Tag: COLD WAR

  • Bridge of Spies: Spielberg and the Coen Brothers Punch Up History

    Bridge of Spies: Spielberg and the Coen Brothers Punch Up History


    The mythology about Rudolf Abel survived for decades on end.  It began when he was captured and then tried as a Russian espionage agent in a New York City court in 1957. The legend was furthered by not one, but two hearings before the Supreme Court concerning whether or not the arrest of Abel was done within the boundaries of a legal search and seizure.  It reached its apogee when President Kennedy approved an exchange of Abel for captured U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers in 1962.  Abel’s American lawyer, a man named James B. Donovan, carried out that exchange in Germany.  In 1964, Donovan wrote a book on the Abel case and the later prisoner exchange.  Strangers on a Bridge became a national best seller. Now even more people were exposed to the Abel myth.

    What do I mean by the “Abel mythology?”  First off, there was no such Russian spy born with that name.  He borrowed that name from a deceased Russian colonel.  Abel’s real name was Willie Fisher.  And as one can guess by that moniker, he wasn’t Russian.  He was born in 1903 in Benwell, Newcastle upon Tyne, in the north of England.  When his family moved to Russia in the twenties, Fisher became a translator since he had an aptitude for language acquisition.  He later developed an affinity for electronics and radio operation.  And this was what the NKVD, precursor to the KGB, used him for during World War II.

    Another myth is that the FBI uncovered Fisher and then cracked the case. This is not at all accurate. Fisher was caught through the betrayal of his assistant. That assistant was named Reino Hayhanen.  Moscow had sent Hayhanen to help Fisher.  But Reino turned out to be a very bad assistant.  He was both a drunkard and a womanizer—he squandered some of the money given to him by Fisher on prostitutes.  When Fisher had had his fill of him, he sent Reino back to Russia.  Sensing that he would be disciplined upon his return, Hayhanen stopped at the American Embassy in Paris.  There he turned himself in as a Soviet spy.   And this is how Fisher was uncovered.

    A third myth is that he was a master spy, somewhat on the level of Kim Philby.  As several latter day commentators who have studied the Fisher case have concluded, there is simply nothing to even approximate such a lofty comparison. To use just one example: there is no evidence that, in the entire nine year period that Fisher was in America, he even recruited one agent, or source, on his own.  But further, once the KGB got the news of Hayhanen’s betrayal, Fisher had an opportunity to dispose of much of the incriminating evidence in his flat.  He did not.  But further, although he had used a false name with Hayhanen, he had taken him to his home. By casing the building, by following some of the residents who fit Reino’s description, and then snapping a picture of the man Hayhanen knew as “Mark,” this is how Fisher was caught.  Through his own carelessness and errors in tradecraft.

    Fisher’s cover while in the United States was that of a painter/photographer.  Steven Spielberg begins his film Bridge of Spies with a clever and adroit composition. The spy is painting a self-portrait in his studio.  Shooting from behind, we see then a dual image of the man: one in a mirror, and the other on the canvas–with the real subject in between, his back to us.  This makes not just for an interesting composition, but it’s a nice symbolic précis of who the man is.  We then watch as the FBI begins to follow Fisher around New York as he paints and takes photos.  They then break into his hotel room.  Fisher asks for permission to secure his palette of colors, and as he does he hides a coded message he had just secured from a drop point.

    From here, the film now cuts to the man who will be the main character, attorney James Donovan. Once Fisher was caught, the FBI had planned on deporting him, since he was in the country illegally under various aliases, and had not registered as a foreign national. Which is why the INS was in on the raid. They shipped him to a detention center in Texas.  There, they tried to turn him into a double agent.  (Donovan, Strangers on a Bridge, pgs. 16, 45)  Fisher turned down the offer.  Since the Bureau discovered so much incriminating material in both his hotel room and his apartment, they switched strategies.  Instead of deporting him, they now decided to place him on trial.  Which was a rather unusual decision.  Because, as Donovan wrote, there was no case he could find of a foreign spy being convicted of peacetime espionage. (Donovan, p. 19) The actual indictment contained three charges: 1.) Conspiracy to transmit atomic and military secrets to Russia; 2.) Conspiracy to gather classified government information; and 3.) Illegal residency in the U.S. as a foreign agent. (ibid, p. 20)

    The Brooklyn BAR association decided to ask Donovan to represent the defendant. (ibid, p. 9) Donovan was at this time, 1957, mainly an insurance lawyer. But he had worked for the OSS during the war, and was one of the lawyers at the Nuremburg trials.  Although the film only shows Donovan with one assistant, he actually had two. (Donovan, pgs. 34, 54) Some affluent law firms through the BAR furnished these.  To his and their credit, the local legal establishment was determined to give the spy a decent defense team.  (In a rather odd departure, the film does not portray Reino Hayhanen on screen.)

    Rather early in the case, Donovan discovered that his best hope in defending Fisher were problems with the original search and seizure.  Donovan concluded that this process was legally faulty due to the fact that the original strategy was to use the threat of deportation to turn Fisher.  In other words, the FBI wanted to keep the profile of the raid low, so that the KGB would not understand that they had turned Fisher into a double agent.  Therefore, they had not secured the properly designated warrants. But once they failed to turn the man, they now wished to prosecute him as if they had the proper warrants.   (Donovan, pgs. 109-110)

    The original trial judge would not accept Donovan’s motion to suppress evidence based on this issue.  If he had, the prosecution’s case would have been gravely weakened.  So once Fisher was convicted, Donovan raised the motion in an appeals court hearing. Once it was denied there, he went to the U.S. Supreme Court.   That court heard the case twice.  They eventually denied the appeal on a 5-4 vote.  The film does not include the original appeals court case. It then collapses the two Supreme Court hearings into one.

    Spielberg apparently wanted to cut down on these legal procedures to add more about Donovan’s family life, specifically under the pressures applied during the case; and also to make more screen time for the Gary Powers aspect of the story.  The assumptions being that the former will add more human interest for the audience; the latter more action and opportunity for visual imagery. But there ends up being a problem here.  For me, it’s at about these points that the film starts to slide off the rails as far as dramatic license goes.  For example, in his book, Donovan does note that he got some crank calls because of his defense of Fisher.  He then changed his phone number.  (Donovan, p. 50)  That wasn’t enough for Spielberg.  This gets changed to an actual shooting attempt on Donovan’s daughter as she is quietly watching television alone in the living room.  Now, I am sure if this had actually happened, Donovan would have written about it.  It probably would have been front-page news in New York. 

    This is paralleled by what Spielberg does with the shoot down of Powers over Russia in the U-2.  As Philip Kaufman proved  so memorably in his fine film, The Right Stuff, high altitude aviation can be viscerally exciting; it’s an excellent subject for cinematography.  But again, that in and of itself was apparently not enough for Spielberg.  After Powers ejects from his plane, we actually see him hanging onto the tail and working himself around to try and push the “Destruct” button on the front control panel. Which, of course, he fails to do.  Then as he parachutes downward, we watch as the plane actually brushes alongside his chute.  In no account I have read of this incident have I seen any of this mentioned.  Why was it necessary?  Powers had serious trouble ejecting anyway because he couldn’t separate from his oxygen tank. Secondly, one of the pursuing planes was shot down by friendly fire.

    I was kind of taken aback—again.  First, the CIA director does not represent the “highest levels” of government, at least not overtly.  But second, Dulles had left the CIA in November of 1961.  The new director was John McCone.

    But beyond that, there are two other aspects that the director and writers could have used for dramatic effect.  First, Lee Harvey Oswald was in the USSR at the time of the Powers shoot down. There are even some writers who think he may have been in the gallery during Powers’s trial.  Secondly, it was this incident that scuttled the Paris summit conference scheduled for just two weeks later. President Eisenhower tried to deny it happened.  But the Russians kept Powers confined and hid the wreckage that they found of the plane.  So Eisenhower was blindsided.

    From what I have been able to garner about the screenplay, it was originally written by Matt Charman.  Spielberg then brought in the Coen brothers  (Joel and Ethan) to, as they say, “punch it up.” To put it mildly, if I was doing an historical film, about the last writers I would bring in to “punch it up” would be the Coen brothers. 

    Because what I have mentioned above is just the beginning of the pushing the limits of dramatic license.  After the Supreme Court ruling went against Donovan, and Fisher started serving his sentence, the White House decided to seriously move for a prisoner exchange between the Russian spy and Powers.  Donovan writes about it in his book’s last chapter.  But he prefaces it with a warning that it was secret and he cannot reveal all of its elements.  (Donovan, p. 371)  But he does reveal two important things about the mission.  First, it began on January 11, 1962 when he attended a meeting in Washington with several other persons, including a Justice Department lawyer. (ibid, pgs. 373-75) Secondly, at this meeting, he was told that this prisoner exchange had been approved at the highest levels of the government.  Is that not kind of unambiguous?  The highest level of the government would be the White House, right?

    Again, this was not enough for Spielberg and the Coen brothers.  In the film, Donovan (played by Tom Hanks) goes to Washington to meet CIA Director Allen Dulles.  I was kind of taken aback—again.  First, the CIA director does not represent the “highest levels” of government, at least not overtly.  But second, Dulles had left the CIA in November of 1961.  The new director was John McCone.  As I said, Donovan’s book places this meeting two months after Kennedy had forced Dulles to resign.  Again, I don’t see what was gained by this.

    But during this meeting, Dulles tries to tell Donovan that he will be getting very little support on this mission.  He will be largely on his own.  This is not true even in the film’s terms.  But it is certainly not true according to Donovan’s book.  In the film, we watch as Hanks is escorted around West Germany by various American agents.  They give him a safe house and a phone number to call.  (The film actually has Donovan memorize this phone number when, in reality, he kept it on a card as he went to East Germany.) 

    In fact, in every step of Donovan’s trip—including the flight over on a MATS plane—he was escorted and assisted by American agents. The only part of his mission where he was alone was when he crossed over into East Germany. And that, of course, was pretty much unavoidable.  Again, in this aspect, we see Donovan spending  time in a holding cell at the hands of those brutal East Germans.  Not only did that not occur, but also the incident that causes it did not happen either (e.g., the Abel family lawyer Wolfgang Vogel, speeding at over a hundred miles per hour in his sports car).

    Let us close with three more points of divergence. The film makes much of the dealings between Donovan and the Russian Embassy official Ivan Schischkin, and the family lawyer, Vogel.  This is because Donovan wants to release both Abel and an American economics student imprisoned in East Germany, Frederic Pryor.  This led to a much longer mission than planned.  Two days stretched into over a week.   But this is not really accurate either.  For Donovan actually was trying to release three prisoners.  In addition to Pryor and Abel, he tried to release a man named Marvin Makinen.  At this he did not succeed.  But he did extract a promise that the Soviets would let him go later if super power relations improved.  They did, and in October of 1963, Makinen was freed.

    The film shows Donovan having his coat stolen from him under threat from a small gang of East German thugs.  Again, this is not in Donovan’s book.   The arrest of Frederic Pryor is made while the Berlin Wall is being constructed.  As Pryor later revealed, he was not even in Berlin when the wall was going up. (Click here for more from Pryor).

    I could go on further, but here is my question: Where are the history defiler zealots?  You know, those screaming  fanatics who come out of the woodwork whenever Oliver Stone makes a history film and uses elements of dramatic license?  This highly praised film got very little of that kind of criticism as far as I could see.  The Washington Post did allow David Talbot a brief column pointing out the Dulles fallacy and the actual primacy of President Kennedy over the mission. (See 10/28/15) But that was about it as far as I could tell.  I made this same distinction in my review of Clint Eastwood’s poor film J. Edgar. There really does seem to be a double standard for people in the club, and those not in the club—that is the Washington/Hollywood nexus.  It is a slice of pernicious hypocrisy that seems ingrained into our society.

    But let me add something here. In Oliver Stone’s case, he is working in fields in which there are many unknowns (e.g., the JFK assassination, Nixon and Watergate). In other words, he is pushing the envelope. I don’t think that applies in this case.

    As per the aesthetic elements of the film, Spielberg had a very long apprentice period as a director.  It was over ten years from when he began making his amateur films in Arizona until he made his first really well directed feature film, Close Encounter of the Third Kind. Since then, his films have generally been quite well made.  As noted above, he has a good pictorial eye, knows what he wants lighting wise, and his films are acutely edited.  As he himself has said, he doesn’t really have a directorial style.  He tries to serve the material at hand as well  as possible. And, most of the time, he does.  (Who can forget the disasters of Hook and 1941?)

    I have always thought Tom Hanks was a gifted comic actor. He proved that on television in Bosom Buddies, and then furthered that reputation in Splash. In comedy he has energy, timing, and technical command.  I have never been very much enamored of him outside of comedy.  And when he tried to really stretch himself in Road to Perdition, playing a heavy, he fell on his face. (Whereas Michael Caine, who also is good in comedy, pulled off a similar role quite well in Get Carter.)  Hanks is passable here.  He doesn’t really act.  He flexes certain aspects of his personality to fit the moment.  Sort of what someone like Gary Cooper would have done in the fifties, before the Actor’s Studio revolution took hold.

    On the other hand, British actor Mark Rylance as Fisher/Abel really does act.  It’s a subtle, understated performance.  One that is full of delicate secrets untold hidden inside the character.  From the start, Rylance is in that very low emotional register and he not only sustains it throughout, he manages to articulate the character without ever breaking out of that key.  It’s a union of both the British tradition of technical surety, combined with the American revolution of method acting.

    As I noted in my book Reclaiming Parkland, Hanks and Spielberg have definite ambitions in doing historical subjects.  They both fancy themselves amateur historians.  Their idol in the field was the late Stephen Ambrose.  Bridge of Spies is a well-made film.  I just wish it had dispensed with a lot of the dramatic license, which I do not think was really necessary. It would also be nice to see these two men do something a little gutsy concerning American history. Like what Jeremy Renner did with his film about Gary Webb, Kill the Messenger. But as I also showed in my book, because of personal reasons, that doesn’t seem possible. At least not right now.

  • Greg Parker, Lee Harvey Oswald’s Cold War: Why the Kennedy Assassination Should Be Reinvestigated

    Greg Parker, Lee Harvey Oswald’s Cold War: Why the Kennedy Assassination Should Be Reinvestigated


    Volume Two: New Orleans, Fort Worth, California, Japan, Indonesia & Santa Ana

    Excerpt from Part 1

    Reprinted with author’s permission

    Creation of the CAP

    The Civil Air Patrol was formed by Administrative Order 9 on December 1, 1941 to provide civilian air support during WWII. In July, 1946, it was incorporated as a benevolent non-profit organization and made the auxiliary of the newly created US Air Force with mission areas set as aerospace education, cadet programs and emergency services. [xxxiv]

    In New Orleans, the Wing Headquarters and AF-CAP Liaison Office of the CAP Louisiana Wing moved from Building T-232 New Orleans Airport to the International Trade Mart on February 1, 1950. [xxxv]

    The CAP and Col. Cord Meyer, Sr.

    Col. Cord Meyer, Sr. was Northeast Regional Director of the CAP from January 1, 1952 to May 27, 1955 at which time his title changed to Regional Commander. He retired from the CAP on May 21, 1956. [xxxvi]

    Meyer was born in New York City, owned a business in New York City, had his CAP headquarters in New York City, was Commander of American Legion Air Service Post 501 in New York City, headed a draft board in New York City and as at 1954 was living at 116 East 66th St. This was only one and a half miles from the Pic apartment on East 82nd St. [xxxvii]

    Loyalty Police

    In 1948, Norman J. Griffin, Information Officer for the Pennsylvania CAP (part of what would become Meyer’s regional responsibility), prematurely announced a plan being hatched at the national level. What follows is the complete text of the story as published on page 8 of the February 22 issue of the New York Daily News titled Publicity Stalls ‘Loyalty Police’.

    The intention to set up the Civil Air Patrol as a sort of “Loyalty Police” with overtones of a strong-arm squad for American industry may have been scotched because of premature release of the idea through the Pennsylvania Wing of the CAP.

    The National CAP has been a bit coy about the whole business, declaring that the press release, issued by Norman J. Griffin, Public Information Officer of the Pennsylvania CAP, was inaccurate and not in keeping with the national organization’s policy. The Civil Air Patrol, originally under the wartime office of Civilian Defense, is an official auxiliary of the US Air Force.<

    However the national CAP admits that some sort of plan using the CAP for “espionage” work to act in case of a national emergency is now in the tentative stage, and is awaiting the approval of US Central Intelligence and FBI.

    The plan released by the Pennsylvania Wing indicated the organization was getting set to send selected CAP recruits to the Army Counter-Intelligence School at Holabird Signal Depot, Baltimore, Md. It declared that these recruits would be taught the Russian language, Russian military tactics, Russian politics and all characteristics of the Russian people.”

    The release further stated that Col. Philip F. Neuweiler, Commander of the Pennsylvania Wing, had asked the cooperation of the FBI and the State police in screening candidates for this training.

    According to the release Col. Neuweiler was quoted thus:

    “We are asking the industrialists and business men of Pennsylvania for three things” first, that they enlist one member of their firm in CAP and have them take this course; second, report via this enlistee, all persons in the organization known to have Communistic leanings or subversive tendencies; third, lend any financial support they are able to so that CAP can carry out this program”

    Col, Neuweiler is quoted further:

    “This is the first opportunity the business men have had to do something about this growing menace of Communism. We, of the CAP, are going to call a spade a spade and do something about it.”

    In backgrounding the idea, Col. Neuweiler stated:

    “We feel that someday, and, possibly sooner than we expect, an attack may be made against the shores of the US by some unfriendly foreign nation. Many of us in CAP are certain that any open and violent attack against the peace of the US will be preceded by an intensive enemy-guided ‘softening up’ campaign utilizing sabotage, espionage, propaganda, and many other underground subversive activities. It is against activities of this type that CAP with adequate and proper training, can help…”

    Col. Neuweiler did not explain why such work would be done by volunteers, rather than the regular security force of the USA, nor did he have any suggestion as to why industrialists were to recruit candidates and pay the bills.

    Industrialists in central Pennsylvania, asked for their reaction, said they had not yet been approached. Some thought it might be a good idea, and they indicated an understanding of what they might expect for their financial support, especially with their own handpicked recruits doing the job.

    Griffin’s premature release of the scheme seems to have put the quietus on it for the time being. However, neither the national CAP nor the Pennsylvania Wing stated that the idea has been dropped. [xxxviii]

    The CAP and Col. Harold Byrd

    (David) Harold Byrd was Commander of the Texas Wing of the Civil Air Patrol from December 1, 1941 through May 25, 1948. He had been among a small group who had established the CAP in Washington [xxxix], and was appointed Texas Commander by another co-founder, Fiorello La Guardia, who happened to also be Roosevelt’s Director of the Office of Civil Defense. [xl] Byrd rose in rank from Major to Colonel in 1943 when the CAP was transferred from the Office of Civilian defense to the Department of War.

    During the war, Byrd personally oversaw and guided the activities of the CAP in Texas which included border patrols, antiaircraft training, radar testing, fire patrols, courier services, anti-sabotage patrols and search and rescue missions.

    In 1948, Byrd was made Coordinator (later retitled Regional Commander) for CAP’s Southwest Region which is comprised of Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Louisiana, Arkansas and Arizona. That same year he was also made Vice Chairman of the National CAP Board and took over as Chairman in 1959. [xli]

    Also in 1948, Byrd, along with Earle L. Johnson helped establish the CAP cadet program. [xlii]

    Following WWII, when there was talk of disbanding the CAP, Byrd’s political influence was instrumental in the organization’s incorporation and in fact, he was one of the signatories to that legal instrument. [xliii]

    Byrd and the TSBD Purchase Scam

    Byrd is widely said to have purchased the building at 411 Elm St. in Dallas at public auction on Independence Day, 1939 from the previous owner, the Carroway-Byrd Corp. Thomas Carroway and Harold Byrd had started up as Carroway-Byrd Engineering, but changed the name circa 1936. The corporation was involved in air-conditioning and had purchased the building for $400,000 to use as a manufacturing plant. [xliv]

    The whole auction deal was a scam. It would have taken some string-pulling to run an auction on a 4th of July holiday, revered at the time probably more than Christmas Day – the one day you could guarantee virtually no opposition bidding. The ostensible reason for the sell-off was that the company had defaulted on its loan. As a result, Byrd got the building for $35,000 – less than a tenth of the price his company had paid for it. [xlv]

    The CAP and David Ferrie

    David William Ferrie was born on March 18, 1918 in Cleveland, Ohio, the son of a police captain turned attorney. Originally studying to become a priest, he was forced to leave Saint Mary seminary and later, St Charles seminary over what was delicately termed “emotional difficulties”. In between, he had obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree from Baldwin-Wallace University in 1941.

    Ferrie obtained a student pilot license in 1945 and two years later, as a fully-fledged pilot, became a CAP instructor at Hopkins Airport. According to Stephen Roy, who has spent many years researching the life of Ferrie, a year or two after joining, he was chased out of the CAP for some unorthodox flying activities and taking a group of underage boys to a whorehouse. Roy goes on to say that by 1950 Ferrie had joined the US Army Reserve and began writing letters to the Secretary of Defense as well as to the Commander of the First Air Force, asking for a direct commission to train pilots (“I want to train killers…”) . This bravado should be considered however alongside his letter to St Charles seminary seeking to speed up his admission to avoid the draft for WWII. In any case, he certainly was not volunteering to be a fighter pilot himself, though in fairness he may well have had the capacity to be a very good instructor. The HSCA bio on Ferrie quoted noted aviatrix Jean Naatz as saying that Ferrie had done more for the [Cleveland] Civil Air Patrol than anyone else and built up the squadron to one of the biggest squadrons in the state of Ohio.

    In 1951, with the Korean War in full swing, a civilian pilot shortage saw him land a trainee position with Eastern Air Lines and he was soon transferred to New Orleans via Miami. A year after arriving in the Big Easy, Ferrie became an instructor, and later, a commander of the CAP Lakefront Cadet Squadron, but in April, 1955, he was advised that he had failed to gain reappointment. This is where the story becomes muddied through lack of inquisitiveness by the WC and HSCA, as well as by interference being run by more recent individual efforts. Ferrie’s next CAP activity was via an “unofficial” relationship commencing in June with the smaller Metairie squadron out of Moisant Airport. This relationship apparently terminated later that same year. From here, the official history shows that Ferrie was allowed back into the Lakefront squadron in 1958, but was booted out again in June, 1960. In September, he formed his own cadet squadron without CAP accreditation, but oddly, was allowed to base his group called “Falcon Squadron” at Metairie’s CAP base at Moisant.

    Something doesn’t add up.

    On November 23rd, there was Ed Voebel in the media stating that he had …served in the same CAP Metairie Falcon Squadron with Oswald under the command of Captain David W. Ferrie. If the official story is true, this would have been impossible. Oswald was in the Soviet Union at the time we are led to believe was the only time the Falcon Squadron existed, and Voebel was attending the Marion Military Institute in Alabama.

    Jack Martin, a private investigator working for Guy Banister, heard the media reports and passed the information on to the FBI. [xlvi] The FBI duly caught up with Voebel on November 25 after confirming with WWL-TV that they had interviewed him. Voebel repeated that Oswald had been in the CAP under Ferrie, but was not apparently pressed for any details. On the 27th however, Voebel was interviewed by Sergeant Horace Austin of the New Orleans Police Department and was explicitly asked if he had heard of the Falcon Squadron. Voebel flat out denied ever hearing of it. [xlvii] Given that Voebel had used that name in the media, he most assuredly had heard of it – but since he could not have been involved in the 1960 version, it follows that there must have been an earlier incarnation.

    On the same day that the police were interviewing Voebel, the FBI interviewed Joseph Ehrlicker, Commander of the Louisiana Wing CAP. He located records showing that Oswald was enrolled as a CAP cadet at Moisant on July 27, 1955 with Serial Number 084965. There was no termination date listed. Regarding Ferrie, Ehrlicker stated he had been able to determine that Ferrie’s first period as Squadron Commander was terminated on December 31, 1954 and that Ferrie was working at Moisant Airport at this time. The Wing Commander added that it was later found that Ferrie, subsequent to this date, was working with the squadron at Moisant without official connection with the CAP and that as of late 1955, he was no longer with the squadron. Ehrlicker added that Ferrie was again connected with the CAP in late 1958 and was terminated on December 31, 1960 and that afterward Ferrie had set up a “spurious” CAP squadron – that being described as one with no connection with, or recognition by, the CAP. [xlviii]

    In researching Ferrie’s Falcon Squadron it was noted that some of the literature references an elite inner-circle known as “the Omnipotents” while other sources refer to an elite group called “the Internal Mobile Security Unit” (IMSU). One might be forgiven for thinking that these were just different names for the same group, or that two separate elite groups existed within the Falcon Squadron simultaneously – but no source and none of the literature has ever suggested either possibility. The closest we get to any explanation that actually might work is from Ferrie researcher Stephen Roy, writing under his internet pseudonym of “David Blackburst”. Roy claimed in an online discussion group that Ferrie had merely considered forming the Omnipotents and that this was around September, 1960. Instead, he went on to form the IMSU from his squadron the following month. According to Roy, the purpose of the IMSU was to respond in the event of an attack on the US. According to the HSCA, based on testimony provided at Ferrie’s FFA fitness hearings (conducted following a morals arrest and a number of other complaints), it was the Omnipotents who were formed to respond to any attack upon the US. In its footnote however, the committee clarified (or muddied further, perhaps) by saying that despite would-be members being approached to join, Ferrie associate and former FBI SAC (Special Agent in Charge) in Chicago, Guy Banister, had testified that there never was any group by that name. Not even the footnote accurately reflects the record though. What it actually shows is that Mrs. John F. Barrett had complained to her employer sometime in early August, 1960 that her 14 year old son had been influenced to join an organization called “Omnipotent” and that her son had to swear allegiance and obedience to a 19 or 20 year old male. Mrs. Barrett’s son had told her that a Dr. Ferrie was behind the organization. That information speaks of an existing group – not one merely being contemplated.

    IMSUs actually did exist in other states. The idea was not the brainchild of Ferrie, but of unknown individuals in Chatauqua County in New York who formed the first one in August, 1956. In 1959, after three years of operating in the shadows, it partnered up with the local Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. [xlix]

    Whatever the truth, it shows Ferrie had a propensity for organizing kids with civil defense and counterintelligence operations in mind. It also reinforces the possibility of Oswald being utilized in similar fashion in NYC as contemplated in volume one. Clearly, kids were not off limits in Cold War operations.

    Further evidence surfaced in 1968 when the ONI interviewed a Marine who had been one of Ferrie’s teenagers in 1961. The Marine, whose name is redacted, was used by Ferrie as a messenger and delivery boy for the Cuban Denocratic Revolutionary Front and was soon requested by Ferrie to obtain a passport with the intention of sending the youth to an unnamed South American country for training in “infiltration” into Cuba. [l] This somewhat follows Oswald’s trajectory of being a delivery/messenger boy in New Orleans before joining the Marines where training could take place for his coming “defection” to the Soviet Union. Beyond all of that, we have the HSCA interview with former CAP member, Robert Boylston. On October 17, 1978 Boylston told Bob Buras and L.J. Delsa that

    • Ferrie had paid a $1,000 in tuition fees for him (Boylston) to study at the University of Loyola and had never asked for repayment. [li]
    • Ferrie was always hinting about “secret” orders of a military or intelligence nature. Two examples were given, one relating to the 1958 Lebanon Crisis [lii] and the other relating to Cuba circa 1961 (most likely a reference to the Bay of Pigs).
    • Ferrie talked a great deal about a group who knew what was going on in this country and was going to take care of it.
    • Ferrie knew people in Dallas.
    • Ferrie had once hopped a lift on an Air Force C-47 and that,
    • He (Boylston) felt back then and still did, that some of the people around Ferrie, as well as Ferrie himself were not playing around when they talked of “taking care” of something.

    Boylston’s friend, Van Burns added to the concerns during a May 21st 2001 interview with author, Joan Mellen. Burns told Mellen that in September of 1959, he had seen Lee Oswald with Ferrie. This was just prior to Oswald leaving for Europe. Burns also stated that he had been interested in the CAP in those days and had learned that some cadets were studying the Russian language. Jim di Eugenio has also written about some of the same issues. In Destiny Betrayed: JFK, Cuba, and the Garrison Case, di Eugenio informs his readers that Ferrie told his cadets he was going to control their outside activities and their destinies. [liii]

    Marguerite Oswald & the Recruiting Officer

    Young Oswald commenced 10th Grade at Warren Easton High on September 8, 1955. Barely a month into the term Lee (or a third party) forged a letter in his mother’s name stating that he had to leave school due to a looming relocation to San Diego. He dropped out a few days later, not quite having attained the age of 16.

    During Marguerite’s second session before the Warren Commission, the following colloquy occurred:

    Mr. DOYLE. Tell them about the defection.

    Mrs. OSWALD. Would you please consider that I can’t go any more today? It is 4 o’clock. The defection is a very long and important story that leads into a story where a recruiting officer at age 16 tried to get Lee to enlist into the Marines. And it is a very important story, gentlemen. And I think you would be quite interested in it for the record.

    The CHAIRMAN. We will recess now until tomorrow. Mr. Doyle, I understand in the morning you have a court appearance that you must make. But you will be available at 2 o’clock.

    Mr. DOYLE. Two o’clock, Your Honor.

    The CHAIRMAN. Very well, we will recess now until 2 o’clock tomorrow afternoon.

    Mrs. OSWALD. I appreciate it, because I was up until late last night trying to get the papers for you. It wouldn’t do you any good if I break down.

    The CHAIRMAN. Well, we don’t want to overdo the situation in any way. So we will adjourn until 2 o’clock tomorrow.

    Marguerite had handed the commissioners a key to understanding the path her son had taken, but as already suggested, she would prove abysmal during future appearances, at laying out the details. This was possibly due in part to withholding self-implicating information, given the past roles played by her third husband, Edwin Ekdahl, and eldest son, John Pic in the real Lee Harvey Oswald story. This failure made it easy to marginalize her testimony and to paint her in the most unflattering light.

    Margurerite’s major contention has some support from a surprising source. Donald Monier was with Military Intelligence and was interviewed by the Assassinations Record Review Board on August 12, 1996. Monier covered topics such as the activities of the 112th Military Intelligence Detachment, Military Science and the art of deception, espionage at home and in the Soviet Union, and Civil Rights. Monier also stated that he recalled Navy Code 30 operations relating to a “fake” defector program run by ONI. [liv]

    Unfortunately we are left with two alternatives here. “Code 30” is the Navy operations department dealing with programs for the recruitment of enlisted, officer and reserve candidates. But there is also a Code 30 Department within the Office of Naval Research (ONR). It is unclear at the time of writing if ONR Code 30 existed in 1959, and if it did, whether its role was the same then as it is now and which incorporates Human Performance Training and Education, as well as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, among other streams. It should be added here that Robert Webster, who defected to the Soviet Union shortly before Oswald’s arrival in Moscow, was employed by Rand Corp, and that Rand Corp had a close working relationship with ONR.


    Notes

    [xxxiv]  http://www.gocivilairpatrol.com/about history of Civil Air Patrol

    [xxxv]  The CAP National History Program Website, File #819: General Orders No. 3 January 24, 1950. The author gratefully acknowledges researcher, Paul S. Vine as the finder of this document

    [xxxvi]   Northeast Region CAP website, history page

    [xxxvii]   earlyaviators.com, Cord Meyer, Sr. page

    [xxxviii]  The York Gazette and Daily of January 19, 1948 referred to the plan in its editorial column as “Fascism wrapped in the American flag” and a “gestapo” whereby the CAP would be turned into an organization of stool pigeons recruited and financed by industrialists who would in turn also provide the victims. This editorial also gave the additional information that the plan included the provision of classes in military intelligence and internal security by the state units. It is no doubt this type of adverse publicity which delayed the program. Secrecy would be forced upon it for the same reason, but more so by the very nature of any “off the books” operations it might undertake.

    [xxxix]  Ever since the assassination, there has been an effort by some supporters of the Warren Commission to try and limit Byrd’s historical involvement with the CAP to that of founding the Texas Air Wing. Byrd’s autobiography along with other sources, puts the lie to that. Byrd was indeed a co-founder of the organization in Washington and was so heavily involved from day one that he earned the nickname of “Mr. CAP”.

    [xl]  I’m an Endangered Species, David Harold Byrd, p98

    [xli]  Ibid

    [xlii]  Ibid p99

    [xliii]  Information obtained in 2005 by Duke Lane via telephone interview with Col. Len Blascovich, CAP National Historian.

    [xliv]  Refrigeration Engineering 1937 volumes 33-34, p328

    [xlv]  The Handbook of Texas Online, Texas School Book Depository entry

    [xlvi]  Admin Folder L9: HSCA Administrative Folder, LHO Incoming Communications, volume III, p81

    [xlvii]  Warren Commission Document 365, p37

    [xlviii]  Oswald 201 File, volume 3, Commission Document 75, Part 3, p23

    [xlix]  The Rifleman in Civil Defense, Gun Magazine, p42, Apr 1959

    [l]  ONI Investigative Report by WE Davis. Special Agent, ONI and dated April 17, 1968

    [li]  This was from a man who purchased religious and scholastic credentials from diploma mills for himself.

    [lii]  Eisenhower authorized Operation Blue Bat to deal with the crisis in what was the first test of the Eisenhower Doctrine where US intervention would be restricted to protecting regimes considered threatened by “international communism”.

    [liii]  There was more than a shade of the Athenian System in Ferrie’s sexual attraction to teenaged boys, and his desire to “control their destinies” – specifically to turn them into Spartan warriors. In ancient Athens, shy teens in particular, were attractive to the older males – and we see time and time again, Lee’s apparent shyness described by former CAP cadets. An axiom among those ancient Greek “mentors” was the absolute identification of friends and enemies. Help friends, hurt enemies is ubiquitous in Greek literature. It may be no coincidence that Lee wanted to name a son (should he have one) David and dub (misspell?) his own political system the “Atherian System”

    [liv]  NARA Record No 10772 – Sound Recording of Monier (misspelled as “Moneir” by NARA) interview conducted ARRB 8/12/96

  • Andrew Cohen, Two Days in June: John F. Kennedy and the 48 Hours that Made History


    Introduction

    Andrew Cohen had a fine idea for a book.  How many people realize that John Kennedy’s famous “peace speech” at American University—in which he tried to break the vise-like grip of the Cold War– was followed up the next evening by his nearly as famous address on race.  In this one he made the first moral appeal to break the bonds of racism and segregation since Abraham Lincoln. I would be willing to wager that even most informed readers did not recall that the two milestone speeches were made in such close proximity to each other.  In fact, this reviewer—who knows a thing or two about Kennedy’s presidency– did not realize the two speeches were delivered within 48 hours of each other. Yet they were.

    The first one was delivered at around midday on June 10, 1963. (Click here http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkamericanuniversityaddress.html)  Kennedy’s equally epochal address, making segregation a moral issue, was delivered the following evening at 8 PM in the east.  In other words, Kennedy became both the first president to publicly try and soften the grip of the Cold War by proposing rapprochement with the Soviet Union; the next day he was the first president in a century to publicly say America had a serious race problem, and that he was now sending legislation to congress to break the barriers of segregation everywhere. (Click here to read that speech http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkcivilrights.htm)

    But as Cohen points out, it was not just Kennedy’s courage and boldness in addressing these two highly charged issues that make their closeness to each other so remarkable.  It is not even the fact that Ted Sorenson was the major wordsmith in crafting each address.  What really makes them notable is the fact that they were not just examples of the president using the bully pulpit; they weren’t just speeches. In both cases, Kennedy acted upon the sentiments he was expressing.  And he did so with alacrity.  By the end of the year, Kennedy had signed onto the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, gotten the Russians to do the same, and shepherded the treaty through congress.  By the time of his death, Kennedy had submitted his civil rights bill to the House of Representatives, gotten it through committee, and was arranging for a full vote there.  After his assassination, the bill was passed. The first proved that arms control limitations could be negotiated and signed with the Russians.  The second began to methodically and legally break the grip of the nearly hundred-year reign of Jim Crow in the south. To my knowledge, no president–before or since–had ever matched such a large domestic landmark with an equally monumental foreign policy landmark in anywhere near such a brief period.


    I

    Kennedy leaves Hawaii

    Cohen begins the book with a talk President Kennedy gave in Hawaii to a conference of mayors on Sunday, June 9th.  It had been his first visit there as president. That little noticed speech was very much about the civil rights struggle.  Governor John Burns had declared June 9th President’s Day in the islands. He had hoped Kennedy would make a “policy statement of major significance” during his brief visit there.  (Cohen, p. 18) Kennedy did not disappoint the governor.

    Kennedy had arrived in Hawaii on Saturday night. Ten thousand jubilant residents greeted him at the airport.  On Sunday, he attended mass, and then laid a wreath at the Pearl Harbor memorial.  On his way back, over a quarter of a million people stood on either side of his motorcade to cheer him on. Congressman Spark Matsunaga declared that never in the history of the islands “has there been such a reception for anyone, barring none.” (ibid) Not bad for what had been a last minute addition to a western tour culminating in Los Angeles. (ibid, p. 17)

    That Sunday, at the Hawaiian Village Hotel, Kennedy addressed what he referred to as a growing national problem.  He asked the audience, “The question is whether you and I will do nothing, thereby inviting pressure and increasing tension, and inviting possible violence; or whether you will anticipate these problems and move to fulfill the rights of your Negro citizens in a peaceful and constructive manner.” (ibid, p. 19)

    He then moved on more dramatically, “It is clear to me that the time for token moves and talk is past…”  He then said that the rights of black Americans are going to be won, “…and that it is our responsibility–yours and mine–to see that they are won in a peaceful and constructive way, and not won in the streets.” (ibid)  He then called on the mayors in attendance to begin to form biracial local committees to eliminate all segregation laws, to promote equal opportunity in hiring practices, and to also create high school dropout prevention programs.

