus “had been quietly informed by the French Department of Alien Documentation and Counter-Espionage that the CIA planned Malcolm’s murder, and France feared he might be liquidated on its soil.”146

    France had passed on its knowledge of the CIA plot against Malcolm to the diplomat’s country because Malcolm had also visited it. He might have chosen to fly there after being barred from France. The French were warning them that the CIA might kill him within their borders, scapegoating them. The North African diplomat who gave Norden this chilling information then said, “Your CIA is beginning to murder its own citizens now.”147

    It is probably safe to say that, even under the Freedom of Information Act, no one will ever be handed a government document that states U.S. intelligence agencies assassinated Malcolm X. However, we do have a document that states U.S. intelligence agencies (which have assassinated other leaders) were given detailed information of Malcolm’s itinerary for his February 1965 trip to England and France. On February 4, 1965, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sent a confidential memorandum detailing Malcolm’s travel plans to the CIA Director, the Deputy Director of Plans (the CIA office under which Cold War assassinations were carried out), the Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Chief of the Air Force Counterintelligence Division, an office in London whose name was so sensitive that it was deleted from the document and another such office in Paris.148 At the same time, the CIA was reportedly planning to murder Malcolm and his travels to England and France were being tracked by practically the entire U.S. intelligence network.

    While Malcolm was being barred from France for reasons unknown to him, back in the U.S. the NOI newspaper, Muhammad Speaks, was announcing Elijah Muhammad’s final judgment on Malcolm. The paper’s propaganda barrage seemed like a preamble to Malcolm’s assassination. Abdul Basit Naeem, the FBI’s second reliable informant in the NOI’s inner circle, wrote anti-Malcolm articles in the February 5, 12, and 19 issues, culminating in his “Hypocrites Cannot Alter Muhammad’s Divine Destiny.”149 FBI asset Naeem seemed to be laying a foundation for a divine judgment on Malcolm. Elijah himself wrote in the February 12 issue that “Malcolm—the Chief Hypocrite—was beyond the point of no return.” He added what would soon prove to be true, that he “would no longer have to suffer Malcolm’s attacks.”150 Naeem’s and Muhammad’s articles proclaiming the end of Malcolm were like divine prophecies in the hands of their readers during the final week of Malcolm’s life.


    On Saturday afternoon, February 13, 1965, Malcolm flew back from London to New York to face an eviction from his home. The Queens Civil Court had already ordered him and his family to vacate their house in East Elmhurst. Malcolm had filed an appeal that was due to be heard on Monday the 15th.151 At 2:45 a.m. on Sunday the 14th, as Malcolm and his family were sleeping, the house was firebombed. Bottles of gasoline with fuses had been thrown through the front windows, setting the house ablaze. Malcolm staggered into consciousness. He rushed Betty, who was six months pregnant with twins, and their four daughters through the kitchen door. They all escaped into the 20-degree February night. Had it not been for the failure of one poorly aimed firebomb, the entire family could have burned to death. The apparent pattern of the thrown Molotov cocktails was to block every exit. One, however, glanced off the window of three of Malcolm’s daughters’ bedroom. It burned out harmlessly in the grass.152

    Elmhurst house Firebombing
    After firebombing of Malcolm’s house in Queens

    After the fire department extinguished the blaze, a deputy police inspector and a deputy fire inspector opened an investigation by questioning Malcolm in a police squad car. Malcolm’s friend and co-worker Earl Grant was present also. Grant said the officers “asked Malcolm how could anyone else but him have burned his house.”153 This began the charges, soon to be made public, that Malcolm had started the fire to get publicity. It is significant to say that the first move in this game was made by a police and fire inspector. The allegation that Malcolm had tried to burn down his house to gain sympathetic headlines would be used in the press to discredit him and disparage threats to his life in the days leading up to his assassination.

    On Monday the NOI’s Captain of Mosque Seven, Joseph X, began the public attack by telling reporters he believed Malcolm had set off the firebombs himself “to get publicity” and sympathy.154 Joseph X was the same Mosque Seven official who, the year before, in the first NOI plot on Malcolm’s life, had ordered an assistant to wire Malcolm’s car to explode.155 He was also later identified to Karl Evanzz by former members of his mosque as being part of the team of assassins who had actually firebombed Malcolm’s home.156 When Spike Lee was so bold as to ask Joseph X (then Yusuf Shah) in a 1992 interview who bombed Malcolm’s house, he replied, “What do you want me to say? … that was the parsonage. Malcolm didn’t think so, but John Ali and I had the deeds … [The house got bombed] by some mysterious people.”157 However, before he died in 1993, Captain Joseph finally admitted he participated in the firebombing of the Malcolm X home.158

    Two days after the firebombing, police detectives who were investigating it told the media that a whisky bottle containing gasoline had been found “intact and upright on top of a baby dresser” in the house.159 The obvious implication was that Malcolm was the source of the bottle of gasoline. The detectives did not mention that it was Betty Shabazz who, on returning to the gutted house to salvage belongings, had found the bottle on her baby’s dresser. She had pointed it out to firemen. How had it gotten there?

    Malcolm had been saying, “My house was bombed by the Black Muslim movement upon the orders of Elijah Muhammad.”160 When Betty discovered the bottle of gasoline on the dresser and the police raised it publicly, she and Malcolm knew the plot went beyond the NOI to include the police. A coordinated effort was being made by the police and the NOI to scapegoat them. They were being set up for something worse. In such a scheme, it was the police, not the NOI, who ran the show. And who was it who ran the police’s show? Betty said, “Only someone in the uniform of a fireman or a policeman could have planted the bottle of gasoline on my baby’s dresser. It was to make it appear as if we had bombed our own home.”161

    “That was a bad scene, brother. The sickness and madness of those days—I’m glad to be free of them. It’s a time for martyrs now. And if I’m to be one, it will be in the cause of brotherhood. That’s the only thing that can save this country.”

    On Wednesday, Malcolm received a confirmation of this scenario. After a speaking engagement in Rochester, he met an African-American fire marshal, Vincent Canty, at the Rochester Airport. Canty told Malcolm that a fireman had set the bottle of gasoline on the dresser. Malcolm made Canty’s revelation public at a press conference the following afternoon. He demanded an investigation by the FBI into a conspiracy “entered into at the local level between some police, some firemen, and some press to cover up for Elijah and his followers to give the public the impression that we set the house on fire ourselves.”162 At the same press conference Malcolm said he had sent a telegram to the Secretary of State insisting on an investigation to determine why the American embassy did not intervene when he, while in possession of an American passport, was denied entry into France.163


    It sounds as if Malcolm X was seeing conspiracies everywhere. In fact even Malcolm, who was moving quickly toward enlightenment, was being naïve to see them on such a small scale. He was naïve, first of all, to think the planting of the bottle of gasoline was only a conspiracy entered into at the local level, or to think the FBI, of all people, would be of any help in investigating it. And little did he know that his American passport belonged to a man whom the State Department had turned over the previous summer to the CIA because “Malcolm X has, for all practical purposes, renounced his U.S. citizenship.”164 As a U.S. citizen insisting on his rights, Malcolm X was in reality a man without a country, about to be gunned down in a conspiracy that went beyond anyone’s imagination except those who were controlling it.

