Tag: CIA

  • Midnight in the Congo: The Assassination of Lumumba and the Mysterious Death of Dag Hammarskjold


    From the March-April, 1999 issue (Vol. 6 No. 3) of Probe


    “In Elizabethville, I do not think there was anyone there who believed that his death was as accident.” – U.N. Representative Conor O’Brien on the death of U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold

    “A lot has not been told.” – Unnamed U.N. official, commenting on same


    The CIA has long since acknowledged responsibility for plotting the murder of Patrice Lumumba, the popular and charismatic leader of the Congo. But documents have recently surfaced that indicate the CIA may well have been involved in the death of another leader as well, U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. Hammarskjold died in a plane crash enroute to meet Moise Tshombe, leader of the breakaway (and mineral-rich) province of Katanga. At the time of his death, there was a great deal of speculation that Hammarskjold had been assassinated to prevent the U.N. from bringing Katanga back under the rule of the central government in the Congo. Fingers were pointed at Tshombe’s mercenaries, the Belgians, and even the British. Hardly anyone at the time considered an American hand in those events. However, two completely different sets of documents point the finger of culpability at the CIA. The CIA has denied having anything to do with the murder of Hammarskjold. But we all know what the CIA’s word is worth in such matters.

    In the previous issue of Probe, Jim DiEugenio explored the history of the Congo at this point in time, and the difference between Kennedy’s and Eisenhower’s policies toward it. In the summer of 1960, the Congo was granted independence from Belgium. The Belgians had not prepared the Congo to be self-sufficient, and the country quickly degenerated into chaos, providing a motive for the Belgians to leave their troops there to maintain order. While the Belgians favored Joseph Kasavubu to lead the newly independent nation, the Congolese chose instead Patrice Lumumba as their Premier. Lumumba asked the United Nations, headed then by Dag Hammarskjold, to order the Belgians to withdraw from the Congo. The U.N. so ordered, and voted to send a peacekeeping mission to the Congo. Impatient and untrusting of the U.N., Lumumba threatened to ask the Soviets for help expelling the Belgian forces. Like so many nationalist leaders of the time, Lumumba was not interested in Communism. He was, however, interested in getting aid from wherever he could, including the Soviets. He had also sought and, for a time, obtained American financial aid.

    Hatching an Assassination

    In 1959, Lumumba had visited businessmen in New York, where he stated unequivocally, “The exploitation of the mineral riches of the Congo should be primarily for the profit of our own people and other Africans.” Affected minerals included copper, gold, diamonds, and uranium. Asked whether the Americans would still have access to uranium, as they had when the Belgians ran the country, Lumumba responded, “Belgium doesn’t produce any uranium; it would be to the advantage of both our countries if the Congo and the U.S. worked out their own agreements in the future. 1 Investors in copper and uranium in the Congo at that time included the Rockefellers, the Guggenheims and C. Douglas Dillon. Dillon participated in the NSC meeting where the removal of Lumumba was discussed.

    According to NSC minutes from the July 21, 1960 meeting, Allen Dulles, head of the CIA and former lawyer to the Rockefellers, sounded the alarm regarding Lumumba:

    Mr. Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with a person who was Castro or worse … Mr. Dulles went on to describe Mr. Lumumba’s background which he described as “harrowing” … It is safe to go on the assumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Communists; this also, however, fits with his own orientation.2

    Lawrence Devlin, referenced in the Church Committee report under the pseudonym “Victor Hedgman,” was the CIA Station Chief in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa). On August 18th, Devlin cabled Dulles at CIA headquarters the following message:

    EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT…. WHETHER OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTION TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA.3

    The day this cable was sent, the NSC held another meeting at which Lumumba was discussed. Robert Johnson, a member of the NSC staff, testified to the Church Committee that sometime during the summer of 1960, at an NSC meeting, he heard President Eisenhower make a comment that sounded to him like a direct order to assassinate Lumumba:

    At some time during that discussion, President Eisenhower said something – I can no longer remember his words – that came across to me as an order for the assassination of Lumumba…. I remember my sense of that moment quite clearly because the President’s statement came as a great shock to me.4

    The Church Committee report on the Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders recorded that Johnson “presumed” Eisenhower made the statement while “looking toward the Director of Central Intelligence.”5 With or without direct authorization, on August 26, 1960, Allen Dulles took the bull by the horns. He cabled Devlin in the Congo station the following message:

    IN HIGH QUARTERS HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF [LUMUMBA] CONTINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESTIGE OF THE U.N. AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE AND THAT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION.6

    Assassination requests would normally have gone to Richard Bissell. Because Bissell was away on vacation, Dulles told Eisenhower he would take care of Lumumba. According to Dulles family biographer Leonard Mosley, Dulles put Richard Helms in charge of preparing the assassination plot. A few days later, Helms produced a “blueprint” for the “elimination” of Lumumba.7 Although the Church Committee report includes no references to Helms’ involvement, this is certainly plausible. One of the first people involved in the plot to kill Lumumba was Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, who enjoyed Richard Helms’ patronage within the agency. As Helms moved up in the Agency, so too did Gottlieb.8 Gottlieb is identified as “Joseph Scheider” in the Church Committee report. Gottlieb was the grandfather of the CIA’s mind control programs, as well as the producer of exotic and deadly biotoxins for the CIA’s “Executive Action” programs.

    After returning from vacation, Bissell approached Bronson Tweedy, head of the CIA’s Africa Division, about exploring the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba. Gottlieb also conversed with Bissell, and claimed Bissell had indicated they had approval from “the highest authority” to proceed with assassinating Lumumba.

    By September 5, the situation in the Congo had deteriorated badly. Kasavubu made a radio address to the nation in which he dismissed Lumumba and six Ministers. Thirty minutes later, Lumumba gave a radio address in which he announced that Kasavubu was no longer the Chief of State. Lumumba called upon the people to rise up against the army. Just over a week later, Joseph Mobutu claimed he was going to neutralize all parties vying for control and would bring in “technicians” to run the country.9 According to Andrew Tully, Mobutu was “discovered” by the CIA, and was used by CIA to take charge of the country when the favored Kasavubu lost authority. The CIA’s relationship with Mobutu is pertinent to the ultimate question of the CIA’s final culpability in the assassination of Lumumba. Tully refers to Mobutu as “the CIA’s man” in the Congo.10 When Mobutu claimed power, he called on the Soviet-bloc embassies to vacate the country within 48 hours.11 John Prados wrote that Mobutu was “cultivated for weeks by American diplomats and CIA officers, including Station Chief Devlin.”12

    Gottlieb was sent to the Congo to meet Devlin. The CIA cabled Devlin that Gottlieb, under the alias of “Joseph Braun,” would arrive on approximately September 27. Gottlieb was to announce himself as “Joe from Paris.” The cable bore a special designation of PROP. Tweedy told the Church Committee that the PROP designator was established specifically to refer to the assassination operation. According to Tweedy, its presence restricted circulation to Dulles, Bissell, Tweedy, Tweedy’s deputy, and Devlin. Tweedy sent a cable through the PROP channel saying that if plans to assassinate Lumumba were given a green light, the CIA should employ a third country national to conceal the American role.13 Clearly, from the start, deniability was the highest concern in the assassination plotting.

    The toxin was supposed to be administered to Lumumba orally through food or toothpaste. This effort was clearly unsuccessful, if it had ever been fully attempted. Gottlieb’s and Devlin’s testimony conflicted regarding the disposal of the toxins. Both said they disposed of all the toxins in the Congo River. But if one of them did this, the other is lying, and both could be lying to protect the continued presence of toxic substances, as indicated by a cable from Leopoldville to Tweedy, dated 10/7/60:

    [GOTTLIEB] LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USEFULNESS. [DEVLIN] PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP.14

    In October 1960, Devlin cabled Tweedy a cryptic request for him to send a rifle with a silencer via diplomatic pouch, a violation of international law:

    IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQS POUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKE RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER. HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT. HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN, WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON.15

    There is no evidence to suggest a silenced rifle was or was not pouched at this point. The CIA did, however, send rifles to be used to assassinate Rafael Trujillo by diplomatic pouch to the Dominican Republic.

    A senior CIA officer from the Directorate of Plans was dispatched to the Congo to aid in the assassination attempt. Justin O’Donnell, referred to in the Church Committee records as “Father Michael Mulroney,” refused to be involved directly in a murder attempt against Lumumba, saying succinctly, “murder corrupts.”16 But he was not opposed to aiding others in the removal of Lumumba. He told the Church Committee:

    I said I would go down and I would have no compunction about operating to draw Lumumba out [of U.N. custody], to run an operation to neutralize his operations….17

    O’Donnell planned to lure Lumumba away from U.N. protection and then turn Lumumba over to his enemies, who would surely kill him. “I am not opposed to capital punishment,” O’Donnell explained to the Church Committee. He just wasn’t going to pull the trigger himself.

    O’Donnell requested that CIA asset QJ/WIN be sent to the Congo for his use. O’Donnell claimed he wanted QJ/WIN to participate in counterespionage. (The CIA’s IG report, however, indicated that QJ/WIN had been recruited to assassinate Lumumba.18) O’Donnell’s plan, which appears to have been successful, was for QJ/WIN to penetrate the defenses around Lumumba and encourage Lumumba to “escape” his U.N. guard. Once in the open, Mobutu’s forces could then arrest Lumumba and kill him. In the end, this is exactly what appears to have happened. Although O’Donnell denied that QJ/WIN had anything to do with Lumumba’s escape, arrest and murder, a cable to CIA’s finance division from William Harvey implies otherwise:

    QJ/WIN was sent on this trip for a specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been completed.19

    Another CIA operative, code-named WI/ROGUE, was dispatched to aid in the Congo operation. The CIA provided WI/ROGUE plastic surgery and a toupee “so that Europeans traveling in the Congo would not recognize him.” WI/ROGUE was described as a man who would “dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all actions.”20

    WI/ROGUE was apparently assigned to Devlin. a report prepared for the CIA’s Inspector General described the preparation to be undertaken for his use:

    In connection with this assignment, WI/ROGUE was to be trained in demolitions, small arms, and medical immunization.21

    While in the Congo, WI/ROGUE undertook to organize an “Execution Squad.” One of the people he attempted to recruit was QJ/WIN. QJ/WIN did not know whether WI/ROGUE was CIA or not, and refused to join him. Both O’Donnell and Devlin claimed WI/ROGUE had no authority to convene an assassination team. But that assertion seems hard to believe, given that a capable assassin was assigned to a group plotting the permanent removal of Lumumba. And given that WI/ROGUE was to be trained in “medical immunization” it seems possible WI/ROGUE was to administer the poisons brought to the Congo by Gottlieb.

    The CIA, while accepting responsibility for plotting to kill Lumumba, disavows responsibility for his eventual murder. The Church Committee bought this line from the CIA and concluded the same in their report. Yet within the report and elsewhere on the record are events that belie that conclusion. For example, a cable from Devlin to Tweedy implies possible CIA foreknowledge of Lumumba’s escape which led to his death:

    POLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THAT HE BREAK OUT OF HIS CONFINEMENET AND PROCEED TO THAT CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY…. DECISION ON BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY BE MADE SHORTLY. STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY [unidentified agent] OF DECISION MADE…. STATION HAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS TO USE IN EVENT OF BREAKOUT AND STUDYING SEVERAL PLANS OF ACTION.22

    The Church Committee believed that one CIA cable seemed to indicate the CIA’s lack of foreknowledge of Lumumba’s eventual escape. But in another instance they cited this troubling passage, which indicates likely CIA involvement in his capture:

    [STATION] WORKING WITH [CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT] TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS ALERTED [BLOCK] POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTE.23

    According to contemporaneous cable traffic, the CIA was kept informed of Lumumba’s condition and movements during the period following his escape. Some authors believe that the CIA was directly involved in his capture. Andrew Tully acknowledges that “There were reports at the time that CIA had helped track him down,” but adds, “there is nothing on the record to confirm this.” However, nearly all authors agree that Lumumba was captured by Mobutu’s troops, and Mobutu was clearly, as Tully called him, “the CIA’s man” in the Congo.

    By January of 1961, Devlin was sending urgent cables to CIA Director Allen Dulles stating that a “refusal [to] take drastic steps at this time will lead to defeat of [United States] policy in Congo.”24 That particular cable was dated January 13, 1961. The very next day, Devlin was told by a Congolese leader that the captive Lumumba was to be transferred to a prison in Bakwanga, the “home territory” of his “sworn enemy.” Three days later, Lumumba and two of his closest supporters were put on an airplane for Bakwanga. In flight, the plane was redirected to Katanga “when it was learned that United Nations troops were at the Bakwanga airport.” Katanga claimed, on February 13, 1961, that Lumumba had escaped the previous day and died at the hands of hostile villagers. However, the U.N. conducted its own investigation, and concluded that Lumumba had been killed January 17, almost immediately upon arrival in Katanga. Other accounts vary. Some accounts indicated that on the plane, Lumumba and his supporters were so badly beaten that the Belgian flight crew became nauseated and locked themselves in the flight deck. Another account indicated that Lumumba was beaten “in full view of U.N. officials” and then driven to a secluded house and killed. But a contradictory version indicated that U.N. officers were not allowed in the area where the plane carrying Lumumba landed, and that the U.N. officials only had a glimpse at a distance of the prisoners when they disembarked. By all accounts, however, this was the last time any of the prisoners were seen in public alive.

    In a bizarre footnote to this story, former CIA man John Stockwell wrote of a CIA associate of his who told him one night of his adventure in Elizabethville (now Lubumbashi), “driving about town after curfew with Patrice Lumumba’s body in the trunk of his car, trying to decide what to do with it.” Stockwell added that his associate “presented this story in a benign light, as though he had been trying to help.”25 And in a similarly incriminating statement, CIA officer Paul Sakwa remembered that Devlin subsequently “took credit” for Lumumba’s assassination.26 In an open letter to CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner, Stockwell wrote:

    Eventually he [Lumumba] was killed, not by our poisons, but beaten to death, apparently by men who had agency cryptonyms and received agency salaries.27

    From the CIA’s own evidence, the CIA sought to entice Lumumba to escape protection. They then monitored his travel, assisted in creating road blocks, and when he was captured, encouraged his captors to turn him over to his enemies. The CIA had a strong relationship with Mobutu when Mobutu had the power to decide Lumumba’s fate. And then there are the admissions reported by Stockwell and Sakwa. How can anyone, in the light of such evidence, claim the CIA was not directly responsible for Lumumba’s murder?

    Hammarskjold’s Last Flight

    The CIA could not have been satisfied solely with the death of Lumumba. One of the barriers to completing the takeover of the Congo remained the United Nations, and more specifically, U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold.

    Dag Hammarskjold’s heritage stemmed from that of a Swedish knight. Subsequent generations had served as soldiers and statesmen. It seemed only fitting that with such a heritage, Hammarskjold would be drawn to a life of governmental service. He grew up in the Swedish capital among a group of progressive economists, intellectuals, and artists. He sought out companions and mentors from these fields. But Hammarskjold was on a strong spiritual quest as well, seeking his own divine purpose and contemplating the sacrifices of others for the common good. He was an intensely private man who never married. Because of this, many assumed he must have been a homosexual. Hammarskjold always denied this, and once wrote a Haiku addressing his frustration at having to deal with this constant accusation:

    Because it did not find a mate
    they called
    the unicorn perverted.28

    Speaking four languages and having a reputation as an agile negotiator, Hammarskjold was a natural choice for the United Nations. Always gravitating toward roles of leadership, he came ultimately to serve in the highest position of that body during one of the most difficult periods in its existence.

    When he took office, the United States was embroiled in virulent McCarthyism. His predecessor at the U.N. had bent over backwards to please American sponsors by expelling suspected communists from the ranks of the U.N. When Hammarskjold took his place, his first acts focused on rebuilding badly damaged morale among the U.N. workers. Once in office, he traveled the world seeking peace and reconciliation among warring factions. He felt that dispatching U.N. troops on peacekeeping missions was a necessary, if poor substitute for failed political negotiations. In 1958, Hammarskjold was unanimously reelected to a second five-year term as Secretary-General.

    By far, Hammarskjold’s biggest challenge was the Congo. Hammarskjold understood the complexity of the political situation there and resisted moves that would put the people in that country at risk of exploitation. When Katanga seceded, the Soviets were furious that Hammarskjold didn’t send troops in to prevent the secession, and claimed Hammarskjold was siding with colonialists. Lumumba too lashed out at Hammarskjold for not responding in force. Hammarskjold’s hands were tied, however, by the American, British, French and Belgium factions which wanted to see Katanga secede in order to maintain access to the great mineral wealth there. But Hammarskjold did not give in completely to these non-native interests, and sent U.N. troops between the warring Congo and Katanga forces to see that one side did not annihilate the other. Hammarskjold had originally been impressed with Lumumba, but his opinion of him declined as Lumumba increasingly acted in an irresponsible manner. The country virtually fell apart in September when first Kasavubu (another Congo leader in the CIA’s pocket29), then Lumumba, and ultimately Mobutu claimed to be the country’s leader. One of the few world leaders openly supporting Hammarskjold’s policy in the Congo was President John Kennedy.

    Hammarskjold died in a plane crash sometime during the early morning hours of September 8, 1961. He was flying aboard the Albertina to the Ndola airport at the border of the Congo in Northern Rhodesia, where he was to meet with Tshombe to broker a cease-fire agreement. The pilot of the Albertina filed a fake flight plan in an attempt to keep Hammarskjold’s ultimate destination hidden. Despite this and other measures taken to preserve secrecy, less than 15 minutes into the flight the press was reporting that Hammarskjold was enroute to Ndola.

    At 10:10, the pilot radioed the airport that he could see their lights, and was given permission to descend from 16,000 to 6,000 feet. Then the plane disappeared. It was found the next day, crashed and burnt at a site about ten miles from the airport. The unexplained downing of the plane gave rise immediately to rumors of attack and sabotage.

    Two of Hammarskjold’s close associates, Conor O’Brien and Stuart Linner, had been targets of assassination attempts. Several attempts had been made in Elizabethville on O’Brien. And gunmen tried to lure Linner to Leopoldville, then under Kataganese control. One gunman even made his way into Linner’s office before being apprehended. Forces both inside and outside the Congo made clear that they did not approve of the U.N.’s handling of affairs there. U.N. forces were continually attacked. And Hammarskjold himself had received various threats. Because of this obvious animosity, it was no stretch for people to believe Hammarskjold’s death was no accident.

    The origin of the plan to meet at Ndola was itself under dispute. O’Brien asserted in print on three different occasions that the location had been chosen by Lord Lansdowne. As one author noted,

    He was doing more than accuse Lansdowne of not telling the truth. He was implying the Britisher was partly responsible for a journey that ended in disaster.30

    The British government has always insisted the choice of Ndola was Hammarskjold’s. But the British were clearly working against Hammarskjold by siding with Katanga. The British colony of Northern Rhodesia also sent food and medical supplies to Katanga. Rhodesia’s Roy Welensky served as a media conduit for Tshombe. Clearly, the British had a motive to get rid of Hammarskjold, who stood in the way of Katanga’s independence, and therefore their denial regarding the choice of Ndola should be weighted accordingly. In fact, leaders from around the world accused Britain of being directly responsible. The Indian Express, India’s largest daily, wrote, “Never even during Suez have Britain’s hands been so bloodstained as they are now.” Johshua Nkomo, President of the African National Democratic Party in Southern Rhodesia, said “The fact that this incident occured in a British colonial territory in circumstances which look very queer is a serious indictment of the British Government.” The Ghanian Times ran an editorial headed “Britain: The Murderer.” Note that this prophetic piece was written in 1961:

    The history of the decade of the sixties is becoming the history of political and international murders. And one of the principal culprits in this sordid turn in human history is that self-same protagonist of piety – Britain.

    Britain was involved, by virtue of her NATO commitments, in the callous murder of the heroic Congolese Premier, Patrice Lumumba.

    But Britain stands alone in facing responsibility for history’s No. 1 international murder – the murder of United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold.31

    Due to public interest and obvious questions, both the British-contolled Northen Rhodesian government and the U.N. convened commissions to investigate the incident. Two of the earliest claims regarding the crash were given focus by both commissions: reports of a second plane, and reports of a flash in the sky near the airport. Seven different witnesses told the Rhodesian commission of a second plane in the vicinity of the Ndola airport. In Warren Commission-like fashion, the Rhodesian authorities waved away these sightings under various excuses. The only plane officially recorded to be in the vicinity was Hammarskjold’s, therefore the witnesses had to be wrong. But the airport was not using radar that night, and another plane could easily have been in the area. One witness chose not to talk to the Rhodesian authorities and went directly to the U.N.. He too had seen a second plane, following behind and slightly above a larger plane. After the plane crashed and exploded, he saw two Land Rover type vehicles rush at “breakneck speed” toward the site of the crash. A short time later, they returned. Asked why he hadn’t shared his account with the Rhodesians, the witness replied simply, “I do not trust them.” The U.N. report theorized that perhaps people had seen the plane’s anti-collision beam and thought it represented a second plane. However, some of the witnesses claimed the second plane flew away from the first after the crash, negating that theory. 32 Earwitness evidence was also suggestive. Mrs. Olive Andersen heard three quick explosions at the time when the plane would have passed overhead. W. J. Chappell thought he heard the sound of a low-flying plane followed by the noise of a jet, followed later by three loud crashes and shots as if a canon was firing.33

    Assistant Inspector Nigel Vaughan was driving on patrol that night about ten miles from the site of the crash. He told investigators that he saw a sudden light in the sky and then what seemed to be a falling object. But he placed the sighting an hour after the plane disappeared, and so his testimony is ignored. However, other witnesses also claimed to see a flash in the sky that night, including two police officers, one of which thought the sighting important enough to report to the airport.

    Adding to suspicion of a broader plot was the fact that, despite the Albertina’s having announced its arrival at the airport, no alarm was raised when the plane did not land. In fact, Lord Alport sent the airport people home, claiming the Albertina’s occupants must have simply changed their mind and decided not to land there. No search and rescue operation was launched until well into the following morning.Later examinations of the bodies showed that Hammarskjold may well have survived the initial crash, although he had near-fatal if not fatal injuries. There was a small chance that had he been found in time, his life may have been saved.

    Royal Rhodesian Air Force Squadron Leader Mussell told the U.N. commission that there were “underhand things going on” at that time in Ndola, “with strange aircraft coming in, planes without flight plans and so on.” He also reported that “American Dakotas were sitting on the airfield with their engines running,” which he imagined were likely “transmitting messages.”