    He ended his speech with what can only be called a peroration. He said, “Justice cannot wait for too many meetings.  It cannot wait for the action of the Congress or the courts. We face a moment of moral and constitutional crisis, and men of generosity and vision must make themselves heard in every section of this country.” (ibid)  He then concluded that all men “should be equal in their chance to develop their character, their motivation, and their ability.  They should be given a fair chance to develop all the talents that they have, which is a basic assumption and presumption of this democracy of ours.”  Cohen deserves credit for pointing out this obscure but powerful and important address.  It serves as a neat prelude to his book.

    From here, the author moves to the creation of the peace speech delivered the next day at American University.  Cohen credits Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins with the originating impetus for Kennedy’s decision to make the speech. Like Jim Douglass, whose JFK and the Unspeakable he does not credit—a point we shall return to later—Cohen notes the role of Cousins in creating a non-official back channel between Kennedy and Russian premier Nikita Khrushchev.  This began a month after the Missile Crisis when Cousins alerted the White House that he would be making a journey to the USSR and probably talking to high officials there, including Khrushchev.  Kennedy assigned presidential assistant Ralph Dungan to the matter. (Cohen, p. 50)  Before Cousins left for Russia in December, Dungan invited him to meet with the president. 

    Kennedy knew that Cousins had been a lifelong crusader for nuclear arms reduction.  So he realized that, in the shadow of the Missile Crisis, the subject would come up when Cousins arrived in Moscow.  Kennedy advised Cousins to tell the premier that, “…I don’t think there’s any man in American politics who’s more eager than I am to put Cold War animosities behind us and get down to the hard business of building friendly relations.”  (ibid)  When Khrushchev heard this from Cousins, he said that if such was the case, then the first thing they should do is to negotiate a treaty limiting nuclear weapons testing.  They then should start work on limiting their proliferation. 

    Kennedy at American University

    When Cousins returned to Russia in April of 1963, he brought news that Kennedy would do all he could to get the treaty signed. The Russian premier was ready to sign on to a total test ban if it allowed a minimum amount of on site inspections. Kennedy favored that kind of ban also.  But his problem was that he knew he could not get that through the senate, where you needed a two-thirds vote to ratify a treaty. The extremists in America wanted much more inspection. (ibid, p. 51) Therefore, the two men had to settle for a partial ban.  This one banned testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, but still allowed for testing underground. Khrushchev was disappointed in the compromise. Kennedy understood the disappointment.  He told Cousins, “He would like to prevent a nuclear war but is under severe pressure from his hard-line crowd, which interprets every move in that direction as appeasement.  I’ve got similar problems.” Kennedy then continued in this vein by saying, the lack of progress “gives strength to the hard-line boys…with the result that the hard-liners in the Soviet Union and the United States feed on one another, each using the actions of the other to justify its own position.” (p. 52)

    Cousins replied that it was not just the hard-liners in the USSR. The Chinese also felt that Khrushchev’s efforts at conciliation were unrealistic.  And that once the negotiations broke down, they thought there would be a move towards closer friendship between China and the USSR. In fact, a delegation from Bejing was scheduled to visit Moscow in June. Kennedy understood this and was worried about it.  He saw the test ban as a way to derail it. (ibid)

    Cousins told the president that “what was needed was a breathtaking new approach toward the Russian people, calling for an end to the Cold War and a fresh start in American–Russian relationships.”  This kind of approach would insinuate that “the old animosities could become the fuse of a holocaust.” Kennedy took all of this in, digested it and understood it.  He told the editor to write him a memo on both their meetings and his visit with the Russian premier. Which Cousins did. (ibid, p. 53)  Two weeks later, in early May, Ted Sorenson–Kennedy’s main speechwriter–called him to his office.  Sorenson told him that Kennedy was going to use some of his arguments and he wanted some more notes. The Kennedy/Cousins connection was the beginning of the American University address.

    Sorenson wrote a rough draft first.  It was reviewed by National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Bundy’s assistant Carl Kaysen, fellow speechwriter Arthur Schlesinger, and Adrian Fisher from the Arms Control and Disarmament agency.  On June 6th, Sorenson took all the suggestions and turned out a second draft overnight.  After another go-round with the same circle he refined it again.  On June 7th, he gave that final draft to Kaysen for the necessary security clearances.  Kennedy advised Kaysen on this process.  When handed the speech, the Chair of the Joint Chiefs, Maxwell Taylor decided not to show it to the other service branch chiefs.

    On the return plane ride back from Hawaii, Sorenson showed the speech to Kennedy.  JFK suggested some changes but, overall, he liked it.  Kennedy also showed the speech to Senator Mike Mansfield and Averill Harriman from the State Department, who he would later choose to negotiate the test ban treaty.  (ibid, pgs. 26-27)  It was ratified in the senate in late September of 1963 and took effect on October 10th.

    After JFK arrived at the White House from Hawaii at a little after nine in the morning, Bobby Kennedy called his brother.  He congratulated him on his speech in Hawaii. The Attorney General then asked him when he was speaking at American University.  The president replied that it would be at 10:30 that morning.   Bobby asked if he could come to the White House after that. He needed to talk to him about the crisis at the University of Alabama.


    II

    Meridith at Ole Miss

    This is another point that most of us have forgotten about.  Sandwiched between these two epochal speeches, a gripping televised drama was playing itself out. The University of Alabama was the last major institution of higher learning in the south to remain segregated. At Ole Miss, the previous year, President Kennedy had to send in federal troops when Governor Ross Barnett had resisted admitting black student James Meredith.  During that violent conflict, two people were killed, cars were burned, and federal marshals were pelted with rocks. Barnett resisted even though Meredith’s case had been ruled upon by both a federal appeals court and the U.S. Supreme Court.  When he did so, the governor was then found in contempt of court. He was given five days to comply or he would be arrested and fined. The problem for Barnett was that he had proclaimed, “No school will be integrated in Mississippi while I am your governor.” Therefore, the Kennedys and the legal system had to go into high gear to gain entry for Meredith.  And because Barnett wanted to satisfy the racist element of the electorate, he resisted until the end. Because of this, violence ensued.  RFK later came to the conclusion that if Barnett could not stop Meredith from registering, his fallback plan was to make it appear that only the Kennedys sending in thousands of federal troops made him do so.  And for Meredith’s protection, troops stayed on campus for eight months. In other words, as in the Civil War and Reconstruction, the North was occupying the South.  Afterwards, Bobby Kennedy understood that this had been Barnett’s plan from the start.  (Robert Kennedy in His Own Words, edited by Ed Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, p. 160)

    In Alabama, Governor George Wallace had taken a similar pledge. His was to stand in the schoolhouse door to stop the University of Alabama from being integrated.  The last thing the Kennedys wanted was another Ole Miss conflagration.  But as with Meredith, two young black students–Vivian Malone and James Hood–had been cleared by the courts to attend the publicly financed state university.  In addition to his public pledge, Wallace had made a political calculation after he lost the 1958 race for governor to the rightwing, Klan backed  John Patterson.  Prior to that loss, Wallace had  been–comparatively speaking–rather moderate on civil rights.  As both a state representative and circuit judge, he had done things that would not pigeonhole him as a racist, like granting probation to black prisoners.

    But after he lost to Patterson he reportedly told aide Seymore Trammell, “Seymore, you know why I lost …..?  I was outniggered by John Patterson.  And I’ll tell you here and now, I will never be outniggered again.” (Dan Carter, The Politics of Rage, p. 2; this incident is also depicted in John Frankenheimer’s award winning TV film, George Wallace.)  In other words, like Barnett, Wallace was putting on what was partly a theatrical performance.  He was playing to his constituency.  And his constituency was the Democratic Party in Alabama, just as Barnett’s was the Democratic Party in Mississippi.  In other words, the Kennedys were bucking up against what was supposed to be their own political colleagues.  I wish Cohen had given us a bit of historical background on how this happened. He does not.  (Which is a shortcoming of the overall book I will elaborate on later.)

    In a nutshell, it was Lincoln, a Republican, who had declared the Emancipation Proclamation. He then passed the Thirteenth Amendment.  And it was the Radical Republicans who had then passed the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  Further, Andrew Johnson, a southerner, had been nearly impeached and removed from office by the Radical Republicans when he resisted their program for military occupied Reconstruction.

    Therefore, when the Klan began to organize around the remnants of the Confederacy and the southern army, their natural allies were the local and regional Democrats.  To their everlasting shame, those Democrats made a decision based upon nothing but arithmetic–as if the Civil War and its hundreds of thousands of casualties had never happened.  They casually and simply added up the number of white residents in the various states and compared them with the number of black residents.  Since the former outnumbered the latter by a margin of at least two to one, it was easy to see where political success lay.  Therefore, the local Democratic authorities united with the local racist groups and put together what historians today call the Mississippi Plan. In its most extreme form, on the eve of elections, white paramilitary groups would ride on horseback, processional style, through the center of towns and villages carrying torches, with weapons in their saddles.  The message was clear:  if the newly liberated black slaves tried to vote they would do so at their own risk.  And the fact that these processions openly rode through towns certified that the local legal authorities would do nothing about enforcing federal laws, like the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

    This was followed by the infamous Compromise of 1877.  In that backroom deal, the presidential victory of Democrat Samuel Tilden was negated.  Republican Rutherford B. Hayes became president. The Democrats again were practicing arithmetic. In this horse trade, the Republican Hayes and his predecessor President Grant now removed the last northern armies from the south. Reconstruction was now ended. When that occurred, the last Republican governments in the south collapsed. That geographic area now become a bastion of Democratic electoral strength in national elections.  It came to be called the Solid South. With these two events, things like the Black Codes now morphed into Jim Crow.  Jim Crow then became a systematic and methodical plan of complete segregation.   No American president had seriously challenged this system before Kennedy.  And since he had spoken out on the issue as a senator and a candidate, he had lost six states in the Solid South in the 1960 election—before he was even inaugurated. Most historians see this as the beginning of the great transformation of the south from a Democratic to a Republican stronghold. 

    What made it all the worse was that the presidents who should have done something about this appalling situation did little or nothing.  That is, the so-called Progressive presidents (Taft, Teddy Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson), and Democratic liberals like Franklin Roosevelt, and Harry Truman.  The last two understood something should be done.  But they both made the practical decision that if they acted on the subject in any real or forceful way, the other parts of their political agenda would be torpedoed by the power of the so-called Dixiecrats in the House and especially in the Senate i.e. the southern Democrats who controlled the chairmanships of so many committees in congress. Therefore Roosevelt did as much as he could symbolically by appointing black Americans to his administration.  Truman integrated the military services.

    But what is the excuse for Dwight Eisenhower?  The reason I express the question that way is because he had the sanction of the Supreme Court.  In 1954, the Warren Court passed down the Brown vs. Board decision.  This crucial case reversed the 1896 Supreme Court decision in Plessy vs. Ferguson, that had sanctified local Jim Crow laws, and therefore separate facilities were now deemed equal before the law. The Supreme Court had ratified segregation.  But the 1954 decision very clearly overturned that case and dictated that the system of segregation should be now taken apart with all due speed.  But as many commentators have stated, the Eisenhower/Nixon regime proceeded with the speed of a turtle with arthritis.  For instance, Eisenhower’s Justice Department never filed a civil rights case in Mississippi during his entire administration.  In the six years after Brown vs. Board, Eisenhower filed a grand total of ten civil rights cases based up on either equal accommodations or voting discrimination.  To say this was a snail’s pace is an insult to snails. As many commentators have pointed out, this hesitance was the beginning of Vice President Richard Nixon’s Southern Strategy: the deliberate courting of the racist element in the south for political gain.  In other words, the Republicans were–not very subtly–reversing the heritage of Lincoln. (The one exception in the six year span was the 1957 crisis at Central High in Little Rock, Arkansas.) Therefore, because of the political calculation of Eisenhower and Nixon, Kennedy had an even more uphill climb in front of him.  He had to overcome the nearly one hundred year institutional basis of segregation, which had now become ingrained in southern culture in every way: socially, politically, and psychologically. But further, he had to find a way to get around the Dixiecrat control in congress e.g. Senator James Eastland of Mississippi.

    I wish Cohen had detailed some of the above in his text. It would have placed the dramatic reversal President Kennedy was about to enact in a more accurate context.


    III

    Wallace in Tuscaloosa

    As authors Irving Bernstein, Harry Golden and Harris Wofford have noted, Kennedy understood that there were simply not enough votes in congress to get a civil rights bill enacted his first year. Therefore, in 1961, the White House did what Eisenhower and Nixon had not done. Attorney General Bobby Kennedy concentrated on school integration with the Brown vs. Board decision backing him. (Guthman and Shulman, pgs. 147-48)  The Kennedys sent Justice Department officials like Ramsey Clark, Burke Marshall and John Siegenthaler to local districts where they thought black families would have difficulty registering their children in public K-12 schools.  As Bernstein notes in Promises Kept, in 1961, Kennedy proceeded to do as much as possible through executive orders in order to build momentum, instead of sustaining a legislative defeat or filibuster.  In 1962, the administration did send up a modest voting rights bill.  As Bobby Kennedy later said, it went nowhere.  It was filibustered and the White House did not have anywhere near the votes to get cloture. (Guthman and Shulman, p. 149)  So the White House continued with administrative actions, like local lawsuits under Brown vs. Board and Title III of the 1957 Civil Rights Act, and equal employment through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. With the last, the Kennedys were determined to make sure that companies doing business with the government were active in hiring minority groups.

    Then came the Birmingham spectacle, with Sheriff Bull Connor facing off against Martin Luther King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The sight of white firemen slamming black children against buildings with fire hoses, of German Shepherds leaping and biting innocent civilians, of police officers smashing demonstrators’ skulls with billy clubs, these nightly TV images created a sensation.  As JFK told his brother and Dr. King, the bill he sent to congress should have been called Bull Connor’s Bill. (Guthman and Shulman p. 171) Washington watched and listened as people in the north were now repulsed by what a century of segregation had done to Americans in the south—even after the Civil War amendments had legally made former slaves equal to whites. Such was simply not the case; not even close. The actions of Ross Barnett in Oxford, and Bull Connor in Birmingham now formed the background for President Kennedy versus Governor Wallace in Tuscaloosa.

    Cohen uses what is today a little known source for the backbone of his description of this conflict.  The late Robert Drew was a committed documentary film director who was one of the first—along with Emile de Antonio—to make cinema verite films.  That is, documentaries that did not use the device of  breaking up the action of the story with a posed and well lighted sit down interview with a subject.  Drew had previously made the film Primary in this way.  That was about the Wisconsin Democratic primary election of 1960, which featured Kennedy against Senator Hubert Humphrey.  (The only author in the JFK assassination field who has mentioned that film to any degree is Joseph McBride in his book Into the Nightmare.) Kennedy had seen the film and liked it.  He asked Drew what he wanted to do next. Drew said he wanted to make a film about his administration during a particularly stressful period of time. (Cohen, p. 78)  They eventually decided upon the racial crisis between Kennedy and Wallace over the integration of the University of Alabama.  In addition to filming the Kennedy brothers and the two students, Governor Wallace agreed to allow cameras to follow him around also.  The film, naturally entitled Crisis, aired on ABC in the fall of 1963. Its candor created quite a controversy. Two of the points the film makes are that 1.) It was Kennedy who was pushing for sending a civil rights bill to congress ASAP, and 2.) It was RFK who was pushing his brother to make a national speech in primetime before he did that.  (Cohen, pgs. 82-83)  Cohen not only saw the film, he saw hours of outtakes from it.

    The confrontation at the schoolhouse door was weeks in the making.  In April, Robert Kennedy had visited Wallace in Birmingham to try and ward off another violent, life threatening spectacle as with Barnett. As Bobby said later, that meeting was “unhelpful….We really didn’t get very far.” (Guthman and Shulman, p. 185)  In May, another meeting took place between the  AG and Wallace, again with no real result. Wallace was intent on being as unhelpful, and as unpredictable, as possible. Even though the university’s board of trustees wanted to let the students register, since Wallace was the titular head of the board, they could not overrule him. (ibid, p. 187)

    To give an example of this, on the evening of Saturday June 8th, Wallace had sent the White House a telegram telling the president that “out of an abundance of caution” he was calling up about 500 state guardsmen.  Kennedy replied that he was “gratified by the dedication to law and order expressed in your telegram” informing him of the potential use of the National Guard at Tuscaloosa. But, the president continued, the only foreseeable threat of violence came from Wallace’s “plan to bar physically the admission of Negro students in defiance of the order of the Alabama Federal District Court, and in violation of accepted standards of public conduct.” (Cohen, p. 74)  On Tuesday June 11th, Wallace flew from Montgomery to Tuscaloosa. He had a motorcycle escort to the Hotel Stafford where he constructed his headquarters.  Wallace was going to make real his promise to stand in the schoolhouse door.  The problem for the White House was that the courts had ruled on May 21st that the students had to be enrolled for the summer session, which began on June 11th. (ibid, p. 236)

    Katzenbach and Wallace

    On the scene, the point man for the White House was Deputy Attorney General Nicolas Katzenbach. He had arrived on Monday, and set up his office on campus.  RFK and he had decided that Malone and Hood would not accompany Katzenbach to the gate.  Since the two had already been admitted he decided to escort them to their rooms.  The problem was the actual registration, which Wallace was holding up. (Cohen, p. 85)  The White House had out manned Wallace.  President Kennedy had 3,000 soldiers on the scene if Wallace refused to yield, was arrested, and violence broke out.  They were under the command of General Creighton Abrams who was in dress clothes so as not to suggest a military commander.  Colonel Albert Lingo, Alabama’s director of public safety, raised a force of 825 law enforcement officers.

    One of the valuable insights Cohen brings to the fore in his analysis of the Tuscaloosa showdown is the role of Louis Martin Jr.  Martin was a longtime reporter and editor for black newspapers like the Chicago Defender. He was recruited into Kennedy’s campaign by his brother-in-law Sargent Shriver.  He became one of the president’s main advisors on race issues. And Kennedy consulted with him in the early days of the conflict.  (Cohen, p. 226)  Kennedy was trying to decide just how wide his civil rights bill should be.  He originally wanted a bill that included integration of public accommodations, school desegregation, and voting rights. Some Republicans, like Senator Everett Dirksen, wanted to stop short of privately owned facilities like restaurants.  Previously advised by Martin, President Kennedy disagreed with this. Martin had told him the bill had to include all public accommodations or “we’re going to have one hell of a war in this country.” (ibid, p. 227) Therefore, at a private conference with Kennedy, when the Republicans objected to this aspect, Kennedy replied that all restaurants must be integrated. Martin also recommended a billion dollar program for job creation and development of job skills for inner city youth.

    Katzenbach,Johnson,Kennedy
    Katzenbach, LBJ, RFK

    Cohen also deals with the role of Lyndon Johnson in all this.  Kennedy included LBJ in a meeting with Republican leaders on Monday, the tenth. And he also describes the long discussion that many authors have mentioned between Sorenson and Johnson from a week before, which was taped by the vice-president.  Johnson also recommended that the president get on national television to push the issue.  But he was not sure that this was the proper time because, like Larry O’Brien and Ken O’Donnell, Johnson thought that pushing the issue might endanger the rest of Kennedy’s program. (ibid, pgs. 227-29)  In light of that, the subtext of Cohen’s work in this regard is that it was really Robert Kennedy who was the driving force in the Wallace crisis and also the speech on race.

    The Kennedys had two tactical advantages over the governor.  The first was that Frank Rose, the president of the university, was in favor of admitting the students.  (ibid, p. 239)  Therefore, he was providing the Kennedys with inside information about what Wallace was doing.  Secondly, if Wallace resisted admittance, the White House could attempt to nationalize the state national guard.  This was the step that the Kennedys realized they had to take before sending in federal troops under Abrams, which the White House always looked upon as a last resort.  (ibid, p. 249)  With over 300 journalists in attendance from all over the world, and a national TV broadcast, that is the way the conflict played out.  President Kennedy made the decision to nationalize the guard.  (ibid, p. 267)  Therefore Brigadier General Henry V. Graham asked Wallace to step aside upon orders of President Kennedy. Katzenbach and his assistant on civil rights John Doar now had the students registered.  Graham and his detachment stayed on campus, actually in the students’ dorms, for protection purposes. 

    It was with the peaceful conclusion of this conflict that President Kennedy decided to go ahead with the speech that evening.  Or as Ted Sorenson later related: as Wallace left the gate, JFK turned to him and said, “I think we’d better give that speech tonight.”  The problem was that Sorenson had not prepared a speech.  What existed were some notes put together by RFK and the Justice Department.  And here, Cohen inserts something that was new for this reviewer: the figure of Richard Yates. 

    Today, Yates is known as one of the most distinguished novelists of his era.  But like many other fiction writers, his fame and recognition only arrived after his death in 1992.  While alive, none of his books ever sold more than twelve thousand copies. His most famous novel, Revolutionary Road, was made into a film in 2008 by director Sam Mendes.  In 1963, Yates was freelancing as a speechwriter for Bobby Kennedy.  Anticipating, and in fact, pushing his brother to make a forceful nationally televised address on race, Bobby had told Yates to prepare a speech on the subject.  At the time the speech was telecast, June 11, Yates had only been working for RFK for a couple of weeks. (Cohen, p. 287)  On the evening of June 9th, Yates began working on a speech.  He completed in two days later, the day JFK went on television.  Sorenson did not hand the president a speech until less than an hour before he went before the cameras.  As Cohen notes, there is no evidence that Sorenson used the Yates draft in his work.  But there is evidence that he used some of the themes that Yates sounded.  (ibid, p. 289)

    JFK Civil Rights Speech June 11, 1963

    As Cohen notes, Kennedy only had a few minutes to look over the speech before going on camera. He delivered it without a teleprompter. (ibid, p. 331) And he actually extemporized the last four paragraphs. Kennedy chose to accent the events of the day, the showdown with Wallace, as the lead.  And he especially wished to highlight the facts that it was an Alabama guardsman who removed Wallace, and it was an Alabama judge who wrote the order to do so.  And they did this so that two Alabama citizens could enter the university.  Although Cohen includes a neat and incisive summary–impressing the fact that Kennedy was the first president since Lincoln to make race a moral, not a legal issue–I cannot do better than to recommend the reader watch this milestone speech for himself.  (http://abcnews.go.com/Archives/video/june-11-1963-jfk-promises-civil-rights-bill-9295675) In my opinion, among Kennedy’s several memorable speeches, it seems to me to be significantly underrated: both as a speech, and as part of the fabric of a dramatic historical revolution. It is almost impossible to imagine Eisenhower or Nixon making such a speech.  In fact, as Cohen notes, Martin Luther King was overjoyed after he heard it.  He told Walter Fauntroy, a friend he was watching it with, “Walter, can you believe that white man not only stepped up to the plate, he hit it over the fence!”  (ibid, p. 339)

    But there were some who detested the speech, and the movement that had brought it on.  Cohen closes the book proper with the wife of Medgar Evers watching the speech with her children in Jackson, Mississippi. (Cohen, p. 350)  She was riveted by the things the president was saying.  Evers himself was at a mass meeting at the New Jerusalem Baptist Church.  In the very early minutes of June 12th, as he was driving up his driveway, he was shot and killed by Klansmen Byron de La Beckwith.  At his second trial for murder, which ended with a hung jury–as did the first–Ross Barnett approached Beckwith at the defense table and shook hands with him, as his wife Myrlie was testifying from the stand.  As with the Civil War and Reconstruction, the forces of segregation and Jim Crow were not going down without a fight.  De La Beckwith was not convicted for another thirty years. 

    But it was this speech that really turned the conscience of America. Because it was spoken by a president who was a wealthy white man.  Kennedy used it to submit his Civil Rights Bill. Bobby Kennedy attended the funeral of Medgar Evers. After which the president invited Evers’ family to the White House.


    IV

    JFK signs Equal Pay Act with American Association of University Women

    I don’t wish to leave the impression that these two speeches and their immediate background are all the author covers in the book.  He also touches on other significant accomplishments during Kennedy’s brief presidency.  For example he deals with the Equal Pay Act for women; Kennedy’s very close ties to the labor movement ( as one labor lobbyist noted, “We lived in the White House” p. 113).  He also deals with Kennedy’s attempt at stressing physical fitness programs, reforming immigration, and even touches on Kennedy’s attempt to soften the exit of some industries from Indonesia, American industries that President Sukarno had expelled. (p. 310)  And the author also notes that Kennedy held a press conference almost every sixteen days.  Which is amazing in light of their frequency today.

    At the beginning I said that Cohen had a fine idea for a book.  And as noted above, the volume has some good (and some new) attributes to it.  But ultimately I cannot fully endorse it like I did Robert Rakove’s Kennedy, Johnson and the Nonaligned World, or Philip Muehlenbeck’s Betting on the Africans.  There are two reasons for this.

    As touched upon previously, Cohen is not really an historian. So unlike Rakove and Muehlenbeck, he does not give you the historical backdrop to either the race issue or the rapprochement with the Soviets issue, which are his two main topics. Above, I tried to barely outline the backdrop to the race issue. The latter is even more complex.  And unlike the former, the scholarship in this area—how the Cold War originated and then aggrandized itself—is still growing.  Cohen does not even try to map any of this out. To give just one example: it is hard to believe, but you will not see the name of either of the Dulles brothers—neither John Foster, nor Allen—in the entire book. Any true historian—like Rakove or Muehlenbeck, if they had been writing this book– would have included them. In one central aspect, history is finding a through line. That is a combination of balanced background, cause and effect relationships, and, from there, searching for patterns and origins of new behavior and actions.  From all this one then finds, as Arthur Schlesinger once said, “currents”. There definitely were shifting currents in JFK’s presidency, especially on these two issues. And if Cohen had done a fuller job as historian, the reader would more fully understand the quantum leap that Kennedy was making in both areas. And why it was so difficult? Along with this failing, there is also a lack of information as to the central mystery:  Why, psychologically, did Kennedy do both of these things?  Again, the answer to that question is also in the record, but Cohen fails to excavate it for the reader.

    Kennedy in Dallas

    Because of these shortcomings, it leads to what I believe is the flawed conclusion he makes in his epilogue.  Cohen writes there that because of these two speeches, “For the first time in his whiplashed presidency, he came to inhabit his office.” (p. 373) This is echoed on the rear cover: a description reads, that in “Kennedy’s crowded hour, he begins to see things differently.” I could not disagree more.  On both points. The reason Kennedy’s early presidency was “whiplashed” was that he was being duped by the CIA over the Bay of Pigs issue, and he was starting a truly revolutionary program in foreign policy. And an only slightly less revolutionary one in domestic policy.  There was no way that was going to be easy, especially at the start. Because there was no way the opposition was not going to resist strongly.

    On the second point, I would say that Kennedy came to inhabit his office almost immediately. In the sense that he knew what he wanted to accomplish at the start. And he set out to achieve it.  The first and, I think, foremost example is one Cohen ignores: the situation in Congo. Again, you will not see the name of Patrice Lumumba in this book. Even though he was a black man striving to free his country from imperialism. Describing that struggle—even briefly—would have highlighted and dramatized the conflict Cohen is describing domestically. I have explained in my review why Kennedy’s bill was not sent up until 1963;  it would have been filibustered effectively.  The reason the attempt at détente took place in 1963 was due to the Bay of Pigs drama; which as many have noted was due to Allen Dulles misleading President Kennedy. This is called creating a balanced historical backdrop.

    Which relates to another failing of the book.  Like Thurston Clarke, Cohen is and wants to be an upstanding member of the MSM.  He has written for Time, UPI and, since he is a Canadian, the Globe and Mail, which is the USA Today of Canada.  He has been described by the New York Times as one of “Canada’s most distinguished authors.” In his book he actually praises Sally Bedell Smith’s Grace and Power as “groundbreaking”.  Which is about the last word I would use to describe it.  I would call John Newman’s JFK and Vietnam, groundbreaking. I would describe Richard Mahoney’s JFK: Ordeal in Africa as groundbreaking. I would also call Irving Bernstein’s Promises Kept and Donald Gibson’s Battling Wall Street groundbreaking tomes. No surprise, you will not see any of those books in his bibliography. But there you will see Ben Bradlee’s worthless book Conversations with Kennedy, and you will also see the late (and lying) David Heymann’s even more worthless biography of Robert Kennedy.  See, real historians like Robert Rakove and Phil Muehlenbeck are academics.  They are not part of the MSM propaganda machine. Therefore, they are not beholden to it for favors. Cohen is a part of it.  Therefore he dutifully spends a senseless amount of space on Mary Meyer. (Although, thankfully, he does not buy the Timothy Leary aspect of that story.) We are also told—Bradlee like–that Kennedy was endlessly interested in the John Profumo sex scandal in England. The author actually gives space and credibility to Mimi Alford. Even though Australian researcher Greg Parker has shown her story to be, at best, dubious. (Click here http://www.reopenkennedycase.net/reopen-blog/a-storm-in-a-mini-teapot) If you can comprehend it, as with Heymann, even stripper Tempest Storm makes an appearance in Cohen’s pages. What any of this has to do with race relations or nuclear arms control is Cohen’s secret. (Or maybe Tempest Storm’s?)

    This is all part of a publishing industry subdivision I have called the “Posthumous Assassination of John F. Kennedy”.  It’s a way of demeaning Kennedy’s character and legacy and, as a byproduct, killing off interest in his assassination.  As we shall see–and as I mentioned in that essay—Bob Loomis of Random House was one of its ringleaders. (The two-part essay “The Posthumous Assassination of John F. Kennedy” is available on the Probe CD collection, and in the book The Assassinations.  Many readers considered it one of the finest essays Probe ever published.)

    The problem for Cohen is his book was distributed by a subsidiary of Random House. It was Random House and the notorious Loomis who originated the work of Gerald Posner on the JFK murder. To the point of having CIA asset Loomis actually arrange interviews for Posner with the likes of Yuri Nosenko.  (Loomis was in prime position to do that.  When I called his office in 1997, his secretary said he was in Washington, since he spent about two days a week there.)  As anyone who has followed the Kennedy saga knows, Loomis has been one of the most pernicious behind the scenes operators in the field.  Some of his and his company’s clients—besides Posner—have included James Phelan, Sy Hersh, Alford, and Norman Mailer.  (The Assassinations, edited by James DiEugenio and Lisa Pease, pgs.  369-70.  See Destiny Betrayed Second Edition, p. 244, for Loomis’ handiwork on the MLK and RFK cases.) And as Sally Bedell Smith herself once admitted—as was the case with Posner—her book was not her idea.  It was pushed on her by the bigwigs at Random House—while Loomis was still there. (See SF Gate, May 23, 2004, interview with Carolyne Zinko) Therefore I have little doubt Loomis helped stage interviews for Vanity Fair’s answer to Kitty Kelley. And as we have learned about this cottage industry—with both Kelley and Heymann—some of these “interviews” did not happen. And that is why Smith’s book got such a big sendoff. Just like Loomis gave Posner a huge publicity binge. (Another Loomis client, Robin Moore, had his book, The Hunt for Bin Laden, partly fabricated by a false witness. The fabrication was done with direct authorization by Loomis.) As they say in that industry, you scratch my back and I’ll scratch your book. Cohen wanted to get his ticket punched.  So he played the game. No matter how badly it marred his work.

    Therefore what could have been an important and sterling volume is seriously compromised with a lot of litter.  Instead of being up there with Rakove and Muehlenbeck, it stands a couple of steps downward, with Thurston Clarke’s mixed bag of nuts.

  • Jeffrey Sachs, To Move The World

    Jeffrey Sachs, To Move The World

    Jeffery Sachs is a professor of economics at Columbia University. He is a Ph. D. graduate of Harvard. At the age of 28, he became a tenured, full professor of economics at Harvard. Sachs spent about two decades there before switching to Columbia in 2002. He is the author of three bestselling books: The End of Poverty, Economics for a Crowded Planet, and The Price of Civilization. He is quite controversial in his third career: as an advisor to many different countries on shifting over from a collectivist to a free enterprise system. This includes the nations of Poland, Slovenia, Estonia and the USSR. He has been named, by both Time and Vanity Fair, as one of the hundred most influential people on the contemporary American scene. Today, he is very much concerned with creating what he calls sustainable environments. That is economies, which grow, benefit all citizens, are non-polluting, and use energy that is not solely hydrocarbon based. He is clearly one of the most influential economists in America. Perhaps in the world.

    Last year, he authored a book called To Move the World: JFK’s Quest for Peace. In the Preface to his book, he writes that he based part of a series of 2007 lectures for the BBC on Kennedy’s famous 1963 American University speech. (Sachs calls it the Peace Speech) This, of course, is the speech that so influenced Jim Douglass’ JFK and the Unspeakable and which he included as an appendix to the book. (Sachs includes it as one of the four speeches he appends to the end of this book.) He also adds that he met Ted Sorenson at Columbia and the two became friends. Sorenson told him that the American University speech was his favorite. The two were then going to cooperate on a book, but Sorenson passed away. So Sachs completed the work on his own.

    The result is an uneven work. Sachs is a first-rate economist. In my view, he is not a first-rate historian. For instance, in his Preface, he calls Kennedy a Cold Warrior when he entered office. As this reviewer has stated previously, this is simply not the case. In relation to Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson and Nixon, Kennedy was not a Cold Warrior in 1961. Using a multiplicity of sources, this issue has been dealt with by this reviewer in the second edition of Destiny Betrayed. (See pages 17-33) When Kennedy entered office in 1961 he was already a complex and sophisticated thinker on foreign policy. And he did not see the world’s problems through the lens of anti-communism. And he criticized those who did, e.g. Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. This is why JFK reversed the Eisenhower/Dulles policy in more than one place in 1961, for example, in Congo and Laos. If he had really been a Cold Warrior, he would have kept those policies in place.

    In Chapter 1, Sachs tries to briefly sketch in the problems Kennedy had in office in 1961. Therefore, he naturally discusses the Bay of Pigs invasion. And here, this reviewer has another disagreement with the author. In writing on the Bay of Pigs, he calls the operation naive, and incompetently designed and managed. The most recent scholarship and declassified records on this issue would seem to paint a different picture. As Jim Douglass wrote in his book, using an important essay from the academic journal Diplomatic History, CIA Director Allen Dulles never really expected the operation to succeed. What he was banking on was that Kennedy really was a Cold Warrior and he would send in the Navy when he saw the operation was going to fail. (Douglass, p. 14)

    Sachs also writes in Chapter 1 that Kennedy denied the Cuban exiles air support during the first day of the invasion. As the declassified record now makes clear, this is a myth. It was created by Dulles and Howard Hunt during the White House Taylor Commission hearings on the Bay of Pigs. Hunt ghostwrote an article for reporter Charles Murphy of Fortune Magazine. That article tried to switch the blame for the failure of the Bay of Pigs from the CIA to Kennedy. Hunt and Dulles therefore created this story about the canceled D-Day air strikes. The problem is that Kennedy never approved these D-Day strikes to be launched until a sufficient beachhead bad been secured on Cuba. (DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, p. 46) Since no such beachhead was ever achieved, the strikes did not go forward. But, as Lyman Kirkpatrick wrote in the CIA’s Inspector General Report, these would not have made any difference anyway. Because Castro had brought too much heavy artillery, tanks and troops to the front within 10 hours. The exiles were greatly outnumbered and outgunned before the first day was over. (pgs. 40-41)

    Further, Sachs notes an exchange between Kennedy and Eisenhower on whether or not this capitulation should have happened. He quotes Eisenhower as saying that Kennedy’s attempt to keep American forces out was wrong headed because the world was going to know that the Cubans could not have launched such an amphibious assault on their own anyway. So America had to be involved. This shows a lack of understanding of Kennedy’s version of the Truman Doctrine. Kennedy differentiated between aiding and abetting forces resisting communism, and the United States actually directly involving itself in a conflict through the insertion of American combat troops. This is something Kennedy resisted for his entire term of office. On the other hand, Eisenhower committed troops into Lebanon, Johnson into the Dominican Republican and Vietnam, and Nixon into Cambodia. Therefore, Kennedy was not a classic Cold Warrior.

    But to further try and portray Kennedy as something he was not in 1961, Sachs also notes that Jupiter missiles were inserted into Turkey at that time. This is accurate. But this deployment had been agreed upon in 1959 under Eisenhower. Kennedy was only implementing a predetermined agreement. And Kennedy had actually wanted the Jupiters removed almost immediately and replaced with Polaris undersea missiles which would not be so open to a first strike. (Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 807)

    II

    In Chapter 2, Sachs shifts to the Vienna summit and the dispute over West Berlin. He notes that Kennedy had decided in advance not to give atomic weapons to Konrad Adenauer and West Germany. He traces the subsequent Berlin Crisis and the construction of the Berlin Wall in August of 1961. Sachs adds that the stemming of the flow of refugees from East Berlin to West Berlin by the construction of the wall did much to lessen the tension over the refugee issue. So, in an ironic way, the construction of the wall actually helped solve a practical problem as it created a large, dark symbol of the Cold War.

    Afterwards, Kennedy told O’Donnell that he thought the whole crisis was overblown. To risk so many lives over access rights on the autobahn was simply ridiculous.

    As a result of the crisis, Russia now announced it was resuming nuclear testing. And on October 30, 1961, the Tsar Bomba test explosion took place at the Novaya Zemyla archipelago. This hydrogen bomb device had a yield of 55 megatons. To this day, it is the largest nuclear explosion ever recorded. It had ten times the power of all the bombs ever dropped during World War II. Sachs writes that, to Kennedy, this resumption of testing was the greatest disappointment in his first year in office. As a reaction, the president had Asst. Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric spell out America’s distinct advantage in nuclear weaponry. Sachs now says that this was a precipitating cause of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Again, this reviewer cannot recall interpretation noted elsewhere. In The Kennedy Tapes, which is probably the best volume on the subject, this is never even mentioned as a cause of the crisis.

