Tag: COLD WAR

  • Garrison Interview, “Some Unauthorized Comments on the State of the Union” (May 27, 1969)

    Garrison Interview, “Some Unauthorized Comments on the State of the Union” (May 27, 1969)


    This remarkable interview with Jim Garrison was done about two months after Clay Shaw was acquitted.

    It is an interview with a European publication since, for reasons he notes, Garrison had given up doing such things with the American press.

    Note that some of the things he brings up differ from his previous interview in 1967 in Playboy. For instance, quite early, he brings up the importance of Vietnam to the assassination, and he then returns to this at the end. He is now open about the role of the FBI in cooperation with the Warren Commission in the cover up. (p. 3). Right after this, he singles out Allen Dulles for his role on the Commission. He then becomes one of the first commentators to say there was a link between the murders of JFK, King, and Bobby Kennedy. He understands just how important Pierre Finck’s bombshell testimony was at the Clay Shaw trial (p. 18). He then describes the after-effects of a coup d’état and how the new government ratifies itself (p. 20). He is very pessimistic on the truth about Kennedy’s murder ever coming to light. In retrospect, what makes all this so impressive is how correct he was in the light of history on all these points. It is also enlightening to compare his ideas about the case to what others were writing and saying at the time. Most of the other critics were still concentrating on what happened in Dealey Plaza. They were not even aware of the bombshells in Finck’s testimony. But we now know the Justice Department certainly was, to the point they sent Thornton Boswell, another JFK pathologist, to New Orleans to discredit Finck, although they did not follow through on the plan.

    Our thanks to Bart Kamp and the invaluable Malcolm Blunt for this engrossing interview. Thanks also go to Prof. Dennis Riches of Seijo University, Tokyo, for providing the following, more legible transcription of the original document.

    ~ Jim DiEugenio


    (Click here to open the document in another page.)

  • NATO’s Secret Armies, Operation Gladio, and JFK

    NATO’s Secret Armies, Operation Gladio, and JFK

    The very word “secrecy” is repugnant in a free and open society; and we are as a people inherently and historically opposed to secret societies, to secret oaths, and to secret proceedings. We decided long ago that the dangers of excessive and unwarranted concealment of pertinent facts far outweighed the dangers which are cited to justify it. Even today, there is little value in opposing the threat of a closed society by imitating its arbitrary restrictions. Even today, there is little value in insuring the survival of our nation if our traditions do not survive with it. And there is very grave danger that an announced need for increased security will be seized upon by those anxious to expand its meaning to the very limits of official censorship and concealment. That I do not intend to permit to the extent that it is in my control.

    – John F. Kennedy, addressing the American Newspapers Publishers Association, April 27, 1961

    I. JFK in Italy

    On 1 July 1963, less than five months before his assassination, John F. Kennedy was escorted by motorcade through Rome, passing a large crowd gathered beside the Roman Coliseum, where gladiatorial contests were once held. The Latin-based gladiator is rooted to the Celtic term gladius, or sword. In Italy, the gladio of the ancient warriors was characterized by a short double-edged blade.

    JFK motorcade passing the Colosseum

    That evening, Kennedy was the special guest at a banquet held in the Quirinale Palace and arranged by the Italian president, Antonio Segni. One of the dignitaries Kennedy was due to confer with was Pietro Nenni, head of Italy’s Socialist Party (PSI). Nenni’s greatest hope was that JFK would lend his support to the “opening to the left” (l’apertura a sinistra): a plan frowned upon by the Eisenhower administration, which would create a left-of-center coalition between the Socialists and Italy’s ruling party, the Christian Democrats. Nenni was not disappointed. Deeply moved by their intense conversation, he left the meeting with tears of joy in his eyes. Shortly afterward, Kennedy would give his official approval to l’apertura and ask labor leader Victor Reuther and his brother Walter, president of the United Auto Workers, to help generate financial aid to the Socialists.

    President Kennedy at the Quirinale Palace

    Upon his return from Europe, the president remarked to his special assistant Arthur Schlesinger (the man who had initially convinced Kennedy to support l’apertura): “So far as I could see, everyone in Italy is for an opening to the left.” For any scholar familiar with the history of Operation Gladio, such a remark could mean only one of two things. Either Kennedy was playing his cards very close to his vest with a man who had already earned his trust and confidence, or he was completely uninformed on the subject of Italy’s postwar clandestine “stay-behind” guerrilla army: a virulently anticommunist, antisocialist, and one might even say antidemocratic organization, code-named Gladio.

    As the Swiss historian Dr. Daniele Ganser explains in his book about NATO’s secret armies,

    When John F Kennedy became president in January 1961 the policy of the United States toward Italy changed because Kennedy, unlike his predecessors Truman and Eisenhower, sympathized with the PSI [Italian Socialist Party]. He agreed with a CIA analysis that in Italy “the strength of the socialists, even without aid from outside, means that left-wing sentiment looked forward to a democratic form of socialism.” Yet Kennedy’s plans for reform met with stiff resistance from both the U.S. State Department and the CIA.1

    JFK at City Hall in Rome

    Indeed, there were shadowy forces back in Washington that remained hell-bent on thwarting the president’s goals and whose actual alliance was to a power elite that transcended the agenda of any mere president. At this historical moment, the covert “powers that be” were, in part, represented by some rather sinister overt figures who also liked to linger in those shadows, as “spooks” are wont to do.

    One was James Angleton, the CIA’s chief of Counterintelligence, who played a singular role in rescuing and recruiting some of the more bestial Fascists who were later to serve in Operation Gladio, such as Prince Junio Valerio Borghese (aka “The Black Prince”), commander of an anti-partisan campaign that murdered hundreds of Italian communists who had fought against Mussolini. Prince Borghese, “in close collaboration with the CIA in Rome on the night of December 7, 1970 started the second right-wing Gladio coup d’état in Italy, code-named Tora Tora”2 (now known as the Borghese coup). As historian Stuart Christie notes, “Angleton became the key American figure controlling all right wing and neofascist political and paramilitary groups in Italy in the postwar period.”3

    Another notable spook was Richard Helms, the CIA’s Deputy Director for Plans, who, along with Allen Dulles, helped to establish MKULTRA, a barbaric mind-control program that even the CIA’s current website admits broke the Nuremberg Code that “prohibits experimentation with humans without their consent.”

    And then there was Bill Harvey. Although Harvey wasn’t part of the upper echelon, he was a hard-boiled operator who was placed in charge of running some important missions. One was Task Force W, part of Operation Mongoose, the CIA’s covert war against Cuba. Another was ZR/RIFLE, the Agency’s assassination program designed to eliminate foreign leaders. Harvey had particularly incurred the wrath of the president’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, because of his insubordination during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the midst of delicate negotiations between JFK and Soviet Premier Khrushchev that narrowly avoided World War III, Harvey had the temerity to secretly launch three boat missions against Cuba. As a result, an utterly furious RFK demanded he be sacked. Instead, Richard Helms quietly shipped Harvey off to Europe as a means of protecting him. Harvey was appointed as the CIA’s Rome station chief, where he would work closely with certain right-wing members of the Italian secret service.

    We should also highlight the figure of Allen Dulles, who, although officially “retired” in 1961 at JFK’s insistence, continued to exert significant influence behind the scenes.4 Dulles’s Operation Paperclip and Gehlen Operation had rescued Nazis from prosecution at the Nuremberg trials (either by changing their names or altering their résumés) so they could later be used as scientists and engineers in American research projects and also as intelligence officers against the USSR for West Germany. Paperclip paved the way for similar compromises with unrepentant Fascists, Nazis, and right-wing terrorists who were recruited to serve in the secret Gladio network throughout Europe, all with NATO’s consent.

    Dulles directed the creation of Gladio from its inception. In the words of Dr. Ganser: “Dulles during his time as Director of CIA had been the brain behind the secret anti-Communist armies. When the Gladio secret armies were discovered across Western Europe in 1990, an unnamed former NATO intelligence official explained that ‘though the Stay Behind operation was officially started only in 1952, the whole exercise had been in existence for a long time, in fact ever since it was born in the head of Allen Dulles.’”5

    Approaching NATO headquarters in Naples

    In a story that was first reported by David Talbot in The Devil’s Chessboard, as soon as Kennedy returned to Washington, Dino Pionzio,6 the “CIA’s leading operator in Italy,” approached Aldo Moro’s administrative secretary (and future prime minister) Sereno Freato. Dino wanted to pick his brain about Moro’s recent conversation with Kennedy during the Rome visit. (Moro, a prominent member of the Christian Democrats, would serve his first term as prime minister beginning on December 4th of that year.) This was when Pionzio—and the powers that be—learned that JFK and Moro had agreed to advance the goals of l’apertura or the “opening to the left.” Talbot adds: “Dulles and the CIA felt they had a proprietary relationship with the Christian Democrats, ever since those early Cold War days when the agency began funneling money to the Italian party.”

    As Daniele Ganser likes to point out, rigging the 1948 Italian election was the first operation ever conducted by the recently formed CIA. Some of it was done out of the office of the Dulles brothers law firm, Sullivan and Cromwell. (James Angleton would also play an important role in helping to steal that ’48 election.) An electoral success by the Christian Democrats would allow for a non-Communist Italy to join NATO the following year. Once that was accomplished, the direction of the Italian government would fall under the secret control of NATO’s clandestine operational arm, Gladio. During the Cold War, Britain and the United States were both deeply alarmed over the prospect of a coalition government in Italy that included the Socialists and the Communists. According to Italian magistrate Felice Casson, to undermine such collaboration a “strategy of tension”—the disruption of ordinary civilian life by prefabricated social violence and chaos—would be put into place by forces within the State.

    Pionzio’s meeting with Freato put the Christian Democrats on notice: their budding alliance with the Socialists did not enjoy full support in Washington, particularly in national security circles […] The CIA’s attempt to subvert the aperture was one more flagrant example of how the agency sought to undermine the Kennedy presidency, as well as Italian democracy.7

    JFK attending ceremony at NATO headquaters, Naples

    Nonetheless, that November—in a move that would later help to seal his fate—Aldo Moro went ahead and created a coalition government that included the Socialists. The following summer, when JFK-hater Bill Harvey arrived in Rome to assume his position as CIA station chief, he didn’t waste any time. In a page taken right out of the Gladio script, Harvey tried to convince Renzo Rocca, an espionage chief working with Italian intelligence (or SIFAR) “to use his ‘action squads’ to carry out bombings of Christian Democratic Party offices and newspapers—terrorist acts that were to be blamed on the left.”8 This was a foreshadowing of what would occur in the years ahead, during Italy’s infamous Anni di piombo, or “Years of Lead”: a period extending from the late Sixties to the late Eighties. Even Harvey’s deputy in Rome, Felton Wyatt, who served as a principal CIA liaison with Operation Gladio, later professed to be shocked by Harvey’s extremism.

    Perhaps it’s no coincidence that the escalating violence of the “Years of Lead” coincided with the appointment of General Lyman Lemnitzer as Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO (SACEUR). In his position as SACEUR from 1963 to 1969, Lemnitzer would have the final word over the activities of Gladio.

    Lemnitzer served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962, but was relieved of his position by JFK shortly after Lemnitzer approved of Operation Northwoods. This plan proposed the staging of false-flag operations, including terrorist bombings in Florida and in the nation’s capital, that would have wounded Cuban refugees (and, one assumes, other innocent bystanders). Northwoods also proposed the blowing up of an American ship harbored in Guantanamo Bay—and then blaming all the terror on pro-Castro Miami Cubans. As if to illustrate that such false-flag mayhem was nothing new, the Northwoods memo even makes reference to the sinking of the USS Maine in Cuba, another probable act of state-directed violence that conveniently served as a trigger for the Spanish-American war.

    On March 13, 1962, Lemnitzer submitted his Northwoods plan to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Fortunately, Northwoods was never carried out, and it remains uncertain whether JFK ever saw the original memo. However, three days later, at a Cuba strategy meeting held in the Oval Office, Lemnitzer “informed Kennedy that the Joint Chiefs ‘had plans for creating plausible pretexts to use force [against Cuba], with the pretexts either attacks on U.S. aircraft or a Cuban action in Latin America for which we would retaliate.’” According to Air Force officer Edward Lansdale, the president replied “bluntly that we were not discussing the use of U.S. military force.”9 Lemnitzer’s relationship with Kennedy was antagonistic and his persistence in trying to convince JFK to take military action against Cuba finally forced the president’s hand. A few months later, Kennedy denied Lemnitzer a second term and informed the general that he would instead be serving at the helm of NATO.

    Kennedy’s motorcade, featuring a fully enclosed security phalanx, driving through Naples

    In his 2018 memoir, American Values, Robert Kennedy Jr. calls Lemnitzer a “warmongering general” and “a Cold War fanatic,” adding:

    That Operation Northwoods memo should serve as a warning to the American people about the dangers of allowing the military to set goals or standards for our country.10

    The Northwoods memo is unique only insofar as it remains the single official document released by the government that spells out a plan for terror directed against American citizens on domestic soil. No doubt, there were other equally insane military contingency plans floating around which have either remained classified or been destroyed.11 But Northwoods clearly illustrates how this sort of amoral “strategic” thinking was typical of the power elite. In the years ahead, the same strategy of false-flag pandemonium was actually carried out in Europe, especially in places such as Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, Turkey, and Greece, all of which suffered some of the worst State-sponsored terror that was unleashed by NATO’s secret army.

    Gladio was coordinated by NATO and run by various European secret services under the supervision of the CIA and Britain’s MI6. All this is the subject of Daniele Ganser’s groundbreaking and encyclopedic tome, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe (which I have relied upon for most of the Gladio-related information in this essay). Building on earlier works such as Philip Willan’s seminal Puppetmasters (an examination of Gladio in Italy) and British reporter Peter Murtagh’s The Rape of Greece, Ganser has constructed the first in-depth examination of the Gladio network as it unfolded throughout all of Western Europe.

    In various interviews with Dr. Ganser, the listener may notice a frequent use of the term “data” and the question of whether certain statements are adequately supported by such objective facts. A quick look at his background is illuminating in this regard: Ganser was Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the prestigious Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), in Zurich. He studied at Basel University in Switzerland, at Amsterdam University in the Netherlands, and at the London School of Economics and Political Science. (Perhaps not surprisingly, Ganser’s history professors at this most prestigious British institution had never heard of Gladio: an omission that Ganser compares to a specialist on late-twentieth-century history having never been schooled about the Vietnam War!) Thus, as a serious historian who gradually grew fascinated with the subject of secret warfare and the eventual exposure of the Gladio network, Ganser’s first question concerned the nature of the extant factual data and how it might support this seemingly outlandish tale. As a result, his narrative proceeds from one fact to the next, with a minimum of speculation or theoretical detour. For those familiar with some of the more ungrounded and meandering sallies into this territory, such an approach is surely welcomed.

    Dr. Daniele Ganser

    II. The Secret Armies

    Perhaps there exists no better summary of Operation Gladio than the opening paragraph of Ganser’s meticulously researched, scholarly account:

    As the Cold War ended, following judicial investigations into mysterious acts of terrorism in Italy, Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti was forced to confirm in August 1990 that a secret army existed in Italy and other countries across Western Europe that were part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Coordinated by the unorthodox Warfare section of NATO, the secret army had been set up by the U.S. secret service, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the British secret intelligence service (MI6) or (SIS) after the end of the Second World War to fight communism in Western Europe. The clandestine network which, after the revelations of the Italian Prime Minister, was researched by judges, parliamentarians, academics, and investigative journalists across Europe, is now understood to have been code-named “Gladio” (the sword) in Italy, while in other countries that Network operated under different names […] In each country the military secret service operated the anti-Communist party within the state in close collaboration with the CIA or the MI6, unknown to parliaments and populations. In each country, leading members of the executive, including prime ministers, presidents, interior ministers, and defense ministers were involved in the conspiracy, while the “Allied Clandestine Committee” (ACC), sometimes also euphemistically called the “Allied Co-ordination Committee” and the “Clandestine Planning Committee” (CPC), less conspicuously at times also called “Coordination and Planning Committee” of NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), coordinated the networks on the international level. The last confirmed meeting of ACC with representatives of European secret services took place on October 24, 1990 in Brussels.12

    As mentioned earlier, the Italian gladio weapon was made with a double-edged blade. Likewise, from the inception of this covert operation, the secret armies served a dual purpose. One was to remain behind enemy lines in the event of a Soviet invasion and to operate as a guerilla resistance network. Gladio soldiers were supplied with arms caches composed of explosives, sophisticated radio communication equipment, and light weapons that were secretly stockpiled, hidden in caves, or buried at various sites across Europe.

    But the other function of the “stay-behind” was to sabotage political parties, elected representatives, or left-wing supporters that NATO and its CIA bedfellows deemed inappropriate. And the methods used were utterly Machiavellian. As briefly discussed above, various acts of State-fabricated terror were set into motion that led to the deaths of hundreds of civilians, and these crimes were subsequently blamed on the left. Sometimes, this involved the creation of fictional “left-wing” groups that were, in fact, nonexistent and the planting of falsified evidence that included anonymous phone calls or letters (often penned in the stereotypical style of B-movies).

    As we find throughout history, legitimate leftists who had nothing to do with violence were seized by the police and forced into the role of the patsy. For example, in the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing, Giuseppe Pinelli, a mild-mannered pacifist, anarchist, and autodidact—Pinelli had been too poor to pursue studies in school—was escorted to police headquarters in Milan. He was on friendly terms with the local authorities and was allowed to drive his scooter to the police station. Detained and subjected to a prolonged examination, Pinelli never survived his interrogation. Shortly before midnight on December 12th , he went flying through a fourth-floor window, plummeting to his death. At first, police claimed that Pinelli had committed suicide. Then, a 1975 inquiry ludicrously concluded that he’d “fainted” out the window. Pinelli was eventually cleared of any involvement in the Piazza Fontana bombing. His murder inspired Nobel Prize laureate Dario Fo to write a play, Accidental Death of an Anarchist, that immortalized this man of such humble origins who had been employed as a railroad worker.

    Giuseppe Pinelli

    At other times—as in the case of Italy’s Red Brigades—extant left-wing groups were steered to violence once the leadership of these groups was usurped. After the former leaders were pushed aside—either disgraced, imprisoned, or killed—the new leaders (in reality, agents provocateurs) directed State-sponsored murder disguised as a “radical left” action. In this context, one might speak of turning an entire organization into a patsy. In other cases, when government intel agencies were tipped off to impending terrorist actions fomented by either the right or left, a passive “stand back and do nothing” approach was taken—if such acts simultaneously served a “higher” goal of the Deep State (the “state within the state,” from the Turkish derin devlet), such as incriminating the left and strengthening the call for increased security measures at the sacrifice of civil liberties and freedom.

    Thus, the “double-edged sword” shifts from a literal to a figurative meaning: “Something that can have both favorable and unfavorable consequences; something that has both good and bad parts or results.”

    It’s also important to note that secret armies were established in certain European countries even before the existence of NATO (1949) and its Gladio network. In 1944, Winston Churchill ordered the establishment of one such covert army in Greece, known by the acronym LOK. In France, a secret army was created immediately after the end of the war. Once again, fear of the electoral strength of the Communist Party and the left was the issue; as always, the “solution” was the installation of a right-wing dictatorship.

    On July 30, 1947, the existence of the French secret army was suddenly revealed to a startled populace: “French Socialist Minister of the Interior Edouard Depreux lifted the veil and declared to a baffled population that a secret right-wing army had been erected in France behind the back of the politicians, with the task to destabilize the French government. ‘Toward the end of 1946 we got to know of the existence of a black resistance network, made up of resistance fighters of the extreme right, Vichy collaborators, and monarchists,’ Depreux explained. ‘They had a secret attack plan called Plan Bleu, which should have come into action toward the end of July, or on August 6, [1947].’”13 Although the army was shuttered following public outcry, another was created shortly afterward to replace it.

    Although Ganser doesn’t venture into the subject of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO, which heavily infiltrated the American Communist Party) or the CIA’s domestically-based Operation CHAOS,14 similar acts of infiltration and incitement to violence were also occurring on U.S. soil during this same period. To cite just two examples, members of the Weather Underground in Cincinnati were taught the art of bomb making by an ex-Green Beret and Vietnam veteran named Larry Grathwohl: an agent provocateur and FBI informant who also supplied them with guns.15 And the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) was infiltrated by an intel asset named Lee Harvey Oswald, whose sudden thrust into the limelight on November 22, 1963 served the dual purpose of providing a patsy for the JFK assassination and destroying the FPCC. As Republican Senator Richard Schweiker, a member of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, remarked in 1975: “We do know Oswald had intelligence connections. Everywhere you look with him, there are fingerprints of intelligence.” (No better one-line description of what Oswald was up to has ever emerged.) It was only recently revealed that Richard Gibson, co-founder of the FPCC, offered his assistance to the CIA in July 1962 and officially worked for the Agency as a spy (code name: QRPHONE-1) from 1965 to 1977.16 Perhaps an even better example of CIA/FBI domestic infiltration and destruction can be found in the history of the Black Panther movement, which featured the CIA’s drug-induced manipulation of Huey Newton,17 and the Bureau’s role in manipulating police to assassinate Panther leaders Mark Clark and Fred Hampton.18 Informants who assisted in these Black Panther murders were effectively paid a “bounty” in the form of bonuses personally approved by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.19 And, as antiwar activist Noah Chomsky recalls: “Government agencies financed, helped organize, and supplied arms to right-wing terrorist groups that carried out fire bombings, burglaries, and shootings … In most cases [it was] the FBI, although one right-wing terrorist in Chicago claims that his group was financed and directed in part by the CIA.”20 Thus, the link between such actions in the U.S. and Europe is revealed not only in the modus operandi, but in the presence of high-ranking personnel who supervised such operations, both here and abroad.

    J. Edgar Hoover, director of the FBI from to 1935-72

    So, who were these modern-day “gladiators”? As Ganser is quick to note, not every European nation fell subject to such abyssmal acts; and many soldiers who served in the Gladio network considered themselves to be patriots whose sole job was to defend their country against the Soviet Union. For example, in the Cold War period that Ganser covers in his book (1945–1990), Norway, Switzerland, and Austria were never victimized by false-flag attacks. And many Scandinavians who enlisted in the stay-behinds later objected to even being called a “Gladio” soldier. But when we study the events that occurred during this same period in Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, Turkey, and Greece, a wholly different picture emerges. That is, many Gladio operatives were hardened right-wing fanatics who thought nothing of participating in terror, torture, and the taking of innocent lives in the service of a “higher” cause—one they often spoke of with a religious fervor. Not surprisingly, the ranks of the Gladio armies were brimming with recalcitrant Nazis and Fascists. As one neofascist confessed after his arrest: “The personnel was recruited in circles where anti-communism was at its strongest; that is to say on the far right.”21 To make matters worse, some of the directors and leading figures of national intelligence agencies were also recycled from these same Nazi and Fascist networks.

    One of the most infamous was General Reinhard Gehlen, whom Hitler appointed as chief of Foreign Armies East in 1942, and whose secret service career with the Nazis was focused on fighting the Soviet Union. According to author Christopher Simpson, “Gehlen derived much of his information from his role in one of the most terrible atrocities of the war: the torture, interrogation, and murder by starvation of some four million Soviet prisoners of war.”22 Gehlen was rewarded for such niceties by being scooped out of Germany by the Americans and shipped with his top staff to Fort Hunt, Virginia. After a cordial meeting with Allen Dulles, it was decided that Gehlen would be given a new assignment. Once the general and his crew were shipped safely back to Germany, he became the director of the “Gehlen Organization”: West Germany’s top intelligence agency, which also integrated other brutal, incorrigible Nazis into its structure. According to Ganser:

    When the Gladio scandal erupted in 1990, an unnamed former NATO intelligence officer explained that the covert action branch of the CIA under Frank Wisner, in order to set up the German secret army, had “incorporated lock, stock, and barrel the espionage outfit run by Hitler’s spy chief Reinhard Gehlen. This is well known, because Gehlen was the spiritual father of Stay Behind in Germany and his role was known to the West German leader, Konrad Adenauer, from the outset.” According to the unnamed NATO officer, U.S. President Truman and German Chancellor Adenauer had “signed a secret protocol with the U.S. on West Germany’s entry into NATO in May 1955, in which it was agreed that the West German authorities would refrain from active legal pursuit of known right-wing extremists. What is not so well known is that other top German politicians were privy to the existence of secret resistance plans.”23

    Thus, the State-controlled terrorists were given carte blanche to operate without fear of reprisal.

    Reinhard Gehlen

    Ganser devotes the first three chapters of his chronicle to establishing the basic facts behind the Gladio network; its eventual exposure; and the subsequent refusal of NATO, CIA, and MI6 to even acknowledge its existence. The next dozen chapters go into greater detail about all twelve European nations that hosted the Gladio networks, with a chapter on each national history. Condensing this complex, baroque narrative must have been a daunting task, but the author pulls it off brilliantly. In the course of this essay, we will touch upon just a few highlights, but this barely does justice to the rich contents of NATO’s Secret Armies.

    As Ganser explains, the invitation to join NATO was itself a double-edged sword. Western European nations were pressured to participate in the alliance and reap its benefits. Yet, to do so, they were forced to sign secret protocols that essentially stripped them of their sovereignty. NATO would have the final word regarding whether an elected official or his party could continue to serve or whether, instead, he should be besmirched, overthrown, or killed. The protocols remained a secret to many of the leaders of these countries. Communist, socialist, or left-leaning parliamentarians could not be trusted—so went the logic—to keep this arrangement secret. Neither could many of the prime ministers or presidents. Besides fearing a backlash from the public, NATO feared the Soviets might be informed. Thus, only “trustworthy” leaders were privy to such information. And, in certain cases, the signatories of these agreements were right-wing directors of intel agencies rather than the democratically elected leaders of said countries.

    President Kennedy may have also fallen into this category of so-called untrustworthy men who would remain uniformed about the details of Operation Gladio.24 After all, the president was viewed by many on the extreme right as a “communist appeaser.” Kennedy would establish backchannels of communication with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev during and after the Cuban Missile Crisis, and he was also on the verge of attempting a rapprochement with Cuba’s leader, Fidel Castro.25 We should also note that, as early as 1967, New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison was well aware of the foreign policy connection to the JFK assassination. In his On the Trail of the Assassins, Garrison states his belief that Clay Shaw’s motivation to participate in the conspiracy “stemmed from Shaw’s history as a CIA operative and his desire, shared by the hard-core cold warriors in the intelligence community, to stop Kennedy’s attempt to turn around U.S. foreign policy.”26

    As it turns out, it was not just Kennedy’s foreign policy in Vietnam and Cuba they wanted to reverse, but his policy in key strategic areas around the globe, including Indonesia and the Congo. Congo possessed copper, gold, diamonds, cobalt, and the world’s largest and most densely concentrated deposit of uranium oxide. (The high-grade uranium used in the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima was derived from a Congolese mine in Katanga.) Indonesia was one of the very few nations that surpassed Congo in resource wealth. It was brimming with silver, copper, gold, and vast reserves of oil. It still hosts one of the world’s largest—if not the largest—copper and gold mine. This immense wealth at least partly explain why the CIA supervised several assassination plots of the Congo’s nationalist leader, Patrice Lumumba. They succeeded just three days before Kennedy’s inauguration—and the Agency managed to keep it a secret from JFK for the next twenty-four days. It also explains why, after failing to overthrow Sukarno in Indonesia in 1958, the Agency directed a successful coup in 1965 that cost at least a half million innocent lives. And which Allen Dulles may have been secretly involved with, even though JFK had retired him in late 1961. (See the upcoming book by Greg Poulgrain, JFK vs Allen Dulles: Battleground Indonesia)

    As early as 1959, while Chairman of the African Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kennedy clearly carved out his position: “Call it nationalism, call it anti-colonialism, call it what you will, Africa is going through a revolution … The word is out—and spreading like wildfire in a thousand languages and dialects—that it is no longer necessary to remain forever poor or forever in bondage.” Years after Kennedy was killed, Fidel Castro told Robert F. Kennedy, Jr: “If your uncle had lived, the relationship between our countries would have been very different. He was a great president, an unusual man with love for children and a powerful understanding of the military and large corporations that run your country. We were on a road to peace.”27 This is exactly what the military-industrial complex did not want.

    Kennedy’s willingness to negotiate with nationalist leaders of nonaligned Third World nations and his increasingly anti-colonialist foreign policy which would have cost powerful multinational corporations billions of dollars—especially in places such as Africa and Indonesia—28 would have placed him in a far more dangerous position than, say, Charles de Gaulle or Aldo Moro, both of whom were also victims of assassination attempts. Moro was kidnapped and killed; Charles de Gaulle survived numerous close-calls with death; both leaders were targeted in these attacks by members of the Gladio network. In the latter case, this was admitted by the French chief of the secret services (DGSE), Admiral Pierre Lacoste, in 1990. But, unlike Kennedy, de Gaulle had a countermeasure in place that wasn’t available to JFK. That is, he possessed his own extensive network of loyal military and secret service personnel that were willing to engage in “unorthodox” operations to avenge their president and war hero. This included former members of the Service d’Action Civique, a veritable Gaullist praetorian guard, and loyalists in the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE). After the failed Generals’ Putsch of April 21–26, 1961, de Gaulle’s SDECE operatives were said to have placed bombs in Algerian cafes frequented by the same Gladio/OAS (Organisation Armée Secrète) members who had tried to eliminate de Gaulle—and blew them to smithereens. “The old general was willing to fight with equal ferocity.”29 Indeed, “like few others, Charles de Gaulle had been at the center of secret warfare in France for most of his lifetime.” And during the attempted coup, President de Gaulle called directly upon les français—the ordinary French citizens—to help rally against such seditious threats:

    And all over France, millions of people did rush to the aid of their nation. The following day, a general strike was organized to protest the putsch…. Over ten million people joined the nationwide demonstrations, with hundreds of thousands marching in the streets of Paris, carrying banners proclaiming “Peace in Algeria’ and shouting, “Fascism will not pass!” Even police officer associations expressed “complete solidarity” with the protests.30

    Although President Kennedy lent his full support to de Gaulle, Allen Dulles and the CIA—who had a hand in the coup attempt—were not pleased. Besides sending his press secretary, Pierre Salinger, to the Élysée Palace, Kennedy phoned the French ambassador, Hervé Alphand, to convey his assurances that he was opposed. But also to warn him about what they were both up against: “The CIA is such a vast and poorly controlled machine that the most unlikely maneuvers might be true.” The president had learned his lessons about CIA duplicity during the Bay of Pigs Invasion, which had occurred just days before, on April 17, 1961. Someone was clearly trying to overload the president’s work schedule.

    President De Gaulle greeted by a grateful populace in 1961, after the failed Generals’ Putsch

    Once de Gaulle was informed about the secret Gladio network, in 1966 he decided to remove France from the military portion of NATO and kick NATO headquarters out of France. (Until then, it was located in Paris.) His memo signaling this withdrawal takes on a deeper dimension in light of what we now know about the secret NATO protocols that, in essence, nullified a nation’s freedom: “France is determined to regain on her whole territory the full exercise of her sovereignty.”

    De Gaulle denounced the protocols as an infringement of national sovereignty. Similar secret clauses were also revealed in other NATO states [… historian] Giuseppe de Lutiss revealed that when becoming a NATO member, Italy in 1949 had signed not only the Atlantic Pact but also secret protocols that provided for the creation of an unofficial organization “charged with guaranteeing Italy’s internal alignment with the Western Bloc by any means, even if the electorate was to show a different inclination.”31

    After its expulsion by de Gaulle, NATO set up shop in Brussels. In the years ahead, Belgium became the sorry host of horrific domestic terrorism, thanks to this same Gladio network.

    III. Gladio Exposed

    The unraveling public exposure of Gladio traces back to a terrorist attack in the small village of Peteano, in 1972. The Carabinieri (Italy’s national gendarmerie) received an anonymous tip about an abandoned car. When they arrived on the scene and opened the trunk, three policemen were killed by an explosion. Shortly afterward, the Red Brigades were said to have claimed responsibility for the terror. In addition, an official investigator reported that the explosive material used in the attack could definitively be attributed to the Red Brigades network.

    Peteano car bomb, 1972

    Eighteen years later, in the summer of 1990, a courageous, resolute Italian magistrate named Felice Casson was busy at work, combing through data on right-wing terrorism that was stored in the archives of the military secret service. Casson’s research led him to conclude that there were unquestionable links between terrorist operations and the State. He said that a “strategy of tension” had been intentionally developed in order to eviscerate left-leaning political parties, both in Italy and elsewhere. The purpose of this strategy, he continued, was to:

    Create tension within the country to promote conservative, reactionary social and political tendencies. While this strategy was being implemented, it was necessary to protect those behind it, because evidence implicating them was being discovered. Witnesses withheld information to cover right-wing extremists.