    Beyond the strange circumstances surrounding the downing of the plane, the plane itself contained interesting, if controversial evidence. 201 live rounds, 342 bullets and 362 cartridge cases were recovered from both the crash site and the dead bodies. Bullets were found in the bodies of six people, two of whom were Swedish guards. The British Rhodesian authorities concluded that the ammunition had simply exploded in the intense heat of the fire, and just happened to shoot right into the humans present. But this contention was refuted by Major C. F. Westell, a ballistics authority, who said,

    I can certainly describe as sheer nonsense the statement that cartridges of machine guns or pistols detonated in a fire can penetrate a human body.34

    He based his statement on a large scale experiment that had been done to determine if military fire brigades would be in danger working near munitions depots. Other Swedish experts conducted and filmed tests showing that bullets heated to the point of explosion nonetheless did not achieve sufficient velocity to penentrate their box container.35

    If someone aboard the plane fired the bullets found in these bodies, who would it have been? P. G. Lindstrom, in Copenhagen’s journal Ekstra Bladet, wrote that one of Tshombe’s agents in Europe told him that an extra passenger had been aboard who was to hijack the plane to Katanga. No evidence of an additional body was found in the wreckage, however.

    Transair’s Chief Engineer Bo Vivring examined the plane and noted damage to the window frame in the cockpit area, as well as fiberglass in the radar nose cone, and concluded that these injuries were likely bullet holes. He told the Rhodesian commission months later, “I am still suspicious about these two specimens.”36

    In their final report, the Federal Rhodesian commission concluded that the incident was the result of pilot error, and denied any possibility that the plane was in any way sabotaged or attacked. The U.N. took a more cautious stance, declining to blame the pilot. But they were unable to pinpoint the cause, and refused to rule out the possibility of sabotage or attack. In contrast, the Swedish government, along with others carried the strong opinion that the plane had been shot from the ground or the air, or had been blown up by a bomb.

    And there the matter lay, as far as the public was concerned. No one would know for sure. Some had suspicions. In a curious episode, Daniel Schorr once questioned whether the CIA was behind the murder. The question must be set in its original context.

    In January of 1975, President Ford was hosting a White House luncheon for New York Times publisher Arthur Sulzberger, among others, when the subject of the Rockefeller commission came up. One of the Times’ editors questioned the overtly conservative, pro-military bent of the appointees. Ford explained that he needed trustworthy citizens who would not stray from the narrowly defined topics to be investigated so they wouldn’t pursue matters which could damage national security and blacken the reputation of the last several Presidents. “Like what?” came the obvious question, from A. M. Rosenthal. “Like assassinations!” said clumsy ex-Warren Commission member Ford, who added quickly, “That’s off the record!” But Schorr took the question to heart, and wondered what Ford was hiding. Shortly after this episode, Schorr went to William Colby, then CIA Director, and asked him point blank, “Has the CIA ever killed anybody in this country?” Colby’s reply was, “Not in this country.” “Who?” Schorr pressed. “I can’t talk about it,” deferred Colby. The first name to spring to Schorr’s lips was not Lumumba, Trujillo, or even Castro. It was Hammarskjold.37

    Is there any evidence of British or CIA involvement in Hammarskjold’s death? Sadly, the answer is yes. Of both. In 1997, documents uncovered by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission indicated a conspiracy between the CIA and MI5 to remove Hammarskjold. Messages written on the letterhead of the South Africa Institute for Maritime Research (SAIMR), covering a period from July, 1960 to September 17, 1961, the date of Hammarskjold’s crash, discussed a plot to kill Hammarskjold named Operation Celeste. The messages, written by a commodore and a captain whose names were expunged by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, reference Allen Dulles. According to press reports, the most damning document refers to a meeting between CIA, SAIMR, and the British intelligence organizations of MI5 and Special Operations Executive, at which Dulles agreed that “Dag is becoming troublesome…and should be removed.” Dulles, according to the documents, promised “full cooperation from his people.” In another message, the captain is told, “I want his removal to be handled more efficiently than was Patrice [Lumumba].”

    Later orders to the captain state:

    Your contact with CIA is Dwight. He will be residing at Hotel Leopold II in Elizabethville from now until November 1 1961. The password is: “How is Celeste these days?” His response should be: “She’s recovering nicely apart from the cough.”38

    According to the documents, the plan included planting a bomb in the wheelbay of the plane so that when the wheels were retracted for takeoff, the bomb would explode. The bomb was to be supplied by Union Miniere, the powerful Belgian mining conglomerate operating in the Katanga province. However, a report dated the day of the crash records that the “Device failed on take-off, and the aircraft crashed a few hours later as it prepared to land.”39

    A British Foreign Officer spokesman suggested to the press that the documents were Soviet disinformation.40 The documents were also dismissed as fakes by a former Swedish diplomat, but according to news reports, “they bear a striking resemblance to other documents emanating from SAIMR seven years ago … These documents show the SAIMR masterminded the abortive 1981 attempt to depose Seychelles president Albert RenÈ. It was also behind a successful 1990 coup in Somalia.”41

    The reference to cooperation between MI5 and CIA is not farfetched either. British and American interests worked together to defeat Mossadegh in Iran. In his book that was originally banned in Britain for revealing too many state secrets, former MI5 officer Peter Wright described how William Harvey, the head of the CIA’s “Executive Action” programs, accompanied by CIA Counterintelligence Chief James Angleton, visited MI5 in 1961 to ask for help finding assassins.42 And according to Paul Lashmar in his book Britain’s Secret Propaganda War 1948-1997, the British secretly aided in the overthrow of Sukarno in 1965, a coup for which the CIA bears a great deal of responsibility.

    Brian Urquhart, a former U.N. Under-Secretary-General and the author of an extensive biography of Dag Hammarskjold, stated that “The documents seem to me to make no sense whatsoever.” He praised Bishop Desmond Tutu for saying there was no verification for the authenticity of these documents. But Urquhart went too far when he said, “Even supposing there was any such conspiracy, which I strongly doubt, there is no conceivable way they could have got within any kind of working distance of Hammarskjold’s plane in time.”43 In fact, the plane was left unguarded for four hours. There was general security at the airport, but anyone who knew what they were doing would have no trouble gaining access to the plane. The cabin was secured, but the wheelbay, hydraulic compartments and heating systems were accessible.44 Urquhart also contends that saboteurs would have attacked the wrong plane, as Lansdowne and Hammarskjold switched planes that day. But if the saboteurs were as sophisticated as the CIA was with Lumumba, that information would have been known in advance by the necessary parties. What if the plotters themselves occasioned the switch of the planes? Urquhart shows himself to be a man of limited imagination in this regard. Urquhart caps his comments by adding that he had seen “20 or 30 different accounts” over the years of how Hammarskjold was killed, and that “if one is true all the other 29 are false.” In the words of Buffy the Vampire Slayer, “Does the word ‘duh’ mean anything to you?” There can be only one truth. Having 29 false leads would not negate the truth of the remaining one.

    While Bishop Tutu conceded the documents may be disinformation, he added the following qualifier:

    It isn’t something that is so bizarre. Things of that sort have happened in the past. That is why you can’t dismiss it as totally, totally incredible.45

    In the Independent of 8/20/98, author Mary Braid wrote that “In 1992, ex-U.N. officials said mercenaries hired by Belgian, U.S. and British mining companies shot down the plane, as they believed their businesses would be hurt by Hammarskjold’s peace efforts.” The key here is to understand that these assertions are not mutually exclusive. The CIA has shown its disdain for official government positions on more than several occasions, and has a long track record of working with private corporations to effect a foreign policy dictated more by business needs than political ones. In the Congo, we saw that the CIA apparently pursued a triple track. They planned poison, gun, and escape-capture-kill plans as they sought to remove Lumumba from the scene. If they were intent on getting rid of Hammarskjold, as the Truth Commission discoveries suggest, the CIA may have employed both bomb planters and mercenaries.

    Has anyone ever claimed responsibility for Hammarskjold’s death? Surprisingly, the answer is yes. A longtime CIA operative claimed he personally shot down the plane.

    Confessions of a Hitman

    In 1976, Roland “Bud” Culligan sought legal assistance. After serving the CIA for 25 years, Culligan was angry. He had performed sensitive operations for the company and felt he deserved better treatment than to be put in jail on a phony bad check charge so the agency could “protect” him from foreign intelligence agents. He had been jailed since 1971, and now the agency was disavowing any connection with him. His personal assets had mysteriously vanished, and his wife Sara was being harassed. But Culligan had kept one very important card up his sleeve. He had kept a detailed journal of every assignment he had performed for the CIA. He had dates, names, places. And Culligan was a professional assassin.

    Culligan sought the aid of a lawyer who in turn required some corroborative information. The lawyer asked Culligan to provide explicit details, such as who had recruited him into the CIA, who was his mutual friend with Victor Marchetti, and could he describe in detail six executive action (E.A.) assignments. Culligan answered each request. One of the executive actions he detailed was his assignment to kill Dag Hammarskjold.

    Culligan described first in general terms how he would receive assignments:

    It is impossible, being here, to recall perfectly all details of past E.A.’s Each E.A. was unique and the execution was left to me and me alone. Holland [identified elsewhere as Lt. Gen. Clay Odum] would call, either by phone or letter memo. At times I would be “billed” by a fake company for a few dollars. The number to call was on the “bill.” I have them all. I studied each man, or was introduced by a mutual friend or acquaintance, to dispell suspicion. I was not always told exactly why a man was subject to being killed. I believed Holland and CIA knew enough about matter to be trusting and I did my work accordingly…. By the time I was called in, the man had become a total loss to CIA, or had become involved in actual plotting to overthrow the U.S. Gov, with help from abroad. There were some exceptions.

    …When an E.A. was planned, I was given all possible details in memo form, pictures, verbal descriptions, money, tickets, passports, all the time I needed for plan and set up. I and I alone called the final shot or shots.

    Culligan matter-of-factly described five other EAs. But when he told of Hammarskjold, it was out of sequence and in a different tone than the other descriptions:

    The E.A. involving Hammarskjold was a bad one. I did not want the job. Damn it, I did not want the job…. I intercepted D.H’s trip at Ndola, No. Rhodesia (now Zaire). Flew from Tripoli to Abidjian to Brazzaville to Ndola, shot the airplane, it crashed, and I flew back, same way…. I went to confession after Nasser and I swore I would never again do this work. And I never will.

    Culligan did not want his information released. He only wanted to use it to pressure the CIA into restoring his funds, clearing his record, and allowing his wife and himself to live in peace. When this effort failed, a friend of Culligan’s pursued the matter by sending Culligan’s information to Florida Attorney General Robert Shevin.

    Shevin was impressed enough by the documentation Culligan provided to forward the material along to Senator Frank Church, in which he wrote,

    It is my sincere hope and desire that your Committee could look into the allegations made by Mr. Culligan. His charges seem substantive enough to warrant an immediate, thorough investigation by your Committee.

    Culligan was scheduled to be released from prison in 1977. He wrote the CIA’s General Counsel offering to turn in his journal if he was released without any further complications. But once out of jail, Culligan found himself on the run continuously, fearing for his and his wife’s life. A friend continued to write public officials on Culligan’s behalf, saying,

    There are forces that operate within our Government that most people do not even suspect exist. In the past, these forces have instituted actions that would be repugnant to the American people and the world at large. I have always wanted to see this situation handled quietly and honorably without a lot of publicity. Unfortunately, the agencies, bureaus, and services involved are devoid of honor. This story is extremely close to going public soon and when it does, I fear for the effect upon our Country and her position in the world community.

    The story never did go public, until now. And this is only a piece of what Culligan had to say.46 You can’t see all of what he had to say. These files remain restricted at the National Archives, withdrawn by the CIA, unavailable to researchers. Not even the Review Board could pry forth the tape Culligan made in jail detailing his CIA activities. And no wonder. Want to hear one of Culligan’s bombshells? In the list of Executive Actions Culligan detailed, three related to the Kennedy assassination. Culligan wrote that he was hired to kill three of the assassins who had participated in, as he called it, the “Dallas E.A.” Apparently, the three were asking for larger sums to cover their silence. Culligan recruited them for a mission and told them to meet him in Guatemala. When they showed up, he killed all three.

    Is Culligan to be believed? Why can’t we know for certain? Where are the leaders who are not afraid to confront the demons of the past, to genuinely seek out the truth about our history? Who will take this information and pursue it where it leads? Because no one pursued the truth about Lumumba at the time, and no one found the truth about Hammarskjold’s death, assassination remained a viable way to change foreign policy. Malcolm X, the two Kennedy brothers and Martin Luther King fell prey to the same forces. When will the media serve the public, instead of the ruling elite, by finally reporting the truth about the assassinations of the sixties?

    Notes

    1. Gerard Colby with Charlotte Dennett, Thy Will Be Done (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 325-326.

    2. Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 57, hereafter Assassination Plots.

    3. Assassination Plots, p. 14.

    4. Assassination Plots, p. 55

    5. Assassination Plots, p. 55.

    6. Assassination Plots, p. 15.

    7. Leonard Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network (New York: The Dial Press, 1978), pp. 462-463. From his notes, Mosley’s source for this appears to have been Richard Bissell.

    8. John Marks, The Search for the Manchurian Candidate (New York, W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1979), p. 60.

    9. Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 451.

    10. Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story (New York: Crest Books, 1963), pp. 178, p. 184.

    11. Hammarskjold was later to write that policy in the Congo “flopped” and cited as two defeats “the dismissal of Mr. Lumumba and the ousting of the Soviet embassy.” Urquhart, p. 467.

    12. John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), p. 234.

    13. Assassination Plots, p. 23.

    14. Assassination Plots, p. 29.

    15. Assassination Plots, p. 32.

    16. Assassination Plots, p.38n1.

    17. Assassination Plots, p. 39.

    18. Assassination Plots, p. 45.

    19. Assassination Plots, p. 44.

    20. Assassination Plots, p. 46.

    21. Assassination Plots, p. 46.

    22. Assassination Plots, p. 48.

    23. Assassination Plots, p. 48

    24. Assassination Plots, p. 49.

    25. John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1978), p. 105.

    26. Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 67.

    27. Mahoney, p. 71, citing the letter as published in the International Herald-Tribune of April 25, 1977.

    28. Urquhart, p. 27.

    29. William Blum, Killing Hope (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1986), p. 158.

    30. Arthur Gavshon, The Mysterious Death of Dag Hammarskjold (New York: Walker and Company, 1962), p. 167. Gavshon was, according to the biography on the back flap of his book, a “veteran diplomatic correspondent for one of the world’s biggest new agencies and from his London vantage point has had access to the confidential information known to the diplomats and governments riding the dizzying Congolese merry-go-round.”

    31. Gavshon, p. 50.

    32. Gavshon, p. 237.

    33. Gavshon, p. 17.

    34. Gavshon, p. 58.

    35. Gavshon, p. 58.

    36. Gavshon, p. 57.

    37. Daniel Schorr, Clearing the Air (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), pp. 143-145.

    38. Mail & Guardian (of Johannesburg, South Africa), 8/28/98.

    39. Mail & Guardian, 8/28/98.

    40. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 8/20/98.

    41. Mail & Guardian, 8/28/98.

    42. Peter Wright, Spy Catcher (New York: Dell, 1988), pp. 203-204.

    43. Anthony Goodman, Reuters, 8/19/98.

    44. Gavshon, p. 8.

    45. The Atlanta Constitution and Journal, 8/22/98.

    46. For more information on Culligan, see Kenn Thomas’ interview of Lars Hansson in Steamshovel Press #10, 1994.

  • Dodd and Dulles vs. Kennedy in Africa


    Introduction

    The following essay by Jim DiEugenio appeared in the January-February 1999 issue of Probe (Vol. 6 No. 2).  It is largely based on a much and sorrowfully overlooked book by Richard Mahoney entitled JFK: Ordeal in Africa. That book contains probably the best look at President Kennedy’s views of foreign policy, especially in the Third World. It concentrates on the Congo crisis of the late fifties and early sixties, following it from Eisenhower, to Kennedy, to Johnson. Mahoney really did use the declassified record, as he visited the Kennedy library for weeks to attain documents to fill in the record. In examining this record, there can be no doubt about the facts, the actions, and the conclusions. In relation to his predecessor, and his successor, Kennedy was not a Cold Warrior, and he did not buy the Domino Theory. And he was in conflict with those who did, hence the title of the essay.

    But this essay, and Mahoney’s book, go beyond just the Congo crisis and Kennedy’s sympathy for Lumumba. It explains why he held those beliefs about the Third World, and why they extended to Vietnam. As Mahoney notes, Kennedy was in Saigon when the French colonial empire there was crumbling. And it is there where he met Edmund Gullion, the man who would be his teacher on the subject of European colonialism. After learning his lessons, Kennedy returned home, where he tried to break the logjam of anti-communist boilerplate in the debate between the Dean Acheson Democrats and John Foster Dulles Republicans. His 1957 speech on the floor of the Senate about Algeria is still thrilling to read today–but it was a bombshell at the time. It is that speech we have to keep in mind in explaining the things he did not do as president: no Navy forces at the Bay of Pigs, no invasion during the Missile Crisis, and no combat troops into Vietnam. By the end of this essay we then see why Kennedy had those ingrained sympathies. In his revealing conversation with Nehru, we see that he never forgot where he came from i.e. Ireland had been subjugated by Britain for 800 years.

    The following is not polemics. It is actually history. It tells the truth about an important event. But as it does so, it reveals the true character of the men who helped mold it: Eisenhower, Allen Dulles, Lumumba, Thomas Dodd, Joseph Mobutu, Hammarskjold, Moise Tshombe, Cyrille Adoula, Johnson and, primarily, JFK. In doing that, it becomes larger than its subject, as it magnifies the moment and the people molding it. It therefore elucidates a complex episode, and by doing so, it empowers the reader with real information. Which is what good history usually does.


    “In assessing the central character …
    Gibbon’s description of the Byzantine general
    Belisarius may suggest a comparison:
    ‘His imperfections flowed from the contagion of the times;
    his virtues were his own.’”
    ~
    Richard Mahoney on President Kennedy

    As Probe has noted elsewhere (especially in last year’s discussion of Sy Hersh’s anti-Kennedy screed, The Dark Side of Camelot), a clear strategy of those who wish to smother any search for the truth about President Kennedy’s assassination is to distort and deny his achievements in office. Hersh and his ilk have toiled to distort who Kennedy really was, where he was going, what the world would have been like if he had lived, and who and what he represented. As with the assassination, the goal of these people is to distort, exaggerate, and sometimes just outright fabricate in order to obfuscate specific Kennedy tactics, strategies, and outcomes.

    This blackening of the record – disguised as historical revisionism – has been practiced on the left, but it is especially prevalent on the right. Political spy and propagandist Lucianna Goldberg – such a prominent figure in the current Clinton sex scandal – was tutored early on by the godfather of the anti-Kennedy books, that triple-distilled rightwinger and CIA crony Victor Lasky. In fact, at the time of Kennedy’s death, Lasky’s negative biography of Kennedy was on the best-seller lists. Lately, Christopher Matthews seemed to be the designated hitter on some of these issues (see the article on page 26). Curiously, his detractors ignore Kennedy’s efforts in a part of the world far from America, where Kennedy’s character, who and what he stood for, and how the world may have been different had he lived are clearly revealed. But to understand what Kennedy was promoting in Africa, we must first explore his activities a decade earlier.

    The Self-Education of John F. Kennedy

    During Kennedy’s six years in the House, 1947-1952, he concentrated on domestic affairs, bread and butter issues that helped his middle class Massachusetts constituents. As Henry Gonzalez noted in his blurb for Donald Gibson’s Battling Wall Street, he met Kennedy at a housing conference in 1951 and got the impression that young Kennedy was genuinely interested in the role that government could play in helping most Americans. But when Kennedy, his father, and his advisers decided to run for the upper house in 1952, they knew that young Jack would have to educate himself in the field of foreign affairs and gain a higher cosmopolitan profile. After all, he was running against that effete, urbane, Boston Brahmin Henry Cabot Lodge. So Kennedy decided to take two seven-week-long trips. The first was to Europe. The second was a little unusual in that his itinerary consisted of places like the Middle East, India, and Indochina. (While in India, he made the acquaintance of Prime Minister Nehru who would end up being a lifelong friend and adviser.)

    Another unusual thing about the second trip was his schedule after he got to his stops. In Saigon, he ditched his French military guides and sought out the names of the best reporters and State Department officials so he would not get the standard boilerplate on the French colonial predicament in Indochina. After finding these sources, he would show up at their homes and apartments unannounced. His hosts were often surprised that such a youthful looking young man could be a congressman. Kennedy would then pick their minds at length as to the true political conditions in that country.

    If there is a real turning point in Kennedy’s political career it is this trip. There is little doubt that what he saw and learned deeply affected and altered his world view and he expressed his developing new ideas in a speech he made upon his return on November 14, 1951. Speaking of French Indochina he said: “This is an area of human conflict between civilizations striving to be born and those desperately trying to retain what they have held for so long.” He later added that “the fires of nationalism so long dormant have been kindled and are now ablaze….Here colonialism is not a topic for tea-talk discussion; it is the daily fare of millions of men.” He then criticized the U. S. State Department for its laid back and lackadaisical approach to this problem:

    One finds too many of our representatives toadying to the shorter aims of other Western nations with no eagerness to understand the real hopes and desires of the people to which they are accredited.

    The basic idea that Kennedy brought back from this trip was that, in the Third World, the colonial or imperial powers were bound to lose in the long run since the force of nationalism in those nascent countries was so powerful, so volcanic, that no extended empire could contain it indefinitely. This did not mean that Kennedy would back any revolutionary force fighting an imperial power. Although he understood the appeal of communism to the revolutionaries, he was against it. He wanted to establish relations and cooperate with leaders of the developing world who wished to find a “third way,” one that was neither Marxist nor necessarily pro-Western. He was trying to evolve a policy that considered the particular history and circumstances of the nations now trying to break the shackles of poverty and ignorance inflicted upon them by the attachments of empire. Kennedy understood and sympathized with the temperaments of those leaders of the Third World who wished to be nonaligned with either the Russians or the Americans and this explains his relationships with men like Nehru and Sukarno of Indonesia. So, for Kennedy, Nixon’s opposition toward Ho Chi Minh’s upcoming victory over the French in Vietnam was not so much a matter of Cold War ideology, but one of cool and measured pragmatism. As he stated in 1953, the year before the French fell:

    The war would never be successful … unless large numbers of the people of Vietnam were won over from their sullen neutrality and open hostility. This could never be done … unless they were assured beyond doubt that complete independence would be theirs at the conclusion of the war.

    To say the least, this is not what the Dulles brothers John Foster and Allen had in mind. Once the French empire fell, they tried to urge upon Eisenhower an overt American intervention in the area. When Eisenhower said no, Allen Dulles sent in a massive CIA covert operation headed by Air Force officer Edward Lansdale. In other words, the French form of foreign domination was replaced by the American version.