    From here, Sachs begins to chronicle the Missile Crisis. Again, he says something questionable. He writes that Kennedy favored an air strike at the beginning of the Ex Comm meetings. In the strictest sense, this may be true. But by questioning what would happen as a result of stray bombs during an air strike, Kennedy then searched for another option. He was not willing to risk thousands of dead civilians over a superpower conflict. One in which these civilians would be innocent bystanders.

    Sachs then proceeds to the conclusion of the crisis. The exchange included the Russians removing their atomic weapons on the island for a public pledge by Kennedy not to invade Cuba, combined with a secret agreement to remove the obsolete Jupiters in Turkey.

    The author sees this conclusion to the Missile Crisis as the prelude to both Kennedy and Khrushchev now seeking a way to deter the threat of nuclear Armageddon in the future. For instance, in an exchange of letters, the Russian leader told the American president that he appreciated the restraint he had shown during the crisis.

    And this is how the author essentially sums up the first two years of Kennedy’s foreign policy forays. When I read this summary I wrote in my notes, “Sachs leaves out Congo, Indonesia, India, Ghana, all of Africa, Nasser, Sadat, Iran and several others.” And it is this lack which allows him to write that JFK was now a changed man in 1962. If, for instance, Sachs had reviewed the Congo policy, he would have seen that Kennedy was really not a changed man at the end of 1962. He entered office with revolutionary ideas about American foreign policy and the Cold War, especially in the Third World. And he enacted those ideas almost immediately. What delayed any rapprochement with the USSR was the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Which many felt impacted the Cuban Missile Crisis. Khrushchev was determined not to lose his outpost in the Caribbean, which the Russian could use as leverage in Germany. Therefore, he misjudged Kennedy’s restraint during the Bay of Pigs and moved the nuclear triad into Cuba. If Kennedy had not been mislead about the Bay of Pigs, it is an open question that he would have gotten off to such a slow start with his rapprochement to Russia.

    III

    In Chapter 3, Sachs gets to the heart of his volume. And this is the section of the book that is the most valuable. Here the author begins to outline what he thinks were Kennedy’s goals in office concerning the Soviet Union in 1963 and how he thought they could be achieved.

    Number one on this list is arms control. After the fearsome explosion of Tsar Bomba, Kennedy was determined that the arms race be brought back under control. But Sachs notes that he was also worried about how atomic warfare could be kicked off by mistake. Kennedy was always reading. And one of his favorite books was Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August. This was a microstudy of the military decisions that led up to the start of World War I. It was published in 1962 and became an immediate bestseller through most of 1963. In it, Tuchman pointed out all the miscalculations made by leaders on both sides that resulted in the tragedy of trench warfare and the astronomical casualties consumed on the Western Front. Kennedy was so impressed by the book he gave copies to his cabinet and military advisors.

    Sachs also says that by 1963 Kennedy understood that peace with the USSR was going to be a process, a series of understandings taken step by step. He also knew that it had to be achieved by recognizing what the interests of the other side were, and where there was a mutuality of interests to share and cooperate upon. Therefore, another value was that the president knew he had to be a good listener. And that he should also utilize go-betweens, which he did with Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins. Cousins served as a courier of messages between Kennedy, Krushchev and Pope John XXIII. (This extraordinary circle is captured by Cousins in his book, The Improbable Triumvirate.)

    As Sachs notes, Kennedy told Cousins that both he and Khrushchev were partly imprisoned by the militant right-wingers within their governments. And these two groups, whether they realized it or not, aided each other. Kennedy tried to assure Khrushchev, who was worried about atomic war over Germany, by not giving nuclear weapons to West Germany. And according to Sachs, this decision hurt the militant Adenauer and led to the ascension of the more reasonable Ludwig Erhard in late 1963.

    Finally, Sachs writes that Kennedy understood that only strong and vigorous leadership could work toward peace. Or as he puts it, “only active presidential leadership would overcome the doubts, fears, and provocations of the military and hardliners and the public.” Sachs then continues with, “Both Kennedy and Khrushchev gave ground to each other to enable his counterpart to force down his own domestic skeptics and critics.” (He could have added here, that Castro offered to do the same with Lyndon Johnson in order to keep up Kennedy’s attempt at détente.)

    In Chapter 4, Sachs talks about speeches that he thinks may have influenced Kennedy in his American University address. I almost fell off my chair when he mentioned Winston Churchill’s 1946 Iron Curtain speech. This was made at the invitation of President Truman in Fulton, Missouri. Sachs tries to disguise this declaration by calling it the “Sinews of Peace” speech. But clearly, when read as a whole, Churchill was calling out the Russians for their domination of Eastern Europe, even though, this had been largely been arranged in advance by the infamous Percentages Agreement between Stalin and Churchill in 1944. A call for a new Cold War is clearly how Stalin viewed the speech.

    Sachs is on a bit stronger ground when he mentions two speeches by President Eisenhower. These were both delivered in 1953. One was called the “Chance for Peace” speech and the other was the “Atoms for Peace” speech. The first was made in April of 1953 to the American Society of Newspaper Editors and broadcast on TV and radio. It was made in the wake of Stalin’s death and called for a winding down of the Cold War, saying that the money spent of weapons, could help each side to build things like schools and power plants. The second speech was made before the UN at the end of 1953. In it Eisenhower called for peaceful uses for atomic energy and a non-proliferation of warheads. There has been a debate about the reasons for the speech. Some have said that Eisenhower was really just trying to soften the image of nuclear energy being only a destructive force.

    The last speech Sachs names is the famous Eisenhower Farewell Address. Most of us are familiar with this speech because Oliver Stone used it as the prelude to his film JFK. It is indeed quite a memorable speech. Yet Sachs does not make the irony as clear as he should: If Eisenhower was really serious about the first two speeches, then why did he have to make the ominous warning about the Military-Industrial Complex in the last speech?

    In point of fact, none of these speeches goes as far as Kennedy’s did in forging a new vision of understanding based on mutual interests as the America University speech. That speech, excerpted by Sachs here and Jim Douglass in JFK and the Unspeakable, was probably the first by an American president to actually try and recognize the USSR as something less than a permanent opponent, as something like a necessary partner, and as such, a nation that the USA needed to understand in order to cooperate with. As Sachs says in Chapter 5, Kennedy really tried to humanize the Soviet Union and its citizenry. And as Douglass noted, the reaction to the speech in the USSR was more congratulatory than the one in the USA.

    From here, Sachs goes on to trace the push by Kennedy for the Limited Test Ban Treaty. As Thurston Clarke had noted, the president made this a very high priority. And he literally covered all the bases in advance to make sure the treaty would pass. Which it did in a resounding vote of 80-19. And about 90 other countries signed onto the treaty. But Kennedy could not get a comprehensive ban through. For the reason that he and the USSR could not agree on the number of on-site inspections per year. Evidently, the Russians thought that too many inspections would allow for American spying. Therefore, underground testing was allowed to proceed.

    But as Sachs notes, Kennedy’s technical advisers on the treaty, like Adrian Fisher, said that they felt that Kennedy saw this as just a beginning. It was just a first step in a disarmament program. Sachs also notes that after the treaty passed, Kennedy continued in his attempt at détente with the USSR. The author mentions things like cultural exchanges, the installation of the hotline for crisis management, the large sale of wheat to Russia and Kennedy’s proposal for cooperation with Russia on a project to get to the moon.

    When Kennedy was murdered, Nikita Khrushchev was overwhelmed with grief. He wrote President Johnson a moving letter saying that Kennedy’s death not just a blow to America by a loss for the whole world, including the Soviet Union. And as Sachs notes, after Kennedy’s death, Khrushchev was deposed the following year.

    Sachs closes the book with the insight that, if Kennedy lived, the nuclear arsenals would not have grown to the astronomical heights they later did. And it would not have taken as long to draw them down to a more reasonable number. He also notes that Kennedy was very interested in non-proliferation, that is that other countries not gain nuclear arsenals either. Kennedy’s vision did not come to pass in any way near the form he wanted. The USSR went on a nuclear building binge that eventually passed the size of the American arsenal. At one time, the Soviets had over 40,000 warheads. In fact, in 1974, Henry Kissinger observed, “One of the questions we have to ask …is what is the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it politically, militarily, operationally at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?”

    It was probably that comment that got Kissinger neutralized by the hawks in the Ford administration, namely Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld. Which was the true beginning of the neoconservative movement. Cheney and Rumsfeld wanted the USA to maintain whatever “superiority” they could. Thus began the whole Committee on the Present Danger campaign led by people like Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Paul Nitze, to drum up support for the growing mythology of Soviet military superiority. (That whole aspect, which Sachs ignores, is well described by Jerry Sanders in Peddlers of Crisis.) Therefore, it was not really until 1991 and START I that a serious step toward arms control and the lowering of numbers was actually taken. But yet, by the nineties, Kennedy’s other goal, non-proliferation, was violated since 6 other countries now had nuclear weapons. Including Israel, which Kennedy was very much opposed to.

    Causes of the Cuban Missile Crisis

    In October 1962, a U-2 American spy plane covertly took pictures of the nuclear missile sites that the Soviet Union was building on the island of Cuba. However, President Kennedy didn’t want Cuba and the Soviet Union to know that he had found the missiles. He arranged a secret meeting with his advisors for a number of days to talk about the issue. There are plenty of causes of the missile crisis in Cuba (also known as the Fidel Castro Cuban missile crisis) including America’s naval blockade, the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the arms race, the Bay of Pigs Disaster, and the Cuban Revolution.

  • Greg Parker, The Korean War Intelligence “Failure”

    Greg Parker, The Korean War Intelligence “Failure”


    Introduction to the “Korean War” section of
    Lee Harvey Oswald’s Cold War, Vol. One

    The Korean War. The “forgotten” war. If war is ugly, this was Quasimodo without the redemptive heart.

    The “conflict,” as it is sometimes euphemistically called, likely helped test and refine germ warfare, and may have been started just for that purpose. It provided the raison d’etre for expanded programs and funding in the search for radiological weapons and enhanced interrogation and “mind control” techniques. Further, it provided the impetus for more research and development within the field of military hardware and munitions, and kept the money rolling in for military contractors.

    It should also be regarded as the starting point to our understanding of the Oswald “legend.” This legend began to be built when Oswald became a teenager and took to skipping school in New York City.

    The Chinese had developed a profile for potential defectors from the West and used this profile to target individual POWs for recruitment.

    The indicators being looked for were soldiers who had unstable childhoods, were raised in female dominated house-holds, had high IQs but low prospects, or had physical differences, an aversion to authority, a thirst for knowledge, or had been involved in activity that may result in some type of State sanction.

    By the time Oswald left for the USSR, he not only had the profile in New York court and school records, but also in his military records. And as if that wasn’t enough, he wore it ostentatiously. For our purposes however, we are not just looking at the Korean War from the micro as one mirror into Oswald (which it is) – we are also looking at the macro – how the war was used as a testing ground for biological warfare; how it was used to justify all manner of covert activity and experimentation, how it ramped up the profits of the war industry, saw the emergence of the US as Sheriff on the world stage and paved the way for the emergence of the Neoconservative movement.

    Without the Korean War, Oswald would have remained obscure, Kennedy may have lived to see a second term and the march toward Fascism would not be quite so bold.


    The Korean War Intelligence “Failure”

    The undeclared war began on June 25, 1950 when the North Korean Army crossed the 38th Parallel that divided the Soviet backed north from the US backed south.

    The official story has barely wavered. The aggressors were the North Koreans and the CIA had failed to foresee imminent danger. This obstinately obtuse view is encompassed best in a story broadcast by National Public Radio (NPR) to mark the 60th anniversary of the conflict. In fact, it takes a leaf out of the Warren Commission’s ode to vitiation (officially known as The President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy) by citing the very CIA documents to support its case that could and should have been used to destroy it.

    One clear example of this come from a CIA memo dated January 13, 1950 which states inter alia:

    Troop build-up. The continuing southward movement of the expanding Korean People’s Army toward the thirty-eighth parallel probably constitutes a defensive measure to offset the growing strength of the offensively minded South Korean Army. The influx of Chinese Communist trained troops… [is] further bolstered by the assignment of tanks and heavy field guns … [yet] despite [these increases] in North Korean military strength, the possibility of an invasion of South Korea is unlikely unless the North Korean forces can develop a clear cut superiority over the increasingly efficient South Korean Army.

    The CIA is then excused for this (supposed) completely dumbfounding and appallingly bad misreading of both North Korean intent and South Korean military superiority because it was “just three years old and lacked resources.” This excuse completely ignores the fact that the CIA had been granted greater autonomy (and probably resources) after its “failure” in Bogota. It also ignores the fact that despite being a mere three years old, the CIA was heavy with former OSS and SIS agents with many years of experience in the field. The fact is, there was no misreading. This was an accurate assessment.

    Not all scholars have held with the official line. According to Oliver Lee, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, the South Korean government provoked the north into a counter-attack in order to draw in the US and thus ensure the survival of the unpopular regime. Lee further pointed out there were no credible witnesses to North Koreans being the aggressors because, conveniently, UN observers had left the thirty-eighth parallel two days before the outbreak, and all but one of the five hundred US advisors had gone to Seoul for the weekend!

    Professor Lee listed the following circumstantial evidence in support of his thesis:

    1. Syngman Rhee’s government in Seoul was extremely unpopular and insecure, able to rule only by imposing upon South Korea “a cloud of terror that is probably unparalleled in the world,” according to a New York Times reporter on March 6, 1950. Despite the terror, Rhee’s party was dealt a disastrous defeat in the parliamentary election held four weeks before the war broke out. Rhee thus had a plausible motivation to start the war so as to create a totally new ball game.

    2. Rhee had several times announced his ambition to “regain” North Korea, boasting in January 1950, for example, that “in the new year we shall strive as one man to regain the lost territory.”

    3. Rhee received encouragement from certain US high officials, such as John Foster Dulles, who said in Seoul six days before the war broke out, “You are not alone. You will never be alone so long as you continue to play worthily your part in the great design of human freedom.”

    4. There had been a long pattern of South Korean incursion into North Korea. The official US Army history of the American Military Advisory Group in Korea, referring to the more than 400 engagements that had taken place along the 38th parallel in the second half of 1949, reports that “some of the bloodiest engagements were caused by South Korean units securing and preparing defensive positions that were either astride or north of the 38th parallel. This provoked violent actions by North Korean forces.”

    5. South Korean troops were reported by the Seoul government as having captured Haeju, one mile north of the parallel, on June 26. While we can accept this as an acknowledgement of their troop incursion into the north of the 38th parallel, such acceptance does not require us to believe their report as to the timing. They may well have made the capture one day earlier, touching off the counterattack.

    6. The two captured North Korean documents which allegedly prove that the North had started the war exist only in English, supposedly translated from the Korean original. Ostensibly titled “Reconnaissance Order No. 1” and “Operation Order No. 1,” the originals were never made public, nor have they subsequently ever been found.

    7. Rhee made a self-incriminating statement when he said to US News & World Report in August 1954, “We started this fight in the first place in the hope that the Communists would be destroyed.” Although the context of this statement was not explicitly military, certain American leaders knew enough about Rhee to understand what he meant, and indeed to be worried about his possible provocation of yet another Korean War.

    Meanwhile the Pentagon budget, which had not exceeded $60 billion between the years of 1947 and 1950, needed a crisis to get Congress to dig deeper into the treasury coffers. Undersecretary of State, Dean Acheson, who was among the first to nominate North Korea as the aggressors, put it succinctly when he said “Korea saved us.” The “us” cited by Acheson clearly didn’t include John or Joan Q. Citizen.

    After 1952, the Pentagon budget would never drop below $143 billion.

    The Korean “Conflict” was, in reality, a limited war that spun nearly unlimited gold for the War Machine, shifted goal posts at the UN and saw the US emerge as the world’s sheriff.

    It would also be the catalyst for Lee Harvey Oswald’s eventual involvement in covert interplay between the two Superpowers.

    Peace Talks and the Geneva Convention Failures

    Talk of a peace settlement began in July, 1951 and took two long years to reach an agreement – one sticking point being the disposition of what was nothing other than a tract of wasteland. For that, more casualties accrued than in the previous two years combined.

    Though a lack of trust and good faith no doubt, also played a major role in dragging the war out , the other major sticking point was an issue that was far more complex on political, moral, legal and propagandistic grounds. Some prisoners on both sides simply did not want to be repatriated. At the end of hostilities the problem was that Article 118 of the Geneva Convention did not allow a choice. Repatriation had been a thorny issue from the beginning with sick and wounded prisoners – who were covered by Articles 109 through 115 of the Convention – eligible to be treated in a neutral country or returned to their country of origin.

    Legitimately owning the “moral high ground” was a dystopian nightmare to the architects of this war. Owning it by means of psychological warfare was another matter entirely. There was, admittedly, not much new within that situation. What was new was one of the psy-op ploys used: accusations of brainwashing from the Americans against accusations of using germ-warfare from the opposite camp. Propaganda is best defined as ideas, facts, or allegations spread deliberately to further one’s cause or to damage an opposing cause. There is still debate as to whether either of these allegations had any basis in fact.

    Operation Little Switch

    The death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, seems to have been the catalyst for a change in policy by the North Koreans and China . On March 28, the respective Communist leaders not only agreed to an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners; but suggested that such an exchange may provide a platform for a resolution of all POW and cease-fire issues.

    Operation Little Switch took place between April 20 and May 3. It was not until May 25 that the residual disagreements were resolved through the creation of a UN sponsored Neutral Nations Repatriations Commission (NNRC). The Commission would be tasked with maintaining responsibility for non-repatriates over 60 days. The fate of those men would be determined during the course of the next few months by means of peer pressure or via a political conference that was allowed for under Agenda Item 4 of the July 27 Armistice Agreement.

    During Operation Little Switch, the Communists released 471 South Koreans, 149 Americans, 32 Britons, 15 Turks, 6 Colombians, 5 Australians, 2 Canadians, and one prisoner each from The Philippines, South Africa, Greece and The Netherlands. On the other side, the United Nations Command (UNC) returned 5,194 North Koreans. 1,030 Chinese, and 446 civilians. These were the men most in need of medical treatment. The figures corresponded to about a fifth of the total prisoners held by either side. Although accusations arose that the Communists only released those who were most likely to provide a positive portrayal of their captors, those released later in Operation Big Switch were certainly in overall better physical condition.

    Operation Big Switch

    Operation Big Switch was the operation which would see the remaining POWs sent home (save those who had not accepted repatriation). It began at 8:56 on the cool, dull morning of August 5, 1953 when Russian built trucks rattled and clunked to a halt in front of the triple arched gates at Panmunjom. The trucks were ferrying the first batch of UN POWs to leave the peninsula since Little Switch.

    It took until September 6 for the operation to be completed.

    The final disposition of this second group was that the North Koreans and Chinese handed over 12,773 to the UNC and another 359 to Indian Custodial Forces. Of the latter, 9 were returned to the UNC, 347 were returned to the Communists, 1 escaped and 2 were shipped to the NNRC based in India.

    The UNC meanwhile returned 75,773 POWs to the Communists and 22,604 to the Indian Custodial Forces. Of the latter, 629 were returned to the Communists, 21,820 were returned to the UNC, 13 escaped (or were otherwise missing), 38 died while in Indian custody, 18 remained in Indian custody and 86 were shipped off the NNRC .

    The unofficial war was now unofficially over. New CIA Director Allen Dulles called the armistice “one of the greatest psychological victories so far achieved by the free world against Communism.”

    Germ(ane) Warfare

    Unit 731 of the Imperial Japanese Army – officially titled the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army – was based in Harbin. Harbin was a city in what is now Northeast China, but was at that time the Japanese puppet state popularly known as Manchuria.

    The history of Unit 731 actually traces back to the poor performance of the medical system during the 1894 war with China. To remedy that, army doctors were shuttled off to Europe for intense training.

    By the commencement of the Russo-Japanese War, military medicine in Japan had reached a new pinnacle in performance, especially in dealing with the types of disease outbreaks common in war-time. Having reached that benchmark, Japan turned its thoughts to weaponizing chemicals and biological materials. This program, headed by bacteriologist and physician Shiro Ishii, accelerated after Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933 while deep in dispute over its invasion of Manchuria. The invasion had been predicated on a false flag operation, and marked the beginning of the end for the toothless League.

    By the time of World War II, the unit was well versed in the art of black medical experimentation. The unit’s activities included infecting men, women and children with various diseases and then performing vivisections upon them; performing amputations on live victims to study the effects of blood loss; and removing parts of organs such as brain, liver and lungs from other living subjects.

    Japan’s entry into the war opened up opportunities for Unit 731 to exploit even more diverse groups while offering unbridled rein to the sickening imagination of Ishii and his team. Such were the atrocities and tortures that thousands of victims no doubt welcomed death when it was finally granted.

    Among the many selected to take part in this perverse lottery were 1500 American, British and Australian POWs who were shipped to Manchuria and infected with everything from bubonic plague to typhoid. In one 5 day period alone, 186 deaths occurred. The nature of the deaths however, was suppressed by the Allies.

    The main aim of the exercise was to ascertain which strains of which diseases were the most virulent for use in war.

    In August, 1945, the staff of Unit 731 fled Manchuria to escape the invading Russian Army. The Japanese homeland however provided only a temporary haven, with formal surrender a looming and forlorn certainty. The surrender finally arrived on September 2nd.

    The International Military Tribunal for the Far East held its war trials in Tokyo, commencing April 29, 1946. High on the agenda was the prosecution of Ishhi and others responsible for the atrocities of Unit 731, but the Tribunal was blindsided by General McArthur and his Chief of Intelligence, Charles Willoughby. McArthur and Willoughby’s idea of interrogating Ishhi involved convivial dinner parties at the home of the germ warfare specialist. As soon as it became apparent that Ishii would not be prosecuted (due in no small measure to the withholding of evidence gathered by MacArthur’s men), MacArthur conspired to have him and others granted blanket immunity in return for their full cooperation. The boys from Fort Detrick Biological Warfare Laboratories quickly moved in. It was by now 1948 and the US was not only desperate to have the data for itself, it was equally desperate to keep it out of other hands; allies and new Cold War enemies alike.

    The Tribunal was not the end of court action. The Soviet Union commenced War Crimes Trials in 1949, and the trials must have given MacArthur and Willoughby ulcers when a court sitting in Siberia took testimony to the effect that Unit 731 had tried out lethal germs against American POWs. The POW experimentation had been undertaken “to ascertain the degree of vulnerability of the American army to different combat infections.” In any event, MacArthur wasted no time in issuing a denial, letting the press know that “there are no known cases in which Japanese used American prisoners in germ warfare experiments.” It was a lie of significant proportions, but one that was necessary in MacArthur’s eyes given the deal that had been struck with Ishhi, and the need to conceal anything that could lead to uncomfortable questions being asked.

    The Japanese germ warfare materials collected by Unit 731 now complimented what Fort Detrick had produced.

    The US was about to become akin to an urban teenage street gang (straight out of a Hollywood short, circa 1950) with a newly acquired baseball bat and glove. Someone just needed to find a rival gang and get the game started.

    Six months later, the Korean War began.

    In the meantime, the US press was doing what it does best; preparing the citizenry to accept what was coming. This work started just prior to the Tokyo War Crime Trials.

    March 12, 1949. UP reports Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal as stating that the US “leads the world in germ warfare research;” that germ weapons are “definitely not the fantastic killers they have been labelled,” but could be “a cheap and most important means of warfare.” Major General Alden H Wyatt, head of the Army Chemical Corp reiterates that “potentially” the spreading of disease germs “is a most important means of warfare.” It is stressed that the US program is aimed “primarily” at defense and that the US is quite prepared to strike back with biological weapons if other nations should attack with them.

    May 27, 1949. UP reports an assertion by the former chief of the air-borne infection project at the US biological warfare headquarters at Camp Detrick, Dr. Theordor Rosebery. Dr. Rosebery states that the practicality of germ warfare cannot be proven unless it is used in war. He also warns that “defense against BW (biological weapons) as a whole is pitiably weak, so weak that none of us, civilian or military, can find much comfort in its prospect.”

    July 21, 1949. AP reports that the army has asked Congress for an extra 3.3 million to improve both the “defensive and offensive aspects of war with biological weapons.”

    September 10, 1949. AP reports Director General of the World Health Organization, Dr. Brock Chisolm as declaring that biological weapons would make “large armies, navies and air forces” obsolete along with the atomic bomb. Dr. Chisolm also claims that scientists have found “one substance so deadly that seven ounces, properly distributed, could kill the people of the world within six hours.” He does not name the substance.

    June 25, 1950. The undeclared war in Korea begins.

    July 26, 1950. UP reports that “defensive measures against germ warfare are being drawn up.” The scientist being quoted is familiar with the program and adds “that they include no new rays or other ‘magic’ means of coping with germs. Instead, the measures would consist of “training health officers in known medical and public health practices – but on an emergency basis.”

    November 3, 1950. AP reports that the armed forces are looking ahead to wars fought with radiological poison weapons, germ warfare, guided missiles and special devices to make maps of enemy terrain under cover of night or clouds.

    December 28, 1950. UP reports that the Federal Government is urging “civil defense workersto prepare for nerve gas and germ warfare attacks upon American Cities.” The story adds that a manual issued by the Health Resources division states that automatic detection devices are essential for adequate protection” but ominously concludes such devices are not available at a price which would make their purchase and use for civil defense practical.”

    There is a clear design in these stories. It goes like this: the US has the most advanced germ warfare program in the world. It wants to use this program in a defensive manner only, but is carefully leaving the door ajar for a first strike option. We also learn that the program needs to be evaluated under combat conditions. Next, we are treated to the prospect that the US will probably soon suffer a germ warfare attack – followed by the awful truth that civil defense is inadequately trained and equipped to cope with such an attack if it ever occurs. Once these seeds have been planted, the reader is left to conclude for themselves that a pre-emptive strike is the only viable option.

    But first things first. A limited land war was needed to test Fort Detrick’s arsenal.

    Allegations from the Communists that the UNC was using biological weapons against North Korea began in March 1951 and grew into a crescendo of specific charges by February the following year. The charges indicated that US forces had been “systematically scattering large quantities of bacteria-carrying insects by aircraft in order to disseminate infectious diseases over our front line positions and rear. Bacteriological tests show that these insects scattered by the aggressors on the positions of our troops and in our rear are infected with plague, cholera and the germs of other infectious diseases.”

    In response, General Ridgway stood before Congress and emphatically denied the allegations. Elsewhere, the counterclaim was being made that North Korea and China were engaging in propaganda, and that they could even be using the accusations as an excuse to launch their own bioweapons offensive.

    The Red Cross offered to investigate, if both sides agreed.

    Both sides duly agreed.

    The Red Cross put together a Blue Ribbon Panel.

    The Red Cross Blue Ribbon Panel duly found no substance to the allegations.

    The Reds duly accused the Red Cross of having a pro-West bias.

    And so it goes.

    The specific allegations expanded into claims of attacks on animals and crops, and by September, the Reds had commissioned their own investigation through the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) – a body organized by participants at the Nuremburg Trials. The IADL was later accused of being a Communist Front.

    The IADL issued two reports during March and April, 1952. Both reports read like indictments, with the second report concluding, “We consider that the facts reported above constitute an act of aggression committed by the United States, an act of genocide, and a particularly odious crime against humanity. It indeed hangs over the whole world as an extremely grave menace, the limits and consequences of which cannot be foreseen.”

    If the Red Cross had a pro-West bias, the bias charge could equally be levelled against the IADL – not to mention all other organizations that had been commissioned by either side. It was a courtroom drama on a grand scale replete with dueling experts.

    Time thankfully has the grace to allow some detachment – enough to permit a determination based on good faith rather than partisanship, and any conclusion about these events must now take into account the very strong circumstantial case against the US. The case includes the planning of covert actions for conducting biological warfare. It includes the actual production of disease-laden insects, and the subsequent discovery of such insects in the war zone. It includes the preparation of disease-laden feathers and the discovery of such feathers around exploded bombs in the war zone. It also includes the manufacture of specific weapons and delivery systems and the discovery of same in the war zone. Finally, it includes America’s secreting away of Japan’s biological warfare secrets.

    The discovery of all this physical evidence underlines the means. The motive, as already explored, can be found in the alleged need for the US to test such weapons in combat conditions. The opportunity came via the manufacturing of a pretext for war and the railroading of the United Nations.

    The Great Un(brain)washed

    On December 26, 1948, Cardinal József Mindszenty of Hungary was arrested and charged with treason and conspiracy. The specifics included theft of the Crown Jewels, and plotting the eradication of Communism through aiding America to start World War III. The payoff for the Cardinal would be political power in his homeland should America prevail.

    A few days prior to being arrested, the Cardinal wrote a very prescient letter to his Bishops advising that if he should resign or confess, and even if his signature was appended to any such declarations, they should know that it was the result of “human frailty” and he declared it “null and void in advance.”

    A few days after the arrest, but still weeks out from the trial and acting on instructions, one of his clergy issued a document stating that the Cardinal feared that the Communists would use the drug Actedron on him. Actedron, the document claimed, had been used in previous trials to break morale and extract bogus confessions.

    The release of this document caused a world-wide furore.

    The broth was starting to bubble.

    Actedron is an amphetamine and used historically as an appetite suppressant. More recently, it has been prescribed to sufferers of ADHD.

    The Security Research Section of the CIA was internally admitting that though they saw the drug as having some potential in interrogations, the drug alone could not produce the results being credited to it in relation to what would later become known later as “mind control.”

    News of US pilots confessing to dropping deadly germs behind enemy lines broke in early May, 1952 when it was reported that 1st Lt. Kenneth L. Enoch and 1st Lt. John Quinn had made certain admissions which had been taped and broadcast over Radio Peiping (the previous name for Beijing). Among the details supplied by Enoch, whose B-26 had been shot down on January 13, was that the undetonated bombs he had dropped would be called “duds.” His confession is now kept in the grandiloquently titled “Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum” in Pyongyang.

    That story was followed by one which told of five British businessmen who had been to a trade conference in Moscow before moving on to Peiping to discuss trade expansion with China. The five reported that they had been played the taped confessions of four American POWs and believed that the confessions warranted being taken seriously.

    The immediate response to the charges was typified by Dean Acheson who dismissed the confessions as having been “dictated by Red propagandists,” without stating outright that they were fake.

    Experience tells us that cover stories come in phases as need may, from time to time, dictate. That was phase one. Phase two was claiming that collaborators had been brainwashed. Phase three was blaming the upbringing and lack of discipline of the soldiers and also in not having any unified and ingrained American doctrine on liberty to help withstand Communist indoctrination.

    The term “brainwashing” was coined in September 1950 by Edward Hunter, a CIA operative with non-official cover as a journalist. Hunter used the term to describe how China was forcing its citizens into joining the Communist Party, and claimed that the use of drugs and hypnotism were paramount to success.

    This was a distortion of the historical truth , but with Cardinal Mindszenty’s confessions still fresh in the public mind, alongside the claimed use of drugs, it stuck, as it was no doubt meant to.

    The POW Homecoming

    Each returned prisoner was interviewed during the course of the trip home about their symptoms and experiences. Chief among the POW’s symptoms were a lack of spontaneity, flat affect, apathy, retardation and depression. Incongruously, many also exhibited signs of tenseness, restlessness and suspicion of their surroundings.

    Other systems in combination could have been associated with chronic physical and mental disease, or vitamin deficiency.

    Once on home soil they became subjected to several studies (including at least one lasting a number of years). Some of the studies were aimed ostensibly at searching for answers as to what exactly happened in Korea and the short and long term effects thereof. Others were aimed at profiling those who collaborated as a means of having the ability to weed out potential turncoats at the time of enlistment, and putting in place such public policies that might produce a better, more resilient fighting force. Public reaction meanwhile, was being manipulated in whatever direction the winds (along with sundry windbags) were blowing. History is not driven by individuals acting alone, or by conspiracy or coincidence, but a combination of those as end products (or sometimes mere by-products) of philosophies, agendas, policies and contingencies which colloquially and collectively, these may all come under the heading of “mind-sets,” The repatriated prisoners were thus put through three phases of thematic nuance as various philosophies, agendas, policies and contingencies were deployed in the fight for control over the POW “reality.” First came the “atrocities” theme, following by the “brainwashing” theme, and ending at the more tenaciously entrenched theme of blaming the victims for lacking discipline, moral compasses and patriotism.

    Each theme was responded to as if true.

    The fear that these men had been victims of atrocities led to hero homecomings. The fear of brainwashing led to trainees at Stead AFB, Nevada being forced to spend hours in a dark hole up to their shoulders in water, fed only raw spaghetti and uncooked spinach, given electric shocks and being verbally abused – all to make them capable of withstanding such treatment, if captured. The Navy conducted similar training at Camp Mackall in North Carolina. Additionally, it offered up excuses to expand “mind control” programs at home (yes indeed, there was purportedly a “mind control” gap). Finally, the fear that American men were soft led to the Military Code of Conduct which had to be signed by all personnel. Various other programs involving forms of indoctrination in “Americanism” also soon appeared.

    In short, symptoms which should have been associated with chronic physical and mental illness and vitamin deficiencies, were instead being attributed to brainwashing or moral decay (if not complete moral turpitude) on the home-front.

    Militant Liberty & the Code of Conduct

    To those who blamed the POW situation on the “softness” of American soldiers, the response was to seek a strengthening through a deeper understanding of American values. Militant Liberty was the 1954 brainchild of John C Broger, President of the Far East Broadcasting Company (FEBC) and consultant to the Joint Subsidiary Activities Division in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What the proposal boiled down to was the use of Chinese indoctrination methods through rigid programs of re-education and proselytization. The whole shebang was being sponsored by Abraham Vereide and his secretive organization known as “The Fellowship.”

    The program imploded barely a year into its mission amid criticism that it breached the line between military and civilian life through politicization of the troops. Despite this, it did manage to insinuate itself into Hollywood scripts for movies like John Ford’s Wings of Eagles starring the All-American epitome of Rugged Individualism, John Wayne, and Cecil B. DeMille’s The Ten Commandments which according to author Professor Alan Nadel, attempted to equate “God’s perspective with American global interests.” In short, it was produced with the aim of gaining acceptance for the doctrine of Manifest Destiny through the use of cinema magic and psychology. Put another way, it was yet more of what author Jeff Sharlet termed Vereide’s “bastardized Calvinism” at work.

    Nor did it hurt Broger’s career . In 1956 he was made Deputy Director of the Directorate for Armed Forces Information and Education within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) before taking over as Director and holding that position until 1984.

    Broger’s stint as the Pentagon communications Czar was not without controversy. In 1977, Jack Anderson reported that Broger had once used his position to arrange a two-day seminar in “Christian Counseling,” had military techs record the entire event, then packaged the tapes and sold them commercially through the National Association of Evangelicals at $34.95 a set. Meanwhile, internal complaints of mismanagement, malfeasance, corruption and conflicts of interest abounded until finally, the Defense Department’s general counsel and Air Force Special Investigators were called in. Their findings were forwarded to the Justice Department which found no evidence of criminal culpability. According to Anderson however, the reason no evidence was found was that the most damaging facts were omitted from the submitted report. This document should be tagged “Exhibit A” and presented to anyone holding to the fantasy that official reports are sacrosanct.

    Anderson also gave some insights into Broger’s background and mindset. His world was black and white – populated only by “good guys” and “bad guys.” The “good guys” were “conservatives, anti-Communists and Christian fundamentalists who believe in the God-given American right to make a buck.” The “bad guys” were, unsurprisingly, “liberals, hippies and Communists.” Anderson also described Broger’s old broadcasts with the FEBC as “right-wing anti-Communist propaganda to alien lands in the guise of Evangelical Christianity.”

    Meanwhile, as the debate over Militant Liberty was being waged, the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War was tasked with drafting a code which would outline US POW obligations while augmenting the Geneva Convention on their treatment. It also investigated the extent of treasonable conduct which had occurred and found that it had been exaggerated. This should have negated the need for such a code, but the POW “scandal” was going to be spun into programs addressing the nation’s ideological needs, come hell or high water.

    The Code was signed into law through Executive Order 10631 on August 17, 1955. Evangelicals determined to refashion the American gestalt by promotion of a civil-military-religious Menage a trois were definitely on a roll.

    One of those most responsible for bringing in the code was Dr. Winfred Overholser. Overholser had testified at the inquiry on behalf of Colonel Frank Schwable, another POW who had confessed to the use of biological weapons. The doctor recommended to the inquiry that the military do more to “condition our people to resist communist brainwashing.”

    After facing possible execution for cowardice, Schwable was instead awarded the Legion of Merit and given a desk job at the Pentagon.

    Dr. Overholser will re-enter our narrative soon.

    Fred Korth & the Korean War

    Korth was brought to Washington in March 1951 by Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace. The two were old acquaintances, having served together in Air Transport Command during WWII. Pace offered, and Korth accepted, the position of Deputy Counsel for the Army. This did not last long. In yet another response to the Korean POW situation, the position of Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) had been created, and on Pace’s recommendation, Korth was appointed by Truman in May, 1952.

    The following year, with a newly inaugurated Republican president, Pace and Korth were back doing business in the Lone Star State. Pace had been appointed CEO at General Dynamics Corp and Korth returned to law, while also taking the role of vice president of Continental National Bank in Fort Worth. It is important to note however, that his services were retained as a consultant by the new Secretary of the Army, and this consultancy continued up until 1960.