    Judge Casson (who now serves on the Italian Senate) discovered that an operator named Vincenzo Vinciguerra, a member of a paramilitary terrorist organization called Ordine Nuovo, was behind the crime. (Gladio researcher Philip Willan characterizes Vinciguerra as a “virulent fascist of psychopathic ruthlessness.”)32 Arrested and placed on trial in 1984, Vinciguerra bluntly stated that he was protected and enabled by the government’s own intelligence and security organizations, which shared his extremist anti-Communist views:

    With the massacre of Peteano and with all those that have followed, the knowledge should by now be clear that there existed a real live structure, occult and hidden, with a capacity of giving a strategic direction to the outrages. [This structure] lies within the state itself. There exists in Italy a secret force parallel to the armed forces, composed of civilians and military men, in an anti-Soviet capacity, that is, to organize a resistance on Italian soil against a Russian army.

    [This] super-organization, lacking a Soviet military invasion which might not happen, took up the task, on NATO’s behalf, of preventing a slip to the left in the political balance of the country. This they did, with the assistance of the official secret services and the political and military forces.

    According to Vinciguerra, all the bombings that followed the Peteano massacre stemmed from the same “single, organized matrix.”33 Most chilling of all, Vinciguerra fleshed out the strategy of tension in a manner that only a hardened killer could who had participated in its every step:

    You had to attack civilians, the people, women, children, innocent people, unknown people far removed from any political game. The reason was quite simple. They were supposed to force these people, the Italian public, to turn to the State to ask for greater security. This is the political logic that lies behind all the massacres and the bombings which remain unpunished, because the State cannot convict itself or declare itself responsible for what happened.34

    For students of the theater, this pithy statement could be viewed as the climactic dialogue of a key protagonist that serves to encapsulate the principal theme of the drama and, more importantly, suddenly illuminates what lies at its core. As we shall see, Vincenzo Vinciguerra’s revelations did not exist in a vacuum.

    On December 7, 1970, Gladio’s right-wing extremists launched a coup that was code-named Tora Tora. According to Philip Willan’s Puppetmasters, the coup was named after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that had also occurred on 7 December, in 1941. Although it was called off at the last moment, one paramilitary group had already entered the Interior Ministry and distributed 180 machine guns to their Gladio comrades. As a result of all this, Italian politicians and parliamentarians on the left were sent a clear message regarding how easily they could be humbled, pushed aside, or done away with. Part of the coup plan “called for the arrest of left-wing political and trade union leaders as well as leading journalists and political activists who were to be shipped away and locked up in the Gladio prison in Sardinia.”35

    Puppetmasters, by Philip Willan

    Giovanni Tamburino, an investigative magistrate of the Italian city Padua, critically investigated the Tora Tora operation and, to his massive surprise … discovered the involvement of a mysterious secret army, later discovered to be Gladio. Thereafter, he arrested Vito Miceli, the acting director of the SID [Servizio Informazioni Difesa, Italy’s foreign intelligence service] who before had directed NATO’s Security Office in Brussels. Tamburino charged Miceli with “promoting, setting up, and organizing, together with others, a secret association of military and civilians aimed at provoking an armed insurrection to bring about an illegal change in the constitution of the state and the form of government.” His data suggested that a mysterious armed organization existed within the state, and as its real code-name Gladio had not yet been discovered, the structure during questioning was referred to as “Super-SID.”

    Placed on trial on November 17, 1974, “an angry Miceli shouted: ‘A super SID on my orders? Of course not! But I have not organized it myself to make a coup d’état. This was the United States and NATO who asked me to do it!’” In 1977, Miceli confessed: “There has always been a certain top secret organization, known to the top authorities of the state and operating in the domain of the secret services, involved in activities that have nothing to do with intelligence gathering.”36

    In 1990, after Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti was forced to admit the reality of Gladio, parliamentarians launched an investigation. In 1995, they produced a 370-page report, which tepidly stated that the “CIA [had] enjoyed maximum discretion” in Italy during this period. Five years later, a second parliamentary investigation concluded that the U.S had supported the “strategy of tension” (i.e., terror) in order to “stop the PCI [Italian Communist Party] and to a certain degree also the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] from reaching executive power in the country.” The Senate report also concluded:

    Those massacres, those bombs, those military actions had been organized or promoted or supported by men inside Italian state institutions and, as has been discovered more recently, by men linked to the structures of United States intelligence.37

    Note the term: “structures” of U.S. intelligence. This leaves the door open to include not only the CIA but other intel agencies such as the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

    Further highlighting the significance of Vinciguerra’s admission, Ganser adds: “In marked contrast to other right-wing terrorists that had collaborated with the Italian military secret service and walked free, Vinciguerra after his revelations was sentenced for life and imprisoned.”38

    Additional confirmation surfaced in the testimony of General Giandelio Maletti, former head of Italian counterintelligence. During a March 2001 trial of right-wing terrorists accused of the Piazza Fontana massacre (a bombing that killed sixteen and wounded eighty), the general made a telling remark: “The impression was that the Americans would do anything to stop Italy from sliding to the left.” And he added: “The CIA, following the directives of its government, wanted to create an Italian nationalism capable of halting what it saw as a slide to the left; and, for this purpose, it may have made use of right-wing terrorism … Don’t forget that Nixon was in charge and Nixon was a strange man … a man of rather unorthodox initiatives.” Later on, at the ripe age of seventy-nine, Maletti revealed another quintessential element in the Gladio equation: “‘Italy has been dealt with as a sort of protectorate’ of the United States. ‘I am ashamed to think that we are still subject to special supervision.’”39

    Piazza Fontana bombing

    Maletti’s reference to Nixon is significant. When we examine the strange death of Aldo Moro, the shadow of Nixon’s henchman, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, will be seen flickering across the final act of the Moro tragedy. Also of significance is the general’s use of the term “unorthodox”: that adjectival euphemism most often employed in intel circles to describe inhumane or terrorist methods generated from within their own agencies.

    Unfortunately, besides Italy, the only countries to initiate parliamentary investigations were Belgium and Switzerland. In this sense, Vinciguerra had the final word when he proclaimed: “The State cannot condemn itself.”

    Following Judge Casson’s exposure of the Italian Gladio, journalists approached French President François Mitterrand to ask about a possible French connection. But Mitterrand, who was often referred to as “l’Dieu” (God), quickly attempted to sidestep the matter and sweep it under a rug. “When I arrived [Mitterrand was first elected in 1981], I didn’t have much left to dissolve. There only remained a few remnants, of which I learned the existence with some surprise, because everyone had forgotten about them.” Although the French president was also known as the “Old Fox,” Prime Minister Andreotti’s own foxiness was clearly on par with that of his French counterpart. Refusing to allow Mitterrand to assume a smug, paternalistic high road, Andreotti slyly pointed out that the French Gladio representatives were also seated at the last Allied Clandestine Committee meeting held in Brussels, which had occurred as recently as October 24, 1990. At this point, Mitterrand assumed his most well-known persona: that of an old French fox with sealed lips.

    In Belgium, the falling dominoes of Gladio revelations made a spectacular, clattering crash on November 7, 1990 when Socialist Defense Minister Guy Coeme announced, during a special televised broadcast, that NATO’s secret army had been active in Belgium since the Cold War. Coeme’s climactic statement was: “I want to know whether there exists a link between the activities of this secret network and the wave of crime and terror which our country suffered from during the past years.”40 One of the more notable terrorist acts that the defense minister was referring to was the dreadful Brabant Massacres, a grisly series of attacks in which innocent men, women, and children were gunned down in places such as shopping markets by masked, hooded men with shotguns. The Brabant Massacres resulted in twenty-eight deaths, with another twenty-two injured. Journalist Phil Davison remarked: “If the object was to sow terror, the killers chose the perfect targets: women, children, and the elderly, cut down by rapid gunfire while wheeling their trolleys through a local supermarket.”41

    A 2017 memorial ceremony in Aalst, Belgium, for victims killed and injured by the Brabant assassins. The mayor of Aalst, criticizing the Justice Department, said: “You have failed for years in correctly dealing with the victims, and the investigation has been extremely unprofessional. There are so many questions that remain. Who is lying? Who is telling the truth?”

    A parliamentary investigation subsequently discovered that the secret army had been structured into two separate branches of the Belgian secret services. One (SDRA8) was located within the military secret service; the other (STC/Mob) was contained within the civil secret service. (Many of the Gladio stay-behinds were disguised in this way: like a graduated series of Chinese boxes.)

    To properly investigate possible connections to terrorism, parliamentarians demanded to see a list of the Gladio soldiers, or even a list with their names excised and replaced by birth dates, in order to compare them to known terrorist suspects. To maintain confidentiality, the Senate commission agreed that the list would be shown only to three judges, who were investigating the case.

    But their efforts to arrive at the truth were blocked, and the investigation went nowhere. Despite pressure and protest from the Senate, M. Raes, director of the state security service, and Lieutenant Colonel La Grande, chief of the military secret service, effectively prevented any deeper, more meaningful probe. They also refused to hand over the lists. Thus, Defense Minister Coeme’s crucial question about terrorist links to Gladio was left hanging in midair.

    The parliamentarians were equally outraged with the CIA and MI6 over their refusal to hand over their own identical list of Belgium’s “gladiators.” (Washington and London possessed a master copy of every single Gladio soldier operating in Europe, along with a complete set of fingerprints.) Apparently, avenging the deaths of innocent civilians and meting out justice to their murderers was not high on the American Empire’s to-do list. Furthermore, the parliamentarians would even be ridiculed by their own security chief, who had the audacity to post a victory message in the Belgian newspaper Le Soir: “‘Give us the names!’ ‘Never!’ reply the ‘Gladiators.’ The hour of truth has come. This is Brussels calling. Dear friends in Operation Stay Behind. Section SDRA8 [the military secret service] assures you of its very high esteem and thanks you for your devotion to your country. They guarantee that the pressures and threats will be empty and that undertakings will be honored. Adolphe is looking well!”

    Once the Senate concluded that the encoded message originated from Lieutenant Colonel La Grande, both La Grande and Raes were forced to resign.

    Brabant Massacre memorial incribed with phrase: “Why, Gladio?”

    It was later confirmed that a neo-Nazi group called Westland New Post (WNP) was connected with the stay-behind Gladio army. A WNP member named Michele Libert confessed that the head of WNP regularly met with U.S. Embassy officials. WNP chief Paul Latinus eventually informed journalist Rene Haquin that American military secret services had instructed him to construct WNP.

    When the Gladio scandal spread to Germany, a socialist parliamentarian named Hermann Scherer called for an investigation of what he termed a reprehensible Ku Klux Klan-like group. But Scherer withdrew his request upon learning that members of his own Socialist Party had participated in hushing up Gladio’s existence. All this occurred amidst growing outcries in the press over the shameful history of Reinhard Gehlen and his Nazi-staffed “Gehlen Organization.”

    But the exposure of Gladio in Germany could actually be traced back to September 9, 1952, when a gentleman named Hans Otto strolled into police headquarters in Frankfurt. According to government records, Otto, a former SS officer, claimed “to belong to a political resistance group, the task of which was to carry out sabotage activities and blow up bridges in case of a Soviet invasion.” Otto’s dramatically climactic line was: “Although, officially, neofascist tendencies were not required, most members of the organization featured them.” Otto added: “The financial means to run the organization had been provided by an American citizen with the name Sterling Garwood.” In addition, he claimed that his group had assembled blacklists of communists and socialists who were to be gathered up and executed in case of a national emergency.

    Otto revealed that the name of this secret army was Technischer Dienst des Bundes Deutscher Jugend (TD BDJ). August Zinn, Prime Minister of the Hessen region, called for a judicial investigation. TD BDJ members were arrested … and then, as early as 30 September, allowed to walk free when a higher court in Karlsruhe stepped in and, behind Zinn’s back, mysteriously ordered the release of these Nazi secret soldiers. A baffled and exasperated Zinn concluded: “The only legal explanation for these releases is that the people in Karlsruhe declared that they had acted upon American direction.”

    Greece 1967 coup

    Another problem with parliamentary investigations was that in some of the countries that hosted Gladio all forms of democracy had already been eclipsed. Spain and Portugal were in the throes of long-term dictatorships. Turkey underwent three coup d’états; and its Gladio network was so deeply integrated into the traditional structures of government that the State was, in effect, synonymous with Gladio itself. Neighboring Greece underwent a Gladio-controlled coup in 1967 that ushered in the infamous Regime of the Colonels, a dictatorship that lasted until 1974.

    The Hellenic cradle of democracy had also hosted an early military use of napalm, when the United States sprayed the countryside with this incendiary liquid in order to decimate the same communist partisans who had fought in unison with the Allies in attempting to defeat the Nazis. Via “Operation Torch,” the U.S.,

    used chemical warfare to defeat the Greek partisans by dropping thousands of gallons of napalm on Greece. In late 1948, the Greek resistance, which on their native soil had defeated both the German Nazis and the British troops, collapsed. The end of the Civil War meant total victory for the Greek Right and its patron, the United States.43

    Thus, all across postwar Europe, the United States was not only obsessed with avoiding a “slip to the left”; it was actively promulgating a push to the right, even if this resulted in dictatorship.

    General Talat Turhan, torture victim

    In Turkey, the 1990 revelations lent a new voice to former Turkish General Talat Turhan, who had been brutally tortured by the Turkish Gladio (code-named Counter-Guerrilla). “When it was discovered in 1990 that Italy had an underground organization called Gladio, organized by NATO and controlled and financed by the CIA, which was linked to acts of terrorism within the country, Turkish and foreign journalists approached me and published my explanation as they knew that I have been researching the field for years.”44 General Turhan called for an independent European Union investigation into Gladio in order to bypass the immovable roadblocks that would inevitably be raised by the Turkish military should the government even attempt to initiate its own probe. However, a subsequent Counter-Guerilla scandal that occurred in 1996 led to a seven-month investigation after thousands took to the streets in protests. It concluded with the Turkish prime minister admitting, in a television broadcast watched by millions, that an “execution squad was formed within the state,” and that “all parts of the state were aware of what was going on.” Derin devlet, indeed.45

    *   *   *

    Ganser titles the third chapter of his book “The Silence of NATO, CIA, and MI6.” Like the backpedaling of President Mitterrand, NATO’s response suggests that its leadership was also caught off guard:

    After almost a month of silence, on Monday November 5, 1990, NATO categorically denied Andreotti’s allegation concerning NATO’s involvement in Operation Gladio and the secret armies. Senior NATO spokesman Jean Marcotta said at SHAPE headquarters in Mons, Belgium that “NATO has never contemplated guerilla war or clandestine operations; it has always concerned itself with military affairs and the defense of Allied frontiers.” Then, on Tuesday November 6, a NATO spokesman explained that NATO’s denial of the previous day had been false. The spokesman left journalists only with a short communiqué which said that NATO never commented on matters of military secrecy and that Marcotta should not have said anything at all. The international press protested against the ill-advised public relations policy of the military alliance when it related with bitterness: “As shock followed shock across the Continent, a NATO spokesman issued a denial: nothing was known of Gladio or stay-behind. Then a seven-word communiqué announced that the denial was “incorrect” and nothing more.”46

    Alas, doublespeak had reached new heights.

    MI6 also refused comment, but a Conservative Party member named Rupert Allison told the Associated Press: “‘We were heavily involved and still are … in these networks.’ The British ‘certainly helped finance and run, with the Americans,’ several networks and, through the MI6 together with the CIA, were directly involved.”47

    Gladio’s exposure in 1990 occurred during America’s Gulf War. Although the secret army was widely reported by the European press, it was given scant attention by the U.S. media. Both President Bush and the CIA refused to comment. But several middle-ranking retired CIA officers were more forthcoming. One was Thomas Polgar, a thirty-year Agency veteran who “explained with an implicit reference to CPC [NATO’s Clandestine Planning Committee] and ACC [NATO’s Allied Clandestine Committee] that the stay-behind programs were coordinated by ‘a sort of unconventional warfare-planning group linked to NATO.’ In their secret headquarters the chiefs of the national security armies ‘would meet every couple of months in different capitals.’”48

    And twelve years earlier, one “Company Man” made the following statements in his memoir:

    He said that a covert branch of the CIA, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), “had undertaken a major program of building, throughout those Western European countries that seemed likely targets for Soviet attack, what in the parlance of the intelligence trade were known as ‘stay-behind nets,’ clandestine infrastructures of leaders and equipment trained and ready to be called into action as sabotage and espionage forces when the time came.” His assignment was to “plan and build such stay-behind nets in Scandinavia.” The author also referred to the hidden arm caches: “These nets had to be coordinated with NATO’s plans, the radios had to be hooked to a future exile location, and the specialized equipment had to be secured from CIA and secretly cached in snowy hideouts for later use.”49 Although he never mentions the word “Gladio,” he clearly describes some of its key elements.

    The book’s publication aroused ire in Scandinavian circles, but somehow these shocking revelations seemingly passed unnoticed by the other European nations aligned with NATO. William Colby’s memoir (with its unwittingly amusing title) Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA, was penned in an attempt to enhance the battered image of the CIA during the late Seventies. Thus, the former Director of Central Intelligence was careful to never admit that, besides preventing a Soviet advance, the armies had also served a more diabolical function.

    As a case in point: terrorism experts employed by the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had produced a classified training manual known as Field Manual 30–31 (along with two equally barbaric appendices, 31A and 31B). The 140-page booklet, which was translated into several languages, offers “advice for activities in the fields of sabotage, bombing, killing, torture, terror, and fake elections.” It also instructs the secret soldiers to “carry out acts of violence in times of peace and then blame them on the Communist enemy in order to create a situation of fear and alertness.” (The strategy of tension.) “Alternatively, the secret soldiers are instructed to infiltrate the left-wing movements and urge them to use violence.” All this reads like a virtual Bible and explicit blueprint for what occurred during the Years of Lead. And it makes the Northwoods document pale in comparison, or even read like a “limited hangout” admission, since Northwoods was never enacted whereas the Field Manual was actively used in training offered by the American government to Gladio operators. As Ganser notes, FM 30–31 “stressed explicitly as its main point that the involvement of the Pentagon had to remain secret under all circumstances.” According to the manual, “Only those persons who are acting against the revolutionary uprising shall know of the involvement of the U.S. Army in the internal affairs of an allied country.”

    Military officers running the Turkish Gladio net received their training at the U.S. government’s notorious School of the Americas. And one of the principal manuals used for their instruction was FM 30–31. In 1973, in the midst of a rash of inexplicable terrorist attacks that rocked Turkey, a Turkish newspaper announced the publication of the manual. Shortly thereafter, the journalist who had obtained it was “disappeared.” After FM 30–31 was translated and published in Turkey, it soon surfaced in Spain and Italy. With the 1990 exposure of NATO’s secret armies, interest in the manual was reawakened, and researchers explored its connection to Gladio.50

    Since the Gladio scandal involved all twelve member states that then composed the European Union, it was perhaps inevitable that Gladio was finally discussed by the European Parliament. A debate was held on November 22, 1990 (oddly enough, on the anniversary of the JFK assassination).

    The Greek parliamentarian Vassillis Ephremidis was particularly outspoken during his E.U. address: “It was set up by the CIA and NATO, which while purporting to defend democracy were actually undermining it and using it for their own nefarious purposes.” Calling for further investigation and referring to the Gladio-imposed Greek dictatorship (the bloody Reign of the Colonels), he added: “The Democracy we are supposed to have been enjoying has been, and still is, nothing but a front.” The truth at last. Next, one of the French parliamentarians, Monsieur De Donnea, took a diametrical viewpoint, preferring to address the need to maintain the secrecy of those employed in the clandestine groups. “We must therefore pay tribute to all those who, while the Cold War lasted, worked in these networks.” But De Donnea also paid lip service to the need to investigate possible connections to terrorism. Dutch parliamentarian Vandemeulebroucke next took an opposing view: “We are entitled to attribute to it all the destabilization, all the provocation, and the terrorism that have occurred in our countries over these four decades.” After stating, “This affair leaves a bad taste in the mouth,” he made it clear that it was the very secrecy of the networks that most troubled him. He added: “I should like to protest most strongly against the fact that the American military, whether through SHAPE, NATO, or the CIA, think they can interfere in what is our democratic right.”

    Following this debate, the E.U Parliament passed a resolution that included a seven-point introduction featuring some very frank, unambiguous language.

    Whereas for over forty years this organization [Gladio] has escaped our Democratic controls and has been run by the secret services of the states concerned in collaboration with NATO … whereas such clandestine networks may have interfered illegally in the internal political affairs of Member States or may still do so … whereas in certain Member States military secret services (or uncontrolled branches thereof) were involved in serious cases of terrorism and crime … whereas these organizations operated and continue to operate completely outside the law … whereas the various “Gladio” organizations have at their disposal independent arsenals … thereby jeopardizing the democratic structures of the countries … and greatly concerned at the existence of decision-making and operational bodies which are not subject to any form of democratic control … the resolution of the E.U. parliament condemns the clandestine creation of manipulative and operational networks and calls for full investigation.

    The resolution that followed this preamble attempted to address each of the points raised in the introduction, including dismantling the networks and instituting judicial parliamentary investigations. But sadly enough, as Dr. Ganser concludes: “The dog barked loudly, but it did not bite. Of the eight actions requested by the EU parliament not one was carried out satisfactorily. Only Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland investigated their secret armies with a parliamentary commission, producing a lengthy and detailed public report.” Although the resolution was also sent to NATO and the U.S., neither President Bush or NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner publically replied or supported an investigation.51

    *   *   *

    In 1992, filmmaker Allan Francovich produced an important BBC documentary about Gladio. In the film, he presents a copy of Field Manual 30–31 to Ray Cline, former head of the Directorate of Intelligence for the CIA. (Cline held this position from 1962 until 1966.) In his filmed response, Cline replies unequivocally: “This is an authentic document.” But when Francovich filmed a similar interaction with William Colby, who had served as CIA director from 1973 to 1976, the former director evasively claimed: “I have never heard of it.” (But then, why would he state otherwise? Colby was, after all, an “honorable man.”) Gladio kingpin Licio Gelli—a character we shall soon explore—was far more forthcoming: “The CIA gave it to me.”52

    One result of the Gladio exposé was to resurrect interest in one of its prime players. Daniele Ganser views Licio Gelli as a parallel figure to Reinhard Gehlen. Like Gehlen, despite his dishonorable past, Gelli was accorded royal treatment by the United States. No stranger to fascists, Gelli fought for Franco in the Spanish Civil War. He served alongside the SS in World War II. One of Gelli’s more marketable skills involved the liberal use of torture. A political chameleon, near the end of the war Gelli played both sides and nimbly switched allegiances when the time seemed right.

    For such an undereducated man, his rise to power seems incredible. (Philip Willan says that Gelli “was only semi-educated, having been expelled from school at the age of thirteen for striking the headmaster.”53) In 1969, Henry Kissinger and U.S. General Haig (who ran NATO as SACEUR from 1974–1979) authorized Gelli to “recruit four-hundred high ranking Italian and NATO officers into his lodge.”54 This was a secret Masonic group called Propaganda Due (P2), of which Gelli would eventually become—at the very least—titular head. (The widow of prominent bank chairman Roberto Calvi claimed that P2’s real director was Giulio Andreotti.55 This might explain why Licio liked to confess that his childhood dream had been to become a puppet master.) Gelli was invited to the inaugurations of American presidents Ford and Carter; during Reagan’s administration the former SS associate even scored a front-row seat.

    Near the end of his life, Licio Gelli proclaimed: “I am a fascist and will die a fascist.”

    The significance of Gelli’s Propaganda Due Lodge (P2) is paramount to an understanding of the Gladio operation in Italy—and beyond. Gladio and P2 were U.S. funded; both were, in Ganser’s words, “parallel governments.” The membership list of Propaganda Due consisted of a virtual “Who’s Who” of powerbrokers and leading military and government officials. In no uncertain terms, P2 was the Italian power elite. The Lodge was also linked to leading right-wing figures in Latin America. (P2 was active in Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina.)

    In 1981, during an investigation of Mob-connected Michele Sindona and the collapse of his bank, police broke into Gelli’s house shortly after Gelli had fled the scene and discovered a list of 962 Propaganda Due members. Although probably not complete, the list included figures such as the future prime minister Silvio Berlusconi and the heads of all three Italian intelligence services. Another prominent member was Stefano delle Chiaie, an Italian neofascist connected to Operation Condor, a U.S.-backed program of State terror and assassination in Latin America. Gladio’s tentacles were, in fact, transatlantic, and they exercised a firm grip on events in various Latin American countries. (Delle Chiaie would also play an important role in the kidnap and murder of Aldo Moro.) As Philip Willan explains:

    The membership list discovered in 1981 showed that 195 high-ranking officers from all branches of the military belonged to the lodge. There were officers from the Carabinieri paramilitary police, six from the police, and thirty-seven from the finance police; nine belonged to the Air Force, twenty-nine to the Navy, and fifty to the Army […] “As can be seen at a glance, the membership lists reveal a map of the highest levels of military power, with individuals who have often played a central role in particularly significant moments of the recent history of our country, as well as in events of a subversive nature,” the P2 Commission commented.56

    No wonder that Gelli—tipped off by someone within the State apparatus about the imminent visit of the Carabinieri at dawn—had decided to join his neofascist pals in Latin America. (He was rumored to have found safe harbor in General Augusto Pinochet’s Chile.) Narrowly missing arrest, he lacked even the time to scoop up his secret papers. Gelli would later be charged with obstructing justice in the investigations of the Piazza Fontana bombing: one of several bombs that exploded in various locations in Rome in a single day, December 12, 1969. (Piazza Fontana was also the first of a series of dreadful acts that ushered in Italy’s Years of Lead. In 1969, there were 398 terrorist attacks in Italy, a figure that steadily increased each year, culminating at 2,513 attacks in 1979.)

    At an airport in Rome in 1982, additional documents were found in a suitcase in the possession of Gelli’s daughter. Titled “Memorandum on the Italian Situation” and “Plan of Democratic Rebirth,” they characterized the trade unions and the Italian Communist Party as enemies of the State. (Italy’s largest union had lent its support to the Socialist and Communist Parties.) Equally troubling, they called for a disruption of the planned “Historic Compromise” that Aldo Moro was then working on: the integration of Italy’s Communist Party (PCI) into a coalition with the Christian Democrats (DCI), thus sharing the executive branch of government. As former Culture Minister Dario Franceschini explained: “He convinced the two winners of an election, neither of which had a majority, to support a government,” (Note that the PCI had distanced itself from Moscow and was functioning more along the lines of Eurocommunism or what we would today regard as a socialist democratic party.) Moro’s Historic Compromise was taking things a step further than merely inviting the Socialist Party in out of the cold, as Pietro Nenni and Moro had been planning during JFK’s visit in the summer of 1963. Instead, it was promoting something that was at the heart of NATO’s greatest fear.

    Striking workers at FIAT, 1969

    Gelli’s documents called for the installation of a right-wing authoritarian (but so-called democratic) government. There remains little doubt that the P2 roster represented the hand-picked leadership of this new regime. In 1981, the P2 Commission run by Tina Anselmi concluded that Propaganda Due was a criminal organization: “It tried to influence and condition political life in our country, above all by acting through the secret services, which it controlled for many years.” Anselmi added: “These people did not intend to talk about Masonic brotherhood or business. Besides, businessmen were underrepresented in the lodge.”57 Not surprisingly, Gelli and his Propaganda Due Lodge had been expelled by the Masonic Grand Orient of Italy, in 1976.

    *   *   *

    Almost eleven years after President Kennedy’s death, this time it was Aldo Moro who would board a plane and fly cross the Atlantic. Like Kennedy, he would not live long upon his return to the homeland. Accompanied by Italian President Giovanni Leone, Moro was traveling to Washington:

    to discuss the inclusion of the Italian left in the government. But their hopes were shattered. … In a heavy confrontation with Henry Kissinger … the Italian representatives were told that under no circumstances must the Italian left be included in the Italian government. Italy had to remain firmly and strongly within NATO. The visit weighed heavily on Aldo Moro, who had already lived through both the Piano Solo Gladio coup and the Tora Tora Gladio coup and hence had no illusions concerning the influence of the United States on Italy’s First Republic.

    Upon his return to Italy, Moro was sick for days and contemplated his complete withdrawal from politics. “It’s one of the few occasions when my husband told me exactly what had been said to him without telling me the name of the person concerned,” Moro’s wife Eleonora later testified. “I will try and repeat it now: “You must abandon your policy of bringing all the political forces in your country into direct collaboration. Either you give this up or you will pay dearly for it.”

    Aldo Moro

    Nonetheless, on March 16, 1978, the courageous politician gathered together the documents related to the Historic Compromise between the Christian Democrats (DCI) and the Communist Party (PCI). He then traveled, with his bodyguards, to the Italian parliament in Rome, “where he was determined to present the plan to include the Italian Communists in the executive.” After Moro’s ominous meeting with Kissinger in Washington, he had requested a bulletproof car, but his request was denied. As Moro and his five bodyguards cruised through a residential suburb of Rome, the car was ambushed.

    Six assailants opened fire, killing all five of Moro’s bodyguards in what appeared to be a highly professional operation. Only one of Moro’s guards managed to return a couple of rounds.

    Moro was captured unharmed and held hostage for fifty-five days in a drama that took the strategy of tension to new heights. His body was later found riddled with bullets and stuffed into the trunk of a car abandoned in central Rome, on Via Caetani. This despite the fact that the streets were swarming with secret service. The precise location was a symbolic one: “parked halfway between the headquarters of the DCI [Christian Democrat Party] and the headquarters of the PCI [Italian Communist Party].”58 Although the kidnapping and execution were blamed on the Red Brigades, “the professional skill of the principal gunman did not correspond to that of any known Red Brigades member.”59

    Renato Curcio and Alberto Franceschini, the original leaders of the Red Brigades, were already in jail; and the titular, ersatz leader, Mario Moretti, was secretly linked to the Italian State. In addition, the building where Moro was supposedly held captive was located on the Via Gradoli, a neighborhood under the complete control of the Mafia (those cozy bedfellows of Gladio and the Italian State). And the Via Gradoli had already been under police surveillance before the kidnapping on March 16th.

    Scene of the Moro kidnapping

    Two days after Moro’s abduction, the police finally paid a visit to 96 Via Gradoli, knocking on the door of apartment 11, a Red Brigades base controlled by Mario Moretti. When there was no response, the neighbors assured them that the gentleman in residence was “respectable,” so they left and never returned. At least, this was the official story. In fact, one neighbor in the building had informed the police that she heard Morse code transmissions at night. The police later claimed to have never received this information even though the woman had requested that her written statement be delivered to “a senior officer of her acquaintance.”

    In early April, the police also received a tip that included the word Gradoli. Instead of searching Via Gradoli, they took a trip to an Italian town of that same name. Even Moro’s wife “suggested that the tip could refer to the name of a Rome street but was told by Interior Minister Cossiga that no such street was listed in the Yellow Pages map of the city. The street exists and was listed.”60

    There may also have been a symbolic aspect (witting or unwitting) to the location of Aldo Moro’s corpse on the Via Caetani. Mino Pecorelli, an Italian journalist with numerous high-level sources and connections, published a magazine that specialized in producing encoded messages that would have tried the patience of a Sherlock Holmes. On May 23, 1978, it featured a particularly puzzling tale.

    Mino published what appears to be an eyewitness account of the scene in Via Caetani, where the body of Aldo Moro was dumped in the boot of a car, parked next to the high wall which runs down one side of the street. A “blond woman” is present among the bystanders at the scene and comments that behind the wall lie “the remains of the Theater of Balbus, Rome’s third amphitheatre.” She continues: “I read in a book that in those days runaway slaves and prisoners were taken there so that they could fight one another to the death. Who knows what there was in the destiny of Moro that his death should be discovered next to that wall? The blood of yesterday and the blood of today.” Pecorelli is talking about “gladiators” in the context of Moro’s death, but until mid-1990 very few people could have understood what he meant.

    Among other things, Philip Willan concludes that Pecorelli, who was renowned for his vast net of secret service contacts, “appears to be hinting that the gladiators were in some way implicated in Moro’s murder.”61

    Corpse of Aldo Moro discovered on Via Caetani

    Pecorelli was assassinated one year after Aldo Moro. In an article featured in the May 9, 2003 Guardian newspaper, Willan reports: “A Perugia appeals court convicted Giulio Andreotti of ordering his murder. The court ruled that the killing was carried out at the behest of the seven-time prime minister to prevent Mr. Pecorelli from making damaging revelations about the Moro case in his magazine, Osservatore Politico. Mr. Pecorelli’s writings attained an added significance last November, when a Perugia appeals court convicted Giulio Andreotti of ordering his murder.”

    Giulio Andreotti—that perennial éminence grise who served as prime minister on and off from 1972 to 1992—was no stranger to the most privileged and elite corridors of byzantine Italian politics, and for the most part he sailed unfettered through such convoluted and dangerous labyrinths. Serving his second term (1976–1979) during the time of the Moro kidnapping, he didn’t hesitate. Andreotti immediately blamed the Red Brigades and “cracked down on the left: 72,000 roadblocks were erected, and 37,000 houses were searched. More than six million people were questioned in less than two months.”62

    But convincing evidence suggests that Moro’s kidnapping was carried out by a Deep State apparatus with ties to Lucio Gelli and Propaganda Due. And that furthermore, leading conservative forces in the Christian Democrats Party stood back and did nothing even though Moro could easily have been rescued. And clearly, the assassination had served its purpose, in that Moro’s Historic Compromise died with its author.