    Kennedy and Africa

    Needless to say, the Eisenhower-Nixon-Dulles decision on Indochina had an epochal ring that can be heard down to the present day. But there was another developing area of the world where Kennedy differed with these men. In fact it is in the news today because it still suffers from the parallel pattern of both Indochina and Indonesia, i.e. European colonialism followed by American intervention. In 1997, after years of attempted rebellion, Laurent Kabila finally ousted longtime dictator Joseph Mobutu in the huge African state of Congo. But Kabila’s government has proven quite weak and this year, other African states have had to come to his aid to prop him up. In late November, the new warring factions in that state tentatively agreed to a cease-fire in Paris brokered by both France and the United Nations. The agreement is to be formally signed in late December. If not, this second war in two years may continue. As commentators Nelson Kasfir and Scott Straus wrote in the Los Angeles Times of October 19th,

    What Congo so desperately needs and never has enjoyed is a democratic assembly, one that can establish a constitution that will allow the country’s next president to enjoy sufficient legitimacy to get started on a long overdue development agenda.

    There was a Congolese leader who once could have united the factions inside that country and who wanted to develop its immense internal resources for the Congolese themselves: Patrice Lumumba. As with Achmed Sukarno of Indonesia, Lumumba is not talked about very much today. At the time, he was viewed as such a threat that the Central Intelligence Agency, on the orders of Allen Dulles, planned his assassination. Lumumba was killed just before President Kennedy was inaugurated.

    Yet, in the media commentaries on the current crisis, the epochal changes before and after Kennedy’s presidency that took place in the Congo are not mentioned. As with Indonesia, few commentators seem cognizant of the breaks in policy there that paved the way for three decades of dictatorship and the current chaos. One thing nobody has noted was that Mobutu came to absolute power after Kennedy’s death in a policy decision made by the Johnson administration. This decision directly contradicted what Kennedy had been doing while in office. Kennedy’s Congo effort was a major preoccupation of his presidency in which many of his evolving ideas that originated in 1951 were put to the test and dramatized in a complex, whirring cauldron. The cauldron featured Third World nationalism, the inevitable pull of Marxism, Kennedy’s sympathy for nonaligned leaders, his antipathy for European colonialism, and the domestic opposition to his policies both inside the government and without. This time the domestic opposition was at least partly represented by Senator Thomas Dodd and CIA Director Allen Dulles. This tortured three-year saga features intrigue, power politics, poetic idealism, a magnetic African revolutionary leader, and murder for political reasons. How did it all begin?

    Kennedy Defines Himself

    In 1956, the Democrats, always sensitive to the charge of being “soft on communism”, did very little to attack the Eisenhower-Nixon-Dulles foreign policy line. When they did, it was with someone like Dean Acheson who, at times, tried to out-Dulles John Foster Dulles. Kennedy was disturbed by this opportunistic crowd-pleasing boilerplate. To him it did not relate to the reality he had seen and heard firsthand in 1951. For him, the nationalistic yearning for independence was not to be so quickly linked to the “international Communist conspiracy.” Kennedy attempted to make some speeches for Adlai Stevenson in his race for the presidency that year. In them he attempted to attack the Manichean world view of the Republican administration, i.e. that either a nation was allied with America or she was leaning toward the Communist camp:

    the Afro-Asian revolution of nationalism, the revolt against colonialism, the determination of people to control their national destinies….In my opinion, the tragic failure of both Republican and Democratic administrations since World War II to comprehend the nature of this revolution, and its potentialities for good and evil, has reaped a bitter harvest today – and it is by rights and by necessity a major foreign policy campaign issue that has nothing to do with anti-communism. (Speech in Los Angeles 9/21/56)

    This was too much even for the liberal Stevenson. According to author Richard Mahoney, “Stevenson’s office specifically requested that the senator make no more foreign policy statements in any way associated with the campaign.” (JFK: Ordeal in Africa p. 18)

    Kennedy objected to the “for us or against us” attitude that, in Africa, had pushed Egypt’s Gamel Abdul Nasser into the arms of the Russians. He also objected to the self-righteousness with which people like Dulles and Nixon expressed this policy. John Foster Dulles’ string of bromides on the subject e.g. “godless Communism”, and the “Soviet master plan”, met with this response from Senator Kennedy: “Public thinking is still being bullied by slogans which are either false in context or irrelevant to the new phase of competitive coexistence in which we live.” (Mahoney p. 18)

    Kennedy on Algeria

    Kennedy bided his time for the most fortuitous moment to make a major oratorical broadside against both political parties’ orthodoxies on the subject of Third World nationalism. He found that opportunity with France’s colonial crisis of the late 1950’s: the struggle of the African colony of Algeria to be set free. By 1957, the French had a military force of 500,000 men in Algeria committed to putting down this ferocious rebellion. The war degenerated at times into torture, atrocities, and unmitigated horror, which when exposed, split the French nation in two. It eventually caused the fall of the French government and the rise to power of Charles De Gaulle.

    On July 2, 1957, Senator Kennedy rose to speak in the Senate chamber and delivered what the New York Times was to call “the most comprehensive and outspoken arraignment of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented by an American in public office.” (7/3/57) As historian Allan Nevins wrote later, “No speech on foreign affairs by Mr. Kennedy attracted more attention at home and abroad.” (The Strategy of Peace, p. 67) It was the mature fruition of all the ideas that Kennedy had been collecting and refining since his 1951 trip into the nooks and corners of Saigon. It was passionate yet sophisticated, hard-hitting but controlled, idealistic yet, in a fresh and unique way, also pragmatic. Kennedy assailed the administration, especially Nixon and Dulles, for not urging France into a non-military solution to the bloody crisis. He even offered some diplomatic alternatives. He attacked both the United States and France for not seeing in Algeria a reprise of the 1954 Indochina crisis:

    Yet, did we not learn in Indochina … that we might have served both the French and our own causes infinitely better had we taken a more firm stand much earlier than we did? Did that tragic episode not teach us that, whether France likes it or not, admits it or not, or has our support or not, their overseas territories are sooner or later, one by one, inevitably going to break free and look with suspicion on the Western nations who impeded their steps to independence. (Ibid p. 72)

    The speech ignited howls of protest, especially from its targets, i.e. Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, Acheson, and Nixon. The latter called it “a brashly political” move to embarrass the administration. He further added that, “Ike and his staff held a full-fledged policy meeting to pool their thinking on the whys underlying Kennedy’s damaging fishing in troubled waters.” (Los Angeles Herald-Express 7/5/57) Mahoney noted that, of the 138 editorials clipped by Kennedy’s office, 90 opposed the speech. (p. 21) Again, Stevenson was one of Kennedy’s critics. Jackie Kennedy was so angry with Acheson’s disparaging remarks about the speech that she berated him in public while they were both waiting for a train at New York’s Penn Central.

    But abroad the reaction was different. Newspapers in England and, surprisingly, in France realized what the narrowly constricted foreign policy establishment did not: Kennedy knew what he was talking about. The speech was a mature, comprehensive, and penetrating analysis of a painful and complicated topic. As one French commentator wrote at the time:

    Strangely enough, as a Frenchman I feel that, on the whole, Mr. Kennedy is more to be commended than blamed for his forthright, frank and provocative speech…. The most striking point of the speech … is the important documentation it revealed and his thorough knowledge of the French milieu.

    As a result, Kennedy now became the man to see in Washington for incoming African dignitaries. More than one commented that they were thrilled reading the speech and noted the impact it had on young African intellectuals studying abroad at the time. The Algerian guerrillas hiding in the hills were amazed at its breadth of understanding. On election night of 1960 they listened to their wireless radios and were alternately depressed and elated as Nixon and Kennedy traded the lead.

    Ike and the Congo

    Once in office, Kennedy had very little time to prepare for his first African crisis. It had been developing during the latter stages of the Eisenhower administration and like Laos, Vietnam, and Cuba it was a mess at the time Kennedy inherited it. With John Foster Dulles dead and Eisenhower embittered over the U-2 incident and what it had done for his hopes for dÈtente, Allen Dulles and, to a lesser extent, Nixon had an increasingly stronger pull over National Security Council meetings. This was even more true about subject areas which Eisenhower had little interest in or knowledge about.

    In June of 1960, Belgium had made a deliberately abrupt withdrawal from the Congo. The idea was that the harder the shock of colonial disengagement, the easier it would be to establish an informal yet de facto control afterward. Before leaving, one Belgian commander had written on a chalkboard:

    Before Independence = After Independence

    As hoped for, the heady rush of freedom proved too much for the new Congolese army. They attacked the Europeans left behind and pillaged their property. The Belgians used this as a pretext to drop paratroops into the country. In response, the democratically elected premier, Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu asked United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold for help. At his request, the United Nations asked Belgium to leave and voted to send a peacekeeping mission to the Congo.

    At this point, the Belgians made a crucial and insidious move. Realizing Hammarskjold would back the newly elected government against the foreign invaders, Belgium began to financially and militarily abet the secession of the Congo’s richest province, Katanga, in the southeast corner of the state. There was a primitive tribal rivalry that served as a figleaf for this split. But the real reason the Belgians promoted the break was the immense mineral wealth in Katanga. They found a native leader who would support them and they decided to pay Moise Tshombe a multimillion dollar monthly bounty to head the secessionist rebellion. As Jonathan Kwitny has noted, some of the major media e.g. Time and the New York Times actually backed the Belgians in this act. Yet, as Kwitny also notes:

    Western industrial interests had been egging Tshombe on toward succession, hoping to guarantee continued Western ownership of the mines. They promised to supply mercenaries to defend the province against whatever ragtag army Lumumba might assemble to reclaim it. (Endless Enemies, p. 55)

    In spite of the Belgian plotting and Tshombe’s opportunistic betrayal, Allen Dulles blamed Lumumba for the impending chaos. His familiar plaint to the National Security Council was that Lumumba had now enlisted in the Communist cause. This, even though the American embassy in Leopoldville cabled Washington that the Belgian troops were the real root of the problem. The embassy further stated that if the UN did not get the Belgians out, the Congo would turn to someone who would: the Russians. Further, as Kwitny and others have noted, Lumumba was not a Communist:

    Looking at the outsiders whom Lumumba chose to consult in times of trouble, it seems clear that his main socialist influence in terms of ideas … wasn’t from Eastern Europe at all, but from the more left-leaning of the new African heads of state, particularly, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. (p. 53)

    As Mahoney makes clear in his study, Nkrumah was a favorite of Kennedy’s who the new president backed his entire time in office.

    Eisenhower Turns on Lumumba

    At this inopportune moment, July of 1960, Lumumba visited Washington for three days. Eisenhower deliberately avoided him by escaping to Rhode Island. Lumumba asked both Secretary of State Christian Herter and his assistant Douglas Dillon for help in kicking out the Belgians. The response was purposefully noncommittal. Meanwhile, the Soviets helped Lumumba by flying in food and medical supplies. Rebuffed by Washington, Lumumba then asked the Russians for planes, pilots, and technicians to use against Katanga. This was a major step in sealing his fate in the eyes of Allen Dulles. Larry Devlin, the CIA station chief in Leopoldville (then the capital of the Congo), wired CIA headquarters that the Congo was now experiencing “a classic Communist effort” to subjugate the government. Within 24 hours, Dulles, apparently with Eisenhower’s approval, set in motion a series of assassination plots that would eventually result in Lumumba’s death. Ironically, on the day the plots originated, Lumumba made the following radio address to his citizens:

    We know that the US understands us and we are pleased to see the US position in bringing about international peace…. If the Congolese place their confidence in the US, which is a good friend, they will find themselves rewarded. (Mahoney, p. 44)

    What the unsuspecting Lumumba did not know was that Eisenhower’s advisers had already made up their mind about him. As Douglas Dillon told the Church Committee, the National Security Council believed that Lumumba was a “very difficult, if not impossible person to deal with, and was dangerous to the peace and safety of the world.” (Kwitny, p. 57) Imagine, the newly elected premier of an undeveloped nation whose army could not even stop an internal secession was now threatening the safety of the world. But, to reiterate, there is little evidence of Lumumba even being a Communist. As Kwitny notes, “all through his brief career … he had publicly pledged to respect private property and even foreign investment” (p. 72). (Kwitny also could have noted that Dillon was hardly an unbiased source. As revealed in the book Thy Will be Done, Dillon was a co-investor with his friend Nelson Rockefeller in properties inside the Belgian Congo and therefore had an interest in it remaining a puppet state.)

    Lumumba wanted the UN to invade Katanga. Hammarskjold refused. At this point Lumumba made his final, fatal error in the eyes of the Eisenhower establishment. He invited the Russians into the Congo so they could expel the Belgians from Katanga. Simultaneously, the Belgians began to work on Kasavubu to split him off from, and therefore isolate, Lumumba. The CIA now begin to go at Lumumba full bore. The CIA station, led by Devlin, began to supersede the State Department policy-making apparatus. Allen Dulles began to funnel large amounts of money to Devlin in a mad rush to covertly get rid of Lumumba. At the same time, Devlin began to work with the Belgians by recruiting and paying off possible rivals to Lumumba i.e. Kasavubu and Joseph Mobutu. This tactic proved successful. On September 5, 1960 Devlin got Kasavubu to dismiss Lumumba as premier. But the dynamic and resourceful Lumumba got the legislative branch of government to reinstate him. When it appeared Lumumba would reassert himself, Dulles redoubled his efforts to have him liquidated. (The story of these plots, with new document releases plus the questions surrounding the mysterious death of Hammarskjold will be related in the second part of this article.)

    With a split in the government, Hammarskjold was in a difficult position. He decided to call a special session of the UN to discuss the matter. At around this time, presidential candidate Kennedy wired foreign policy insider Averill Harriman a query asking him if Harriman felt Kennedy should openly back Lumumba. Harriman advised him not to. Since he felt that there was little the US could do unilaterally, he told the candidate to just stay behind the United Nations. (Interestingly, Harriman would later switch sides and back Tshombe and Katanga’s secession.) Kennedy, whose sympathies were with Lumumba, took the advice and backed an undecided UN. In public, Eisenhower backed Hammarskjold, but secretly the CIA had united with the Belgians to topple Lumumba’s government, eliminate Lumumba, and break off Katanga. Lumumba’s chief African ally, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, made a speech at the UN in September of 1960 attacking Western policy in the Congo. Kennedy now made references in his speeches to Nkrumah which – not so subtly – underlined his split with Eisenhower over the Congo.

    The Death of Lumumba

    As of late 1960, the situation in the Congo was a chaotic flux. Hammarskjold’s deputy on the scene, Rajeshwar Dayal of India, refused to recognize the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime. Dayal went further and decided to protect Lumumba and his second in command, Antoine Gizenga, from arrest warrants made out for them by this new government. The American ambassador on the scene, Clare Timberlake, was now openly supporting the pretenders, Kasavubu and Mobutu. His cables to Washington refer to Lumumba as a Communist with ties to Moscow. With Timberlake’s sympathies now clear, and the Belgians pumping in more war supplies to Katanga, Lumumba’s followers decided to set up their own separatist state in the northwest Congo, the province of Orientale with a capital at Stanleyville.

    In November of 1960, Dayal rejected the Kasavubu-Mobutu government and blamed them for playing a role in murder plots against Lumumba. Following this declaration – and exposure of covert action – the US openly broke with Hammarskjold on Congo policy. The State Department issued a press release stating (incredibly) that it had “every confidence in the good faith of Belgium.” (Mahoney, p. 55) The White House further warned the UN that if Hammarskjold tried any compromise that would restore Lumumba to power, the U. S. would make “drastic revision” of its Congo policy. As Kwitny notes, this clearly implied that the US would take unilateral military action to stop a return to power by Lumumba.

    Dayal had tried to save Lumumba’s life against Devlin’s plots by placing him under house arrest, surrounded by UN troops in Leopoldville. On November 27th, Lumumba tried to flee Congo territory and escape to his followers in Stanleyville. Devlin, working with the Belgians, blocked his escape routes. He was captured on December 1st and returned to Leopoldville. (There is a famous film of this return featuring Lumumba bloody and beaten inside a cage, being hoisted by a crane, which Timberlake tried to suppress at the time.) Enraged, Lumumba’s followers in Stanleyville started a civil war by invading nearby Kivu province and arresting the governor who had been allied with the Leopoldville government.

    At this juncture, with his followers waging civil war, the Congolese government not recognized by the UN, and Lumumba still alive, the possibility existed that he could return to power. On January 17th, Lumumba was shipped to Kasai province which was under the control of Albert Kalonji, a hated enemy of Lumumba. There he was killed, reportedly on orders of Katangese authorities, probably Tshombe, but surely with the help of the CIA. As author John Morton Blum writes in his Years of Discord, the CIA cable traffic suggests that Dulles and Devlin feared what Kennedy would do if he took office before Lumumba was gone (p. 23). Kwitny also notes that the new regime may have suspected Kennedy would be less partial to them than Eisenhower was (p. 69). He further notes that Kasavubu tried a last minute deal to get Lumumba to take a subordinate role in the government. Lumumba refused. He was then killed three days before JFK’s inauguration.

    Although he was murdered on January 17th, the news of his death did not reach Washington until February 13, 1961.

    Kennedy’s new Policy

    Unaware of Lumumba’s death, Kennedy requested a full-scale policy review on the Congo his first week in office. Kennedy had made an oblique reference to the Congo situation in his inaugural address. He had called the UN, “our last best hope” and pledged to support “its shield of the new and the weak”. Once in office he made clear and forceful those vague insinuations. On his own, and behind the scenes, he relayed the Russians a message that he was ready to negotiate a truce in the Congo. Ambassador Timberlake got wind of this and other JFK moves and he phoned Allen Dulles and Pentagon Chief Lyman Lemnitzer to alert them that Kennedy was breaking with Eisenhower’s policy. Timberlake called this switch a “sell-out” to the Russians. Upon hearing of the new policy formation, Hammarskjold told Dayal that he should expect in short order an organized backlash to oppose Kennedy.

    On February 2nd, Kennedy approved a new Congo policy which was pretty much a brisk departure from the previous administration. The new policy consisted of close cooperation with the UN to bring all opposing armies, including the Belgians, under control. In addition, the recommendation was to have the country neutralized and not subject to any East-West competition. Thirdly, all political prisoners should be freed. (Not knowing Lumumba was dead, this recommendation was aimed at him without naming him specifically.) Fourth, the secession of Katanga should be opposed. To further dramatize his split with Eisenhower and Nixon, Kennedy invited Lumumba’s staunch friend Nkrumah to Washington for an official visit. Even further, when Nehru of India asked Kennedy to promise to commit US forces to the UN military effort and to use diplomatic pressure to expel the Belgians, Kennedy agreed. But although his policies were an improvement, Kennedy made a tactical error in keeping Timberlake in place.

    The Republican Timberlake now teamed with Devlin and both ignored the new administration’s diplomatic thrust. They continued their efforts to back the increasingly rightwing Kasavubu-Mobutu government with Devlin also helping Tshombe in Katanga. When Congo government troops fired on the newly strengthened and JFK-backed UN forces, Timberlake stepped over the line. In early March of 1961 he ordered a US naval task force to float up the Congo River. This military deployment, with its accompanying threat of American intervention, was not authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, let alone Kennedy. Coupled with this was another unauthorized act by Devlin. The CIA, through a friendly “cut-out” corporation, flew three French jet trainers into Katanga. Kennedy was enraged when he heard of these acts. He apologized to Nkrumah and recalled Timberlake. He then issued a written warning that the prime American authority in countries abroad was the ambassador. This included authority over the CIA station.

    Enter Thomas Dodd

    At this point, another figure emerged in opposition to Kennedy and his Congo policy. Clearly, Kennedy’s new Congo policy had been a break from Eisenhower’s. It ran contra to the covert policy that Dulles and Devlin had fashioned. To replace the Eisenhower-Nixon political line, the Belgian government, through the offices of public relations man Michael Struelens, created a new political counterweight to Kennedy. He was Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut. As Mahoney notes, Dodd began to schedule hearings in the senate on the “loss” of the Congo to communism, a preposterous notion considering who was really running the Congo in 1961. Dodd also wrote to Kennedy’s United Nations ambassador Adlai Stevenson that the State Department’s “blind ambition” to back the UN in Katanga could only end in tragedy. He then released the letter to the press before Stevenson ever got it.

    One of the allies that Dodd had in his defense of the Katanga “freedom fighters”, was the urbane, supposedly independent journalist William F. Buckley. As Kwitny wittily notes, Buckley saw the spirit of Edmund Burke in the face of Moise Tshombe. Dodd was a not infrequent guest on Buckley’s television show which was then syndicated by Metromedia. Buckley’s supposed “independence” was brought into question two decades ago by the exposure of his employment by the CIA. But newly declassified documents by the Assassination Records Review Board go even further in this regard. When House Select Committee investigator Dan Hardway was going through Howard Hunt’s Office of Security file, he discovered an interesting vein of documents concerning Buckley. First, Buckley was not a CIA “agent” per se. He was actually a CIA officer who was stationed for at least a part of his term in Mexico City. Second, and dependent on Buckley’s fictional “agent” status, it appears that both Hunt and Buckley tried to disguise Buckley’s real status to make it appear that Buckley worked for and under Hunt when it now appears that both men were actually upper level types. Third, when Buckley “left” the Agency to start the rightwing journal National Review, his professional relationship with propaganda expert Hunt continued. These documents reveal that some reviews and articles for that journal were actually written by Hunt, e. g. a review of the book The Invisible Government.

    In other words, the CIA was using Buckley’s journal as a propaganda outlet. This does much to explain that journal’s, and Buckley’s, stand on many controversial issues, including the Congo crisis and the Kennedy assassination. It also helps to explain the Republican William F. Buckley allying himself with Democrat Tom Dodd in defending the Katanga “freedom-fighters.”