    NOTES

    1. The Korean War, June 1950 – July 1953 Introductory Overview, Naval History & Heritage @ history.navy.mil

    2. CIA Files Show US Blindsided By Korean War, by Tom Gjelten, NPR broadcast transcript

    3. South Korea Likely Provoked War with North by Oliver Lee, Star-Bulletin, June 24, 1994

    4. Ibid

    5. US Military Spending In The Cold War Era: Opportunity Costs, Foreign Crises, and Domestic Constraints, by Robert Higgs, Professor of Political Economy, Lafayette College

    6. CenturyChina.com, Korean War FAQ

    7. “Long Delay on Peace: Korea talks ‘might take four weeks,’” AAP report, The Courier-Mail, July 10, 1951, p4 “The United States has not ruled out the possibility that the talks may fail altogether. In the meantime United Nations’ forces will continue to press their field operations against the enemy. There is much uneasiness that should the talks fail, the Communists would have brought time to mount a smashing counter-offensive.”

    8. ABC-CLIO History and Headlines: The Korean War 60th Anniversary: Remembering a “Forgotten” Conflict – Operations Big Switch/ Little Switch by Clayton D. Laurie

    9. Ibid

    10. Time Magazine, August 17, 1953 article, “Korea: Big Switch”

    11. A Substitute for Victory: Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) by Rosemary Foot, p191

    12. Military Medicine: From Ancient Times to the 21st Century, by Jack E McCallum, p337

    13. The Pariah Files: 25 Dark Secrets You’re Not Supposed to Know by Philip Rife, p 134

    14. The Scramble for Asia: US Military Power in the Aftermath of the Pacific War, by Marc Gallicchio, p 157

    15. Russians Press Germ War Trial, UP wire story, Dec 27, 1949

    16. Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology and History, Volume 1, edited by Eric A. Croddy, James J. Wirtz , p 175

    17. The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea, by Stephen Lyon Endicott and Edward Lagerman, p195

    18. “The Adelaide Advertiser,” Catholic Church News, p9, February 12, 1949 and derived from the breaking article in The Tablet published on January 1.

    19. “China Reds Broadcast Germ Warfare ‘Confessions,’” UP report appearing in the Oxnard Press-Courier, May 5, 1952, p1

    20. Acheson Attacks Red Germ Warfare Charge, AP report appearing in The News & Courier, May 8, 1952, p1

    21. AP Report, Claims Airmen were Tortured to “Confess,” Oct 23, 1952. The story claims information was gathered in Indo-China, Hong Kong, India and elsewhere that the airmen had been “brainwashed” in the same way as Mindszenty and others using a combination of prolonged questioning, sleep deprivation, threats to friends and relatives, drugs and perhaps hypnosis.

    22. When the Army Debunks the Army: a legend of the Korean War by William Peters (Encounter Magazine, July 1960)

    23. AP Report, “Yanks Brainwashed in Survival Training,” Spokane Daily Chronicle, p55, September 8, 1955

    24. Military Medicine, vol. 167, November, 2002, Psychiatry in the Korean War, p902

    25. The Family: Power, Politics and Fundamentalism’s Shadow Elite, by Jeff Sharlett, pp201-202

    26. The US Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War: The State-Private Network, edited by Helen Laville, Hugh Wilford,

    27. The Nevada Daily Mail, “Communication Czar Uses Pentagon Post,” by Jack Anderson with Joe Spear, p18, Jan 12, 1977

    28. International Society for Military Ethics article, University of Notre Dame. Article, “Evangelicals in the Military and the Code of Conduct,” by Lori L. Bogle

    29. The Pentagon’s Battle for the American Mind: The Early Cold War, by Lori L. Bogle, p131.

    30. American Torture: from the Cold War to Abu Ghraib and Beyond, by Michael Otterman, p35

    31. Act of Retribution: The Military-Industrial-Intelligence Establishment and the Conspiracy to Assassinate President John F Kennedy, by J. P. Phillips, p343

    32. Texas Bar Journal, 1962, vol. 25, p201

    33. Current Biography Yearbook, 1963, by Charles Moritz, p244

  • Thurston Clarke, JFK’s Last Hundred Days


    Thurston Clarke has now written three books in a row on the Kennedys. Since 2004, he has written two books on President Kennedy and one on Senator Robert Kennedy. The subtitle of his present book is “The Transformation of a Man and the Emergence of a Great President”. I disagree with the both the title and the subtitle.

    First of all, it would have been grand if Clarke had really just focused on the last hundred days of the Kennedy administration. For Kennedy was doing some remarkable things both at home and abroad in the last three months of his presidency. And although Clarke addresses some of them adequately, he also ignores some of them completely. For instance, there is not one sentence in the book about the epochal Congo crisis. One which both UN chairman Dag Hammarskjold and President Kennedy dealt with – Kennedy for the entire three years he was in office. This is even more bewildering since two years before Clarke published his book, Susan Miller released her milestone volume on the death of Hammarskjold, Who Killed Hammarskjold? That book was so compelling in its argument for foul play that it caused a new United Nations inquiry into the case. That inquiry recommended the case be reopened.

    Clarke also does not mention the name of Achmed Sukarno, the president of Indonesia in 1963. A man who Kennedy understood and appreciated as a leader of the Non-Aligned nations movement. A movement which Kennedy respected and was in agreement with. In fact, with almost no exceptions, there is not anything in the book of any substance about Kennedy’s policies toward these Third World nations in Asia and Africa. Even though there have now been three crucial books written on the subject: Richard Mahoney’s JFK: Ordeal in Africa in 1983, Philip Muehlenbeck’s Betting on the Africans, and Robert Rokave’s Kennedy, Johnson and the Nonaligned World, the last two both published in 2012. And considering the miracles of speed in the publishing world these days, Clarke could have consulted both of the latter for his book. Evidently, he wasn’t interested. Which is surprising since he studied at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies.

    But by largely ignoring these aspects of Kennedy’s life and presidency, he can keep up the idea that somehow Kennedy was “transformed” in his last hundred days. Even though Kennedy broke with Eisenhower’s policies in Congo and Indonesia in 1961. (Destiny Betrayed, Second Edition, pgs. 28-33) Even though, in a rather jarring vacuum, he never explains how or why this alleged transformation took place in those last 100 days. Further, Clarke does not really isolate the last hundred days of Kennedy’s presidency. He often wanders astray from the book’s titled focus. In his discussion of the creation of the back channel to Fidel Castro, which Kennedy was working very hard on toward the end, he flashes back to when it began, which was after the Missile Crisis. (Clarke pgs. 190-92) Another example: In his discussion of Kennedy’s Vietnam policy, he actually flashes all the way back to Representative Kennedy’s visit to Saigon in 1951. (Clarke, p. 54)

    That visit in 1951 to Saigon was a puzzling one for Clarke to include. Because what he is referring to there is the meeting between Kennedy, his brother Robert, and American diplomat Edmund Gullion. Mahoney first depicted this episode in his milestone book. And to his credit, Clarke explains its importance in the development of young JFK’s thinking. For Gullion explained to the young congressman that the French attempt to recolonize Vietnam would not succeed. Mainly because the desire by the Vietnamese to be free of imperial influence was now too strong. Therefore, it could not be muzzled. As Mahoney explained, this discussion had a very strong impact on Kennedy’s thinking. And he now began to rebel against the established orthodoxies of the leading statesmen of the Democrats (Dean Acheson) and the Republicans (John Foster Dulles). But in spite of this, when Clarke then addresses some of the things Kennedy said in the presidential race in 1960, he writes that “Kennedy’s cold war rhetoric was not an act” and that he “subscribed to the domino theory… ” (p. 56)

    Yet to show how muddled his presentation is, directly after this, Clarke says something that contradicts what he just wrote. He notes that, soon after he was elected, it became clear to Kennedy’s staff that, if Kennedy was a cold warrior, “he was a fairly non violent one … ” (ibid) He goes on to add that Kennedy talked tough in certain situations, but when push came to shove, he would not commit combat troops. Which, to most people, would seem to indicate that he was not really a cold warrior. And, in fact, Clarke later uses a revealing quote from National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy in this regard. Bundy told his assistant Marcus Raskin, “You know there are only two pacifists in the White House, you and Kennedy.” (p. 217) Bundy, who should know, also told author Gordon Goldstein for the book Lessons in Disaster, that Kennedy did not buy into the domino theory. That book was published in 2009. Clarke includes it in his bibliography. Apparently, he missed, or forgot, that important passage. That Clarke wanted to have it both ways on this indicated to me that he was a rather compromised author.

    Another telltale issue in this regard was his use of Ellen Rometsch. Rometsch was born in East Germany and was a member of the communist party there. She then fled to West Germany. She married a pilot who was later stationed to Washington. While there, she began to attend a social club called the Quorum Club. This was set up by Lyndon Johnson’s former aide Bobby Baker. When Baker got into legal trouble with the Justice Department, Rometsch now became a political football between Baker and the Kennedys. Was she really a spy? Did she have an affair with JFK? Clarke keeps up this trail of innuendo throughout a large part of the book. It isn’t until near the end that he finally has to write that an FBI inquiry ultimately found that there was no connection between the woman and anyone in the White House. (p. 267) This is the same conclusion that researcher Peter Vea came to after going through all the FBI papers on the subject he could find at the National Archives. Why did the author waste our time and his if he knew the end result?

    In addition to using Bobby Baker as a source, Clarke also uses people like Traphes Bryant. Bryant was the dog keeper at the White House. He later wrote a trashy book about his days there. But Clarke then goes beyond that. He actually sinks to David Heymann levels. I never thought I would see the day when a mainstream historian would use a book by Tempest Storm, who, no surprise, also claimed she had an affair with Kennedy. But, if you can believe it, Clarke does so. Author Jerry Kroth once wrote that if one bought into all the women who said they had affairs with JFK, one gets into the same problem writers have with James Dean. The actor simply did not live long enough to have all those affairs. Well, Kennedy wasn’t in the White House long enough to have that many affairs. (Kroth checked the number. With Mimi Alford, who Clarke also buys into, its now up to 33.)

    And then there is Ben Bradlee. Clarke has done some fairly extensive archival research. And he also did some notable interviews. So its puzzling why he would also include references to Ben Bradlee’s 1975 book Conversations with Kennedy. First of all, Bradlee had a complex relationship with JFK. Some would call it ambiguous, in the sense that it is hard to figure out. Although Bradlee and Kennedy were supposed to be friends, Bradlee’s book is not really a friendly tome. He begins the book by saying that he thought the effect Kennedy had on the populace was due more to flash and dash than any real substance. (Probe, Vol. 4 No. 6, p. 30) He then says that he thought Kennedy was the recipient of a good press while in office. Both of these assertions are quite specious. For instance, Professor Donald Gibson, in his underrated book Battling Wall Street, examines the kind of stories that appeared in the magazines controlled by Henry Luce: Time, Life and Fortune. For instance, it the last publication which was used by Allen Dulles to get out his self-serving cover story for the debacle at the Bay of Pigs. (DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, pgs. 53-55). It was that journal which Dulles and Howard Hunt used to issue the black propaganda that President Kennedy had cancelled the so-called D-Day air strikes. And it was this loss of nerve that had doomed the invasion. When in fact, these strikes had never been approved and were contingent of the Cuban exiles securing a beachhead, which they never did. (ibid, pgs. 45-46) This is only one example among many which belies the idea that Kennedy was the recipient of “good press”.

    Bradlee writes that he did not think that foreign policy was Kennedy’s particular field of expertise. (ibid, Probe, p. 30.) Which was ridiculous for even 1975. Especially considering the horrendous results that occurred after Johnson reversed almost every one of Kennedy’s major policy shifts. (See DiEugenio, pgs. 367-77) But none of this deterred Clarke from using the unreliable Bradlee as a source, sometimes for almost an entire page of material. Even when what the Washington Post editor is saying clearly does not align with the other facts in Clarke’s book.

    Consider what Clarke writes on page 284 about Kennedy and Vietnam and then Kennedy and the Dominican Republic. Concerning the former, Bradlee writes that in looking at a photo of American servicemen dancing with bar girls in Saigon, JFK said, “If I was running things in Saigon, I’d have those G.I.’s in the front lines tomorrow.” Clarke does not ask the obvious question about his source: Mr. Bradlee, your friend Kennedy had three years to put those advisors into the front lines as combat troops and he did not. So why would he say that to you, and to no one else? Bradlee then tops this one. And Clarke dutifully parrots it. Bradlee comments on the coming to power of leftist Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic. The Washington Post editor says that Kennedy was torn “about whether to order the CIA to orchestrate an antigovernment student demonstration there.” If you can believe it, Bradlee counters JFK by saying, “How would you feel if the Soviets did the same thing her?” Bradlee then tops himself by saying Kennedy had no reply to this. And Clarke buys into all of it.

    That story by Bradlee is even more ridiculous than the one Clarke recited about Vietnam. And like the inclusion of people like Bryant, Tempest Storm and Baker, it shows just how well Clarke knows how to honor the sacred cows of the MSM in order to stay a part of the club. The problem is that when one does this, the historian jettisons what is supposed to be his real task: informing the reader of the true facts about his subject. Someone like Gibson does care about the facts. Therefore in his book, which Clarke does not source at all, Gibson understands that Kennedy actually liked Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic. He even advised him on how to run his economy. Once Bosch was overthrown by the rightwing powers on the island with the military in cahoots, Kennedy immediately spearheaded a program of diplomatic and economic sanctions against the new regime. It actually began within hours of him hearing about the overthrow. Kennedy actually led this growing hemisphere wide movement which was picking up steam at the time of his death. Within one month, the Dominican Republic was wincing at the isolation Kennedy had condemned them to. (Gibson, Battling Wall Street, pgs. 78-79)

    Like several other policies, this one was actually reversed by President Johnson. When Bosch was threatening to retake his office, Johnson, Dean Rusk and Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann began to justify intervention by saying that communists were involved in the revolt. Bosch denied all this and said there was hardly any communist influence in the Dominican Republic at all. (ibid, p. 79) Therefore, within 18 months, Johnson reversed Kennedy’s policy and invaded the Dominican Republic to prevent Bosch from returning to power. If Clarke had taken a more expansive view of who Kennedy was, and how he looked at the so-called “non-aligned world”, he would not have been a sucker for the likes of the CIA friendly Ben Bradlee.

    II

    To give Clarke his due, there are some good things in the book. For instance, he makes it fairly clear just how important the 1963 test ban treaty was to Kennedy. For Kennedy told Ted Sorenson that he would have gladly forfeited his re-election bid as long as the treaty passed. (p. 30) And later on, Clarke notes just how hard Kennedy worked to make sure the treaty passed. Which it did by a resounding 80-19 vote. (p. 194) Kennedy was so enamored of this achievement that he started to campaign on it, in of all places, the western states. Even at the home of the Minuteman missiles. (p. 198) And once it was secured of passage, Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko wanted more agreements made with the Russians. President Kennedy in turn suggested a mutual cooperation in the space race. (pgs. 101-103) To my knowledge, Clarke is the first MSM author to mention this fact. And he stays with the argument throughout most of the book. In fact, Clarke notes a discussion Kennedy had with James Webb of NASA trying to figure if the space program could achieve just about all that was needed by being unmanned. (p. 175) Finally, Kennedy ordered Webb to seek cooperation with the USSR in space. (p. 308) In furtherance of detente, Clarke also mentions the 1963 wheat deal to the Russians that Kennedy rammed through. Among many, Lyndon Johnson was critical of this move. He actually called it the worst mistake that Kennedy ever made. (p. 221)

    Clarke devotes some time to the fact that, as a senator, Kennedy wrote a brief book (actually a pamphlet) called A Nation of Immigrants. It has been almost completely ignored by just about everyone in the discussion of Kennedy’s presidency. Clarke calls it “possibly the most passionate, bitter, and controversial book ever written by a serious presidential candidate.” (p. 156) The book celebrated the whole idea of the “melting pot” of America. But it also criticized the bias that contemporary immigration laws had toward Europeans, especially Anglo-Saxons. In fact, Kennedy concluded the book with a rapier attack on the 1958 status of American immigration laws. He first quoted the famous words on the base of the Liberty Bell: “Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.” Kennedy added to this by saying that until 1921 this was relatively accurate. But after then, it was more appropriate to add, “as long as they come from Northern Europe, are not too tired or to poor or slightly ill, never stole a loaf of bread, never joined a questionable organization, and can document their activities for the last two years.” (p. 157)

    Kennedy understood that the present immigration laws made it difficult for people from eastern and southern Europe to get to the USA, and made it all but impossible for Asians to enter the country. By being blind to race and ethnicity, Kennedy’s immigration bill tried to redress these injustices. It was finally passed after his death. (p. 355)

    Clarke brings up another point that should be well known about Kennedy’s foreign policy. It has been mentioned in some previous books, like James Blight’s Virtual JFK. It was commonly known through Kennedy’s diplomatic corps that, in his second term, President Kennedy had planned on extending an olive branch to communist China. As Clarke notes, “His intention to change U.S. China policy was not a secret. He had told Marie Ridder that it was on his agenda for his second term, and Dean Rusk said they often discussed it, and he thought Kennedy would have reached out to the Chinese in 1965.” (p. 320)

    Clarke also has some incisive commentary on the extremely underrated Walter Heller. Heller was Kennedy’s chair of the Council of Economic Advisors. Kennedy was determined to get the economy into high gear since he thought the Eisenhower years were sluggish in economic performance. He and Heller brainstormed on how to get a Keynesian stimulus into the economy at the lowest possible cost to the consumer and the producer. They first discussed a large government-spending plan. But they figured they would not get the votes in congress for it. (Timothy Noah, The New Republic, 10/12/12) They finally decided on a tax cut on the marginal rates of income. Heller said this might produce a short-term deficit but it would eventually produce a long-term surplus. What made this proposal even more daring was the fact that the economy was already growing when Heller proposed it. Further, unemployment was only at 5%. In other words, many other presidents would have been satisfied with what they had. But as Clarke notes, Kennedy was determined to double the growth rate of Eisenhower, “preside over 8 recession free years, and leave office with the nation enjoying full employment.” (p. 178) The package worked extremely well. It eventually brought down unemployment to 3.8% in 1966. And tax revenue actually increased in 1964 and 1965. Heller’s design worked marvelously until President Johnson decided to greatly expand the Vietnam War without raising taxes. Heller knew this would cause an inflationary spiral. So he resigned.

    I wish Clarke had discussed a rather important historical point here. Since the birth of Arthur Laffer’s “supply-side” fantasies, many Republicans have used the Heller model to advocate tax cuts as being the magic elixir of the economy. Heller would laugh at them. Heller despised Milton Friedman and his acolytes; he used to poke fun at them. When Heller proposed the tax cut, marginal rates were at over 90%. He brought the top rate down to 70%. The bottom 85% got almost 60% of the benefits of the cuts. Therefore, it was not a cross the board tax cut. And it was not supply side oriented; it was demand oriented, since most of the benefits went to the middle and working class. That is a far cry from what Ronald Reagan proposed and passed. In fact, the top rate was twice as high after Heller’s cut than what the Reaganites proposed. Reagan’s cuts really were supply side oriented since most of the benefits went to the top end. (ibid, Noah)

    But with today’s grotesquely lopsided income distribution, any kind of Laffer style across the board tax cut will benefit the rich and ultra rich to a disproportionate degree. Further, there was still an effective corporate tax rate in 1963, and a significant capital gains tax. In other words, with Heller’s plan, the money saved in taxes would really go into consumer spending and investment. Not into Thorstein Veblen type conspicuous consumption. And as Donald Gibson has shown, Kennedy’s other economic policies rewarded the reinvestment and expansion of business. He did not reward globalization. Further, as his confrontation with Johnson showed, Heller was not at all for ballooning the deficit in the long run in order to exercise a short-term stimulus.

    Clarke also addresses a point that needs to be corrected. Lyndon Johnson did not originate the War on Poverty. Kennedy understood that a tax cut would not do the trick with alleviating poverty. In fact, he made the specific point about this in his State of the Union address in 1963. Heller was also concerned with this issue and warned JFK that America was experiencing a “drastic slowdown in the rate at which the economy is taking people out of poverty.” (p. 243) Heller decided this could not be remedied unless a specific program was devised to address it. About this proposed program Kennedy said, “Walter, first we’re going to get your tax cut, and then we’re going to get my expenditure program.” (ibid) He then told Heller, that the attack on poverty would be a part of his 1964 campaign.

    The book also reminds us that Kennedy’s Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Anthony Celebrezze, presented a Medicare Plan to congress in November of 1963. (p. 311) And Clarke goes on to add that, in large part, Johnson’s Great Society was a compendium of leftovers from Kennedy’s proposals and initiatives. (p. 355) And contrary to what Robert Caro wrote in his disappointing book The Passage of Power, there really was no mystery about what was going to happen with Kennedy’s agenda. His bills, including the tax cut bill and his civil rights bill, were going to pass. Unlike what Caro implies, Kennedy was good friends with Republican Senator Everett Dirksen, and he had already targeted him as the key vote for the civil rights bill. (p. 356) In fact, this was all known back in 1964. Because Look magazine had done an extensive survey about whether or not Kennedy’s program was going to pass if he had lived. This survey including dozens of interviews and the result showed that the Kennedy program was going to pass in 1964. It may have taken a bit longer, but there was little doubt it was going to pass.

    I should add one other interesting anecdote in the book. In 1961, a man named Ted Dealey was the publisher of the Dallas Morning News. Dealey had gone to the White House that year and told Kennedy that he and his advisors were a bunch of “weak sisters”. He added that “We need a man on horseback to lead this country, and many people in the southwest think you are riding Caroline’s tricycle.” (p. 339) Kennedy replied to this indirectly in a speech a few weeks later. Noting that Dealey had not served in World War II, he said that many people who have not fought in wars like the idea – until they are engaged in it. He added, that they call for a “man on horseback”, since they do not really trust the people. Very acutely, he then said they tend to equate democracy with socialism and socialism with communism. Kennedy concluded with “let our patriotism be reflected in the creation of confidence in one another, rather than in crusades of suspicion.”

    III

    With that anecdote about Ted Dealey included, I was surprised at what Clarke did near the end of the book. He starts to include things about the Secret Service that appear lifted from Gerald Blaine’s book, The Kennedy Detail, a volume that Vince Palamara all but eviscerated on this web site. For example Clarke says that Kennedy refused to place the bubble top on the limousine in Dallas. (p. 341) Yet Clarke does not include things like the attempt to kill Kennedy in Chicago, or the fact that the Secret Service was drinking hard liquor until three in the morning the evening before the assassination at Pat Kirkwood’s after hours bar. To his credit, Clarke does not say that three shots ran out in Dealey Plaza. But he does not say that Kennedy’s body slammed backward and to his left at the moment the fatal bullet struck. (p. 346)

    Clarke also mangles a couple of other events that occurred near the end. Although he is generally sound on Kennedy’s decision to withdraw from Vietnam, somehow he does not mention perhaps the most important find by the Assassination Records Review Board in this regard. Namely the record of the May, 1963 gathering in Hawaii called the Sec/Def meeting. (Probe, Vol. 5 No. 3, p. 18) The record of this meeting showed that Kennedy had already decided to withdraw from Vietnam even before the formal issuance of NSAM 263 in October, 1963. Which is why he himself directed the editing of the Taylor/McNamara report upon which that NSAM was based. (In an offbeat passage, Clarke has Bobby Kennedy editing the report. But both John Newman and Fletcher Prouty say that this was done by Victor Krulak and RFK, but at President Kennedy’s direction. See John Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 401)

    Then there is what Clarke does with his handling of the so-called “coup cable” of August 24, 1963, and its attendant results. The two best treatments of this whole episode that I know of are by John Newman in his 1992 book, and by Jim Douglass in JFK and the Unspeakable. Newman is very good on the sending of the cable. Douglass is good on what happened in Saigon between Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and CIA officer Lucien Conein to ensure the worst possible result i. e. the killing of both Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother. Clarke is much too brief and sketchy about how the cable to Saigon ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was sent, and what Lodge’s role was at the other end when he got it. Clarke spends about a page on these matters. (pgs. 90-91) Newman spends about six pages on the issue. (pgs. 345-51) And although Newman does minimal interpreting of the data he presents, he gives the reader enough information to see what was really happening between the lines.

    There was a faction inside the State Department that wanted to get rid of Diem, mainly because he could not control his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. Nhu was chief of South Vietnam’s security apparatus. He had chosen to perform numerous crackdowns on Buddhist pagodas, and this had caused a national crisis in South Vietnam. It had culminated in the June 11th self-immolation of Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc. That event was announced in advance and was captured with American news cameras rolling. (Newman, p. 333) This crisis was ratcheted upward by the rather bizarre description of this shocking event by Nhu’s wife as a “barbecue”. That internationally televised event caused many in Washington to lose faith in the ability of Diem to lead his country against the growing effectiveness of the Viet Cong rebellion in the countryside.

    The faction inside the State Department who wished to be rid of Diem was led by Roger Hilsman, Averill Harriman, and Michael Forrestal. But it is clear from Newman’s discussion of the sending of the cable that this group had allies elsewhere e.g. in the CIA and in Saigon. Two South Vietnamese generals had met with CIA official Lucien Conein on the 21st and asked him if the USA would support a move against Diem. And Lodge had talked to both Harriman and Forrestal before leaving for Saigon. He understood they were not satisfied with Diem. Further, the sending of the ‘coup cable’ had been presaged by what Harriman had done the previous year with a peace feeler from North Vietnam. One that Kennedy wished to follow up on through John Kenneth Galbraith in India. In Gareth Porter’s book, The Perils of Dominance, he makes it clear that Harriman had deliberately distorted Kennedy’s instructions to Galbraith in order to sabotage a neutralization solution. (Porter, pgs. 167-69)

    The plotters waited until a weekend when nearly all the major principals in government were out of town. This included Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, CIA Director John McCone, McNamara’s assistant Roswell Gilpatric and Krulak. With those six out of the direct loop, and Lodge in Vietnam, the circumstances were now optimal. On the 24th, Lodge had sent in some cables that seemed to indicate the military wanted to move against Diem. (Newman, p. 346) Once these cables came in, Hilsman, Harriman and Forrestal went to work drafting what came to be known as the Saturday Night Special. This cable said that Lodge should tell Diem to remove Nhu. If he did not, and reforms were not made, “We face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved.” (ibid) The cable said that if Diem would not cooperate, “then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem.” Then came the kicker, “You may also tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown…” (ibid) It should be noted that Hilsman said that Rusk had cooperated with the drafting of the cable and actually inserted the sentence about support for the generals. Rusk vehemently denied this to author William Rust. (ibid, p. 347)

    When Kennedy was contacted in Boston, Forrestal told him it was urgent to get the cable out that night, for events were beginning to come unglued in Saigon. Kennedy asked that the cable be cleared by the other principals, and he specifically named McCone, probably since he knew McCone would not support it. McCone did not sign off on the cable. But the cabal told Kennedy that he had. Neither did Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Maxwell Taylor. (Ibid, p. 349) In fact, Taylor was not shown Cable 243 until after it was sent to Saigon. Once he saw it, he immediately realized that “the anti-Diem group centered in State had taken advantage of the absence of principal officials to get out instructions which would never have been approved as written under normal circumstances.” (ibid) But yet, Taylor did not call Kennedy to tell him he was being maneuvered into a corner.

    When the cable arrived in Saigon, Lodge ignored the wording about going to Diem and advising him about dismissing his brother. Instead, he went straight to the generals. On the 29th, Lodge then cabled Rusk that “We are launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning back. The overthrow of the Diem government. There is no possibility in my view that the war can be won under the Diem administration.” As Lodge told Stanley Karnow for the PBS special Vietnam: A Television History, Kennedy sent him a cancellation cable on the 30th. He now said that Lodge should not play any further role in encouraging the generals.

    But Lodge, who had just been sent to Saigon as ambassador to South Vietnam, seems to have had his mind made up upon his arrival. John Richardson was the CIA station chief there when Lodge arrived. Since Richardson supported Diem, and understood where Lodge was heading with him, there was tension between the two. Lodge eventually got Richardson removed from his post. (Washington Post, October 6, 1963) As Jim Douglass notes, this paved the way for the coup to go forward in early November, and then for Conein and Lodge to cooperate with the generals on the assassination of the brothers. (Douglass, pgs. 207-10)

    Almost every major point made above is somehow lost on Clarke. From the failure to get McCone to sign on, to the ultimate cooperation between Lodge and Conein to ensure the generals knew where the Nhu brothers were trying to hide and then escape. Which resulted in their deaths.

    Clarke also mangles the last month of Kennedy’s Cuba policy. He says that even in November, after the back channel to Castro was in high gear, Kennedy was still trying to overthrow Fidel. Yet, as many authors have pointed out, the anti-Castro efforts by this time had dribbled down to almost nothing. In the entire second half of 1963, there were five authorized raids into Cuba. The entire corps of commandoes the CIA could call upon totaled 50 men. (Destiny Betrayed, Second Edition, p. 70) Question for Clarke: How does one overthrow a government with 50 men? Desmond Fitzgerald, who ran the Cuba desk in 1963 agreed. He later said that this effort was completely inadequate to the task and recommended it be scrapped. (ibid)

    Further, Clarke also says that Castro was trying to subvert democracy elsewhere in November. And he uses the Richard Helms anecdote from his book, A Look over My Shoulder. This is where Helms goes to, first RFK, and then JFK, with what he says is proof of an arms shipment into Venezuela by Castro. (Helms, pgs. 226-27) Somehow, Clarke does not understand that neither Kennedy was at all impressed with this so-called “discovery”. Probably because, like former CIA officer Joseph B. Smith, they understood that the Agency likely planted the shipment to divert Kennedy’s back channel. (Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior, p. 383)

    In summary, this is a kind of odd book. Even for the MSM. Clarke and his cohorts seem to be just catching up to what people in the know understood about Kennedy decades ago. But only now, in 2013 can this be revealed. But even then, it must be accompanied by the usual MSM rumor-mongering and dirt. (In addition to Rometsch, and Storm, Clarke throws in Marlene Dietrich.) I guess, under those restrictive circumstances, this is the best one can expect from someone who trusts the likes of Ben Bradlee.

  • James W. Douglass, JFK and the Unspeakable

    James W. Douglass, JFK and the Unspeakable

    This book is the first volume of a projected trilogy. Orbis Books has commissioned James W. Douglass to write three books on the assassinations of the 1960’s. The second will be on the murders of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, while the third will be on the assassination of Bobby Kennedy.

    This is one of the few books on the Kennedy case that I actually wished was longer. In the purest sense, Jim Douglass is not a natural writer. But it seems to me he has labored meticulously to fashion a well organized, thoroughly documented, and felicitously composed piece of workmanship that is both comprehensible and easy to read. These attributes do not extend from simplicity of design or lack of ambition. This book takes in quite a lot of territory. In some ways it actually extends the frontier. In others it actually opens new paths. To achieve that kind of scope with a relative economy of means, and to make the experience both fast and pleasant, is quite an achievement.

    I should inform the reader at the outset: this is not just a book about JFK’s assassination. I would estimate that the book is 2/3 about Kennedy’s presidency and 1/3 about his assassination. And I didn’t mind that at all, because Douglass almost seamlessly knits together descriptions of several of Kennedy’s policies with an analysis of how those policies were both monitored and resisted, most significantly in Cuba and Vietnam. This is one of the things that makes the book enlightening and worthy of understanding.

    One point of worthwhile comparison would be to David Talbot’s previous volume Brothers. In my view, Douglass’ book is better. One of my criticisms of Talbot’s book was that I didn’t think his analysis of certain foreign policy areas was rigorous or comprehensive enough. You can’t say that about Douglass. I also criticized Talbot for using questionable witnesses like Angelo Murgado and Timothy Leary to further certain dubious episodes about Kennedy’s life and/or programs. Douglass avoided that pitfall.

    One way that Douglass achieves this textured effect is in his quest for new sources. One of the problems I had with many Kennedy assassination books for a long time is their insularity. That is, they all relied on pretty much the same general established bibliography. In my first book, Destiny Betrayed, I tried to break out of that mildewed and restrictive mold. I wanted to widen the lens in order to place the man and the crime in a larger perspective. Douglass picks up that ball and runs with it. There are sources he utilizes here that have been terribly underused, and some that haven’t been used before. For instance, unlike Talbot, Douglass sources Richard Mahoney’s extraordinary JFK:Ordeal in Africa, one of the finest books ever written on President Kennedy’s foreign policy. To fill in the Kennedy-Castro back channel of 1963 he uses In the Eye of the Storm by Carlos Lechuga and William Attwood’s The Twilight Struggle. On Kennedy and Vietnam the author utilizes Anne Blair’s Lodge in Vietnam, Ellen Hammer’s A Death in November, and Zalin Grant’s Facing the Phoenix. And these works allow Douglass to show us how men like Henry Cabot Lodge and Lucien Conein did not just obstruct, but actually subverted President Kennedy’s wishes in Saigon. On the assassination side, Douglass makes good use of that extraordinary feat of research Harvey and Lee by John Armstrong, the difficult to get manuscript by Roger Craig, When They Kill a President, plus the work of little known authors in the field like Bruce Adamson and hard to get manuscripts like Edwin Black’s exceptional essay on the Chicago plot. Further, he interviewed relatively new witnesses like Butch Burroughs and the survivors of deceased witnesses like Thomas Vallee, Bill Pitzer and Ralph Yates. In the use of these persons and sources, Douglass has pushed the envelope forward.

    But it’s not just what is in the book. It is how it is molded together that deserves attention. For instance, in the first chapter, Douglass is describing the Cuban Missile Crisis at length (using the newest transcription of the secretly recorded tapes by Sheldon Stern.) He then segues to Kennedy’s American University speech. At this point, Douglass then introduces the figure of Lee Harvey Oswald and his relation to the U-2 (p. 37). This is beautifully done because he has been specifically discussing the U-2 flights over Cuba during the Missile Crisis, and he subliminally matches both Kennedy and Oswald in their most extreme Cold War backdrops. He then switches back to the American University speech, contrasting its rather non-descript reception in the New York Times with its joyous welcome in Russia, thus showing that Kennedy’s efforts for dÈtente were more appreciated by his presumed enemy than by the domestic pundit class.

    These artful movements would be good enough. But the design of the book goes further. As mentioned above, in his first introduction of Oswald Douglass mentions the Nags Head, North Carolina military program which launched American soldiers into Russia as infiltrators. Near the end of the book (p. 365), with Oswald in jail about to be killed by Jack Ruby, Douglass returns to that military program with Oswald’s famous thwarted phone call to Raleigh, North Carolina: the spy left out in the cold attempting to contact his handlers for information as how to proceed. But not realizing that his attempted call will now guarantee his execution. Thus the author closes a previously prepared arc. It isn’t easy to do things like that. And it doesn’t really take talent. One just has to be something of a literary craftsman: bending over the table, honing and refining. But it’s the kind of detail work that pays off. It maintains the reader’s attention along the way and increases his understanding by the end.

    II

    One of the book’s most notable achievements is the 3-D picture of the Castro-Kennedy back channel of 1963. Douglass’ work on this episode is detailed, complete, and illuminating in more ways than one. From a multiplicity of books, periodicals, and interviews, the author produces not opinions or spin on what happened. And not after the fact, wishy-washy post-mortems. But actual first-hand knowledge of the negotiations by the people involved in them.

    It started in January of 1963. Attorney John Donovan had been negotiating the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners when Castro’s physician and aide Rene Vallejo broached the subject of normalizing relations with the USA (p. 56). Right here, Douglass subtly tells us something important. For Vallejo would not have broached such a subject without Castro’s permission. In approaching these talks, Dean Rusk and the State Department wanted to establish preconditions. Namely that Cuba would have to break its Sino/Soviet ties. Kennedy overruled this qualification with the following: “We don’t want to present Castro with a condition that he obviously cannot fulfill.” NSC assistant Gordon Chase explained Kennedy’s intercession, “The President himself is very interested in this one.” (pgs. 57-58)

    Because the State Department was cut in at the start, the CIA got wind of the opening. Douglass makes the case that David Phillips and the Cuban exiles reacted by having the militant group Alpha 66 begin to raid Russian ships sailing toward Cuba. Antonio Veciana later stated that Phillips had arranged the raids because, “Kennedy would have to be forced to make a decision and the only way was to put him up against the wall.” (p. 57) The initial raid was followed by another a week later.

    Phillips did indeed force Kennedy into making a decision. At the end of March, the Justice Department began to stop Cuban exiles from performing these raids off of American territory. This resulted in crackdowns and arrests in Florida and Louisiana. And it was this crackdown that provoked a bitter falling out between the leaders of the CIA created Cuban Revolutionary Council and President Kennedy. Dr. Jose Miro Cardona stated that the “struggle for Cuba was in the process of being liquidated” for “every refugee has received his last allotment this month, forcing them to relocate.” (p. 59) The CRC had been a special project of both Phillips and Howard Hunt. As the Associated Press further reported in April, “The dispute between the Cuban exile leaders and the Kennedy administration was symbolized here today by black crepe hung from the doors of exiles’ homes.” (Ibid)

    Clearly, Kennedy was changing both speeds and direction. At this time, Donovan visited Castro and raised the point of Kennedy clamping down on the exile groups. Castro replied to this with the provocative statement that his “ideal government was not to be Soviet oriented.” (p. 60) When newscaster Lisa Howard visited Castro in late April, she asked how a rapprochement between the USA and Cuba could be achieved. Castro replied that the “Steps were already being taken” and Kennedy’s limitations on the exile raids was the first one. (p. 61)

    As Douglass observes, every Castro overture for normalization up to that point had been noted by the CIA. And CIA Director John McCone urged “that no active steps be taken on the rapprochement matter at this time.” (p. 61) Deftly, the author points out that– almost simultaneous with this–Oswald inexplicably moves from Dallas to New Orleans to begin his high profile pro-Castro activities. And later that summer, CIA case officers will secretly meet with Rolando Cubela to begin another attempt on Castro’s life.