    The Moro assassination has been subject to nearly the same level of microanalysis as the JFK coup (in Europe, it’s referred to as the “JFK assassination of Italy”). And the results of this analysis point to the same sort of inexplicable, contradictory facts. Including the complex involvement of figures known to continually weave their way in and out of intelligence services, positions of political power, mafia circles, and the military: the handmaidens of what is traditionally referred to as the power elite. But one danger of microanalysis is that it may miss or forget the bigger picture. The macrocosm focus of each of these murders rests upon the issue of foreign policy.

    IV: JFK, Gladio, and Permindex

    James DiEugenio describes Clay Shaw as a “well-dressed, dignified, upstanding representative of upper-crust New Orleans”63 who, among other things, was the director of the International Trade Mart. One of the reasons District Attorney Jim Garrison remained so intrigued by the elusive figure of Shaw is that, while he prosecuted Shaw for participating in a conspiracy to kill President Kennedy, he came across information in the Italian press that tied Shaw not only to the CIA—a connection Garrison had already suspected—but to two highly suspicious organizations that he categorized as the “twin international intelligence combines, the Centro Mondiale Commerciale (World Trade Center) and Permindex.”64 Before elaborating on what has been learned about these entities since Garrison’s time, it might be helpful to summarize his own words as they appear in his 1988 account, On the Trail of the Assassins.

    Clay Shaw

    Garrison says that the news articles exposed “Shaw’s secret life as an Agency man in Rome trying to bring Fascism back to Italy.” This remark resonates with added implications given what we now know about Gladio on the one hand (whose fascist operators were specially trained in the use of patsies) and, on the other, Shaw’s numerous associations not only with members of the global economic elite but with a lowly “nobody” and future patsy named Lee Harvey Oswald. Recall that Garrison’s investigation discovered that Shaw had driven Oswald to Clinton, Louisiana in a black Cadillac during the summer of 1963, where they were seen by numerous members of this small town, who later positively identified them. Other credible witnesses to this hours-long visit identified a third man accompanying Shaw and Oswald: right-wing extremist David Ferrie, an intriguing presence in the events of November 22nd. (Ferrie also appears in a 1950s photograph with Oswald, who joined Ferrie’s Civil Air Patrol when Lee was only fifteen years old.)

    The Italian dailies Paese Sera and Corriere della Sera reported on the Permindex scandal in 1967, with Paese Sera publishing a six-part series in March. In the years ahead, both Permindex and Centro Mondiale Commerciale (CMC) would exhibit visible strands directly connecting them to Gladio operators.

    “Centro Mondiale Commerciale,” continues Garrison, “had initially been formed in Montreal but then moved to Rome in 1961. Among the members of its board of directors … was one Clay Shaw from New Orleans.” Another director was Ferenc Nagy, the “exiled former premier of Hungary and the former head of its leading anti-Communist political party. Nagy also was described by the Italian newspapers as the president of Permindex (ostensibly a foundation for a permanent exposition and an offshoot of the Centro Mondiale Commerciale). Nagy, the Italian newspaper said, had been a heavy contributor to fascist movements in Europe.” Another Permindex director was Giuseppe Zigiotti, president of the Fascist National Association for Militia Arms.

    Garrison also paraphrases from Paris Flammonde’s The Kennedy Conspiracy (1969): “The Centro was apparently representative of the paramilitary right in Europe, including Italian Fascists, the American CIA, and similar interests. [Flammonde] described it as ‘a shell of superficiality … composed of channels through which money flowed back and forth, with no one knowing the sources or the destination of these liquid assets.’” In 1962, both Permindex and CMC were expelled from Italy for “subversive intelligence activity.”

    Paese Sera reported that Centro Mondiale Commerciale (CMC) “was a creature of the CIA … set up as a cover for the transfer of CIA … funds in Italy for illegal political-espionage activities.” And here’s the punch line: Centro Mondiale Commerciale represented “the point of contact for a number of persons who, in certain aspects, have somewhat equivocal ties whose common denominator is anti-communism so strong that it would swallow up all those in the world who have fought for decent relations between East and West, including Kennedy.” In his inimitably laconic manner, Garrison drolly concludes:

    That just happened, as well, to be a trenchant one-line description of the parent organization, the Central Intelligence Agency. As for Permindex, which Clay Shaw also served as a director, the Italian press revealed that it had, among other things, secretly financed the opposition of the French Secret Army Organization (OAS) to President de Gaulle’s support for Independence for Algeria, including its reputed assassination attempts on de Gaulle.65

    These were prescient, far-reaching statements, especially for the time. I would posit that this last fact—the funding of OAS assassination attempts by an organization (Permindex) with a CIA man on its board (Shaw) who also served as a director—is the clearest indication that Permindex may have been working hand-in-hand with Gladio. The key question is whether Permindex was also funding various other Gladio operations, either in Italy or abroad.

    Jim Marrs, an indefatigable researcher and author of Crossfire: The Plot That Killed Kennedy (1989, 2013), notes that the 1962 edition of Who’s Who in the South and Southwest lists Shaw as a member of the Permindex Board of Directors. In the 1963–64 edition, however, the reference to Permindex is deleted. Marrs goes on to discuss how Permindex’s major stockholder Louis Bloomfield reportedly “established Permindex in 1958 as part of the creation of worldwide trade centers connected with CMC.” There is also evidence that Bloomfield may have worked with the British/Canadian Special Operations Executive William Stephenson.

    Permindex “began to draw attention in 1962, when French President Charles de Gaulle publically accused the company of channeling funds to the outlawed Secret Army Organization (OAS). De Gaulle identified several major and well-known international companies as investors in Permindex, which had made several attempts on de Gaulle’s life.”

    Another intriguing fact that brings us to the penumbra of Gladio: both CMC and Permindex were expelled from Italy in 1962 “for subversive activities connected to those in the much-publicized Propaganda-2 masonic lodge scandal … in which the lodge was accused of attempting to overthrow the Italian government and set up a fascist regime.” Marrs also cites the work of whistleblower Victor Marchetti, author of The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (1974) and former assistant to the CIA’s deputy director. Marchetti revealed that Clay Shaw and David Ferrie were each employed by the Agency and that CIA Director Richard Helms “repeatedly voiced concern over the prosecution of Shaw and even instructed top aides to ‘do all we can to help Shaw.’”66

    Perhaps no other researcher knows more about how, why, and to what great extent the Agency stepped in to secretly defend Shaw—and to keep an eye on the bothersome Garrison—than James DiEugenio. As DiEugenio writes in the second edition of Destiny Betrayed (1992, 2012), a researcher named Peter Vea “discovered a very important document while at the National Archives in 1994,” a CIA memo that stated “Shaw had a covert security approval in the Project QKENCHANT” in 1967, “meaning that Shaw was an active covert operator for the CIA while Garrison was investigating him.”

    The author goes on to explain that financial backing for Permindex came from J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation, a firm “that had been closely associated with Allen Dulles” via the latter’s law firm, Sullivan and Cromwell. Dulles eventually became the bank’s General Counsel. Its “founder, Baron Kurt von Schroeder, was associated with the Third Reich, especially Heinrich Himmler.” Apparently, the Swiss were none too happy to learn of all this; as a result, Permindex was forced to leave Switzerland and relocate to Rome.

    The board of directors of Permindex was packed with the crème de la crème of fascist scoundrels: “Bankers who had been tied up with fascist governments, people who worked the Jewish refugee racket during World War II, a former member of Mussolini’s cabinet, and the son-in-law of Hjalmar Schact, the economic wizard behind the Third Reich, who was a friend of Shaw’s. These people would all appeal to the conservative Shaw.” Nagy, one of Permindex’s founding members, was a friend of OAS leader and former governor general of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle. As we have seen, the OAS “later made several attempts on de Gaulle’s life, which the CIA was privy to.” According to French news reports, a few months before the Generals’ Putsch against de Gaulle in April 1961, Soustelle had met with the CIA’s Deputy Director for Plans, in Washington.

    DiEugenio also describes how, the day after Kennedy was shot, Shaw, under his alias Clay Bertrand, “called his lawyer friend Dean Andrews” and asked Andrews to defend Oswald.67 This is not at all surprising since a CIA agent named David Phillips “was managing the CIA’s anti-FPCC program [anti-Fair Play for Cuba Committee], of which Oswald was a part of.”68

    The subject of Permindex and the Centro Mondiale Commerciale (CMC) doesn’t make an appearance in either Puppetmasters or NATO’s Secret Armies. But it has been explored at length by Michele Metta, author of a recently published book, CMC: The Italian Undercover CIA and Mossad Station and the Assassination of JFK. Thanks to Metta’s work, we now have conclusive proof that Shaw served on the CMC board of directors; that fascist-supporter Ferenc Nagy (director of CMC and president of Permindex) was a CIA asset; and that numerous connections exist between CMC and Licio Gelli’s P2 Masonic Lodge.

    Michele Metta’s recently published book on CMC and Permindex

    Metta has also documented an attempt to defeat JFK’s presidential election. That is, a pact between U.S. and Italian Freemasons to “influence Italian immigrants in the USA to vote against Kennedy” (this in the words of Enzo Milone, Grand Master of the Freemasons). The plot was hatched by CIA agent Frank Gigliotti and organized by Giuseppe Pièche. The latter figure served on CMC’s board and was a former general under Mussolini.

    Apparently, Dr. Gigliotti was no middling, low-level functionary. Instead, “he was a CIA agent with great power.” Metta cites a September 30, 1952, letter written by Gigliotti to President Truman, in which “Gigliotti showed a decisive tone of command by asking Truman to fire [Walter] Bedell Smith, who was then director of the CIA … As a matter of fact, Bedell Smith was actually fired; and it was exactly thanks to this firing that, from February 1953, Allen Dulles reached the top of the CIA. The latter was a Freemason himself.”69

    In Puppetmasters, Philip Willan reveals that Gigliotti played an important role in the Masonic world of Lucio Gelli. Gelli’s Propaganda Due Lodge (P2) was part of the Grand Orient of Italy. After the Second World War, the “revival of freemasonry in Italy … was encouraged by both the British and the Americans” as a means of steering Italian masons toward appropriate political interests and objectives, i.e., anti-Communism. Indeed, there were American lodges established for each NATO base in Italy.

    Gelli was given the task of working for the unification of the various Italian masonic groupings and to improve relations with the Catholic Church … In 1971, he was made secretary of P2. This accelerated Masonic promotion was personally instigated by Grand Master Giordano Gamberini, who has been dubbed “the traveling-salesman of anti-communism.” On his retirement in 1970, Gamberini was given responsibility for contacts with foreign masonic lodges and with the CIA.

    Willan concludes that Gelli’s close association with this figure probably explains Gelli’s rapid ascent in the masonic world. Again, fear of the “Communist Peril” was at the heart of all these NATO/CIA/freemasonry relationships.

    Until its confiscation by Mussolini’s forces, the seat of the masonic order of the Grand Orient of Italy was the Palazzo Guistiniani, a palace in Sant’ Eustachio, Rome. After the war, pressure from American freemasonry led to its return to the Grand Orient. “A key role in the negotiations was played by one Frank Gigliotti, a former OSS and then CIA agent,” who attended the official signing-over ceremony with the American ambassador and the Italian Finance Minister, in 1960.70 The palace is now the official residence of the President of the Italian Senate.

    Palazzo Guistiniani

    From Metta we learn that the aforementioned Italian intel asset, Giuseppe Pièche, “with the complicity of the … Italian Interior Minister Mario Scelba, created and directed a Servizio Antincendi” (an agency for fire prevention). According to Metta, this seemingly innocuous institution served a hidden purpose: “In reality [it] obscured a Stay-Behind structure. He was helped in this venture by a soon-to-be member of P2, [Count] Edgardo Sogno.” “In the 1990s [Sogno] made several public declarations clearly qualifying this Antincendi as a NATO project linked to the Gladio network.”71

    The implications of all this are enormous, because here we find a clear, visible link between a CMC board member (Pièche) and the Gladio stay-behind. Pièche’s colleague Count Sogno was associated with supporters of the 1970 Borghese coup and was a conspirator in the planned seizure of the Quirinale Palace in 1974. Philip Willan informs us that the Count, like Licio Gelli, possessed “high-level U.S. and NATO contacts.”72

    Metta notes that Giuseppe Pièche protected neofascist groups and filed secret reports on Italian progressives through this “fire prevention” mechanism. (This is confirmed in declassified CIA documents cited by the author.) He adds that Italian intel documents “reveal a strong symbiosis between the Antincendi and the so-called Gehlen organization,”73 which, as we have seen, was another Gladio-related group.

    The other significant finding to emerge from Metta’s research is the evidence he provides linking Centro Mondiale Commerciale (CMC) to the CIA. A recently declassified memo from the CIA’s International Organizations Division (“the CIA branch occupied in psychological warfare both at home and abroad”) documents that Ferenc Nagy had asked the CIA to place an American businessman on Permindex’s board and a CIA agent on its staff. Nagy also asked the Agency to invest in Permindex so that it could subsequently participate in the firm’s management. Metta’s data also conclusively proves that Clay Shaw was serving on CMC’s board.74

    Metta reproduces a CIA memo on Jean-René Souètre, a member of the dissident OAS that tried to kill de Gaulle. Souètre was “in Fort Worth on the morning of November 22nd” (so was JFK) “and in Dallas in the afternoon.” (Ditto.) “The French believe that he was expelled to either Mexico or Canada.” (In fact, Souètre was apprehended within forty-eight hours of the JFK assassination.) The memo continues: “Subject is believed to be identical with a Captain who is a deserter from the French army and an activist in the OAS. The French are concerned because of de Gaulle’s planned visit to Mexico.”75 (One wonders: if the French were so worried about de Gaulle, why weren’t the Americans equally concerned about the fate of President Kennedy?) As James DiEugenio points out, Souètre had developed contacts with radical rightwing elements in Dallas and New Orleans, and also with anti-Castro Cubans.

    Jean-René Souètre

    CIA documents on Souètre were declassified in 1976 and have long held the interest of JFK researchers. To fully comprehend their significance, one must recall that, as a young senator, on July 2, 1957, JFK delivered a speech to the Senate chamber that had a radical impact on the entire situation in Algeria. As James DiEugenio points out, “It was Kennedy’s powerful Algeria speech that helped collapse the Fourth Republic and brought de Gaulle to power.” DiEugenio concludes:

    But the speech had even more impact than that. As Alistair Cooke noted, the way the speech was perceived by the [Eisenhower] White House, and the derogatory comments made by its occupants, had now vaulted Kennedy’s profile into high relief in Europe. He was the man pointing out their dogged and doomed attempts to hang onto fading empires. In America he had made himself the Democrat that Eisenhower had to “do something about.” … five months after making the watershed Algeria speech, on December 12, 1957, Time published its first cover story on Kennedy. It was titled, “Man Out Front.”

    And in the speech, Kennedy called for the French withdrawal from their Algerian colony, something that the OAS would have been livid about. Kennedy said that France’s “overseas territories are sooner or later, one by one, inevitably going to break free and look with suspicion on the Western nations who impeded their steps to independence.” Kennedy later added: “The time has come for the United States to face the harsh realities of the situation and to fulfill its responsibilities as leader of the free world … in shaping a course toward political independence for Algeria.”76

    As mentioned earlier, the renegade OAS officers were tied to Gladio, especially in its international functioning. And this “worldwide” aspect brings us to our final point:

    Metta discusses various characters who weave their way in and out of Aginter Press: a right-wing terrorist organization, located in Lisbon, with strong ties to the OAS. This would make sense since, as revealed by Philip Muehlenbeck in his book, Betting on the Africans, Kennedy had tried to talk the Portugese dictator Salazar into freeing the African colonies of Mozambique and Angola. When this did not work, Kennedy sent aid to the rebels there. (Muehlenbeck pp. 107–11) Aginter also received support from the CIA. Metta reproduces memoranda generated from a “special branch of the Italian Carabinieri” that reviews how the aforementioned Guido Giannettini (the right-wing journalist and intel agent who helped to develop the strategy of tension) “‘met [OAS officer Yves] Guerin-Serac in 1964 in Lisbon, and presented him to Captain Jean Souètre of the OAS.’” The documents add that “Souetre was given by [Guerin-]Serac the command of mercenaries recruited by Aginter.”77

    Metta believes that “Aginter Press was born of a marriage between the OAS and the so-called Gehlen Organization.”78 According to Daniele Ganser, although posing as a press agency, Aginter was actually a branch of Gladio. What’s special about Aginter is that it featured a virtual import-export group of assassins. Bear in mind the word international. Ganser devotes most of his ninth chapter, “The Secret War in Portugal,” to this Gladio/Aginter Press operation.

    When Gladio was exposed in 1990, the Portuguese newspaper O Jornal “informed a stunned audience in the country that ‘The secret network, erected at the bosom of NATO and financed by the CIA … had a branch in Portugal in the 1960s and the 1970s. It was called “Aginter Press” and was allegedly involved in assassination operations in Portugal as well as in the Portuguese colonies in Africa.’” (My emphasis.) And note the widening global thread in what follows. Ganser continues:

    Aginter Press was no press at all. The organization did not print books or anti-Communist propaganda leaflets but trained right-wing terrorists and specialized in dirty tricks and secret warfare in Portugal and beyond. The mysterious and brutal organization was supported by the CIA and run by European right-wing officers who, with the help of the PIDE [International and State Defense Police], recruited fascist militants. The investigation of the Italian Senate into Gladio and the secret war and massacres in Italy discovered that Italian right-wing extremists had also been trained by Aginter Press, while in Portugal it was revealed that a sub-branch of Aginter Press called “Organisation Armée contre Communisme Internationale” (OACI) had also operated in Italy. The Italian senators found that the CIA supported Aginter Press in Portugal and that the secret organization was led by Captain Yves Guerin, better known by his adopted name of Yves Guérin-Sérac.79

    Judge Salvini, who worked with the Italian Senate investigation, explored the ominous link between Yves Guérin-Sérac and Guido Giannettini:

    Giannettini was an Italian active in the OAS support network during the Algerian War. He was also a paid agent of the Italian intelligence agency SIFAR, and a linchpin between right-wing extremists and the Italian intel services. A principal figure in the State’s manipulation of terror and the intellectual development of the strategy of tension, in November 1961 Giannettini held a three-day seminar at the United States Central Naval Academy at Annapolis on “The Techniques and Prospects of a Coup d’Etat in Europe.” Philip Willan tells us that Giannettini’s manual, Techniques of Revolutionary War (1965), was also on the recommended reading list (along with Hitler’s Mein Kampf) at the Ordine Nuovo’s summer camp for aspiring fascists. (“Selective terrorism,” Giannettini writes, “is carried out by eliminating particular men carefully chosen for a series of motives,” one of which is “because their removal will provoke harsh reprisals which increase the tension, creating an irreversible process leading to civil war.”)80

    Yves Guérin-Sérac

    Former OAS Captain Yves Guillou, aka Yves Guérin-Sérac, ran Aginter Press. Guérin-Sérac was also implicated, along with Giannettini, in the Italian “State massacre” known as the Piazza Fontana bombing. Moreover, Guérin-Sérac was considered to be its mastermind. Ganser rightly characterizes him as “an unmatched strategist of terror.” He had skillful mentors. During the French Indochina War (1946–1954), Guérin-Sérac served as French liaison officer with the CIA. During the Korean War he was awarded a Bronze Star Medal from the United States. He was also a chief protagonist in the attempted OAS coup against de Gaulle.

    After the failed OAS rebellion, he boasted: “The others have laid down their weapons, but not I. After the OAS, I fled to Portugal to carry on the fight and expand it to its proper dimensions—which is to say, a planetary dimension.” (In other words: worldwide.) Next, Guérin-Sérac rounded up his fugitive OAS pals who, along with other extremists, set up shop at Aginter Press headquarters in Lisbon. Ganser adds: “The OAS diaspora strengthened militant right-wing networks internationally.”81 We should bear this in mind since Aginter had what might be called global subsidiaries.

    After the fall of Portugal’s dictatorship, Guérin-Sérac fled to Franco’s Spain. Meanwhile, the new Portuguese secret service [SDCI] launched an investigation. It concluded that Aginter had four principal functions:

    First, it had been an internationally well-connected “espionage bureau run by the Portuguese police and, through them, the CIA, the West German BND or ‘Gehlen Organisation,’ the Spanish Dirección General De Seguridad, South Africa’s BOSS, and, later, the Greek KYP.” Next to this intelligence gathering task Aginter Press had secondly functioned as a “center for the recruitment and training of mercenaries and terrorists specializing in sabotage and assassination.” According to the SDCI document, Aginter Press had thirdly been a “strategic center for neofascist and right-wing political indoctrination operations in sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and Europe in conjunction with a number of sub-fascist regimes, well-known right-wing figures, and internationally active neofascist groups.” Fourth, Aginter Press had been a secret anti-Communist army, an “international fascist organization called “Order and Tradition” with a clandestine paramilitary wing called OACI, “Organisation Armée contre le Communisme International.”

    From Guérin-Sérac’s newly established digs in Madrid, among other acts of terror, he organized attacks abroad that were blamed on the Algerian liberation movement. His bombs were deposited at the Algerian Embassies in France, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain. One unexploded mechanism that failed to detonate in Frankfort was found to contain C–4. In Judge Salvini’s words, C–4 is “an explosive exclusively used by the U.S. forces, which has never been used in any of the anarchist bombings.”

    In these investigations data has emerged which confirms the links between Aginter Press, Ordine Nuovo, and Avanguardia Nazionale” Judge Salvini explained to the Italian senators investigating the secret war in Italy and beyond. “It has emerged that Guido Giannettini had contacts with Guerin-Serac in Portugal ever since 1964. It has emerged that instructors of Aginter Press … came to Rome between 1967 and 1968 and instructed the militant members of Avanguardia Nazionale in the use of explosives.” Judge Salvini concluded that, based on the available documents and testimonies, it emerges that the CIA front Aginter Press had played a decisive role in secret warfare operations in Western Europe and had started the great massacres to discredit the Communists in Italy.82

    From all this, we may conclude that Gladio, far from being a local phenomenon strictly anchored within its respective host nations was, in reality, a fluid network with complex international appendages. (As mentioned earlier, this nexus extended even to Latin America.) Whether such poisonous strands reached into Dallas in 1963 through figures like Yves Guérin-Sérac—with his sick dream of a “planetary dimension” of State-sponsored terror—remains a question. And the implications of his OAS colleague, Jean Souètre, shadowing the movements of JFK on that fateful day are intriguing.

    *   *   *

    On November 22, 1963, after his scheduled departure from Dealey Plaza, the next stop on the president’s agenda was supposed to be a luncheon at the Dallas Trade Mart. A year after Kennedy’s death, this business center became host to a bronze sculpture of an eagle with its wings spread, created by artist Elisabeth Frink. Engraved upon its platform is a line from William Blake’s “Marriage of Heaven and Hell: “When thou seest an eaglethou seest a portion of genius lift up thy head!” A second engraving reads: “Placed in memorial by the friends of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy who awaited his arrival at the Dallas Trade Mart Nov. 22, 1963.”83

    Elisabeth Frink’s “Eagle” sculpture at the Dallas Trade Mart, in memory of President John F. Kennedy

    For Blake, this majestic creature was a symbol of the soaring, unfettered creative imagination—and even the genius of special talent.84 Diametrically opposed to this we find the symbol of the crow, subject of another of Blake’s “Proverbs of hell”: “The eagle never lost so much time as when he submitted to learn of the crow.”

    In another proverb, Blake writes: “The crow wish’d every thing was black, the owl, that every thing was white.” Unfortunately, John F. Kennedy was all too often forced to suffer the presence of crows, as was Aldo Moro. The kind of “thinking outside the box” exemplified by Moro and JFK—who both dared to steer a foreign policy course against the powerful tide of the powers that be—was a direct threat to the crows, who could imagine no other way of dealing with it.

    Interview with Dr. Daniele Ganser

    Bibliography:


    David Black, ACID: A New Secret History of LSD (London: Vision Paperbacks, 2001).

    [The title of Black’s book is perhaps misleading since so much of it concerns the “extraordinary career” of Ronald H. Stark, an MKULTRA asset who played an important role in right-wing terrorism in Italy and, in particular, in the secret undermining of the Red Brigades. The last three chapters chronicle Stark’s life in Italy during the Years of Lead: his connections to the Mafia, Propaganda Due, the Italian secret service, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and certain American Embassy officials. Besides all this (no doubt, as part of his MKULTRA assignment), Stark was one of the world’s largest independent producers of LSD, a substance that did a marvelous job of distracting the youth movement and destroying the disciplined work and clear thinking of political groups the world over. No wonder that Dick Helms once called it “dynamite.” Stark is also featured in Philip Willan’s Puppetmasters and in Acid Dreams, by Martin A. Lee and Bruce Shlain.]

    James DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed: JFK, Cuba, and the Garrison Case, Second Edition (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2012).

    Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 2005).

    Daniele Ganser, “Terrorism in Western Europe: An Approach to NATO’s Secret Stay-Behind Armies,” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, p. 74.

    Michele Metta, CMC: The Italian Undercover CIA and Mossad Station and the Assassination of JFK (independently published, 2018).

    Jefferson Morley, The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James Jesus Angleton (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2017).

    David Talbot, The Devil’s Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America’s Secret Government (New York: HarperCollins, 2015).

    Philip Willan, Puppetmasters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy (Lincoln, NE: Author’s Choice Books, 1991).

    Notes:


    1 Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 70.

    2 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 76.

    3 Stuart Christie, Stefano delle Chiaie, (London: Anarchy Publications, 1984), p. 4, as quoted in Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 65.

    4 After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, JFK forced the resignation of Allen Dulles. His official letter of resignation was released by the White House on November 29, 1961. Exactly two years later, on November 29, 1963, President Johnson appointed Dulles to the Warren Commission, in which capacity Dulles served as its “single most active member” (as noted by James DiEugenio in Destiny Betrayed: JFK, Cuba, and the Garrison Case, Second Edition (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2012), p. 394). According to author David Talbot, even after his resignation Dulles continued to meet with CIA officials and to direct secret operations. See David Talbot, The Devil’s Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America’s Secret Government (New York: HarperCollins, 2015), pp. 545–48.

    5 Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 59.

    6 Dino’s “claim to fame was the time he spent as CIA deputy chief of station in Santiago, Chile, in 1970, during the massive CIA destabilization of the Allende government.” Covert Action Information Bulletin, number 33, winter 1990, archive.org.

    7 David Talbot, The Devil’s Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America’s Secret Government (New York: HarperCollins, 2015), p. 468. For a detailed account of these events, see pp. 463–78.

    8 Talbot, The Devil’s Chessboard, p. 475.

    9 Talbot, Brothers. The Hidden History of the Kennedy Years (New York: Free Press, 2008), pp. 107-08.

    10 Robert F. Kennedy Jr, American Values: Lessons I Learned from My Family (New York: HarperCollins Publisher, 2018), pp. 135, 215, 368.

    11 Although Danielle Ganser doesn’t explore the subject of Northwoods (or Lemnitzer) in his book, in various interviews he discusses its significance as a “military-industrial-complex” document. The first person to serve in the position as SACEUR was General Dwight D. Eisenhower (1951–1952). Eisenhower was followed by General Alfred M. Gruenther (1953–1956) and General Lauris Norstad (1956–1962). Kennedy replaced Norstad with Lemnitzer in 1963. After Lemnitzer’s departure in 1969, the other generals appointed to SACEUR during the Cold War (all Americans) were Andrew J. Goodpaster (1969–1974), Alexander M. Haig (1974–1979), and Bernard W. Rogers (1979–1987). These men stood at the helm of NATO during a period of the bloodiest terrorist violence in Western Europe. (In Italy alone there were 398 terrorist attacks in 1969, a figure that continued to rise, reaching its peak at 2,513 in 1979.) Rogers was followed by General John R. Galvin, who served from 1987–1992.

    12 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 1.

    13 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 88.

    14 Amidst growing opposition to the Vietnam War, in 1965 President Johnson asked the CIA to launch a program to surveil and counter domestic dissent. Authorized by Johnson in 1967, the program, later known as Operation CHAOS, was greatly expanded by President Nixon. All this occurred despite the fact that the Agency is legally forbidden to engage in domestic spying. The program was developed by James Angleton under Richard Helms. It maintained at least 10,000 files on American citizens.

    15 Martin A. Lee; Bruce Shlain, Acid Dreams: The Complete Social History of LSD: The CIA, the Sixties, and Beyond (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1992), p. 232.

    16 Jefferson Morley, “CIA Reveals Name of Former Spy—and He’s Still Alive.” Newsweek, May 15, 2018, newsweek.com.

    17 “CIA agent John Stockwell said the CIA waged psychological warfare on Huey Newton from the time he left prison until his death.” John L. Potash, Drugs as Weapons Against Us (Walterville, OR: Trine Day, 2015), p. 241.

    18 “FBI dirty tricks, the Senate intelligence committee later discovered, provoked ‘shootings, beatings, and a high degree of unrest’ in the Black Panther movement. For two Panthers in Chicago, the FBI tactics brought sudden death. Fred Hampton and Mark Clark died in a hail of gunfire, and three others were wounded, when police burst into their apartment at 4:00 a.m. on December 3, 1969. It later emerged that the police had fired ninety-eight rounds, the Panthers—maybe—one. “In 1982, after persistent litigation, the survivors were awarded $1.85 million in damages against the police, in a case that revealed the killings had been the direct result of action by the FBI. The Bureau had provided the police with detailed information on Hampton’s movements, along with a floor plan of the apartment. Veteran agent Wesley Swearingen quoted a Chicago colleague as telling him: ‘We told the cops how bad these guys were, that the cops had better look out or their wives were going to be widows … We set up the police to go in there and kill the whole lot.’” Anthony Summers, Official and Confidential. The Secret Life of J. Edgar Hoover (New York: Putnam, 1993), pp. 458–59.

    19 One informant was paid $300 “for uniquely valuable services”: information that helped the FBI to locate Fred Hampton and arrange for him to be killed while he was asleep in bed. The snitch was Fred Hampton’s bodyguard, William O’Neal. Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991), pp. 620–21.

    20 Noam Chomsky, Introduction to Nelson Blackstock, Cointelpro: The FBI’s Secret War on Political Freedom (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1988), as quoted by David Black, ACID: A New Secret History of LSD (London: Vision Paperbacks, 2001), p. 107.

    21 Philip Willan, Puppetmasters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2002), p. 141.

    22 Christopher Simpson, Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), p. 44, as quoted by Ganser in NATO’S Secret Armies, p. 191.

    23 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 193, quoting from the British periodical, Searchlight, January 1991.

    24 This is my speculation, not necessarily Ganser’s.

    25 In his autobiography, Fidel Castro says: “It’s my opinion—I’ve said this before—that if Kennedy had survived, it’s possible that relations between Cuba and the United States would have improved.” In a footnote to this remark, Ignacio Ramonet adds: “In 2003 a conversation between President Kennedy and his national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, was made public; it showed that the president wanted to explore a rapprochement with Cuba, and had agreed to the possibility of a secret meeting with an emissary from Havana, on the suggestion of Fidel Castro.” Fidel Castro and Ignacio Ramonet, My Life. A Spoken Autobiography. Trans. Andrew Hurley (New York: Scribner, 2009), pp. 592, 709.

    26 Jim Garrison, On the Trail of the Assassins (New York: Warner Books, 1988), pp. 293–294.

    27 Robert F. Kennedy Jr, p. 262.

    28 See Richard Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa; Philip Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders; Greg Poulgrain, The Incubus of Intervention: Conflicting Indonesia Strategies of John F. Kennedy and Allen Dulles; Robert Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson and the Nonaligned World.  These represent some of the most significant developments in JFK research and focus on Kennedy’s brilliant yet rarely discussed foreign policy innovations, many of which could not help but incur the wrath of the power elite, both in the U.S. and abroad.

    29 Talbot, The Devil’s Chessboard, p. 423.

    30 Talbot, The Devil’s Chessboard, p. 420.

    31 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, pp. 98–99. In 1961, Richard Helms spread disinformation against Paese Sera, claiming the CIA had nothing to do with supporting the OAS generals and their attempt to assassinate de Gaulle. This was an outright lie.

    32 Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 138.

    33 In a 5 December 1990 interview with the Guardian, Vinciguerra further elaborated: “The terrorist line was followed by camouflaged people, people belonging to the security apparatus or those linked to the state apparatus through rapport or collaboration. I say that every single outrage that followed from 1969 fitted into a single, organized matrix.”

    34 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 7.

    35 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 76.

    36 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 78.

    37 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 82.

    38 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 8.

    39 Willan, “Terrorists ‘Helped by CIA’ to Stop Rise of Left in Italy,” Guardian, March26, 2001, as cited by Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 6.

    40 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 17.

    41 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 144.

    42 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 147.

    43 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 215.