    The Death of Hammarskjold

    In September of 1961, while trying to find a way to reintegrate Katanga into the Congo, Hammarskjold was killed in a suspicious plane accident (to be discussed in part two of this article). At this point, with Hammarskjold gone, Timberlake recalled, and Dodd carrying the propaganda battle to him, Kennedy made a significant choice for his new ambassador to replace Timberlake in the Congo. He chose Edmund Gullion for the job. As Mahoney writes:

    Kennedy’s selection of Edmund Gullion as ambassador was of singular consequence to Congo policy. In the President’s view, Gullion was sans pareil among his Third World ambassadors – his best and brightest. There was no ambassador in the New Frontier whose access to the Oval Office was more secure than his. (p. 108)

    Gullion had been one of Kennedy’s early tutors on foreign policy issues and the pair had actually first met in 1948. Later, Gullion was one of the State Department officials Kennedy sought out in his 1951 visit to Saigon. He had been important in convincing Kennedy that the French position in Vietnam was a hopeless one. In 1954, when Kennedy began attacking the Eisenhower administration’s policy in Indochina, he had drawn on Gullion as a source. The White House retaliated by pulling Gullion off the Vietnam desk. As Mahoney states about the importance of Gullion’s appointment by Kennedy:

    In a very real sense, the Congo became a testing ground of the views shared by Kennedy and Gullion on the purpose of American power in the Third World.… Both Kennedy and Gullion believed that the United States had to have a larger purpose in the Third World than the containment of communism. If the US did not, it would fall into the trap of resisting change…. By resisting change, the US would concede the strategic advantage to the Soviet Union. (p. 108)

    What Gullion and Kennedy tried to do in the Congo was to neutralize the appeal of the extremes i.e. fascism and communism, and attempt to forge a left-right ranging coalition around a broad center. This policy, and Kennedy’s reluctance to let Katanga break away, was not popular with traditional American allies. When British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan questioned Kennedy’s intransigence on Katanga, Kennedy wrote back:

    In our own national history, our experience with non-federalism and federalism demonstrates that if a compact of government is to endure, it must provide the central authority with at least the power to tax, and the exclusive power to raise armies, We could not argue with the Congolese to the contrary. (Ibid. p. 109)

    This precarious situation, with both domestic and foreign opposition mounting against him, seemed to galvanize the usually cool and flexible Kennedy. He went to New York to pay tribute to Hammarskjold’s memory. He then moved to supplement Gullion inside the White House. George Ball was appointed as special adviser on the Congo. Even in 1961, Ball had a reputation as a maverick who was strongly opposed to US intervention in Vietnam. Ball agreed with Kennedy and Gullion that a political center had to be found in the Congo. The administration concentrated their efforts on the appointment of Cyrille Adoula as the new premier. Adoula was a moderate labor leader who, unfortunately, had little of the dynamism and charisma of Lumumba. By the end of 1961 he had moved into the premier’s residence in Leopoldville.

    But there was one difference between Ball and Gullion on American Congo policy post-Hammarskjold. Ball seemed willing to compromise on the issue of Katanga’s autonomy; perhaps even willing to negotiate it away for a withdrawal of all mercenary forces from the Congo. But it seems that Kennedy’s visit to New York for Hammarskjold’s wake at the UN stiffened his resolve on this issue. Before the General Assembly, Kennedy had stated: “Let us here resolve that Dag Hammarskjold did not live or die in vain.” He then backed this up by allowing Stevenson to vote for a UN resolution allowing the use of force to deport the mercenaries and advisory personnel out of Katanga.

    Dodd in Katanga

    One week after the November 24, 1961 UN resolution, Senator Dodd was in Katanga. Moise Tshombe had already labeled the resolution an act of war and had announced he would fight the deployment of the UN force. Dodd was at Tshombe’s side when he toured the main mining centers of Katanga attempting to drum up support for the anticipated conflict. Dodd later did all he could to intimidate Kennedy into withdrawing U. S. support for the mission by telling him that Tshombe’s tour had elicited a “tremendous” popular response amid “delirious throngs” of both blacks and whites.

    While in Katanga, a curious event occurred in the presence of Thomas Dodd. Dodd was being feted at a private home in Elizabethville when Katangese paratroopers broke into the house. They took hostage two UN representatives, Brian Urquhart and George Ivan Smith. A State Department employee, Lewis Hoffacker, bravely attempted to stop the kidnapping and managed to get Smith away from his abductors. But he couldn’t get Urquhart away. Under heavy threats from the UN military commander, Colonel S. S. Maitro, Urquhart was released shortly afterwards, albeit in badly beaten condition. The event is curious because it poses some lingering questions: 1) How did the paratroopers know about the location of the private party? 2) Dodd was not molested. Were the soldiers advised not to touch him? 3) Unlike Hoffacker, it does not appear that Dodd used his influence to intervene in the abduction. If so, why not?

    Whatever the odd circumstances surrounding this event, and whatever Dodd’s actions in it were, it proved to be the causus belli in the war for Katanga. Shortly afterwards, Katangese tanks blockaded the road from the UN headquarters to the airport. The UN troops attacked the roadblocks and heavy fighting now broke out. Supplemented by U. S. transport planes, the UN effort was logistically sound. So the Katangese had to resort to terrorist tactics to stay even. They used civilian homes, churches, and even hospitals to direct fire at UN troops. The troops had no alternative except to shell these targets. Kennedy and the UN began to take a lot of criticism for the civilian casualties. But when the new Secretary General, U Thant, began to waiver ever so slightly, Kennedy gave him the green light to expand the war without consulting with the other Western allies who were not directly involved with the military effort. When Secretary of State Dean Rusk relayed the allies’ complaints over the expansion of the war, Kennedy replied that “some of our friends should use their influence on Tshombe.” (Mahoney p. 117) He further told Rusk that there would be no consideration of a cease-fire until Tshombe agreed to talk to Adoula.

    The Propaganda War over Katanga

    Once the shooting started in earnest, the propaganda war also began to heat up. A full page ad appeared in the New York Times. It compared Katanga to the Soviet client state of Hungary in its 1956 crisis. One of the signers for the ad was Buckley’s young conservative group, the Young Americans for Freedom. Time magazine placed Tshombe on its cover. Kennedy fought back by getting Eisenhower to issue a statement in support of his policies. He also sent an emissary to break up any attempted alliance between Dodd and southern senator Richard Russell of Georgia. When the same State Department officer tried to get in contact with Nixon, the former vice-president told him not to waste his time.

    In December of 1961, Tshombe sent word to Kennedy that he wanted to negotiate. Tshombe was in a weak position as fighter jets were strafing his palace. Kennedy sent Gullion and former UN official Ralph Bunche to mediate the talks. The session did not go well. Tshombe, in the middle of the talks wished to leave to consult with other dignitaries from his government. Gullion would not allow it but he did get Tshombe to recognize the Congo’s constitution and place his soldiers under Kasavubu’s authority. He would then be allowed to run for the Congolese parliament. This would have been enough for Ball to agree to a cease-fire. But immediately upon his return to Katanga, Tshombe denounced the bargain and the violence was renewed.

    Tshombe’s ploy almost worked. Adoula’s leftist followers lost faith in him and began to leave for Stanleyville. Britain and France defected from the mission. Congress did not want to refinance the UN effort to put down the revolt. Even Ball advised Kennedy to cut his losses and leave. It appears that it was Gullion who decided to press on in the effort to break Katanga and it seems it was his advice, and his special relationship with Kennedy, that kept the president from losing faith.

    Kennedy’s Economic Warfare

    In 1962, Kennedy decided to hit Tshombe where it hurt. A joint British-Belgian company named Union Miniere had been bankrolling the Katangan war effort in return for mineral rights there. Kennedy, through some British contacts now attempted to get the company to stop paying those fees to Tshombe. Union Miniere refused. They replied that they had billions wrapped up in Katanga and could not afford to risk the loss. Kennedy now went through the American ambassador in England to the Belgian representatives of the company. He told them that unless a good part of the stipend to Katanga was curtailed, he would unleash a terrific attack on Katanga and then give all of Union Miniere over to Adoula when the Congo was reunified. This did the trick. The revenues going to Tshombe were significantly curtailed. The cutback came at an important time since Tshombe had already run up a multimillion dollar debt in resisting the UN effort.

    To counter these moves, Dodd forged an alliance with Senator Barry Goldwater, the ultraconservative senator from Arizona. Their clear message to Tshombe was that he should hold out until the 1964 presidential election in which Goldwater had already expressed an interest in running. Kennedy countered by bringing Adoula to both New York and Washington. In his speech at the United Nations, Adoula paid tribute to “our national hero Patrice Lumumba” and also criticized Belgium. (Mahoney, p. 134) At his visit to the White House, Adoula pointed to a portrait of Andrew Jackson and told Kennedy how much he admired Old Hickory. Remembering his history, and clearly referring to Tshombe and Katanga, Kennedy made a toast to Adoula quoting Jackson’s famous reply to secessionist John Calhoun, “Our federal union; it must be preserved.” Two months after the visit, Kennedy wrote a letter to Adoula:

    These three months have been trying for us. I am searching for an agreement to end the armaments race and you are searching for an agreement to reunite your country…. You may be assured that we will spare no effort in bringing about this end. (Ibid p. 135)

    The supporters of Tshombe needed to retaliate for the success of the Adoula visit. Tshombe’s press agent, Michel Struelens arranged for him to appear on a segment of Meet the Press, a rally at Madison Square Garden, and a press conference at the National Press Club in Washington. Dodd invited Tshombe to testify before his subcommittee. In the face of all this advance fanfare, Kennedy made it clear that he was considering not granting Tshombe a visa into the country. Gullion and Stevenson argued that it was not a legal necessity since Tshombe was not a real representative of the Congolese government. Kennedy’s legal adviser, Abram Chayes argued against the denial. In the end, Kennedy again sided with Gullion and denied the visa. Again, Kennedy took a barrage of criticism for this maneuver. His father’s old friend, Arthur Krock, accused the administration of evasion and of denying Tshombe his right to be heard. The John Birch Society now formally entered on Katanga’s side. Even Herbert Hoover lent his name to pro-Katanga statements.

    The Last Round

    Denied access to the US, Tshombe now set about rearming his military. Kennedy decided to push for economic sanctions followed by a blockade. But Kennedy tried one last time to open negotiations with Tshombe. But by October of 1962 these had proved futile. Moreover, Adoula misinterpreted Kennedy’s negotiation attempt as backing out on his commitment to the Congo. Adoula now turned to the UN and the Russians in hopes of one last knockout blow against Tshombe. On November 2, 1962 the first clashes began. Gullion worked overtime to get Adoula to stop courting the Russians. Kennedy then wrote to Rusk and Ball that he wanted both men to come to a conclusion on what the American role should be in the renewed hostilities. Finally, Ball decided on the use of force, even if it meant the direct use of American air power.

    On December 24, 1962 Katangese forces fired on a UN helicopter and outpost. The UN now moved with a combined land and air strike code-named Operation Grand Slam. By December 29th, Elisabethville, the capital of Katanga was under heavy siege. By the second week of January, the UN advance was proceeding on all fronts. By January 22nd, Katanga’s secession effort was over. As Stevenson said later, it was the UN’s finest hour. Kennedy wrote congratulatory notes to all those involved. To George McGhee, special State Department emissary on the Congo, Kennedy wrote that the task had been “extraordinarily difficult” but now they were entitled to “a little sense of pride.” (Mahoney p. 156)

    The Congo: 1963

    A few months after Katanga had capitulated and Tshombe had fled to Rhodesia, the UN, because of the huge expense of the expedition, was ready to withdraw. Kennedy urged U Thant to keep the force in the Congo; he even offered to finance part of the mission if it was held over. But the UN wanted its forces out, even though it looked like Adoula’s position was weakening and the Congolese army itself was not stable or reliable. Kennedy had a difficult choice: he could quit the Congo along with the UN, or the US could try to stay and assume some responsibility for the mess it was at least partly responsible for. Kennedy chose to stay. But not before he did all he could to try to keep the UN there longer. This even included going to the UN himself on September 20, 1963 to address the General Assembly on this very subject:

    a project undertaken in the excitement of crisis begins to lose its appeal as the problems drag on and the bills pile up…. I believe that this Assembly should do whatever is necessary to preserve the gains already made and to protect the new nation in its struggle for progress. Let us complete what we have started.

    The personal appearance and the speech were enough to turn the UN around. The body voted to keep the peacekeeping mission in place another year. Adoula wired Kennedy his sincere gratitude.

    But in October and November things began to collapse. President Kasavubu decided to disband Parliament and this ignited an already simmering leftist rebellion. Gizenga’s followers called for strikes and army mutinies. They tried to assassinate Mobutu. Kennedy followed the new crisis and wanted a retraining of the Congolese army in order to avert a new civil war. But there was a difference between what Kennedy wanted and what the Pentagon delivered. By October of 1963, Mobutu had already become a favorite of the Fort Benning crowd in the Army, the group that would eventually charter at that military site the School of the Americas, an institution that would spawn a whole generation of rightwing Third World dictators. Kennedy had wanted the retraining carried out by Colonel Michael Greene, an African expert who wanted the retraining to be implemented not just by the US but by five other western countries. Kennedy also agreed with U Thant that there should be African representation in the leadership of that program. Yet Mobutu, with the backing of his Pentagon allies, including Army Chief Earle Wheeler, managed to resist both of these White House wishes. In November, Kennedy ordered a progress report on the retraining issue. The Pentagon had done little and blamed the paltry effort on the UN.

    1964: LBJ reverses Kennedy’s policies

    In 1964, the leftist rebellion picked up strength and began taking whole provinces. President Johnson and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy decided that a weakened Adoula had to be strengthened with a show of American help. The CIA sent Cuban exile pilots to fly sorties against the rebels. When the UN finally withdrew, the US now became an ally of Belgium and intervened with arms, airplanes and advisors. Incredibly, as Jonathan Kwitny notes, Mobutu now invited Tshombe back into the Congo government (p. 79). Further, Tshombe now blamed the revolts on China! To quote Kwitny:

    In a move suspiciously reminiscent of a standard US intelligence agency ploy, Tshombe produced what he said were some captured military documents, and a Chinese defector who announced that China was attempting to take over the Congo as part of a plot to conquer all of Africa. (p. 79)

    With this, the Mobutu-Tshombe alliance now lost all semblance of a Gullion-Kennedy styled moderate coalition. Now, rightwing South Africans and Rhodesians were allowed to join the Congolese army in the war on the “Chinese-inspired left”. Further, as Kwitny also notes, this dramatic reversal was done under the auspices of the United States. The UN had now been dropped as a stabilizing, multilateral force. This meant, of course, that the tilt to the right would now go unabated. By 1965, the new American and Belgian supplemented force had put down the major part of the rebellion. General Mobutu then got rid of President Kasavubu. (Adoula had already been replaced by Tshombe.) In 1966, Mobutu installed himself as military dictator. The rest is a familiar story. Mobutu, like Suharto in Indonesia, allowed his country to be opened up to loads of outside investment. The riches of the Congo, like those of Indonesia, were mined by huge western corporations, whose owners and officers grew wealthy while Mobutu’s subjects were mired in abject poverty. As with the economy, Mobutu stifled political dissent as well. And, like Suharto, Mobutu grew into one of the richest men in the world. His holdings in Belgian real estate alone topped one hundred million dollars (Kwitny p. 87). Just one Swiss bank account was worth $143 million. And like Suharto, Mobutu fell after three decades of a corrupt dictatorship, leaving most of his citizenry in an anarchic, post-colonial state similar to where they had been at the beginning of his reign.

    The policies before and after Kennedy’s in this tale help explain much about the chaos and confusion going on in Congo today. It’s a story you won’t read in many papers or see on television. In itself, the events which occurred there from 1959 to 1966 form a milestone. As Kwitny writes:

    The democratic experiment had no example in Africa, and badly needed one. So perhaps the sorriest, and the most unnecessary, blight on the record of this new era, is that the precedent for it all, the very first coup in post-colonial African history, the very first political assassination, and the very first junking of a legally constituted democratic system, all took place in a major country, and were all instigated by the United States of America. (p. 75)

    Whatever Kennedy’s failures as a tactician, whatever his equivocations were on taking quick and decisive action, he realized that nationalism would have to have its place in American foreign policy. As Mahoney concludes, Kennedy did what no other president before or after him had done. He established “a common ground between African ideals and American self-interest in the midst of the Cold War.” (p. 248) As Kwitny notes, this was the basis of Lumumba’s (undying) appeal:

    Lumumba is a hero to Africans not because he promoted socialism, which he didn’t, but because he resisted foreign intervention. He stood up to outsiders, if only by getting himself killed. Most Africans … would say that the principal outsider he stood up to was the United States. (p. 72)

    Mahoney relates an anecdote which helps explain why Kennedy understood the appeal of Lumumba. It has little to do with his 1951 trip to Saigon, although it may help explain why he sought out the people he did while he was there. The vignette illuminates a lot about the Kennedy mystery, i.e. why the son of a multimillionaire ended up being on the side of African black nationalism abroad and integration at home. In January of 1962, in the midst of the Congo crisis, Kennedy was talking to Nehru of India when, presumably, the great Indian leader was lecturing him on the subject of colonialism. Kennedy replied:

    I grew up in a community where the people were hardly a generation away from colonial rule. And I can claim the company of many historians in saying that the colonialism to which my immediate ancestors were subject was more sterile, oppressive and even cruel than that of India.

    Kennedy, of course, was referring to the conquest and subjugation of Ireland by the British. A colonization that has now lasted for 800 years. Clearly, Kennedy never forgot where his family came from.

    It is also clear that in his brief intervention in the politics of the newly liberated continent of Africa, its new progressive leaders realized Kennedy’s sensitivity to their painful and precarious position. They also seem to have realized what Kennedy the politician was up against, and what may have caused his death.

    Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana – a clear leftist who Kennedy had backed against heavy odds and who was perhaps the greatest of that period’s African leaders – was overcome with sadness upon hearing of the young American president’s death. In a speech at that time, he told his citizens that Africa would forever remember Kennedy’s great sensitivity to that continent’s special problems. (Mahoney, p. 235) Later, when the American ambassador handed Nkrumah a copy of the Warren Report, he thumbed through it and pointed to the name of Allen Dulles as a member of the Warren Commission. He handed it back abruptly, muttering simply, “Whitewash.”


    In part two, Lisa Pease explores the covert action underlying the plots against Lumumba and new evidence which has surfaced regarding the mysterious death of Dag Hammarskjold.

  • The Sins of Robert Blakey


    From the September-October 1998 issue (Vol. 5 No. 6) of Probe


    Thankfully, the Assassination Records Review Board has declassified many of the files of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. This process is ongoing as it winds down to its termination date of October 1, 1998. But there is quite enough now available to begin to get an accurate gauge on the performance of that committee, more specifically the record of its controversial second Chief Counsel, G. Robert Blakey. It seems odd that, as of today, no one has written a book-length critique on the history and findings of the HSCA. Within four years of the issuance of the Warren Report, there were several incisive, full length analyses of that report and organization. Yet, nearly two decades after the HSCA’s Final Report, there is no matching volume of the last investigation into the murder of President Kennedy – or the corresponding HSCA inquest into the assassination of Martin Luther King.

    This essay will not pretend to be the comprehensive history and analysis that now cries out – screams – to be done on the HSCA. It is written as a stepping stone, an indication of what could and should be written on that topic. In the immediate aftermath of the release of the HSCA Final Report in 1979, two books were being written that proposed to perform this critical analysis. One, to be written by Ted Gandolfo, to my knowledge, never got past the unpublished manuscript stage. Another book, Beyond Conspiracy, an anthology by Peter Scott, Russell Stetler, Paul Hoch, and Josiah Thompson, progressed further toward publication than Gandolfo’s. This too was never published. And from the version of the volume I have, it does not take on the function of critical analysis that Mark Lane or Sylvia Meagher did in the previous decade. In fact, the tone is not really critical at all. This can be seen by reading Thompson’s discussion of the HSCA’s version of the single bullet theory. This celebrated critic actually seems to accept what he was so skeptical about in his 1967 Warren Commission critique, Six Seconds in Dallas. As we shall see in part two of this essay, Blakey’s version of the magic bullet theory is, in some ways, even more strained than the Warren Commission’s.

    In the wake of the HSCA Final Report, finally issued in the summer of 1979, there were three books published on the JFK case in 1980 and 1981. David Lifton released Best Evidence, Anthony Summers authored Conspiracy, and Blakey (with co-author Dick Billings) wrote The Plot to Kill the President. Both Summers and Lifton seemed to take their cues from Blakey’s post press conference press conference. After the Final Report was issued, Blakey called his own press conference to say that although the HSCA had come up with a finding of “probable conspiracy” without pointing the finger directly at any one, he knew that the real culprit was the Mob. His book, published by a subsidiary of the New York Times, reiterated that verdict in (unconvincing) detail. In the book’s preface, Blakey again stated that “the evidence . . . established that organized crime was behind the plot to kill John F. Kennedy.” Although the Lifton and Summers books discuss the HSCA, they are in no way rigorous anlayses of that body. In fact, both books rely on some of the information published by the HSCA and both writers were privy to leaks since they had contacts inside the committee. With the benefit of hindsight, this has proven to be at least a partly questionable practice. As HSCA investigator Gaeton Fonzi once told me, the HSCA was so compartmentalized that only those people at the top really knew what the entire body was doing. These would include Blakey, his deputy on the JFK side, Gary Cornwell, and the Final Report’s co-author, Billings. Relying on informants inside the committee only gave these writers a glimpse of the gestalt. With the release of the raw files of the HSCA, it seems that both Summers and Lifton were too deferential to certain important aspects of the HSCA, a point to which we will return. (An interesting sidelight should be noted at this point. Nearly all the authors mentioned thus far – Summers, Scott, Hoch, Lifton – have all been muted in their criticism of Blakey. Yet, when the subject of Jim Garrison is brought up, they have no problem venting their spleens at length on the late DA.)

    It is important to trace the origins of the House Select Committee to understand the temper of the times in which the last investigation began, and also to briefly map out the change that occurred when Robert Blakey, Cornwell, and Billings took over for the original Chief Counsel, Richard Sprague and his Deputy Counsel Robert Tanenbaum.

    After Clay Shaw’s acquittal in 1969, Jim Garrison had attempted to bring Shaw up on (well-justified) perjury charges. In May of 1971, Judge Herbert Christenberry (whose wife had telegraphed Shaw their congratulations upon his earlier acquittal) threw out the charges. As Mort Sahl related to me, he and Garrison then went to the 1972 Democratic National Convention to try and make a political issue of the case with people like George McGovern who had been a friend of both John and Robert Kennedy. They were frowned upon by people in the Louisiana delegation, headed by former Warren Commissioner Hale Boggs. At this juncture the case seemed dead. But the ensuing Watergate scandal inadvertently revived it. The Senate’s Republican minority report, issued by then minority counsel and now Senator Fred Thompson, saw much CIA involvement in that scandal. Thompson’s boss, Senator Howard Baker, later became one of the participants in Frank Church’s subsequent investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1975. That committee publicly exposed a myriad of crimes conducted by both the CIA and the FBI. But there were two aspects of Church’s work that impacted with force on the JFK case and helped revive it in the media. First, Church held hearings on the secret CIA plots to kill foreign leaders, most notably Fidel Castro. Second, committee members Richard Schweiker and Gary Hart conducted their own investigation of the performance of the FBI and CIA in investigating the Kennedy assassination. That report remains mandatory reading today. It was a scathing indictment of both agencies which categorically exposed the breathtaking rush to judgment to nail Lee Harvey Oswald.