    Oblivious to this, the back channel was now picked up and furthered by Howard and William Attwood. Howard reported that Castro was even more explicit now about dealing with Kennedy over the Russian influence in Cuba. He was willing to discuss Soviet personnel and military hardware on the island and even compensation for American lands and investments. The article she wrote at this time concluded with a request that a government official be sent to negotiate these matters with Fidel. (p. 70) This is where former journalist and then diplomat Attwood stepped in. Knowing that Attwood had talked with Castro before, Kennedy instructed him to make contact with Carlos Lechuga. Lechuga was Cuba’s ambassador at the United Nations, and Kennedy felt this would be a logical next step to continue the dialogue and perhaps set some kind of agenda and parameters. Howard arranged the meeting between the two opposing diplomats. Attwood told Lechuga that Kennedy felt relations could not be changed overnight, but something “had to be done about it and a start had to be made.” (p. 71) Lechuga replied that Castro had liked Kennedy’s American University speech and he felt that Castro might OK a visit by Attwood to Cuba. This, of course, would have been a significant milestone.

    A funny and revealing thing happened next. Both sides alerted the other that they would be making boilerplate anti-Cuba and anti-America speeches. (Adlai Stevenson would be doing the anti-Cuba one at the UN.) This clearly implies that the players understood that while relations were warming in private, motions had to be gone through in public to please the pundit class.

    Howard then requested that Vallejo ask Castro if Fidel would approve a visit by Attwood in the near future. Attwood believed this message never got through to Castro. So Kennedy decided to get the message to Castro via Attwood’s friend, French journalist Jean Daniel. (p. 72) What Kennedy told Daniel is somewhat stunning. Thankfully, and I believe for the first time in such a book, Douglass quotes it at length. I will summarize it here.

    Kennedy wanted Daniel to tell Castro that he understood the horrible exploitation, colonization, and humiliation the history of Cuba represented and that the people of Cuba had endured. He even painfully understood that the USA had been part of this during the Batista regime. Startlingly, he said he approved of Castro’s declarations made in the Sierra Maestra Mountains. He added, “In the matter of the Batista regime, I am in agreement with the first Cuban revolutionaries. That is perfectly clear.” Daniel was somewhat taken aback by these sentiments. But, Kennedy continued, the dilemma now was that Cuba — because of its Soviet ties — had become part of the Cold War. And this had led to the Missile Crisis. Kennedy felt that Khrushchev understood all these ramifications now, after that terrible thirteen days.

    The president concluded with this, “…but so far as Fidel Castro is concerned, I must say I don’t know whether he realizes this, or even if he cares about it.” Kennedy smiled and then ended Daniel’s instructions with this: “You can tell me whether he does when you come back.”

    Daniel then went to Havana. On November 19th Castro walked into his hotel. Fidel was fully aware of the Attwood/Lechuga meetings. He was also aware of Kennedy’s briefing of Daniel. He had found out about this through Howard. In fact, he had told her he did not think it would be a good idea for him to meet Attwood in New York. He suggested that the meeting could be arranged by picking up Attwood in Mexico and flying him to Cuba. Castro also agreed that Che Guevara should be left out of the talks since he opposed their ultimate aim. Attwood said that Lechuga and he should meet to discuss a full agenda for a later meeting between himself and Castro. This was done per Kennedy’s instructions, and JFK wanted to brief Attwood beforehand on what the agenda should be. Things were heading into a higher gear.

    Daniel was unaware of the above when Castro walked into his room for a six-hour talk about Kennedy. (pgs. 85-89) I won’t even attempt to summarize this conversation. I will only quote Castro thusly, “Suddenly a president arrives on the scene who tries to support the interest of another class … ” Clearly elated by Daniel’s message, Castro and the journalist spent a large part of the next three days together. Castro even stated that JFK could now become the greatest president since Lincoln.

    On the third day, Daniel was having lunch with Fidel when the phone rang. The news about Kennedy being shot in Dallas had arrived. Stunned, Castro hung up the phone, sat down and then repeated over and over, “This is bad news … This is bad news … This is bad news.” (p. 89) A few moments later when the radio broadcast the report stating that Kennedy was now dead, Castro stood up and said, “Everything is changed. Everything is going to change.” (p. 90)

    To say he was prophetic is putting it mildly. Attwood would later write that what it took 11 months to build was gone in about three weeks. By December 17th it was clear that President Johnson was brushing it all aside. Retroactively, Attwood came to conclude that it had all really ended in Dealey Plaza. He finalized his thoughts about the excellent progress made up to that point with this: “There is no doubt in my mind. If there had been no assassination we probably would have moved into negotiations leading toward normalization of relations with Cuba.” (p. 177)

    Douglass has done a real service here. Gus Russo will now have an even more difficult time in defending the thesis of his nonsensical book. No one can now say, as the authors of Ultimate Sacrifice do that these negotiations were “headed nowhere.” And if they do, we will now know what to think of them.

    III

    Equally as good as the above is Douglass’ work on Kennedy and Vietnam. Especially in regards to the events leading up to the November coup against Ngo Dinh Diem and the eventual murder of both he and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu.

    Taking a helpful cue from David Kaiser’s American Tragedy, Douglass begins his discourse by analyzing Kennedy’s single-minded pursuit of a neutralization policy in neighboring Laos. (pgs. 98-101) Douglass exemplifies just how single-minded JFK was on this by excerpting a phone call the president had with his point man on the 1962 Laos negotiations, Averill Harriman: “Did you understand? I want a negotiated settlement in Laos. I don’t want to put troops in.” (p. 104)

    Unfortunately, no one felt the same way about Vietnam. Except President Kennedy. The Pentagon, the CIA, Lyndon Johnson and the Nhu brothers all looked askance at Laos as a model for Vietnam. (p. 106) Even the one general that JFK favored, Maxwell Taylor, told him to send in combat troops as early as 1961. (Ibid) After Taylor’s visit there, Ambassador Frederick Nolting wired Kennedy that “conversations over the past ten days with Vietnamese in various walks of life” showed a “virtually unanimous desire for introduction US forces in Viet Nam.” (p. 107) In other words, his own ambassador was trying to sell him on the idea that the general populace wanted the American army introduced there. Finally, both Secretary of Defense Bob McNamara and his assistant Ros Gilpatric also joined the chorus. As Taylor later recalled, no one was actually against it except President Kennedy “The president just didn’t want to be convinced … . It was really the President’s personal conviction that U.S. ground troops shouldn’t go in.” (Ibid) But in 1961, Kennedy was not yet ready to withdraw. So he threw a sop to the hawks and approved a new influx of 15, 000 advisers.

    In April of 1962, John K. Galbraith sent a memo to Kennedy proposing a negotiated settlement with the North Vietnamese. The Joint Chiefs, State Department, and Harriman vigorously opposed the idea. It was too much like Laos. (pgs 118-119) But Kennedy liked the proposal. And in the spring of 1962 he instructed McNamara to initiate a plan to withdraw American forces from South Vietnam. In May of 1962, McNamara told the commanders on the scene to begin to plan for this as the president wanted to see the blueprint as soon as it was ready.

    To put it mildly, the military dragged its heels. It took them a year to prepare the outline. In the meantime Kennedy was telling a number of friends and acquaintances that he was getting out of Vietnam. Douglass assembles quite an impressive list of witnesses to this fact: White House aide Malcolm Kilduff, journalist Larry Newman, Sen. Wayne Morse, Marine Corps Chief David Shoup, Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson, Asst. Sec. of State Roger Hilsman, Sen. Mike Mansfield, Congressman Tip O’Neill, and newspaper editor Charles Bartlett, among others. Mansfield, for one, wrote that Kennedy had become unequivocal on the subject of withdrawal by the end of 1962. (p. 124)

    In May of 1963, at the so-called SecDef meeting in Honolulu, the generals in Vietnam finally presented their withdrawal plan. McNamara said it was too slow. He wanted it revised and speeded up. In September, Kennedy and McNamara announced the order — NSAM 263 — to begin the withdrawal. It consisted of the first thousand troops to be out by the end of the year. Which, of course, would be reversed almost immediately after his death. (See Probe, Vol. 5 No. 3 p. 18.)

    The parallel story that Douglass tells — with grim skill and painful detail — is of the tragic demise of the Nhu brothers. It is the clearest and most moving synopsis of that sad tale that I can recall. It begins in May of 1963 with the famous bombing of the Hue radio station during a Buddhist holiday. A Buddhist rally was in progress there to protest another discriminatory edict passed by the Catholic Diem. The importance of this bombing, and the subsequent firing into the crowd–which left seven dead and fifteen wounded–cannot be minimized. As many commentators have noted, this localized incident mushroomed into a full-blown political crisis, spawning huge strikes and large street demonstrations. The twin explosions that shook the building were first blamed on the Viet Cong. Then on the South Vietnamese police. Which enraged the Buddhist population against Diem even further since his brother Nhu was in charge of the security forces. It was a milestone in the collapse of faith by the State Department in Diem. And it eventually led them to back the coup of the generals against the Nhu brothers.

    What Douglass does here is introduce a new analysis based on evidence developed at the scene. Because of the particular pattern of destruction on both the building and the victims, the local doctors and authorities came to the conclusion that it had to have been caused by a certain plastic explosive — which only the CIA possessed at the time. A further investigation by a Vietnamese newspaper located the American agent who admitted to the bombing. (p. 131) This puts the event in a new context. Douglass then builds on this in a most interesting and compelling manner.

    As mentioned above, the Hue atrocity caused even the liberals in the State Department to abandon Diem. So now Harriman and Hilsman united with the conservative hawks in an effort to oust him. In late August, they manipulated Kennedy into approving a cable that gave the go-ahead to a group of South Vietnamese generals to explore the possibility of a coup. (Afterwards, at least one high staffer offered to resign over misleading Kennedy about McNamara’s previous approval of the cable.) The leading conservative mounting the effort to dethrone Diem was Henry Cabot Lodge. Kennedy had planned to recall Ambassador Nolting and appoint Edmund Gullion to the position. And, as readers of the Mahoney book will know, Gullion was much more in tune with Kennedy’s thinking on Third World nationalism. He had actually tutored him on the subject in 1951 when Congressman Kennedy first visited Saigon. But Secretary of State Dean Rusk overruled this appointment, and suggested Lodge for the job. Lodge lobbied hard for the position because he wanted to use it as a springboard for a run for the presidency in 1964.

    Many, including myself, have maintained that if there was a black-hatted villain in the drama of Saigon and the Nhu brothers in 1963, it was Lodge. Douglass makes an excellent case for that thesis here. Before moving to Saigon, Lodge consulted with, of all people, Time-Life publisher Henry Luce. He went to him for advice on what his approach to Diem should be. (p. 163) Kennedy’s foe Luce advised Lodge not to negotiate with Diem. Referring him to the work of a journalist in his employ, he told Lodge to engage Diem in a “game of chicken”. What this meant was that unless Diem capitulated on every point of contention between the two governments, support would be withdrawn. The ultimate endgame would be that there would be nothing to prop up his rule. And this is what Lodge did. With disastrous results.

    From the time of the August cable, Lodge plotted with CIA officer Lucien Conein to encourage the coup and to undermine Diem by ignoring him. Even though, as Douglass makes clear, this is contrary to what JFK wanted. Kennedy grew so frustrated with Lodge that he sent his friend Torby McDonald on a secret mission to tell Diem that he must get rid of his brother Nhu. (p. 167)

    It was Lodge who got John McCone to withdraw CIA station chief John Richardson who was sympathetic to Diem. Lodge wanted McCone to replace him with Ed Lansdale. Why? Because Lansdale was more experienced in changing governments. Richardson was withdrawn but no immediate replacement was named. So in September of 1963, this essentially left Lodge and Conein in charge of the CIA’s interaction with the generals. And it was Conein who had been handling this assignment from the beginning, even before Lodge got on the scene. Around this time, stories began to emanate from Saigon by journalists Richard Starnes and Arthur Krock about the CIA being a power that was accountable to no one.

    It was Lodge, along with establishment journalist Joe Alsop — who would later help convince Johnson to create the Warren Commission — who began the stories about Diem negotiating a secret treaty with Ho Chi Minh. (p. 191) This disclosure — looked upon as capitulation– further encouraged the efforts by the military for a coup. In September, Kennedy accidentally discovered that the CIA had cut off the Commodity Import Program for South Vietnam. He was taken aback. He knew this would do two things: 1.) It would send the South Vietnamese economy into a tailspin, and 2.) It would further encourage the generals because it would convey the message the USA was abandoning Diem. (p. 195)

    On October 24th, the conspirators told Conein the coup was imminent. JFK told Lodge he wanted to be able to stop the coup at the last minute. (Conein later testified that he was getting conflicting cables from Washington: the State Department was telling him to proceed, the Kennedys were telling him to stop.) At this time Diem told Lodge he wanted Kennedy to know he was ready to carry out his wishes. (p. 202) But Lodge did not relay this crucial message to Kennedy until after the coup began.

    The rest of Douglass’ work here confirms what was only suggested in the Church Committee Report. Clearly, Conein and Lodge had sided with the generals to the ultimate degree. And, like Lenin with the Romanov family, the generals had decided that Diem and his brother had to be terminated. Lodge and Conein helped the coup plotters to facilitate the final bloody outcome. In turn, by using the Alsop-Lodge story about the Diem/Ho negotiations, the CIA egged on the murderous denouement. (p. 209) Not knowing Lodge was subverting Kennedy’s actual wishes, Diem kept calling the ambassador even after the coup began. This allowed Lodge to supply his true location to Conein after the brothers had fled the bombed presidential castle. So when the brothers walked out of the Catholic Church they had taken refuge in, they thought the truck that awaited them was escorting them to the airport. But with the help of their two American allies, the generals had arranged for the truck themselves. And the unsuspecting Nhu brothers walked into the hands of their murderers.

    Kennedy was so distraught by this outcome he decided to recall Lodge and fire him. He had arranged to do this on November 24th. Instead, President Johnson called the ambassador back with a different message: the US must not lose in Vietnam. (p. 375)

    These are the best twin summaries on Kennedy’s 1963 Vietnam and Cuba policies that I have seen between the covers of one book. After his death, the negotiations with Cuba would disappear forever. And, with even more alacrity, Lyndon Johnson now embarked on an escalation into a disastrous war in Southeast Asia whose price, even today, is incalculable. Douglass makes a convincing case that neither would have occurred if JFK had lived. I leave it to the reader to decide whether those two irrevocable alterations directly and negatively impacted the lives of tens of millions in America, Cuba, and Southeast Asia.

    IV

    Generally speaking, Douglass has done a good job of choosing some of the better evidence that has appeared of late to indicate a conspiracy. What he does with Ruth and Michael Paine, especially the former, is salutary.

    Michael Paine did not just work at Bell Helicopter. He did not just have a security clearance there. His stepfather, Arthur Young, invented the Bell helicopter. His mother, Ruth Forbes Paine Young, was descended from the Boston Brahmin Forbes family — one of the oldest in America. She was a close friend of Mary Bancroft. Mary Bancroft worked with Allen Dulles as a spy during World War II in Switzerland. This is where Dulles got many of his ideas on espionage, which he would incorporate as CIA Director under Eisenhower. Bancroft also became Dulles’ friend and lover. She herself called Ruth Forbes, “a very good friend of mine.” (p. 169) This may explain why, according to Walt Brown, the Paines were the most oft-questioned witnesses to appear before the Commission.

    Ruth Paine’s father was William Avery Hyde. Ruth described him before the Warren Commission as an insurance underwriter. (p. 170) But there was more to it than that. Just one month after the Warren Report was issued, Mr. Hyde received a three-year government contract from the Agency for International Development (AID). He became their regional adviser for all of Latin America. As was revealed in the seventies, AID was riddled with CIA operatives. To the point that some called it an extension of the Agency. Hyde’s reports were forwarded both to the State Department and the CIA. (Ibid)

    Ruth Paine’s older sister was Sylvia Hyde Hoke. Sylvia was living in Falls Church, Virginia in 1963. Ruth stayed with Sylvia in September of 1963 while traveling across country. (p. 170) Falls Church adjoins Langley, which was then the new headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency, a prized project of Allen Dulles. It was from Falls Church that Ruth Paine journeyed to New Orleans to pick up Marina Oswald, who she had been introduced to by George DeMohrenschildt. After she picked Marina up, she deposited her in her home in Irving, Texas. Thereby separating Marina from Lee at the time of the assassination.

    Some later discoveries made Ruth’s itinerary in September quite interesting. It turned out that John Hoke, Sylvia’s husband, also worked for AID. And her sister Sylvia worked directly for the CIA itself. By the time of Ruth’s visit, Sylvia had been employed by the Agency for eight years. In regards to this interestingly timed visit to her sister, Jim Garrison asked Ruth some pointed questions when she appeared before a grand jury in 1968. He first asked her if she knew her sister had a file that was classified at that time in the National Archives. Ruth replied she did not. In fact, she was not aware of any classification matter at all. When the DA asked her if she had any idea why it was being kept secret, Ruth replied that she didn’t. Then Garrison asked Ruth if she knew which government agency Sylvia worked for. The uninquiring Ruth said she did not know. (p. 171) This is the same woman who was seen at the National Archives pouring through her files in 1976, when the House Select Committee was gearing up.

    When Marina Oswald was called before the same grand jury, a citizen asked her if she still associated with Ruth Paine. Marina replied that she didn’t. When asked why not, Marina stated that it was upon the advice of the Secret Service. She then elaborated on this by explaining that they had told her it would look bad if the public found out the “connection between me and Ruth and CIA.” An assistant DA then asked, “In other words, you were left with the distinct impression that she was in some way connected with the CIA?” Marina replied simply, “Yes.” (p. 173)

    Douglass interpolates the above with the why and how of Oswald ending up on the motorcade route on 11/22/63. Robert Adams of the Texas Employment Commission testified to having called the Paine household at about the time Oswald was referred by Ruth — via a neighbor– to the Texas School Book Depository (TSBD) for a position. He called and was told Oswald was not there. He left a message for Oswald to come down and see him since he had a position available as a cargo handler at a regional cargo airline. Interestingly, this job paid about 1/3 more than the job Oswald ended up with at the TSBD. He called again the next day to inquire about Oswald and the position again. He was now told that Lee had already taken a job. Ruth was questioned about the Adams call by the Warren Commission’s Albert Jenner. At first she denied ever hearing of such a job offer. She said, “I do not recall that.” (p. 172) She then backtracked, in a tactical way. She now said that she may have heard of the offer from Lee. This, of course, would seem to contradict both the Adams testimony and common sense. If Oswald was cognizant of the better offer, why would he take the lower paying job?

    In addition to his work on the true background of the Paines, which I will return to later, Douglass’ section on the aborted plot against Kennedy in Chicago is also exceptional. The difference between what Douglass does here and what was done in Ultimate Sacrifice is the difference between confusion and comprehension. After they were informed of a plot, the police arrested Thomas Vallee on a pretext. Interestingly Dan Groth, the suspicious officer in on the arrest of Vallee, was later part of the SWAT team that assassinated Black Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark Clark in 1969. (p. 204) Groth took several lengthy leaves from Chicago to Washington for special training under the auspices of the FBI and CIA. Groth never had a regular police assignment, but always worked counter-intelligence, with an early focus on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. (Ibid)

    Thomas Vallee, the presumed patsy, is just as interesting. The Chicago version of Oswald had suffered a severe concussion during the Korean War. It was so debilitating, he was discharged and then collected disability payments. When he got home he was in a bad car crash and suffered serious head injuries, which caused him to slip into a two-month coma. (p. 205) He was later diagnosed as mentally disturbed with elements of schizophrenia and paranoia. The CIA later recruited him to train Cuban exiles to assassinate Castro. It was these connections which probably helped maneuver him to be in a warehouse overlooking President Kennedy’s parade route for a scheduled visit to the Windy City. After his arrest, and the cancellation of the early November visit, the police tried to track down his license plate. They found out they couldn’t. (p. 203) The information was “locked”. Only the FBI could “unlock” it.

    I should also note the author’s probing of the enduring mystery of Carl Mather and Collins Radio. This originates from the sighting of an Oswald double about ten minutes and eight blocks from his arrest at the Texas Theater. Around 2:00 PM, auto mechanic T. F. White noticed a Ford Falcon that first drove past, and then parked oddly in the lot of El Chico Restaurant. Which was across the street from White’s garage. He told his boss about the man in the car who seemed to be hiding. White walked over to get a closer look. About ten yards away from the car, he stopped as the man in the white T-shirt looked right at him. (p. 295) Before he left the lot, he wrote down the license plate number of the car. When he went home that night and saw Oswald’s face on TV, he told his wife that this was the man he saw in the Falcon.

    Local Dallas broadcaster and future mayor Wes Wise heard about White’s experience. When he interviewed him, White gave him the license number. Wise called the FBI. The Bureau traced the license to one Carl Mather of Garland, Texas. But the license number was on Mather’s Plymouth, not a Falcon.

    Mather did high-security communications work for Collins Radio, a major contractor for the CIA. How major and sensitive? Collins had outfitted raider ships for sabotage missions off the coast of Cuba. They also installed communication towers in Vietnam. Further, Mather had installed electronics equipment on Air Force Two. (p. 297) After Wise’s call, the Bureau wanted to talk to Mather. But Mather didn’t want to talk to the Bureau. So they talked to his wife Barbara. She surprised the G-men by saying her husband had been a close friend of J. D. Tippit. How close? When Tippit was shot, his wife phoned them. Many years later, the HSCA also wanted to talk to Mather. He didn’t want to talk to them either. They persisted. He relented upon one condition: he wanted a grant of immunity from prosecution. But he still had no explanation for how his license ended up on a car with an Oswald double in it right after Oswald’s arrest. This is all interesting, even engrossing, on its own. But the author takes it further. Citing the valuable work of John Armstrong, he then builds a case that there were two Oswalds at the Texas Theater on November 22, 1963. One was arrested and taken out the front door. The second Oswald was hiding in the balcony and later escorted out the back by the police. Before anyone gets too dismissive, there are two Dallas Police Department reports that refer to Oswald being in the balcony of the theater. (p. 293) And there are two witnesses who saw an Oswald lookalike escorted out the rear: Butch Burroughs and Bernard Haire. (I should add here, in a 4/8/08 interview I did with Armstrong for this review, he said there was a sheriff’s officer who also saw this second Oswald on the stairs between the mezzanine and the first floor.) The author postulates that the man who exited the rear is the man who ended up in the Falcon. He then wraps this up by saying that this double was ultimately flown out of Dallas on a military transport plane. This is based on the testimony of retired Air Force officer Robert Vinson. It is contained in a 52-page affidavit given to his attorney James P. Johnston of Wichita, Kansas.

    I would like to conclude this section by noting Douglass’ attention to the pain and suffering inflicted upon those who have tried to tell the truth as they knew it about the JFK case. Their only misfortune being that what they saw and knew was not conducive to the Warren Commission’s mythology.

    Most of us are aware of what happened to Richard Case Nagell. How he was railroaded and incarcerated after he was arrested in El Paso, Texas on September 20, 1963. (pgs. 152-158) But Douglass sheds light on what happened to three other important witnesses. Jim Wilcott and his wife worked for the Agency out of the Tokyo station. On the day of the assassination, Wilcott pulled a 24-hour security shift. That evening, more than one employee told him that the CIA had to have been involved in Kennedy’s killing. When Wilcott asked how they knew this, the response was that they had handled disbursements for him under a cryptonym. Also, he had been trained by the Agency as a double agent at Atsugi. (pgs. 146-147) Later, both Jim and his wife quit the Agency. They then went public with their knowledge. Jim lost his private sector job, started receiving threatening phone calls, and had the tires on his car slashed.

    Abraham Bolden was a Secret Service agent who had asked to leave the White House in 1961. He did not care for the lackadaisical practices of the White House detail. (p. 200) On October 30, 1963 Bolden was in Chicago when the local agents were briefed on what they knew about an attempt being planned on JFK’s life there. After Vallee’s arrest and the foiling of the plot, Bolden felt a foreboding about Kennedy’s upcoming trip to Dallas. When Kennedy was killed, Bolden noted the similarities between what had occurred in Dallas and what almost occurred in Chicago. In May of 1964 he was in Washington for a Secret Service training program. (p. 215) He tried to contact the Warren Commission about what he knew. The day after his call to J. Lee Rankin, he was sent back to Chicago. Upon his arrival he was arrested. The pretense was that he was trying to sell Secret Service files to a counterfeiter. Upon his arraignment he was formally charged with fraud, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy. (Ibid) Needless to say, Bolden was convicted based upon perjured testimony. (The phony witness later admitted this himself.) He was imprisoned at Springfield where he was placed in a psychiatric unit. (p. 216) He was given mind-numbing drugs. But other inmates alerted him to the nature of the drugs in advance. So he knew how to fake taking the pills. While in prison, his family endured a bombing of their home, setting fire to their garage, and a sniper shooting through their window. Mark Lane, while working for Garrison, visited him in 1967. Lane then wrote about Bolden’s knowledge of the plot in Chicago. When the prison authorities learned about this, they placed Bolden in solitary confinement. He was finally released in 1969.

    Compared to the fate of Ralph Yates, Bolden did all right. On November 20, 1963 Yates was making his rounds as a refrigerator mechanic for the Texas Butcher Supply Company in Dallas. That morning he picked up a hitchhiker on the R. L. Thornton Expressway. The man had a package with him that was wrapped in brown paper. When Yates asked him if he would prefer to place it in the back of the pickup, the passenger said no. They were curtain rods and he would rather keep them in the cab. (p. 351) The conversation rolled around to the subject of Kennedy’s upcoming visit. The man asked Yates if he thought it was possible to kill Kennedy while he was there. Yates said that yes, it was possible. The hitchhiker then asked if Yates knew the motorcade route. Yates said he did not, but it had been in the paper. The man asked if he thought it would now be changed. Yates said that he doubted it. The passenger asked to be let off at a stoplight near Elm and Houston. Yates then returned to his shop and told his colleague Dempsey Jones about the strange conversation. (p. 352)

    After the assassination, Yates noted the hitchhiker’s resemblance to Oswald. So he volunteered his experience with him to the FBI. They brought him back for a total of four interviews. It became clear they did not want to believe him. The reason being that Oswald was not supposed to be on the expressway at that time. They finally gave him a polygraph test. The agents then told Yates’ wife that, according to the machine, her husband was telling the truth. But, they concluded, the reason was that “he had convinced himself that he was telling the truth. So that’s how it came out.” (p. 354) The FBI told Yates that he needed help. So they sent him to Woodlawn Hospital, where he was admitted as a psychiatric patient. To quote the author, “From that point on, he spent the remaining eleven years of his life as a patient in and out of mental health hospitals. ” (Ibid) Such was the price for disturbing the equilibrium of the official story.

    V

    In this last section, I want to tie together four strands Douglass deals with. I also want to suggest how they fit together not just in a conspiratorial design, but a design against this particular president.

    In addition to his elucidation of the Castro/Kennedy back channel, Douglass also deals with Kennedy’s back channel to Khrushchev. Kennedy had gotten off to a rocky start with the Russians because of the Bay of Pigs debacle and the roughness of the 1961 Vienna summit. But toward the end of 1961, he and the Russian premier had established a secret correspondence. The first letter was delivered by Georgi Bolshakov to Pierre Salinger wrapped in a newspaper. (p. 23) Khrushchev seemed to be trying to tell Kennedy that although he may have seemed unreasonable in Vienna, he was dead set against going down a path to war that would lead to the death of millions. The letter was 26 pages long, and Khrushchev mentioned hot spots on the globe like Laos and Berlin. Kennedy dutifully responded. And the correspondence went on for a year. It was then supplemented by two unlikely cohorts: Pope John XXIII, and Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins. Cousins had been the intermediary between John and the premier. When Kennedy heard of this, he decided to have Cousins carry messages to Khrushchev for him also. In fact, it seems that it was actually Cousins who provided the impetus for Kennedy to make his remarkable American University speech of June 10, 1963. (p. 346)

    This speech is one of the centerpieces of the book. Douglass prints it in its entirety as an appendix. (pgs. 382-388) He also analyzes it at length in the text. (pgs. 41-45) Khrushchev was ecstatic about the speech. He called it, “the greatest speech by any American president since Roosevelt.” (p. 45) So inspired was he that he countered the speech and the renewed correspondence in multiple terms: 1.) A limited test ban treaty 2.) A non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and 3.) He encouraged Castro in his back channel with Kennedy. Douglass places much importance on the last and he uses Russian sources, including Khrushchev’s son, to bolster it. (pgs 68-69)

    There was another person at the time tiring of the Cold War and his role in it. Except he had a much lower profile than the four luminaries depicted above. His name was Lee Harvey Oswald. As Marina once said, Oswald “liked and approved of the President and he believed that for the United States in 1963, John F. Kennedy was the best president the country could hope to have.” (p. 331) At the New Orleans Public Library, he checked out William Manchester’s profile of JFK, Portrait of a President, Kennedy’s own Profiles in Courage, and a book called The White Nile. The last he read only because Manchester noted that Kennedy had read it recently. (Ibid) When Kennedy spoke on the radio about the test ban treaty, Lee listened intently and told Marina that he was making an appeal for disarmament. Curiously, he also informed his wife that Kennedy would actually like to pursue a more gentle policy with Cuba. But unfortunately he was not free to do so at the time. Doesn’t sound like the Krazy Kid planning on murdering JFK does it?

    The night after Kennedy’s test ban speech, Oswald gave a speech of his own at Spring Hill College in Mobile, Alabama. His cousin, Eugene Murret was a seminarian there and he invited him to talk about his experiences in the Russian system. Douglass uses Oswald’s notes on the speech to inform us what he was thinking at the time. And, for the man depicted by the Warren Commission, its extraordinary. Away from New Orleans, away from his handlers, away from scripted situations arranged by others, Oswald said some surprising things. He first chided his audience. Sounding like JFK, the man he admired, he warned them that military coups are not a far away thing in some banana republic in South America. It could happen here, in the USA, their own country. (Ibid) Which organization could do such a thing? He said it could not come from the army, because of its many conscripts, its large and cumbersome structure, its huge network of bases. Amazingly, he specifically mentioned Kennedy relieving Edwin Walker of his command as evidence it would not come from there. Walker, the man he derisively dismisses here, is the man he was already supposed to have tried to shoot!

    He then said that from his experience in both Russia and America, “Capitalism doesn’t work, communism doesn’t work. In the middle is socialism and that doesn’t work either.” (p. 473) He concluded that by returning to the USA, he was choosing the lesser of two evils. This does not remotely suggest the ideological zealot debating Ed Butler about the merits of Marxism, who was passing out flyers begging for fair treatment for Cuba, who got into street fights with anti-Castro Cubans who perceived him as a defender of Fidel. Here, in a secluded place, many miles away from Clay Shaw, David Ferrie, and Guy Banister, he sounds like a spy ready to come in from the cold. Ready to retire to a desk job under the president he admired.

    But his handlers weren’t ready to retire him just yet. As Ruth Paine left her stay in Falls Church to head south to pick up Marina, Oswald allegedly embarked on what Philip Melanson called his Magical Mystery Tour to Mexico. The object of this final charade of course was to depict Oswald as trying to obtain visas for Cuba and the Soviet Union. As Douglass describes it, this utterly intriguing journey is multi-layered. What Oswald seems to think he is doing is the final act of what he did in New Orleans: discrediting the FPCC. Which had been an operation the CIA had that was ongoing. As John Newman has pointed out, David Phillips and James McCord were in on it. But there was also something else going on here. After the fact, the CIA seems to have tried to create a questionable trail, one that would suggest Oswald was trying to get into contact with Valery Kostikov. Kostikov worked at the Soviet consulate but was also a KGB agent who the FBI had discovered was involved in assassination plots. (p. 76) But as the author demonstrates here, the record of this trip is so fraught with inconsistencies, improbabilities, conflicting testimony and outright deception that it “inadvertently revealed more about the CIA” than about Oswald. (p. 75)

    The author notes the witnesses at the Cuban embassy who could not identify the man they saw as Oswald. Using the fine work of Newman, Douglass shows that at least some of the calls attributed to Oswald are dubious. (p. 76) He also adroitly notes that, prior to the assassination, the CIA held this alleged Kostikov/Oswald association close to its vest. If they had not, then it is highly probable that Oswald would not have been on the president’s motorcade route on 11/22. Which, shortly after his return, was insured by the Paines not telling Oswald about the other job offer. Douglass astutely relates the final way his presence there was ultimately clinched. A man at the Bureau, Marvin Gheesling, deactivated Oswald’s FLASH warning on 10/9/63. This meant that Oswald was not placed on the Security Index in Dallas. Again, if he would have been on this list, it is very likely the Secret Service would have had him under surveillance prior to November 22nd. Hoover was furious when he found out what Gheesling had done. He had him censured and placed on probation. On the documents censuring him he wrote, “Yes, send this guy to Siberia!” (p. 178) Later, on the marginalia of another document, he wrote that the Bureau should not trust the CIA again because of the phony story the Agency had given them about Oswald in Mexico City. (Ibid)

    As others have noted, the combination of Oswald moving around so much plus the late-breaking, dubious, but explosive details of the Mexico City trip, all caused the system to overload in the wake of the JFK assassination. On November 23rd, after talking to Hoover by phone and John McCone in person, Johnson was quite clear about his fear of nuclear war. He told his friend Richard Russell that the question of Kennedy’s murder had to be removed from the Mexico City arena. Why? Because “they’re testifying that Khrushchev and Castro did this and did that and kicking us into a war that can kill forty million Americans in an hour.” (p. 231) The manufactured trail in Mexico helped freeze any real attempt to search for the actual facts of this case. It was too dangerous. And there was a second built-in element that curtailed any real investigation. The fact that the FBI was short changed on information about Oswald — by the files not getting from New Orleans to Dallas quickly enough, and by the CIA withholding crucial information about Oswald in Mexico City — this helped pitch the Bureau into a CYA mode. For clearly, their surveillance of Oswald had been faulty. His activities in New Orleans, his alleged attempts to contact Kostikov in Mexico, his threatening message left at the Dallas FBI office, all of these should have put him on the Security Index.

    But as Donald Gibson has noted, the safety valve to all this soon emerged. First, Jock Whitney’s New York Herald Tribune put out the cover story about a disturbed Oswald being a “crazed individual” with “homicidal fantasies”. (Probe, Vol. 7 No. 1 p. 19) This, of course, began to detract from the Oswald as the Marxist-motivated, Kostikov-employed assassin. It created a new profile for Oswald. He was now the lonely and disturbed sociopath. As Gibson further showed, a day after this, the lobbying effort of Eugene Rostow, Dean Acheson, and Joe Alsop would convince Johnson to create the Warren Commission. (Probe, Vol. 3 No. 4 p. 8) And at one of its very early meetings, Allen Dulles passed out a book promoting this particular view of American assassinations.

    If all Douglass had written about the technique of the cover-up was the above, he would have done a salutary and exceptional job. But he has gone further. And this makes his writing on the subject both new and even more valuable. Carol Hewett once wrote a quite interesting article (Probe, Vol. 4 No. 3) about how Ruth Paine “discovered” Oswald’s alleged letter to the Russian embassy in Washington. The date of this letter is November 9th. In the letter Oswald writes about “recent events” in Mexico with a man he calls Comrade Kostin. (This has usually been taken to mean Kostikov, although Hewett pointed out that there actually was a Soviet agent named Kostin.) Oswald went on to write, “I had not planned to contact the Soviet embassy in Mexico so they were unprepared, had I been able to reach the Soviet embassy in Havana as planned, the embassy there would have had time to complete our business.” (p. 228, Douglass’ italics.) The author comments, “here the letter deepens the Soviet involvement in the plot and extends the complicity to Cuba.” In other words, “the business” would have been part of a co-conspiracy between the two communist countries. Further, Oswald betrayed knowledge in the letter that Eusebio Azcue, an employee at the Cuban consulate, had been replaced. But this did not happen until November 18 –the day the letter arrived at the Soviet embassy. How Oswald knew this would happen in advance has never been adequately explained.

    In his call to Johnson on November 23rd, Hoover mentioned the letter. But he played down its more explosive and conspiratorial elements. (p. 229) But it was not until 1999, when Boris Yeltsin turned over long-secret documents to President Clinton, that we got the contemporaneous Soviet reaction to the arrival of this letter. The Soviet diplomats considered it a clear provocation against them. (p. 230) They also considered it a deception, since they had no such ties to Oswald. They also noted it was typed yet other letters that he wrote to them were handwritten. They thus concluded it was a forgery. Or perhaps someone had dictated it to him–perhaps as a completion of the FPCC counter-intelligence operation. But most significantly, the Soviets felt the letter was “concocted by those … involved in the President’s assassination.” (p. 230) To disown it, they turned it over to the State Department on November 26th.

    But, by then, the FBI already had two copies of the letter. One from a mail intercept program and one via Ruth Paine. Ruth Paine gave FBI agent Jim Hosty her handwritten copy of the letter on November 23rd. As Hewett pointed out, how and why she copied this letter was a matter of a long colloquy spread over three days between her and the Warren Commission. Altogether, she gave three different reasons as to why she copied the letter. She finally decided on this: since Oswald left it on her secretary desk, he must have wanted her to read it! The shifting and unconvincing excuses all seem a way to disguise and obfuscate one simple but revealing fact: she was spying on Oswald. And this spying went as far as copying his private correspondence without his permission. (For who she is spying and why is, of course, never broached.) Further, her copy of the letter differs in some interesting ways from the typewritten one. As the author notes, it de-emphasizes Oswald’s contacts with the communist embassies. Instead, it emphasizes his differences with the FBI. It also replaces the pregnant phrase “time to complete our business” with phrases like “time to assist me” referring to a travel process. (p. 233) Amazingly, it was this Ruth Paine version of the letter — not the one Oswald allegedly typed and mailed — that the Warren Commission used in its analysis of what the correspondence meant. The Commission then returned Oswald’s rough draft, the one Ruth copied, not to Marina, but to Ruth. According to Carol Hewett, Ruth’s handwritten copy is nowhere to be found today. (Hewett interview, 4/8/08)

    There are many fascinating aspects to Ruth Paine’s role with this letter. So many that one could write a lengthy essay about it. One thing I wish to point out here. The FBI could not make their version of the letter public since it would have revealed their intercept program. Clearly, the State Department did not want to reveal their version. Because by November 26th, Johnson had decided to bury the allegations about Oswald in Mexico City to avoid the threat of conflagration. But by Ruth Paine’s spying on Oswald, it was possible to circulate a softer version of the letter, thus further labeling him a communist who had problems with American authority. Douglass has finally brought this episode, and Ruth Paine’s role in it, into bold relief.