    Malcolm concluded his Thursday afternoon press conference by stating, “The police in this country know what is going on—this conspiracy leads to my death.”165 Malcolm did know what was going on. He had simply not yet connected all the dots.

    Audubon Ballroom
    Audubon Ballroom

    In the meantime, a dry run of Malcolm’s assassination had already occurred at the Audubon Ballroom. This was witnessed by the WPM BOSSI infiltrator, Gene Roberts, who was Malcolm’s security guard. By this time, Roberts had also become Malcolm’s friend and admirer. He was taking his role as Malcolm’s bodyguard more seriously than his BOSSI superiors had wanted.

    On the night of the dry run, Monday, February 15, Malcolm spoke to 700 people at the Audubon Ballroom. Many years later, Gene Roberts described what was for him the most significant part of the evening:

    I was part of what we call “the front rostrum guard.” We stood in front of the stage. If anybody tried to get to Malcolm, we’d take them out or whatever. I’m on Malcolm’s right. … There’s a noise in the middle of the audience. There’s a young individual walking down the aisle. I moved toward him, and he sat down. Then everything was back to normal. But I’m saying, “I don’t like this.” I just had a bad gut feeling.166

    Roberts had seen a preview of what would happen the following Sunday: a fake disruption in the audience designed to draw everyone’s attention, then a movement elsewhere toward Malcolm which on Sunday would include three shooters firing simultaneously.


    Malcolm’s own reaction to the dry run can be found in a published transcript of his Monday night talk:

    What’s up? [Commotion in audience.] Okay. Y’all sit down and be cool. [Laughter] Just sit down and be cool.167

    Roberts said he called his supervisors when the Monday meeting was over:

    I says, “Listen. I just saw the dry run on Malcolm’s life.” I told them I felt like it was going to happen at the meeting [scheduled for the Audubon Ballroom] the following Sunday. I told them if it’s going to happen, it’s going to go down Sunday. And they said, okay, we’ll pass it on.168

    What they did with it I don’t know … I don’t think they really cared.169

    Roberts also said Malcolm’s own security people got together with him in the middle of the week to prepare for the Sunday meeting at the Audubon:

    A lot of his other people said, “Can we carry guns?” He said, “No!” He was emphatic about that. He said, “No!” Then there was [the question], “Can we search?” He said, “No way.” Again he was emphatic—no searching. So that was the way it went.170

    On Friday February 19, Malcolm dropped in unexpectedly at the home of his friend, Life photographer Gordon Parks. Malcolm was in a reflective mood. The two men talked of Malcolm’s years with the Nation of Islam, which Parks had helped photograph. Malcolm began to recall the vicious violence he had taken part in (that Alauddin Shabazz described to me). Malcolm said,

    That was a bad scene, brother. The sickness and madness of those days—I’m glad to be free of them. It’s a time for martyrs now. And if I’m to be one, it will be in the cause of brotherhood. That’s the only thing that can save this country. I’ve learned it the hard way—but I’ve learned it. And that’s the significant thing.171

    Describing this last meeting with Malcolm, Parks said he was struck by the change in the Malcolm he had known: “He was caught, it seemed, in a new idealism. And, as time bore out, he had given me the essence of what was to have been his brotherhood speech—the one his killers silenced. It was this intentness on brotherhood that cost him his life. For Malcolm, over the objections of his bodyguards, was to rule against anyone being searched before entering the hall that fateful day: ‘We don’t want people feeling uneasy,’ he said. ‘We must create an image that makes people feel at home.’”172

    “You don’t offer somebody like that protection.” ~NYPD headquarters officer

    Malcolm’s final edicts against guns on his bodyguards (not obeyed by all of them), and against searching at the Audubon’s door because it made people uneasy, have been lumped together with the NYPD’s claim that Malcolm refused police protection. It is important to examine this claim, as well as any evidence to the contrary.

    The NYPD process had begun, the police told author Peter Goldman, with BOSSI intelligence analysts recognizing the truth of what their sources were telling them: a serious attempt was about to be made on Malcolm’s life. Accordingly, the BOSSI analysts drew up a scenario—essentially for their own protection, not Malcolm’s. What they knew, first of all, was that they didn’t want to protect Malcolm. “The guy had a bad sheet,” as one headquarters officer put it to Goldman, “You don’t offer somebody like that protection.”173 Nevertheless, following a prudent game plan, they formally offered Malcolm protection, assuming he would almost certainly have to refuse it for political reasons. As a BOSSI man told Goldman, “Representatives of the New York police department made three approaches during the final two weeks to Malcolm or to men presumed to speak for him and offered to put him under round-the-clock guard. These offers were made formally and before witnesses. In each case, also following the BOSS[I] scenario, Malcolm or his people refused. The refusals were duly noted in the Malcolm File. “As far as I was concerned,” the man from BOSSI told Goldman, “that took us off the hook.”174

    These carefully witnessed offers of protection protected the NYPD. Thus Deputy Police Commissioner Walter Arm could say in the wake of the assassination, with “proof” if anyone wanted it, that Malcolm had refused the department’s offer to protect him.175 Alex Haley wrote, however, that he knew from many of Malcolm’s associates that during the week before his death, “Malcolm X complained repeatedly that the police would not take his requests for protection seriously.”176 As we have seen, Malcolm had in fact welcomed the protection of the Los Angeles and Chicago police, who only a few days before spirited him through airports and shielded him from assaults. He evidently thought the New York Police Department had a similar responsibility. So did BOSSI undercover agent Gene Roberts, who warned his superiors of precisely what to expect, and when and where to expect it—and expected them to prevent a killing. It didn’t happen.

    Assuming the police did speak “to Malcolm or to men presumed to speak for him,” their offer may have been made to individuals who they could count on to say no in Malcolm’s name. They could also have made the offer to Malcolm in such a way as to guarantee his refusal. The police’s self-confessed purpose in any case, was not to protect “a guy with a bad sheet” but simply to take them “off the hook.”

    The most serious argument against the police’s claim that they were even minimally serious in wanting to protect Malcolm is their behavior in response to the firebombing. The police were complicit in the planting of the bottle of gasoline on the dresser. They then used that planted evidence to scapegoat Malcolm for the firebombing of his own home. Far from wanting to protect Malcolm, those in command of the NYPD were evidently in league with the other forces seeking his death.