    This was a qualitative leap up from Garrison. The New Orleans DA could only howl in the wind about what he knew to be the malfeasance, or worse, of those two agencies in the Kennedy case. Now, with access to the actual documentary record, Frank Church and the U. S. Senate were certifying that much of what Garrison said was true and warranted. Further, Church was also saying that the CIA secretly plotted the deaths of political leaders and was tracing those plots in detail. At this time, New Orleans magazine ran a cover story on Garrison basically saying that he had said all this before and no one had listened to him. Researcher Mary Ferrell wrote him a letter apologizing for not standing by him more staunchly. She didn’t suspect in 1967 that the CIA could do such awful things.

    In the midst of the tumult about Church’s sensational disclosures, Robert Groden and Dick Gregory went to Geraldo Rivera who then had a network talk show at ABC. At the time, Groden had the best copy yet made of Abraham Zapruder’s 26 second film of the JFK assassination. On March 6, 1975, for the first time, millions of Americans were convinced that, at the very least, Oswald had not acted alone. The effect of this public showing of the Zapruder film was, in a word, electrifying. The day after, the Kennedy assassination was topic number one in bars and barber shops across America. The case was back on the front burner. Along with the exposure of the crimes of the CIA, and the negligence of the FBI, what Warren Commission critic could have asked for more?

    One of the people who got hold of a copy of the Zapruder film at this time was the son of Congressman Thomas Downing of Virginia, who had represented the Newport News area of that state for over fifteen years. An accomplished lawyer by trade, Downing was a well-respected member of the House of Representatives. When I interviewed Downing in 1993 at his luxurious office in beautiful Newport News, he told me that his son and a friend of his named Andy Purdy had viewed the film at the University of Virginia and were shocked at what it depicted. His son made Downing watch the film and the Congressman decided that this evidence itself merited an investigation by the House. He decided to draw up a bill focusing on the formation of a committee to reinvestigate the murder of John F. Kennedy.

    At the time of Downing’s action, the spring of 1975, there already was a bill on the House floor (HR 204), authorizing a reinvestigation of all three assassinations of the sixties – JFK, Robert Kennedy, Martin Luther King and the attempted killing of George Wallace. Its author was Texas representative Henry Gonzalez. Gonzalez was part of the reception party when Kennedy had visited Dallas and he was at Parkland Hospital when Kennedy had died. His name is mentioned at times in the Warren Commission volumes. Gonzalez had liked Kennedy and his policies and wished to go farther than just examining only JFK’s death – he wished to relate it to the other two. But his bill was stalled and had little hope of succeeding. Gonzalez decided to give way to Downing’s bill and then both men made a tactical move. They decided to attach only the King case to Downing’s bill in order to enlist the aid of the Black Caucus in the House.

    It was an uphill battle, but the momentum kept accumulating. On September 8, 1975 Senator Schweiker introduced a Senate resolution calling for a reopening of the Kennedy case. In the House, Don Edwards’ subcommittee on Constitutional Rights held hearings into allegations that Oswald had delivered a threatening letter to the Dallas headquarters of the FBI just weeks before the assassination. This was the famous note that was subsequently destroyed after the assassination. With this kind of controversy playing in the papers, the Downing-Gonzalez bill was getting some help. And Downing was a determined man who made some impassioned speeches on the floor of the House. (The one he made on March 18, 1976 was a dandy. See page 16.) Finally, in September of 1976 the bill cleared the Rules Committee where it had been bottled up for months. On September 17, 1976 HR 1540 creating the House Select Committee on Assassinations was passed by a vote of 280-65.

    The committee was first led by Downing with Gonzalez as second in command. Once formed, it faced two immediate problems. First, Downing had decided that this would be his last term in the House of Representatives. He would step down at the end of 1976. Second, a chief counsel would have to be chosen. Both of these events were absolutely crucial to the history of this committee. Neither of them has gotten the attention or weight they deserve. Although the battle to get the HSCA authorized had been a difficult one, the newly formed committee still had plenty of ballast from the momentous events described above, all taking place from 1974-1976. Also, former Warren Commissioner Gerald Ford, who we now know was up to his neck in the spurious editing of the Warren Report, was about to leave office. Ford had done everything he could to thwart the investigations of Frank Church and his congressional counterpart Otis Pike in the House. He had even formed his own commission to preempt them. It had been headed by, of all people, Nelson Rockefeller who chose as his chief counsel former Warren Commissioner David Belin. Jimmy Carter was to be the new president and he had campaigned against the corruption symbolized by Watergate with the slogan, “I will never lie to you.”

    When I asked Downing if he had ever thought of staying on just to see the committee through, he replied no he had not. He was eager to return home, spend time with his family, and get back to his law practice. In retrospect, Downing’s departure was a blow the committee could not sustain. Gonzalez was now slated to be eventual chairman, and as Bob Tanenbaum later told me, he hadn’t the experience or the stature to carry out what would be an insurmountable task. But before leaving, Downing was determined to choose a worthy chief counsel, one who would be above reproach from both a political and professional standpoint.

    Downing told me that he was mystified by reports in the media (see page 19) that he was pushing Mark Lane for that position. He never suggested him for the job since he was perceived as being too close to the subject to lead an impartial investigation. He said he opened up the subject to the committee members themselves. They nominated several people for different positions. He then pulled out the record of the original nominations made on September 29, 1976. It shows that the nomination of Richard A. Sprague was made by Gonzalez himself. Five days later, Sprague was appointed Chief Counsel and Staff Director.

    Henry James could not have dreamed a more ironic stroke. As we shall see, the upcoming battle between Gonzalez and Sprague was to ensure both their ousters. But Sprague was actually a salutary choice at the time. He had just come off a brilliant legal performance in a sensational murder case, namely the conspiracy to kill reform labor leader Jock Yablonski, a conspiracy headed by corrupt union boss Tony Boyle. Sprague had been appointed special prosecutor for Washington County, Pennsylvania between 1970 and 1975. He had unraveled the complex conspiracy behind the Yablonski murders. He went through a series of five trials pyramiding upward through each level of the conspiracy. It culminated with the conviction of Boyle, not once but twice since the original verdict had been overturned upon appeal. Previously, Sprague had made a reputation as first assistant DA in Philadelphia under, of all people, Arlen Specter. Tanenbaum told me that although Sprague liked Specter personally, he thought he was a completely political animal. And politics was something that never entered Sprague’s legal ethos.

    When Downing approached Sprague for the position, the former special prosecutor told him that he had no fixed opinion on what had happened in either the King or Kennedy cases. He was aware that there had been a controversy as to what and how much had been revealed to the public. So he insisted that there should be no more cover-ups. If he took the job it would have to be with the insistence that as much as possible be done in public. He also insisted on four other conditions:

    1. He wanted to hire his own investigators.
    2. There would be no time constraints that would allow government agencies to just stonewall and outlast the committee.
    3. There had to be enough money to employ a large, efficient staff so there would be no reliance on other aspects of the government for services rendered.
    4. To emphasize the non-political nature of the inquest, there would be no majority and minority counsel positions, just a chief counsel and executive director.

    As Sprague related later on Ted Gandolfo’s cable program in New York, if Downing would not have agreed to all four conditions, he was prepared to go back to private practice. Downing said yes, and Sprague took command. For a brief moment, the critical community thought they finally had their man in a position that could finally do something to officially change the status of the Kennedy case. As Cyril Wecht commented:

    Dick Sprague was the ideal man for that job with the HSCA. Richard Sprague had probably prosecuted more murder cases than any DA in the United States. . . . He knew how the police worked. He wasn’t just the kind of guy who tried the case. He worked with the police. He knew thoroughly how homicide cases were conducted. He’s tough, he’s tenacious, he’s aggressive. He has a strong streak of independence. He was the man for the job.

    Or, as Gaeton Fonzi recalled it in The Third Decade of November of 1984,

    After talking with Sprague I was now certain he planned to conduct a strong investigation and I was never more optimistic in my life. I remember excitingly envisioning the scope and character of the investigation. It would include a major effort in Miami, with teams of investigators digging into all those unexplored corners the Warren Commission had ignored or shied away from. They would be working with squads of attorneys to put legal pressure on, to squeeze the truth from recalcitrant witnesses. There would be reams of sworn depositions, the ample use of warrants and no fear of bringing prosecutions for perjury. We would have all sorts of sophisticated investigative resources and, more important, the authority to use them. The Kennedy assassination would finally get the investigation it deserved and an honest democracy needed. There would be no more bullshit.

    And for a short time, there wasn’t. Sprague hired two top deputies, one for the Kennedy side of the HSCA, and one for the King side. They both came out of New York City. Tanenbaum took the JFK side, and his friend Bob Lehner took over the MLK investigation. Sprague granted both men the freedom to pick their own staffs. Tanenbaum brought in some first class detectives from New York, like Al Gonzalez and Cliff Fenton. From an interstate homicide task force he helmed, Tanenbaum hired L. J. Delsa to work New Orleans. He hired Michael Baden and Cyril Wecht to serve as his chief medical consultants. After talking to Richard Schweiker, he decided to hire his chief field investigator, Fonzi to investigate the Florida scene. There were literally thousands of applicants for the researchers’ positions on the HSCA. When I interviewed Al Lewis in Lancaster, he told me that they must have gotten at least 12,000 applications to work on the committee from young people around the country, most of them college students who wanted to serve. Lewis was an attorney who had worked with Sprague in Philadelphia, helped on the Yablonski case, and later joined him in private practice.

    The feeling on the committee, and inside the research community was that the JFK case was now going to get a really professional hearing. Jim Garrison never had the resources or the professional manpower to really helm a widespread, multi-pronged criminal task force. It looked like celebrated prosecutor Sprague now would. As Lewis related to me, one of the areas that Sprague expressed a special interest in was the medical and ballistics evidence. Sprague and his fellow staff attorneys requested entrance into the National Archives in order to survey the existing medical evidence firsthand. They were appalled at what they saw. Coming out of big city homicide bureaus, they had studied many autopsies. Remembering back to the experience of encountering the autopsy materials in this case, a look of disbelief and disgust crossed Lewis’ face. Sitting in his office on a Sunday afternoon in Lancaster, Pennsylvania I took note of that look and I commented that Harold Weisberg has written that skid row bums had received better autopsies than President Kennedy’s. Lewis replied, “Its worse than that.” When I asked him to elaborate, he waved me off. As Bob Tanenbaum plodded through the Warren Commission volumes, he was shocked at their incompleteness and the lack of thorough investigation. As he relates in his fictionalized treatment of the matter, Corruption of Blood, it struck him as being unsatisfactory for a first year assistant DA and something in which a law student could have found giant evidentiary holes.

    Sprague was eager to delve into some of the better, more concrete materials that the critics had come up with. One area that he felt was important was the photographic evidence. Soon after he accepted the position, counsel Richard A. Sprague was introduced to photoanalyst-computer technician Richard E. Sprague. Sprague quickly arranged a presentation of the voluminous photos that Richard E. Sprague had collected over the years, undoubtedly the largest collection of pictures on the JFK case in any private collection. Sprague directed every hired detective and researcher to attend a photographic slide show put together by the Kennedy researcher. According to people who were there, it was a long and impressive presentation. But before the lights went down, Sprague turned to everyone in attendance and said, “I don’t want anyone to leave unless I leave. And I don’t plan on leaving.” By the end of Sprague’s four hour slide show, Al Lewis told me that, of the 13 staff lawyers in attendance, only one still held out for the single bullet theory.

    ….

    The rest of this article can be found in The Assassinations, edited by Jim DiEugenio and Lisa Pease.

  • Sirhan and the RFK Assassination, Part II: Rubik’s Cube


    In Part I of this article, we saw that Sirhan could not have shot Kennedy. Indeed, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that Sirhan was firing blanks. If Sirhan did not shoot Kennedy, who did? Why? And how is it that Sirhan’s own lawyers did not reveal the evidence that he could not have committed the crime for which he received a death sentence?

    Before one considers the above issues, one larger issue stands out. If Sirhan did not kill Kennedy, how has the cover-up lasted this long? In the end, that question will bring us closer to the top of the conspiracy than any other. No matter who was involved, if there were a will to get to the bottom of this crime, the evidence has been available. The fact that no official body has ever made the effort to honestly examine all the evidence in this case is nearly as chilling as the original crime itself, and points to a high level of what can only be termed government involvement. In the history of this country and particularly the sixties, one entity stands out beyond all others as having the means, the motive, and the opportunity to orchestrate this crime and continue the cover-up to this very day. But the evidence will point its own fingers; it remains only for us to follow wherever the evidence leads.

    Cover-Up Artists

    It has often been said that a successful conspiracy requires not artful planning, but rather control of the investigation that follows. The investigation was controlled primarily by a few key LAPD officers and the DA. Despite Congressman Allard Lowenstein’s efforts, no federal investigation of this case has ever taken place. In other words, a small handful of people were capable of keeping information that would point to conspirators out of the public eye. The Warren Commission’s conclusions were subjected to intense scrutiny when their documentation was published. Evidently the LAPD wanted no such scrutiny, and simply refused to release their files until ordered to do so in the late ’80s.

    SUS members predominantly came from military backgrounds.1 Charles Higbie, who controlled a good portion of the investigation, had been in the Marine Corps for five years and in Intelligence in the Marine Corp. Reserve for eight more. Frank Patchett, the man who turned the Kennedy “head bullet” over to DeWayne Wolfer after it had taken a trip to Washington with an FBI man, had spent four years in the Navy, where his specialty was Cryptography. The Navy and Marines figured prominently in the background of a good many of the SUS investigators. The editor of the SUS Final Report, however, had spent eight years of active duty with the Air Force, as a Squadron Commander and Electronics Officer.

    Two SUS members were in a unique position within the LAPD to control the investigation and the determination of witness credibility: Manuel Pena and Hank Hernandez. Pena had quite the catbird seat. A chart from the LAPD shows that all investigations were funneled through a process whereby all reports came at some point to him. He then had the sole authority for “approving” the interviews, and for deciding whether or not to do a further interview with each and every witness. In other words, if you wanted to control the flow of the investigation, all you would have to do is control Lt. Manuel Pena.

    In a similarly powerful position, Sgt. Enrique “Hank” Hernandez was the sole polygraph operator for the SUS unit. In other words, whether a witness was lying or telling the truth was left to the sole discretion of Hernandez. Some people mistakenly think that a polygraph is an objective determiner of a person’s veracity. But a polygraph operator can alter the machine’s sensitivity to make a liar look like a truth teller, or a truth teller look like a liar. In addition, the manner of the polygraph operator will do much to assuage or create fear and stress in the person being polygraphed. In addition, no less than William Colby himself said it is possible to beat the machine with a few tricks. For these and other reasons, no court in America allows the results of polygraph tests to be used as evidence. But Hernandez’s polygraph results were given amazing weight in the SUS investigation. Indeed, his tests became the sole factor in the SUS’s determination of the credibility of witnesses.

    Because of their prominent roles in the cover-up, the background of Pena and Hernandez has always been of special interest. Pena has an odd background indeed. His official SUS information states he served in the Navy during WWII and in the Army during the Korean War, and was a Counterintelligence officer in France. According to Robert Houghton, he “spoke French and Spanish, and had connections with various intelligence agencies in several countries.”2 Pena also served the CIA for a long time. Pena’s brother told the TV newsman Stan Bohrman that Manny was proud of his service to the CIA. In 1967, Pena “retired” from the LAPD, leaving to join AID, the agency long since acknowledged as having provided the CIA cover for political operations in foreign countries. Roger LeJeunesse, an FBI agent who had been involved in the RFK assassination investigation, told William Turner that Pena had performed special assignments for the CIA for more than ten years. LaJeunesse added that Pena had gone to a “special training unit” of the CIA’s in Virginia. On some assignments Pena worked with Dan Mitrione, the CIA man assassinated by rebels in Uruguay for his role in teaching torture to the police forces there. After his retirement from the LAPD (and a very public farewell dinner) in November of 1967, Pena inexplicably returned to the LAPD in 1968. 3

    Hernandez had also worked with AID. During his session with Sandy Serrano, he told her that he had once been called to Vietnam, South America and Europe to perform polygraph tests. He also claimed he had been called to administer a polygraph to the dictator of Venezuela back when President Betancourt came to power.

    One of Hernandez’s neighbors related to Probe how Hernandez used to live in a modest home in the Monterey Park area, a solidly middle-class neighborhood. But within a short time after the assassination, Hernandez had moved to a place that has a higher income per capita then Beverly Hills: San Marino. He came into possession of a security firm and handled large accounts for the government.

    Another all-important position in the cover-up would necessarily have been the office of the District Attorney, then occupied by J. Evelle Younger. Evelle Younger had been one of Hoover’s top agents before he left the FBI to join the Counterintelligence unit of the Far East branch of the OSS.4

    Under these three, credible leads were discarded. Younger wrote off the problem of Sirhan’s distance as a “discrepancy” of an inch or two, when in fact the problem was of a foot or more. Truthful witnesses were made to admit to impossible lies under Hernandez’s pressure-cooker sessions. Pena took a special interest in getting rid of the story of the girl in the polka dot dress. But no investigation could be considered fully under control if one did not also have control over the defense investigators. Sirhan’s defense lawyers could not be allowed to look too deeply into the contradictory evidence in the case.

    The “Defense” Team

    Despite the late appearance of the autopsy report (after the trial had already commenced), its significance was noted and reported to Sirhan’s lead attorney, Grant Cooper by Robert Kaiser. Why did Cooper not act on this very important information? Was Cooper truly serving Sirhan, or was Cooper perhaps beholden to a more powerful client? What of the others on Sirhan’s team? Just what kind of representation did Sirhan receive?

    Several people were key to Sirhan’s original defense. These were – in order of their appearance in the case – A. L. “Al” Wirin, Robert Kaiser, Grant Cooper, Russell Parsons, and Michael McCowan. Who were these people?

    Upon Sirhan’s arrest, he asked to see an attorney for the ACLU. Al Wirin showed up. In 1954, Wirin had brought a suit against the LAPD over the legality of some of the department’s wiretapping methods.5 Most people might expect that a lawyer for the ACLU would care a great deal about the rights of the accused; that’s what the American Civil Liberties Union is supposed to be all about. But that evidently wasn’t Abraham Lincoln Wirin’s style. Consider the following information from Mark Lane:

    On December 4, 1964, when I debated in Southern California with Joseph A. Ball… [of the Warren Commission and] A. L. Wirin….Wirin made an impassioned plea for support for the findings of the commission….He said, his voice rising in an earnest plea:

    “I say thank God for Earl Warren. He saved us from a pogrom. He saved our nation. God bless him for what he has done in establishing that Oswald was the lone assassin.”

    The audience remained silent. I asked but one question: “If Oswald was innocent, Mr. Wirin, would you still say, ‘Thank God for Earl Warren’ and bless him for establishing him as the lone murderer?” Wirin thought for but an instant. He responded, “Yes. I still would say so.”6

    Wirin has made a number of claims, including that Sirhan confessed the assassination to him. Given the evidence, such a confession is of little value, since no matter what Sirhan thought, he could not have been the shooter. But more troubling is the fact that an ACLU lawyer would share a comment made by a prisoner in confidence to what he thought was a legal representative there to help him. And when Sirhan requested a couple of books relating to the occult shortly after his arrest, Wirin felt the need to report this to the media.

    How Robert Blair Kaiser entered the case is a bit fuzzy. According to Melanson and Klaber, Wirin commissioned Kaiser to approach Grant Cooper. But according to Kaiser, he had injected himself into the case right after the assassination. Upon hearing of the assassination, he claimed he “choked, cried, cursed, and, instead of sitting there weeping in front of the TV, tried to do something.” His something was to call Life magazine’s LA Bureau, where he “found that the bureau needed [his] help and tried to get on the track of the man who shot Kennedy.”7

    One of Kaiser’s first acts on the case was to interview Sirhan’s brother Saidallah in his Pasadena apartment on the night of June 5th, less than 24 hours after RFK had been shot. Kaiser brought along Life photographer Howard Bingham, who tried to take Saidallah’s picture. Saidallah did not want his picture taken.8 Saidallah later filed a police report detailing an incident later that night after Kaiser’s visit. The LAPD record states:

    At approximately 11:30 p.m. he heard someone kick on his front door. He answered the door and just as he unlocked the screen, the door was kicked open. A man rushed through the door and struck [Saidallah] Sirhan in the cheek with his fist and stated, “Damn it, we’re gonna kill all you Arabs.”…The man stated, “If you don’t give your photograph to Life, we’re going to take it from you.” He took a photograph of Sirhan from a small table and walked out of the apartment. Another man was with the one who entered Sirhan’s apartment, but he did not enter.

    Kaiser claims this event never happened. But how could he know? On a strange note, Kaiser gave Sirhan a copy of Witness, the book detailing Whittaker Chambers’ account of “exposing” Alger Hiss.9

    Kaiser initiated contact with Sirhan by calling Wirin to ask if he could get him in to see Sirhan. During the call, Kaiser mentioned that he had discussed the case with Grant Cooper, a well-known Los Angeles criminal attorney. When Wirin heard Kaiser knew Cooper, Wirin asked Kaiser to urge Cooper to help Sirhan. Curiously, Sirhan had also picked out Cooper’s name when shown a list of lawyers. It seemed everyone wanted Cooper in this case, including Cooper himself.

    Cooper had an interesting background. He had, but a year earlier, gone all the way to Da Nang, Vietnam to defend a Marine corporal on a murder charge before a military court. Why would a Los Angeles lawyer fly all the way to Vietnam to defend a man in military court? Answered Cooper, “I’d never been asked to defend a man before a military court before.”10 This highly paid lawyer with no reported proclivities for lost causes nonetheless agreed to take on Sirhan’s case, even though the family had virtually no money to offer for Sirhan’s defense. He couldn’t do so immediately, however, as he was busy defending an associate of Johnny Roselli in the Friar’s Club card cheating scandal. Roselli was hired by Robert Maheu to head up the CIA’s assassination plots against Castro. Roselli spent time at JMWAVE, the CIA’s enormous station in Miami, training snipers among other activities.11 Cooper’s client was also accused by another associate of Roselli’s, of having passed him money to pay for a murder.12

    As Probe readers saw in Jim DiEugenio’s landmark piece about how the CIA worked hand in hand with Clay Shaw’s attorneys to undermine New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison’s investigation of John Kennedy’s murder, the CIA maintained a “Cleared Attorneys’ Panel” from which they could draw trustworthy, closemouthed representation as needed.13 When someone as knowledgeable as Roselli of the CIA’s innermost secrets is being defended, one would assume that the CIA would go to great lengths to provide him legal assistance. Cooper was in direct and extensive contact with Roselli’s lawyer James Cantillion. In connection with this case, Cooper himself obtained stolen grand jury transcripts by bribing a court clerk, a very serious (not to mention illegal) offense. In addition, Cooper had twice lied to a federal judge. Frankly, Cooper sounded more like a candidate for the CIA’s Cleared Attorneys’ Panel than for the role of a justice crusader. The notion that he would volunteer to defend Sirhan at a time when his own legal troubles were raging around him is preposterous. Something besides pity for a penniless, guilty-looking client was likely motivating Cooper.