    I do have some reservations about the book. Let me note them briefly. Douglass, like several others before him, couldn’t resist mentioning and misinterpreting David Morales’ remarks as quoted by Gaeton Fonzi in The Last Investigation. (p. 57) Second, he places more faith in some assassination witnesses than I do, e.g. Ed Hoffmann. And I disagree with his characterization of JFK as a ‘cold warrior” who “turned” during the Missile Crisis. If Kennedy was actually a cold warrior when he entered office, he would have sent in the Navy and Marines to complete the job at the Bay of Pigs. Which is what a real cold warrior, Richard Nixon, told him to do. He also would have sent combat troops into Vietnam in 1961, when all of his advisers said it was necessary.

    But overall, and overwhelmingly, this is a rich, rewarding, and reverberating book. One that does two things that very few volumes in the field do: it both illuminates and empowers the reader. I strongly recommend purchasing it. It is the best book in the field since Breach of Trust.

  • Lamar Waldron, with Thom Hartmann, Legacy of Secrecy – Update


    My review of Legacy of Secrecy was cross-posted at various sites on the web. And Ed Sherry did a mass mailing of it to his large JFK list. This caused some interesting feedback.

    First off, there was a primary witness involved who can shed some light on how President Kennedy felt about the contingency plans. Some of which, like OPLAN 312, I specifically mentioned in my review. Sherry was temporarily based at Homestead AFB in Florida in November of 1962. He was an Army Intelligence officer who monitored the plans and kept track of all circulating copies from dawn to dusk. While in Florida on TDY from Virginia, he was temporary custodian of all 48 copies of the Contingency Plan for two weeks. He knew the subject well as he had typed in many of the revisions and addendums to the original plan. When Kennedy visited the base in late November of 1962, it was Sherry who typed the briefing for him on the plan. About ten days after Kennedy left Florida, Sherry recalls getting a classified code word to cancel the plans and return home. Kennedy was going to keep his word to the Russians about his no invasion pledge of Cuba. Sherry recalls that there were a lot of unhappy officers when JFK canceled the plans. Recall, these were contingency plans JFK was cancelling.

    Second, another reader sent Sherry an e-mail concerning my review. Recall, according to Waldron and Hartmann, the coup was set for December 1, 1963. According to a CIA cable, the plotter in chief, Juan Almeida, was on a flight to Algeria on November 28th. He was the head of a 162 man Cuban delegation that had been arranged well in advance. This is incredible. What are we to believe in light of it? Almeida was going to run the coup and its resulting chaos from Africa? Further, this reader said the National Security Agency was monitoring traffic in Cuba closely at the time. They detected nothing suspicious going on there.

    But it’s even worse than that. The reader (who wishes to remain anonymous) told Waldron about this a long time ago. And in fact, when I learned this, it did ring a bell with me. And sure enough, it is in Legacy of Secrecy. On page 280, Waldron and Hartmann mention the flight to Algeria. Ignoring the fact that the trip had been prearranged, they now try to say that Almeida left because Castro suspected something was going on. But what is the evidence he suspected Almeida? The authors list none. So why did Almeida leave if the coup was to take place within 72 hours, and he was to be running it from the island? If you can believe it, and you probably can, the authors never answer that question. They never even pose it. Since the evidence indicates that Almeida left because there was no coup scheduled, and he was not a part of it. In their nearly fanatical clinging to a discredited theory, Hartmann and Waldron remind us of the likes of David Belin, David Slawson and, even worse, John McAdams.

    But perhaps even more shameful is the way their promoters cling to it also. In my review of Legacy of Secrecy, I mentioned one of them: Mark Crispin Miller. I also could have mentioned another, Gore Vidal. I know through two sources that Miller read my review of Ultimate Sacrifice. This did not stop him from promoting that book on his blog. And he later also praised Legacy of Secrecy. And in terms that are rather unrestrained. (In fact, they remind me of the bought and paid for movie blurbs that adorn the ads for so many lousy films these days.) Take this for example: “Legacy of Secrecy is the astounding sequel to their Ultimate Sacrifice, which came out in 2005; and this new volume is as thorough and meticulous in its research as it ground-breaking predecessor.” Further on, Miller writes, “…the authors demonstrate that the long suppression of the facts about Jack Kennedy ‘s murder set the stage for the killings, five years later, of both Martin Luther King Jr., and Bobby Kennedy.”

    All of this breathless hyperbole makes me ask a sensible question: Did Miller read the books? As I discussed in my review of the latter book, the authors demonstrate no linkage between C-Day and the murders of King and RFK. How the heck could there be? The book says Ray killed King, and the weight of the evidence dictates that Sirhan killed Robert Kennedy. Was Ray in on C-Day? Was Sirhan?

    And the last word I would use to describe the work of Hartmann and Waldron is “meticulous”. Even worse is ” ground-breaking”. What ground did they break? As I mentioned in my review of Legacy of Secrecy, Gus Russo wrote about the contingency plans years before Waldron and Hartmann did. And as I and others have proven nine ways to Sunday, the authors grievously mischaracterize them. And by doing so, they create a false theory, actually a misleading mythology. As for being meticulous, how can Miller write that with a straight face? What kind of meticulous writers deliberately disguise the source for Edwin Black’s wonderful work on the Chicago Plot? And once that is done, the same writers twist that work into something it is not. What kind of authors don’t even look up the proper date of Jim Garrison’s flight to New York with Russell Long? And then attribute something to those two men that could not have happened if they got the date right? Is hiding the name of Bernardo DeTorres from the reader “meticulous”? Is then altering his background from a dyed-in-the-wool CIA officer to a protÈgÈ of Trafficante meticulous? Yes, in one way it is: its meticulously misleading.

    Miller’s mindless praise for these two awful books is so skewed that it made me wonder if he, like Waldron and Hartmann, had an agenda. It turns out he does. And like Vidal, it is to denigrate Oliver Stone’s film JFK. Consider the following: “…the authors show that that long cover-up was driven not by an enormous dark alliance of complicit US agencies and corporations … but by a lot of entities compelled by motives infinitely more prosaic. (Bobby also helped maintain the cover-up.)” Further on, Miller continues that although there was a conspiracy and the Warren Commission was a crock, “all such secrecy was not proof of complicity, as Oliver Stone would have us all believe … Rather, that cover-up but [sic] motivated by a raft of other, largely more innocuous … concerns …”

    Of course, this is exactly what I wrote that the aim of Ultimate Sacrifice was. After my long analysis of how these “meticulous” researchers had altered the evidence, I concluded that they did this to detract from the real evidentiary trail and confabulate out of whole cloth an already discredited one: Robert Blakey’s Mafia did it theory. But they tried to disguise this around their phony C-Day scenario. Which has now collapsed.

    But none of this matters to Miller. Why?

    Because he has enlisted in the Noam Chomsky/Alex Cockburn ranks. Like them, he styles himself a leader of the Left. And he explains how that fits into his agenda about these two volumes: “These books are absolute must-reads because they liberate us from the dangerous assumption … that anyone who dares to speak up for the good will be cut down by violence, at the hands of an almighty, inescapable cabal. That fatalistic view is one that we cannot afford to hold-and one that is, in fact, unfounded, as these two books so powerfully demonstrate.”

    The last thing I would say is that these two books “powerfully demonstrate” their thesis. I have demonstrated that in detail. When the Cuban coup leader is in Africa, you have some problems. When neither the Secretary of Defense, or State, or National Security Adviser or Director of Plans for the CIA knows about your upcoming invasion, you have more problems. When your chief “confessor” is suffering from Alzheimer’s while a jailhouse informant is coaxing him, well, that’s the ball game.

    But, like Chomsky and Cockburn, this is beside the point for Miller. Facts don’t matter. And if facts don’t matter, then truth doesn’t matter either. Why? Because he knows what is good for the progressive public. And if they need to be served up pabulum, so be it.

    I disagree with Miller. But I agree with Bob Tanenbaum, the first Chief Counsel of the JFK investigation for the House Select Committee on Assassinations. And he knows a heck of a lot more about the JFK case than Miller or Vidal do. During a speech in Chicago in 1993, he outlined how the CIA, and especially David Phillips, obstructed his investigation into Oswald’s activities in Mexico City. And when he wanted to confront Phillips with perjury charges the committee backed down. He ended his speech by posing this question: “Does anybody really believe that certain people in the executive intelligence agencies are more equipped to handle the truth than the American people? If so, then we will redefine the nature of our democracy. And that’s something I’m not prepared to do.”

    That’s the real question about all this. The question that Waldron and Hartmann wish to disguise. The question that the likes of Miller and Robert Stone don’t think the American public can handle. So in this regard, and with an almost cosmic irony, Stone and Miller resemble the former heads of the major networks, i.e. Bill Paley and David Sarnoff. Except the pabulum that Waldron and Hartmann give the public is not the old pig in a poke of the Warren Commission. But Blakey’s Mob did it pig. A pig with lipstick, eye shadow, and mascara.

    But only someone either too ignorant or too willing to be gulled would have been taken in by the makeover.

  • Lamar Waldron, Ultimate Sacrifice


    The first time I heard Lamar Waldron’s name was through the auspices of Gus Russo. It was at the famous (or infamous) 1993 ASK Conference in Dallas. Now, after reading Waldron’s book Ultimate Sacrifice (co-written with Thom Hartmann), I think it is relevant and enlightening to describe some of the things that happened back in 1993. Somehow, some way, Russo had been given control over a panel and had also invited some rather odd guests to attend, e.g. Ed Butler. As described elsewhere (see my article on Russo in Probe Vol. 6 No. 2 p. 12) it was at this conference that Russo basically reversed course from his earlier days and went over to the “Krazy Kid Oswald” camp. He had completed work on his shockingly one-sided PBS special and at this conference he and Mark Zaid began to forcefully divorce themselves from any kind of conspiracy angle. For example: The late Larry Harris had gotten several witnesses to arrange themselves in Dealey Plaza. Zaid went there and passed out leaflets attempting to discredit them. Zaid also helmed a panel on Oswald and he proclaimed that Oswald had no ties to the intelligence community. Zaid also was screaming at people who used the Zapruder film to advocate conspiracy: “You know more than Dr. Luis Alvarez, huh!” The conference culminated in a shouting match between Dr. Cyril Wecht and Russo over his loaded PBS special.

    It was during this singular conference that I first heard Lamar Waldron speak. Apparently, Waldron was another one of Russo’s invitees. On the panel he helmed, Russo had given Waldron a solid hour to expound on his “Project Freedom” thesis. This was an extraordinary amount of time: 20-25 minutes had been the outer limits before Waldron appeared. The talk Waldron gave has become one of the main concepts of the book under discussion. In retrospect, considering where Russo had been and was headed, I now fully understand why he was promoting Waldron. I recall listening to Waldron for about 10 minutes and being puzzled as to how the unconvincing hodge-podge he had assembled fit together. I walked out. When I returned he had fielded a question by mentioning that Robert Kennedy controlled JFK’s autopsy at Bethesda. Even at that time this idea was dubious simply because of, among other things, Pierre Finck’s testimony at the Clay Shaw trial. In light of that evidence I remember thinking: Lamar Waldron has an agenda the size of a football stadium.

    After reading Ultimate Sacrifice I think I was wrong. Lamar Waldron has an agenda the size of the Grand Canyon. I can also see why Waldron needed an hour. The authors are nothing if not long winded. They make the likes of Joan Mellen, Dick Russell (in his revised version), and Noel Twyman look like models of brevity. The book’s text comes in at 786 pages. With photos, exhibits, and footnotes the hardcover edition is 875 pages. It was published by Carroll & Graf, a house that is notorious for skimping on editing, fact, and source checking (see the works of Harrison Livingstone.) As we shall see, this book needed serious help in all those areas. In no way does it justify its length. Most of the book is a tedious rehash of the work of dubious authors, so it could have easily been half as long. And what makes that aspect worse is, when all is said and done, they have not proven any of the central tenets of the volume. Even though, as we shall see, they have brazenly cherry-picked the evidence they present.

    The book is divided into three parts. Part One deals with the so-called discovery of C-Day. That is, a plan for a coup in Cuba to be carried out by the Pentagon and the CIA. This would be coordinated with the murder of Castro by a secret collaborator on the island. The murder would be blamed on the Russians, this would create a crisis on the island and that would precipitate an invasion by a large flotilla of Cuban exiles led by Manuel Artime, Tony Varona, Eloy Menoyo, Manolo Ray and a group of Fort Benning trained Cuban militia. A provisional government would then be erected. This first part of the book also discusses the CIA-Mafia plots against Castro, two previous assassination attempts in Chicago and Tampa and profiles of major players involved in C-Day. (Part of the book’s turgidness comes from repetition. There was no need to discuss the two previous plots against JFK here since they are detailed much later.)

    Part Two deals further with the CIA-Mafia plots, and what they see as the actual perceived build-up to the assassination by the Mob. Part Three is essentially a chronicle of November 1963. It includes longer versions of the Chicago and Tampa attempts, the actual assassination, and how that impacted C-Day, and a final chapter entitled The Legacy of Secrecy, in which the authors trace how the assassination enabled a cover-up of C-Day and how this had an effect on events afterwards.

    If one examines the text, the first of many curious aspects becomes evident. The longest part of the volume is the middle section, which is not actually about C-Day. It is really about the Mob’s motivation, planning, pretexts, and precedents for killing JFK. And this is really the subject of the last section also. So by my rough estimate, about 2/3 of the book is not about what the author’s trumpet as their great discovery. The larger part of the book is actually a kind of concentration and aggrandizement of all the Mob-did-it books rolled into one. As we shall see, this book is actually a new (and fatuous) spin on an old and discredited idea, namely Robert Blakey’s Mob-did-it theory. The reader can see this just by browsing through the footnotes, which I did for this review. The familiar faces are all there: John Davis, Dan Moldea, Blakey, the HSCA volumes, David Scheim, even, startling enough, Frank Ragano. They are all quoted abundantly and, as we shall see, indiscriminately. I can literally say that this book would not exist in its present (bloated) form without that gallery of authors.

    But before dealing with that aspect of the book, let’s deal with Part One, where Waldron and Hartmann present the concept of C-Day to us. The plan I summarized above was scheduled for December 1, 1963, nine days after JFK was killed. The sources for this is a series of CIA documents codenamed AM/WORLD, interviews with former Kennedy Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and a man named Harry Williams who was a friend of Bobby Kennedy’s and was allegedly coordinating this plan with the exiles.

    In the hardcover edition of the book, they do not name the coup leader, but they very strongly hint that it was Che Guevara. They do everything except underline his name in this regard. Whole chapters are written about him. Now, considering that, I had a hard time digesting the logic of AM/WORLD. As anyone would who has read the history of Castro’s revolution. We are to believe that Che Guevara, the man who came to symbolize worldwide Marxist rebellion, would betray that lifetime struggle, murder his partner in revolution, ally himself with the capitalist colossus of the north, and blame the murder of his friend on his Russian communist allies. Further, he would then cooperate in a provisional government with the likes of CIA stooges like Artime and Varona. Had Che Guevara undergone a rapid and extreme conversion without anyone noticing? Did the bearded revolutionary icon really believe that by killing Castro and throwing in his lot with Artime, Varona and the CIA that he would be purifying the communist zeal of 1959 which Castro had somehow subdued?

    To put this strange scenario on the page, the authors leave out some facts that made Che Guevara the living legend he was. And also the facts of his death, when he was hunted down and killed in Bolivia with the help of the CIA. (Poor devil, he actually thought the guys who killed him were his allies.) Let’s fill in some of those expurgated pages. After Castro’s revolution took hold, he began rounding up all the higher ups left over from the Batista government. He then arranged a series of show trials before he imprisoned and/or executed them. The number put before the firing squad is estimated at about four hundred and up. The man in charge of the phony trials and summary executions was Che Guevara. So the idea that he would turn around and be palsy-walsy with Artime and Varona, who were much closer to Batista than to him, is kind of weird. In 1959 he may have had them shot or imprisoned. Second, one of the reasons Che left Cuba is that he wanted to spread the Marxist revolt abroad, whereas Castro was trying to solidify it at home. Yet the authors want us to believe that Guevara would put an end to this foothold right in the place he struggled to establish it. Third, during the Missile Crisis, it was feared that the US would launch a huge armada to invade the island. The Russians had given the Cubans not just ballistic missiles, but tactical nukes. Reportedly these were under the control of the Cubans. It was Che Guevara who urged Castro to use them to vaporize any invasion crossing the Caribbean. If you buy this book, a year later he was inviting them with open arms to take over the island he was willing to partially nuke in order to save. Maybe Che Guevara had a nervous breakdown in the interim? Or did he really believe that Artime, Varona and the CIA would allow him, Ray and Menoyo to construct a leftist paradise after the invasion?

    Evidently, others, like David Talbot in Salon, had some trouble with this aspect of the book. So in the trade paper version, the authors changed their tune. The new identity of the coup leader is Juan Almeida. Now Almeida does not really fit the profile the authors describe in the hardcover version. That is, a person of such enormous stature and appeal that he could seamlessly replace Castro, convincingly blame the murder on the Russians, and then set up this Provisional Government with a group of people who had invaded their country two years ago and then almost nuked it 13 months before. Further, he is still alive and in the titular position of Revolution Commander. There is a recent photo of him with Raul Castro at a session of the National Assembly in Havana. It was after the trade paper version was released. I wonder what the conversation was like between the two when Raul learned of Juan’s plan to murder his brother, and probably him, and turn the country over to the CIA, the Pentagon, and Artime.

    What makes this switch even more bracing is the person who rode to the rescue for Waldron and Hartmann. It was none other than Liz Smith. The same Liz Smith who is always good for a blurb on the books of John Davis. Who is always there for a “Kennedys and the murder of Monroe” spiel (which, predictably, figures in this volume on pp. 402-407). And who has always been an avid promoter of Judith Exner. In fact she penned the last installment before Exner passed away. (Of course, Exner appears here more than once.) In her column in the New York Post dated 9/22/06 she says she found out about the coup leader’s actual identity through some new CIA documents. Hmmm. (She is not known as an ace archival researcher.)

    Another interesting aspect of this coup in Cuba idea is who knew about it and who did not. According to Talbot, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara did not know. Even though the authors insist that it was more a Pentagon operation than a CIA one. (Even more puzzling: they state on p,. 42 that the operation could rise to the level of a full-scale invasion by US forces. When were they going to tell McNamara, the day before?) And although the authors use Rusk to bolster their claim, he says he did not know about it at the time, but learned about it later. National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy did not know about it either since he told author David Corn that in 1963, the operations against Cuba were winding down to a dribble. So the three highest Cabinet level officers, who should have known about such an operation, somehow were left in the dark.

    But the authors know who was in the light. They were:

    • Jack Ruby 
    • Guy Banister
    • David Ferrie
    • David Morales
    • Howard Hunt
    • John Martino
    • Richard Nixon
    • Carlos Prio
    • Santo Trafficante
    • Jimmy Hoffa
    • Carlos Marcello
    • Sam Giancana
    • Johnny Roselli
    • David Phillips
    • Rolando Masferer
    • Bernard Barker
    • James McCord
    • Michael Mertz
    • Charlie Nicoletti
    • Gilberto Lopez
    • Richard Cain
    • Frank Sturgis
    • George Nonte

    And I saved the best for last: Lee Harvey Oswald. So the Kennedys were so careless that the word about this secret operation leaked out to people like Ruby and Ferrie; but yet they were paradoxically so careful that they managed to keep it from McNamara. Now some people would think this odd. The authors anticipate this by saying that some people in the administration knew and some did not. They even go to the lengths of depicting meetings at which some know about it and some do not. (p. 51) Even when it’s actually under discussion. Yet, to use a figurative example, McNamara never said to Richard Helms, “Dick, did you say we were sponsoring a coup in Cuba next month?” To which Helms must have replied, “Oh no Bob, the Cubana Coupe is a new car model I’m buying.”

    The aspect of who knew and who did not is so tenuous, so questionable, so minutely balanced on the head of a pin that serious questions arise about those who the authors say were witting. As stated above, Helms was supposed to be knowledgeable about C-Day. Yet there is a revelatory anecdote about this issue in his book, A Look Over My Shoulder (pgs 226-227). Helms got word of a large arms cache that had landed in Venezuela from Cuba. It was allegedly shipped to help some communist guerillas there. In other words, Castro was exporting revolution into South America. Something the Kennedys did not want him to do. Helms was so alarmed by this that he personally went over to see Robert Kennedy to plead his case for emergency action. After all it was three tons of armaments. RFK passed on it and told him to go see the president. He did and he even took over one of the rifles supposedly found, presumably to convince JFK of the urgency of the situation. Here was the casus belli. Yet JFK was non-plussed. But Helms did salvage something for his efforts. He asked for and got a photo of Kennedy.

    What I find so interesting about this episode is the date Helms places it on: November 19, 1963. Did Helms forget C-Day was coming up in 12 days? Did he want to move it up because he knew the Mafia was going to kill JFK? Was it all a silly charade? Or maybe Helms just wanted the picture. But that’s not all. In Joseph B. Smith’s book Portrait of A Cold Warrior (p. 383), he refers to the seizure of this cache of arms. He apparently got some reports on it, and skillful and veteran analyst he was, he quickly deduced it was planted. So if we take Ultimate Sacrifice seriously, Helms went to the trouble of creating a phony provocation when he knew that C-Day was less than two weeks off.

    But the capper is this: both the Helms and Smith books appear in the footnotes to Ultimate Sacrifice.

    David Talbot raised an interesting point about the central thesis. If the Kennedys were sponsoring a coup in Cuba for December 1st, why would the Mafia, and some Cubans, conspire to assassinate him nine days before? It’s especially odd since one would think that the exile Cubans who Waldron and Hartmann say knew about it, like say Masferer and Sturgis, would likely want it to succeed. After all, they had been working for this for years. Interestingly, the authors don’t even mention some of the Cubans who are highly suspect in the JFK case, like say Bernardo DeTorres and Sergio Arcacha Smith. Now, if Smith was involved in JFK’s murder, it is really odd. He was part of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) as was Varona, who the authors maintain was one of the major players in the operation. Yet Varona apparently never told his colleague Smith. Or maybe there was nothing to tell. For as Bill Davy noted in Probe Magazine (Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 5), FBI informants within the CRC, including leader Jose Miro Cardona, were disgusted with Kennedy in 1963 over his Cuba policy. After a high level meeting in Washington, Cardona came away with the feeling that “the United States policy is now one of peaceful co-existence with Communist Cuba.” More to the point, “the United States has no plan to free Cuba of Communism.” The Justice Department report continued that the CRC’s feeling about the US was “very bad, and they feel they had been abandoned in their fight.” Is this perhaps why people like Smith and DeTorres became suspect in the JFK case and why Smith tried to set up the seemingly pro-Castro Oswald, in order to provoke an attack against Cuba? You won’t read a sentence about that in Ultimate Sacrifice.

    Although the authors mention the Lisa Howard/William Attwood back channel to Castro in the attempt for dÈtente with Cuba, they downplay it (p. 113), and later they actually dismiss it as meaningless. They also do not mention Kennedy’s 1963 letter to Khruschev, which Davy quotes: “I have neither the intention nor the desire to invade Cuba. I consider that it is for the Cuban people themselves to choose their destiny.” (Davy, op. cit.) And of course, Waldron and Hartmann ignore the important Peter Kornbluh article in Cigar Aficionado (summarized in Probe, Vol. 7 No. 1 pp. 8-9). Probably because it paints a quite different picture of the quest for dÈtente. When Castro learned of Kennedy’s death, he told JFK’s envoy in the process, “This is an end to your mission of peace. Everything is changed.” And as Kornbluh notes, Castro was right. LBJ pursued it no further.

    This rigorous, systematic refusal to acknowledge or confront contrary evidence is nowhere more demonstrable than in the treatment of the Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis. One would think that in a book concentrating on Cuban-American relations from 1960-63, these two events would get special treatment. One would be dead wrong. Combined they get all of five pages. Even though there have been reams of documents declassified on both events by the Assassinations Records Review Board, they use none of it. Incredibly, they ignore both the CIA Inspector General Report by Lyman Kirkpatrick, and the White House sponsored Taylor Report on the Bay of Pigs. Concerning the Missile Crisis, they fail to quote from the landmark book The Kennedy Tapes, which is the closest thing we have to a verbatim account of the crisis. This was unfortunate for me since I wanted to get their take on why JFK would not OK an invasion during those two events when everyone in the situation room was demanding it, yet he would OK one in 1963 when tensions had decreased and fewer people were egging him on. If you essentially skimp the two incidents, you can dodge the question.

    II

    The second part of the book is about the plotting of the Mafia Dons to assassinate President Kennedy. It also discusses the idea that the Mob discovered the C-Day plan, and then used this to somehow cover up their murder plot. This is the new twist to another Mob based scenario.

    This part of the book is heavily — and I mean heavily — reliant on the authors of three decades ago whose books were spawned by the work of the House Select Committee’s unremitting focus on the Mob. Waldron and Hartmann line them all up and use them profusely and without care: Dan Moldea, John Davis, Robert Blakey and Dick Billings, David Scheim. Even Frank Ragano and Aaron Kohn appear. As we shall see, some of the statements made in this section of the book are rather startling.

    But even I was surprised at what the authors pulled in Chapter 33. Like Joan Mellen, they want to rewrite the history of the CIA-Mafia plots. To do so they question the best source we have on that subject, namely the 1967 Inspector General Report done for Richard Helms at the request of President Johnson. They say it is incomplete and that it leaves out certain aspects. Maybe this is so, and maybe it is not. For instance, there are rumors that the writers of the report actually did interview John Roselli. Did Waldron and Hartmann actually stumble upon this tape, or transcript or at least the interviewer? Is this what they found that was left out? That would truly be new and important.

    But that isn’t it. What is it then? None other than Dan Moldea (pp. 380-390).

    They actually say that material in Moldea’s 1978 book The Hoffa Wars should have been in the IG Report. I had to smile.

    Let me explain. After I read Moldea’s disgraceful book on the RFK case, I was shocked at its shoddiness (Probe Vol. 5 No. 4, p. 10, and The Assassinations pgs 610-631). I wondered how someone like this ever got started. So I went back and borrowed his first volume, the book on Hoffa. I took 30 pages of notes and came to the conclusion that it was almost as bad as his RFK book. (I never reviewed it since we decided to discontinue Probe.) Since Moldea is relying a lot on Walter Sheridan and other such sources, the portrait of Hoffa is aggrandized and sensationalized. The reason for this is twofold. Sheridan furnished Moldea with his prime witness against Hoffa, Ed Partin. Second, Moldea was writing right after the revelations of the Church Committee Report, which exposed in public the CIA-Mafia plots to kill Castro. Partin, Sheridan, and Moldea had a problem with those plots. Hoffa wasn’t in on them. So Sheridan let Moldea borrow Partin so he could further his mendacious magic act. And Waldron and Hartmann suck this all up — and expand it even further.

    But being indiscriminate with a writer like Moldea is like a boxer leaving his chin exposed in the ring. You’re looking for trouble. When Sheridan was heralding Partin as his star witness he had to do a lot of rehab work on him. Because writers like Fred Cook had shown that Partin had a criminal record that, to say the least, was rather compromising. So he decided to give Partin a lie detector test. Needless to say, since Sheridan arranged it, he passed with flying colors. But years later, something interesting happened to this test. A professional society of polygraph technicians got hold of the raw data from it. They were worried that less than scrupulous people were abusing legal ethics in using the machine. So a team of the country’s leading experts studied the results and unveiled their findings at a convention. They concluded that Partin was deceptive throughout, but he almost broke the machine at the part where he related Hoffa’s plot to murder RFK. Partin was so bad that the society deduced that the administrator of the test had to turn down the detection device to ensure the results Sheridan wanted. Ace archivist Peter Vea mailed me these documents over a decade ago and I discussed them at the 1995 COPA Conference in Washington. Vea later sent me a newspaper story about one of the original technicians being later convicted for fraud. So the information has been out there for about 12 years. Somehow, Waldron and Hartmann missed it. (And so did Moldea since he was still vouching for Partin in 1997 when his RFK book was published.)

    But as I said, Moldea’s book came out in 1978. Well after Hoffa was convicted and passed away so mysteriously. So the act Partin did for Sheridan was not enough for Moldea. Watergate and the Church Committee had occurred in the interim. So for Moldea, Partin added some current sex appeal to his already fatuous story. He now told Moldea that Carlos Marcello contributed a half million to Nixon’s campaign in 1968 (Moldea pp. 108, 260). The go-between was Hoffa. Hoffa was also supplying arms to Castro before he took over Cuba (Ibid. p. 107). Waldron and Hartmann use these tales and source them to Moldea– without telling the reader that the source is Partin! At one point they even refer to this proven liar as a most trusted source. In this day and age, with all we know about Partin, this is academic irresponsibility.

    But if Moldea is bad, what can one say about Frank Ragano? Ragano is mentioned many times by Moldea in his Hoffa book. Ragano was an attorney for Hoffa, Marcello and Trafficante. He did this for many years. And during this time, many of these Mafia did it books emerged. But it was not until Oliver Stone’s JFK came out that he decided to write about how his three clients conspired to kill President Kennedy. The other curious thing about the timing of Ragano’s 1993 book Mob Lawyer, is that he was in trouble with the IRS over back taxes and cried out that he was being persecuted: perhaps for his much delayed broadcast about his clients assassination conspiracy? Or maybe he was just using the delayed expose to plea bargain the charge down? Whatever the case, Ragano made two mistakes in his coming out party. First, he sold Moldea the old chestnut about Jim Garrison’s investigation of Clay Shaw being a method to divert attention away from Marcello. I exposed this for the canard it was at the 1994 COPA Conference, and Bill Davy expanded on it in his book, Let Justice Be Done (pgs 149-167). Evidently, Ragano had not done his homework on the issue. And that crack investigative reporter Moldea was not up to checking it out beforehand. (See Ragano’s biography at spartacus.schoolnet.) Second, Ragano tried to get cute and was a bit too specific about Trafficante’s convenient deathbed confession to him. He said it occurred on March 13, 1987 in Tampa. He says the ailing Don called him and asked him to come down and pick him up. When Ragano arrived to take him for a spin, the dying 72-year-old Mob boss trotted out to the car in pajamas and robe. He told Ragano that he and his underworld cohorts had erred. They should have killed Bobby, not John. His conscience cleansed by his confession to his consigliore, Trafficante passed away a few days later.

    Unfortunately for Ragano, Tony Summers checked up on his belatedly revealed tale. According to Summers, who sources several witnesses, Trafficante was living in Miami in March of 1987 and had not been to Tampa for months. He was very ill at the time and was receiving kidney dialysis and carrying a colostomy bag. Further, Summers interviewed at least two witnesses who placed Trafficante in Miami on that day. There are also hospital records that put him in Miami’s Mercy Hospital for dialysis treatment on both the day before and the day after the Ragano “confession”. And Trafficante’s doctor in Tampa said he was not there on March 13th. (Vanity Fair 12/94) Now, from Miami to Tampa is about 280 miles. To think that a 72 year old dying man would drive four hours one way and then four hours back — between dialysis treatments — to do something he could have done with a call on a pay phone strains credulity to the breaking point. To postulate that he would fly the distance is just as bad. Did he buy two seats in order to put his colostomy bag next to him? Ragano told Summers he could produce other witnesses. But only if he was sued for libel. Since it is next to impossible for a family to sue for a deceased member over libel, Ragano was being real gutsy.

    Another spurious author used extensively in this section is Davis, who they refer to as a “noted historian” (p.264) and later (p. 768) as an “acclaimed historian.” (The authors are quite liberal in their use of the term “historian”: Tony Summers, Peter Dale Scott, even Tad Szulc are all given the title. Yet none of them are historians.) Others, like Bill Davy and myself have questioned the methodology of this “noted historian”. As I once wrote of him, although Davis likes to use a large bibliography to lend weight and academic ballast to his work, he does not footnote his text. And as Davy and I have both pointed out, even the freight of his pretentious bibliography is spurious. In his two books on the JFK assassination, Mafia Kingfish and The Kennedy Contract, Davis listed two primary sources: the transcript of the Clay Shaw trial and 3, 000 pages of CIA documents. He said they were housed at Southeastern Louisiana University at Hammond. Davy checked and I called. They aren’t there. (Probe Vol. 5, No.1, p. 9) In that same issue, in discussing his Kennedy biography, Dynasty and Disaster, I showed how Davis distorted his sources to twist words and events into something they do not really mean. And sometimes into the opposite of what they mean. I then demonstrated how his lack of footnoting made this hard to detect for a novice.

    But Ultimate Sacrifice ignores all this. The book uses Davis, and even some of the claims that Davy actually addressed head on. For instance: the 7,000-dollar payoff, which Marcello supposedly admitted in his HSCA executive session testimony. The problem here is he actually didn’t admit it. (Ibid) Further, Davy and I interviewed U.S. Attorney Jon Volz who was in on the prosecution that put Marcello away. He and his cohorts listened to years of surveillance on Marcello, including the storied “Brilab tapes”. Volz told us, “There’s nothing on those tapes.” (Ibid). In fact, Volz told us that far from the fearsome, all-inspiring Mafia Don Davis makes him out to be, Marcello was kind of slow and dull. Further, Waldron and Hartmann use their “noted historian”, to make Marcello an all encompassing Mafia Superman, his Hitlerian reach extending throughout ten states, Central America, the Caribbean and beyond. (Ultimate Sacrifice p. 264). Funny, because Volz told us that, by the time he prosecuted him, Marcello was not even the number one godfather in Louisiana. Anthony Carolla was.

    But Waldron and Hartmann need to use Davis to exalt Marcello because they want us to believe, as Davis and Blakey do, that Marcello was reaching through to Oswald through Guy Banister and David Ferrie. Repeatedly, throughout the volume, Ferrie and Banister are referred to as “working for Marcello.”. In no other book I have ever encountered have I seen this rubric used with these two men anywhere to the extent it appears here. Further, Banister and Ferrie are pretty much cleaned off of their other well-documented ties to the CIA and the FBI. There is almost no mention of Ferrie’s ties to the Bay of Pigs, how he trained Cuban exiles for that operation, how he engineered aquatic equipment like a miniature submarine, how he watched films of the debacle with his friend Sergio Arcacha Smith. There is also no mention of Ferrie’s attempts to recruit young men for MONGOOSE. And it’s almost the same for Banister. Again, this was an eccentric trend that was started with Blakey and Billings at the end of the HSCA. Ferrie had worked for Wray Gill, one of Marcello’s local attorneys. So Blakey shorthanded this into Ferrie working for Marcello. In 1962 and 1963, Ferrie got Banister some investigatory work through his Gill employment. But not even the HSCA and Blakey construed this as Banister being an employee of Marcello. Waldron and Hartmann do this throughout. Again, this is deceptive and journalistically irresponsible. But, as I will show later, its part of a grand design.

    But it’s not just Marcello who gets the Superman treatment. Apparently modeling themselves on Davis, they attempt to enlarge John Roselli beyond any dimensions I have ever read. Roselli was seen previously as a second tier Mafia figure, right below the top Godfathers who sat on the national council. And his affable demeanor, brains, and facility in conversation made him a good ambassador and envoy for the Cosa Nostra to gain entry into things like the film business and the CIA-Mafia plots. This book goes way beyond that to places I had never seen or imagined. Did you know that Roselli was somehow in on the murder of Castillo Armas in Guatemala in 1957? How about the assassination of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic in 1961? If you can believe it, the dapper, satin shirted, silk tied Roselli was in training with the Cuban exiles at JM/WAVE. He even makes an appearance at Banister’s office at 544 Camp Street. Roselli is somehow involved with Marilyn Monroe in a mÈnage a trois with Frank Sinatra and Sam Giancana before she tries to warn the FBI about a Mob hit on RFK. (This whole episode with Monroe has to be read to be believed. Its on pages 405-409.) And with Waldron and Hartmann, its Roselli who introduced Judith Exner to Senator Kennedy, since Roselli is trying to play it safe in the 1960 election (p. 390). And as the Mob plot heats up, he maneuvers her around to somehow monitor JFK.

    Except it’s not true. Unfortunately, I read Exner’s book My Story (see The Assassinations pp. 329-338 for my essay on Exner). In that book, Exner describes her first meeting with Senator Kenendy. She met him through a dinner hosted by Peter Lawford and Frank Sinatra (see pp. 86-89). In that book, contrary to what Ultimate Sacrifice clearly implies, there is not a hint that John Roselli had anything to do with her relations with JFK. In their further aggrandizement of Roselli, they attempt to place him in Dallas on 11/22/63 but they qualify this by saying that none of the sources meet their standard of reliability. (p. 712) But they state the accusation anyway by noting the multiplicity of accounts. Also, according to them, Roselli had no alibi for that day. When I looked up their multiplicity of sources, I smiled and shook my head. The three were James Files, Robert Plumlee, and Chauncey Holt. Gary Aguilar wrote a searing expose on the whole Files affair, which resulted in a rather embarrassing video on the JFK case. (Probe Vol. 3 No. 6 p. 27) Plumlee has been marketing his story for years about flying various people in and out of Dallas before and after the assassination. He figured in one of the early cuts of that video which the producer tried to sell to investors. The late Chauncey Holt was trying to sell himself as one of the three tramps for a number of years. The fact that the authors include these men is critical comment in and of itself.