    The assassination of Malcolm X on Sunday afternoon, February 21, 1965, at the Audubon Ballroom in Harlem proceeded like an execution, for that is what it was. As we have already seen from the Hoover memorandum, of February 4, 1965, Malcolm, on his trip to England and France, was being followed by an intelligence network. A network that included the FBI, the CIA Director, the CIA’s Deputy Director of Plans (read covert action and assassinations), the Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Chief of the Air Force Counterintelligence Division and two foreign offices too sensitive to be identified. These were the chickens Malcolm was talking about in his JFK comment that launched him into independence from Elijah Muhammad. Now after Malcolm’s pilgrimage to Mecca and revolutionary Africa, the same chickens were coming home to roost for him.

    Malcolm realized, as he said to Alex Haley, that the NOI was now serving as a proxy, much like how the CIA used the Mafia as their go-between in the attempted killing of Castro and furnished plausible deniability and a showy scapegoat. In what appears to have been a COINTELPRO or perhaps joint FBI-CIA operation, the Nation of Islam was being used as a religious Mafia.

    BOSSI’s young black infiltrator, Gene Roberts, was caught in the middle of this covertly managed execution. Roberts had been won over by Malcolm. “I learned to love the man; respect him,” Roberts said to a reporter in the ’80s long after it was all over. “I think he was a good person.”177

    For the rest of his life, Roberts would recall that Sunday again and again. It began with a conflict he had with his wife over Malcolm. While Roberts was at home putting on his new gray suit for his Audubon guard duty, Joan Roberts told him she was going to the meeting too. He argued no, the department wouldn’t like it. Joan wouldn’t give ground. She had never seen Malcolm X speak. She was curious. Gene finally gave in. But he told her to at least keep a low profile, and to take a seat in the back. She chose a seat in the front of the ballroom, next to some reporters.178

    Malcolm had stayed over Saturday night at the New York Hilton Hotel in Manhattan. Soon after he checked in, three black men asked for his room number. Hotel security was alerted, and focused its attention on Malcolm’s 12th floor. On Sunday morning, he was awakened by the phone, which rang at exactly eight o’clock. What he identified as a white man’s voice said, “Wake up, brother,” and hung up. Malcolm felt it was a veiled message from a system larger than the NOI, telling him that today would be the day. He had been feeling that already.179

    He spoke on the phone with his sister, Ella, in Boston. His last words to her were:

    “You pray for me, Ella, because I firmly believe now I need it more than I’ve ever needed it before. So you ask Allah to guide me, because I feel they may have me doomed for this day.”

    “Not this day,” Ella protested.

    “Yes, this day,” Malcolm said.180

    He also phoned Betty and asked if she could come to the meeting that afternoon with all four children. She said she would.

    As we know from Talmadge Hayer’s confession, the five men from Newark’s Mosque Number 25 had checked out the floor plan of the Audubon Ballroom at a dance held there on Saturday night. We also know that John Ali was in town. As he had been at the LA airport three weeks previous, as he had been shortly after at the LA hotel, now John Ali was in New York on the weekend of Malcolm’s murder. At this time, Hayer states the final assassination plans were being laid.

    According to information that briefly surfaced at the 1966 trial of Hayer and his two co-defendants, John Ali “had come in from Chicago on February 19th, checked into the Americana Hotel in midtown Manhattan and checked out on the evening of February 21st.” (Goldman, p. 314, NY Times 3/3/66, p. 24) According to this testimony, Ali arrived just in time for the final rehearsal in advance of the murder.

    A confidential March 3, 1966 FBI report bolsters the testimony. An FBI memo from the Special Agent in Charge (SAC), New York, to the Director, cites a witness whose name has been deleted as saying, “John Ali met with Hayer the night before Malcolm X was killed.” (Hayer denied this to Peter Goldman, per Goldman p. 432) The FBI reports say that the state never called this witness because the witness was later arrested for theft. Yet a criminal background presented no barrier to the state’s calling of other witnesses. More probable is the fact that for people in the know, an Ali-Hayer meeting on the eve of the murder would have been explosive. It could very possibly mean that Hayer and his cohorts were being controlled by an agent of the Bureau. It is not surprising that an FBI document would back the state’s judgment in passing over a witness who would open up that door to the FBI. After that all-too-brief opening at the trial, the state shut all further federal government connections to the murder.

    Malcolm realized the overall dynamics of a police operation without being aware of the details. He said repeatedly during his final week that he knew the Nation of Islam was full of police. So even when he was emphasizing initially that the Black Muslims were to blame for bombing his house, he was not excluding the NYPD or federal agencies that were complicit with them. Because he knew the NOI was riddled with agents, Malcolm understood that it was their controllers who really held the keys to his life. It was not the NOI that was directing a plot, which included planting a bottle of gasoline in his fire-gutted house. He referred to this directly in a speech of February 15th:

    Don’t you think that anything is going down that [the police] don’t know about. The only thing that goes down is what they want to go down, and what they don’t want to go down they don’t let go down.

    Malcolm realized, as he said to Alex Haley, that the NOI was now serving as a proxy, much like how the CIA used the Mafia as their go-between in the attempted killing of Castro and furnished plausible deniability and a showy scapegoat. In what appears to have been a COINTELPRO or perhaps joint FBI-CIA operation, the Nation of Islam was being used as a religious Mafia.


    On Sunday afternoon, they carried out the strategy they had drawn up. If there was searching at the door, they would turn around and leave. Because there was no search, the men went in with their guns under their coats. Talmadge Hayer and Leon Davis sat down in the front row on the left side. Hayer had a .45 automatic, Leon a Luger. William X and Benjamin Thomas sat a few rows behind them. William X was carrying a sawed-off, double-barrel shotgun under his coat. Ben Thomas, sitting beside him, did not have a shooting role. Thomas was the group’s organizer. As the assistant secretary to the Newark mosque, he was also their sanctioning authority. Seated near the rear of the ballroom was Wilbur X, who would create the diversion to start the action. Wilbur would pretend someone was picking his pocket, then would throw a smoke bomb. The three shooters would fire, and everyone would run for the street. Their car was parked a few blocks away, on a street headed for the George Washington Bridge. Thanks to the absence of police, four of the five men would escape safely. They would never spend a day in jail for killing Malcolm.181

    “[T]he more I keep thinking about this thing, the things that have been happening lately, I’m not all that sure it’s the Muslims. I know what they can do, and what they can’t, and they can’t do some of the stuff recently going on. … the more I keep thinking about what happened to me in France, I think I’m going to quit saying it’s the Muslims.”