    While Cooper was waiting to finish the Friar’s Club case, Wirin showed Cooper a list of attorneys that included the names of Joseph Ball and Herman Selvin. Curiously, it was Ball and Selvin who had participated with Wirin in the debate with Mark Lane (all three defending the Warren Report against the attacks of Mark Lane). Ball and Selvin were Cooper’s first choices, but they turned him down.14 Two others on the list included Russell E. Parsons and Luke McKissack. Cooper chose Parsons, saying he did not know McKissack, but that he had ” worked with Russ before.”15 (McKissack was later to become a lawyer for Sirhan.16) Parsons immediately accepted defending this “poor devil in trouble,” as he characterized Sirhan.17 For whatever strange reason, LAPD files record Russell Parsons as having an alias: Lester Harris.18 Perhaps that was a remnant from his days as a Mob lawyer.19

    Parsons, in turn, brought Michael McCowan into the case as a private investigator. McCowan was an ex-Marine, an ex-cop and an ex-law student.20 Michael McCowan had been expelled from the LAPD in the wake of his dealings with David Kassab and others who were running a land scam deal in the San Fernando Valley in 1962. In the SUS files, there are continual references to the “Kassab Report”, a report of an investigation into “alleged ties between the J.F.K. and the R.F.K. assassinations.” The report itself is nowhere to be found. Listed as being in the report are names such as Clay Shaw, Lyndon B. Johnson, John F. Kennedy, Jim Braden, Russell Parsons, and many others of interest to assassination researchers. The report is over 900 pages long, according to page references scattered among these files. Why was such a massive report compiled? Why do so many references to it appear in the SUS files? And why has the full Kassab report been suppressed to this day?

    McCowan had other problems to bring to the table beyond the Kassab deal. A former girlfriend of his notified the police that he kept a large stash of weapons in his residence. The police issued an order to investigate whether the weapons represented “loot” from other crimes, but asked that the investigation be kept quiet. At the time McCowan entered the Sirhan case, he was on a three-year probation, having appealed a five-year sentence he received in conjunction with theft and tampering with U.S. mail.

    Following his involvement in the Sirhan case, McCowan worked as a defense investigator for peace activists Donald Freed and Shirley Sutherland. Freed and Sutherland had been set up by a self-proclaimed former CIA Green Beret named James Jarrett. In March of 1969, Freed and Sutherland helped organize “Friends of the Black Panthers.” Jarrett had infiltrated the group by offering training in the area of self-defense, as members of the group had experienced assaults and even rape. Freed asked Jarrett to buy him a mace-like spray to use for defensive purposes. Jarrett instead presented Freed a brown-paper wrapped box of explosives while wearing a wire and attempting to get Freed to say that the “stuff” was for the Panthers. Minutes after the exchange, agents of the FBI, LAPD and Treasury raided Freed’s home. Freed was charged with illegal possession of explosives. McCowan was hired by the defense as an investigator. McCowan in turn hired Sam Bluth to assist the defense. But Bluth worked instead as a police informant, stealing defense files and witness lists and proffering them to the police.21

    Cooper had originally secured an initial agreement from yet another lawyer to participate in the case: the famous Edward Bennett Williams. Williams had represented the Washington Post during its Watergate coverage while also representing the target of the break-in, the Democratic National Committee. He had defended CIA Director Richard Helms when he was charged with perjury in the wake of the revelations about the CIA’s participation in the events surrounding the assassination of Allende in Chile. Williams in fact defended a number of CIA men.

    Williams had also defended Jimmy Hoffa when Robert Kennedy was aggressively pursuing him. And he had the gall to ask Robert Kennedy’s personal secretary Angie Novello, recipient of the John Kennedy autopsy materials, to work for him after Robert was killed. Novello refused until Williams convinced her (rightfully or wrongly) that he and Bobby had made up in the wake of the Hoffa pursuit. In addition, Williams had defended Joseph McCarthy when he was under attack from the Senate. (Perhaps that is why Kaiser gave Sirhan Witness to read!) Lastly, and perhaps importantly, Williams had become good friends with Robert Maheu, the man who had hired Roselli to kill Castro on behalf of the CIA. Maheu himself appears to play a larger and more interesting role in the story of the RFK assassination, a point to which we’ll return. All in all, Williams was a most curious choice of Cooper’s, and one wonders what moved Williams to make even a tentative agreement to represent Sirhan.

    When Williams bowed out, Cooper turned to Emile “Zuke” Berman. Berman’s biggest case had involved defending a Marine drill instructor who had led his troop into a fast-rising estuary. Six drowned in this incident. Berman was able to get the man’s sentence reduced to six months, and then obtained a full reversal from the Secretary of the Navy. Berman was later accused by Cooper of leaking the story of a proposed plea bargain (in which Cooper would plead Sirhan guilty to 1st degree murder in the hopes of avoiding a death sentence) to the press during the trial. (Judge Walker claimed he had been told the source was Kaiser.22) Berman was distressed that the Israeli/Palestinian battles were being given focus by the defense team during the case, and Kaiser was later to say Berman was “there in name and body only; his spirit wasn’t there.”23

    Now if you temporarily throw out any questions raised by the evidence that has just been presented, and focus solely on how well these people served Sirhan, the picture is grim indeed. On the key point of the lack of a clear chain of possession of the bullets, Cooper met with the prosecuting attorneys in Judge Walker’s chamber on February 21, 1969. The way Cooper gives in on an issue he has every reason to fight goes to the heart of the credibility of how well he defended his client. Here is the relevant section:

    Fitts (Deputy DA): Now, there is another problem that I’d like to get to with respect to the medical. It is our intention to call DeWayne Wolfer to testify with respect to his ballistics comparison. Some of the objects or exhibits that he will need illustrative of his testimony will…not have adequate foundation, as I will concede at this time.

    Cooper: You mean the surgeon took it from the body and this sort of thing?

    Fitts: Well, with respect to the bullets or bullet fragments that came from the alleged victims, it is our understanding that there will be a stipulation that these objects came from the persons whom I say they came from. Is that right?

    Cooper: So long as you make that avowal, there will be no question about that.

    Fitts: Fine. Well, we have discussed the matter with Mr. Wolfer as to those envelopes containing those bullets or bullet fragments; he knows where they came from; the envelope will be marked with the names of the victims….24 [Emphasis added.]

    Cooper would make many strange moves, allegedly in “defense” of Sirhan. He kept the autopsy photos from being presented in court under the notion that they would cause sympathy for Kennedy and arouse even more ire against his client. But that was the evidence that could have been used to absolve Sirhan of guilt in the case. But Cooper wasn’t looking for evidence of Sirhan’s innocence. In addition, Sirhan’s notebooks were found during an illegal search (a search authorized by Adel, but Adel had no legal authority to give such authorization) of Mary Sirhan’s house, where Sirhan was living at the time. Cooper had every reason to bar these notebooks from being admitted into evidence, but he chose not only to admit them into evidence, but even had Sirhan read portions of them from the stand. And it was Cooper who supplied Sirhan the motive he lacked, claiming that Sirhan was angry that RFK was willing to provide jets to Israel. Sirhan, lacking any memory of the crime or why he was there with a gun, readily accepted this in lieu of the only other explanation suggested to him, that he was utterly insane.

    Kaiser involved himself with Sirhan’s defense team by negotiating a book contract, claiming that a portion of the proceeds could be used to pay the lawyers. In return for his access, he would work as an investigator for Sirhan. It was Kaiser who brought the distance problem regarding Sirhan’s position relative to Robert Kennedy’s powder burns to the attention of Sirhan’s defense team, albeit late in the game. Yet Kaiser believes that Sirhan and Sirhan alone fired all the bullets in the pantry. Kaiser was also the first to bring attention to the strange behavior of Sirhan during the crime that so strongly suggested to Kaiser that he was under some sort of hypnotic influence.

    This issue is all-important to the question of Sirhan’s guilt. The ballistics and forensic evidence indicates clearly that there was a conspiracy. So wasn’t Sirhan a conspirator? Not necessarily. The question has always been this: did Sirhan play a witting, complicit role; or was he guided in some manner by others to the point where he was not in control of his actions and their consequences? This most serious issue was never brought up during Sirhan’s only trial.

    The Question of Hypnosis

    The defense team hired Dr. Bernard Diamond to examine Sirhan to ascertain his mental state, and to find out if Sirhan could be made to remember what happened under hypnosis. As soon as Diamond hypnotized Sirhan, he found that Sirhan was an exceedingly simple subject. In fact, Sirhan “went under” so quickly and so deeply that Diamond had to work to keep him conscious enough to respond. Kaiser recorded that the very first words that Sirhan spoke to Diamond when put under hypnosis were “I don’t know any people.”25 Such rapid induction generally indicates prior hypnosis.

    The tapes of Diamond’s hypnosis sessions reveal a man that sounds like he is more interested in implanting memories than recovering them. This has been well detailed in the literature elsewhere so I will not focus on it here. Diamond, however, argued against Kaiser’s notion that Sirhan had been somehow hypnotically in the control of another, and claimed Sirhan had hypnotized himself. But self-hypnosis rarely (if ever) results in complete amnesia. In addition, Sirhan “blocked” when asked key questions under hypnosis, such as “Did you think this up all by yourself?” (five second pause), and “Are you the only person involved in Kennedy’s shooting?” (three second pause).26 In hypnosis, blocks are as important as answers, in that they can indicate some prior work in that area. Skilled hypnotists can place blocks into the subject’s mind that prevent memory of actions undertaken and associations made while under hypnosis.

    Dr. Eduard Simson-Kallas, the chief psychologist when Sirhan was at San Quentin Prison, remains convinced that Sirhan was hypnoprogrammed. He spent hours getting to know Sirhan, and when Sirhan talked about the case Simson-Kallas said it was as if he was “reciting from a book”, without any of the little details most people tell when they are recounting a real event. Sirhan came to trust the psychologist, and asked him to hypnotize him. At this point, the psychologist was stopped by prison authorities who claimed he was spending too much time on Sirhan. Simson-Kallas resigned from his job over the Sirhan case. Simson-Kallas also said he had no respect for Diamond, who claimed both that Sirhan was schizophrenic, and that he was self-hypnotized. Schizophrenics cannot hypnotize themselves.27

    The evidence that Sirhan was in some mentally altered state on the night of the assassination is plentiful. By his own account he had about four Tom Collinses. But not one person reported him as appearing drunk. Sandy Serrano, who had seen him walk up the back steps into the Ambassador had described him as “Boracho” but specifically explained that by that she didn’t mean drunk, but somehow out of place. Yosio Niwa, Vincent DiPierro and Martin Patrusky all saw Sirhan smiling a “stupid” or “sickly” smile while he was firing. Mary Grohs, a Teletype operator, remembered him standing and staring at the Teletype machine, nonresponsive, saying nothing, and eventually walking away. And then there was the issue of his incredible strength. Sirhan was a fairly small man, and he was able to hold his own against a football tackle and several other much larger men in the pantry. George Plimpton recalled that Sirhan’s eyes were “enormously peaceful”. Plimpton’s wife said Sirhan’s “eyes were narrow, the lines on his face were heavy and set and he was completely concentrated on what he was doing.” Joseph Lahaiv reported Sirhan was strangely “very tranquil” during the fight for the gun. Some have claimed Sirhan was simply tranquil because he was fulfilling his quest to kill Kennedy. But he didn’t kill Kennedy, and even if he did, such a premise would have required at least a recollection of having finally completed successfully the planned act, if not an exclamation of “Sic Semper Tyrannus”. Sirhan, like the other “lone nut assassins” of the sixties, was neither jubilant nor remorseful. But he could not claim that he hadn’t shot Kennedy, because he truly didn’t remember anything from that moment.

    Even at the police station, Sirhan’s conversation could only be termed bizarre. He would not tell his name, didn’t talk about the assassination, and was interested only in engaging in small talk with the frustrated officers around him. These trained officers tried every tactic they knew to get him to talk, but Sirhan remained silent on anything relating to his identity. When he was arraigned before the judge, he was booked only as “John Doe” until his identity was eventually discovered. This point worried the police; usually when a subject didn’t divulge his identity, it was a ruse to protect confederates, giving them a chance to get away.

    An Arab doctor spoke Arabic to Sirhan, but obtained no response in recognition. Sheriff Pitchess would say of Sirhan that he was a “very unusual prisoner…a young man of apparently complete self-possession, totally unemotional. He wants to see what the papers have to say about him.”28 At the station in the middle of a hot Los Angeles June night, Sirhan got the chills. He exhibited a similar reaction every time he came out of hypnosis from Diamond.

    Sirhan’s family and friends insisted that Sirhan had changed after a fall from a horse at a racetrack where he was working as an exercise jockey. One of his friends from the racetrack, Terry Welch, told the LAPD that Sirhan underwent a complete personality change; that he suddenly resented people with wealth, that he had become a loner. After the fall, Sirhan was treated by a series of doctors. It’s possible that one of these doctors saw Sirhan as a potential hypnosis subject, and started him down a path that would end at the Ambassador hotel. Curiously, renowned expert hypnotist Dr. George Estabrooks, used by the War Department after Pearl Harbor, suggested planting a “doctor” in a hospital who could employ hypnotism on patients.29

    The strange notebook entries, if they were indeed written by Sirhan, show certain phrases repeated over and over, including “RFK must die” and “Pay to the order of”. Other words that pop up with no explanation, scattered throughout the writing, are “drugs” and “mind control”. Diamond once hypnotized Sirhan and asked him to write about Robert Kennedy. Out came “RFK must die RFK must die RFK must die” and “Robert Kennedy is going to die Robert Kennedy is going to die Robert is going to die.” When asked who killed Kennedy, Sirhan wrote “I don’t know I don’t know I don’t know.”

    Just hours after the assassination, famed hypnotist Dr. William Joseph Bryan was on the Ray Briem show for KABC radio, and mentioned offhandedly that Sirhan was likely operating under some form of posthypnotic suggestion. Curiously, in the SUS files there is an interview summary of Joan Simmons in which the following is listed:

    Miss Simmons was program planner for a show on KABC radio and was contacted regarding allegations of Sirhan belonging to a secret hypnotic group. She stated that she knew nothing of a Doctor Bryant [sic] of the American Institute of Hypnosis or Hortence Farrchild. She was acquainted with Herb Elsman [the next few words are blacked out but appear to say “and considered him some right-wing extremist.“]

    Dr. Bryan was the President of the American Institute of Hypnosis, the headquarters of which were located on Sunset Boulevard in Hollywood. Bryan was famous for having hypnotized Albert De Salvo, the “Boston Strangler” and claimed to have discovered De Salvo’s motive under hypnosis. There is good reason to doubt that De Salvo was in fact the killer, according to Susan Kelly in her recent, heavily documented book The Boston Stranglers.30 And if he was not, that throws a more sinister light on Bryan’s overtly coercive involvement with De Salvo. Curiously, De Salvo was the topic of one of Sirhan’s disjointed post-assassination ramblings at LAPD headquarters, and references to “Di Salvo” and appear in Sirhan’s notebook.

    Bryan, by his own account, had been the “chief of all medical survival training for the United States Air Force, which meant the brainwashing section.”31 He also claimed to have been a consultant for the film The Manchurian Candidate, based on Richard Condon’s famous novel about a man who is captured by Communists and hypnotically programmed to return to the United States to kill a political leader. Condon’s novel was itself based upon the CIA’s ARTICHOKE program, which sought to find a way to create a programmed, amnesiac assassin. ARTICHOKE became MKULTRA.

    Bryan bragged to prostitutes that he had performed “special projects” for the CIA, and that he had programmed Sirhan. Publicly, Bryan denied any involvement with Sirhan. Bryan was a brilliant but sometimes insufferable egotist who seems to have had a ready opinion on nearly any subject. But whenever Sirhan came up, with the exception of that first night, he uncharacteristically shut down and refused to discuss the case. It would appear that if Bryan was not himself directly responsible, he had some inside knowledge perhaps as to who was, and chose not to reveal it. Ultimately, the case for hypnosis does not rest on Bryan, and whether or not he worked on Sirhan has no bearing on the overall issue of Sirhan having been hypnotized.

    After seeing the movie Conspiracy Theory, many people wondered if MKULTRA was indeed a real government program. Yes, Virginia, there was a sinister mind control program in which people were made to undergo hideous, obscene mental and physical tortures in the CIA’s quest for a way to create a Manchurian Candidate. It should be noted that Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, and surprisingly, the Rockefeller Foundation were instrumental in developing, supporting and funding the CIA’s various mind control programs.32

    Most CIA doctors and hypnotists will claim that they never found success, that they could never program someone to do something against their will. Not true, argue others. On the latter point, the simple way to get someone to do something against their will is to alter their reality. Estabrooks had salient comments in relation to this point:

    There seems to be a tradition that, with hypnotism in crime we hypnotize our victim, hand him a club, and say, “Go murder Mr. Jones.” If he refuses, then we have disproven the possibility of so using hypnotism. Such a procedure would be silly in the extreme. The skillful operator would do everything in his power to avoid an open clash with such moral scruples as his subject might have.33

    Will the subject commit murder in hypnotism? Highly doubtful – at least without long preparation, and then only in certain cases of very good subjects….Yet, strange to say, most good subjects will commit murder….For example, we hypnotize a subject and tell him to murder you with a gun. In all probability, he will refuse….But a hypnotist who really wished a murder could almost certainly get it with a different technique….he hypnotizes the subject, tells the subject to go to [the victim’s place], point the gun…and pull the trigger. Then he remarks to his assistant that, of course, the gun is loaded with dummy ammunition [even though it is not].34

    Under such a scenario, Estabrooks and other hypnotists are certain that creating a murderer is possible.

    But even more to the point is a note John Marks makes in his book The Search for the Manchurian Candidate, which details the CIA’s efforts in this regard. He quotes a veteran CIA officer who says that while it would be highly impractical to program an assassin, due to the unpredictable number of independent decisions the subject might encounter which could lead to exposure before the deed was done, creating an assassin in this manner is also unnecessary, as mercenaries have been available since the dawn of time for this heinous act. Marks then adds the following:

    The veteran admits that none of the arguments he uses against a conditioned assassin would apply to a programmed “patsy” whom a hypnotist could walk through a series of seemingly unrelated events – a visit to a store, a conversation with a mailman, picking a fight at a political rally. The subject would remember everything that happened to him and be amnesic only for the fact the hypnotist ordered him to do these things. There would be no gaping inconsistency in his life of the sort that can ruin an attempt by a hypnotist to create a second personality. The purpose of this exercise is to leave a circumstantial trail that will make the authorities think the patsy committed a particular crime. The weakness might well be that the amnesia would not hold up under police interrogation, but that would not matter if the police did not believe his preposterous story about being hypnotized or if he were shot resisting arrest. Hypnosis expert Milton Kline says he could create a patsy in three months; an assassin would take him six.35 [Emphasis added.]

    Sirhan exhibited behavior during the trial that also appeared to indicate post-hypnotic suggestion. One day, two girls showed up in court that Sirhan identified as Peggy Osterkamp (a name that appeared frequently in the notebook) and Gwen Gumm. Sirhan became enraged at their presence and demanded a recess, asking to talk to the judge in chambers. The judge refused to hear Sirhan in chambers, and Sirhan, visibly fighting for self-control, said “I, at this time, sir, withdraw my original please of not guilty and submit the plea of guilty as charged on all counts.” Asked what kind of penalty he wanted, Sirhan answered “I will ask to be executed,” Asked why he was doing this, Sirhan replied, “I killed Robert Kennedy willfully, premeditatedly, with twenty years of malice aforethought, that is why.” This ridiculous “confession” that a four-year old Sirhan was contemplating the murder of a man not yet famous almost half a world away strains credulity past the breaking point.

    Making this even more bizarre is the fact that the two girls were not the two girls Sirhan said they were, but in fact two other people, identified by Kaiser as Sharon Karaalajich and Karen Adams. Sirhan’s extreme reaction to two people who were not the people he thought they were forced Kaiser to conclude that “Sirhan was in a kind of paranoid, dissociated state there and then….”36 It follows that if someone programmed Sirhan to be the perfect patsy, they would likely also have programmed a seemingly spontaneous “confession” that could be spouted at the appropriate time, triggered by some person or event.

    In an interesting little book named 254 Questions and Answers on Practical Hypnosis and Autosuggestion, author Emile Franchel put forth some very interesting and relevant information on hypnosis. For example, asked how long a person could be held in a hypnotic state, Franchel replied: “With sufficient knowledge and skill on the part of the hypnotist, indefinitely.” Asked whether the hypnotic state could always be detected, Franchel said no, not in all cases. Franchel referred to hypno-espionage without further explanation, and when asked what official government agencies he worked for, Franchel declined to answer. He stated that he felt he was a bit of a “black sheep” among associates, explaining, “I help the innocent as well as convict the guilty.”

    The following question and answer pair seemed particularly relevant to Sirhan’s case. Recall that Sirhan kept firing his gun, even while six big men were pounding him, causing a sprained foot and a broken finger.

    Q: Reading about an assassination attempt recently, the report described how it took six or more bullets to stop each assassin. Could these assassins have been “conditioned” with hypnosis not to feel any pain?

    A: Well, I am not sure who is going to like or dislike my answer to your question, but I read the same reports that you did. Unfortunately, I do not have access to any more official information. From what I read, I would conclude that they not only had been hypnotically conditioned to feel no pain, but in all probability were working, perhaps partly of their own free desires, but also under hypnotic compulsion, to complete a given mission.

    The reports seem to clearly indicate that the assassins had to have a bullet placed in a vital organ to stop them. Bullets that hit anywhere else did not apparently deter them in any way.

    For whatever reason, in this 1957 book, Franchel felt compelled to offer a warning regarding hypnosis and its usage:

    [A:] The hypnotic techniques being employed at present make the hypnotic technicians of the ex-Nazi regime look like well meaning psychiatrists….

    Q: Do I understand correctly, that you are saying that hypnotism is being abused, completely without regard to human rights?

    A: You understand correctly. I am fully satisfied that hypnotic techniques are being used on a vast scale, both criminally and for other terrible reasons. Perhaps one day I might be permitted to tell you.