    III

    But even using all these dubious books and authors, with their questionable sources and bibliographies, Waldron and Hartmann still suffer greatly from the “conditional syndrome”. That is, something can happen only if something else occurs i.e. the contingency or assumption factor. To give the reader a representative sample:

    • If Roselli had told David Morales that Ruby would be helpful in the fall 1963 CIA-Mafia plot, Morales would have had no reason to doubt him. (565)
    • It is possible that the call was related to Oswald…or a trip Ruby would soon make to Chicago… (566)
    • And even on November 1, Ferrie might have flown to Chicago instead of back to New Orleans, if the Chicago assassination plan had not been uncovered …(577)
    • Phillips was saying that about Oswald in the context of an autobiographical novel, but it could indicate that the CIA’s “plan we had devised against Castro” was similar to the way JFK was killed. (p. 580)
    • The sad thing is that the Mafia may have taken the very plan that the CIA had intended to use against Castro…and used it instead to kill JFK in an open limousine. That could account for the comments of Bobby and David Atlee Phillips after JFK’s death. (P. 581)

    And my favorite:

    • Morales probably engaged in business with Trafficante associate John Martino in the years after JFK’s death. On the other hand, Morales may have simply provided help and information to Roselli during his nighttime drinking binges. (p. 584, italics are mine in all excerpts)

    I am reminded of Cyril Wecht’s response to one of Michael Baden’s inventive rationales for the single bullet theory: “Yeah, and if my mother had a penis she’d be my father.” The book is literally strewn with these kinds of “would have” “could have” “might have” scenarios. In the sample above, I culled from a span of 20 pages and I cited six passages, leaving at least one other one out. Go ahead and do the math for a text of 786 pages. There must be well into the hundreds of these Rumsfeldian “unkown unknowns” populating this book– like autumn leaves in a Pennsylvania backyard. When I wrote my introduction to Bill Davy’s fine work, Let Justice Be Done, I noted that one of its qualities is the author used very few of these types of clauses. He didn’t have to. I also noted that the Mafia theory advocates were noted for these kinds of contingency phrases. Since Ultimate Sacrifice is essentially the “Mega Mob Did It” opus, it amplifies the usage of them exponentially. Which leaves one to ask: If you need so many of these clauses then what is the real value of the book and its research?

    Hand in glove with the above feature is the “he had dinner with him” syndrome. Peter Dale Scott’s works were rich in this kind of thing and then Robert Blakey brought it to new heights in the field. Waldron and Hartmann continue in this tradition.

    • Back in Dallas on Thursday evening November 20, Ruby had dinner with … Ralph Paul. Paul was associated with Austin’s Bar-B-Cue, where one of the part-time security guards was policeman J. D. Tippit. (p. 713)
    • The Teamster organizer was an associate of Frank Chavez, linked to Jack Ruby by FBI reports. (p. 740)
    • Ruby called the home of friend Gordon McLendon, owner of KLIF radio, who was close to David Atlee Phillips and had a connection to Marcello. (747)

    If you use the sources the authors use, and a lot of conditional phrasing, and you make the connections as oblique and inconsequential as a Bar-B-Cue pit, then you can just about connect almost anything and anyone. Sort of like the Six Degrees of Separation concept. You can even come close to duplicating that masterpiece of disinformation, Nomenclature of an Assassination Cabal, aka The Torbitt Document (which is not a document and is therefore even deceptive in its nickname.) The point is that now, with the work of the ARRB, we don’t need to do this anymore. Waldron and Hartmann want to take us back to the Torbitt days.

    In this middle section of the book, which allegedly describes the plotting of the assassination, appear some of the most bizarre statements and chapters I have encountered in the JFK library of books. Which is saying a lot. After reading chapters 29-31, I actually wrote in my notes, “The preceding three chapters are three of the most ridiculous I have ever read in the literature.”

    But that is par for the course in this book. Did you know that:

    1. Guy Banister joined the plot because he was a segregationist. (pp. 457-458)
    2. John Roselli personally met RFK in Miami prior to the Missile Crisis. (This is on pp 408-409 and comes via Moldea and the incontinent Gerry Hemming.)
    3. The USA continued to support the corrupt and brutal Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua because the Somozas knew too much about C-Day. ( p.158)
    4. Banister encountered Oswald in New Orleans in the first quarter of 1963 and relayed the information that he would be a perfect patsy for JFK to Marcello. (p. 456)
    5. Hoffa attempted to actually strangle RFK to death with his bare hands in a Justice Department office. (p. 430)
    6. Marilyn Monroe committed suicide because the Mob was pressuring her to blackmail RFK. (p. 407)
    7. In 1963 Oswald was about to announce to the nation his undercover role in an effort to achieve dÈtente between the Soviet Union and America. (p. 458, 463)
    8. Senator Thomas Dodd was above reproach. (p. 462.)
    9. It was Banister who got Oswald to take a shot at Edwin Walker in an attempt to get publicity for a white supremacist ally. (p. 467)
    10. The Mafia arranged for Antonio Veciana to meet with Oswald and Phillips in 1963. (p. 485)

    These are all strained at best. And some — like the Nicaragua charge — are jocular. Some fly in the face of direct evidence. (For the case against Dodd for instance, see Probe Vol. 3 No. 5, Vol. 3 No. 6, and Vol. 6 No.2, plus Bob Tanenbaum’s novel Corruption of Blood for his own suspicions of the man.) In the face of all this the idea that Dodd is “beyond reproach” is goofy.

    IV

    Part Three of Ultimate Sacrifice deals with the attempts on President Kennedy’s life in Chicago and Tampa, the assassination in Dallas, the ensuing cover-ups of the assassination and C-Day, and the effects of all this for the country. Waldron and Hartmann lend great import to Chicago and Tampa and depict them both as being Mob-oriented, and later of being covered up because of some revelations about C-Day. The evidence about the latter is pretty much diaphanous. But some of the circumstances surrounding the Chicago attempt are interesting. And what the authors do with them is even more so.

    The authors declare that their treatment of the Chicago attempt is the most extensive yet. Whether it is or isn’t, it is almost indecipherable. Through their usual tortuous logic and maneuvering, they somehow get Michael Mertz on the scene (with the help of the always useful Gerry Hemming.) They attempt to link the man who was being set up, Thomas A. Vallee, to John Martino, simply because Valle had once been a member of the John Birch Society and Martino was part of their Speaker’s Bureau. (p. 630) They conclude that Trafficante, Roselli and Marcello were behind the whole thing and Richard Cain was in on the cover up. The book cites former Secret Service agent Abraham Bolden who says that two of the suspected four man hit team were named Rodriguez and Gonzalez. They then surmise that those Hispanic names are important because those were two names of members in the Tampa branch of the FPCC. Which, in a spellbinding leap of logic, they connect to the Chicago attempt. (p. 625)

    One of the major sources that Ultimate Sacrifice uses for the two chapters on Chicago is a writer named Edwin Black. Today, Edwin Black is an illustrious author of several famous books like War on the Weak, which is about how famous philanthropies sponsored eugenics experiments in America, and The Transfer Agreement, which is about the founding of the Israeli state. .

    Unlike Ultimate Sacrifice, if you read Black, you get the idea that the Secret Service actually did a fair job once they were tipped off. Even though understaffed, they got help from the local police and did a quick job in apprehending Vallee and rolling up part of the cell. All of this was done before JFK’s scheduled arrival (which was eventually cancelled). Another difference is that although Bolden is a major source for Black, there is no mention of the two surnames, Gonzalez and Rodriguez. And then there are the important things Black discovered which Ultimate Sacrifice leaves out. Consider:

    1. Like Oswald, Vallee was a former Marine who was stationed at a U-2 base in Japan. (Black, p. 5)
    2. Like Oswald, the cover unit for Vallee’s probable CIA recruitment was something called Joint Technical Advisory Group.(ibid)
    3. Vallee had spoken bitterly of JFK, “We lost a lot of good men at the Bay of Pigs. (Ibid. p. 6)
    4. One of the men who arrested him, Dan Groth, was suspected of being a CIA undercover agent. And Groth inexplicably left off his arrest report the fact that Vallee had 750 rounds of live ammo in the trunk of his car. Further he said his notation of “M-1 rifle” on the report was a typo. This was one reason why Vallee could not be detained, since the charge for pulling him over — which was nothing but a pretext–was a minor traffic infraction. (Ibid p. 31)

    But the most startling thing Ultimate Sacrifice leaves out is the codename of the original FBI informant who tipped off the Secret Service. It was “Lee”. (Black, p. 5)

    Instead of all the Sturm und Drang Ultimate Sacrifice presents, if one reads Black one could conclude that Oswald was doing in Chicago what he did in New Orleans. As revealed later by FBI worker William Walter, although Oswald was serving as a CIA agent provocateur, he was also a likely informant for the FBI. And in the milieu he worked — the CIA and rightwing sponsored Cuban exile community — he tipped off the Bureau as to a plot he heard concerning the murder of JFK in Dallas. According to Black, he may have done it in Chicago also. One could also conclude that Groth screwed up his arrest report so that Vallee could not be thoroughly interrogated. And finally, Black adds that while he was pursuing his inquiry into the Chicago attempt, he was followed and investigated not by the Mafia, but by the DIA. (Black, p. 3)

    Until I read this book I did not know Black had written about the Kennedy assassination. Jim Douglass, who contributed to The Assassinations, pointed something out to me. Although Ultimate Sacrifice uses Edwin Black, you could never locate his original work from it. For if you try and match up the mentions of his name and use of his material in the text to the footnotes, you will discover something puzzling. Namely, you can’t. The authors footnote Edwin Black’s work to a man named George Black and to George Black’s book entitled The Good Neighbor. When you find The Good Neighbor, you will see that there is nothing in it about President Kennedy’s assassination. The book is about US foreign policy in Central America. Douglass, who is writing his own book on the JFK case, sent me Edwin Black’s actual essay on Chicago. That long essay was the cover story of a periodical titled Chicago Independent dated November 1975, which was edited by Black and his wife. You won’t find this essay in the footnotes in the two chapters about Chicago in Ultimate Sacrifice. To dismiss this mismatching as all a mistake one must believe the following:

    1. Waldron and Hartmann confused two completely different authors
    2. They confused two completely different subjects
    3. They mistook a book for a magazine article.

    One other aspect of this scholarly failure puzzles me. Waldron and Hartmann have about eleven footnotes to George Black’s book. Not one of them cites a page number. Probably because they can’t. Try and find another book they use for multiple but blind citations. The reason I find this all so bracing is that when I read Edwin Black’s essay I was struck by how clear it was compared to Ultimate Sacrifice, how different the interpretation of events was, and — as I have shown here — the crucial things what Waldron and Hartmann leave out. Ninety nine percent–or more–of the book’s readership can’t really conclude this or see the difference in the two treatments. When one does see the difference one has to at least postulate that the authors of Ultimate Sacrifice didn’t want you to find Edwin Black’s essay. Why?

    The work on the alleged Mob oriented Tampa plot directly follows the two chapters on Chicago. It begins with the rather hoary Joseph Milteer-William Somersett taped conversation. Somersett was an FBI informant who recorded his calls with Milteer. Milteer was a moderately well off southern racist who was associated with the extremist anti-civil rights group the National States Rights Party (NSRP). Somersett shared his beliefs but was against the use of violence to achieve them. On the tape, Milteer talks about a possible scenario for killing Kennedy with a high-powered rifle from a tall building.

    To say the least, it is problematic to use Milteer for the Tampa scenario since according to many sources (Henry Hurt, Michael Benson, Anthony Summers), if Milteer is talking about any location on the tape, it is Miami not Tampa. Further, Milteer had no detectable ties to the Mafia. But that doesn’t daunt our authors. They again use their Six Degrees of Separation technique. See, Milteer’s group had ties to associates of Guy Banister. And remember, Banister was doing work for Marcello. So that takes care of that. After utilizing this technique, the authors then shift into another one of their hundreds of “conditional syndrome” phraseologies:

    • Banister likely would have used Milteer in a supporting role for the JFK plot…Milteer himself would have made a logical person to take some of the blame if needed, given his far right credentials and public anti-Kennedy stance. (p. 662)

    They go on to write that Milteer could have even been used as a linkage to Vallee in Chicago. (Ibid.) Six Degrees is one handy tool to have at hand.

    The main Mafioso they link to Tampa is, of course, Trafficante. They use former Tampa police Chief J. P. Mullins, who has since died, as a source. Apparently, they never talked to Florida Department of Law Enforcement special agent Ken Sanz who is alive and an authority on Trafficante. He told the St. Petersburg Times (11/23/05) that he never heard of Trafficante’s involvement in the affair. Even though he has done years of research on Trafficante and is serving as a consultant to a book on the man.

    Between the two attempts on JFK, the authors interpolate a chapter on President Kennedy’s speech in Miami on November 18th. They say that part of the address was supposed to be aimed at the C-Day leader as a note of encouragement that the operation was ongoing. Oddly, they do not quote or paraphrase here that part of the speech under discussion. Basically, Kennedy said that Castro and his crowd had made Cuba into a victim of foreign imperialism, meaning the Russians. And that they together were now trying to expand revolution into South America. He then added:

    This, and this alone, divides us. As long as this is true, nothing is possible, without it, everything is possible. Once this barrier is removed, we will be ready…to work with the Cuban people in pursuit of the progressive goals which a few short years ago stirred the…sympathy of many people throughout the hemisphere.

    Now, some of the Kennedy people who worked on the speech were Arthur Schlesinger and Dick Goodwin. The authors quote Schlesinger as saying that only Kennedy’s staff had input into the speech. But then, Waldron and Hartmann bring a contradicting author on stage. It is Seymour Hersh and his hatchet job of a book The Dark Side of Camelot. They use this book to say that the CIA and Desmond Fitzgerald had a hand in the paragraph above. They footnote Hersh on this, but they give no page number for the reference. When you find the material in Hersh’s book, you will see that he is not even talking about the same speech. (Hersh, p. 440) He is writing about an address President Kennedy gave in Palm Beach ten days earlier. Hersh’s source is a former investigator for the Church Committee who is quoting a former CIA liaison to the committee. Further, the original source, Seymour Bolton, died in 1985 (Hersh’s book is full of second hand sources quoting deceased acquaintances.) If one studies the work of CIA liaisons with congressional inquiries one understands their purpose is to do one thing: protect the CIA at all costs. In this instance Bolton was trying to sell the Church Committee on the idea that the paragraph was inserted by CIA officer Desmond Fitzgerald as a message to Rolando Cubela, a CIA asset in Cuba who the Agency had enlisted to kill Castro. Cubela was not the coup leader. So Ultimate Sacrifice shifts both the speech and the alleged target of the message. So how do they show in this chapter that the speech was a message to the coup leader? Or maybe they were thinking no one would notice these things?

    But it’s actually worse than that. If one looks at the passage, does it not sound as if Kennedy is saying that he just wants Castro and Che Guevara to abstain from exporting Marxist revolution into South America? And if this would stop, the USA and Cuba could then establish a dÈtente? And that jibes with what Kennedy was trying to do through his triple back channel of Lisa Howard, William Attwood, and Jean Daniel. (Which, interestingly enough, the authors try to discount in this very chapter on page 670. Probably to make their unsupported scenario more palatable.) If we look at the passage in that way, then Kennedy’s special envoy Attwood can shed some valuable light on the Miami address:

    • It was intended to help me by signaling to Castro that normalization was possible if Cuba simply stopped doing the Kremlin’s work in Latin America (such as trying to sabotage — vainly as it turned out — the upcoming Venezuelan elections). (Attwood, The Twilight Struggle, p. 262)

    This concept of the speech, that it was an olive branch extended to Castro and not a war overture to Cubela–or whomever Waldron and Hartmann are referring to–is echoed in an article by Daniel published shortly after the assassination entitled “Unofficial Envoy” (The New Republic 12/14/63 ). And his information was from the most primary source of all: JFK himself.

    Now, if we are not blinded by the likes of Sy Hersh and Seymour Bolton, we should note Attwood’s mention of the upcoming Venezuelan elections. We should also note the date of the Miami speech, and also the date of the Richard Helms anecdote about the Venezuela arms cache that I mentioned earlier. The speech was on November 18th. Helms went to see Robert Kennedy and the president the next day with his phony story about the arms caches sent by Castro to Venezuela, a country that Attwood says JFK was worried about Cuba interfering in. Doesn’t it seem more likely that Helms and Fitzgerald were trying to force Kennedy into backing up the very words he had delivered the night before? Helms is figuratively telling JFK: “This is what you warned Castro about last night Mr. President. And look, today we discover he is doing just what you warned him not to do. What are you going to do about it? We have to do something. ” Far from sharing this C-Day agenda about Cuba, it would seem to me that the CIA was trying to get inside this overture for dÈtente, in order to take advantage of it and snuff it out just as it got rolling.

    V

    And this is a real problem with the book, its handling of the CIA. I never thought I would see a book about the JFK case that would vouch for the honesty of Richard Helms. But this one tries to ( pp. 44-45). About the only guy with less credibility than Helms on the assassination would be David Phillips. But Ultimate Sacrifice tries to rehabilitate Phillips’ words and writings on the JFK case (p. 562). And they even go beyond that. It tries to say that the things he did, he didn’t really do. Why? Because he did them without knowing he was being manipulated by the likes of Banister and the Mob. I’m not kidding:

    • By having Oswald use the FPCC and build a very public (and well-documented) pro-Castro cover … Phillips played right into the hands of Banister and others planning JFK’s assassination … (p. 473)

    By no means is this the only place they serve as defense attorneys for Phillips. They do it at least four other times (pp. 241, 509, 531, 532). Poor Dave, flying from JM/WAVE, to Mexico City, to Langley. He was so busy he didn’t realize that his street operative Banister was setting him up the whole time. What a fool.

    When David Talbot reviewed the book (all too kindly) in Salon, he pointed out this clear aspect of the work: the authors’ defense tract for the Agency. Waldron and Hartmann wrote Talbot to defend themselves:

    • … our book exposes Mafia-compromised CIA assets, extensive CIA intelligence failures, unauthorized operations, and the stonewalling of Robert Kennedy and government committees by certain CIA officials — all under the veil of secrecy covering AM/WORLD.

    In other words, they issued a non-denial denial. I like that: e.g. Clay Shaw and Ferrie manipulating Oswald in Clinton-Jackson was one of many “CIA intelligence failures”. I like even better the phrase “Mafia-compromised CIA assets”. See, Ferrie and Banister were working with Marcello, not the CIA. And this device is probably the reason that the book barely mentions Shaw, and amazingly, does not mention at all Ruth and Michael Paine. It would have been tough, even for these inventive authors, to make them into “Mafia-compromised” figures in the landscape.

    But the problem with the non-denial denial is that the authors cannot deny their book. To list every instance where they try to immunize the CIA would literally take pages. But how’s this for starters:

    • Later chapters show how some of those CIA assets were unknowingly manipulated by the Mafia in their plot to assassinate JFK. (p. 51)
    • More than anything, the CIA’s decades-long organizational cover up was designed to hide intelligence failures and protect reputations…(p.59)
    • Just because certain names have been linked to C-Day…It does not mean that any particular CIA officials were knowingly involved in JFK’s assassination. (p. 62)
    • Phillips and the CIA had their own agenda for Oswald, an agenda that had nothing to do with JFK’s assassination. (p. 173)
    • Harry Williams told us which one of the C-Day participants he felt was knowingly involved in JFK’s assassination (and it was not someone like E. Howard Hunt or James McCord)…(p. 187)
    • The Dallas meeting between Oswald and David Atlee Phillips probably eliminates Phillips from knowingly being involved in JFK’s assassination…(p. 531)

    And on and on and on. There must be at least 20 such passages in the book. But the one that takes the cake is this:

    • Two months later, when Ms. Odio saw Oswald on TV after JFK’s assassination, she fainted … That was exactly what the Mafia wanted … (p. 164)

    When I read that, I didn’t know whether to laugh or cry. Or do both and go bipolar. To her everlasting credit, when Sylvia Meagher examined the Odio incident four decades ago, she postulated that it showed a conspiracy between the Cuban exiles, the CIA, and elements of the reactionary right (Accessories After the Fact pgs 384-86). But according to Ultimate Sacrifice, the poor deluded lady was wrong. And we are all lost sheep. Why? Because we either didn’t know or ignored the incredibly powerful fact that Rolando Masferer’s brother lived in Odio’s complex. And Masferer — you guessed it — knew a couple of mobsters. What do the authors leave out? That many Cuban exiles lived in that complex, and that you could have picked out others who had relations to every group that was funding anti-Castro operations.

    What I have described with the Odio incident is absolutely systematic throughout the book. Especially in a section called “Three Oswald Riddles”. For instance, the authors write that Oswald did actually order the rifle, but probably at the behest of someone working for the Mafia (p. 460). And somehow Richard Cain would get the info into the media after the fact. (p. 465) The problem with that wild and irresponsibly speculative scenario is that today, due to people like Raymond Gallagher, (Probe Vol. 5 No. 6, p. 10) and especially John Armstrong, we can show that it is highly doubtful that Oswald ever ordered that rifle. In a tour de force performance in his book Harvey and Lee, Armstrong demonstrates, almost beyond a shadow of a doubt, that Oswald could not have ordered the rifle. (pgs 438-487) And he shows that-guess what-the people who manufactured the phony evidence afterwards weren’t mobsters.

    This consistent pattern of distorting, smudging, and obfuscating good evidence in favor of amorphous, and sometimes non-existent, Mafia “connections” has one of its highlights in Mexico City. Ignoring all the questions about entrance and exit into the country (see for example my first book Destiny Betrayed p. 264) Ultimate Sacrifice maintains that Oswald really did go to Mexico and onward to Mexico City. (p. 540) Ignoring the problems with the sign-in sheet at the hotel (DiEugenio op. cit. ), they further believe that Oswald stayed in Mexico City. And further, they say it was him at both the Cuban and Soviet consulates. Now to go into all the disputes about what the witnesses who saw him say the person who was there looked like would take several pages (for a decent summary see Tony Summers, Conspiracy pgs 343-352). But the capper for me is that they say he was there actually trying to get to Cuba! (In aid of C-Day of course.) Now many authors have noted the scene he created, what a nuisance he was, how truculent he was in attitude. How him raising his voice caused others to look around and even come out of their cubicles. How he didn’t even seem to know the right protocol to get a visa. How his calls to the Soviet Embassy arrived on the wrong day or during times when the staff was not there. Even Castro commented later that anyone trying to get to Cuba does not do what Oswald did. Again, Waldron and Hartmann either ignore all this or try to explain it away. And the only way to explain this obtuse balderdash in Ultimate Sacrifice is in light of the authors’ previous comments about Phillips. They are trying to get him (and his assistant Ann Goodpasture) off the hook about their manipulation of an Oswald imposter in Mexico City. Further, they wish to disguise how the CIA used the incident to 1.) frame Oswald, and 2.) force President Johnson into a cover up after the fact.

    Although I had hints about what Ultimate Sacrifice was up to before this, when I read this section the proverbial light went on in my head. And the light spelled out the name of Robert Blakey. Let me explain the clear parallel. As writers like Gaeton Fonzi and myself have pointed out, Blakey had a problem at the end of the HSCA inquiry. His committee had turned up a lot of evidence showing that the CIA was involved in the conspiracy, and also that the military had covered up that fact with the autopsy. How did Blakey solve that problem? He dismissed most of the investigators and kept a small coterie of trusted associates to write the Final Report and edit the published volumes. In that report, and in the volumes, he did all he could to minimize any CIA involvement and to disguise the true facts of the autopsy. He then stowed away a massive amount of raw evidence, much more than the Warren Commission did.

    This worked for awhile. It fell apart when the Assassination Records Review Board began to declassify much of the hidden record. People like Gary Aguilar and David Mantik began to expose how Blakey had hidden what really happened in Bethesda. John Newman and Bill Davy began to delve into the new revelations about Mexico City and New Orleans. I wrote an article with these new documents to indicate what Blakey had done. (See The Assassinations pp. 51-89) In other words, the cat was out of the bag.

    What Ultimate Sacrifice tries to do is put the cat back in the bag. It tries to repeat what Blakey did. It says: All this striking, powerful new evidence the ARRB released is not what you think. You say the military deliberately disguised the autopsy and may have forged the x-rays? You’re wrong. Bobby Kennedy controlled the autopsy. You think the Lopez Report on Mexico City says an Oswald imposter was there under the control of David Phillips? Wrong again, its C-Day and Richard Cain. You read Fonzi’s The Last Investigation and think the Odio incident is a more powerful indicator now of CIA and CIA affiliated Cuban exile involvement? Wrong once more, you fool. That’s just what Roselli and the Mafia wanted you to think.

    But if we are all fools, that leaves the question Talbot asked: Why would the Mafia kill JFK if they knew he was going into Cuba in a few days? Did they not want back into the island to get their hotels and casinos back? The authors answered this in their letter to him by saying, “…the Kennedys tried to exclude the Mafia from any involvement in the coup plan, and any involvement in Cuba after the coup.” Like almost every aspect of the book, this is preposterous. Concerning the first contention, that the Kennedys excluded the Mob from the plan: Really? You mean RFK didn’t call up Giancana and say, “Hey Sam, we’re going into Cuba on December 1st. Meet me then in Havana at the Tropicana and I’ll sell you your hotels back.” About the latter part, keeping them out of the liberated Cuba: How would it be possible to ensure that the Mafia would be kept off the island? Did the Kennedys plan on occupying every square mile of the place with a 150,000 man army and protecting the long shoreline with a naval armada indefinitely? Would they do background checks on every Cuban on the island and every one coming in to see they had no ties to the Mafia? (This in the days before computers.) Even though two of the alleged coup leaders, Varona and Artime, already had ties to the Mob? But this is the kind of thing one has to swallow to accept this abomination of a book.

    One of the most puzzling things about Ultimate Sacrifice is that some have actually taken it seriously. Peter Scott has said it is well documented. My question to Peter: Well-documented with what? Frank Ragano and Ed Partin? If you don’t analyze the footnotes you might be impressed. Unfortunately for my mental health, I did so I’m not impressed. Vince Palamara has gone on Amazon.com to praise the book as one of the best ever written on the case. Vince is supposed to be an authority on the Secret Service. Did he not notice what the authors did with Edwin Black’s seminal essay on Chicago? That people like this, and others, could be bamboozled by a dreadful and pretentious pastiche shows how rudderless the research community has become.

    When Gus Russo introduced Lamar Waldron in Dallas many years ago, he clearly meant him to be the fair-haired Luke Skywalker, rescuing the Jedi research community from the hordes of the Galactic Empire. What many didn’t recall, then or later, was that Luke Skywalker’s father turned out to be Darth Vader.

  • Lamar Waldron, with Thom Hartmann, Legacy of Secrecy


    Lamar Waldron and Thom Hartmann wasted little time in writing a sequel to their first book Ultimate Sacrifice. That long and portentous volume was originally published in November of 2005. Some authors take awhile to fill the tank between new entries in assassination research. But not them. Just three years after their original foray they have now come out with a new volume. This one is called Legacy of Secrecy. And, at 864 pages, it is almost as long as the first book. Taken together, the length of the two volumes begins to approach Vincent Bugliosi territory. Which, of course, is a dubious distinction.

    The authors write that the original length of this book was a little more than three hundred pages. The reason the book clocked in much longer was their desire to include the RFK and MLK cases. What is so odd about their attempt to do so is that, in their discussions of those two cases, they do not come close to relating them to what is their main thesis about the JFK case. The reader will recall that this is the concept of C-Day. That is, the so-called plan for a coup in Cuba that was scheduled for December 1, 1963. This was to partly consist of a Cuban exile invasion from the USA organized by the Pentagon and CIA. The plan was to have the so-called “coup leader” —who was acting as a double agent on the island—murder Castro, blame it on the Russians, call a state of emergency, and arrange for a flotilla of Cuban exiles to invade Cuba. The Pentagon would wait in the wings in case they were needed. Since the sizeable Russian force remaining in Cuba would hardly take this laying down, they probably were going to be needed. Yet, when David Talbot asked Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara if he was aware of the upcoming invasion, McNamara said he never knew about it. And as I mentioned in that earlier review, neither did the other two Cabinet level officers who not only should have known, but had to have known. Namely Secretary of State Dean Rusk and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy. A truly fantastic state of affairs to present to the reader. But the authors proceeded anyway. Even presenting meetings at which some officials knew about C-Day and some did not.

    Who was the so-called “coup leader” who was going to pull off bloody treason in the new socialist state? In the hardcover edition of the book, he was not actually named. But it was very strongly hinted that he was Che Guevara. For reasons I stated in my review, this was topping an incredible scenario with an incredible choice for a double agent. David Talbot also called them on this point in his review in Salon. So on the way to the soft cover edition, aided by Liz Smith, the name was now revealed to be Juan Almeida. But here’s the problem. For such a daring and bold plan one needed a coup leader the size and stature of Guevara. If for no other reason, to galvanize the Cuban public into turning on their Russian allies. Which would be no easy feat. Almeida had no such outsize stature. And the possibility exists he would have been rolled over by a combination of the Russians plus the Cubans still loyal to Castro. Which, in light of the objective, would have made things even worse than before.

    In this new volume, for the first three parts of the book, the authors essentially discuss the JFK case, with the accent on C-Day again. That is up until about page 470. From there until about page 700 they mainly discuss the Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy cases. Here’s the problem with their presentation: I could find no credible linkage between the C-Day plotting and the other two cases. And since their argument about the other two cases is remarkably unconvincing, I really do not understand why they included King and RFK. But even the scope of those three epochal cases wasn’t enough for these two radical-and insatiable—revisionists. The authors include a closing section on Watergate. Again, I don’t know why. But I will make a guess later.

    I

    Although I have briefly summarized the key concept of Ultimate Sacrifice, I strongly recommend that the reader read the first section of my original review for a more detailed discussion of the concept of C-Day. (That can be read here. ) One of the problems the authors have with their thesis is that writers who have since read these documents e.g. Jeff Morley and William Davy, do not agree with the spin Waldron and Hartmann place on them. (After my review came out, Davy told me, “Jim, those are contingency plans, and they are labeled as such.”) Not even Peter Dale Scott, who had some praise for aspects of the book, buys into them as C-Day.

    But perhaps the most devastating response to the book is by the writer who helped launch Lamar Waldron and his C-Day thesis into the research community. In my previous review, I detailed how Waldron was introduced by none other than Gus Russo at the 1993 Dallas ASK Conference. So one would think that the man who introduced the co-writer of the volume would stand beside the book. One would be wrong. Apparently, Russo got a bit perturbed at the authors for taking credit for revealing the documents to the world for the first time. Which they did on page two of the previous volume. Why did he feel like that? Because Russo discussed them in Live By the Sword eight years earlier. (Russo, pgs 176-179)

    In fact, in his conversations with Vincent Bugliosi, Russo goes after the C-Day concept with abandon. Russo actually tackles one of Waldron’s prime sources, Harry Williams. Russo questions how Williams could have known about these plans since it is “abundantly clear” that the documents refer to Manuel Artime’s “Central American operation and have nothing to do with a December ‘coup’ or ‘C-Day”‘ as Waldron refers to it.” (Reclaiming History, End Notes, p. 762) In fact, parts of the plans actually refer to Artime’s group, the MRR, in code. And right below this, Artime himself is also mentioned in code. (CIA record of 6/28/63) Waldron tries to counter this by saying that Williams told the authors that Artime was actually serving under him. But where is the documentary proof of this? Because to anyone who knows anything about Artime’s special place in the CIA, it seems ridiculous on its face. This, I believe, is the beginning of a serious questioning of Williams as a source for the authors. It is an issue I will take up later.

    Vincent Bugliosi, agreeing with Davy, quotes from parts of the plans to demonstrate their true nature. For instance, the CINCLANT (Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet) OPLANS 312 and 316 were prepared “in case of a revolt in Cuba.” (op. cit. Bugliosi, p. 758, italics added) The plans were prepared by the US Army under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are entitled “State-Defense Contingency Plans for a Coup in Cuba”. (ibid) The fact that they are labeled State-Defense makes it even more incredible that neither McNamara nor Rusk knew about the upcoming invasion. But in light of the use of the word “contingency” in the title, that fact is made understandable. In other words, it was never a “go” project. In fact, one draft of the plan, under the above Contingency Plan title, was dated October 21, 1963. Just one month before the assassination. So it must have been clear to everyone what the nature of the project really was by the time of Kennedy’s murder. In fact, one of documents even says that no invasion should be contemplated unless there is active aggression by Castro and/or the Soviets “that threaten the peace or security of the Hemisphere.” (Undated Army memo to the President by Sterling Cottrell. Record No. 198-10004-10072) Since I have taken a lot of space in criticizing Reclaiming History, I am glad to give Bugliosi credit for this part of the book. Especially when he is backed up by the likes of William Davy.

    Now let’s get back to the late Harry Williams. Williams first surfaced on the JFK case through the work of William Turner and Warren Hinckle (especially the former) in their fine book The Fish is Red. Turner spent hours interviewing Williams for that book because the volume largely focused on American relations with Cuba during the Kennedy years. But when I talked to Turner about Waldron’s thesis he told me that Williams never mentioned anything about the C-Day concept to him in any of their interviews. Further, when Waldron sent him a thank you note with a copy of Ultimate Sacrifice, Turner told me he wanted no thanks for that book. But with Legacy of Secrecy, this situation gets even worse. Because in this installment, Williams now talks about things that are not only not in The Fish is Red, but they are not even in Ultimate Sacrifice. Or at least, I don’t recall them. And some of these belated revelations are so bombastic, I am sure I would have.

    For instance, as I said, in the hardcover version of Ultimate Sacrifice Juan Almeida was not mentioned as the “coup leader”. The emphasis was clearly on Che Guevara. But now, the authors write that Williams told them that Cyrus Vance of the Army was fully aware of Almeida’s role. (Legacy of Secrecy, p. 22) Since Vance helped supervise plans that were labeled as “contingency”, one might ask: His role in what? There is an incredible passage on page 287 that is supposed to describe a meeting that RFK had with President Johnson after Kennedy’s assassination. The subject was C-Day. Since, conveniently, only Johnson and RFK were there, the source for this discussion is Harry Williams, allegedly channeling RFK. According to the roundabout sourcing LBJ told RFK he was not continuing with the C-Day plans, but he would continue to fund some of RFK’s favorite Cuban groups. This paragraph is actually not footnoted at all. But since the authors date other interviews that they did with Williams as taking place in 1992, they had to have known this for the first book. But yet it appears here for the first time. As does the following information (p. 296). RFK made sure that the CIA provided for Almeida’s family members after LBJ decided to halt the C-Day plans. (How one can halt a contingency plan remains the authors’ secret.) This bit of information comes from 1992 interviews with Williams. Again, it first surfaces here. Finally, through an unnamed RFK aide, Williams kept in contact with RFK all the way up to 1968-even during the presidential campaign. (p. 621) They even met privately during this hectic campaign time. And when they did, amidst all the swirling campaign pressures and furious updates, the subject of Almeida and his family “always came up”. (The entire paragraph that contains this information has no footnotes.)

    But there is one last bit of belated info from Williams that needs to be noted. In Ultimate Sacrifice, I discussed and criticized the authors’ treatment of Oswald in Mexico City. One of the reasons I did so is that the authors seemed to accept the CIA’s story that it was Oswald there the entire time. Well in Legacy of Secrecy they surface a relevant piece of belated information from Williams in that regard. According to Waldron and Hartmann, Harry Williams saw a picture of Oswald entering the Mexico City Cuban Embassy. (p. 234) Somehow, this wasn’t deemed important enough to include in their previous discussion of Oswald in Mexico City in 2005. Even though the discussion then was much more detailed than it is here. How did Williams see this photo? Through an unnamed Cuban exile linked to Artime. The reason he showed the photo to Williams is not mentioned. And worse, the authors apparently never were curious enough to ask that question of Williams. What makes it odd is that very, very few people have ever mentioned any picture of Oswald. Or claimed to have seen it. And when they have, it is described as shot from an angle and behind. So the identification is not really probative. The only person who has ever stated that such a photo definitely did exist was Winston Scott, the Mexico City station chief at the time of Oswald’s visit. Why he, or anyone else inside the CIA’s surveillance operation, would show such a photo to some unnamed Cuban exile escapes me. And why this exile would be allowed to keep such a photo is even more of a mystery. Especially in light of the fact that the CIA, under intense pressure by the investigators for the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), could produce no such picture. Which, of course, fed suspicions that Oswald never really entered the Cuban Embassy. But somehow, over lunch or a baseball game, an anonymous exile showed Williams this invaluable photo.

    With what the authors have now done to Williams’ credibility, plus the near universality of agreement on the true nature of the C -Day plans, the end should be spelled out for this entire “second invasion” thesis. Because the only other “on the record” source they had for it the first time around was Dean Rusk. Yet Rusk made it clear that he only heard of such a plan after he left office. Which makes me believe that, while in office, the contingency plans were so contingent that they never even made it to the Secretary of State’s desk. And with the collapse of the C-Day scenario, their use of it is now seen as what I argued it was before: a pretext to do a new spin on a Mob did it book.