    44 Ganser, Terrorism in Western Europe: An Approach to NATO’s Secret Stay-Behind Armies,” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, p. 74, fpri.org/orbis.

    45 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 20.

    46 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 25.

    47 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 36.

    48 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 33.

    49 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, pp. 56–57.

    50 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, pp. 230–35.

    51 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, pp. 20–24.

    52 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 235.

    53 Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 55.

    54 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 74.

    55 Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 57.

    56 Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 59.

    57 Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 75.

    58 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, pp. 79–80.

    59 Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 215.

    60 Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 241.

    61 Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 158. One wonders why the tale’s narrator is described as a “blond.” Was this supposed to be the portrait of an American and, thus, a reference to U.S. government influence?

    62 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 80.

    63 DiEugenio, p. 93.

    64 Garrison, p. 137.

    65 Garrison, pp. 101–03.

    66 Jim Marrs, Crossfire: The Plot That Killed Kennedy (New York: Basic Books, 2013), pp. 470–71.

    67 DiEugenio, pp. 385–87. Regarding Shaw’s connections to the economic elite: “The first speaker for the International Trade Mart opening in 1948 was brought down from New York, William McChesney Martin, who later became Federal Reserve Chairman. The companies that promoted the creation of these kinds of bodies were called The World Trade Corporation, headed by Winthrop Aldrich, chair of the Chase National Bank. Herbert Brownell was on the board. The year before it was created, Aldrich and Allen Dulles made speeches promoting the idea of world trade at a luncheon in New York. The other body that promoted these marts was the World Commerce Corporation (WCC), started in 1945 as the British American Canadian Corporation. The WCC board included former Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, and former OSS Director William Donovan, and William Stephenson who ran British intelligence in the USA during World War II.” DiEugenio, June 25, 2019, private communication, citing Donald Gibson, The Kennedy Assassination Cover-Up (Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2000) for most of this information.

    68 DiEugenio, p. 395.

    69 Michele Metta, CMC: The Italian Undercover CIA and Mossad Station and the Assassination of JFK (independently published, 2018), pp. 14–15.

    70 Willan, Puppetmasters, pp. 57–59.

    71 Metta, p. 16.

    72 Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 110.

    73 Metta, p. 130.

    74 Metta, pp. 91–92. “This evidence is very important because it confirms that this company’s purpose was not just to provide an exhibition hall for companies wanting to sell their products, but that there was also an intelligence aspect to it.” John Kowalski, “The Canadian Archives, Michele Metta, and the Latest on Permindex.” February 8, 2019, kennedysandking.com.

    75 Metta, p.134.

    76 DiEugenio, pp. 27–28.

    77 Metta, pp. 132–34.

    78 Metta, p.130.

    79 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 115.

    80 Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 204.

    81 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, p. 116.

    82 Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies, pp. 120–22.

    83 The “divine in man” was one of three main themes in Frink’s work.

    84 “The eagle, which was reputed to be able to gaze unblinded on the sun, is the symbol of genius.” S. Foster Damon and Morris Eaves, A Blake Dictionary: The Ideas and Symbols of William Blake (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2013), p. 112.

  • Truthdig, Major Danny Sjursen and JFK

    Truthdig, Major Danny Sjursen and JFK


    truthdigOn April 6, 2019 Truthdig joined the likes of Paul Street and Counterpunch in its disdain for scholarship on the subject of the career and presidency of John F. Kennedy. To say the least, that is not good company to keep in this regard. (see, for instance, Alec Cockburn Lives: Matt Stevenson, JFK and CounterPunch, and Paul Street Meets Jane Hamsher at Arlington) What makes it even worse is that the writer of this particular article, Major Danny Sjursen, was a teacher at West Point in American History. In that regard, his article is about as searching and definitive as something from an MSM darling like Robert Dallek. The problem is, Truthdig is not supposed to be part of the MSM.

    Sjursen’s article is part of a multi-part series about American History. The title of this installment is “JFK’s Cold War Chains”. So right off the bat, Sjursen is somehow going to convey to the reader that President Kennedy was no different than say Dwight Eisenhower, Harry Truman, or Richard Nixon or Lyndon Johnson in his foreign policy vision.

    Almost immediately Sjursen hits the note that the MSM usually does: Kennedy was really all flash and charisma and achieved very little of substance in his relatively brief presidency. And the author says this is true about both his foreign and domestic policy. Like many others, he states that Kennedy hedged on civil rights. I don’t see how beginning a program the night of one’s inauguration counts as hedging.

    On the evening of his inauguration, Kennedy called Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon. He was upset because during that day’s parade of the Coast Guard, he did not see any black faces. He wanted to know why. Were there no African American cadets at the Coast Guard academy? If not, why not? (Irving Bernstein, Promises Kept, p. 52) Two days later, the Coast Guard began an all-out effort to seek out and sign up African American students. A year later they admitted a black student. By 1963 they made it a point to interview 561 African American candidates. (Harry Golden, Mr. Kennedy and the Negroes, p. 114)

    This was just the start. At his first cabinet meeting Kennedy brought this incident up and said he wanted figures from each department on the racial minorities they had in their employ and where they ranked on the pay scale. When he got the results, he was not pleased. He wanted everyone to make a conscious effort to remedy the situation and he also requested regular reports on the matter. Kennedy also assigned a civil rights officer to manage the hiring program and to hear complaints for each department. He then requested that the Civil Service Commission begin a recruiting program that would target historically black colleges and universities for candidates. (Carl Brauer, John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction, pp. 72, 84) Thus began the program we now call affirmative action. Kennedy issued two executive orders on that subject. The first one was Executive Order 10925 in March of 1961, three months after his inauguration.

    Kennedy’s civil rights program extended into the field of federal contracting in a way that was much more systematic and complete than any president since Franklin Roosevelt. (Golden, p. 61) In fact, it went so far as to have an impact on admissions of African American students to private colleges in the South. As Melissa Kean noted in her book on the subject, Kennedy tied federal research grants and contracts to admissions policies of private southern universities. This forced open the doors of large universities like Duke and Tulane to African American students. (Kean, Desegregating Private Higher Education in the South, p. 237)

    I should not have to inform anyone, certainly not Major Sjursen, about how this all ended up at the University of Mississippi and then the University of Alabama. The president had to call in federal marshals and the military in order to escort African American students past the governors of each state. In both cases, the administration had helped to attain court orders that, respectively Governors Ross Barnett and George Wallace, had resisted. That resistance necessitated the massing of federal power in order to gain the entry of African American students to those public universities.

    After the last confrontation, where Kennedy faced off against Governor Wallace, he went on national television to make the most eloquent and powerful public address on civil rights since Abraham Lincoln. Anyone can watch that speech, since it is on YouTube. By this time, the summer of 1963, Kennedy had already submitted a civil rights bill to Congress. He had not done so previously since he knew it would be filibustered, as all other prior bills on the subject had been. Kennedy’s bill took one year to pass. And he had to mount an unprecedented month-long personal lobbying campaign to launch it. (Clay Risen, The Bill of the Century, p. 63) When one looks at Kennedy’s level of achievement in just this one domestic field and locates and lists his accomplishments, it is clear that he did more for civil rights in three years than FDR, Truman and Eisenhower did in nearly three decades (see chart at end).

    The reason for this is that the Kennedy administration was the first to state that it would enforce the Brown vs. Board decision of 1954. The Eisenhower administration resisted enacting every recommendation sent to it by the senate’s 1957 Civil Rights Commission. (Harris Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings, p. 21) As Michael Beschloss has written, Eisenhower actually tried to persuade Earl Warren not to vote in favor of the plaintiffs in that case.

    Kennedy endorsed that decision when he was a senator. In fact, he did so twice in public. The first time was in New York City in 1956. (New York Times, 2/8/56, p. 1) The second time he did so was in 1957, in of all places, Jackson, Mississippi. (Golden, p. 95) Attorney General Robert Kennedy then went to the University of Georgia Law Day in 1961. He spent almost half of his speech addressing the issue: namely that he would enforce Brown vs Board. Again, this speech is easily available online and Sjursen could have linked to it in his article. So it would logically follow that in 1961, the Kennedy administration indicted the Secretary of Education in Louisiana for disobeying court orders to integrate public schools. (Jack Bass, Unlikely Heroes, p. 135)

    Once one properly lists and credits this information, its easy to see that the Kennedy administration was intent on ripping down Jim Crow in the South even if it meant losing what had been a previous Democratic Party political bastion. (Golden, p. 98) Kennedy’s approval rating in the South had plummeted from 60 to 33% by the summer of 1963. He was losing votes for his other programs because of his stand on civil rights. But as he told Luther Hodges, “There comes a time when a man has to take a stand….” (Brauer, pp. 247, 263-64)

    In addition to that, Kennedy signed legislation that allowed federal employees to form unions. (Executive Order 10988 , January 17, 1962) This was quite important, since it began the entire public employee union sector movement, today one of the strongest areas of much diminished labor power. In March of that same year, Kennedy signed the Manpower Development and Training Act aimed at alleviating African American unemployment. (Bernstein, pp. 186-87)

    On April 11, 1962 Kennedy called a press conference and made perhaps the most violent rhetorical attack against a big business monopoly since Roosevelt. Thus began his famous 72-hour war against the steel companies. Kennedy had brokered a deal between the unions and the large companies to head off a strike and an inflationary spiral in the economy. The steel companies broke the deal. Robert Kennedy followed the speech by opening a grand jury probe into monopoly practices of collusion and price fixing. He then sent the FBI to make evening visits to serve subpoenas on steel executives. No less than John M. Blair called this episode “the most dramatic confrontation in history between a President and corporate management.” (Donald Gibson, Battling Wall Street, p. 9) When it was over, the steel companies rescinded their price increases.

    Three months later, Kennedy tried to pass a Medicare bill. It was defeated in Congress. But on the day of his assassination, he was working with Congressman Wilbur Mills to bring the bill back for another vote. (Bernstein, pp. 256-58) In October of 1963, Kennedy’s federal aid to education bill was passed. This was the first such bill of its kind. (Bernstein, pp. 225-230)

    At the time of his assassination, due to the influence of Michael Harrington’s The Other America, Kennedy was working on an overall plan to attack urban poverty. As careful scholars have pointed out, the War on Poverty was not originated by Lyndon Johnson. Kennedy had been working on such a program with the chairman of his Council on Economic Advisors, Walter Heller, for months before his murder. (Edward Schmitt, The President of the Other America, pp. 92, 96) As more than one commentator has written, what Johnson did with the Kennedy brothers’ draft of that plan was quite questionable. (Wofford, p. 286 ff.) To cite just one example, LBJ retired the man—David Hackett—who the Kennedys had placed in charge of the program.

    I could go on with the domestic side, pointing to Kennedy’s almost immediate raising of the minimum wage, his concern for lengthening unemployment benefits, his establishment of a Women’s Bureau, the comments by labor leaders that they just about “lived in the White House”, etc., etc. In the face of all this, for Sjursen to write that Kennedy’s administration contained “so few tangible accomplishments” or did nothing for unemployed African Americans, this simply will not stand up to a full review of the record.

    Sjursen’s discussion of Kennedy’s foreign policy is equally obtuse and problematic. He begins by saying that Kennedy fulfilled “his dream of being an ardent Cold Warrior.” He then writes that “Kennedy was little different than—and was perhaps more hawkish than—his predecessors and successors.”

    In the light of modern scholarship, again, this will simply not stand scrutiny. Authors like Robert Rakove, Philip Muehlenbeck, Greg Poulgrain, and Richard Mahoney—all of whom Sjursen ignores—have dug into the archival record on this specific subject. They have shown, with specific examples and reams of data, that Kennedy forged his foreign policy in conscious opposition to Secretaries of State Dean Acheson, a Democrat and Republican John Foster Dulles.

    This confrontation was not muted. It was direct. And it began in 1951, even before Kennedy got to the Senate, let alone the White House. His visit to Saigon in that year and his meeting with a previous acquaintance, State Department official Edmund Gullion, about the French effort to recolonize Vietnam, was the genesis for a six-year search to find a new formula for American foreign policy in the Third World. Congressman Kennedy was quite troubled with Gullion’s prediction that France had no real chance of winning its war against Ho Chi Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap. Upon his return to Massachusetts, he began to make speeches and write letters to his constituents about the problems with America’s State Department in the Third World. In 1954, Senator Kennedy warned that

    … no amount of American military assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere, an enemy of the people which has the sympathy and covert support of the people.

    In 1956, he made a speech for Adlai Stevenson in which he criticized both the Democratic and Republican parties for their failures to break out of Cold War orthodoxies in their thinking about nationalism in the Third World. He stated that this revolt in the Third World and America’s failure to understand it, “has reaped a bitter harvest today—and it is by rights and by necessity a major foreign policy campaign issue that has nothing to do with anti-Communism.” (Richard Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, pp. 15-18) Stevenson’s office wired him a message asking him not to make any more foreign policy statements associated with his campaign.

    My question then to Mr. Sjursen is: If you are too extreme for the liberal standard bearer of your party, how can you be “little different than” or even “more hawkish” than he is?

    This was all in preparation for his career-defining speech of 1957. On July 2 of that year, Kennedy spoke from the floor of the Senate and made perhaps the most blistering attack on the Foster Dulles/Dwight Eisenhower Cold War shibboleths toward the Third World that any American politician had made in that decade. This was Kennedy’s all-out attack on the administration’s policy toward the horrible colonial war going on in Algeria at the time. He compared this mistake of quiet support for the spectacle of terror that this conflict had produced with the American support for the doomed French campaign to save its colonial empire in Indochina three years previously. He assaulted the White House for not being a true friend of its old ally. A true friend would have done everything to escort France to the negotiating table rather than continue a war it was not going to win and which was at the same time tearing apart the French home front. In light of those realities, he concluded by saying America’s goals should be to liberate Africa and to save France. (John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, pp. 66-80)

    Again, this speech was assailed not just by the White House, but also by people in his own party like Stevenson and Harry Truman’s Secretary of State Dean Acheson. (Mahoney, p. 20) Of the over 130 newspaper editorials it provoked, about 2/3 were negative. (p. 21) A man who was “little different” than his peers would not have caused such a torrent of reaction to a foreign policy speech. To most objective observers, this evidence would indicate that Kennedy was clearly bucking the conventional wisdom as to what America should be doing in the Third World with regards to the issues of nationalism, colonialism and anti-communism. As biographer John T. Shaw later wrote about these speeches, what Kennedy did was to formulate an alternative foreign policy view toward the Cold War for the Democratic party. And this was his most significant achievement in the Senate. (John T. Shaw, JFK in the Senate, p. 110) But for Mr. Sjursen and Truthdig, this is all the dark side of the moon.

    By not noting any of this, Sjursen does not then have to follow through on how Kennedy carried these policies into his presidency. A prime example would be in the Congo, where Kennedy pretty much reversed policy from what Eisenhower was doing there in just a matter of weeks. The man who Kennedy was going to back in that struggle, Patrice Lumumba, was hunted down and killed by firing squad three days before the new president was inaugurated. Eisenhower and Allen Dulles had issued an assassination order for Lumumba in the late summer of 1960. (John Newman, Countdown to Darkness, p. 236) After he was killed, the CIA kept the news of his death from President Kennedy until nearly one month after Lumumba was killed. But on February 2, not knowing he was dead, Kennedy had already revised the Eisenhower policy in Congo to favor Lumumba. (Mahoney, p. 65) In fact, this was the first foreign policy revision the new president had made. Some have even argued that the plotting against Lumumba was sped up to make sure he was killed before Kennedy was in the White House. (John Morton Blum, Years of Discord, p. 23)

    How does all of the above fit into the paradigm that Sjursen draws in which the Cold War heightened under Kennedy and his vision had no room for nuances of freedom and liberty? Does anyone think that Eisenhower would have reacted to Lumumba’s death with the pained expression of grief that JFK did when he was alerted to that fact? Eisenhower was the president who ordered his assassination. (For an overview of this epochal conflict and how it undermines Sjursen and Truthdig, see Dodd and Dulles vs Kennedy in Africa)

    One of the most bizarre statements in the long essay is that Kennedy was loved by and enamored of the military. The evidence against this is so abundant that it is hard to see how the author can really believe it. But by the end of the 1962 Missile Crisis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were openly derisive of JFK. They told him to his face that his decision to blockade Cuba instead of attacking the island over the missile installation was the equivalent of Neville Chamberlain appeasing Hitler at Munich. (James DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, Second Edition, p. 57) They were also upset when he rejected the false flag scenarios outlined in their Operation Northwoods proposals, e.g., blowing up an American ship in Cuban waters. These were designed to create a pretext for an invasion of the island. He also writes that Kennedy deliberately chose the space race since it was a popular way to one-up the Russians. This ignores the fact that Kennedy thought it was too expensive and wanted a joint expedition to the moon with the Soviets. According to the book One Hell of a Gamble by Tim Naftali and Aleksandr Fursenko, Kennedy actually attempted to do this earlier, in 1961, but was turned down by Nikita Khrushchev.

    Sjursen blames the failure of the Bay of Pigs on Kennedy. First of all, the Bay of Pigs invasion was not Kennedy’s idea. And anyone who studies that operation should know this. It was created by Eisenhower and Allen Dulles. Dulles and CIA Director of Plans Dick Bissell then pushed it on Kennedy. They did everything they could to get Kennedy to approve it, including lying to him about its chances of success. The important thing to remember about this disaster is that Kennedy did not approve direct American military intervention once he saw it failing. This had been the secret agenda of both Dulles and Bissell, who knew it would fail. (DiEugenio, p. 47)

    Kennedy later suspected such was the case and he fired Dulles, Bissell and Charles Cabell, the CIA Deputy Director. There is no doubt that if Nixon had won the election of 1960, he would have sent in the Navy and Marines to bail out the operation. Because this is what he told JFK he would have done. (Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 288) And today, Cuba would be a territory of the USA, like Puerto Rico. Again, so much for there being no difference between what came before Kennedy and what came after.

    Sjursen then tries to connect the Bay of Pigs directly to the Missile Crisis. As if one was the consequence of the other. Graham Allison, the foremost scholar on the Missile Crisis, disagreed. And so did John Kennedy. After the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy had a meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna. He found the Russian leader obsessed with the status of Berlin. So much so that during the Berlin Crisis in the fall of 1961, the Soviets decided to build a wall to separate East from West Berlin. In the fine volume The Kennedy Tapes, still the best book on the Missile Crisis, it is revealed that Berlin is what Kennedy believed the Russian deployment was really about. (See Probe Magazine, Vol. 5, No 4, pp. 17-18) That whole crisis was not caused by Kennedy. It was provoked by Nikita Khrushchev. And again, Kennedy did not take the option extended by many of his advisors, that is, using an air attack or an invasion to take out the missiles. He insisted on the least violent option he could take. One person died during those thirteen days. He was an American pilot. Kennedy did not take retaliatory action.

    I should not even have to add that Sjursen leaves out the crucial aftermath of the Missile Crisis: that Kennedy developed a rapprochement strategy with both Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev. Both of these are well described by Jim Douglass in his important book JFK and the Unspeakable. (see pp. 74-90 for the Castro back-channel; pp. 340-51 for the Kennedy/Khrushchev détente facilitated by Norman Cousins) The rapprochement attempt with Russia culminated with Kennedy’s famous Peace Speech at American University in the summer of 1963. Which, like Kennedy’s Algeria speech, Sjursen does not mention.

    Predictably, Sjursen ends his essay with Kennedy and Vietnam. He actually writes that Kennedy’s policies there led the US “inexorably deeper into its greatest military fiasco and defeat.” What can one say in the face of such a lack of respect for the declassified record?—except that all of that record now proves that Kennedy was getting out of Vietnam at the time of his murder. (Probe Magazine, Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 18-21) That Johnson knew this at the time, and he consciously altered that withdrawal policy, and then tried to cover up the fact that he had. And we have that in LBJ’s own words today. (Virtual JFK, by James Blight, pp. 306-10) There was not one combat troop in Vietnam when Kennedy was inaugurated. There was not one there on the day he was killed. By 1967, there were over 500,000 combat troops in theater.

    Many informed observers complain about the censorship and distortion so prevalent on Fox News. But I would argue that when it comes to this subject, the journals on the Left do pretty much the same thing, ending up with the same result: the misleading of its readership. I would also argue the very process—from the editor on down to the choice of author and sources used—skews the facts and sources as rigorously and as stringently as Fox. On two occasions, I have asked Counterpunch to print my reply to anti-Kennedy articles they have written. I sent an e-mail to Truthdig to do the same with this essay. As with Counterpunch, I got no reply. This would suggest that there is a Wizard of Oz apparatus at work, one which does not wish to see the curtain drawn. Such a contingency reduces this kind of writing to little more than playing to the crowd. With Fox, that crowd is on the right. With Counterpunch and Truthdig, it is on the left. In both cases, the motive is political. That is no way to dig for truth.

  • Creating the Oswald Legend – Part 2

    Creating the Oswald Legend – Part 2


    I. Oswald’s Passport and Illegals

    In part 2 we will continue our journey into Oswald’s wondrous world and discover that his USSR defection was only a part of the larger picture. Moscow and Minsk were only stops, but not the destination of his journey. These stops were to become part of his resume, to create a “Legend” who will return home pretending to be a Soviet spy in order to infiltrate suspected communists, subversives, and supporters of Castro. From the beginning that destination was Cuba; it has always been about Cuba.

    Marguerite Oswald was in disbelief when she was informed that her son had defected to the Soviet Union. In September, her son visited his mother in Fort Worth after his discharge from the Marines and told her that he wanted to travel to Cuba. In February, an FBI agent, John Fain, interviewed Marguerite regarding the whereabouts of her missing son. He later stated in his report that “Mrs. Oswald stated he would not have been surprised to learn that Lee had gone to, say, South America or Cuba, but it never crossed her mind that he might go to Russia or that he might try to become a citizen there.”1

    When Oswald tried to defect to the USSR, a wire service noted that his sister-in-law said “that he wanted to travel a lot and talked about going to Cuba.”2 Similarly, when he returned back to the States, a 1962 Fort Worth newspaper recalled what Oswald said to his family: “He talked optimistically about the future. Some of his plans had included going to college, writing a book, or joining Castro’s Cuban army.”3

    Oswald’s travel destinations included Cuba, the Dominican Republic, England, Turku Finland, France, Germany, Russia and Switzerland. One has to wonder how the recently discharged Marine would have been able to fund a trip that involved so many countries that were far apart from each other, like Cuba and Russia. Before leaving the Marines, he applied for a passport on September 4, 1959 and received it on September 10, 1959. To apply for the passport he used for identification a Department of Defense (DOD) I.D. card, although he could have provided his birth certificate. As George Michael Evica noted, “Lee Harvey Oswald should never have had a DOD I.D. card on September 4, 1959, possibly on September 11th, but not on September 4th.”4 September 11 was the date that he was to be transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve, once his active duty was over.

    The Marine Corps confirmed that it had issued the card before he was discharged, but this kind of practice ended as of July 1959, so he was probably issued the DOD I.D. card because he was going to fill a civilian position overseas that required it.5

    Too many peculiarities surround the young ex-Marine, his DOD I.D. card, his passport application, the countries he was planning to visit and the expenses needed to support such a trip. All these were enough to sound the alarm bells in the intelligence community, but somehow this did not happen.

    Oswald had also stated in his passport application that he intended to study in Europe, and he named two institutions. One was the Albert Schweitzer College (ASC) in Churwalden, Switzerland, and the second was the University of Turku in Finland.

    Oswald sent his application to the ASC on March 19, 1959, informing them that he was going to attend the third (spring) term of the trimester schedule, from April 12, to June 27, 1960, followed by a registration fee payment of $25 on June 19. However, this time length posed a problem by itself. Oswald’s passport was valid for four months overseas, so if he wanted to attend its third trimester, then his passport should have been valid for nine months, an extra five months. According to his passport, he could have only made it to study the fall trimester of 1959, and then only if he was given an early discharge, which actually happened.6 Oswald was released from the Marines with a dependency discharge on September 11, 1959 to go to Fort Worth to take care of his injured mother. However, his mother had only a minor injury and Oswald left for New Orleans on September 17, 1959, to begin his trip to Europe. A year later, after his defection to the Soviet Union, he was given an undesirable discharge from the Marine Corps, something that was to haunt him to his final days.

    In 1995 the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB) revealed the communication between the FBI Legat at the Paris Embassy and FBI Director Hoover. The FBI Legat had sent Hoover five memoranda regarding Oswald’s intentions to study the ASC.

    The first memorandum was dated October 12, 1960. It was based on information from the Swiss Federal Police and stated that Oswald was planning to attend the fall trimester of 1959. The second memorandum was a strange one, since it stated that Oswald “had originally written a letter from Moscow indicating his intention to attend there (at Churwalden).”7

    This was an extraordinary turn of events, as the second memorandum implied that Oswald was planning to attend the third trimester, similar to his college application and the Warren Commission’s conclusion.

    The fourth and fifth memoranda were even more peculiar. They revealed that Oswald had not attended the course under a different name and that there is no record of a person possibly identical to Oswald attending the fall trimester.

    The above information should have sounded the alarms in FBI HQ because they suspected that since he did not attend the college he had brought with him his passport and his birth certificate to the Soviet Union. Even Marguerite Oswald, when asked by FBI agent Fain about her son’s whereabouts in Europe, replied that Lee has taken his birth certificate with him.

    The above information forced Hoover to send an enquiry to the Office of Security in the Department of State regarding the “missing” Lee: “Since there is a possibility that an impostor is using Oswald’s birth certificate, any current information … concerning subject (Oswald) … ”8

    Hoover, like his agent before him, suspected that Oswald had fallen victim to a Soviet spy ring that would have used his birth certificate to create a false identity which an “illegal” spy would adopt to enter the United States as a sleeper agent.

    The illegals were not under diplomatic protection like their legal counterparts that were usually connected to a Soviet embassy. They would resume the life of an American, probably one that has died, live a normal capitalistic life and would be activated when the need arose.

    Switzerland had been a center of espionage since WWII. Soviet illegals would never send or receive mail directly to/from the Soviet Union but would use neutral countries like Switzerland as a cover address to avoid detection. It is a surprise that the CIA counter-intelligence mole hunters did not open a 201 file on Oswald as soon as he defected. In fact, they did not do that for over a year. Instead, they put him on the HT/LINGUAL list of about three hundred Americans whose mail was secretly being opened.9 This would be an indication that Oswald was used to detect illegal networks in Switzerland by detecting their mails.

    The ASC was reputed to be a place where liberals, communists and Marxists would go to study, perhaps being a possible illegal passing point. By applying to this college, even if he never went there, it could appear that his birth certificate was used to create an illegal in Switzerland that would later use his identity and papers to travel to the States. Another scenario would have been that someone looking very similar to him, someone almost identical in appearance, could have taken his place, like a Soviet illegal. Alternatively, the US intelligence services would have looked suspiciously on Oswald upon his return to the States, wondering if he had been turned into a Soviet spy coming home on behalf of his new Soviet handlers.

    Regardless of the truth, Oswald—wittingly or unwittingly—had created a “Legend” for himself that could be used any time against various targets. Most importantly though, the US intelligence services would suspect that Oswald was probably impersonated by someone else for sinister purposes. This was to be the first time but it would not be the last.


    II. Albert Schweitzer College

    How did Oswald find out about this obscure college somewhere in Switzerland? It has been suggested by various authors that Kerry Thornley, one of Oswald’s Marine friends at Santa Ana, brought it to his attention and helped him with the application.

    Thornley was a New Age writer, satirist, mystic and crypto-fascist, and a native Californian who had studied at USC. He had been six months in active duty, following time in the reserves when he met Oswald at El Toro base near Santa Ana. Oswald even gave Thornley his copy of George Orwell’s 1984 to read.10 Thornley claimed that he met Oswald a week after Oswald applied to the ASC. As Greg Parker notes, it is possible that Thornley met and knew Oswald before his application to the college.11

    Thornley testified to the Warren Commission:

    I believe it was the First Unitarian Church in Los Angeles. I had mentioned earlier at the time I was talking to Oswald, and knew Oswald, I had been going to the First Unitarian Church in Los Angeles. This is a group of quite far to the left people politically for the most part, and mentioned in order to explain my political relationship with Oswald, at that moment, and he began to ask me questions about the First Unitarian Church and I answered, and then he realized or understood or asked what Oswald’s connection with the First Unitarian Church was and I explained to him that there was none.

    We do know that Oswald had visited Los Angeles, at least to get his passport, although he may have visited the Cuban Consulate as we shall see later on.

    The leader of this church was Minister Stephen Fritchman. He was a peace activist who had supported the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, had been called by the Un-American Activities Committee and had attended the World Congress for Peace in Stockholm in May 1959.12

    Was there a connection between Oswald, Thornley, Fritchman and the ASC? The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) included in its assassination files about Oswald a sixty-page report on Fritchman. Additionally, the Warren Commission and the FBI were interested and curious about Oswald and Thornley’s Unitarian Church link while trying to explain how Oswald obtained information about the ASC.13

    Evica believed that “Oswald’s mysterious source of information about Albert Schweitzer College could be explained by Thornley’s attendance at Fritchman’s First Unitarian Church in Los Angeles … the pastor may have possessed detailed information about the college and copies of the college’s registration forms. When Oswald visited LA, he could have picked up the materials at the church … Alternatively, Thornley … could have picked them up and passed them on to Oswald.”14

    The Liberal Religious Youth (LRY) was a group that cooperated with the ASC. Reverend Leon Hopper, one of its members, said to Evica in March 2003 that “student recruitment was almost always through personal contacts … also confirmed that Stephen Fritchman could have been an information source … Finally Hopper confirmed that the LRY concentrated on the summer sessions of ASC, reaching prospective students through personal contacts.”15

    The ASC was located in the small village of Churwalden, Switzerland, and there was something peculiar about it since it did not offer degrees. Even the Swiss authorities did not know it existed until the early 60s when there were accusations of a narcotics and fraud scandal involving the college. Soon the college was in debt, and closed only after an unknown entity from Liechtenstein paid off all of its debts.16 The peculiarities did not end there. Since the village was very small, it did not have a hospital, a library, a fire department or a police station. The village was many miles away from the nearest town of Chur, and one had to drive through poor roads and across mountains to reach the village.

    The college was housed in the village’s larger building, the hotel Krone with thirty rooms capacity.17 It opened in 1954, and the first list of students available revealed there were no Swiss students at all, which served to keep it unknown to the Swiss Government.18

    The ASC was created by the International Association for Religious Freedom (IARF). According to Richard Boeke, first President of the American chapter of IARF, it was the crown jewel of all the IARF’s associate religious centers and had initially been “good for Liberal Swiss Protestants.”19 The IARF originated in 1900 as the International Council of Unitarian and Other Liberal Religious Thinkers and workers on May 25, in Boston. The stated aim was “opening communications with those in all lands who are striving to unite Pure Religion and Perfect Liberty, and to increase fellowship and cooperation among them.”20 It would include religions like the Unitarian, Buddhist, Humanist, Muslim, Scientology and Theosophy.21

    The ASC was operated by the Albert Schweitzer College Association—a non- profit organization with its legal HQs in the village of Churwalden—and the Unitarian “American Friends of Albert Schweitzer College” which was also a non-profit organization. The “American Friends of Albert Schweitzer College” had its offices in Boston. It was incorporated in New York in 1953 with the purpose of receiving tax-deductible contributions from United States citizens and corporations.22 Its directors were John H. Lathrop (Brooklyn, NY), John Ritzenthaler (Montclair, NJ), and Percival F. Brundage (Montclair, NJ).23 Brundage was the most interesting individual out of the three directors, a true member of the “Power Elite”, with government and intelligence connections.


    III. Percival F. Brundage

    Who was Percival F. Brundage? Brundage was the son of a Unitarian Minister who graduated cum laude from Harvard University in 1914 and afterwards became a successful accountant, probably one of the best of his era. In 1916 he worked as a civilian in the Material Accounting Section of the War Department’s Quartermaster Depot Office in New York which involved record keeping of sensitive military procurement operations.24

    He became a senior partner in the accounting firm, Price-Waterhouse. He was director, and then president of the Federal Union that argued for the federation of the Atlantic democracies.25

    Brundage had a significant connection to the Unitarian Church and the ASC. He was a major Unitarian Church officer from 1942-1954 when the Unitarian Church was cooperating with, first, the OSS, and later the CIA.26 He was also president of the International Association for Religious Freedom (IARF) from 1952-1955 and president of the American Friends of Albert Schweitzer College from 1953-1958. Most importantly, Brundage became the most prominent member of the Bureau of Budget (BOB) during the Eisenhower presidency. He was its deputy director from 1954-1956, its president from 1956-1958 and he served it as consultant until 1960.27

    As the head of the BOB, Brundage was controlling the United States budget, and from that privileged position he would be familiar with the Pentagon’s and CIA’s secret black budgets but without ever exposing or surveying them. It seemed that Brundage would turn a blind eye and let them do their secret work without the government ever bothering them.