    Q: I have heard you say many times during your television programs [Adventures in Hypnosis] that a subject under hypnosis “cannot be made to do anything that is against his moral or religious beliefs.” How can you say that now?

    A: I am afraid you have not been listening too closely to what I was saying. The only similar remark I have made is, “IT IS SAID that a person under hypnosis cannot be made to do anything that is against their religious or moral beliefs.” I trust that the implication is clear.

    It should be noted that hypnosis is considered dangerous enough that it is illegal to broadcast a hypnotic induction on television.

    If Sirhan was indeed programmed, then his statements at the trial, his appearance at the shooting range hours before the assassination and his firing of a gun in the pantry may all have been actions carried out without the intervention of will. There is a strong possibility that Sirhan was not only hypnotized but additionally drugged by alcohol or some stronger substance. Frankel warned that drugs could shut down the conscious mind, preventing it from filtering what reaches the subconscious, adding:

    With the conscious filter action removed, anything can be forced into the subconscious mind, which must obey it in one way or another, as the subconscious cannot argue but must believe all information reaching it, and use it.

    Had Sirhan had a real trial, the possibility of his having been hypnotized may have provided reasonable doubt on the question of his guilt. But if Sirhan wasn’t guilty, then who was?

    The Polka Dot Girl and Company

    One of the most intriguing figures in this case has been “The Girl in the Polka Dot Dress” who was seen with Sirhan immediately prior to the shooting, and who was subsequently witnessed running from the scene crying “We shot him! We shot him!” The LAPD tried to shut down this story by getting the two most public witnesses to retract their stories. But there were so many credible sightings of this girl that the police were forced to take a different tack. They identified first one, then a second woman as “the” girl, despite the fact that neither bore much of a resemblance to the girl described. Meanwhile, languishing unnoticed in the LAPD’s own files is the name of a far more likely candidate, someone who leads to a host of suspicious characters.

    Over a dozen witnesses gave similar descriptions of a girl in a polka-dot dress who for varying reasons drew their attention. The two most famous of these were Vincent DiPierro, a waiter at the Ambassador Hotel, and Sandy Serrano, a Kennedy volunteer. DiPierro first noticed Sirhan in the pantry because of the woman he saw “following” him. The LAPD interviewed him the morning of the shooting (Kennedy was shot at 12:15 A.M. the morning of June 5th). During one interview, DiPierro gave the following information about the girl:

    A (DiPierro): The only reason that he [Sirhan] was noticeable was because there was this good-looking girl in the crowd there.

    Q: All right, was the girl with him?

    A: It looked as though, yes.

    Q: What makes you say that?

    A: Well, she was following him.

    Q: Where did she follow him from?

    A: From—she was standing behind the tray stand because she was up next to him on—behind, and she was holding on to the other end of the tray table and she—like—it looked as if she was almost holding him.

    DiPierro reported that he saw Sirhan turn to her and say something, to which she didn’t reply, but smiled. He said Sirhan had a sickly smile, and said “When she first entered, she looked as though she was sick also.” He described her as Caucasian and as about 20 or 21 years old, definitely no older than 24. She was “very shapely” and was wearing a “white dress with—it looked like either black or dark violet polka dots on it and kind of a [bib-like] collar.” He said her hair color was “Brown. I would say brunette,” “puffed up a little” and that it came to just above her shoulders. DiPierro told the FBI that she had a peculiar-looking nose.

    That same morning, Sandy Serrano had described to the LAPD a “girl in a white dress, a Caucasian, dark brown hair, about five-six, medium height…Black polka dots on the dress” in the company of a man she later recognized as Sirhan and another man in a gold sweater. She had seen this trio walk up the back stairs to the Ambassador earlier in the night. Sometime later, the girl and the guy in the gold sweater came running down the back stairs. Serrano recalled to the LAPD this encounter:

    She practically stepped on me, and she said “We’ve shot him. We’ve shot him.” Then I said, “Who did you shoot?” And she said, “We shot Senator Kennedy.”

    She described the girl’s attitude in this manner:

    “We finally did it,” like “Good going.”

    Serrano thought the girl was between the ages of 23 and 27, with her hair not quite coming to her shoulders, done in a “bouffant” style, wearing a polka dot dress with a bib collar and ? length sleeves. She also recalled that the girl had a “funny” nose.

    Ultimately, the LAPD pressured Serrano and DiPierro into backing down on these stories, getting each to admit they had first heard of the girl from the other, an impossibility the LAPD hoped would go unnoticed. Across page after page of witness testimony cover sheets Pena scrawled “Polka Dot Story Serrano Phoney”, “Girl in Kitchen I.D. Settled”, “Wit[ness] can offer nothing of further value” or “No further Int[erview].” But the interviews behind these sheets tell a different and compelling story.

    Dr. Marcus McBroom was in the pantry behind Elizabeth Evans, one of the shooting victims. He exited the kitchen through the double doors at the West end and noticed a brunette woman aged 20-26, medium build, “wearing a white dress with silver dollar size polka dots, either black or dark blue in color.” The report of his LAPD interview records what drew McBroom’s attention to the girl:

    This young lady showed no signs of shock or disbelief in comparison to other persons in the room and she seemed intent only on one thing—to get out of the ballroom.

    George Green was also in the pantry during the shooting, and reported seeing a girl in a polka dot dress (early 20s, blond hair) and a young, thin, taller male with dark hair. He saw this couple earlier in the night and after the shooting. Afterwards, Green stated, “They seemed to be the only ones who were trying to get out of the kitchen…Everyone else was trying to get in.”37

    Ronald Johnson Panda told the LAPD that a good-looking girl, about 5’6″, in a polka dot dress ran by him in the Embassy room immediately after the shooting yelling “They shot him.” He had seen her earlier that night carrying some drinks.

    Eve Hansen had talked to a girl in a “white dress with black or navy blue polka dots approximately the size of a quarter” who had dark brown hair that hung just above the shoulders, who had a “turned-up nose.” The girl gave Hansen money for a drink and Hansen ordered the drink. When she brought it back to her, the girl made a toast “To our next President” and shortly thereafter left the bar.

    Earnest Ruiz reported something he thought was odd to the police. He had watched a man and a girl in a polka dot dress run out of the hotel, but said the man later came back as Sirhan was being removed and was the first to yell, “Let’s kill the bastard.”

    Darnell Johnson, another pantry witness, told the police the following:

    While I was waiting [for Kennedy], I saw four guys and a girl about halfway between Kennedy and where I was standing. The girl had a white dress with black polka dots. During the time that a lady yelled, “Oh, my God,” they walked out. All except the one…this is the guy they grabbed [Sirhan]. The others that walked out seemed unconcerned at the events which were taking place.

    Johnson also told the police that he had received threatening phone calls and that his car brakes had been tampered with, causing a near-accident.

    Roy Mills also observed a group of five people, one of which was female, standing outside the Embassy Room as Kennedy was speaking. He claimed that Sirhan was one of the four males in the group, remembering him distinctly for his baggy pants. He thought one of the other men was a hotel employee. He couldn’t remember anything about the girl except that she was wearing a press pass. Curiously, Conrad Seim—who, like Serrano, DiPierro and Hanson, had noticed the girl’s “funny nose”—reported being asked by a girl in a white dress with black or navy polka dots for his press pass. He refused her request, but she came back about 15 minutes later. “She was very persistent,” he told the police. He thought the girl’s nose might have been broken at one time, and described her as Caucasian but with an olive complexion.

    Bill White saw a female Latin and two male Latins near the door of the embassy room. Their dress looked out of place. He also noticed a busboy wearing a white button-down jacket in the Anchor Desk area sweeping up cigarette butts where there were no butts to be swept up. He wasn’t sure this was really a busboy.

    Earnest Vallero was a job dispatcher for the Southern California Waiters Alliance. He reported that a man resembling Sirhan appeared at the union office two or three weeks prior to the assassination and requested placement as a waiter at the Ambassador Hotel. Vallero said the man got upset when he was refused, and flashed an Israeli passport.

    A Hungarian refugee “with absolutely no credentials at all”38 named Gabor Kadar had been turned away from the Embassy Room during the night, but found a waiter’s uniform, and donned it. Kadar later involved himself directly in the struggle to wrest the gun from Sirhan.

    Booker Griffin, another pantry witness who had reported seeing a woman in a polka dot dress,39 asked Richard Aubry, a friend of his who was also in the pantry during the shooting, “Did they get the other two guys?”40

    At about 9pm the night of the 4th, Irene Gizzi noticed a group of three people who “just didn’t seem to be dressed properly for the occasion.” Her LAPD interview report summarizes the events as follows:

    [Gizzi] saw a group of people talking who did not seem to fit with the exuberant crowd. Observed the female to be wearing a white dress with black polka dots; approximately the girl was standing with a male, possible Latin, dark sun bleached hair gold colored shirt, and possible light colored pants, possibly jeans. Possibly with suspect [Sirhan] as a third party….”

    A friend of Gizzi’s who was also present, Katherine Keir, gave a very similar description of this group, describing a male in a “gold colored sport shirt” and blue jeans, another man of medium build with a T-shirt and jeans, both with dark brown hair, and a girl in a black and white polka dot dress. Keir was standing at a stairway when the polka dot dress girl ran down yelling, “We shot Kennedy.” The police were able to persuade Keir to consider that she had heard the girl say instead, “Someone shot Kennedy.”

    Jeanette Prudhomme also saw two men, one of which looked like Sirhan and the other of which was wearing a gold shirt, in the company of a woman who appeared to be 28-30, with brown, shoulder length hair, wearing a white dress with black polka dots.

    A couple of people even recalled seeing this girl on the CBS broadcast. A Mr. Plumley, first name unrecorded, claimed he had seen a polka dot dress girl in the CBS broadcast the night of June 4th. Duncan Grant, a Canadian citizen, wrote the LAPD when he heard they were canceling their search for the polka dot dress girl, stating that he had seen her on the CBS broadcast. He wrote:

    We could hear two shots fired and then another burst of shots. At this moment someone shouted that the Senator had been shot. There was more confusion and at this moment a young lady burst in on the picture and she shouted We have shot Kennedy then shouted again We have shot Senator Kennedy. She was what I would call half-running and she crossed right in front of the camera from left to right and disappeared from view.

    Sirhan himself remembered talking to a girl shortly before he blacked out that night. According to Kaiser, one of Sirhan’s last memories is of giving coffee to a girl of “Armenian” or “Spanish” descent in the pantry:

    “This girl kept talking about coffee. She wanted cream. Spanish, Mexican, dark-skinned. When people talked about the girl in the polka-dot dress,” he figured, “maybe they were thinking of the girl I was having coffee with.”41

    Sirhan had been at the Ambassador the Sunday before election night. A girl matching the description of the polka dot dress girl was also seen there Sunday. Karen Ross described her to the LAPD as having a nose that had been “maybe fixed”, a white dress with black polka dots, ? length sleeves, dark blond hair worn in a “puff” and with a round face. Sirhan and a girl were also recorded as behaving suspiciously at a previous Robert Kennedy appearance in Pomona on May 20th.

    One man may have spent the last day of Kennedy’s life with this girl. While his tale is extraordinary, it is eerily credible for the nuances and details which matched other evidence of which he could not possibly have been aware. Kaiser and Houghton referred to this man by the pseudonym of “Robert Duane.” His real name is John Henry Fahey.42

    June 4th with the Mystery Girl

    At 9:15 A.M. on June 4th, Fahey entered the back of the Ambassador Hotel. He had planned to meet another salesman there 45 minutes earlier, but had left late and been held up in traffic. On his way up the back stairs, he noticed two men he thought looked Spanish. When they spoke, however, he realized it wasn’t Spanish because he knew Spanish. He presumed they were kitchen workers.

    While in the lobby area, he spotted a pretty girl and made a flirtatious comment to her. She asked him where the Post Office was, and he couldn’t help her, and she left. About ten minutes later, she returned. He invited her to join him for breakfast in the coffee shop at the hotel. She spoke “very good English” but also had a “slight accent” that he couldn’t place. He asked her where she was from. She said she had only been there three days, and that she was from Virginia. Fahey had a relative in Virginia, and asked her if she knew Richmond, whereupon the girl said she really had come from New York, and before that a middle-eastern country (“Iran” or “Iraq”, Fahey thought). She mentioned specifically Beirut. (Fahey had to ask his interviewer if there was a place named “Beirut”.) She also mentioned “Akaba”. When he asked her name, she gave him one, and soon another, and another. He didn’t know what her real name was. She, meanwhile, pumped him for as much information as she could get, asking his name, his occupation, and his business at the hotel. When he asked her about her own business, she said “I don’t want to get you involved…I don’t know if I can trust you to tell you the whole thing.”

    She told him that they were being watched, and indicated a man near the door of the coffee shop. Fahey saw a man he thought might be Spanish or Greek, resembling one of the men he had seen on the back stairs when entering the hotel. He thought the man resembled Sirhan, except that this man was taller and had sideburns. When later shown pictures of Sirhan’s family, Fahey said the man was not one of the Sirhan brothers.

    The girl wanted Fahey to help her get a passport. Fahey said he had no idea how to do that, at which point she explained to him that you just find a deceased person, use their Social Security Number and write to the place where he was born to get a passport. He said she seemed shaken, and very nervous, with clammy hands, and that she seemed to be genuinely in some sort of trouble.

    He described her as “Caucasian” but with an “Arab complexion, very light.” He called her hair “dirty-blond” and guessed her age might be 27-28. He said her clothes, shoes and purse were all tan. In addition, he felt the purse and stockings looked foreign. He also said “Her nose was of—on the hooked fashion where you can realize that she was from the Arabic world.” Asked if the nose was what one might call prominent, Fahey answered affirmatively.

    Fahey had business calls to make in Oxnard, and invited the girl to come along for the ride with him, since she seemed so troubled. When they got up to leave, she wanted to pay the bill, and opened a purse where he saw a fistful of money in her wallet—”big stuff—50 dollar bills—hundred dollar bills.”

    They drove up the coastal route through Malibu. Two different tails followed them for part of the way. At one point, Fahey was so nervous he pulled off the road, thinking the tail would leave him. As he started to get out of the car, he noticed the girl eyeing his keys, and thinking she might run off with his car, decided not to get out after all. During the ride, she said the people tailing them were “out to get Mr. Kennedy tonight at the winning reception.” He thought they should call the police to get rid of the tail but she insisted they should not call the police, and asked to be taken back to Los Angeles. In the end, although they drove to Oxnard, Fahey opted out of his sales calls and returned with the girl to the Ambassador Hotel. After driving and eating meals, they returned at around 7pm, where he dropped her off. She wanted him to come into the hotel with her. When he refused, she got angry.

    Fahey might not have thought of this incident again had it not been for the assassination and the story of the strange woman who ran out into the dark afterwards. A frightened Fahey called the FBI and told them he thought he might have spent the day with that woman. After talking to the FBI, Fahey read a story by journalist Fernando Faura in the Valley Times about the polka dot girl. He called Faura and told him he might know something about the girl. Faura was hot on the trail of the mystery girl, and took Fahey’s detailed description of the girl to a police artist. Fahey tweaked the image with the artist until he saw a match.

    Faura then showed the drawing to Vincent DiPierro. “That’s her,” DiPierro responded. “She’s the girl in the polka-dot dress. The girl’s face is a little fuller than this sketch has it, but this is the girl.”43 Faura then brought in Chris Gugas, a top Los Angeles polygraph operator, who put Fahey and his story through a lie detector. Faura told Fahey he passed the test “like a champion.”44

    Jordan Bonfante, the Los Angeles Bureau Chief of Life magazine, was interested in publishing Faura’s account. Hank Hernandez of SUS, however, was busy trying to crack Fahey under his own polygraph test. Under pressure from Hernandez, Fahey told an untruth, saying it was Faura who had persuaded him to connect the girl he was with to the polka dot girl. But Fahey had made the connection to the FBI long before he ever spoke with Faura. But this lie was pronounced “true” by Hank Hernandez, proving again that a polygraph’s value depends a great deal upon the integrity of the operator. Sgt. Phil Alexander tried to persuade Bonfante that Fahey was not credible, and that Life shouldn’t run the story on the girl. Kaiser amusingly recounts this incident:

    “I don’t think you’ve really proved that [Fahey] was mistaken,” said Bonfante. He was right. It was practically impossible to do so. But if the police didn’t do so, the implications were that there was a girl who knew something about the Kennedy assassination and that the police couldn’t find her. That was a black eye for the department.

    To Bonfante, this sounded too much like Catch 22 to be true. He decided to discover how important this was to the LAPD and let Alexander talk. Six hours later, Alexander was still talking, and had not yet managed to persuaded Bonfante there was no “girl in the polka dot dress.”45

    So then the final question is this. Was the LAPD really so deficient? Could they really not find the girl? Amazingly, the LAPD evidence log itself contains a plausible name that may well lead to the heart of the conspiracy.

    The Girl Revealed?

    A former New York Police Department detective named Sid Shepard, then working at CBS-TV in New York as Chris Borgen, happened upon Sander Vanocur’s 5:00 A.M. (Eastern time) interview of Sandy Serrano. He recalled a couple of people who seemed to fit the description of the polka dot dress girl. In fact, he had observed them at a protest demonstration in New York at the United Nations building which had been captured on 16mm film. He felt so strongly about the match that he put the film, along with a couple of blowups made from the film, onto a TWA flight for Martin Steadman of the WCBS-TV affiliate in Los Angeles. Steadman brought the film and two photos made to Rampart detectives L. J. Patterson and C. J. Hughes. These items were booked into evidence as items #69 and 70 in the evidence log for the case as follows:

    #69 1 Film — 16mm roll on gry plast reel

    #70 1 Photo — 8″ x 10″ of female (1) protest demo (taken from abv film)

    Photo — 3″ x 4″ of female “Shirin Khan” with writing on back “Shirin Khan DOB 4/22/50 daughter of Khaibar Khan Goodarzian, presented flowers & court order to Shah of Iran in NY 6/1964.”

    That Shepard/Borgen would identify Shirin Khan as a likely candidate for the girl was positively uncanny. He could hardly have known at that point that her father had reportedly been seen with Sirhan at Kennedy headquarters just two days before the assassination, and that some campaign workers had identified Khan as a suspicious person in the Kennedy camp.

    Khaibar Khan at Kennedy Headquarters

    Bernard Isackson, a Kennedy campaign volunteer, had been at the Ambassador in the Embassy room at the time of the shooting. His interview summary contains this interesting tidbit:

    Mr. Isackson was asked if anything or anyone acted strange or out of place around the headquarters. He stated the only thing that stood out as being unusal [sic] was the actions and statements of Khaibar Khan (I216). He stated Khan would never fill out cards or write on anything from which the handwriting could be positively ID as Khan. He also stated to Mr. Isackson he was from Istanbul, Turkey and currently living in England. Mr. Isackson stated Khan was very overbearing when it came to the point of trying to impress someone.

    Mr. Isackson recalled one incident when Khan asked one of the office girls if she had seen a [sic] unidentified volunteer, when the office girl started to page the volunteer Khan became very nervous and told the girl to never mind. Khan would often meet volunteers entering the headquarters and escort them to the information desk to register them as if they were personal friends of his; this was evidence[d] by many of them using his address and phone number.

    Khan was from Iran, not Turkey, and had been living in New York before he came to Los Angeles. He filled out over 20 volunteer cards (present in the SUS files) with names of “friends”, always using his own address as their contact information. For this, and a more sinister reason, Isackson was not the only one suspicious of Khan. Several campaign workers said they had seen him with Sirhan.

    Eleanor Severson was a campaign worker for RFK. She told the LAPD that on May 30, 1968, a man named Khaibar Khan came into Headquarters to register for campaign work. Khan claimed to have come to California from back East to help the campaign. From that day, Khan came into Headquarters every day until the election. The Sunday before the election, June 2, he brought four other foreigners (of Middle Eastern extraction) in to work as volunteers. Severson and her husband both said that Sirhan was one of these men. She remembered this group in particular because while she was registering the men, Kennedy’s election day itinerary was taken from her desk. Her husband thought Sirhan may have taken it. Severson reported seeing Sirhan again early in the afternoon of June 3, standing near the coffee machine.

    Larry Strick, another Kennedy worker, confirmed this account. He said he had spoken to Sirhan in the company of Khan. When Sirhan’s picture was finally shown on TV, he and Mrs. Severson called each other nearly at the same instant to talk about the fact that this was the man they both remembered from Headquarters. Strick positively ID’d Sirhan from photos as the same man he had seen on June 2nd to both the LAPD and the FBI in the days immediately following the assassination.

    Estelle Sterns, yet another Kennedy volunteer, claimed to have seen Sirhan at Headquarters on Election Day itself. He was with three other men of Middle Eastern extraction and a female who was wearing a white coat or dress and who had dark hair that was nearly shoulder length. Sterns said Sirhan offered to buy her a cup of coffee (a typical Sirhan act), which Sterns declined. Sterns said that Sirhan and another of the men were carrying guns. The day after the assassination, Sterns claimed to have received a phone call from a man who sounded muffled, as though he was speaking through a towel, telling her “Under no circumstances give out any information to anybody as to the number of people or their activities at your desk on Tuesday.”

    The LAPD loved this. They “discredited” the whole Sirhan-at-headquarters sighting by focusing solely on Sterns’ account. They even used Severson to discredit this story, although the LAPD buried Severson’s interview where she stated she too had seen Sirhan at Headquarters. The LAPD also claimed Strick had retracted his identification of Sirhan.

    Surprisingly, Khan himself, as well as his “sister” (who was really his personal secretary/consort) Maryam Koucham both claimed they saw Sirhan at Headquarters. Khan claimed to have seen Sirhan standing in Headquarters on June 4th at around 5:00 p.m. in the company of a girl in a polka dot dress. The question is, did he really see a girl with Sirhan and was he trying to help, or was he instead helping to muddy the waters about a girl who may have been his own daughter? Khan also claimed to have seen Sirhan with the woman on June 3rd, the same day he brought his daughter Shirin Khan into headquarters. (On this day, he also met Walter Sheridan and Pierre Salinger at the Ambassador Hotel.) But did he bring his daughter Shirin into Headquarters, or his other daughter Rose, or some other woman, or no woman at all? Did he see a girl with Sirhan, or did Khan just say he did to deflect suspicion away from both himself and his daughter? How are we to know which statements of his are to be believed?