    Malcolm had said on the previous Tuesday to his friend and aide James Shabazz, “I have been marked for death in the next five days. I have the names of five Black Muslims who have been asked to kill me. I will announce them at the [Sunday] meeting.”182 As he waited to be introduced on Sunday afternoon, Malcolm had the names of his five assassins written on a piece of paper in his pocket.

    Before walking out on the stage, Malcolm told his assistants that he was going to stop saying it was the Muslims. Things had been happening that went beyond what they could do.183 He also said he was going to tell the black man to stop fighting himself. That was a part of the white man’s strategy, to keep the black man fighting each other. “I’m not fighting anyone, that’s not what we’re here for.”184

    Gene Roberts had been a part of the afternoon’s first rostrum security, during a preliminary speech by Malcolm’s assistant, Benjamin Goodman. When Roberts was relieved of his duty, he sat down in the back of the ballroom. Benjamin Goodman introduced Malcolm to the audience of 400 people as “a man who would give his life for you.”

    After receiving a long standing ovation, Malcolm greeted everyone—including the five assassins he assumed were present—with “As-salaam alaikum.” (“Peace be with you.”) The response came back, “Wa-laikum salaam.” (“And with you peace.”)

    Wilbur began his ploy by yelling at the man seated next to him, “Get your hand out of my pocket, man!”

    Malcolm responded to the sounds of a beginning fight by stepping out from behind the podium and walking to the front of the stage, thus making himself a perfect target. An audio cassette was found with him saying, just before the shots, “Now, now, brothers, break it up. Hold it, hold it, hold it … “185

    Gene Roberts, recognizing the same diversion he’d seen the Tuesday before, stood up and started down the aisle. Ahead of him, William X began moving toward Malcolm. Wilbur ignited the smoke bomb in the rear, creating a panic in the crowd. At a distance of 15 feet from Malcolm, William X fired the shotgun in a roar, hitting Malcolm with a dozen buckshot pellets that made a circle on his chest. The shotgun roared again. Hayer and Davis were standing and firing their pistols again and again at Malcolm’s body lying on the stage.186 Then they were all running for the street.

    Gene Roberts picked up a chair. Hayer looked at him, aimed, and fired his .45. The bullet pierced Roberts’ suit coat, missing his body. He threw the chair at Hayer, knocking him down. Hayer got up limping. Another security guard shot Hayer in his left thigh. Hayer kept on limping, hopping, and made it out the front door. A crowd encircled him, and began beating him.

    Hagan/Hayer apprehended
    Thomas Hagan AKA Talmadge Hayer apprehended

    Thomas Hoy was the only police officer stationed outside the ballroom. He managed to pull Hayer away from the crowd. A police car cruising by stopped. Sergeant Alvin Aronoff and patrolman Louis Angelos helped Hoy save Hayer’s life by pushing him into the car. They took him to the Wadsworth Avenue Police Station.187 Roberts had gone up on the stage. He found Malcolm still had a pulse. Roberts began giving Malcolm mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, trying to revive him. Malcolm died on the stage.188


    Over the next 24 hours, Gene Roberts went through a series of BOSSI debriefings on the assassination. His superiors were incredulous at his attempt to save Malcolm’s life on the stage. “What did you do that for?” he was asked.

    And I told them, Roberts said, “Well, I’m a cop. And this is what cops are supposed to do—save people.”189

    Roberts at assassination
    Gene Roberts: “This is what cops
    are supposed to do—save people.”

    When Malcolm was shot, Joan Roberts had gone to Betty Shabazz, who had thrown her body over her children. Joan tried to hold her. Betty struggled to get free, throwing Joan against the wall, and ran to Malcolm’s side. Gene eventually helped Joan, who was shaken, to a taxicab.190

    Gene Roberts was the precursor to Marrell McCullough in the assassination of Martin Luther King. In a famous photo, McCullough can be seen with a stricken look kneeling over King’s body on the balcony of the Lorraine Motel in Memphis, April 4, 1968. McCullough belonged to a Memphis black power youth group working with King. He was the first person to reach him after he was shot. Unknown to King’s associates for another decade, Marrell McCullough was also a deep cover operative for the Memphis Police Department.191

    LIFE magazine feature Malcolm X assassination
    The LIFE issue on the assassination of Malcolm X

    Talmadge Hayer, Norman Butler, and Thomas Johnson were tried for Malcolm’s murder from January 21 to March 11, 1966. Butler and Johnson were two well-known New York “enforcers” for the Nation of Islam whom the police had picked up in the week following the assassination. A series of shaky witnesses, several contradicting their own grand jury testimony, testified to having seen Butler and Johnson take part in the murder. Butler and Johnson claimed they hadn’t even been in the Audubon Ballroom that afternoon. Butler had three supporting witnesses and Johnson two, to their each having been at home during the shooting. In the years to come, many of Malcolm’s people would emphasize that Butler and Johnson as well-known local NOI enforcers would have been quickly identified and watched closely had they entered the ballroom that day. They simply weren’t there. Talmadge Hayer agreed. In the trial’s most dramatic moments, Hayer took the stand, confessed his own participation in the assassination, and said Butler and Johnson had nothing to do with it. However, because Hayer refused to identify his real co-conspirators, his testimony was discredited. All three men were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Hayer’s more detailed 1978 confession, naming the other four men in his group, was too late to help Butler and Johnson. They each served more than 20 years. The only man who has ever confessed to the murder of Malcolm X, Talmadge Hayer (who has become Mujahid Abdul Halim), has also made another confession:

    I remember some of the ministers used to say that time reveals all things. Malcolm used to say it himself—time will tell. And for the longest time, I always thought that time would tell what that man was saying was wrong. Well, time has told. Time has told that a lot of things he said was true.192

    Benjamin Goodman Karim
    Benjamin Goodman Karim

    Benjamin Goodman, in a 1978 affidavit supporting Butler and Johnson’s innocence, provided an insight into the coercion of trial witnesses. Goodman said that in 1965, he was summoned to a New York police station where detectives questioned him about Butler and Johnson. When he told the detectives repeatedly that Butler and Johnson had not been in the Audubon Ballroom that afternoon, the detectives became angry. Later in 1965, Goodman was summoned to another interview, this time from assistant District Attorney Stern. Goodman told them that:

    I knew Butler and Johnson, they had not been present at the ballroom that day, and that I had not seen the actual shooting. When I said this, Mr. Stern became angry and said that he knew I had previously said that I had seen the shooting through an open dressing room door. This was not true and I had never said this to anyone. In his anger, Mr. Stern threatened me and asked me, have you ever been to jail? How would you like to go to jail?