    One of Brundage’s closest friends was a fellow Unitarian, James R. Killian Jr., president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).28 Killian was appointed the chairmanship of president Eisenhower’s Technological Capabilities Panel in 1953 to measure the nation’s security and intelligence capabilities and also to study both military and intelligence applications of high-flight reconnaissance.29 Killian appointed Edward H. Land, inventor of the Polaroid land camera, as chief of the top-secret intelligence section of the Air Force Technological Capabilities Panel that helped create high-flight reconnaissance, like the U-2 and satellites. Land was also responsible for the CIA receiving the responsibility for the U-2 program.30 In 1957 he was appointed by Eisenhower as Special Assistant for Science and Technology, and in 1956 became Eisenhower’s chairman of the US Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, reporting to the president the activities of the intelligence community, especially the CIA.31 This board was supported by Brundage’s BOB. Later, Killian advised Eisenhower that the Air Force was incapable of developing photographic reconnaissance satellites. This allowed him to turn over that assignment to the CIA, which led to the CORONA satellite program32 that was discussed in part 1.

    Killian, Brundage and Nelson Rockefeller were the three men who transformed the national Committee of Aeronautics (NACA) into the civilian agency responsible for the US space program. It was renamed NASA. Brundage was responsible as the head of BOB for drafting the congressional legislation for the creation of NASA.33 Brundage was also involved in Operation Vanguard, which was “intended to establish freedom of space, and the right to overfly foreign territory for future intelligence satellites.”34

    In 1960, Brundage and one of his associates, E. Perkins McGuire, were asked to hold the majority of a new airline stock “in name only.”35 They both agreed to act on behalf of the CIA. The airline was none other than Southern Air Transport, which was used in paramilitary missions in the Congo, the Caribbean and Indochina. The Newsweek issue of May 19, 1975 linked Percival Brundage to Southern Air Transport, Double-Check Corp, the Robert Mullen Company and Zenith Technical Enterprises. The Double-Check Corp was a CIA front that was used to recruit pilots for covert missions against Cuba; Robert Mullen’s advertising company provided cover for CIA personnel abroad; and Zenith Technical Enterprises was the front that provided cover for CIA’s JM/WAVE station in Miami.36

    Southern Air Transport was created by Paul Helliwell, an originator of the CIA’s off-the-books accounting system and nicknamed Mister Black Bag. Helliwell was a member of the OSS and later of the CIA in the Far East; he was one of the most prominent members of the China Lobby. His mission was to assist Chang Kai-Shek and his Kuomintang (KMT) army in Burma to invade China. This army managed and controlled the opium traffic in the region. Helliwell created two front companies to help KMT to carry out its war and the drug trade. One was Sea Supply in Bangkok and the other was CAT Inc., later Air America in Taiwan.37 Helliwell had organized a drug trafficking network supported by banks to launder CIA’s drug profits in the Far East.

    Richard Bissell brought Helliwell back to the States to plan a similar network of front companies and banks to finance the Agency’s war against Castro. Similar to Sea Supply and Air America, he created Southern Air Transport in Miami to fly over drugs and guns to support not only the war on Cuba but also in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia.

    In his book Prelude to Terror, Joseph Trento claimed that Helliwell’s main objective was to cement the CIA’s relationship with organized crime.38 Meyer Lansky and Santo Trafficante were both planning to invest in the Far East by bringing heroin back to the States. Helliwell established banks in Florida and became the owner of the Bank of Perrine in Key West, “a two-time laundromat for the Lansky mob and the CIA”, and its sister Bank of Cutler Ridge.39 Lansky would deposit money into the Bank of Perrine, reaching the US from the Bank of World Commerce in the Bahamas. Lansky also used the small Miami National Bank, where Helliwell was a legal counsel, to launder money from abroad and from his Las Vegas casinos.40 Peter Scott claimed that Helliwell worked with E. Howard Hunt, Mitch WerBell and Lucien Conein on developing relationships with drug dealing Cuban veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion, and became CIA paymaster for JM/WAVE to finance Chief of Station Ted Shackley’s operations against Cuba.41 Sergio Arcacha-Smith, one of the New Orleans Cubans who knew Oswald and E. Howard Hunt, was involved in the lucrative business of contraband transportation from Florida to Texas, specializing in drugs, guns, and even prostitution.42

    In other words, Percival Brundage was no ordinary citizen. His BOB activities with the U-2, the satellite programs, the Pentagon, the CIA, and especially his involvement with the ASC, linked him indirectly to Lee Harvey Oswald. The young Marine had applied to the ASC to study in Switzerland and his defection to the Soviet Union was unwittingly connected to the U-2 and CORONA projects that brought an end to the Paris Peace talks and prolonged the Cold War. When Percival Brundage became a part of Southern Air Transport, he entered a nexus of CIA, Mafia, drug trafficking, money laundering and anti-Castro Cubans, one which later met and manipulated Oswald, and some of whose members were very likely involved in the assassination of John F. Kennedy. It is also very plausible that the assassination was financed by this drug trafficking and banking network instead of oil-men money as many believe.


    IV. Cuban Sympathizer or Agent Provocateur?

    Was Oswald a communist sympathizer from his early days, like the Warren Commission concluded? Had he been in contact with the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles?

    Corporal Nelson Delgado was a Puerto Rican stationed at El Toro Marine Corps base who became close friends with Oswald. They were both loners but they had a common interest, and that was Cuba. Both admired Castro because he seemed to be a freedom fighter against Batista’s tyranny who could bring democracy to Cuba. They were dreaming that they could go there and become officers and free other islands like the Dominican Republic. Delgado could speak Spanish and Oswald would configure his ideas about how to run a government—so they kept dreaming.

    Things got a little strange when Oswald became serious about it and was trying to find ways to actually go to Cuba.43

    When interviewed by the Warren Commission, Delgado said he advised Oswald to go and see the Cubans at the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles. Wesley Liebeler, a Warren Commission lawyer, took Delgado’s testimony and stretched it by the ears to make it look like Oswald was in contact with the Cubans all along. According to Australian researcher Greg Parker, “Liebeler, adroitly took a bunch of assumptions and leaps of logic by Delgado and magically recast them as proven fact leading to an inevitable conclusion.”44

    According to Delgado:45

    • Oswald told Delgado there was a Cuban consulate in Los Angeles;
    • Oswald started receiving letters with a seal on them that Delgado thought might be from Los Angeles because Oswald had said he was getting such mail from the Cuban Consulate;
    • Oswald took a trip by train to Los Angeles to “see some people”.

    Based on the above, Liebeler instructed Delgado to “tell me all that you can remember about Oswald’s contact with the Cuban Consulate.”46

    Delgado also noted that after Oswald allegedly visited the Cuban Consulate, he started receiving mail, pamphlets and a newspaper. Naturally, he assumed that they must have come from the Cuban Consulate and concluded the newspaper was communist, since it was written in Russian. He asked Oswald if it was a communist newspaper and he replied that it was White Russian and not communist. Still, Delgado, who did not know what White Russian meant, concluded it was a Soviet newspaper.47

    One of the pamphlets had a big impressive seal that looked like a Mexican eagle with different colors, red and white and a Latin script with the word “United” included. Parker believes that Delgado probably was describing the logo of a Russian Solidarist movement known as NTS (HTC in Russian), standing for Narodnyi Trudovoy Soyuz (National Labor Union) in English.48 Below we can see the NTS logo with something that looks like an eagle, and the colors white, blue and red in the background.

    nts logo
    NTS logo

    More information about NTS can be found in Stephen Dorill’s book MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service. According to Dorill, NTS was founded in Belgrade in July 1930 by Prince Anton Turkul and Claudius Voss, and it stood for National Labor Council. Prince Turkul was a member of the White Russian Armed Services Union (ROVS) and its purpose was to restore Tsarist Russia. Voss was the head of ROVS in the Balkans and “a British intelligence agent and ran ROVS’ MI6-friendly counter-intelligence service, the Inner Line, that sponsored NTS.”49

    Dorill also revealed that “the Russian émigré organizations were working overtime through bodies such as the NTS … to undermine the Soviet regime and to form a provisional government when the Soviets collapsed.”50 Dorill described NTS’ origins: “Initially a left-of-centre grouping, NTS soon moved to the right, promoting an anti-Marxist philosophy of national labor solidarity, based on three components: idealism, nationalism, and activism. It enjoyed the support of several European intelligence services, in particular MI6, and also attracted substantial funds from businessmen with interests in pre-revolutionary Russia, including Sir Henry Deterding, chair of Royal Dutch Shell, and the armaments manufacturer, Sir Basil Zaharooff.”51

    If Parker is right, and the pamphlets that Oswald was receiving were not communist but on the contrary from the NTS, then we can conclude that Oswald was in contact with fervent anti-communist White Russians. In that context, then, his trip to the Soviet Union could be viewed from a different perspective.

    Oswald received help to apply to the ASC and travel to the Soviet Union, most likely from a nexus that involved the CIA and anti-communist organizations with relations to the military-industrial complex. When Oswald applied to the ASC, he listed his favorite authors as Jack London, Charles Darwin and Norman V. Peale.52 Jack London was one of the founders of The League for Industrial Democracy (LID), whose purpose was to extend democracy in all aspects of American life. During the Cold War, it was renamed the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID), had close ties to the CIA and had become anti-communist.53 Jack London was a supporter of social Darwinism, eugenics, Nietzschean philosophy and Jungian psychology.54

    Darwin was a Unitarian and author of “Origins of the Species.” His cousin Francis Galton studied heredity based on Darwin’s work and as a result he coined the word “eugenics”, the theory that selective breeding will improve the human race.55

    Norman Vincent Peale was a minister of the Lutheran church, politically conservative, and opposed the liberal and Catholic Jack Kennedy. He believed that as a Roman Catholic President Kennedy would align with the Vatican with respect to US foreign policy.56 He headed a group, which included Billy Graham, that held a secret meeting to discuss how to derail Kennedy’s election bid.57 Some of Peale’s associates were supporters of lynching, while others were against the Eisenhower-Khrushchev Paris peace summit.58 He was also friends with the conservatives Nixon and Hoover.59

    If Oswald was, as he is alleged to be, a communist sympathizer, these interests and connections to the reactionary and elitist Right come as a surprise. Indeed, they would seem to indicate, on the contrary, that Oswald was actually instructed and guided by people who were anti-communist and probably tied to the CIA.

    Even Hans Casparis, the founder of the ASC, had probable CIA connections. Casparis claimed that he had graduated from three universities, studied at a fourth and was a full-time lecturer in German and philosophy at the ASC. There were no specific degrees listed on the ASC brochure presenting Casparis, while five other lecturers held doctorates, and another one, along with Casparis’ wife, Therese, held a BA.60 Casparis claimed that he was a lecturer in education at the School of European Studies at the University of Zürich, but when Professor Evica asked the university to confirm it, they replied that Casparis had never lectured there.61 Records indicated that Casparis had studied at the University of Chicago (1946-1947), and the University of Tübingen (1922-1923), but never received degrees from either of the two.62

    The same ASC brochure said that Therese Casparis, his wife, had a BA degree in education from the University of London. However, the university’s assistant archivist revealed that Therese had received a second-class honors degree in German and then enrolled to take a teacher’s diploma, but she left without taking an exam, so she never received a BA in education from that university. Therese gave birth to five children from 1934 to 1948, but Evica could not find any college in Europe or England which awarded a degree to Hans or Therese. 63 It was a mystery how they were able to raise five children without any higher degrees, yet were able to attract support from important Unitarians to establish a college in an unknown village somewhere in Switzerland. It is likely that Hans and Therese were employed by the CIA to infiltrate this liberal college. If we consider Evica’s findings that Allen Dulles had used religious organizations like the Unitarians to create humanitarian front organizations in order to conceal OSS and later CIA covert operations to destabilize Eastern Europe, South America and South East Asia, we can conclude, or strongly suspect, that ASC was such a front cover.

    When Oswald was arrested in New Orleans during the summer of 1963, he was asked by police officer Frank Martello how he came to be a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). To that he replied that “he became interested in that committee in Los Angeles … in 1958 while in the US Marine Corps.”64 Although he gave the wrong information, since the FPCC was established in April of 1960, he simultaneously revealed that when he was visiting Los Angeles he most likely met the pro-Castro people that had organized the FPCC’s Los Angeles branch at the first Unitarian Church of Robert Fritchman.65

    In 1963, Richard Case Nagell was investigating the FPCC branch in Los Angeles, leftists and Unitarians. In his notebook were written the names of: Helen Travis of the FPCC, Dorothy Healy of the Communist Party, USA, Reverend Robert Fritchman of the First Unitarian Church, and the officials of the Medical Aid for Cuba Committee.66

    Is it possible that all along Oswald was being groomed to penetrate the FPCC?

    A 1976 CIA internal memo stated, “In the late 1950’s, Hemming and Sturgis, both former US Marines, joined Fidel Castro in Cuba but returned shortly thereafter, claiming disillusionment with the Castro cause.”67 Delgado testified that a mysterious man visited Oswald at the gate of El Toro base. He had assumed that he was someone from the Los Angeles Cuban Consulate. However, Gerry Patrick Hemming revealed later on that he had met Oswald in the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles and went to confront Oswald at the gate of El Toro base.

    There are indications that this actually happened. A CIA memo stated that “Henning (Hemming) returned to California in October 1958 … he left for Cuba by air via Miami on or about 18 February 1959, arriving in Havana on 19 February 1959. He claimed to have contacted the officials in the Cuban consul’s office in Los Angeles prior to his departure.”68 Another CIA Security Office memo from 1977 linked Oswald to Hemming: “The Office of Security file concerning Hemming which is replete with information possibly linking Hemming and his cohorts to Oswald … ”69

    Could it be possible that Oswald was being “put together” to penetrate pro-Castro organizations like the FPCC as Hemming had been associated with Castro and his allies before him?

    In a 1976 article in Argosy, it was stated that, “Hemming maintains that the US should utilize a number of Special Forces types … who could penetrate revolutionary movements at an early stage, gain influential positions, and then channel them into more favorable areas.70 It was during that period late 1959, early 1960, when Oswald defected to the Soviet Union that the US Government—and Hemming—had realized that Castro was pro-Soviet. He was a Communist who could pose a threat to the US interests and an option would have been to have him “eliminated.”71

    It is likely that Oswald was sent to the Soviet Union to build up a “Legend” as a pro-communist, pro-Soviet sympathizer. One who appeared to have provided secret information to help the Soviets shoot down the U-2—even if he did not—and then return home as a Soviet spy, or as someone who had helped create a Soviet illegal. His mission would have been to infiltrate leftist, subversive and pro-Castro organizations while pretending to be on their side.


    Summary of Parts 1 and 2:

    • The way Oswald received his passport was very peculiar.
    • In 1959 Oswald likely visited the Los Angeles Cuban Consulate, allegedly because he was a Red sympathizer.
    • His Marine mate Delgado thought he was receiving mail and leaflets from the Cuban Consulate, while the material was more likely White Russian, from an anti-communist solidarity organization called Narodnyi Trudovoy Soyuz
    • Oswald had applied to study at the Albert Schweitzer College (ASC), an obscure college in Switzerland.
    • There was confusion as to which trimester he was planning to attend ASC.
    • It is a mystery as to how Oswald found out about this college.
    • Kerry Thornley, another of Oswald’s Marine mates, was attending the First Unitarian Church in Los Angeles where Robert Fritchman was its Minister.
    • Either Thornley or Fritchman probably supplied Oswald with all the necessary information.
    • Oswald listed on his college application authors Jack London, Charles Darwin and Norman B. Peale, which indicated that Oswald had elitist, conservative and far right political views.
    • Hans Casparis the founder of the ASC falsely claimed that he had academic credentials he did not have.
    • Similarly with his wife Therese, also a lecturer at the ASC.
    • The ASC was created by the International Association for Religious Freedom (IARF) and was supported by the Unitarian American Friends of Albert Schweitzer College.
    • Percival Brundage was one of the Directors of the Unitarian American Friends of Albert Schweitzer College.
    • Brundage was Director of the Bureau of Budget (BOB) during the Eisenhower presidency.
    • Along with another Unitarian, James Killian, he was involved in the U-2 and CORONA satellite projects.
    • Brundage held major stocks of Southern Air Transport that Paul Helliwell had established.
    • Helliwell was a CIA man in the Far East who helped arrange drug trafficking to finance CIA operations.
    • This brought Brundage in contact with a network of drug-trafficking, money-laundering banks, anti-Castro Cubans and the CIA operations against Castro.
    • The ASC was to become a link between Oswald and Brundage.
    • Oswald’s mother thought it was strange that her son would go to the Soviet Union; she thought he was more likely to go to Cuba.
    • Oswald stated in 1963 that he first learned about the FPCC while visiting Los Angeles.
    • The people who established the Los Angeles FPCC branch were attending Fritchman’s First Unitarian Church.
    • It is probable that Oswald was prepared by some US intelligence service, probably the CIA, to penetrate pro-Castro organizations like the FPCC at a time that the US government began plans to eliminate Castro.
    • For that reason it had to appear that he defected to the Soviet Union.
    • His actions there created his bona fides that he had been turned into a communist spy.
    • CIA counter-intelligence chief James Angleton ran a second operation involving Oswald or his file to sabotage the peace summit.
    • Oswald was a fake defector and a US intelligence dangle.
    • He never intended to renounce his citizenship.
    • The FBI learned from his mother that he had his birth certificate with him.
    • Hoover feared that some impostor might be using his birth certificate and that a Soviet illegal might take his place if he returned to the States.
    • Oswald was put on the CIA’s illegal HT/LINGUAL mail-opening program designed to detect Soviet illegals.
    • This would have also strengthened his Soviet spy profile.
    • The U-2 had a finite operational life time.
    • It was scheduled to be replaced by the A-12 aircraft and the Corona satellites, so there were alternatives if something went wrong.
    • Oswald did not give information to the Soviets to help them shoot down the U-2, but it appeared that he did. This boosted his “Soviet Spy” legend.
    • Dulles admitted that it happened due to a malfunction.
    • Prouty believed that it was sabotaged from the inside.
    • The U-2 was sacrificed, since there were other alternatives to replace it, to disrupt the Paris peace summit and prolong the Cold War.
    • It was planned by a treasonous collaboration of American and Soviet hardliners who had invested in the Cold War.
    • Oswald was part of Angleton’s mole hunt to discover who betrayed Popov and the U-2 project.
    • However, Popov was not betrayed by a mole, so a mole hunt was not necessary.
    • Angleton used the mole hunt as a cover to accommodate the U-2 shoot down. Although it failed to discover the mole’s identity, that exercise gave him a usable alibi by which he could claim, in the case suspicions were raised that it was an inside job, that the U-2 incident was the work of a mole.

     

    In Part 3, we examine the Oswald legend in Dallas, New Orleans and Mexico City.

    Go to Part 1

    Go to Part 3

    Go to Part 4

    Go to Part 5

    Go to Part 6

    Go to Conclusion

    Go to Appendix


    Notes

    1 John Newman, Oswald and the CIA, Skyhorse Publishing Inc. 1995, p. 92.

    2 Newman, p. 92.

    3 Newman, p. 92.

    4 George Michael Evica, A Certain Arrogance, Trine Day 2011, p. 21.

    5 Evica, p. 22.

    6 Evica, pp. 25-26.

    7 Evica, pp. 68-69.

    8 Evica, p. 59.

    9 Newman, p. 423.

    10 Greg Parker, Lee Harvey’s Oswald Cold War, vols. 1 & 2, New Disease Press, 2015, p. 283.

    11 Parker, p. 285.

    12 Parker, p. 287.

    13 Evica, p. 35.

    14 Evica, pp. 35-36.

    15 Evica, p. 87.

    16 John Armstrong, Harvey and Lee, Quasar Press, 2003, p. 227.

    17 Armstrong, pp. 227-228.

    18 Armstrong, p. 228.

    19 Evica, p. 83

    20 Parker, pp. 287-288.

    21 Parker, p. 288.

    22 Evica, p. 86.

    23 Armstrong, p .228.

    24 Evica, p. 237.

    25 Evica, p. 238.

    26 Evica, p. 276.

    27 Evica, p. 238.

    28 Evica, p. 245.

    29 Evica, p. 247.

    30 Evica, p. 248.

    31 Evica, p. 248.

    32 Evica, p. 250.

    33 Evica, pp. 255-256.

    34 Parker, p. 290.

    35 Evica, p. 272.

    36 Armstrong, p. 229.

    37 Peter Dale Scott, The American Deep State, Rowman & Littlefield, 2015, p. 126.

    38 http://spartacus-educational.com/JFKhelliwell.htm.

    39 http://www.globalresearch.ca/deep-events-and-the-cia-s-global-drug-connection/10095.

    40 http://www.globalresearch.ca/deep-events-and-the-cia-s-global-drug-connection/10095.

    41 http://spartacus-educational.com/JFKhelliwell.htm.

    42 James DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, Skyhorse Publishing, 2012, p. 329.

    43 Newman, pp. 96-97.

    44 Parker, pp. 280-281.

    45 Parker, p. 281

    46 Parker, p. 281.

    47 Parker, p. 282.

    48 Parker, p. 282.

    49 Stephen Dorril, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service, Harper Collins, 2002, p. 405.

    50 Dorril, p. 405.

    51 Dorril, p. 406.

    52 Parker, p. 296.

    53 Parker, p. 297.

    54 Parker, p. 297.

    55 Parker, p. 297.

    56 Parker, pp. 297-298.

    57 Parker, p. 300.

    58 Parker, p. 301.

    59 Parker, p. 302.

    60 Evica, pp. 95-96.

    61 Evica, p. 96.

    62 Evica, p. 96.

    63 Evica, pp. 100-101.

    64 Evica, p. 36.

    65 Evica, p. 36.

    66 Dick Russell, The Man Who Knew too Much, Carroll & Graf, p. 226.

    67 Newman, p. 101.

    68 Newman, p. 102.

    69 Newman, p. 103.

    70 Newman, p. 104.

    71 Newman, pp. 115-121.

  • Edmund Gullion, JFK, and the Shaping of a Foreign Policy in Vietnam

    Edmund Gullion, JFK, and the Shaping of a Foreign Policy in Vietnam


    In the 1951 photograph above, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny is leading a contingent through the streets of Saigon at a time when France was engaged in a losing cause during the First Indochina War. In the back of the pack, a young congressman from Massachusetts, John F. Kennedy, is observing the conditions on the ground in a war effort that was at the time receiving substantial American aid. Kennedy’s younger brother Robert accompanied him on the trip. RFK later ran on an anti-war platform at the height of the Vietnam War, shortly before his assassination in 1968. This study explores the impact of the 1951 trip to Vietnam on John F. Kennedy, his association with the diplomat Edmund Gullion, and the evolving vision of JFK for American foreign policy in Vietnam, which was articulated in a major address given in 1954.

    Edmund Gullion (1913-98) enjoyed a distinguished career as a diplomat followed by a second life in academia as Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, where he trained a generation of foreign officers. As a Southeast Asian specialist, he held senior positions at the American Embassy in Saigon from 1949-52 during the First Indochina War. At a time when the Truman administration was ramping up aid for France in an effort to salvage its colonial outpost in Southeast Asia, Gullion was an advocate of Vietnamese independence. Later, at a critical juncture in America’s involvement in Vietnam in 1963, Gullion asked a colleague, “Do you really think there is such a thing as a military solution for Vietnam?”1

    Gullion was also a confidant of the young Congressman and World War II hero John F. Kennedy, who visited Saigon in 1951. Congressman Kennedy was there to observe up close the conditions of a foreign colonial war in progress, in preparation for his run for the Senate the next year against Henry Cabot Lodge. Later, he used Gullion as a sounding-board as he was shaping his own views on America’s role in Southeast Asia and the Third World. During his presidency, JFK appointed Gullion as ambassador to the Congo.2 Gullion’s oral interviews and the words of JFK himself help to shed light on the congressman’s formation as a statesman in the period before he acceded to the presidency. The year 1954 is an especially important crossroads in the history of Vietnam and a turning point for JFK in articulating a foreign policy for Southeast Asia.

    Young John F. Kennedy was an inveterate traveler. When he was a Harvard student, he took time out to travel to Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East in 1939, witnessing first-hand the ominous signs of the coming war. During the war itself, he survived an attack on his PT boat in the Solomon Islands, heroically rescuing a badly burned crew member and guiding his men to safety until they were rescued. At the close of the war in 1945, he worked as a journalist, attending the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco and the Potsdam Conference. As a congressman from Massachusetts, Kennedy embarked on a seven-week, 25,000-mile trip in 1951. Accompanied by his brother Robert and his sister Patricia, Kennedy visited Israel, Pakistan, Iran, India, Singapore, Thailand, French Indochina (Vietnam), Korea, and Japan. Upon his return home, he conveyed to the press that his goal for the trip was to learn “how those peoples regarded us and our policies, and what you and I might do in our respective capacities to further the cause of peace.”3

    At the time, he described in a radio interview what he believed should be the primary goal of combatting communism in the Third World, which was “not the export of arms or the show of armed might but the export of ideas, of techniques, and the rebirth of our traditional sympathy for and understanding of the desires of men to be free.”4 When Kennedy met with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, he asked Nehru for his view on the current war in French Indochina. Nehru replied that the military and financial assistance provided to the French by the United States was a “bottomless hole” because the war was an example of doomed colonialism.5 Upon arriving in Vietnam, the Kennedy entourage observed Charles de Gaulle and the top brass of the French military as the war was in progress. But, more significantly, the young Congressman was to have a fateful meeting with an American consular officer named Edmund Gullion.


    II

    While the French were optimistic about retaining their colonial empire with American support, Gullion had recognized in 1951 that they would not prevail. Kennedy had known Gullion since 1947 when they had conferred about a speech the congressman was to give on foreign policy. Now, they met privately on the top of the Hotel Majestic in Saigon. Earlier in the day, Kennedy had been told by the French commander, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, that with 250,000 troops, it would be impossible for the French to lose.6 But as JFK listened to the twilight mortar shells exploding in the distance from the artillery of the Viet Minh, Gullion informed him that

    In twenty years there will be no more colonies. We’re going nowhere out here. The French have lost. If we come in here and do the same thing, we will lose, too, for the same reason. There’s no will or support for this kind of war back in Paris. The homefront is lost. The same thing would happen to us.7

    Congressman Kennedy would never forget the prophetic words of Gullion. A decade later, in the now famous debates in the White House in November of 1961, he recalled them to his cabinet members. As John Newman and James Blight have described, these men were pressing him as commander-in-chief to augment military advisors in Vietnam with American combat troops, a request that JFK adamantly rejected.8

    When Kennedy returned from his 1951 trip, it was clear that he was deeply affected by the words of Gullion. Robert Kennedy later recalled that the experience had been “very very major” [sic] in shaping his older brother’s vision for American foreign policy in the countries he had visited.9 In describing this period in Kennedy’s life, historian Herbert S. Parmet writes that,

    … at a time of containment as the sine qua non of meeting the spread of the ‘international Communist conspiracy,’ Jack Kennedy was evolving into a spokesman for a more sophisticated view. He was beginning to call attention to the soft spot of the Western cause, to the frustration of a region that had long contended with colonial domination.10

    In March of 1952, Kennedy spoke to an audience in Everett, Massachusetts, voicing his opposition to sending American troops to assist the French in Indochina. In April, he addressed a Knights of Columbus chapter in nearby Lynn, stating that “we should not commit our ground troops to fight in French Indochina.”11 In an editorial in The Traveler,the Congressman received praise for taking a stand against the status quo: “Mr. Kennedy is doing a service in prodding our conscience.”12 It was clear in 1952 that Kennedy was as outspoken of American aid to the French as he was against the French colonial war itself.

    Gullion returned to Washington in 1953, at which time he renewed his association with Kennedy, who had recently been elected to the Senate. They had many conversations and bonded in their minority opinion about the policy of pouring aid into the French war effort in Indochina. The State Department even suspected Gullion of contributing to Kennedy’s speeches on foreign policy. But Gullion recalls an independently minded Kennedy, who not only did not require Guillon’s assistance as a speechwriter, but was shaping a vision entirely on his own. In reflecting on his meetings with Kennedy in an oral history interview in 1964, Gullion modestly recalled that from the very first speech in which Kennedy had sought Gullion’s aid in 1947, the young politician was thinking for himself:

    Actually, it was a very realistic and an advanced kind of perspective that he had, and it was his own. My own contributions to it were factual, and I volunteered some opinions and some sentences, but I was somewhat surprised and, I suppose, my own very youthful egoisms somewhat checked when I saw the finished product and realized how much of this was Kennedy and how little of it was mine. It was quite an interesting product.13

    Gullion also recalled that after his 1951 trip, Kennedy’s “stance on Indochina certainly went against the prevailing opinion …. Now when he came back he prepared an address in the Senate which was one of his most important.”14 In his work on this major address, Kennedy conferred with Gullion, and, once again, his views were “entirely his own,” according to Gullion.15

    JFK’s speech in the Senate came at a turning point in the modern history of Vietnam in the year 1954. After a brutal, fifty-seven day standoff in northwestern Vietnam, Dien Bien Phu fell to the forces of Ho Chi Minh on May 7. With aid from the Chinese and Russians, the Viet Minh commander Võ Nguyen Giáp had amassed troops and, most importantly, heavy artillery that negated the formidable French airpower. The collapse and surrender of the French that followed were the result of Giáp’s brilliant tactical campaign at Dien Bien Phu. In July, French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France put his signature to the Geneva Accords that effectively marked the end of French control of Indochina. The Geneva agreement stipulated that in the nation’s transition to independence, there would be a temporary partition of the country pending a national election to be held in the summer of 1956.

    But the United States never signed the Geneva agreements, and almost immediately, the CIA aggressively began to transform Vietnam with the same zeal that had just effected regime changes in Iran and Guatemala. Now, to counter Ho Chi Minh in the north, the search was on for a United States backed leader in the south, whose rise to power would be facilitated by the CIA specialist in black operations, Edward Lansdale. In early 1954 and prior to the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Ngo Dinh Diem was made prime minister of Vietnam by France’s longstanding puppet ruler Bao Dai. Within the next two years, Diem would take control of South Vietnam through the sophisticated psychological warfare and propaganda campaigns of Lansdale.16 With Diem in place, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was able to boast that, “We have a clean base there now, without a taint of colonialism. Dien Bien Phu was a blessing in disguise.”17 The elections that were to unify Vietnam never occurred in 1956, because the United States knew that Ho Chi Minh would be elected in a landslide. Instead, the partition between North and South Vietnam was no longer “temporary,” the North Vietnamese were identified as the “communists,” and, propped up by American economic and military support, the “free” nation of South Vietnam under Diem came into existence.18


    III

    As the turbulent events of 1954 were unfolding in Vietnam, and a month before Dien Bien Phu collapsed, John F. Kennedy rose to deliver an address in the Senate on April 6, 1954. The structure of the speech was a detailed, year-by-year recapitulation of the massive American support given to the struggling French mercenary army through administrations of both a Democrat (Truman) and a Republican (Eisenhower). Kennedy had done his homework for the speech. This included sending a list of forty-seven detailed questions to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles about the purpose of American involvement in Vietnam.19 But Kennedy was not aware that the United States national security network had already recognized the futility of American intervention in Vietnam by 1954. In 1971, the release of the secret Pentagon Papers revealed that in 1954,

    … unless the Vietnamese themselves show an inclination to make individual and collective sacrifices required to resist Communism, which they have not done to date, no amount of external pressure and resistance can long delay complete Communist victory in Vietnam.20

    With that knowledge, the Eisenhower administration continued its unalloyed engagement in Vietnam.

    On the floor of the Senate, Kennedy prefaced his chronological survey by demanding the government’s accountability to the American people for adventurism and potential war in Vietnam:

    If the American people are, for the fourth time in this century, to travel the long and tortuous road of war—particularly a war which we now realize would threaten the survival of civilization—then I believe we have a right—a right which we should have hitherto exercised—to inquire in detail into the nature of the struggle in which we may become engaged, and the alternative to such struggle. Without such clarification the general support and success of our policy is endangered.21

    Kennedy was most likely expressing to Eisenhower his personal outrage when he had learned that secret discussions had occurred about deploying atomic warfare in Vietnam to support the fading French prospects of victory. In his speech, Kennedy’s concerns for disclosure were being raised prior to the outcome of the battle of Dien Bien Phu and months before the American subversion of the Geneva Accords that resulted in the artificial division of Vietnam against the will of the Vietnamese people. As he was speaking in the Senate, there was as yet no design for a portion of Vietnam to become an American client state led by a puppet ruler like Diem. It was precisely such a scenario that Kennedy feared.

    Kennedy then went on to warn of the dangers of an American military commitment to Vietnam in the wake of the French struggle he had observed in 1951, based on his first-hand experience and the perspectives he had gleaned from Edmund Gullion:

    But to pour money, materiel, and men into the jungles of Indochina without at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile and self-destructive. I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere, “an enemy of the people” which has the sympathy and covert support of the people.22

    In hindsight, the prophetic nature of Kennedy’s 1954 address underscores a set of lessons that would eventually be learned the hard way by the policymakers after the horrific number of American and Vietnamese casualties during the war that unfolded between 1965-75. Kennedy closed his address by issuing a warning about the potential consequences of military adventurism in Vietnam, including a nod to Thomas Jefferson’s prudence and caution, prior to leaping into the unknown with a military entanglement abroad:

    The time to study, to doubt, to review, and revise is now, for upon our decisions now may well rest the peace and security of the world, and, indeed, the very continued existence of mankind. And if we cannot entrust this decision to the people, then, as Thomas Jefferson once said: “If we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion by education.”23

    This coda to Kennedy’s speech could have been a road map to the future to avoid what became the tragedy of the Vietnam War.