    II

    Let’s return to the frequent and disturbing use of unnamed sources in the book. This kind of sourcing for crucial and controversial pieces of evidence is something that recurs throughout Legacy of Secrecy. For instance, the authors just happened to have an unnamed Naval Intelligence source who was monitoring Oswald. And guess what? This anonymous source also saw this photo of Oswald in Mexico City! (ibid) So, by accident, Waldron and Hartmann have found almost as many people who have seen this photo as are mentioned in the entire Lopez Report. How do the authors know that it was the Mafia that killed JFK? Well an unnamed top Kennedy aide revealed to them “the leading roles of Marcello, Trafficante, and Roselli in JFK’s murder”. And guess what? This top Kennedy aide knew all about C-Day. Must be nice to have sources like that.

    But its even better to have one like the following. Every serious commentator on the JFK autopsy (e.g. Gary Aguilar, David Mantik) has noted the overwhelming evidence that the military controlled that medical procedure and not the Kennedys. (I have used many of these sources in Reclaiming Parkland) These sources extend to the autopsists themselves, and even to Commander Galloway of the Bethesda Medical Center. The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), and the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB) both did extensive investigations about what happened that night. Every significant witness was talked to at least once. And many were talked to twice. In fact, there is a road map to follow in this regard. The FBI agents on hand, Jim Sibert, and Frank O’Neill, had a list of those people present. But apparently, they missed someone. Because the authors have yet another crucial unnamed source who says he was at the autopsy. And, you guessed it, this guy also knew about C-Day. And contrary to dozens of other witnesses, including the autopsists themselves, this mysterious source—who escaped the HSCA and ARRB dragnet—knew that RFK had full knowledge of what happened that night. And further, that RFK probably even directed the autopsy. (p. 184) Hmm. Then why did Bobby Kennedy sign a document that granted “no restrictions” during the procedure? Why did Galloway testify that there were no instructions coming into the autopsy room from the Kennedy suite above? Why did Pierre Finck testify that it was the military that interfered with the autopsy during his famous appearance at the trial of Clay Shaw? But most importantly, in regard to the value of Legacy of Secrecy, why do the authors not mention any of the above proven and pertinent facts? Maybe because it brings into question the information rendered by their unnamed source?

    But the prolific use of unnamed sources for crucial information does not end with the JFK case. It also figures importantly in this volume for the King case. According to the authors, prior to the King assassination, a man named Hugh Spake collected money used in the King plot from workers at an Atlanta auto plant. And further, the authors posit that James Earl Ray called Spake the morning of the assassination. (pgs. 496-498) What is the basis for these rather dramatic revelations? Well if one turns to page 814 in the footnotes, the following sourcing appears: ” … from confidential interviews conducted from early 1976 (when author Lamar Waldron was briefly employed at the Lakewood General Motors Auto Plant) to 2007.” This does not inspire confidence. Especially in light of the fact that Spake passed away three years ago. Therefore I don’t understand the need to shield these sources after the subject is dead. Further, the southern rightwing racist groups the authors say he was associated with have gone into eclipse. Secondly, the author never explains why he was doing an investigation of the King case 34 years ago. I know Waldron says he has been studying the JFK case for a long time. But the King case?

    In addition to the ready use of unnamed sources, there is an all too frequent use of unreferenced information in general. It is almost as bad here as it was with Joan Mellen’s A Farewell to Justice. The authors have always been desperate to bring Carlos Marcello into the nexus of the CIA-Mafia plots to kill Castro. So here they say that some recently declassified files relating to Cuban operations reveal that a certain unnamed case officer was a liaison between the CIA and Marcello. (p. 102) The entire paragraph in which this is revealed lacks footnotes. A few pages later (p. 106), we are informed that three unconfirmed reports place Roselli in Dallas on 11/22/63. This information is also not footnoted. But since the sources they do use also say that a woman drove Roselli and a Miami sharpshooter to the grassy knoll at the far end of Dealey Plaza, we can imagine what the unconfirmed reports are like. In mentioning CIA officer John Whitten and his investigation of Mexico City, the authors write that Richard Helms “knew that Oswald was also linked to his unauthorized Castro assassination operations … ” This is an extremely puzzling statement. This information does not appear in the Inspector General report on the subject. It also does not appear in the Church Committee volumes. To my knowledge, neither Helms nor the CIA has ever uttered a word to this effect. So from where did the authors garner this? Its almost like they are indulging in posthumous mindreading. (As we shall see, they do this with Helms in another instance.)

    It gets worse. According to Legacy of Secrecy, LBJ learned about the C-Day plans in the aftermath of the assassination from Hoover and CIA Director John McCone. (pgs. 171-172) Again, this goes unsourced. And it does not appear in the declassified phone transcripts made available by the ARRB. According to even more secret sources, Naval Intelligence began to shred files from its “tight surveillance” on Oswald on the afternoon of November 24, 1963. ONI also did their own secret investigation of the JFK murder. The authors’ anonymous source actually saw the summary report and its “hundreds of supporting documents”. (p. 247) And another anonymous source, independently vouched for this report. (ibid) Finally in this unfootnoted, anonymous sourcing field, the authors state that RFK knew about David Ferrie’s relationship to Carlos Marcello back in 1963, maybe even earlier (p. 403). Again, this is strange. Not even Jim Garrison knew about this in 1963. And as everyone knows, when Garrison passed the Ferrie lead onto the FBI, they at first dropped it. And they then covered it up for the Warren Commission. But RFK knew about it before all this. But the prize in this regard goes to a paragraph on page 404. This paragraph deals with New Orleans matters. Mainly an alleged connection between Marcello and Dean Andrews, plus Clay Shaw’s ties to the CIA. The attached footnote to this information reads as follows:

    1994.05.09.10:43:33:16005 (p. 810, footnote 19).

    That’s right. Just a line of numbers related to nothing. And no one noticed this pre-publication. Maybe because they didn’t care?

    The continual use of this unscholarly practice—I could have named a dozen other similar instances—is a grievous shortcoming. Especially in a book that is attempting to revise the historical record on a serious subject. It indicates that, unlike with John Newman’s JFK and Vietnam, the writers do not have the factual data to fulfill their new paradigm. Probably because the paradigm doesn’t exist.

    Another sure sign of this lack of a factual basis is their recurrent use of the assumptive mode. When they need something to happen, they just assume it did. As I demonstrated in my earlier review, one of their aims is to shift the cause of the JFK cover-up. It did not occur because Oswald was some kind of intelligence operative. Oh, no. The main reason was fear of exposing C-Day. Now, since Hoover was the mainspring of the cover up, the authors must write that, “over the coming days, Hoover would no doubt learn more about the … coup plan … ” (p. 171) They offer no evidence for this and no source I have ever read on Hoover refers to it. After JFK is assassinated Santo Trafficante is carefree and smiling. Why? Because “Trafficante knew Jack Ruby, and he apparently felt confident that Ruby would be able to take care of silencing Oswald.” (p. 180) Yet I could find no evidence in the book to certify Trafficante’s arrangement with Ruby in advance. Why is the tape of the Hoover/LBJ call on November 23rd, at 10:01 AM missing? According to the authors, “one possibility” is that if LBJ had been briefed on C-Day he could have mentioned it in passing to Hoover on this call. (p. 225) Even though, as I said earlier, there is no evidence that Hoover-or LBJ for that matter-ever knew about C-Day. And certainly nothing would indicate that these plans caused the FBI or Warren Commission cover-up. When RFK met with Helms after the 1967 Jack Anderson story first publicly exposed the CIA-Mafia plots, they “probably discussed” not just that subject, but the 1963 C-Day plan and “the current status of Almeida and his family.” (p. 419) Even though there is no mention of C-Day in the CIA’s Inspector General Report on those plots.

    The most objectionable part of this whole fatuous C-Day cover-up story is that it detracts from the real cause of the cover-up. As demonstrated by writers like John Newman and John Armstrong, that would be the fabricated Mexico City tapes that were sent to Washington and Dallas the evening of the assassination. And which were then made to disappear. Why? Because the voice on the tapes was not Oswald’s. And that would have exposed the whole charade in Mexico City. And as both Newman and the Lopez Report reveal, the three main culprits in that pre-planned charade were James Angleton, David Phillips, and Anne Goodpasture. Which completely vitiates what the authors write at the end of Chapter 17. Namely, that no evidence exists implicating any CIA official above David Morales in the JFK murder.

    They also write that there is no confession to indicate any CIA officer’s participation besides Morales’ either. They neatly avoid David Phillips’ teary-eyed, deathbed confession about being in Dallas on the day of the assassination. Which he himself made to his own brother. (Dick Russell, The Man Who Knew Too Much, 2003 edition, p. 272) And, if you can believe it, in the entire volume there is not one mention of Richard Case Nagell. In fact, I don’t recall his name being in Ultimate Sacrifice either. So in 1,700 pages of writing about the JFK assassination Waldron and Hartmann choose to profusely quote liars like Frank Ragano and Ed Partin. But they couldn’t find the space to mention the man who Jim Garrison called, “the most important witness there is”.

    III

    Which brings us to their discussion of Jim Garrison, who was largely avoided in Ultimate Sacrifice. Although they mention aspects of Garrison’s inquiry earlier, the main part of this discussion leads off at Chapter 29. Their first page makes for an interesting intro. They try to disarm the reader by saying they have reviewed all the “books, articles, and documents” about the DA and have come to the conclusion that he “emerges as neither devil nor saint”. (p. 373) The implication being that after a long and painstaking review, Waldron and Hartmann are going to be fair-minded and objective about a controversial subject. As we shall see, that doesn’t happen. They also add that they will focus on things not talked about previously that reveal the Garrison investigation in a new light. Again, that is not done. With the agenda the authors have, how could it?

    I should note, the Garrison inquiry is mentioned prior to this chapter and its earlier treatment foreshadows what will come. For instance, the authors try to explain David Ferrie’s trip to Texas on the day and night of the assassination as an attempt to retrieve his library card from Oswald. (p. 177) This is odd. It is true that Ferrie was asking for that card from Oswald’s former landlady in New Orleans. But as Dick Russell notes in On the Trail of the JFK Assassins Ferrie told his friend Ray Broshears that he was waiting for a phone call at the skating rink concerning flying participants in the plot out of Texas. (Russell, p. 107) Secondly, wouldn’t it be kind of stupid for Ferrie to look for that card in Dallas? I mean, was he going to go to Ruth Paine’s house and ask her if the police found it yet? Or walk into the Dallas jail and ask Chief Curry if he could have his card back? With those greased eyebrows and that mohair wig?

    A second instance prior to Chapter 29 indicates the quality of their scholarship on the Garrison inquiry. They say that in 1964 Garrison called Robert Kennedy to talk to him about some of his ideas on the JFK case. But RFK hung up on him after some desultory conversation. (p. 254) The source for this piece of nonsense? None other than trashy biographer C. David Heymann. The authors never realize that Garrison could not have any theories to discuss with RFK at the time of this call because he was not investigating the JFK case in 1964. As I thoroughly demonstrated in my review of the book Regicide, Heymann cannot be trusted on anything concerning the JFK case. As is likely here, he has been shown to manufacture interviews. (This reliance on untrustworthy writers is another problem with the book that I will address later.)

    What is the “new light” that Waldron and Hartmann shed on the Garrison investigation? Well they hint at it early on, before they even discuss Garrison in a systematic way. They say that the FBI backed off the investigation of David Ferrie and Guy Banister not because of their ties to Oswald and Clay Shaw. But because of their links to Marcello. This is bizarre since no one knew about any Banister-Marcello tie until 15 years later. And it wasn’t what the authors present it as anyway. As I pointed out in my review of Ultimate Sacrifice, the HSCA stated that Ferrie got Banister some investigative work through Wray Gill, one of Marcello’s lawyers. And Waldron and Hartmann shorthanded this into a Banister-Marcello connection. They continue this eccentric characterization here. Yet, as anyone knows who has studied what Garrison called the “Banister Menagerie”, Banister did not do investigative work. This was just a front for his Cuban exile/CIA missions and other intelligence work he did e.g. planting infiltrators into college campuses. The people around his office who actually did investigative work were hangers-on like Jack Martin and Bill Nitschke. By this kind of logic, Martin and Nitschke were tied into the Mafia.

    Why is it important to note this bizarre interpretation? Because when all is said and done, the “new light” the authors shed on the Garrison inquiry is really a hoary and disproven platitude. By about the middle of Chapter 37 Waldron and Hartmann are merely echoing the likes of their trusted authorities like John Davis, Dan Moldea, and David Scheim. They say that by 1968 Garrison’s inquiry and his pursuit of Clay Shaw became a “grotesque sideshow” (p. 466). Why? Because it was a diversion away from the true perpetrators of the crime. Who of course were Marcello, Trafficante and Roselli. (pgs. 405, 421, 465) The origins of this discredited concept actually goes back almost forty years. To the infamous Life magazine hatchet job penned by FBI toady Sandy Smith. (William Davy, Let Justice Be Done, p. 162)

    One of the strongest indicators of their faulty scholarship about Garrison is their use of some questions that allegedly the New York Times sent to the DA. (p. 370) They say they found a copy of these questions in Garrisons’ files. One of the questions was about Ferrie’s rumored, at that time, association with Marcello. The questions were dated November 21, 1966. What the authors do with these questions and Garrison’s famous airplane trip with Senator Russell Long has to be detailed to understand their agenda on the subject. They actually try and say that because Long allegedly had ties to Marcello, and because Long’s trip with Garrison came after the date of the questions, therefore Long convinced Garrison not to go after Marcello. (ibid) This is fevered John Davis propaganda of a virulent strain. And they have nothing of substance to back it except the NY Times questions. And they then cheat on this. How? By moving the Long/Garrison plane ride back to December of 1966. This way Garrison’s discussion with Long about the JFK case comes after the alleged letter from the Times. But there is a big problem with it all. They are wrong about the date of the trip. The function that Garrison attended in New York occurred on November 13, 1966. In other words, it was before the date of the letter. (Davy, p. 57) But this is silliness anyway. Garrison had briefly investigated Ferrie back in 1963. And there are indications that he had intermittently started back onto the JFK case prior to the Long conversation. But his primary focus at these early points was on Oswald. And in 1966 and early 1967 it was on Oswald’s connections as an agent provocateur being run by Banister. Which Marcello had nothing to do with.

    What the authors do with Garrison and Bernardo DeTorres is even worse. De Torres is an incredibly intriguing personage who the HSCA showed a strong interest in. In fact, he was actually questioned in Executive Session. Gaeton Fonzi writes about DeTorres in his fine book, The Last Investigation. Except he conceals his name by calling him by the pseudonym “Carlos”. DeTorres had been a military coordinator for the Brigade 2506 part of the Bay of Pigs invasion. (Davy, p. 148) He was strongly suspected of being in Dallas on 11/22/63. And even of having pictures of Kennedy being killed in Dealey Plaza. He had been offered a large sum of money for the photos by Life magazine. (See Probe Vol. 3 No. 6) Further, DeTorres claimed to know that Oswald was not involved in the assassination since he knew who actually was involved. And he knew this because “they were talking about it before it even happened.” (Fonzi, p. 239) Later on, DeTorres worked with legendary CIA arms specialist Mitch Werbell, who some suspect of being involved in designing the weaponry used in Dealey Plaza. (See Spooks, by Jim Hougan, pgs 35-36)

    What few people knew prior to the ARRB process is that DeTorres first surfaced as a suspect during the Garrison investigation. He was one of the very early infiltrators sent in by the CIA. Allegedly recommended to the DA by a policeman, he told Garrison that he had important information about the murder. He also used Miami DA Richard Gerstein as a reference. (Davy, ibid) Since he was from Miami, Garrison gave him the assignment of questioning Eladio Del Valle, Ferrie’s colleague who Cuban G-2 strongly suspected of being part of the JFK plot. Not very long after DeTorres was sent to question him, Del Valle’s mutilated corpse was found near the front stairs of DeTorres’ Miami apartment. (ibid) This was at the same time that Ferrie was mysteriously found dead in his apartment. The HSCA later developed evidence that DeTorres was filing reports on Garrison for the Miami CIA station JM/WAVE as he was serving as a double agent in his office. By the time he worked with Werbell, the Cuban exile community knew that Bernardo was the man to see if you had a problem. Why? Because he had “contacts on a high level with the CIA in Washington D.C.” (ibid)

    All of this is absolutely riveting information. And it was not readily available until the time of the ARRB. The backward light it shines on Garrison is nearly blinding. Why? One reason is that Clay Shaw defenders sometimes say that the CIA was “monitoring” Garrison because he was accusing them in the press of being involved in the JFK conspiracy. But the DeTorres penetration occurred before the Garrison inquiry was even made public. And it also occurred before the DA had decided on the CIA as his prime suspect. So before Garrison made any public comments about the CIA, a highly connected Agency plant was sent in and was filing reports with JM/WAVE. And further, DeTorres may have been involved in the setting up of Del Valle because of his association with Ferrie. And it should be noted here that Richard Case Nagell was on the trail of both Ferrie and Del Valle in the spring of 1963 (Dick Russell, The Man Who Knew Too Much, 2003 edition, p. 182). Which, of course, is months before the assassination.

    What Waldron and Hartmann do with all this remarkable information about DeTorres is kind of shocking. (pgs 387-88) They do refer to him as a spy in Garrison’s camp. But they never mention him by name! Then, differing with Garrison authority Bill Davy, they say he was recommended to the DA not by the police, but by another Cuban. And finally Del Valle, “Garrison’s [unnamed] investigator”, and Rolando Masferer (What?) all had ties to Santo Trafficante. So the implication is that the Florida Don had Del Valle killed. Why? Because if he was linked to the JFK assassination, his empire would collapse. That’s what they write. (p. 387) How he would be linked to the Kennedy assassination at this point in time is never explained. In fact, I don’t think we are supposed to ask. But by concealing DeTorres’ name, his background, his ties to JM/WAVE, and the circumstances of Del Valle’s murder, it reverses the logical deduction of what happened to Del Valle. In other words, the censorship and tortured logic conceals a CIA operation and deliberately disguises it as Mafia oriented. The exposure of the above information about DeTorres proves this could not have been by accident. So does their concealment of his name. They didn’t want you to know his name because then you would find out how tied in with the CIA he was. It’s the same thing they did with Edwin Black’s work on the Chicago plot. And as before, this had to have been done by design. ( I will return to Black’s work later.)

    Predictably, the flip side of the coin is also manifest here. If the deluded DA was being led astray, his attacker Walter Sheridan was on the right track. Because, of course, Sheridan suspected the Mafia, especially Carlos Marcello. (p. 465) A lot of their material about Sheridan and Garrison is drawn from David Talbot’s book Brothers. In my review of that volume I minutely examined why Talbot was wrong about his depiction of what Sheridan was doing in New Orleans for NBC, and why he was doing it. The idea that Sheridan strongly suspected that Marcello was behind the JFK killing was brought into question by a conversation that Irving Davidson had on the day the HSCA report was issued. Lobbyist Davidson was a lifelong friend of Marcello’s who also knew Sheridan. And Sheridan, who is sourced in those HSCA volumes, told Davidson that the HSCA report was a piece of crap. (Bugliosi, op. cit., p. 1175) As I said in my review of Brothers, the question now becomes: What did Sheridan actually believe about the JFK case? And further: Was he deliberately leading the HSCA astray? This is a question that Talbot sidestepped. And so do the present authors.

    IV

    As in the first book, the authors make some truly unbelievable statements that are almost perverse in their logic and sense. For instance, they write that if the idea behind the assassination was to provoke an invasion of Cuba, the conspirators would have kept Oswald alive longer so he would have been the focus of an outcry against Fidel. (p. 239) In reality, the longer Oswald was kept alive, the higher the risk was that he would betray who he really was to the authorities. In fact, this risk was seriously broached while he was being held. First, through his attempted call to Raleigh, North Carolina, and second, when the FBI listened to the Mexico City tapes and discovered the voice on them was not Oswald’s. And at this point, Oswald did not even have a lawyer. So the longer he was held, the higher the risk he would declare himself an undercover agent.

    Why did suspicion fall upon Oswald after the assassination? Legacy of Secrecy poses a novel approach to that mystery. Waldron and Hartmann posit that it was due to Oswald’s friendly relations with minority employees. This created suspicion about him in the aftermath of the crime. (p.121) Of course, they present no evidence for this rather strange and revolutionary theory.

    The Tom Tilson story about a man escaping down the railway embankment behind the grassy knoll has been discredited for many years (p. 116), most notably by Canadian author Peter Whitmey. But it gets trotted out here again. And in fact, it gets embellished. They say the man running to a car and throwing something in the back resembled Jack Ruby.

    The interpretation that Waldron and Hartmann put on the alleged attempt by Oswald to shoot General Edwin Walker is startling-even for them. It begins with an incredible report that Oswald was in a New Orleans jail around April 1, 1963. (p. 263) Yet, he had not moved there yet. The authors insinuate that this was somehow part of the congressional investigations into the ordering of weapons through the mail. They then imply that somehow the Walker shooting was manipulated by Walker and his allies to divert attention away from themselves and also people like Marcello, Banister and Joseph Milteer. (p. 265) Conveniently left out of how the Walker tale was manipulated are two key elements. The first is Ruth Paine. She produced the note about the escapade allegedly left by Oswald, which had no fingerprints on it. This was turned over to the police on November 30, 1963. So even though the police had searched the Paine residence twice, they did not find it. It was this note that first caused the FBI to look at Oswald as a suspect in the Walker shooting. (John Armstrong, Harvey and Lee, p. 512) Second, it was this note which caused the FBI to switch both the caliber and the color of the bullet the Dallas Police retrieved from the Walker residence to match the ammunition of the Mannlicher Carcano. (Gerald McKnight, Breach of Trust, p. 49) Incredibly, the authors do not even mention Ruth Paine’s role in this charade and they minimize what the FBI did to transform the bullet. Even though McKnight shows that the FBI knew they were participating in a deception. (ibid pgs 49-50)

    In this regard I must note that the authors pay me a backhanded compliment in this book. My review of Ultimate Sacrifice was fairly coruscating and it received some notoriety within the research community. Waldron and Hartmann clearly read it and took it seriously because they try and counteract several of my criticisms. One of the most serious ones was my relating of an anecdote in Richard Helms’ autobiography entitled A Look Over my Shoulder. On November 19, 1963 Helms visited Robert Kennedy’s office and told him that Castro was shipping a large amount of arms into Venezuela in order to upset their upcoming elections. (Helms, pgs 226-27). Helms has RFK saying nothing. He looks at the evidence the CIA took in—a foreign made submachine gun allegedly retrieved from an arms cache-and told Helms to go see President Kennedy. Helms and his assistant do so and JFK asked a couple of questions about how that large a shipment of weapons got through. They then left and later that day, Helms asked Kennedy’s assistant, Ken O’Donnell, for a picture.

    Now, in my original critique I posed the question that if C-Day was coming up in 12 days, and if all the principals involved in this episode were knowledgeable about it i.e. RFK, JFK and Helms, why would the CIA Director of Plans even bother to see the Kennedys if he knew we were invading Cuba shortly? This story shot a harpoon into the guts of their whole C-Day scenario. Because the authors maintained that even though McNamara, Rusk, and Bundy did not know about C-Day, Helms did. And it would be impossible for all four not to know. But this story, in Helms’ own book, indicates he did not. When they relate this tale in Legacy of Secrecy (p. 36), they leave out the capper. In his book, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (p. 383), CIA analyst Joseph B. Smith mentions this specific arms seizure. And from the reports on it, he deduced that the CIA planted the weapons. So if Helms knew about C-Day, why did he go to the trouble of planting those weapons if he knew we were invading Cuba anyway?

    This is their hapless reply to that question: Helms was testing JFK to see if he was getting cold feet about the invasion. But the problem is there is not any indication of this in Helms’ book. On anyone’s behalf. But further, the authors now contradict themselves in another important way to give their phony spin a pretext in reality. In their first book, they characterized JFK’s back channel to Castro through people like Lisa Howard, Jean Daniel, and William Attwood as going nowhere. In my review, I showed this was false. There was progress being made and JFK was very interested in that progress continuing. I postulated that what Helms was actually trying to do with the planted arms cache was to scuttle those talks since he knew that JFK did not want Cuba interfering in Venezuela’s elections. Now, sit down before you read the next sentence. Waldron and Hartmann have stolen my explanation and try and make it work for them! Now they say that Helms was doing all this to ensure the invasion against the back channel’s imminent success. Without noting that in their previous volume they said there would be no point in doing such a thing since the talks were useless.

    To me, the rearranging of facts, recasting of events, and posthumous mindreading into Helms’ psyche, all this is not scholarship. Plain and simple, it is CYA.

    Another instance where they try and counteract my critique is in regards to their alleged “confession” from Santo Trafficante about his role in the JFK assassination. Using Tony Summers’ work (Vanity Fair, 12/94), I showed that the originator of this tall tale, Mafia lawyer Frank Ragano, was almost surely lying. Why? Because Ragano placed Trafficante in Tampa on the day of his phony confession. He could not have been there since 1.) He was undergoing dialysis treatments and was using a colostomy bag, 2.) Summers interviewed two witnesses who placed him in Miami on the day, 3/13/87, he made the ersatz confession in Tampa. 3.) His doctor in Tampa did not see him on the day in question, and 4.) His relatives said he had not been to Tampa in months. In the face of all this, the authors still vouch for Ragano’s veracity. (p. 757) But they do not tell the reader about the colostomy bag, which would make the 280 mile drive or flight to Tampa ludicrous. And they leave out the two witnesses who placed him in Miami, and the fact he did not see his doctor while in Tampa.

    A third effect of my review is that now the authors properly source Edwin Black’s groundbreaking work on the attempt to kill President Kennedy in Chicago. If one recalls, in Ultimate Sacrifice they tried to disguise the proper source of this essay by footnoting that magazine article to a book by one George Black. A book that did not even discuss JFK’s assassination. Here, they properly source it but incredibly, they never even note how they failed to do so in the first book. They then indirectly confirm my worst fears about why they did not. On page 787, in the Acknowledgments, they write the following sentence: “The work of the following people was useful in our research, even though at times we may differ with some in our conclusions”. The first name listed of people they disagree with in conclusions is Edwin Black’s. In other words, they didn’t like what Black did with the Chicago plot. So they apparently wanted no one to find his work since it would contradict their own. With no thanks to Waldron and Hartmann, you can read Black’s essay here.

    What can one say about this kind of scholarship and honesty? Except that in each instance I mention, the evidence indicates that the authors knew about the information that I used. They chose to ignore it. And in the case of Black, they tried to bury it.

    V

    One of the reasons they desperately hang on to the Ragano/Trafficante fantasy is because they want to ballyhoo this “confessional” motif as evidence that they were right about the actual JFK culprits in Ultimate Sacrifice. That is, the Mafia killed JFK. So they hang on to the specious Ragano declaration because they need it for the Trafficante part of their confessionals. Even though it almost certainly did not happen.

    They also use “confessions” by John Martino and David Morales. These are also dubious. In the case of Morales (p. 97), how can you call what he said a “confession”? After raging against what JFK did at the Bay of Pigs, he then said “Well, we took care of that son of a bitch didn’t we.” (Gaeton Fonzi, The Last Investigation, p. 390) As John Simkin, among others, has commented, this can be fairly interpreted as being nothing but cheap braggadocio. Going further than that, I would be willing to wager that you could have heard dozens of remarks by both the Cuban exiles and CIA operators about JFK down through the years. Does that mean they were all involved in his assassination? But further, Morales was a CIA man all the way. So how does this prove their Mob-did-it thesis?

    In my review of Larry Hancock’s Someone Would Have Talked, I commented on the case of John Martino. The information Martino allegedly conveyed through friends and relatives—which is hard to keep track of since, 35 years later, it keeps on growing—does not connote Martino being part of a plot. To quote myself in my critique of that book, “As summarized above, the information Martino had could have been communicated to him through several of his Cuban exile friends. None of it connotes Martino being part of the plot. And Hancock advances no affirmative evidence to prove that point.” And as I noted in that review, the other person Hancock uses, Richard Case Nagell, is a much more valuable witness than Martino. For me, and in practical terms, Nagell is worth ten times what Martino is worth.

    Another “confession” Waldron and Hartmann use is allegedly by John Roselli. This one they source to Richard Mahoney’s book Sons and Brothers. This is the sum and substance of the “Roselli confession” as it appears on page 229 of that book: “Washington attorney Tom Wadden, a longtime friend and attorney of Roselli’s, subsequently confirmed Roselli’s role in plotting to kill the president.” One natural question in response to this single sentence is: What plotting was he talking about? What exactly did Roselli do? Because if there are no details, there is no confession. But it’s actually worse than that. Because Mahoney never even interviewed Wadden. He got this from Bill Hundley, a former Justice Department lawyer under RFK. Wadden is mentioned exactly one other time in Mahoney’s book. That is on page 333 along with a group of other Mafia attorneys like Jack Wasserman. Before I read about this “startling confession” I wondered why I did not recall any other author sourcing it in the ten years since the Mahoney book had been published. Now I know.

    Obviously, in light of the above, the authors were getting desperate to come up with something of substance. So early on in the book, they foreshadow what will be their “crown jewel” in this regard. (pgs 46-51) That is a confession by Carlos Marcello. They refer to this as the “CAMTEX documents” since Carlos Marcello was in a Texas prison when they originated. And they mischaracterize them at the start. They say that these documents were discovered at the National Archives in 2006 (p. 47) The implication being that no one ever saw them before. Which is false. Ace Archives researcher Peter Vea sent them to me in 1997. Which is ten years before Waldron and Hartmann found them. They also write that the contents are being published in Legacy of Secrecy for the first time. (p. 46) Again, this is misleading. Vincent Bugliosi referred to them in Reclaiming History. (See the End Notes file, pgs. 658-659)

    Both of the above shed light on why no one used them before. When Peter sent me the documents, he titled his background work on them as “The Crazy Last Days of Carlos Marcello.” Peter had done some work on Marcello’s health while he was incarcerated. And between that, and the reports that came out at the time of his 1993 death, he and I concluded that at the time of the CAMTEX documents Marcello was suffering from the onset of Alzheimer’s disease. Today, the accepted gestation period for the disease is about seven years. There is little doubt that by 1988-89 Marcello’s Alzheimer’s was in full and raging bloom. And at this time period, Marcello’s general health was beginning to collapse through a series of strokes. Now, the time period of Marcello’s talks with the jailhouse informant who is one of the sources for the CAMTEX documents begins in 1985. So if you do the arithmetic you will see that Marcello’s Alzheimer’s was very likely well along by then. And later on, when told about the jailhouse informant’s accusation that he had Kennedy killed, Marcello replied that this was “crazy talk”. (Bugliosi op cit p. 658)

    And in fact it is. The CAMTEX documents actually have Marcello meeting with Oswald in person and in public at his brother’s restaurant. (p. 50) But that’s nothing. According to CAMTEX, Marcello set up Ruby’s bar business and Ruby would come to Marcello’s estate to report to him! And so after being seen in public with both the main participants, he has the first one kill Kennedy and the second kill Oswald. But yet, the authors are so intent on getting the CAMTEX documents out there that they don’t note that these contradict their own conclusion written elsewhere in the same book. Namely that Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy. (p. 121)

    VI

    This is already too lengthy to go into any long discussion of the parts of the book devoted to the King case, the RFK case, and Watergate. But, in my view, these are even worse than the JFK section of the book. Which is saying something. For instance, they conclude that James Earl Ray killed King. Without telling the reader that the rifle he allegedly used needed to be properly calibrated by machine. And it wasn’t. Who put Ray up to it? Well it was Joseph Milteer, with the help of Carlos Marcello. (Talk about the Odd Couple.) What’s the evidence for this? Almost all of it is the unnamed sources I noted above. ( In fact, Chapter 52 about Milteer and Spake meeting Ray in Atlanta comes off as near self-parody.)

    And what these two do with Grace and Charlie Stephens is simply appalling. They actually smear her and try and rehabilitate him! This is the woman who, when the authorities went to her to get an ID on Ray, refused to sign the papers because the man she saw in the boarding house the day of the murder was smaller and older. She still refused when they offered her a 100,000 dollar reward. Even though she was poor. When they took the same deal to her husband Charles, he readily made the identification. Even though he was falling down drunk at the time of the shooting. When he tried to collect on the money, the offer was withdrawn. He sued and his efforts failed. So this drunk became the witness that got Ray extradited back for his phony trial. Just so his lawyer Percy Foreman could sell him down the river.

    And what happened to Grace? She got stashed away in a mental institution for ten years. When Mark Lane finally found her there he asked her if he could talk to her about the King case. She agreed. But she told him she was not going to lie about the man she saw at the boarding house. Lane said that was fine. He just wanted her to tell the truth. She did, and the man she saw was not Ray.

    Attempting to rehab Charlie Stephens is like rehabbing Howard Brennan in the JFK case. (All this information on the Stephens matter is reported in Code Name Zorro by Lane and Dick Gregory.) Further, if you can believe it-which you probably can by now-they ignore all the new material generated on the MLK case in the nineties. That is during the attempt by Judge Joe Brown to get the case retried at the time. But yet this is the newest material generated on that case. But it doesn’t fit their agenda. So they ignore it.

    They also strongly imply that Sirhan shot RFK (p. 686). Yep, hypnotized himself into doing it at the request of the Mafia. (p. 666) And that night at the Ambassador Hotel, Sirhan had those drinks to steel himself to kill RFK. (p. 629) See, Sirhan was a compulsive gambler who was losing hundreds of dollars. (p. 626) And … you get the drift by now, don’t you? Incredibly, in the entire section on the RFK case there is not one mention of either MK/Ultra or William J. Bryan. And Bryan is the man who most suspect of programming Sirhan. In fact, there is much evidence to show this is the case. Further, they say it was not Thane Cesar who shot RFK. (p. 641) Even though he was the only person in perfect position to deliver the fatal shot. In fact, any of the RFK shots. Shane O’Sullivan disconnected Michael Wayne from Khaiber Khan in Who Killed Bobby? to minimize that conspiracy angle. Waldron and Hartmann do the opposite: they discount Khan and do not even mention Michael Wayne. (pgs. 660)

    What was the reason for the RFK cover-up? According to them one of the reasons was whether or not drug trafficking played a role in the case. (Read it yourself on p. 680) See, the LAPD acted then and now “not as part of a massive orchestrated cover-up, but to avoid embarrassment and scandal for the department.” (p. 686) If you read Lisa Pease’s review of An Open and Shut Case you will see that what caused the cover-up. It was the probable 14 shots fired that night when Sirhan’s weapon could only fire eight. Further, the acoustics tape indicates the shots came from two directions and therefore from at least two assassins. And Sirhan was not one of the assailants of RFK. Because if he was, they would not have had to substitute the bullet evidence at the Wenke Panel hearings. Which is what the evidence indicates happened. Incredibly, the book does not even mention those proceedings supervised by Judge Wenke. Which would be like discussing the JFK case and never mentioning the HSCA. Further, and perhaps even more shocking, the work done on the newly discovered audio tape of the shooting by sound technician Phil Von Pragg is also never discussed. Even though the cable TV special based on this key discovery was broadcast a year before the book came out.

    And how do the authors support the nonsense they write about these two cases? By using authors like Gerald Posner in the King case and Dan Moldea in the RFK case.

    Their section on Watergate is just as outlandish. They say that the whole motivation behind the two year scandal was Nixon’s attempt to get the Inspector General’s Report on the CIA-Mafia plots. When that seems like thin gruel (because Nixon is not in the report), they shift over to the Inspector General’s Report on the Bay of Pigs operation. (pgs 716-17) The point of all this thrashing about? The usual. The arrests at the Watergate were not engineered by Helms and the CIA. (p. 720) Even though, as Jim Hougan has proven in Secret Agenda, CIA agents James McCord and Howard Hunt deliberately sabotaged the break-in that night. And there are two sources-one through Hougan and one through Washington lawyer Dan Alcorn— that say Helms was alerted to the arrests as they happened.

    I don’t want to leave the impression that the book is utterly worthless. It’s not quite that horrendous. There are some good tidbits in it. For instance, a CIA agent actually reviewed Edward Epstein’s book Inquest when it was published. And this became the model for the famous “Countering the Critics” CIA memorandum prepared for Helms. (p. 380) There is a good description of how LBJ, Earl Warren, and Hoover plotted against the critical movement. (pgs 356-61) The authors note how quickly Johnson shifted the tone and attention in South Vietnam after Kennedy’s death. (p. 275) Finally, they show that it was Arlen Specter who actually composed Dave Powers’ false affidavit about where the direction of the shots came from in Dealey Plaza. (p. 308)

    Unfortunately, that’s about it for the positives. Which is a really bad batting average for a book of over 800 pages. Yet none of the travesty listed above stops people like Rex Bradford and John Simkin from having Waldron do interviews on their web sites. Which makes me think the assassinations are really more of a business interest for these two entrepreneurs than a pursuit of historical truth.

    Let me conclude with one last point. One which I actually was not going to bring up at all. But I have to. Because, near the end, the authors bring it up themselves. Some of the supporters of Ultimate Sacrifice, like Mark Crispin Miller, have said that I accused Waldron of being some kind of agent in my review of that book. I did not. If you read the review carefully, I was talking about Gus Russo in that regard. And I have analyzed the Russo issue at length in my essay “Who is Gus Russo?” But the authors go out of their way to address this charge by saying that they “want to make it clear that they have never worked for the CIA.” (p. 768) This may be technically true. But it is not the whole story. And we know this from the proverbial Horse’s Mouth. A few years ago, Hartmann was giving a talk in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania about one of his many other books. Two JFK researchers were in attendance, Jerry Policoff and Steve Jones. They were both taken aback by one of his early statements. He admitted quite openly to having past ties to both the CIA and corporate America. The question then becomes: If he was open about that then, why is he being disingenuous about it now? To give Legacy of Secrecy the credibility it does not have on its own? Another question: Does Waldron know about this? Or is he just along for the ride?