    Goodman was not called to testify at the trial.193


    Besides Hayer, the most significant trial witness was black police officer Gilbert Henry. Before the prosecution could get him off the stand, Henry revealed the strange way the NYPD had deployed its forces on February 21st. Henry said he had been stationed in the Ballroom’s Rose Room that afternoon, at a distance from Malcolm’s location in the main auditorium. He and his partner, Patrolman John Carroll, had been given specific instructions by their superior officer, Sergeant Devaney, “to remain where [they] would not be seen.” If anything happened, Patrolman Henry was to call for help on a walkie-talkie the two men had with them. It was connected with another walkie-talkie held by an officer at the Presbyterian Medical Center on the other side of the street. When Henry heard shots, he tried calling on the walkie-talkie but got no response. He then ran into the main auditorium, but was too late to see anyone with a gun. He said he saw no other uniformed officers in the auditorium.194

    Malcolm’s unofficial photographer, Robert Haggins, was one of the witnesses never called in the trial who could have testified farther to the odd behavior of the police that afternoon. Haggins told Spike Lee he had seen the anteroom of the ballroom filled with police: “If I took a guess, I’d say 25. It was filled with cops. Cops who must’ve waited until after he was shot to file into the ballroom.”195

    Earl Grant saw the police come in. He said that about 15 minutes after Malcolm was shot, “a most incredible scene took place. Into the hall sauntered about a dozen policemen. They were strolling at about the pace one would expect of them if they were patrolling a quiet park. They did not seem to be at all excited or concerned about the circumstances.

    I could hardly believe my eyes. Here were New York City policemen, entering a room from which at least a dozen shots had been heard, and yet not one of them had his gun out! As a matter of absolute fact, some of them even had their hands in their pockets.”196

    The best witness we have to the assassination of Malcolm X remains Malcolm X, as recorded by Alex Haley.


    On Saturday afternoon, February 20, 24 hours before he would walk to the podium of the Audubon Ballroom, Malcolm phoned Alex Haley at his home in upstate New York. It was to be their last conversation. Malcolm ended it with what Haley, in his epilogue to the autobiography, calls a “digression.” Malcolm was speaking of his impending murder:

    I’m going to tell you something, brother—the more I keep thinking about this thing, the things that have been happening lately, I’m not all that sure it’s the Muslims. I know what they can do, and what they can’t, and they can’t do some of the stuff recently going on. Now, I’m going to tell you, the more I keep thinking about what happened to me in France, I think I’m going to quit saying it’s the Muslims.197

    Malcolm had one final thought. In the last sentence he would ever say to Alex Haley—which Haley describes as “an odd, abrupt change of subject”—Malcolm said why he thought he was about to be killed:

    You know, I’m glad I’ve been the first to establish official ties between Afro-Americans and our blood brothers in Africa.198

    He then said good-bye and hung up.


    Nasser and Nkrumah
    Nasser and Nkrumah

    In the midst of his African campaign the previous August, Malcolm had sent a letter from Cairo to friends in Harlem that foreshadowed his last words to Alex Haley. One month after he was poisoned at the Nile Hilton, Malcolm wrote:

    You must realize that what I am trying to do is very dangerous because it is a direct threat to the entire international system of racist exploitation…. Therefore, if I die or am killed before making it back to the States, you can rest assured that what I’ve already set in motion will never be stopped … Our problem has been internationalized.199

    At the time Malcolm wrote this letter, his friend and ally Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser was taking with extreme seriousness the ongoing threat to Malcolm’s life from U.S. intelligence agencies. He had two Egyptian security men posted outside Malcolm’s hotel room door at all times.200


    Alex Haley, a great author who gave Malcolm a prose platform from which he could address the world, buried in his epilogue what may have been the most significant words Malcolm ever said to him. Malcolm’s “digression” was a revelation, which he would share also with his assistants on Sunday afternoon, and his “change of subject” a coherent climax to his life. Malcolm was willing to give his life for the sake of a unity between Africans and African-Americans that he hoped would change the course of history. In his final year, Malcolm had become a witness to the truth he had experienced in his pilgrimage to Mecca—that all of humankind was one family of brothers and sisters under Allah. But he radically focused that truth on Africa and America. Africa was where our one family had begun, and America where much of it had been sent into slavery. He envisioned and was organizing a mutually supportive African-American movement for human rights on both continents. “But,” as Malcolm said 12 days before his death to a friend in London, “the chances are that they will get me the way they got [Congo’s revolutionary leader Patrice] Lumumba before he reached the running stage.”201 Malcolm was right. And in his final words to Alex Haley, he had already solved the crime of his murder a day before it happened.

    “Muslims don’t carry guns.” (Malcolm X to Charles Kenyatta, shortly before his death)

    Near the end of his life, Malcolm began to think about guns as a question of faith. In his last week, he see-sawed between wanting to apply for a permit to carry a pistol and wanting to confront his killers with no guns on either himself or his followers. He ended by choosing no guns. It seemed a strange final decision for Black America’s most articulate advocate of armed self-defense. Why did Malcolm take such a stand at the hour of his death?

    Malcolm’s co-worker, Charles 37X Kenyatta, has told a revealing story about the man whose life was one continuous turn toward the truth as he saw it. Charles said he and Malcolm were riding in a taxicab to the Chicago airport. They suddenly realized they were being taken instead into the stockyards. The driver had a sinister purpose of his own. Charles, however, had a pistol. He used it to make the driver stop the cab and get out. Charles and Malcolm drove quickly to the airport, and got on their plane.

    Malcolm then told Charles he had lost his religion. Three decades after Malcolm’s death, Charles Kenyatta continued to puzzle over his teacher’s strange words. Malcolm said to him: “Muslims don’t carry guns.”202

    As a deep believer in Islam, Malcolm chose to die as a martyr. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, and a wave of suicide bombers in Israel, Americans have tended to think of the Islamic concept of martyrdom as counter-violent. That was not, however the kind of martyr that Malcolm told Gordon Parks he wanted to be. Nor was it what he learned from the Islamic tradition he embraced on his pilgrimage to Mecca. In response to his assassins, whose identity he said he knew in advance, Malcolm gave his life to Allah “in the cause of brotherhood,” without trying to snatch away the lives of those taking his own.

    He also chose not to go into exile to avoid martyrdom. 12 days before his death, Malcolm listened patiently in a London hotel room, while a friend, Guyan writer Jan Carew, summoned every word at his command to persuade Malcolm not to return to the United States and almost certain death. Carew even invoked the authority of their ancestral spirit world, “the ghosts in our blood,” against the folly of martyrdom.

    Those ancestral spirits whisper warnings, whenever we’re about to do something reckless or foolhardy. Right now they should be whispering to you that, perhaps, surviving for our cause is more important then dying for it.203

    Malcolm answered:

    The spirit world’s fine but I want our folk to be free in the world of the living.204

    And the unspoken thought: So for the sake of the living, I’ll live the truth freely and openly all the way, regardless of the consequences.