    IV

    JFK’s tour-de-force Senate address of 1954 was not political grandstanding. Rather, it was a carefully formulated examination of the question of American intervention in Vietnam at a pivotal moment for both nations. Prior to the Senate speech, Kennedy had spoken to the Cathedral Club in Brooklyn, New York, stressing that the French could not withstand the united forces of Ho Chi Minh, who “has influence penetrating all groups of society because of his years of battle against French colonialism.”24 As he would say again in late 1961 to his advisors, the situation was far different from the recent Korean conflict, wherein an independent government in the south was threatened by the invading communists from the north. Even before the Geneva Accords had mandated free elections to unify Vietnam and before Eisenhower began to use the expression “domino theory,” Kennedy had identified the unique circumstances of Vietnam’s long struggle for independence, as distinct from a nation that America could potentially “lose” to communism.

    After the Senate speech, Kennedy followed up with a television appearance, indicating that the French could not possibly retain Indochina and that again, as he would say seven years later, “American intervention with combat troops would not succeed.”25 In another 1954 speech in Los Angeles, Kennedy asserted that the American people “have been deceived for political reasons on the life and death matters of war and peace.”26 He reiterated this theme before the Whig-Cliosophic Society of Princeton University and the Executives Club in Chicago, stressing above all the importance of recognizing independent movements for nationhood in the Third World and distinguishing them from the global expansion of communism. In response to Vice President Richard Nixon’s call to send American ground troops into Vietnam, Kennedy responded that if we were to do that, “We are about to enter the jungle to do battle with the tiger.”27 By the end of 1954, an imaginary line would be drawn across Vietnam as a result of the Geneva Accords. But a very different line was being drawn in the sand by John F. Kennedy: one that proscribed American military intervention. The 1954 Senate speech, which was addressed to President Eisenhower, was a prescient warning about repeating the mistakes of the French. Ultimately, it was advice that was ignored after the death of President Kennedy by his successors, Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon.

    In Adlai Stevenson’s bid to unseat Eisenhower as president, Kennedy delivered speeches in support of Stevenson in the run-up to the 1956 presidential election. But when he discussed foreign policy, Kennedy refused to engage in partisan politics. In describing American interference in the developing nations of Africa and Southeast Asia, Kennedy observed that

    … the tragic failure of both Republican and Democratic administrations since World War II to comprehend the nature of this revolution, and its potentialities for good and evil, has reaped a bitter harvest today. And it is by rights and by necessity a major foreign policy campaign issue that has nothing to do with anti-communism.28

    After such speeches, the Stevenson election team asked Kennedy to refrain from making further foreign policy remarks in the course of the campaign. Senator Kennedy was unsuccessful in his quest for the nomination of Vice President on the Stevenson ticket. Which was probably a blessing in disguise.

    During the late 1950s, the focus of Southeast Asian foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration was on preventing the nation of Laos from becoming the first fallen domino. During the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy stressed that we would never succeed in Laos against “guerrilla forces or in peripheral wars … We have been driving ourselves into a corner where the choice is all or nothing.”29 As a senator, Kennedy had recognized that “public thinking is still being bullied by slogans which are either false in context or irrelevant to the new phase of competitive coexistence in which we live.”30 By the time he was elected President in 1960, Kennedy had the wisdom to see beyond the Cold War slogans of “the domino theory,” “godless communism,” and “Soviet master plan.” In his first year in office as President, Kennedy traveled to Vienna for a summit with Khrushchev. While en route, he was warmly received in Paris by President Charles de Gaulle. After Kennedy presented de Gaulle with a gift of an original letter written from George Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette, de Gaulle proffered advice to Kennedy on Vietnam, telling him that intervention in Southeast Asia would be “a bottomless military and political quagmire.”31

    This counsel reflected the lessons learned by de Gaulle himself from Dien Bien Phu and Algeria. But John F. Kennedy hardly needed this advice from de Gaulle, as his thinking about the emerging nations of Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia had been formed after a decade of close study and hands-on experience during his travels. His 1954 address in the Senate could be a blueprint even today for correcting the misguided American attempts at “nation building” abroad.32 From the time he traveled to Vietnam until his death, Kennedy had the clarity of thinking to understand that the struggle in Vietnam was the story of nationalism, not a Cold War intrigue. And the thinking that informed his vision was guided at the outset by the words he had heard in 1951 from Edmund Gullion.


    Afterword

    The history of the Vietnam War is invariably delineated by historians as a continuum of escalating involvement from the administrations of Eisenhower to Kennedy to Johnson to Nixon in the form of an incremental progression.33 This essay challenges that notion as apparent in the vision of John F. Kennedy, one that vehemently opposed conventional warfare in Vietnam. According to JFK’s speechwriter Theodore Sorensen, Vietnam was

    … not central to the foreign policy of the Kennedy presidency. Berlin was, Cuba, the Soviet Union, but not Vietnam. Vietnam was a low-level insurrection at that point.34

    While there were sixteen thousand military advisors in Vietnam at the time of his assassination on November 22, 1963, Kennedy had resisted the pressure to send in combat forces. According to Sorensen, Kennedy listened to his hawkish advisors, “but he never did what they wanted.”35 Similarly, Võ Hong Nam, the son of the North Vietnamese general Võ Nguyên Giáp, informed researcher Mani Kang, in an interview in 2011, that “President Kennedy was finally changing his foreign policy in regards to Vietnam in 1963” and “he was withdrawing.”36

    The military historian John M. Newman observes that “at 12:30 P.M., on Friday, November 22, the rifle shots rang out in Dealey Plaza that took the president’s life. His Vietnam policy died with him.”37 Lyndon Johnson’s decision to use the Gulf of Tonkin affair as the pretext to send combat troops into Vietnam, escalate the war, prop up a string of South Vietnamese dictators in a client state, and, finally admit failure, when choosing not to run for reelection as President in 1968, has tended to erase the memory of JFK’s goal of withdrawing all military advisors no later than 1965.

    Speaking before a large gathering at the LBJ Library on May 1, 1995, Robert McNamara, JFK’s Secretary of Defense and, later, one of the principal policymakers of the Vietnam War under LBJ, recalled the strategic meetings of the National Security Council (NSC) on October 2 and October 5, 1963, wherein, against the will of the majority of the NSC committee members, President Kennedy had made the determination for complete withdrawal of United States military advisors from Vietnam by December 31, 1965. Historian James DiEugenio has effectively summarized the psychology that JFK was using against a powerful national security network that opposed his plan for withdrawal from Vietnam:

    Kennedy had based his withdrawal plan on taking advantage of the differences between what the real battlefield conditions were and what the Pentagon said they were. Knowing that the American-backed South Vietnam effort there was failing, the Pentagon was disguising this with a whitewash of how bad things really were. Therefore, Kennedy was going to hoist the generals on their own petard: If things were going so well, then we were not needed anymore.38

    In Kennedy’s plan, the initial phase-out of one thousand advisors would be accomplished by the end of 1963. A public announcement would be made to set these decisions “in concrete.”39 McNamara’s recall of the NSC meeting was corroborated when, in the late 1990s, the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) released tape recordings of key meetings during the Kennedy presidency, including those of the National Security Council sessions of October 2 and October 5, 1963, wherein all of McNamara’s points were confirmed. McNamara’s voice appears on the tape, stating, “We need to get out of Vietnam, and this is a way of doing it.”40 Shortly after the NSC meetings, JFK approved the Top Secret National Security Action Memo 263. Declassified in the early 1990s, the document identifies the first phase of the withdrawal of one thousand U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. The combination of contemporary eyewitness testimony, oral history, recollections of statesmen, tape recordings of meetings, documentary evidence, and, above all, President Kennedy in his own words, points to his capacity as commander-in-chief to steer the United States away from what became the tragedy of the Vietnam War following his assassination.


    Notes

    1 Wolfgang Saxon, “Edmund Asbury Gullion, 85, Wide-Ranging Career Envoy,” obituary, The New York Times, March 31, 1998. (https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/31/world/edmund-asbury-gullion-85-wide-ranging-career-envoy.html)

    2 At a critical stage in the crisis of the Diem regime in Vietnam in the summer of 1963, JFK wanted to appoint Gullion as ambassador in Saigon. But Secretary of State Dean Rusk opposed the nomination of Gullion in favor of an opposition party member, the Republican Henry Cabot Lodge. In an effort to show bipartisan unity, JFK went along with Rusk. But the appointment of Lodge was a grave mistake that eventually JFK would regret. Robert Kennedy had also preferred the selection of Gullion, warning his brother that Lodge would create “a lot of difficulties in six months.” RFK’s words were prophetic, especially at the time of the CIA-backed assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem that occurred six months later and unbeknownst to the President. James W. Douglass, JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters (Mary Knoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008), 151.

    3 Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy—1917-1963 (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2003), 165.

    4 Dallek, 167.

    5 Dallek, 168.

    6 Douglass, 93.

    7 Douglass, 93.

    8 Kennedy’s advisors included Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy and his brother William, and Eugene Rostow and his brother Walt. These were the men identified by journalist David Halberstam as “the best and the brightest” of the intellectuals in JFK’s administration. After the president’s assassination, these civilian policy makers would be complicit with Lyndon Johnson as the chief architects of the disastrous war in Vietnam.

    9 Herbert S. Parmet, Jack: The Struggles of John F. Kennedy (New York: The Dial Press, 1980), 228.

    10 Parmet, 228.

    11 Parmet, 228.

    12 Parmet, 228.

    13 Oral History with Edmund A. Gullion, July 17, 1964.

    14 Oral History with Edmund A. Gullion, July 17, 1964.

    15 Oral History with Edmund A. Gullion, July 17, 1964.

    16 The clandestine operation of Lansdale has been documented with great thoroughness by Talbot and Douglass, as per bibliography.

    17 Richard Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 139. Quoted in James DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed—JFK, Cuba, and the Garrison Case, second edition (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2012), 24.

    18 The 1958 bestselling novel The Ugly American, written by Eugene Burdick and William J. Lederer, exposed the smooth tactics of counterintelligence, propaganda, and force exerted by American operatives to win “hearts and minds” in a fictitious Southeast Asian nation. The thinly veiled portrait of Lansdale was apparent in the wily character of Colonel Edwin Hillendale, whose psychological ploys sought to convert the nation to the American way. Senator John F. Kennedy loved the novel and purchased one hundred copies for distribution to the entire United States Senate. He also paid for a large advertisement of the book in The New York Times.

    19 Mahoney, 15.

    20 The Complete Pentagon Papers, The New York Timesonline, 1945-67 (http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/205509-pentagon-papers-part-iv-a-4.html)

    21 John F. Kennedy, Senate Address on Indochina, April 6, 1954 (https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/JFK-Speeches/United-States-Senate-Indochina_19540406.aspx)

    22 John F. Kennedy, Senate Address on Indochina, April 6, 1954. Shortly after the period in which Edmund Gullion was stationed in Vietnam, Charlton Ogburn became an intelligence officer in Southeast Asia, writing memos to the State Department and warning of the dangers of military involvement in Vietnam. His voice was completely ignored by the overconfident civilian leaders in Washington. Ogburn believed that the reach of the authorities was “totalitarian” in nature, a reality that was grasped by Plato, who may have been the first to identify the amorphous power of the “State” in the example of ancient Athens. For Ogburn, Vietnam was a “laboratory” for understanding how dogma is wielded by authority figures. He later recalled that “we lost over fifty thousand lives in Vietnam because the authorities could not be budged. Their appraisal of themselves was based on their being right …. They had to be right.” 
The passage of time would prove Ogburn to be correct in his assessment of Vietnam. Writing in 1989, Andrew Jon Rotter in The Path to Vietnam—Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989) refers to Ogburn’s dispatches to State Department officials as “startling and prophetic” in his early critique of the false assumptions guiding U.S. policy. Ogburn concluded one of his memos to Dean Rusk with a statement that spoke for the rights of Third World nations caught up in the Cold War. Referring to the people of Southeast Asia, Ogburn wrote, “Darn it, they are the ones who are threatened with a fate worse than death—not we.” Around the same time, John F. Kennedy was making virtually the same argument in his Senate speech of April 4, 1954.

    23 John F. Kennedy, Senate Address on Indochina, April 6, 1954.

    24 Parmet, 281.

    25 Parmet, 286.

    26 Parmet, 285.

    27 Parmet, 285.

    28 Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council Luncheon at the Biltmore Hotel on September 21, 1956. (https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/JFK-Speeches/Los-Angeles-CA-World-Affairs-Council_19560921.aspx)

    29 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days—John F. Kennedy in the White House (New York: Fawcett, 1965), 310-11.

    30 Quoted in James DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed—JFK, Cuba, and the Garrison Case, second edition (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2012), 25.

    31 Dallek, 397. Prior to acceding to the presidency, Kennedy paid a visit to General Douglas MacArthur who, like de Gaulle, advised him to “never get involved in a land war in Asia.” (https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/08/politics/caroline-kennedy-axe-files)

    32 As observed by biographer David Talbot, “Kennedy’s thinking about the historical imperative of Third World liberation was remarkably advanced. Even today, no nationally prominent leader in the United States would dare question the imperialistic policies that have led our country into one military nightmare after another. Kennedy understood that Washington’s militant opposition to the world’s revolutionary forces would only reap ‘a bitter harvest.’” Talbot, The Devil’s Chessboard—Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America’s Secret Government (New York: Harper Collins, 2015), 362.

    33 In the popular Steven Spielberg film The Post, the screenwriters lump together on multiple occasions the American Presidents from Eisenhower to Nixon, suggesting that each President was on board with military intervention in Vietnam, as the American commitment grew exponentially from one administration to the next. But the historical record suggests that this was not the case during Kennedy’s thousand-day presidency.

    34 David Talbot, Brothers—The Hidden History of the Kennedy Years (New York: Free Press, 2007), 215.

    35 Talbot, Brothers, 215.

    36 Mani Kang, “General Giap Knew,” Kennedys and King, August 30, 2013. (https://kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/general-giap-knew)

    37 John M. Newman, JFK and Vietnam—Deception, Intrigue, and The Struggle for Power (self-published, 2016), 458.

    38 James DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland—Tom Hanks, Vincent Bugliosi, and the JFK Assassination in the New Hollywood (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2016), 188.

    39 James K. Galbraith, “Exit Strategy: In 1963, JFK Ordered a Complete Withdrawal From Vietnam,” Boston Review (September 1, 2003).

    40 Galbraith.


    Works Cited Bibliography

    The Personal Papers of Edmund A. Gullion. The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts (https://archive2.jfklibrary.org/EAGPP/EAGPP-FA.xml )

    Historic Speeches of John F. Kennedy. The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts (https://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/Historic-Speeches.aspx )

    The Complete Pentagon Papers, The New York Timesonline, 1945-67 (http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/205509-pentagon-papers-part-iv-a-4.html )

    Dallek, Robert. An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy—1917-1963. New York: Little Brown and Company, 2003.

    DiEugenio, James. Destiny Betrayed—JFK, Cuba, and the Garrison Case, Second Edition. New York, Skyhorse Publishing, 2012.

    DiEugenio, James. Reclaiming Parkland—Tom Hanks, Vincent Bugliosi, and the JFK Assassination in the New Hollywood. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2016.

    Douglass, James W. JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters. Mary Knoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008.

    Galbraith, James K. “Exit Strategy: In 1963, JFK Ordered a Complete Withdrawal From Vietnam,” Boston Review, September 1, 2003.

    Mahoney, Richard. JFK: Ordeal in Africa. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.

    Newman, John M. JFK and Vietnam—Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power, second edition. Self-published, 2016.

    Parmet, Herbert S. Jack: The Struggles of John F. Kennedy. New York: The Dial Press, 1980.

    Rotter, Andrew Jon. The Path to Vietnam—Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989.

    Saxon, Wolfgang. “Edmund Asbury Gullion, 85, Wide-Ranging Career Envoy. “ Obituary, The New York Times, March 31, 1998.

    Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. A Thousand Days—John F. Kennedy in the White House. New York: Fawcett, 1965.

    Talbot, David. Brothers—The Hidden History of the Kennedy Years. New York: Free Press, 2007.

    Talbot, David. The Devil’s Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America’s Secret Government. New York: Harper Perennial, 2016.

  • John Allen Stern, C.D. Jackson: Cold War Propagandist for Democracy and Globalism

    John Allen Stern, C.D. Jackson: Cold War Propagandist for Democracy and Globalism


    I. “The American Century”

    In this concise and penetrating analysis of a largely forgotten Cold War propagandist and public relations figure, John Allen Stern paints a complex picture of the genesis of the Cold War, capturing not only the singular influence of C.D. Jackson on 1950s American foreign policy, but the broader contradictions of the ideological battle waged against the Soviet Union by the United States.

    As has been exhaustively portrayed in many a book on the Cold War, almost immediately following the cessation of hostilities after the Japanese surrender in August of 1945, the United States found itself alone among the world’s nations in terms of hegemonic potential, nuclear capabilities and industrial might. There exists much debate as to the actual established beginning of the Cold War, and the breaking with Franklin Roosevelt’s more friendly American/Soviet aims. Many have placed the milestone—at least thematically—shortly after Churchill’s famous March of 1946 speech in Fulton, Missouri. There Churchill decried an “Iron Curtain” descending over Europe, a phrase previously used by Nazi Foreign Minister Count Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk a year earlier. Others have pointed to George Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” sent in February, 1946 while he was the U.S. Chargé d’affaires in Moscow as the most tangible departure in U.S. Foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union for the coming decade.

    In his message to the Secretary of State, Kennan described the CCCP as, “a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the U.S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi.” His prescription was for “a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” (George Kennan, “Telegraphic Message from Moscow”, 2/22/1946)

    It may be accurate to judge the posture of U.S. policy planners towards the Soviet Union in the wake of World War II as provocative, belligerent, and essentially counter-productive to their purported goal of fostering global stability. But it is worth getting into the minds of those who had just witnessed the apocalyptic horror of an unprecedented total war, the death toll of which exceeded 60 million in only six years. The unlocking and eventual unleashing of the devastating power of atomic weaponry, coupled with the economic and ideological vacuum into which Western Europe descended after the defeat of the Nazis, presented a formidable challenge to even the most sophisticated foreign relations experts. To many, everything west of the Berlin Occupation Zone lay open to communist infiltration, particularly those nations like France with previously strong socialist factions. To others, like C.D. Jackson, the new mantle of global authority gained in the wake of the Second World War presented a unique opportunity for the United States to lead the world on a moral crusade for the hearts and minds of people in beleaguered communist territories. For those who stood at this great juncture in the 20th Century, the Soviet Union loomed like a dark shadow, poised, many felt, to marshal its forces and complete its unfinished conquest of the “free world.”

    Charles Douglas Jackson stepped into this tense scene of early Cold War uncertainty when he accepted his role as special assistant to President Eisenhower. Coming from Life—where he worked alongside Henry Luce, the publisher of this quintessentially American magazine—Jackson brought both his persuasive charm and astute political observations to the job; earning the admiration of many disparate personalities, from the president to the newly appointed director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles. One of the first global flash points on which Jackson cut his teeth was the coup the CIA sponsored against the democratically elected leader of Guatemala, Jacobo Árbenz, in which capacity Jackson quietly aided intelligence planners in the dissemination of disinformation preceding the overthrow. While ostensibly executed as a clandestine removal of a potential communist leader about to fall into Moscow’s waiting hands, an equally compelling financial motive from the board of directors at United Fruit was also responsible for the green-lighting of the caper. It was, after all, Sullivan and Cromwell, a top American law firm that covertly supported the Nazi war machine during WWII, who represented United Fruit. And it was also John Foster Dulles, made partner at the firm during the 1930s, who was Secretary of State under Eisenhower in the summer of 1954 when the plot was unfolding, and his brother Allen, who was Director of the CIA and also a leading board member of the firm.

    Why this familiar incident bears repeating is that throughout his monograph, Stern does an excellent job of exposing this revolving door of mid-century American politics. With a near-monopoly on credibility, magazines like Life were, along with other titans of journalism like the Washington Post and The New York Times, arbiters of truth, and promulgated to a large extent the narratives of what America stood for, what its enemies sought, and how hardworking officials in Washington were vigilantly keeping them safe in their peaceful suburban enclaves. As authors like Carl Bernstein have detailed, Luce was deeply supportive of the CIA. In a 1977 exposé entitled “The CIA and the Media,” he writes, “For many years, Luce’s personal emissary to the CIA was C.D. Jackson, a Time Inc. vice-president who was publisher of Life magazine from 1960 until his death in 1964.” (Rolling Stone, 10/22/1977) It was Life which later bought the rights, within a day of its shooting, to the infamous Zapruder film in November of 1963, and closely guarded it from the public until its eventual leak on Geraldo Rivera’s “Good Night America” show in 1975, deeming it unsuitable for the American psyche. The film—altered or original—shows President Kennedy’s head snapping dramatically back and to the left. Could that possibly have persuaded Luce and his associates in the intel community from releasing it? Honest folks that they were? But I digress.

    What’s also of note is a December 6, 1963 Life article written by Paul Mandel. This extremely telling piece of the cover-up includes statements like, “Oswald was an ex-marine sharpshooter,” and “Oswald had both the time and the ability to zero-in three times.” (Life, 12/6/1963) This is interesting, given that no one—without cheating—has been able to recreate the fantastic feat in the allotted six seconds of the Warren Commission’s official findings. This includes the legendary Carlos Hathcock, a USMC sniper during the Vietnam War who held a world record—later surpassed—for a confirmed kill at 1.4 miles. (James DiEugenio, “The Lost Bullet: Max Holland Gets Lost In Space,” 11/30/2011) When he left the service, Oswald was a poor shot according to his marksmanship performance reviews. Similarly, Mandel states unequivocally that a Clayton E. Wheat Jr., director of the NRA, actually reproduced this shot in a controlled setting for Life. He “fired an identical-make rifle with an identical sight against a moving target over similar ranges for Life last week. He got three hits in 6.2 seconds.” (“The Lost Bullet”) However, as researcher Pat Speer has observed,

    Someone at the (Warren) Commission recalled the claim in the December 6 issue of Life Magazine that Oswald’s purported shots had been duplicated by someone at the NRA, and asked the FBI to look into it. The FBI report forwarded by Hoover is quite damaging to Life’s credibility. While Life claimed the shooter was an official of the NRA, it turned out the shooter had merely been recommended by the NRA. The shooter, Clayton Wheat, moreover, admitted that he’d had 8 or 9 practice shots and had used a 7.35mm Carcano in his tests, not the 6.5 mm Carcano purportedly used by Oswald. He also acknowledged that he’d fired on a moving deer target traveling slowly, 3-5 mph, right to left over 33 feet, and not at a human head and shoulders-sized target traveling 12 mph away on an angle over a distance of 100 feet or so. He also mentioned that that he’d fired at the target from a distance of 150 feet, from approximately 10 degrees above horizontal, as opposed to firing from a distance of 160-265 feet from approximately 22-16 degrees above horizontal for the purported shots on Kennedy from the sniper’s nest. In short, he didn’t reproduce the shots at all.” (Patrick Speer, A New Perspective on the John F. Kennedy Assassination, Vol. 2, p. 22)

    Equally telling is the other blatant lie in Mandel’s piece for Life, which seeks to explain the testimony of a Parkland Hospital doctor who had told investigators that the president’s throat wound was an entrance wound. Mandel claims this was due to Kennedy’s turning and waving at the crowd: “His throat is exposed—to the sniper’s nest—just before he clutches it.” (Life, 12/6/1963) Mandel cites the then-unreleased Zapruder film as proof of this, having personally viewed it. Yet no extant version of the film actually portrays this, raising serious doubt over his conclusion.

    That C.D. Jackson, on behalf of Allen Dulles, also had a CIA asset, Isaac Don Levine, ghostwrite Marina Oswald’s story for Life is equally suspect. (Stern, p. 122) Though the piece was never published, Levine, a member of the Tolstoy Foundation, a CIA-backed anti-communist front organization with ties to C.D. Jackson’s Psychological Strategy Board going back to the 1950s, spent a full week with Marina Oswald immediately before her testimony to the Warren Commission. (George Michael Evica, A Certain Arrogance, p. 225)

    Life’s publisher Henry Luce, a dedicated and vocal anti-communist, was quick to realize the unprecedented historical opportunity afforded America in the wake of the Allied victory in Europe. No serious historian can deny that the Soviet Union, however repressive and internally corrupt it truly was, actually saved Europe from fascism. Yet this was almost never spoken of in the West, and to be honest, rarely is today. During Operation Barbarossa, the German codename for the June, 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler sent 180 divisions (nearly 3.8 million men, 3,800 tanks, 5,400 aircraft and 18,000 artillery pieces) on a mission of conquest and racial extermination which ultimately left over 20 million Russians and Ukrainians dead, as opposed to the forty-five German divisions facing the combined British, Free French, Canadian, Australian, New Zealander, and American forces in late 1942.

    Luce and his pal Jackson, like many Americans in the wake of the Second World War, viewed the outcome as something akin to divine providence, and were quick to draft a persuasive narrative of good versus evil, of a benevolent emancipatory American intervention which paved the way for the liberation of Hitler’s Fortress Europe—a narrative which continues to persuade today. There is no denying the tremendous sacrifices of the American forces in their quest to free Europe from the dark bondage of the Nazi regime. My own grandfather, a French Resistance fighter who helped rescue downed Allied pilots, never forgot that striking image of Operation Overlord’s enormous flotilla anchored off his foggy coast. But it was not a singular effort. Hitler officially declared war on the United States on December 11, 1941, four days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. It was not until November, 1942 that the American expeditionary force touched down in North Africa to begin its actual combat operations against the Afrika Corps led by Erwin Rommel. After a slow and bloody slog across Tunisia, a 1943 invasion of Sicily and subsequent landings on the Italian mainland, a full three years had elapsed from when Soviet troops began fighting for their existence as a people until the D-Day landings in June, 1944. Stalin never forgot this. And, as history would have it, the famous image of American GIs and Soviet troops embracing on the sunny banks of the Elbe river before the Russians stormed Berlin quickly dissolved into the dreaded specter of the Red Menace in the wake of that tragic global conflagration.

    For figures like C.D. Jackson, the arc of the post-war era of the late 1940s and early 1950s represented the unfolding of Luce’s “American Century,” the title of a sensational feature Luce wrote in a February, 1941 issue of Life Magazine. This thematic portrayal and its subsequent economic, strategic and propagandistic initiatives are best summarized by Stern, who explains,

    It entailed economic liberation for the United States through the integration of American business with markets and resources worldwide, for which governmental institutions were to provide the necessary “atmosphere” for expansion. That amounted to the extension abroad of American business interests, long strapped by the backward thinking of many corporate leaders. The American Century would bring as well, political and economic unity between the United States and Western Europe, along with Japan. It promised to raise living standards around the world, especially in Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Latin America—areas soon to be collectively defined as the “Third World,”—where a wealth of natural resources made them vulnerable targets for communist incursion. Above all, the American Century was to instill among Americans a sense of destiny and mission, a conviction that our way of life was right for the world, and that it was our time to rule. (Stern, p. 25.)


    II. “It’s Not Propaganda if You Tell the Truth”

    Author Stern goes to great lengths to explain the various propaganda methods and delivery systems the United States employed in its quest to combat Soviet encroachment, both in continental Europe and the world over. Citing cases like Radio Free Europe, which C.D. Jackson actually designed and helped run, and lesser-known programs, like the comical anti-communist pamphlets shoved in balloons and floated over the Iron Curtain by the tens of thousands, he does a nice job of detailing the subtler methods of Cold War spy-craft and propaganda, and gives a compelling, if cursory exposition on the intellectual history of Western social manipulation. He states,

    C.D. Jackson and President Eisenhower would answer the bellicose cries of the saber-rattlers with a clarion call of their own. Jackson outlined his “Strategy for Survival” in a rapidly changing and dangerous world: What would win the day, he promised in sermon-like prose to a wide and diverse audience, was propaganda: ‘We had better get used to it, because goodness knows we need it, and just because Dr. Goebbels and the Kremlin have debased it, that is no reason why we cannot elevate it.’ He made palatable the idea of ‘an official propaganda organization’—which, he confessed, many citizens found dishonest and un-American—by comparing it to teaching ‘a word of wonderful meaning.’

    What is striking when one takes in the ramifications of these propaganda programs is the contempt with which many of their theorists viewed the American masses. Harold Lasswell, a longtime friend of political commentator Walter Lippmann, and himself an influential Yale law professor, is quoted in Stern’s book as arguing,We must recognize the ‘ignorance and stupidity (of) … the masses’ and not succumb to democratic dogmatisms about men being the best judges of their own interests.” (Stern, 43) This art of “manufacturing consent,” later critiqued by the likes of Noam Chomsky in an eponymous book, became a fundamental part of American society by the time the Second World War had begun to unfold.

    I should note that Edward Bernays, a cousin of Sigmund Freud, was a pioneer of American propaganda. Yet conspicuously absent from Stern’s book is a discussion of the Committee on Public Information, or “Creel Commission,” which arguably was the true genesis of full-blown American war propaganda. It employed Bernays, along with George Creel, Carl Byoir and others to sell the First World War to an isolationist general population. Though he touches on the earlier role Bernays played in Calvin Coolidge’s presidency during the mid 1920s, it’s odd that given his otherwise excellent monograph, this important propaganda think-tank, which lasted from 1917 to 1919, is not mentioned. Indeed, Josef Goebbels, the Nazi Propaganda Minister, often cited Bernays as the greatest influence in shaping his own policies in Germany, and Adolf Hitler was a great admirer of him as well, even citing the Committee on Public Information as a template for his own efforts. (Dan Nimmo and Chevelle Newsome, Political Commentators in the United States in the 20th Century: A Bio Critical Sourcebook, p. 66)

    It would also have been nice if Stern had mentioned how Hitler glossed the cover of Henry Luce’s Time Magazine in 1938 in full regalia as “Man of the Year,”; or how the Führer had actually hired New York advertising agency Carl Byoir & Associates in 1933—the same Carl Byoir of Creel Commission notoriety—to actively promote “positive images” of the Third Reich. (The Observer, 12/22/2014). These collusive links between the purported bastion of democracy in the free world, the United States of America, and one of the most violent and destructive regimes in human history, remains a curious gap in Stern’s story, and are a necessary window into comprehending the Soviet Union’s very real fear of a re-armed Germany in the wake of the Second World War.


    III. “The Hidden Hand”

    What Stern does an exceptional job of showcasing is the impasse at which more nuanced thinkers found themselves when confronted with die-hard cold warriors like the Dulles Brothers and certain members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An especially telling episode from 1953 is one in which a young Tom Braden, fresh out of the CIA academy, overhears Walter Bedell-Smith, now undersecretary of State, on a McCarthyist tirade regarding a new appointment to the U.S. Information Program, one of the departments of the wider public relations umbrella network described in Stern’s book. Braden recalled, “I remember walking into Allen Dulles’ office one day soon after I joined the CIA, and I could hear “Beetle” Smith, whose office door adjoined the Director’s, roaring out from beyond his front door: ‘They got that goddamned communist Nelson Rockefeller running psychological warfare.’ I went into Allen’s office and said I don’t want to work here anymore. I don’t want anything to do with this.” (Stern, p. 110).

    For figures like Jackson, who by no means sought neutralism or appeasement with the Eastern Bloc, there existed a kind of middle ground. Stern does a fine job of showing the small ways in which people like him served as a necessary buffer to the brinkmanship of the war-hawks. As he notes,

    Whereas Jackson wanted to quietly capture the loyalties of the non-aligned nations and make inroads into the Eastern Bloc, as well as strengthen our position with England and France—both of whom recognized the inherent emptiness of communist dialectics and the military threat posed by Russia, but accepted coexistence and especially trade with the Soviet States—(John Foster) Dulles opted for outright coercion and applied bullying tactics.” (Stern, p. 101)

     

    Time and time again this story has been repeated, and Stern’s book is a necessary primer for the arm-twisting the intelligence apparatus would employ on JFK during his brief tenure as president. What is both interesting and arguably under-reported in the scholarship, is how even a former Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe like Dwight Eisenhower was feeling the pressure of his newly-formed intelligence and propaganda machine.

    As Stern notes, in 1956 the CIA had urged the president to parachute weapons and supplies to the disillusioned Hungarian protesters who had taken to the streets in open rebellion against the Soviet Union. This rebellion was largely due to Western propaganda imperatives broadcast over Radio Free Europe. When he refused, many members of the intelligence community saw only weakness, not Eisenhower’s real concerns over provoking a potential nuclear exchange between the superpowers. (Stern, pp. 3-4) Also interesting to note—and the author does—is how the figures the United States had selected to lead the failed Hungarian uprising were largely former members of the fascist Arrow Cross Party. Arrow Cross had been instrumental in WWII in aiding the Nazis’ Jewish extermination program in Hungary after the Germans captured and deposed the Hungarian Regent, Miklós Horthy, through a daring commando operation led by SS Major Otto Skorzeny. Stern argues, “In contrast, Jewish refugees from the uprising told the French Press that, ‘Soviet soldiers had saved their lives.’” (p. 4) And thus in the first chapter of the book, we see the contradictions and moral hazards inherent in the intelligence and propaganda communities’ Realpolitik approach to communism, a theme that would continue to generate blowback and further tarnish the image of the United States in the decades to come.

    While Eisenhower fully supported the CIA’s overthrows of both Mossadeq in Iran and Árbenz in Guatemala, he seemed fearful enough of a final apocalyptic showdown with the Soviet Union to pursue a watered down form of détente. And it was C.D. Jackson himself who wrote the president’s iconic “Atoms for Peace” address to the UN General Assembly in 1953. This rhetorically moving—if somewhat disingenuous—speech deserves reading, as the language is quite revealing in terms of Jackson’s power to persuade:

    … for me to say that the defense capabilities of the United States are such that they could inflict terrible losses upon an aggressor—for me to say that the retaliation capabilities of the United States are so great that such an aggressor’s land would be laid waste—all this, while fact, is not the true expression of the purpose and the hope of the United States. To pause there would be to confirm the hopeless finality of a belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world. To stop there would be to accept helplessly the probability of civilization destroyed—the annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind handed down to us generation from generation—and the condemnation of mankind to begin all over again the age-old struggle upward from savagery toward decency, and right, and justice. Surely no sane member of the human race could discover victory in such desolation. Could anyone wish his name to be coupled by history with such human degradation and destruction?

    Eisenhower continues:

    We never have, and never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet Union surrender what rightly belongs to it. We will never say that the peoples of the USSR are an enemy with whom we have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful relationship. On the contrary, we hope that this coming conference may initiate a relationship with the Soviet Union which will eventually bring about a freer mingling of the peoples of the East and of the West—the one sure, human way of developing the understanding required for confident and peaceful relations. Instead of the discontent which is now settling upon Eastern Germany, occupied Austria and the countries of Eastern Europe, we seek a harmonious family of free European nations, with none a threat to the other, and least of all a threat to the peoples of the USSR. (Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Atoms for Peace,” 12/8/1953)

     

    How much of this was purely stagecraft is debatable, and as Stern notes, many within the CIA, like Tom Braden, felt it was likely a ploy to ensure the United States remained dominant in terms of nuclear first-strike capability, and served to alleviate growing tensions with Western allies in Europe who feared a Third World War extinction event. This constant shadow play, both within the U.S. foreign policy circles and in the diplomatic tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, are a highlight of the book. As Stern reveals, it is never really clear just where even moderates like Jackson ultimately stand within this dynamic. To be clear, this is fine contribution to scholarship, for too often a monolithic Eastern Bloc is juxtaposed against a Red-baiting West in conventional narratives of the Cold War, with figures like Jackson either relegated to tertiary roles in the grand scheme of things or altogether excluded. Even sinister figures like Allen Dulles are shown in their rare finer moments, including Stern’s vignette where Senator Joe McCarthy, the towering figure of anti-communism, responsible for the nationwide purges of purported Soviet sympathizers, is attempting to fire none other than the CIA’s own Deputy Director of Intelligence, William Bundy. His crime: contributing $400 to the Alger Hiss Defense Fund.

    Braden was in Dulles’ office one day with William Bundy, and the Director told Bundy, ‘get out of here and I’ll deal with it.’ Dulles then went directly to Eisenhower and said, in Braden’s words, he wasn’t going to ‘fuck about with this mess from Wisconsin.’ Dulles bluntly told the president ‘he would resign unless McCarthy’s attacks were stopped.’ (Stern, 99)


    IV. Ignorance is Strength

    The late American political theorist Sheldon Wolin once described the United States as an “inverted totalitarian” society. By this he contrasts its more subtle and sophisticated methods of coercion and control with the more overt and brute-force tactics seen in places like the former Soviet Union. In his prescient book Democracy Incorporated, Wolin argues,

    Antidemocracy (sic), executive predominance, and elite rule are basic elements of inverted totalitarianism. Antidemocracy does not take the form of overt attacks upon the idea of government by the people. Instead, politically it means encouraging what I have earlier dubbed ‘civil demobilization,’ conditioning an electorate to being aroused for a brief spell, controlling its attention span, and then encouraging distraction or apathy.” (Sheldon Wolin, Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism, 2008, p. 239å)

    Figures like C.D. Jackson, Bernays, and Luce all served this function of the state. Stern presents a fine account of precisely how this was accomplished in mid-century America, one largely unbeknownst to the general public. With dramatically fewer outlets—no internet, for one—from which to gather a comprehensive and serious view of current events, the average American in the 1950s and early 1960s was largely dependent on what these back-channel propaganda handlers were manufacturing. Though a few independent investigative outfits like Ramparts managed to get some of the less-than-savory episodes in American foreign and domestic policies out into the world, their circulation was dwarfed by the essentially monolithic mainstream print and television media.

    What truly struck me about Stern’s book was the timeliness of its publication. As we gear up for another year of the media’s predictable fear mongering— e.g., “Russia hacked the election,” “Putin murders journalists,” “Russia has weaponized Pokemon Go” (an actual CNN headline)—it’s good to have a source like this book to connect the dots. What’s fascinating is how in the epilogue, written in 2012, he notes that, with the Soviet Union gone and Russia now no longer a threat to the West, our bogeyman has become Islamic fundamentalism. Which, of course, is true; even with the alleged murder and burial at sea of Osama Bin Laden the United States is still mired in a never-ending multiple-theater “war on terror.” But how curious that even six years ago no one in America, at least not seriously, was talking about a renewed Cold War with Russia. Certainly not your average person or generally circulated periodical. And yet just last year, in an October 2017 issue, The Economist ran a sensational cover story entitled, “A Tsar is Born: As the world marks the centenary of the October Revolution, Russia is once again under the rule of the tsar.” Vladimir Putin is featured in an artistic rendering in full 19th– Century Imperial Russian military dress: in place of his bar of ribbons we find a rectangular image of a prisoner’s hands gripping a prison cell’s iron bars, under which hangs a red sickle and hammer medal. That this iconic image symbolizes the ideological opposite of their “tsar” portrait is never explained. But that’s not the point. The point is he’s a tsar, okay? Tsar = bad. Now go watch football and check your Facebook feeds folks. It would make Edward Bernays proud.

    Silly headlines like this serve as reminders of the entrenched philosophical notion of what the 19th-century Prussian philosopher G.W. Hegel once called “negative identity,” or defining yourself by that to which you stand opposed. And CD Jackson: Cold War Propagandist for Democracy and Globalism is a painful reminder of this pernicious attitude that continues to saturate both our government and media. The insights gleaned from this short text are a truly valuable addition for U.S. historians and those interested in the creation and dissemination of propaganda in a professedly free and democratic society. To these ends, Stern succeeds in showing how one forgotten figure of the past played his hand at shaping the landscape of U.S.-Soviet relations behind the scenes.

    While it would have been nice to know more about Jackson the human being—he serves more as a cryptic cipher around which is spun an investigative exposition on the Cold War propaganda apparatus—perhaps that was exactly the author’s intent, despite the fact that the title of the book would suggest a more biographical approach to the reader. Similarly, the subject would seem to lend itself better to a more chronological narration of how the psychological warfare departments and shell companies rolled out during the Cold War evolved, with planners learning from past successes and mistakes and adapting to the exigencies of the time. The book is, in fact, strangely disjointed in its organization, and Jackson himself is curiously quoted only a few times in the body of primary source evidence the author cites. Perhaps, as Stern mentions in his introduction, this owes itself to the relative scarcity of information on him. But the omission does weaken what ostensibly is a case study of this person’s life and times.

    In conclusion, however, I must say that C.D. Jackson: Cold War Propagandist for Democracy and Globalism was a pleasure to read, and I highly recommend it to anyone wishing to fill in the gaps in Cold War historiography.

  • The Enemy Within: The Rise and Fall of the Alliance for Progress

    The Enemy Within: The Rise and Fall of the Alliance for Progress


    with Jim DiEugenio

     

    In March of 1961, President Kennedy gave a moving address at a White House reception for members of Congress and the Diplomatic Corps of Latin America in which he detailed his bold vision for a progressive South and Central American future:

    We propose to complete the revolution of the Americas, to build a hemisphere where all men can hope for a suitable standard of living and all can live out their lives in dignity and in freedom. To achieve this goal political freedom must accompany material progress … Let us once again transform the American Continent into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts, a tribute to the power of the creative energies of free men and women, an example to all the world that liberty and progress walk hand in hand. Let us once again awaken our American revolution until it guides the struggles of people everywhere­ –– not with an imperialism of force or fear but the rule of courage and freedom and hope for the future of man.

    To many, the Alliance for Progress—as the ten-year, $20 billion dollar foreign aid program for Latin America was known—was a necessary, if somewhat controversial move on the United States’ part to quell social upheavals in developing nations. Some felt that the inherent instability of post-colonial Latin America would inevitably lead to the continent’s adoption of communism, that omnipresent Cold War specter largely deployed as a bogey-man for the continuance of U.S. imperialism and intervention, whose very real atrocities in Europe were, by default, exported to the wider world to justify almost every post-war intervention by the United States military-industrial apparatus. While the Soviet Union was far from the ideal society outlined by its founding members after the Russian Revolution of 1917—not to mention the absolutely shocking treatment of its citizens during and after World War II—its international ambitions were far from inevitable. And certainly not always as sinister as U.S. foreign-policy planners insisted, particularly in the Khrushchev era, into which President Kennedy stepped after winning the 1960 election.

    A few key ideological underpinnings of those American policy makers in power during the 1950s and early 1960s must be mentioned. These include, but are not limited to, a myopic paternalism towards non-white governments in the developing world; an irrational, reactive fear of anything resembling socialism or neutralism; and a steadfast belief in allying with the greater of two evils, namely a pro-U.S. dictator over an independent, “potentially communist” official interested in his own country’s well-being. It was in this context that the spymasters at the Central Intelligence Agency, and their friends on the board of United Fruit Company, cooked up Operation PBSUCCESS, the half-baked 1954 overthrow of the democratically elected leader of Guatemala, Jacobo Árbenz. This plot, hatched from Washington by the likes of Allen Dulles and Walter Bedell Smith, to name but two, was intended to redeem the exploitative profits of the United Fruit Company’s banana farms—which Árbenz asked to be fairly taxed and repurposed for general occupancy by the poor—and to destroy any possibility of his land and tax reforms from going “communist.”

    Árbenz himself had no ties to Moscow, was only trying to reverse the decades of dictatorial excess plaguing his nation from its previous rulers, and noted that there wasn’t even a Russian embassy in Guatemala. In the climate of mid-century McCarthyism, it wasn’t a hard sell to discredit Arbenz’ regime.

    In the congressional debate from June of 1954, just weeks before the coming overthrow, both Lyndon Johnson and his fellow Texan, representative Jack Brooks, were staunchly pushing for intervention on Capitol Hill. Eerily echoing rhetoric used to justify the later U.S. support of the Nicaraguan Contras, Congressman Brooks argued, “A communist-dominated government in Guatemala is only 700 miles from Texas—only 960 miles, or a few hours’ bomber time, from the refiners, the chemical plants, and the homes of my own Second District in Texas.” (Congressional Record, Senate, 25 June 1954, pp. 8922-8926) In 1986, Ronald Reagan emphatically reminded those in attendance in his Cabinet Room that if the counter-revolutionaries he was funding through his illegal arms deal with Iran failed, it would create “a privileged sanctuary for terrorists and subversives just two days’ driving time from Harlingen, Texas” (Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a White House Meeting for Supporters of United States Assistance for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance”).

    One of the only opposing voices to the Brooks tirade, Senator William Langer of North Dakota, was largely ignored, and did not even receive comments after his views were expressed. He noted:

    I do not believe that the Members of the Senate have been adequately informed as yet as to what is going on in Guatemala. We have had inadequate time to consider such a major declaration on foreign policy. Is there a foreign invasion of Guatemala, or is there a civil war? …. Of course we are opposed to external interference with the affairs of any nation, especially so with regard to our sister republics of Latin America. But even more, we will, or we ought to be, committed to the principle that every sovereign nation has a right to determine for itself its own form of government. (Congressional Record, Senate, 28 June 1954, pp. 9065-9066.)

    In the end, none of this mattered. And the story, which has been covered in exhaustive and painful detail by the likes of Nick Cullather in Secret History and William Blum in Killing Hope, is well known. Both psychological and direct warfare were employed to achieve their dramatic effect: Miami-based anti-Árbenz radio broadcasts, leaflets dropped by B-26 bombers, and vicious strafings of the harbor’s oil reserve tanks and the city’s capital buildings combined to spread chaos and terror. Renegade pilot Jerry DeLarm and a former Flying Tiger named Whiting Willauer, whose P-47s buzzed Guatemala City, bristling with eight .50 caliber machine guns, searched the city for anything that moved, scattering citizens and forcing Árbenz to steal away to his headquarters with his security detail. The implied threat of a full-blown United States Marine Corps landing eventually forced Árbenz to concede. Days later, fearing for his life in his presidential suite, he appeared on a nightly radio broadcast and announced his reluctant resignation: “Workers, peasants, patriots! Guatemala is going through a hard trial. A cruel war against Guatemala has been unleashed. The United Fruit Company and U.S. monopolies, together with U.S. ruling circles are responsible. Mercenaries have unleashed fire and death, respecting nothing.” (FOIA Guatemala 0000920952 U 3 May 1, 1954)

    Following this, he fled the capital with his remaining loyal staff members and sought refuge in a nearby Mexican embassy. Team members of the coup went so far as to plant Marxist literature in his personal bookshelf. And they left behind a crate of Soviet weapons and ammunition, which was quietly discredited by the international media because of their sloppy work, though Time Magazine predictably parroted the CIA’s disinformation. It has also come to light that on June 3, 1954, just weeks before the coup, Allen Dulles privately ordered Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the publisher of the New York Times, to keep his foreign journalists out of Guatemala. After attempting to convince him that one of his best reporters, Sydney Gruson, was a communist who could not be trusted to provide an accurate picture of the unfolding political situation, Dulles demanded he be prevented from flying to Guatemala City to cover the events. Eventually, Sulzberger conceded: ‘‘I telephoned Allen Dulles and told him that we would comply with their suggestion.” (NY Times, 6/7/1997) It should be noted that Gruson eventually became an executive of the Times, and later a director and vice chairman. He retired from the paper in 1987 and went into investment banking. This was Allen Dulles’ idea of a communist. (NY Times, 3/9/1998)


    II

    In the wake of Árbenz’ removal, and the subsequent removal of Colonel Díaz, who was Árbenz’s final supporter and was in power all of one day, the brutal and corrupt former chief of Guatemalan police, Carlos Castillo Armas arrived. He had been leading a 150-man CIA-funded and trained band of guerillas through the jungles of Honduras on this way to the capital during the air raids. After a brief discussion with Col. Monzon—who had become the third leader of Guatemala in as many days—Armas came to power. He immediately ordered the arrests of all former high-ranking Árbenz supporters. That list of supporters came from John Peurifoy, the U.S. Ambassador the CIA had placed on site before the coup. Over the next few months, he then sent death squads roaming into the countryside, killing thousands of landless peasants and blaming the murders on Árbenz, going so far as to immediately publish a picture book of the mass graves called Genocidio sobre Guatemala, a disturbing Alice in Wonderland revision of history I don’t recommend reading. Within the first few months, over 72,000 people were arrested and detained without trial for alleged ties to communism.

    In the United States, Castillo-Armas was invited by President Eisenhower to a gold-star dinner reception and given a ceremonial party of the highest order. Their man in Guatemala had been installed, and another threat to world stability had been removed. Days after the coup, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles established the official lie in a United States television and radio broadcast, “Led by Colonel Castillo-Armas, patriots arose in Guatemala to challenge the communist leadership—and to change it. Thus the situation is being cured by the Guatemalans themselves.” (Jonathan Fried, Guatemala in Rebellion:Unfinished History, Grove Press, 1983, pp.77-79). The truth was that, had it not been for United Fruit and the CIA, Árbenz would not have been overthrown. Castillo-Armas was simply an appendage manufactured by Washington.

    Árbenz’s daughter committed suicide years later, citing the coup and their uncertain wanderings in exile as her source of depression. Her father died in 1971, an alcoholic by then, in a strange bathtub accident in Mexico City; aides forced their way into his hotel bathroom when they noted steam coming from under the door sill. He was found face down in scalding water. Towards the end of his life he actually did join the Communist Party, since he believed the Soviet Union was the only bulwark against Western imperialism, a trajectory later taken by Fidel Castro after the Cuban revolution, and after multiple attempts had been made on his life by the CIA and its Cuban exile mercenaries, and the implications of the Operation Mongoose terror campaign sank in.

    It was nearly forty years later that the death squads, random political kidnappings, and utter chaos of the overthrow and its aftermath finally abated. Nearly 200,000 Guatemalans were killed in the wake of PBSUCCESS. The nation has never fully recovered from the coup. It not only served to harden the hearts of those with any inkling that the United States was their friend, but fundamentally radicalized figures like Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who himself was in Guatemala City during the coup, and who witnessed the betrayal by the purported beacon of democracy in the free world.

    In a way, PBSUCCESS, along with the overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddegh in Iran only a year earlier, was the template that would be repeated throughout the Cold War: plausible deniability, the co-opting of corrupt insiders seeking power or revenge, crates of weapons and cash, and voilà: peace. Only the total opposite resulted, as both Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran (1953) and Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala (1954) displayed unusual violence once they came to power, essentially condemning their populations to lives of abject misery and despair during their reigns, forever terrified of being tortured and imprisoned by the nations’ respective secret police forces and their embedded CIA handlers and trainers. This was largely lost on policy planners, removed as they were from the scenes of their crimes. Life went on in Georgetown and at CIA headquarters. Figures like E. Howard Hunt and Allen Dulles went on puffing their wooden pipes in their plush, book-lined studies, carefully reading foreign cables and memoranda, dutifully planning the next overthrow, the next dictator to be installed, the next assassination. As E. Howard Hunt’s son observed in a 2007 interview, when he asked his father about the deaths of all those Guatemalans following PBSUCCESS, he said, surprised, “Deaths? What deaths?” (Rolling Stone, 4/5/2007)


    III

    It is in this context that President Kennedy’s struggle to reconcile with the intelligence agencies was born. When he took the oath of office, he had unknowingly filled an essentially compromised position of statesmanship, whose real power lay not in the democratic or executive processes, but in shadowy, essentially rogue organizations like the Central Intelligence Agency, and to a lesser extent, Hoover’s FBI, who at the time were more concerned with subverting peaceful demonstrations domestically and wiretapping elected officials for personal exploitation than with solving major crimes. Indeed, Hoover was in something of a double bind himself, as James Angleton, the CIA’s Chief of Counter-Intelligence, allegedly possessed an incriminating photo of Hoover having sex with his Deputy Director Clyde Tolson, a telling accusation given Hoover’s unusually bitter hatred of homosexuals. (Lisa Pease, Probe, Vol. 7 No. 5., 2000)

    Philip K. Dick’s The Man in The High Castle is a counterfactual scenario in which the Axis forces won World War II. There it is detailed how a triumphant Nazi Germany secretly plotted to undermine their ostensible Japanese ally while fulfilling their commitment to the Final Solution. While this thankfully never took place, what is remarkable about the postwar period is the amount of actual influence these Nazi forces continued to have on Western policy in the wake of their military defeat, and how, in many ways their members shaped the creation of the CIA. Consider for a moment the fact that the OSS, and later the CIA, almost entirely relied on former Nazis to provide intelligence on all Soviet activity in Europe immediately after the war. That Germany had pledged a war of racial extermination against the Russian people only a few years earlier apparently didn’t factor into American officials’ interpretation of their Nazi agents’ reports on Soviet activity and its relative threat to the West. Reinhard Gehlen, a former SS Major General who ran this “Gehlen Organization” which later became West Germany’s Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service), was personal friends with Allen Dulles, who exchanged letters with him years after he was acquitted of war crimes and put on the U.S. payroll to establish his spy network. One letter, from April 1957 begins, “May I extend to you my heartiest and most sincere wishes for your birthday and wish you health and continuing success for your responsible task during the next years of your life. I would like to take this opportunity to enclose my kindest thanks for your cordial hospitality my co-workers and I enjoyed during our stay over there.”

    This should come as little surprise, given Allen Dulles’ own dealings with the Nazis during the war in which his own country was trying bitterly to defeat Hitler, at great loss of life and materiel. Sullivan and Cromwell, the law firm of which John Foster Dulles was managing partner, was instrumental in keeping I. G. Farben, Krupp, and other Nazi industries in business during the ostensible embargo and trading freeze imposed by the United States during World War II. Mirroring their dual powers as Secretary of State and Director of Central Intelligence in the 1950s, John and Allen respectively tested their powers when Allen was OSS station chief of Berne, Switzerland in 1942, and Foster was running his law firm in New York. As David Talbot noted in a recent interview:

    In one case a German industrialist had seen Auschwitz being built and had heard what they were going to be using it for. He slipped across the border with this eyewitness account and Dulles basically did nothing with this to make this an urgent priority of the Roosevelt administration. He was not concerned about the Jews’ fate. He was more concerned about his clients, his German clients: making sure their assets would be carefully hidden and that Germany would emerge from the war defeated but a strong bulwark against the Soviet Union, whom he always regarded as the true enemy. (Reader Supported News, 10/20/2015)

    This historical backdrop is crucial to understanding the future conflation, in the 1950s and 60s, of communism with nationalistic independence movements in the developing world. For it was people like the Dulles brothers and their colleagues who would convince President Truman to create the CIA, under much pressure, and through the presentation of the Red menace as gleaned from the not-entirely-objective Gehlen Group and their Nazi members who were enjoying U.S. salaries and protection. Indeed, not only was Gehlen protected, but also Wernher von Braun, who handpicked Jewish slaves for use at his Peenemünde Mittelwerk rocket facility during the war; von Braun subsequently became the leading scientist for the U.S. space program, going so far as to design the boosters that put the first American astronauts on the moon. Similarly, while seemingly random Nazis were tried and executed at Nuremberg, those with truly useful knowledge in the eyes of U.S. foreign policy officials were conveniently released on strange case-by-case dismissals. Otto Skorzeny, who rescued Mussolini from the Gran Sasso hotel with his elite glider-borne troops, was never convicted of war-crimes, despite being Hitler’s personal bodyguard and despite his equipping SS commandos with captured U.S. uniforms and weapons to sow discord during the Battle of the Bulge. Incredibly, it was three SS soldiers masquerading as U.S. military police officers that broke him out of Darmstadt prison while he awaited his verdict. Maintaining it was always the United States that aided his escape, he quickly found new work after the war from the highest bidders. These included the fascist government of Peron’s Argentina, Franco’s Spain, Israel, and even the United States, which denies ever dealing with him, but whom Skorzeny, in a brief interview, claims hired him to remove Castro. This is actually supported by the CIA’s own records. In a memo from August of 1966, they noted,

    Otto Skorzeny, the former SS Colonel who rescued Mussolini, planned to kidnap Fidel Castro and take him to an undisclosed place, according to a feature article in the Sunday supplement to La Cronica published in Lima, Peru on August 7, 1966. The article says that the plan, known as “Project Tropical,” having the approval of Allen Dulles, head of CIA, was to have been carried out in 1961 but was vetoed by President Kennedy. (FOIA3B3: “Otto Skorzeny Planned to Kidnap Fidel Castro.”)

    In many ways, to figures in the American intelligence agencies, President Kennedy represented a radical departure from previous administrations. For instance, he favored figures like Indonesia’s Sukarno, and Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, both nationalists seeking financial and political independence from Western colonial and industrial policies. Therefore, in the eyes of those who championed the Dulles brothers, he was a traitor. That the CIA tried to overthrow Sukarno and actively participated in the successful assassination of Lumumba did not escape his attention, and from almost the first few months of his term, Kennedy came to discover the truly sinister machinations of an agency which ostensibly existed to gather intelligence against foreign threats, but which in reality had become a well-oiled coup d’état and assassination machine. Hoping that he would carry the torch from the Eisenhower administration’s support of overthrows against developing nations, policy planners in the CIA and other agencies were sorely disappointed by his rhetoric and actions in the face of defiant, outspoken liberation leaders, who they were quick to subsume under the communist umbrella which they saw unfolding across the world in their Manichean ideology of the post-McCarthy era. Kennedy stated in his March 1961 address outlining the Alliance for Progress words which, in the eyes of planners like Dulles, seemed reminiscent of the Kremlin: “We call for social change by free men, change in the spirit of Washington and Jefferson, of Bolivar and San Martin—not change which seeks to impose on men tyrannies which we cast out a century and a half ago. Our motto is what it has always been—progress yes, tyranny no—progreso sí, tiranía no!”


    IV

    As a number of authors—like Richard Mahoney—have shown, unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy understood the evils that colonialism and imperialism had wrought in the Third World. He also understood that the regimes that had been set up in the second Age of Colonialism were beginning to break apart during the fifties. A good example of this was his landmark 1957 speech in the Senate assailing France’s colonial war to maintain its regime in Algeria. In that speech Kennedy specifically targeted American aid to France to fight its imperial war against the Algerian natives. Because of that famous speech, he subsequently became the man to see in Washington for visiting African dignitaries.

    In early 1961, Kennedy had sent Arthur Schlesinger on a tour of Latin America. (Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 175-185) Schlesinger had a strong interest in the area since he had studied Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy. He admired the aim but felt it was limited as it emphasized the diplomatic and legal dimensions of American aid. Its only economic aspect was the Export-Import Bank. Later on, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also entered the picture. But as Schlesinger quickly grasped, the terms placed on loans from the IMF demanded too many restrictive measures, like deflation, which resulted in higher unemployment and reduced per capita income.

    The solution, as far as the Eisenhower/Nixon administration was concerned, was to supply mostly military aid—and then let private companies invest in these Latin American countries in hopes of creating economic development through foreign investment. The problem with this was that the IMF and Export-Import Bank would usually make loans only to nations that had what they considered stable governments. As Schlesinger pointed out, this usually meant right-wing governments. It was this kind of thinking that sent Vice President Nixon to Havana to praise the “competence and stability” of the completely corrupt Batista regime. (Schlesinger, p. 174) These debilitating IMF programs, as well as other private American loans, were well described in John Perkins’ 2004 book Confessions of an Economic Hit Man. There, Perkins observed that far too high a ratio of the loan packages ended up aiding the plutocracy that was already in power.

    As Schlesinger acutely observed, this paradigm ignored how the United States had actually developed as a business and commercial power. Congress had made very large investments in transportation and infrastructure, e.g., canals, highways, and railroads. Congress had also granted large amounts of property to states to create land grant colleges, many of which specialized in agricultural education. The federal government also encouraged the settling of the frontier through what were essentially land giveaways in states like Oklahoma. Therefore, historian Schlesinger concluded, the Eisenhower/Nixon model contradicted the American model. At the same time, the model was inadequate to the needs of these many developing countries. Or as one Latin American leader told Schlesinger, “The United States has given me just enough rope to hang myself.” (Schlesinger, p. 182) It therefore encouraged the image of America as an imperial power from the north. And it also gave an appeal to communists like Fidel Castro. As another leader told Kennedy’s representative:

    There is much poverty in my country. The communists have made themselves the advocates of the just demands of the workers and peasants. That makes it hard for us to oppose them without seeming to oppose what we regard as a just social program. (p. 183)

    Thus it was not just an ethical, and humanitarian dilemma, but also a practical one in terms of the Cold War. America had to be able to compete with the communists on the basic sustenance level in Latin America. If not, then we would encourage violent unrest leading to guerilla warfare. What made the New Frontier’s approach even more attractive was that when Schlesinger talked to most of the leaders in Latin America, they preferred aid from Kennedy more than they did Castro. In other words, the Eisenhower/Nixon approach squandered a welcome opportunity. (p. 185)

    Schlesinger returned in February and briefed the president. On March 13, 1961, the Alliance for Progress was formally announced in the East Room of the White House. Kennedy summoned all Latin American ambassadors to the proceedings, and had them broadcast in Spanish, Portugese, French and English through Voice of America. The president then sent a request to Congress for funding. The basic idea was that aid money would now come from the Treasury Department, bypassing the punitive restrictions of the IMF, Export-Import Bank and private loans. Kennedy declared that he wanted the Alliance to transform the Western Hemisphere “into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts.” (Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 601)

    Five months later, Kennedy arranged for a meeting in Punta Del Este, Uruguay. The president sent Schlesinger, Latin American specialist Richard Goodwin, Adolf Berle (a veteran of the Good Neighbor Policy), United Nations representative Adlai Stevenson, Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon and many foreign aid officers. (Although Dillon was a Republican, he understood Kennedy’s strategy to counter Castro’s appeal.) The Punta del Este concept was similar to a giant business seminar at which Americans were supposed to brainstorm with Latin Americans to write up programs and proposals to advance economic development. Nothing like it had ever occurred before in South America. After the meeting, Kennedy was startled by the scope of the problems he was facing. He had originally conceived a ten-year plan. But now he was skeptical that the problems could be solved in a decade, even with his planned 20 billion dollar investment from the American treasury. (Sorenson, p. 602)

    As Ted Sorenson noted, one of the obstructions Kennedy ran into was the resistance of the landed aristocracy that was already in power. They were quite influential in all facets of the status quo, e.g., the newspapers and the military. They did not want to alter that status quo with land grants, tax reform, or increased wages. And Kennedy did not envision the Alliance as just a funding program. He also wanted it to be a reform program, one that would extend not just economic benefits but political rights. (p. 602) As he expressed with one of his most famous adages, “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.” (p. 602)

    But in spite of all the obstacles, Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress managed to build housing projects, schools, create individually owned farms, and provide food rations for the hungry. And he got many letters from former street urchins who now, for the first time, had a new home to live in. (p. 604)

    Beyond these goals, Kennedy was planning on putting structures in place that would guarantee long range and self-sustaining reform. He was also constructing central planning agencies, technical assistance programs, progressive tax structures, and encouraging the submission of detailed development plans to the Organization of American States. And he did experience some success. In its first year, aid to Latin America tripled. In two years, ten of the nineteen member nations hit their targeted growth rates. (p. 604) One of which was a 2.5% increase in per capita income.

    Like many programs Kennedy had launched, once he was killed in Dallas, the CIA and President Johnson at first neutralized it, and then as Johnson gave way to President Nixon, it was reversed. As every commentator on the Alliance for Progress has pointed out, when Johnson took office, this marked the ascendancy of Thomas Mann in Latin American affairs. Mann, the ambassador to Mexico under Kennedy, like others in the State Department, had been busy in the wake of his assassination trying to put together Oswald as part of a Cuban conspiracy. Mann and Johnson had long been friends. And, like Johnson, Mann was a conservative in his foreign policy views. Johnson quickly made Mann his de facto chief officer in Latin America. Within 18 months, the new president gave Mann three titles in the area, including the directorship of the Alliance. This was significant for one simple reason. Mann had opposed such an aid program for the area as far back as 1959. (Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, p. 156) In other words, while Johnson kept up the Kennedy rhetoric about the Alliance for Progress, Mann was the perfect figure in the bureaucracy to start to extinguish the program. As LBJ speechwriter Harry McPherson once said about Kennedy’s eloquent opening address back in March of 1961 in the East Room, it was a “lot of crap”. (p. 156)

    Mann did two things to start to stamp out the program. First, the overall allotment was greatly reduced for fiscal years 1967-69. Second, what was left was mainly directed to military, not economic, aid. The excuse for this was the increasing massive expenditures going to Indochina. (p. 156) These future planned reductions were accompanied by a speech Mann made in March of 1964, less than four months after Kennedy’s assassination. This address was given to Mann’s Latin American employees in what was supposed to be an off-the-record conference. In the speech, he made no reference at all to the Alliance for Progress. Nor did he address any need for structural changes. What he did point out was the need to spur economic growth while maintaining the status quo. He went as far as to say “this meant quickly recognizing military regimes that overthrew civilian governments” (p. 157) Thus, in short order, two of Kennedy’s aims for the Alliance were stopped cold: encouraging wider democratic participation, and expanding economic opportunity.