    In Malcolm’s eyes, that was freedom. By living and speaking freely, Malcolm denied to the system that assassinated him the victory of taking away his life. He instead gave it freely in the cause of brotherhood and sisterhood. “It’s a time for martyrs now,” as he told Gordon Parks, “And if I’m to be one, it will be in the cause of brotherhood. That’s the only thing that can save this country.”

    In his final days, Malcolm transformed the death by violence that had haunted him all his life. Recognizing its imminence, he embraced it in terms of his faith. He did so in a way that was in tension with some of his own public rhetoric. Although Malcolm continued to insist vehemently right up to his death on armed self-defense as a fundamental right for black people and for all other people as well, he died without wanting his followers to resort to that right for himself. In a life of profound changes, Malcolm’s ultimate choice of how he wanted to die, nonviolently in the cause of brotherhood, was perhaps the most remarkable change of all.

    A “martyr” is literally a witness. Malcolm’s final action, in stepping forward to reconcile two brothers in a fight, made him not only a target for murder but also a witness to brotherhood.

    As he said to us all, “As-salaam alaikum.”


    Notes

    1. The Autobiography of Malcolm X, as told to Alex Haley (New York: Ballantine Books, 1973), p. 9.

    2. Ibid., p. 2.

    3. Ibid., p. 378.

    4. Ibid., p. 381.

    5. Karl Evanzz, The Judas Factor: The Plot to Kill Malcolm X (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1992).

    6. Karl Evanzz, The Messenger: The Rise and Fall of Elijah Muhammad (New York: Pantheon, 1999).

    7. Zak A. Kondo, Conspiracys: Unravelling the Assassination of Malcolm X (Washington: Nubia Press, 1993).

    8. Louis Lomax, To Kill a Black Man (Los Angeles: Holloway House, 1987). Although we have reached different conclusions on the conspiracy to kill Malcolm X, I want to acknowledge the help of a sixth author. In both his book, The Death and Life of Malcolm X (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, second edition, 1979) and the kind interview he gave me, Peter Goldman has been a great resource and source of encouragement. His book provides dimensions of both the death and life that remain indispensable for a pilgrim into either.

    9. Evanzz underlines Lomax’s importance in The Judas Factor p. xxiv. Lomax also had early insights into the murder of the second subject of his book, Martin Luther King Jr.

    10. Memorandum from SAC [Special Agent in Charge], Chicago, to Director, FBI, 1/22169, page 1; in Petition to the Black Caucus, U.S. House of Representatives, of Muhammad Abdul Aziz (Norman 3X Butler) and Khalil Islam (Thomas 15X Johnson), April, 30, 1979; in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers, Gelman Library, George Washington University.

    11. Louis E. Lomax, When the Word Is Given (New York: Signet Books, 1964), p. 82.

    12. Ibid.

    13. Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, December 24, 1963. Church Committee Final Report, Book III, p. 134.

    14. FBI HQ file on Lomax. Evanzz, Judas, p. 198.

    15. Ibid.

    16. Ibid.

    17. Lomax, To Kill, p. 199.

    18. Author’s interview with Wallace Muhammad, now W. D. Mohammed, August 2, 1999.

    19. Evanzz, Messenger, p. 317.

    20. Malcolm X scholar Zak Kondo obtained a March 16, 1954, Detroit FBI Report, captioned MALCOLM K. LITTLE, which cites from a 1950 prison letter written by Malcolm. Fonda, pp. 42, 292 endnote 847.

    21. Messenger, p. 183.

    22. Ibid.

    23. Ibid.

    24. Ibid., p. 557 endnote 39. Evanzz speculates that Abdul Basin Naeem may have been pressured to cooperate with the FBI and BOSSI due to his immigrant status. Ibid.

    25. FBI HQ file on Elijah Muhammad; FBI NY file on Malcolm X; cited by Evanzz, Messenger, p. 186.

    26. Ibid., p. 187.

    27. Goldman, pp. 55-59. Judas, pp. 70-71.

    28. Autobiography, p. 309.

    29. To Kill, p. 103,

    30. Messenger, pp. 187-88.

    31. Cited by Evanzz, Ibid., p. 188.

    32.Messenger, p. 192. Judas, p. 73.

    33. Lomax, When the Word, p. 179.

    34. Autobiography, p. 289.

    35. When the Word, Ibid.

    36. Autobiography, p. 265.

    37. Ibid.

    38. Ibid.

    39. Ibid., p. 292.

    40. Ibid., p. 297.

    41. FBI HQ file on Elijah Muhammad, section 5, memo dated May 20, 1960; approved by Cartha DeLoach, May 22, 1960. Cited by Evann, Messenger, p. 218.

    42. FBI HQ file on Elijah Muhammad. Ibid., pp. 249-50.

    43. Autobiography, p. 301.

    44. John Henrik Clarke, who published a transcript of the conversation, “A Visit from the FBI,” in Malcolm X: The Man and His Times (New York: Macmillan, 1975), pages 182-204, wrote in a footnote on page 182 that it happened on May 29, 1964. That date is too late, given the references in the conversation to the Clay-Liston fight in Florida as a future event. Clayborne Carson in Malcolm X: The FBI File (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1993), pages 252-53, presents an FBI document that indicates the visit took place on February 4, 1964.

    45. Clarke, p. 195.

    46. Ibid.

    47. Ibid., p. 202.

    48. Ibid., pp. 202-3.

    49. Autobiography, p. 302.

    50. Ibid., p. 303.

    51. Ibid., pp. 308-9. Kondo, p. 73.

    52. Autobiography, p. 316.

    53. Malcolm X Speaks, edited by George Breitman (New York: Pathfinder, 1990), p. 18.

    54. Kondo, pp. 63, 259 endnote 375.

    55. Goldman, pp. 159-60, 191.

    56. Malcolm X, “A Declaration of Conscience,” March 12, 1964; Malcolm X Speaks, p. 20.

    57. Ibid.

    58. Ibid., p. 22.

    59. Malcolm X, “The Ballot or the Bullet,” April 3, 1964; Malcolm X Speaks, pp. 34-35.

    60. Judas, pp. 226-27.

    61. Cited by Evanzz, Judas, p. 225.

    62. Ibid.

    63. Messenger, p. 292.

    64. Abdul Aziz Omar, formerly Philbert X Little; in William Strickland, Malcolm X: Make It Plain (New York: Viking, 1994), p. 174.

    65. FBI HQ file on Elijah Muhammad, memo dated April 12, 1964; cited by Evanzz, Messenger, pp. 292-93.

    66. Autobiography, p. 338.

    67. Ibid.

    68. Malcolm told Julian Mayfield and Leslie Lacy what Nkrumah had said. Leslie Alexander Lacy, “African Responses to Malcolm X,” in Black Fire, edited by Leroi Jones and Larry Neal (New York: William Morrow, 1968), p. 32.