    The further erosion of the Alliance was continued the next year in the Dominican Republic. President Kennedy was opposed to the military coup that had expelled the elected president Juan Bosch. Bosch had been elected in December of 1962 in what many declared the first free election in that country’s history. He immediately announced both economic and political reforms in keeping with the Alliance for Progress aims. But he was overthrown in a military coup in September of 1963. As Donald Gibson has described in his book Battling Wall Street, Kennedy took the lead in beginning a hemisphere-wide condemnation and economic boycott of the new regime in order to help Bosch regain power. At the time of his assassination, Kennedy’s actions were picking up steam. (Gibson, pp. 78-79)

    Bosch went into exile in Puerto Rico. While there he arranged for his backers to slowly gain strength in hopes of returning to power. This very likely was about to happen in 1965. But unlike Kennedy, Johnson and Mann were opposed to Bosch. As with Allen Dulles’ view of Arbenz, they saw him as another Castro: a second communist dictatorship in the Caribbean. With the help of the CIA, including Bernardo De Torres, a chief suspect in the JFK assassination, they infiltrated Bosch’s forces, and created a huge propaganda campaign that attributed atrocities to his followers. (James DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, Second Edition, p. 228) This set the stage for the landing of about 30,000 Marines in April of 1965 in order to maintain control and prevent Bosch from taking power. In the name of a souped up and false charge of anti-communism (Bosch was not a communist), Johnson had violated the nonintervention pledge the USA had made when it joined the OAS in 1948. This was consistent with what he felt about that body since he once said it “… couldn’t pour piss out of a boot if the instructions were written on the heel.” (LaFeber, p. 158) Johnson’s invasion of the Dominican Republic told members of the OAS that the Alliance for Progress was all but buried.

    In 1969, President Nixon presided over the last rites. He sent Nelson Rockefeller on a tour similar to Schlesinger’s for Kennedy in 1961. Except Rockefeller came back with a quite different message. He wrote in his report that there was really little America could do in the area and he said that the USA should drastically cut back on its aid programs. (Jeffrey Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, pp. 181-88) This message was similar to Patrick Moynihan’s infamous memo to Nixon in January of 1970 about the plight of African Americans; his recommended solution was to begin a period of “benign neglect”.

    But as author John Bohrer points out in his book The Revolution of Robert Kennedy, it really had entered that phase four years earlier. When Senator Robert Kennedy was preparing for a journey to several countries in South America, he was briefed by the State Department. After listening to their instructions, he replied it looked to him as if what the Alliance for Progress had come down to was that you can “abolish political parties and close down the Congress and take away the basic freedoms of the people … and you’ll get a lot of our money. But if you mess around with an American oil company, we’ll cut you off without a penny. Is that it?” His briefer said that that was about the size of it. As he walked out RFK told an assistant, “It sounds like we’re working for United Fruit again.” (Bohrer, p. 231)

    President Kennedy’s ideas for a more peaceful world were almost universally reversed after his death, the Alliance for Progress being one that has been little noticed by anyone who is not a foreign policy aficionado. But not only did President Kennedy wish to join in a collaborative effort with the Soviet Union to reach the moon; he saw in the concept of mutually assured nuclear destruction a horrifying and unnecessary scenario, going so far as to ratify the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in August of 1963 with Nikita Khrushchev, which essentially took the first major step to wind down the specter of atomic holocaust. Similarly, Kennedy had asked Schlesinger to draw up a written plan to greatly decrease the covert action wing of the CIA, and even restructure it to allow transparency and Congressional oversight. (David Talbot, The Devil’s Chessboard, p. 439)

    The legacy of this brief moment in American history has largely been relegated to the cult of Kennedy’s personality: his playboy image, his charisma, and his superficial sheen. And yet, at least to my knowledge, no president had come so close as to actually delivering on the promises of the United States’ purported mission of fostering peace across the world. There is substantial evidence for his withdrawal plan from Vietnam, which, if he had lived, could have prevented one of the greatest humanitarian crises in 20th-Century history, not to mention preserved the reputation of the world’s leading superpower. In addition, with his assassination came a full retrenchment of the intelligence-industrial complex, whose actions and efforts basically ran unchecked until the cursory reviews of Congress in the mid-to-late 1970s in the wake of Watergate. And with Martin Luther King’s and Robert Kennedy’s assassinations only months apart in 1968, it is safe to say that all of the major players for human progress and actual co-operation among nations and among those at home had been removed. Symbolically, the Sixties ended that hot night in June of 1968 at the Ambassador Hotel, a tragic evening which served as a somber bookend to the brief window of hope that had opened in the election of 1960 for a generation genuinely seeking change.

  • The Vietnam War and the Destruction of JFK’s Foreign Policy (Part 2)


    Part 1


    Part 2: 1963-1975

     

    What happens next, of course, is that Johnson essentially passes NSAM 273 which had been drafted for JFK at his Honolulu conference at which Kennedy said, “When these guys get back, we’re going to have a long discussion about how the heck we ever got into Vietnam.” LBJ rewrites this and he orders three important revisions in the rough draft that McGeorge Bundy had written. One of them was that they would be able to use American naval equipment to raid the north coast of Vietnam and the other two were to make it easier to do special forces cross-border operations into Cambodia and Laos.

    In other words, what you were going to have now was the beginning of the Gulf of Tonkin incident because South Vietnam didn’t have any navy. South Vietnam itself couldn’t do those raids coupled with the destroyer communications missions, what they called the DESOTO patrols, which is going to result in the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

    Second of all, this now spreads the war across the borders into Laos and Cambodia which Kennedy really didn’t want to do. He wanted to keep [Cambodian Prince] Sihanouk in Cambodia and he wanted to try and keep Laos neutral.

    If you can believe it, and by now you can, Burns and Novick don’t mention NSAM 273 and how it altered Kennedy’s policies. After the election, when Johnson then is elected president in a landslide in which he campaigned essentially on the idea that we’re not going to send American boys to fight a war that Asian boys should, he uses this incident in the Tonkin Gulf as a war declaration.

    I’m going to go with that just briefly because I think everybody listening to this understands what the Tonkin Gulf incident was. These patrols that I mentioned, these raids by the South Vietnamese army aboard these American sponsored patrol ships, they were coupled with American destroyers decked out with high-tech communications equipment to find radar spots and communication spots along the North Coast of Vietnam off the Tonkin Gulf. They were clearly … even George Ball who worked for Johnson in the State Department, and even McGeorge Bundy, later said that they were designed as provocations.

    When the North Vietnamese went ahead and counter attacked the raids, they actually put one machine gun bullet into one of the destroyer’s hulls then, of course, there was a so-called second attack, which never really happened. That was enough pretext for Johnson to use as a way to attack the North which is, by the way, what he wanted to do since March of 1964 when he signed NSAM 288, which more or less reversed NSAM 263 and which mapped out certain targets that we would use. He sends these airplane jet sorties over North Vietnam, bombing petroleum refineries and also navy shipyards. I think it was something like at least 65 sorties. Two guys were shot down, one was killed, one was taken prisoner. That signaled to Hanoi that Johnson planned to go to war in Vietnam.

    Giap actually admitted towards the end of his life, through his son, that he understood Kennedy was withdrawing at the end of 1963. (https://kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/general-giap-knew) This new signal told the North to start planning for a war because Johnson’s attitude was completely different.

    And that, of course, is what happened. Once Johnson won the landslide election, then very shortly after that he began to militarize this, by the way, I should say over Bobby Kennedy’s protests.

    There’s a really nice book out by a guy named John Bohrer called The Revolution of Robert Kennedy, where for the first time that I know of, it’s revealed that Bobby Kennedy did not agree with what Johnson was doing, and he did not agree as early as 1964. Everybody says it’s 1967, but that was only when Bobby Kennedy, this is in public; privately, he was trying to discourage Johnson from militarizing the war. That’s what Johnson’s intent was.

    In early 1965, he begins to send all kinds of bombing planes into South Vietnam. I think about 90 some bombers come over from Thailand. Of course, if you’re going to put all these bomber planes in there, the Viet Cong are going to raid them – which they did. That was the excuse for sending in the first American combat troops.

    I think there was something like 5,000 who went ashore at Da Nang in March of 1965 and then that increased amazingly by the end of the year if you can believe it, by the end of 1965 there’s 175,000 combat troops in the country. Amazing escalation.

    Operation Rolling Thunder which was, like I said, the biggest bombing campaign the world had ever seen. You got to wonder what the hell is there to bomb? The reason you bombed Germany or Japan was because there was an industrial base that supplied the war machines of both countries; but how the heck can you bomb rice fields and palm trees? There really wasn’t a heck of a lot of industrial base in North Vietnam to bomb, or in South Vietnam. Of course you ended up killing a heck of a lot of civilians.

    By the way, I should add that when I did some research on this, the numbers I found go way beyond what the Defense Department admitted. I found a study that was made by a British medical group that actually went to Vietnam today and they went ahead and they interviewed, they went door to door, which is what you’re supposed to do with epidemiological work on this. You want to actually try and talk to people in the field. When they asked them, “How many members of your family did you lose when it was all over?” meaning to anything, not just bombing but also stepping on mines and things like that, they came to the rather astonishing figure – these revised figures – that between both the military casualties and the civilian casualties that the number is 4 million, which is amazing in a country of 35 million people. Which means that about one-tenth of the population was killed during this crazy, senseless, nutty war.

    Let me add that this is one of the reasons Kennedy did not want to send combat troops in because he said, “How do you fight an enemy that is both everywhere and nowhere and at the same time has the support of the people? How do you send American combat troops in to fight that kind of a war?”

    Johnson and Westmoreland, who was the guy who … Westmoreland was the general that Johnson chose to be the commanding officer in Vietnam; they didn’t seem to understand that. They never came to a kind of tactical and strategic decision about how to fight the war except to try and overpower the enemy with this terrific artillery fire and air power, and it didn’t work.

    All it did was essentially kill a lot of civilians, not win over the population for us, in fact it did the opposite; and it bombed to smithereens the beautiful ecology of that country. This went on: ’65, ’66, and ’67. By this time, the United States had something like 525,000 combat troops in country. By the way, when I say that figure, once Johnson made his decision to escalate, he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff: he said “Tell me how many men it’s going to take and how long to win this war?” And they actually told him they said 500,000 men, five to ten years to do it.

    Johnson finally hit the 500,000 number in 1967, 1968, around that time; 500,000 combat troops in the country and it still didn’t work. The horrible thing of course is that as it didn’t work, the American army begin to collapse, began to fall apart internally, because they knew there really wasn’t any plan to win the war.

    Colonel Robert Heinl wrote a wonderful article in which he described this, called Collapse of the Armed Forces in Indochina. (https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/Vietnam/heinl.html) He reported all the drug abuse, because in addition to not being able to win the war, the United States got involved through the CIA, Air America, in this Golden Triangle Opium Trade in which President Thieu knew about it and Vice-president Ky was a part of it. By the way, Burns and Novick don’t mention that involvement at all.

    What happened is that many of these soldiers either begin to smoke pot or do heroin and then it got to be a business. It began to be refined because you refine opium into heroin and then it began to be shipped to Marseille a great French seaport on the Mediterranean, and then some of it got into the United States. There had been reports that some of it came in in the body bags of dead American soldiers. I’m not positive that happened, but I’ve seen reports that it happened. There was a report that Hoover talked about it in one of his memos but I’ve never actually seen the memo. That’s how bad this thing got as the American army began to collapse. And then of course began what the military termed “fragging”.

    As the American soldiers begin to see that there was no way to win this war, they began to do two things. They began to take it out on the civilian population by slaughtering many unarmed civilians; and then also by taking it out on their commanding officers. If they got a mission message the night before that they knew was hopeless, instead of going through with the mission, they would just go ahead and toss a grenade in the commanding officer’s cabin.

    There were numerous … Heinl in his article said that … I think it’s from 1969 to 1971. There were well over 200 instances of that happening in Vietnam. You can’t run an army, I don’t have to tell anybody – even people who want to defend this war to this day and there’s still some people who do – that you can’t run an army like that. You can’t run an army, if you got that many people mutinying.

    The American army began to collapse, and then, of course, you have the Tet Offensive. The Tet Offensive took place at the beginning of 1968 and at the time when Johnson and Westmoreland were saying that there’s light at the end of the tunnel. Well, the massive size and scope of the Tet Offensive, in which the Viet Cong raided almost every major city in South Vietnam, in which they actually had Viet Cong inside the American Embassy in Saigon; and there was a famous picture, and Burns and Novick didn’t show this picture. There’s a famous picture of an American diplomat shooting a handgun at a Viet Cong rebel running through the courtyard. That picture got published in Life Magazine.

    Then the American people said “We can’t even defend our own American Embassy in Saigon?” Like I said, these raids took place all throughout South Vietnam, from the northern part to the southern part. That showed the American public that we weren’t winning the war, and Johnson refused to admit this.

    At a famous meeting after the Tet Offensive, he called in his advisors and he called in some elder statesmen like Bob Lovett and Dean Acheson. He brought in the Pentagon to try and explain how United States had not lost Tet; we actually won: because we killed so many more of the enemy than they killed of us. And Acheson walked out. When Johnson called him up later and said: Why did you walk out, Dean? Acheson said something like: I’m not going to listen to any of this crap anymore. I’m not going to listen to some commissioned officer coming over and giving me the message that Pentagon wants to deliver. I actually want to see the raw reports.

    That began to turn Johnson around. A couple of weeks later he sent a new Secretary of Defense, because McNamara had quit by now. One by one all the Kennedy people quit; Pierre Salinger, John McCone, McGeorge Bundy, George Ball, and then McNamara. One by one they all left. He appointed his own Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford. He went over to the Pentagon and he talked about this on more than one occasion. He said words to the effect: When I started these interviews I was a hawk; after two weeks of asking these guys questions based on the documents they gave me, I realized that I had made a terrible mistake. Today, I have no problem saying that I could not have been more wrong about Vietnam.

    At the end of that two-week review, he went back to Johnson and he said, “There’s no way we’re going to win this war. My best advice to you is to get out of this thing.” That’s when Johnson went on TV, I think it was the end of March 1968, and he shocked the country and he said he was not going to run again, as he was going to devote the rest of his time to trying to get a peace treaty in Vietnam.

    OHH:

    ’68 is such an important year. Can you just give us a little chronology of the assassinations, the riots in Chicago, and these other things you were talking about?

    James DiEugenio:

    1968 is one of the most … I mean to call it pivotal doesn’t do it justice. It’s really epochal because you had so many key events happening in that one year that there’s no way around it: Individually they changed the shape of history. Put it together, they completely shifted history around.

    In the beginning of 1968, of course we had the Tet Offensive. That leads to Johnson going on the air and saying he’s not going to run again, which is a shock to everybody. Then a week later, you had the assassination of Martin Luther King in Memphis, just a week later. Then you had McCarthy and Bobby Kennedy both running for president and slowly but surely Bobby Kennedy takes a lead. It looks like he’s going to win the nomination because he won this great victory in California. Then that night, which I think is almost exactly one month after … no, no, excuse me, two months after King is assassinated, then Bobby Kennedy is assassinated.

    In many ways, in many ways, anybody who studies history should be able to tell you this: With the death of Bobby Kennedy you really, I don’t think we’re exaggerating this at all, you really had the death of the 60s. That was it. With him went all the hopes and dreams and the aspirations, whether well-founded or not, of that whole generation of people who really wanted to see the promises of the New Frontier, the promises of the civil rights movement, the promises of a new approach to foreign policy, the promises of a more equitable country. That was over with his death and that’s what made it so shocking.

    That led to the Chicago Convention. At that convention, you essentially had what was the RFK/King wing of the Democratic Party led by all those young people and people of color protesting against the Richard Daley/Lyndon Johnson wing of the Democratic Party. You had that split that was dramatized by the violence which I think most people who study that, that was really a planned attack by Daley who wanted to put down this uprising that he saw.

    It was really kind of a street battle which the networks really didn’t do a heck of a good job broadcasting. But there had been a lot of private pictures taken of what those cops were doing to those kids. It was really brutal. It leaked over to the convention where you had Abraham Ribicoff, a Kennedy guy, looking right at Daley and saying, “If George McGovern won this thing” – because McGovern was the guy they put up at the last minute in place of Bobby Kennedy to represent the Robert Kennedy wing of the party—“We wouldn’t have this Gestapo tactics in the streets of Chicago.”

    You can see Daley, you can read his lips when he says “F – – K. You”; and the Democratic Party splintered apart at that convention. Then of course, you had Nixon … and I’ve said this more than once, Nixon essentially hijacked Johnson’s peace plan. Because he began to perceive this as a way that Johnson was going to become the peace president and win the election for Hubert Humphrey, his vice president who, after Kennedy was killed, won the nomination in Chicago.

    He sabotaged it, quite literally, there’s no other way around this. The evidence today is overwhelming that he sabotaged the peace talks that Johnson was trying to sponsor by having an emissary, Madame Chennault, the wife of Claire Chennault, and Bui Diem who was President Thieu’s Ambassador in Washington. They told President Thieu not to cooperate with Johnson’s peace plan. If they held out, they would get a better deal from Nixon.

    What’s important to remember about that is you have to really understand how treacherous Nixon was. I don’t think that the Burns-Novick special got that close to it. At that time Nixon is having Chennault and Diem report to John Mitchell, who’s going to be his attorney general, and who was his campaign manager. Nixon knows about the meeting of Lovett and Acheson and Clark Clifford in Washington that took place in January and February. He tells people working on his speeches … literally he says, because he has heard about that meeting and he says: We know the war can’t be won, but we can’t let on to that. We have to make like it can be won to have more leverage in the campaign.

    Here’s a guy who knows that the Vietnam War was lost, who sabotages Johnson’s attempt to end it for purely political purposes, and then once he becomes president due to this … because, see, on the eve of the election, I think four or five days before the election, President Thieu made a 27-minute speech – and by the way, Burns and Novick don’t tell you this either – he made a 27-minute speech in Saigon that was carried by all three networks. Back in those days you had ABC, NBC, and CBS, and if you had those three, everybody in the country is watching it because that’s all there was except for PBS which had a very small audience.

    They all televised Thieu’s speech, in which he made it clear that he was not going to cooperate with Johnson’s plan because he perceived this as a sell-out to South Vietnam. Even people who worked for Nixon said that that speech won the election for him because Humphrey was coming on very strong in October and that speech put the stop to Humphrey’s rally.

    That’s what happened in 1968 and that’s how Nixon became president.

    It was an unbelievable, mind-boggling year and it all happened in the space of a matter of months. That’s what put Richard Nixon in the White House. It’s a bloody shame what happened as a result of that because Nixon and Kissinger passed a paper around the first weeks they were in the White House, it’s called NSSM1, which means National Security Study Memorandum. They wanted to know what people thought about in the foreign policy apparatus, what people thought about the Vietnam War.

    Johnson had replaced Westmoreland with Creighton Abrams at this time. Even Creighton Abrams, in his response, said words to the effect that: in my opinion you cannot win a military victory. All you have is a stalemate there.

    In other words, knowing that the best he could do was get a long stalemate and knowing the American people will never stand for that, Nixon begins to expand the air war into Laos and Cambodia. For political purposes, he then began to draw down the number of troops there.

    In other words, you were doing a balancing act. You were getting out American combat troops, trying to turn the war over to South Vietnam; and at the same time you’re increasing and expanding the focus of the air war. What that did, of course, is it destabilized Cambodia and Laos.

    I don’t have to tell about it, what happened in Cambodia, because once the air war began to rain down, it began to help the Chinese Marxist rebels led by Pol Pot. I shouldn’t say that because most people, if you try and classify who Pol Pot was, nobody really knows what the heck he was. He is seen to be like an agrarian revolutionary who wanted to empty whole cities out and bring them to the countryside in a crazy, restructuring of society.

    As the bombing campaign picked up, Pol Pot’s forces strengthened. When Sihanouk brought in his Prime Minister Lon Nol, a military guy, when he went on vacation, Lon Nol staged a coup. Of course, Lon Nol encouraged Nixon because he was keeping what they were doing, and the country got destabilized even more and the bombing went inland. What happened, of course, was this built up Pol Pot’s forces until he was able to lay siege to Lon Nol’s new government, a horrible, horrible situation that resulted.

    This went on, this expansion of the war, Nixon knowing that he really can’t win but trying to find a way to get the best agreement he can, and at the same time he’s polarizing and deceiving the public in America. He’s going to sell out President Thieu because once he realizes that he can’t win the war, he also knows he has to get out before the election or else people are going to ask him … rather, excuse me, he has to arrange to have the defeat come after the election or people are going to say, “You kept us here for four years for nothing.” He begins to create something called “the decent interval”.

    The decent interval is something that both Nixon and Kissinger lied about in both their books; in Nixon’s book, No More Vietnams and Kissinger’s book, The White House Years. They denied that this thing existed, but it did exist. In fact, Kissinger even wrote about it in his notebooks he took over to China and he talked about it with Zhou Enlai. And Zhou Enlai communicated it to North Vietnam.

    The decent interval was this concept: Saigon could fall but it had to fall after the American troops were gone, because then we could blame it on President Thieu and the South Vietnamese army, and it wouldn’t be blamed on us.

    That’s how treacherous these guys were. That’s how bad these guys were. The countless tons of bombs … by the way, Nixon dropped more bombs in Indochina than Johnson did, and it was by of wide margin, just so he could ensure that he’d win the 1972 election and humiliate … these guys hated what they perceived as a liberal media and leftist intellectuals, and so that’s what they were doing. That’s what they were doing. That’s what they did it for. That’s what it went on for.

    What happens, of course, is that there is the Easter Offensive in the spring of ’72 that undoubtedly would have taken the country over at that time. It was a massive tank attack from the north, but then Nixon and Kissinger called in the American Air Force from as far away as Thailand and that stopped the Easter Offensive.

    Then, when Nixon thought he had a peace agreement in the fall of 1972 and Kissinger brought the agreement back to President Thieu, and President Theiu went into a rage because he looked at it and it only mentioned three countries in Indochina; Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. In other words, Nixon and Kissinger were essentially saying: We know that it’s all over and we know that the country is going to be united again with the north and you’re not going to be a part of it. Thieu flew into a rage and Kissinger couldn’t handle him. He let him write out a list of demands and he brought the demands back to Le Duc Tho, who was the negotiator in Paris, with Kissinger.

    It was a list of 60 demands. Le Duc Tho says: Look, I can’t settle every one of these in one-on-one with you. I got to take them back to Hanoi and I have to discuss a few of them with the Politburo there. Kissinger didn’t want to admit that he wasn’t making any headway because Nixon had already relieved Kissinger of his duties with Thieu, and he appointed Alexander Haig to run that aspect. Kissinger said that the North Vietnamese were being deliberately belligerent, and so Nixon ordered the Christmas Bombing which went on for something like 13 days. The North was so outraged by this…

    There is a mythology on what people, like the military, that says somehow that it was the Christmas Bombing that brought Le Duc Tho back to the negotiating table. First of all, Le Duc Tho was going to return to the negotiating table anyway. What Nixon did that for was to try and show President Thieu that he would use American military power if there were any violations of the agreement. That’s what that was for. Then, Hanoi got so angry because they didn’t want to return to the negotiating table. Nixon had to ask them to come back. They didn’t want to come back. The Chinese had to convince them to go back. China basically said: Look, Nixon has lost something like 12 points in his approval ratings because of that bombing. He is in deep trouble over this Watergate thing, which is not going to go away. All you have to do is wait them out and you can take the whole country because they’re going to have to leave.

    Also, Congress has start cutting funding for the war.

    After the shootings at Kent State and Jackson State, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was repealed, and now the liberals in Congress and even some Republicans were so sick of this thing that they started to cut off the funding for the war. The Peace Movement accomplished that, which of course Burns and Novick don’t tell you that in their documentary; but they did achieve that. A very significant achievement.

    So Le Duc Tho went back to Paris and the agreements were signed in January of 1973. Nixon’s big thing was always peace with honor. Well, first of all, there was no peace and there was no honor. The fighting continued, each side trying to get an advantage. There was nothing honorable about it because polarizing the country and selling out your ally at the same time, there’s no honor in doing that.

    Then, of course, in 1975 Nixon is finally out of office due to the Watergate Scandal like the Chinese predicted. Kissinger is running the evacuation of South Vietnam, and everybody remembers the famous image of the American helicopter at the top of … some people say it’s the American Embassy but actually I think it’s a CIA station building. That helicopter there with all the Vietnamese trying to get on the helicopter. Some of them didn’t get on. The United States left. President Jerry Ford and Kissinger left about 500 people there.

    That’s the image that everybody remembers about America leaving Vietnam. That night, Kissinger got on the phone with an old friend of his from academic circles when he was at Harvard and said: Thank God it’s all over. We should have never been there. In other words, that’s what he really thought. That’s what Kennedy was saying – we should have never had American combat troops there, we should have never had this huge military mission there.

    It always amazed me that Nixon and Kissinger were looked up to as these foreign policy mavens. When, in fact, they were nothing but dyed-in-the-wool Cold Warriors, who manipulated the Cold War for political purposes.

    To show you how stupid Nixon and Kissinger were, in the ’80s when Gorbachev took over the Soviet Union, after he met with Reagan … Reagan really liked him. He thought this guy is a real reformer. Margaret Thatcher, the right-wing nut from England actually said we can work with Mr. Gorbachev. Reagan called in Nixon and he then called in Kissinger and he told them: I think I can really work with this guy. I don’t think he’s one of those old hard line communist apparatchiks. Nixon didn’t believe it. He told him, “Yes he is. That’s how he got the power.” And then he told, as he was leaving, he told Reagan’s assistants: “Whatever you do, don’t leave Reagan in the same room with Gorbachev alone.”

    Kissinger said the same thing, How can you be that wrong about two important things, like the Vietnam War and that great moment in history which Reagan partly bungled because of the advice from those two guys? It has always puzzled me how Nixon and Kissinger, how the mainstream media made them out to be these foreign policy gurus when in fact they were nothing except a dressed up John Foster Dulles.

    I’ll take Kennedy any day of the week.

    OHH:

    Right. Just from what happened in Vietnam, and just because you brought up Pol Pot. Eventually it was the Vietnamese themselves that had to go get rid of Pol Pot because of what he had done.

    James DiEugenio:

    Correct. See, that’s something that Burns and Novick don’t even touch on. The horrible genocide that took place in Cambodia because of the Nixon-Kissinger bombing campaign. When Pol Pot took over, God knows … I usually go by a million people but if you go ahead and find that … because there was this investigation I think a few years ago, this long series of trials and investigations that went on. They actually put the figure much higher than that. They actually put the figure at about two million that perished by Pol Pot in Cambodia.

    And you’re exactly right. It got so horrible in Cambodia that the North Vietnamese had to go in, and it was they that overturned the Pol Pot tyranny, not us.

    OHH:

    Right. When you think about what you just said with … you have Cambodia, two million people; you have Vietnam, four million people I don’t think you can take out from this whole thing the Indonesian massacres of 1965 because it’s obvious at the whole domino theory, so you’re talking about seven million people in the course of 20 years, whatever it was.

    James DiEugenio:

    No, that all happened. The vast amount of casualties in Vietnam all happened from about 1966 onward and you had the overthrow of Sukarno in ’65, right? In the period of about a decade, you had the … going by the latest figures, the latest figures that I could find, when you add in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia. What did you say, seven million?

    OHH:

    Just roughly from what you had said earlier…

    James DiEugenio:

    Yeah, that’s what I would say. I would say a rough estimate would be about seven million. That might be wrong, that might be too high, it might be too low but it’s around, from the latest figures I could find, the most accurate figures I could find, it’s about seven million.

    At the very least, it’s five and a half million. And all because of the reversals of Kennedy’s policies in both Indochina and Indonesia. Because Kennedy, as people who read my website and keep up on Greg Poulgrain’s work, the wonderful scholar on Indonesia from Australia, Kennedy was backing Sukarno all the way to the end. I’m talking 1963, and he planned on visiting Indonesia in 1964.

    Kennedy went as far as to arrange nationalization deals for Sukarno, because he thought Sukarno was getting screwed by these big petroleum companies. He actually got on the phone and relayed his message: I want a much more generous split to go to Indonesia. They wanted 90/10 in favor of the company. Kennedy insisted 60/40 in the favor of the Indonesian government.

    That was the whole difference because we know what happened in Indonesia after. Under Johnson, it just became a pig out in which tens of thousands of people, hundreds of thousands of people were slaughtered and Suharto gave the government over to the big corporations, most of them being Americans.

    OHH:

    Let’s end on this. I want to put Kennedy’s policies in perspective a little bit. Do you feel that there’s any resemblance between his idea of what America’s foreign policy should be and what FDR’s vision for the post-war world should have been?

    James DiEugenio:

    I think they’re pretty similar when I look at this. When I see what FDR’s foreign policy was and what he wanted to do with the Soviet Union and what he wanted to do in the third world. I think they’re pretty much similar.

    Roosevelt wanted to keep that grand alliance together after the war: that is between United States, England, and the Soviet Union. He felt he could control Stalin at least in the international field and so he wanted to keep that together after the war. He tried to understand the Soviet Union’s insecurity about Eastern Europe. Now in the third world, Roosevelt did not want any more of the colonialism, this brutal colonialism that actually went in and made the native people even worse off than they were before the colonial state took over. He actually said that to one of his advisors: We can’t tolerate a situation in which the native people are in worse conditions after the Europeans come in than they were before.

    Those two things I think are pretty similar to what Kennedy’s ideas were, certainly by 1963. In my opinion, what you had here is you had Kennedy trying to go ahead and turn back American foreign policy by rebelling against what the Dulles Brothers had done and restoring it back to Roosevelt. Then what you have when Johnson and then Nixon took over, you had essentially the overthrow of Kennedy’s reform policy and you went back to what the Dulles Brothers were.

    By the way, let me add one I’m pretty sure about, I’m right about this. At one time before the Burns-Novick series came on, I was going to do a very long two-part essay for kennedysandking,com, and this was going to be my central idea. I was going to go ahead and demonstrate, because most authors all they do is compare Kennedy with Johnson: what did Johnson do to Kennedy’s foreign policy? I was going to take it all the way through Nixon and Kissinger. And I was going to do it in four central areas: Vietnam, Pakistan and India, Indonesia and the Middle East. I actually spent a lot of time on this. I spent about four months doing research on it.

    Then, when the Burns-Novick thing came on I said, “Well, I can do it this way. I can do it with just focusing on this and this is going to be a big media event so more people will probably read this if I just focus it on Vietnam”, but I did do the preliminary research and so I’m pretty sure that I’m right about this. That was the historical contour: Kennedy was going back to Roosevelt and then after Kennedy was assassinated, Johnson and Nixon went back to Dulles. They repealed almost all the good things that Kennedy had done, and they went back to more or less a Dulles-Eisenhower paradigm.

    To complete that thought – to show you how bad it got – once Nixon left office Jerry Ford, Mr. Warren Commission cover-up, took over. He brought in Don Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney. Those guys thought that Kissinger was too moderate, if you can believe it. They thought he was too moderate. That was the historical beginning of the Neocon movement, the Neoconservative movement that eventually swept through Washington. That was the complete elimination and destruction of whatever was left of Kennedy’s foreign policy once those guys took power. Because we saw what happened first with the Reagan administration and then with both the Bushes. They did so much damage to the American image abroad that … I don’t really honestly … I don’t think you can even salvage it anymore. In my opinion that’s what happened.

    Kennedy’s Foreign Policy today is essentially in a museum.

    OHH:

    Right.

    James DiEugenio:

    It’s dead and buried and you can study it for historical purposes. But that series of events from Johnson to Nixon to Ford spelled the end of that kind of view of American foreign policy throughout the world. It’s like that book that Kennedy liked so much, The Ugly American. Did you know that? That he was a big fan of that book?

    OHH:

    No, no.

    James DiEugenio:

    It was a classic back then. It was trying to show how misguided American foreign policy was, and they made a movie out of it with Marlon Brando. It was how misguided American foreign policy was in the Third World. Kennedy liked it so much he bought a hundred copies and he gave it to everybody else in the Senate, so they could read it so they would understand, in a fictional form, what was happening.

    That view that America could not be a controller, we had to let those people in the Third World have a degree of freedom and democracy for themselves; that we we’re going to lose them to either fascism or communism. That was all dead and buried then, and that’s what happened. I sincerely believe that that was the case from the work I did on this.

    OHH:

    Can you give a list of books if people want to dig more into this issue?

    James DiEugenio:

    To find out about Kennedy’s foreign policy?

    OHH:

    Yeah.

    James DiEugenio:

    Okay. A really good one I believe is [by] Robert Rakove and it’s called Kennedy Johnson, and the Nonaligned World;

    [A second one is:] Betting on the Africans by Philip E. Muehlenbeck.

    The third one is The Incubus of Intervention by Greg Poulgrain.

    The last one is JFK: Ordeal in Africa by Richard Mahoney.

    OHH:

    Is there anything you want to add, tag on at the end here?

    James DiEugenio:

    No. I think we did a pretty good job covering it. There’s a lot of information in this interview that’s not in those essays, so I think we did a pretty good job on it and I got to actually be more explicit about what my original message was going to be.

    OHH:

    Great. You’re such a wealth of knowledge so it’s always great to hear you go over all these things. Let me … is that Colby interview, is that in the new JFK releases?

    James DiEugenio:

    Yes.

    OHH:

    Great. I’ll dig that up at some links on there. Thanks for talking once again, and I really appreciate you taking the time.

    James DiEugenio:

    Okay.


    This interview was edited for grammar, flow and factual accuracy.