    69. 12 years after Kwame Nkrumah’s overthrow, Seymour Hersh reported the CIA’s involvement in the coup in a New York Times article based on a brief description in a book by ex-CIA agent John Stockwell and confirming interviews by “first-hand intelligence sources.” Seymour M. Hersh, “C.I.A. Said to Have Aided Plotters Who Overthrew Nkrumah in Ghana,” New York Times (May 9, 1978), p. 6. John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies (New York: W W Norton, 1978), p. 160 footnote.

    70. “Malcolm Says He is Backed Abroad,” New York Times (May 22, 1964), p. 22.

    71. Frank Donner, Protectors of Privilege (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 155.

    72. Tony Ulasewicz with Stuart A. McKeever, The President’s Private Eye (Westport, Connecticut: MACSAM Publishing, 1990), p. 145.

    73. Ibid., p. 151.

    74. Ibid.

    75. Author’s interview with Teddy Theologes, June 29, 2000.

    76. Elaine Rivera, “Out of the Shadows: The Man Who Spied on Malcolm X,” Newsday (July 23, 1989).

    77. Author’s interview with Gene Roberts, July 7, 2000.

    78. Rivera, Ibid.

    79. To Kill, pp. 198-99.

    80. Ibid., p. 199.

    81. Malcolm X Speaks, pp. 58-59.

    82. To Kill, p. 200,

    83. Talmadge Hayer filed two affidavits on Malcolm’s murder, the first in November 1977, and the second in February 1978. It is the second, which goes into greater detail, that is cited here. Both affidavits are in Petition to the Black Caucus. Michael Friedly includes them as an appendix in his book, Malcolm X: The Assassination (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1992), pp. 215-18.

    84. Ibid.

    85. Peter Goldman, The Death and Life of Malcolm X (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, second edition, 1979), p. 416.

    86. Ibid.

    87. Evanzz, Messenger, p. 96.

    88. Malcolm’s telegram to Elijah Muhammad was published as an open letter in the June 26, 1964, edition of the New York Post. Cited by Kondo, pp. 74 and 269 endnote 467.

    89. Hayer affidavit, Ibid.

    90. Goldman, p. 195.

    91. Ibid.

    92. Author’s interview with Dr. Alauddin Shabazz, January 8, 1999.

    93. Goldman, p. 19S.

    94. Kondo, p. 147. Kondo hypothesizes that this provocative June 1964 phone call to the NOI was from an FBI or BOSSI provocateur, which would be consistent with the FBI’s COINTELPRO to keep Elijah and Malcolm at each other’s throats.

    95. Goldman, p. 414; Kondo, p. 147.

    96. The FBI transcript of the June 27, 1964 phone conversation is on page 480 of Malcolm X: The FBI File.

    97. Ibid.

    98. Judas, p. 241.

    99. “Statement of Basic Aims and Objectives of the Organization of Afro-American Unity,” appendix in George Breitman, The Last Year of Malcolm X (New York: Pathfinder, 1989), p. 106.

    100. Ibid.

    101. Ibid., p. 109.

    102. Kondo, pp. 43 and 239 endnote 249; citing FBI document.

    103. Ibid., endnote 250; citing FBI document.

    104. Malcolm X: The FBI File, p. 482.

    105. Ibid.

    106. John Ali was interviewed by Wesley South on the Chicago radio program Hotline on July 9, 1964. Ali’s analogies to JFK’s assassination, cited by Evanzz in The Judas Factor (pp. 247-48), were in response to a caller who “asked Ali whether it was true that the Black Muslims were trying to assassinate Malcolm X.” Ibid., p. 247. Ali also used espionage analogies, comparing Malcolm to Benedict Arnold and to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who were executed on the grounds that they handed over U.S. nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union. Ibid.

    107. Cited by Evanzz, Judas, pp. 249-50.

    108. Jan Carew, Ghosts in Our Blood (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1994), p. 39.

    109. Eric Norden, “The Assassination of Malcolm X,” Hustler (December 1978), p. 98.

    110. “Appeal to African Heads of State,” Malcolm X Speaks, pp. 75-77.

    111. Ibid., p. 84.

    112. “There’s A Worldwide Revolution Going On,” Malcolm X: The Last Speeches, edited by Bruce Perry (New York: Pathfinder, 1989), p. 116. Carew, Ghosts, p. 83.

    113. Carew, Ibid.

    114. Ibid., p. 115.

    115. M. S. Handler, “Malcolm X Seeks U.N. Negro Debate,” New York Times (August 13, 1964), p. 22.

    116. Ibid.

    117. The missing sentences are included in the citation of the original Times article on page 86 of Malcolm X Speaks.

    118. August 11, 1964, CIA memorandum for Deputy Director of Plans, titled “ACTIVITIES OF MALCOLM POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF AFRICAN NATIONS IN U.S. CIVIL DISTURBANCES,” cited by both Kondo, pp. 49 and 242 endnote 280, and Evanzz, Judas, p. 254.

    119. Evanzz’s citation of FBI HQ file on Malcolm X, Ibid.

    120. Judas, p. 254.

    121. John Lewis, Walking With the Wind (New York: Simon 8c Schuster, 1998), p. 286.

    122. Malcolm X Speaks, p. 85.

    123. Lewis, p. 287.

    124. Ibid., p. 288.

    125. Louis X, “Boston Minister Tells of Messenger Muhammad’s Biggest Hypocrite,” Muhammad Speaks (December 4, 1964), p. 11. Kondo, p. 159. Goldman, pp. 247-48. Cited also on Tony Brown’s Journal, “What Did Farrakhan Say and When Did He Say It?” (Spring 2000).

    126. Spike Lee, By Any Means Necessary: The Trials and Tribulations of the Making of Malcolm X (New York: Hyperion, 1992), p. 56. Farrakhan’s statements to Tony Brown, Barbara Walters, and Mike Wallace are included in “What Did Farrakhan Say …?”

    127. “What Did Farrakhan Say …?”

    128. Messenger, p. 293,

    129. Judas, pp. 263-64.

    130. Judas, p. 267.

    131. M. S. Handler, “Malcolm X Cites Role in U.N. Fight,” New York Times (January 2, 1965), p. 6.

    132. Ibid.

    133. Malcolm X: The FBI File, p, 81.

    134. Hakim A. Jarnal, From the Dead Level (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971), p. 223.

    135. Ibid.

    136. Ibid., pp. 212-15, 228-29.

    137. Haley, p. 425.

    138. Ibid.

    139. Ibid.

    140. Taylor Branch, Pillar of Fire (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), p. 578.

    141. Malcolm X, The Final Speeches: February 1965 (New York: Pathfinder, 1992), p. 26.

    142. Ibid., p. 28.

    143. Coretta Scott King, My Life With Martin Luther King, Jr.; revised edition (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), p. 238.

    144. Ibid., p. 240,

    145. Goldman, p. 254.

    146. Eric Norden, “The Murder of Malcolm X,” The Realist (February 1967), p. 12.

    147. Ibid.

    148. J. Edgar Hoover’s February 4, 1965, memorandum read: “… Information has been received that Malcolm Little plans to travel to England and France during the early part of February. He will reportedly depart this country on February 5, 1965, and will return about February 11, 1965. In this connection, there is enclosed one copy of a memorandum dated February 1, 1965, at New York, which contains available information of the subject’s contemplated travel.” Kondo, pp. 271-72 endnote 491. In addition to the intelligence agencies I have noted, Hoover’s memorandum was also sent to the Assistant Attorney General, the Acting Attorney General, and the Foreign Liaison Unit. Ibid.

    149. Kondo, p. 162.

    150. Ibid.

    151. Kondo, p. 76. Goldman, p. 263.

    152. Goldman, p. 262. Judas, pp. 289-90. Kondo, p. 76. M.X. Handler, “Malcolm X Flees Firebomb Attack,” New York Times (February 15, 1965), p. 1. Malcolm X, Final Speeches, pp. 133-34.

    153. Earl Grant, “The Last Days of Malcolm X,” Malcolm X: The Man and His Times, edited by John Henrik Clarke (NewYork: Macmillan, 1975), p. 86.

    154. “Malcolm Accuses Muslims of Blaze; They Point to Him,” New York Times (February 16, 1965), p. 18.

    155. Autobiography, pp. 308-9. Kondo, p, 73,

    156. Messenger, pp. 318-19.

    157. Lee, p. 63.

    158. On Brother Minister: The Assassination of Malcolm X, a 1997 film directed by Jack Baxter and Jefri Aallmuhammed.

    159. “Bottle of Gasoline Found on a Dresser in Malcolm X Home,” New York Times (February 17, 1965), p. 34.

    160. He said this, for example, on Monday night, February 15, 1965, in his talk at the Audubon Ballroom, “There’s a Worldwide Revolution Going On.” Final Speeches, p. 124.

    161. Norden, “Murder,” p. 12,

    162. In his statement to the press, February 18, 1965, “We Are Demanding an Investigation,” Final Speeches, p. 179.

    163. Ibid.

    164. See endnote 118.

    165. Norden, “Murder,” p. 12.

    166. Author’s interview with Gene Roberts, July 7, 2000.

    167. “There’s a Worldwide Revolution Going On,” Final Speeches, p. 123.

    168. Author’s interview.

    169. Gene Roberts to Elaine Rivera on his efforts to tell his BOSSI supervisors about the dry run. Rivera, “Out of the Shadows.”

    170. Author’s interview.

    171. Gordon Parks, “I was a Zombie Then—Like All [Black] Muslims, I Was Hypnotized,” Life (March 5, 1965), p. 28.

    172. Ibid.

    173. Goldman, p. 261,

    174. Ibid., p. 262.

    175. Haley, p. 438.

    176. Ibid.

    177. Rivera, “Out of the Shadows.”

    178. Ibid.

    179. Haley, p. 431. Grant, “The Last Days,” p. 92.

    180. Norden, “The Murder,” p, 13.

    181. Talmadge Hayer amplified his written confession, with further details that are included here, in an interview on Tony Brown’s Journal, “Malcolm and Elijah,” February 21, 1982. Cited by Kondo, pp, 169-70.

    182. Haley, p. 428. Judas, pp. xiii, 293.

    183. Haley, p. 433.

    184. Ibid.

    185. Kondo, p. xviii.

    186. Goldman, p. 274.

    187. Several witnesses claim two suspects were arrested by the police. Omar Ahmed, who was on Malcolm’s guard detail at the time, thought there were two men arrested outside of the ballroom. Interview by Kondo, p. 84. Earl Grant makes the same claim in “The Last Days of Malcolm X,” p, 99.

    The New York Herald Tribune‘s early edition of February 22, 1965, reported two arrests. Its article said that one suspect, Hayer, was “taken to Bellevue Prison Ward and was sealed off by a dozen policemen. The other suspect was taken to the Wadsworth Avenue precinct, where the city’s top policemen immediately converged and began one of the heaviest homicide investigations this city has ever seen.” New York Herald Tribune (February 22, 1965; city edition) article by Jimmy Breslin, “Police Rescue Two Suspects”; cited by Kondo, p. 83. The Tribune‘s late city editions make no mention of the second suspect. Ibid. The New York Times in its early and late city editions follows the same pattern. Kondo, Ibid.

    Peter Goldman explains the inconsistencies in terms of separate debriefings of Thomas Hoy and Alvin Aronoff: “Hoy and Aronoff were debriefed separately at the time, Hoy at the scene and Aronoff at the stationhouse, and the early editions of the next day’s papers reported that there had been two arrests. The two policemen, as it developed, were talking about the same man …” Goldman, p. 276.

    When Alex Haley wrote his 1965 ‘Epilogue” to the Autobiography, he was still raising the possibility of two arrested suspects and the hope of identifying the second. Haley, p. 438.

    188. Author’s interview.

    189. From Gene Roberts interview in Brother Minister.

    190. Rivera, “Out of the Shadows.”

    191. William F. Pepper, Orders to Kill (New York; Carroll & Graf, 1995), pp. 129-30. Pepper identifies McCullough as being at the same time a member of Army intelligence. Ibid., p. 443.

    192. Kondo, p. 202.

    193. Benjamin Goodman Affidavit, May 19, 1978; in Petition to Black Caucus.

    194. Herman Porter, “The Trial,” in The Assassination of Malcolm X, edited by Malik Miah (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1988), p. 93. Norden, “The Murder,” p. 14. William M. Kunstler’s December 19, 1977, deposition in Petition to the Black Caucus, pp. 25-26.

    195. Lee, p. 42,

    196. Grant, p. 96.

    197. Haley, pp. 430-31.

    198. Ibid., p. 431.

    199. Malcolm X, “A Letter from Cairo,” By Any Means Necessary (New York: Pathfinder, 1991), p. 110.

    200. David DuBois to Spike Lee; in Lee, p. 38.

    201. Carew, p. 36.

    202. Charles 37X Kenyatta in Brother Minister.

    203. Carew, p. 57.

    204. Ibid.


    Copyright 2002 by James W. Douglass

    Originally published in The Assassinations, ed. DiEugenio & Pease (Los Angeles: Feral House, 2003), pp. 376-424.