    He refused to take a polygraph or to attend a showup to identify Sirhan more positively. He was illegally in the country, having overstayed his visa. He told the police he was on the run from the Shah of Iran’s goons. But Khan had previously had a working relationship with the Shah. Khan wasn’t using his real name, but was going by the alias of Goodarzian, as was his ex-wife and daughter Shirin. He had a prior arrest recorded with the LAPD (1/13/67), at which time he had been using the alias of Mohammad Ali. And when the LAPD checked the names of the volunteers whom he had registered under a single address, the LAPD stated that “Records show that none of these persons entered the U.S. between the period of June 1968 through December 1968.”46 (As an aside, thirteen Iranians suspected of participating in a political assassination in 1990 came under suspicion when it was found that they had all listed the same personal address. The address in that case turned out to be an intelligence-ministry building.47)

    The address Khan used belonged to Khan’s ex-wife and Shirin’s mother, Talat Khan. Talat had lived there with sons Mike and Todd and daughter “Sherry”. (After the assassination, “Shirin Goodarzian” went by the name of “Sherry Khan”.) Although housing three children and herself, according to the LAPD records Talat had no source of employment. Her son Mike was working as a manager at a small pizza outlet in Santa Monica. Her daughter Shirin showed two different places of employment for the same dates. She had only just graduated from University High and allegedly worked for either or both “University Ins. Co.” and “Pacific Western Mtg. Co.” in Los Angeles. Despite her working status, Sherry had no social security number.

    Talat told the LAPD that she was divorced from Khan. She initially told them she did not know his whereabouts, but then was able to contact him to tell him the police wanted to talk to him. The LAPD recorded that Talat was not involved in politics. She may have been involved with Khan and Koucham in a bank fraud scheme in 1963, after having divorced Khan in 1961, but the evidence in that regard is far from clear.48 Khaibar Khan, Maryam Koucham and Talat Khan became political targets when Khaibar Khan brought some astounding information to the attention of Senator McClellan’s Committee on Government Operations in May of 1963. Khan had accused several prominent Americans, including David Rockefeller and Allen Dulles, of receiving payoff money from the Shah of Iran from funds received through an American aid program. In short, Khan was no ordinary Iranian. He was master over a powerful intelligence network that had worked for and against the Shah of Iran at various points in time.

    Khaibar Khan’s father had been executed by the Shah when he was only a boy of eight. Khan might have been killed as well, but a British couple named Smiley, who worked for oil interests, had taken pity on him and removed him from the country. Khan was educated in Scotland, and in 1944 joined British military intelligence. In 1948 his Iranian title was restored, and he ran a fleet of taxicabs, trucks and operated a repair shop. He also worked for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and maintained ties with British and American missions there. Fred Cook, who wrote about Khan’s life in detail in The Nation (4/12/65 & 5/24/65), dropped this interesting piece of information:

    The Khaibar Khan’s role in the counter-coup that toppled Mossadegh is not quite clear, but indications are that he helped.

    Was Khan working with the CIA in that operation?

    Despite the Shah’s role in his father’s death, Khan and the Shah became friends. The Shah even provided Khan a villa on the palace grounds. Their friendship took a turn for the worse, however, when Khan wanted to use some of the plentiful American foreign aid coming into the country for a sports arena. The Shah and his family, however, had other plans for the land and the money, leading to a falling out between Khan and the Shah. One day, the Shah discovered that Khan’s large and lavishly equipped Cadillac El Dorado was wiretapped to the hilt, and realized that he had a major spy in his midst. Khan was warned of the Shah’s discovery, and fled the country. But Khan had spent years building up a powerful spy network. As Khan later told the Supreme Court:

    …we put engineers, doctors, gardeners and as servants and as storemen; all educated people working in several different places. And we put a lot of secretaries; a lot of people who was educated in England. And we put them as secretaries.

    Through this network, Khan noticed something interesting. Some $7 million of the sports arena’s funds had been redirected to the Pahlavi Foundation, the Shah’s family’s personal fund. He directed his spies to find out where the money was going, to whom and what for. What his agents found was rather astonishing, and led to a most peculiar congressional investigation. He found that just days before the Shah was to have an audience with President Kennedy in the U.S., six and seven figure checks had been cut from the Pahlavi Foundation account to a number of prominent and influential Americans. Kennedy had no great love for the Shah or his operations, and was not planning on granting the largesse the Shah was seeking. Was the Shah feathering the nest before his arrival by spreading money around? Khan’s agents photocopied a batch of checks from the Shah’s safe. The checks included payments to the following:

    Allen Dallas [sic]: $1,000,000
    Henry Luce: $500,000
    David Rockefeller: $2,000,000
    Mrs. Loy Henderson: $1,000,000
    George V. Allen: $1,000,000
    Seldin Chapin: $1,000,000

    Henderson, Allen and Chapin had all served at some point as Ambassador to Iran, a role Richard Helms would later play when removed from the CIA by Richard Nixon. (Richard Helms, by the way, had been a childhood friend of the Shah; they had attended the same Swiss school in their youth.) David Rockefeller, Allen Dulles and Henry Luce had contributed to Mossadegh’s overthrow, an effort double-headed by the CIA and British intelligence. The Shah’s family members also received checks ranging from six to eight figures in length, the highest being a $15,000,000 check paid to Princess Farah Pahlavi. Princess Ashraf, the Shah’s twin sister, came in second at $3,000,000. High level British officials were also on the list.

    Needless to say, when this news was given to Congress, the earth began to rumble. According to Cook:

    The Khaibar Khan’s disclosures [of May and June, 1963] were called to the attention of President Lyndon B. Johnson in late December by one of the President’s closest advisers, Washington attorney Abe Fortas. Since then, there have been these seemingly significant developments: the American Ambassador to Iran has been relieved of his duties; the Iranian Ambassador in Washington has been recalled—and for the past year there has been a stoppage on all economic (i.e. non-military) aid to Iran….49

    From the look of it, it appeared Khan’s revelations were being taken seriously. Khan’s credibility was enhanced when a secret Treasury report provided solely to McClellan’s committee was photocopied from within the Iranian embassy and given to Khan, who showed the copy to the committee. His copy proved that 1) someone on McClellan’s committee was providing information to the Iranian embassy, and 2) Khan had agents so sensitively placed within the embassy as to be able to intercept this highly sensitive information. Khan’s credibility became something that needed to be destroyed at all costs. Who in Congress dared accuse David Rockefeller, Henry Luce and Allen Dulles of receiving payoffs from a foreign government? Someone had to be taken down, and the spotlight focused on Khan. An attempt was made to physically assault Khan, but the attempt was performed in a public arena and was quickly stopped. A more violent attack was made upon Maryam Koucham in an effort to scare her into revealing Khan’s sources within the Embassy.

    The publication of Cook’s article about these events in The Nation seems to have been the impetus for a sudden and furious turnaround from McClellan’s committee. After two years of pursuing evidence of what the committee had termed “gross corruption” in the use of American aid money to Iran, the committee suddenly launched an all-out assault on Khan. McClellan suddenly surfaced a letter (dated a year earlier) from the bank in Geneva from which the records of payoffs had surfaced. The letter from the bank managers stated that the records Khan had submitted were false, citing typeface difference, differing account number systems and so forth. But were this true, why did McClellan’s committee continue to investigate Khan’s allegations for a full year? Clearly the committee knew no one would buy the letter, at least at that point. But once Cook made the issue public, then anything had to be used, no matter how ill-supported, to discredit Khan. It was at this point that Khan, his ex-wife and Koucham were accused of bank fraud.

    What had started as Khan’s crusade to regain money that was to be used for Iran turned into an ugly, losing battle. Khan was a very resourceful man, and knew how to play on a winning team. It seems highly unlikely that he continued forever his fight against the Shah, and more likely that he gave in to the old adage of “if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em.” And a man with Khan’s sources could not be allowed to become an enemy of American intelligence. He had too powerful a network. One can’t help but wonder if the CIA took an interest in protecting the actions of their own (Dulles, Rockefeller, the Shah et. al.) while using Khan for their own purposes.

    Khan appeared out of the blue at RFK Headquarters, was seen with Sirhan, lied about his background, raised suspicion by his secretiveness, and may have fathered the girl in the polka dot dress. But perhaps his most suspicious act was giving a ride on election night to a man who was arrested while running out of the pantry immediately after the shots had been fired: Michael Wayne.

    Michael Wayne

    Mr. Wayne was in the kitchen when Kennedy was shot, and was the subject of reports by Patti Nelson, Tom Klein and Dennis Weaver of a man running through the lobby with a long object in his hand, which appeared to be a rifle.— SUS supplement to Wayne’s interview (I-1096)

    Michael Wayne, whose real name was Wien, was a twenty-one year old from England who the LAPD wrote “professes to be of Jewish background, but not from the mid-east.”50 Wayne worked at the Pickwick Bookstore on Sunset Boulevard. Wayne had gained entry to the pantry by obtaining a press button, and even managed to get into Kennedy’s suite on the 5th floor. When Kennedy went down to the Embassy room to make his speech, Wayne followed. He was loitering in the kitchen, was asked to leave, and returned shortly before the shooting took place. Cryptic references in the extant files on Wayne seem to indicate that Wayne made some comment indicating foreknowledge of the assassination to a man in the electrician’s booth shortly before the shooting. In fact, the first question on the proposed list of questions to be asked of Wayne under a polygraph was this:

    Did you have prior knowledge that there might be an attempt on Senator Kennedy’s life?

    Curiously, that question does not appear on the actual list of questions asked.51

    Right after the shots were fired, Wayne, who bore a resemblance to Sirhan, although taller and with sideburns, ran out of the East end of the Pantry and then out through the Embassy room. William Singer described this event to the LAPD:

    I was in the lobby of the Ambassador Hotel right next to the ballroom. Senator Kennedy had just walked away from the podium after his victory speech. Several moments before the commotion started a man came running and pushing his way out of the ballroom past where I was standing. I would describe this man as having Hebrew or some type mid-eastern features, he was approx 18/22 5-10 thin face, slim, drk swtr or jkt, drk slacks, no tie, firy [sic] neat in appearance, nice teeth, curly arab or hebrew type hair. He may have been wearing glasses, I’m not sure. I can ID him. He isn’t one of the men in the pictures you showed me (Saidallah B. Sirhan or Sirhan Sirhan) this man was in a big hurry and was saying, “Pardon me Please” as he pushed his way out of the crowded ballroom. He was carrying a rolled piece of cardboard, maybe a placard. This placard was approx 1? yards long and 4-6″ in diameter. I think I saw something black inside. Just as he got pst [sic] me I heard screaming and shouting and I knew something bad had happened. Two men were shouting to “Stop that man.” these two men were chasing the first man. I don’t know if they caught him.52

    Gregory Ross Clayton also reported this incident to the LAPD, adding that it was a newsman who yelled “Stop him.” Clayton then tackled the man and held him while a hotel security guard handcuffed and removed the man. Clayton reported having seen this man standing with a girl and three other men, one of which resembled Sirhan, earlier that night at the hotel.53 Clayton identified Michael Wayne as the man he had seen. The LAPD confirmed that Ace Security guard Augustus Mallard had arrested and handcuffed Wayne because of his suspicious behavior running from the scene of the shooting.

    The press man was evidently Steve Fontanini, a photographer for the Los Angeles Times. Thinking Wayne was a suspect, he ran after him. Fontanini didn’t buy Wayne’s explanation that he was running to a telephone because he was running out of the press room (adjacent to the pantry), a room full of phones. That fact bothered neither the LAPD nor Robert Kaiser, who accepted Wayne’s explanation as the truth.

    Joseph Thomas Klein, Patti Nelson and Dennis Weaver had seen Wayne run by with something rolled up in his hand. Klein originally described the roll as larger at one end than at the other. Weaver remembered Patti had yelled “He’s got a gun,” although Weaver did not see a gun. Weaver said he only saw Wayne for several seconds. A month later, when questioned again, the LAPD recorded the following interesting comments, begging the question of what had given rise to them:

    The man was carrying a blue poster, rolled up in his left hand. It could have been a cardboard tube, or rolled up posters. Mr. Weaver states he had a clear view of the object and states that there was no gun sticking out of the roll.

    This investigator questioned Mr. Weaver additionally concerning the object being carried by the man crossing the lobby. Weaver states he is absolutely sure there was no gun protruding from the object. He states the object was blue, but was not wood colored at the one end, or even resembling a gun stock.

    Patti Nelson’s interview appears to no longer exist. Joseph Klein’s, however, contained the interesting notation:

    Klein states that as he pursued Wayne, he passed Nelson and Weaver and said, to them; “my God, he had a gun, and we let him get by.” (Klein states this is the first time since the incident he can recall making the statement.)

    What happened after Wayne was arrested and handcuffed by Ace Security Guard Mallard is unclear, and troubling. An LAPD supplemental report to Michael Wayne’s interview states:

    This investigator received information that the business card of Keith Duane Gilbert was in the possession of Wayne, at the time of his apprehension after Sen. Kennedy was shot. Gilbert is reported to be an extremist and militant who has been involved in a dynamite theft, previously.

    Wayne, however, denied any knowledge of Gilbert, and did not remember ever having his card. But in the SUS files, yet another problem cropped up. Gilbert’s file, when checked, contained a business card as well. The card belonged to Michael Wayne.

    Sgt. Manual Gutierrez of SUS spent a great deal of time trying to find out whether there was some sinister association between Wayne and Gilbert, a radical Minuteman activist. Gutierrez did not believe Wayne’s denials of a relationship, and ultimately pushed to have Wayne polygraphed. Unfortunately, the polygraph was operated by Hernandez, whose record of truth in this case is so poor as to make his tests worthless. Not surprisingly, Hernandez determined Wayne was “truthful” about not knowing Gilbert. Gutierrez, a fitness buff, died in 1972 at the young age of forty. Turner and Christian wrote, “It was said that he [Gutierrez] had privately voiced doubts about the police conclusion [that Sirhan alone had killed Kennedy].” SUS ended up claiming that that the Michael Wayne card in Gilbert’s file referred to a different Michael Wayne. They never did explain the reverse possession.

    Wayne is an interesting person. He was seen in a group that allegedly included Sirhan. He obtained a ride from the suspicious Khaibar Khan. A couple of people thought he had a gun as he ran out of the pantry. And he was apprehended by a guard from the service that employed one of the most famous alternate suspects in this case, Thane Eugene Cesar.

    Thane Eugene Cesar

    Thane Eugene Cesar was just behind and to the right of Kennedy at the time the shots were fired. If Cesar is telling the truth about his position, then either he was the shooter, or the shooter had to be between himself and Kennedy. Cesar denies that he shot Kennedy, and denies that anyone else in that position shot him either. Cesar’s proximity to Kennedy is graphically demonstrated by the presence of his clip-on tie just beyond Kennedy’s outstretched hand as he lay on the floor. Cesar has made many statements that he has later contradicted, adding to the suspicion of sinister involvement. For example, he told police he had sold his.22 before the assassination, and that he had lost the receipt. But the police found the receipt, and found that he had sold the gun after the assassination.

    Cesar was also one of the first to accurately pinpoint where Kennedy was shot. Most people thought Kennedy was shot in the head. Cesar, on the other hand, in an interview immediately following the shooting, reported that Kennedy was shot in the head, the chest and the shoulder. He also said he was holding Kennedy’s arm when “they” shot him. Asked if Sirhan alone did all the shooting he said, “No, yeah. One man.”54 Paul Hope of the Evening Star also obtained early comments from Cesar. Hope recorded Cesar’s comments as follows:

    I fell back and pulled the Senator with me. He slumped to the floor on his back. I was off balance and fell down and when I looked up about 10 people already had grabbed the assailant.55

    Cesar told the LAPD that he ducked and was knocked down at the first shot, hardly the same report he gave the press. Richard Drew witnessed something similar to Cesar’s original version, as he reported in a separate article in the Evening Star that same day (6/5/68):

    As I looked up, Sen. Kennedy started to fall back and then was lowered to the floor by his aides.

    In Drew’s LAPD interview, he reduced the plural to the singular, saying “Someone” had lowered Kennedy to the floor. Since Kennedy was shot in the back at a range of 1-2 inches, anyone lowering him to the floor should have been an immediate suspect.

    Equally important was Eara Marchman’s report to the LAPD of what she witnessed prior to the assassination. Thane Eugene Cesar had been assigned to guard the pantry area that night. The LAPD recorded the following information from Marchman:

    She walked out towards the kitchen area and observed a man in a blue coat, dark complexion, possibly about 5-3/6 wearing lt. colored pants, standing talking to, and possibly arguing with, a uniformed guard who was standing by swinging kitchen doors (after showing mugs susp Sirhan was pointed out, although she only saw the man from the side position).

    Was Cesar arguing with Sirhan earlier that night? Cesar claims he never saw Sirhan in the pantry before the shooting, despite his having been sighted there by several other witnesses. But is Cesar to be believed?

    Anyone wishing to look into the involvement of Cesar eventually runs into Dan Moldea. (See DiEugenio’s article on Moldea in this issue.) It’s almost as if Moldea has become Cesar’s handler, deciding who will get access to his prize.

    Moldea spends a great deal of his book on the case discussing Cesar. Cesar was standing immediately behind and to the right of Kennedy—exactly the spot from which the gun had to have been fired, according to the autopsy report. While many researchers have felt (and continue to feel) that Cesar was the top suspect for the actual assassin of RFK, Moldea has not. Moldea, curiously, has been a defender. In his first published article on the case in Regardie’s, Moldea concluded with the following statement about Cesar:

    Gene Cesar may be the classic example of a man caught at the wrong time in the wrong place with a gun in his hand and powder burns on his face—an innocent bystander caught in the cross fire of history.

    Whatever Moldea’s motives may have been in 1987, when the above quotes were published, by 1997 he was singing an even more disturbing tune:

    To sum up, Gene Cesar proved to be an innocent man who since 1969 has been wrongly accused of being involved in the murder of Senator Kennedy.

    What would cause a man to state such a thing, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, some of which he dug up himself?

    Moldea tells us that Cesar had secret clearance to work on projects at Lockheed’s Burbank facility, and at Hughes Aircraft. Note that Robert Maheu, Roselli’s partner in assassination plots, was overseeing a great deal of Hughes’ operations in 1968. Note too that the CIA has had a long and admitted relationship with Hughes. A CIA document dated 1974 but not released until 1994 relates the following:

    DCD [Domestic Contacts Division] has had close and continuing relationships with the Hughes Tool Company and Hughes Aircraft Company since 1948. Both companies have been completely cooperative and have provided a wealth of information over the years….It should be noted…that in the case of Hughes Aircraft, DCD has contacted over 250 individuals in the company since the start of our association and about 100 in Hughes Tool over the same period. The substance of the contacts ranged from FPI collection to sensitive operational proposals. In addition, there is some evidence in DCD files that both companies may have had contractual relationships with the Agency. In the context of such a broad range in Hughes/CIA relationships, it is difficult to state with certainty that the surfacing of the substance of a given action would not cause Congressional and/or media interest.56

    He also reveals that at a lunch with Cesar, Cesar casually mentioned that he had purchased some diamonds from a businessman who was a Mafia associate. Despite these points, Moldea writes:

    For years, numerous conspiracy theories have alleged that Cesar worked for the Mafia, the CIA, Howard Hughes, or even as a freelance bodyguard, leg breaker, and hit man.

    There is no evidence to support any of these allegations.

    While one could argue that there is no proof, there is plenty of evidence to support such allegations. Moldea even provided some of it, but did so in a sneaky fashion. For example, the Burbank Lockheed facility is the famous “Skunkworks” facility that housed the CIA’s U-2 program. And Howard Hughes owned Hughes Aircraft. The CIA also had a stake in Hughes Aircraft (and the entire Hughes operation), a non-secret at this point. Why did Moldea leave out such salient points?

    The denouement of Moldea’s exploration of Cesar comes in the form of a much-touted polygraph test, which Cesar passed. Cesar had offered to take a polygraph in the past, but LAPD consistently avoided all opportunities to do so. Moldea claims that had Cesar failed his test, he would have pursued him to the ends of the earth. But since he passed, he concludes that Cesar is credible. He could have passed some of the questions he was asked whether he was the shooter or not. Consider the following:

    Between the ages of twenty-eight and forty-five, other than your kids, did you ever hurt anyone?

    No.

    One can’t help but wonder, from the wording, just what Cesar did do to his kids between those ages! But worse, Cesar was twenty-six at the time of RFK’s assassination, not twenty-eight! That question and a similar one had no relevance to June 5th at all!

    Examine the semantic trick in the next question:

    Did you fire a weapon the night Robert Kennedy was shot?

    No.

    Kennedy was shot at about 12:15 AM in the morning, so “the night” he was shot would have been the night of the 5th, long past the point at which the shooting took place. No assassin fired a gun that “night”.

    The wording of this next question was interesting.

    Were you involved in a plan to shoot Robert Kennedy?

    No.

    Note how the question was limited specifically to shooting, and not to any other broader kind of involvement in a plan to kill Robert Kennedy. What if Cesar was not the shooter, but was protecting the shooter’s identity by saying he was the only one in the shooter’s position? He might do this if he knew it could never be proved that he was the shooter. And if he didn’t fire any shots into the Senator, it would be difficult, despite circumstantial evidence, to link him in a court of law to the crime. But by saying he was there and that no one was between them, possibly he could be lying to protect someone else. If that were true, his next answer could very well be true:

    Regarding57 Robert Kennedy, did you fire any of the shots that hit him in June of ’68?

    No.

    The following question and answer either supports this theory, or proves Cesar to be inaccurate or lying about his position relative to Kennedy:

    Could you have fired at Kennedy if you wanted to?

    No.

    By his own account, he had been practically touching Kennedy, and did have a gun with him that night. So it would seem that his answer is inaccurate, unless someone was physically between him and Kennedy.

    There are, of course, other possibilities to the postulations I have just suggested. He might have truly had no involvement, and genuinely told the truth. Another possibility is that he faked his way through the test. No less than former CIA Director William Colby said this was doable if you knew the tricks of the trade. A third possibility is that the operator, Edward Gelb, altered the machine and/or results to achieve the desired results. And these suggestions are not mutually exclusive.

    Whatever the results, Moldea was not justified in basing his sole conclusion as to the question of Cesar’s guilt or innocence upon a test that is not even admissible in court. Moldea’s unquestioning credence casts as many doubts about Moldea as Cesar’s conflicting statements continue to cast upon himself.

    Lastly, there is the question of Ace Guard Services. Ace was only formed in the beginning of 1968 by Frank J. and Loretta M. Hendrix. And Cesar was only hired in May of 1968, just days before the assassination. Years after the assassination, DeWayne Wolfer, the criminalist in Sirhan’s case, became president of Ace under its newer name of Ace Security Services. Is this all just coincidence?

    Lining Up the Squares

    Like a Rubik’s cube, this case seems to involve many small, separate players. But as you get closer to solving the puzzle, you find there are really only a few planes, all of which connect in a single, logical fashion. The conspiracy is obvious; the players semi-obvious; but the motive is considerably less obvious. The question of Cui Bono remains all-important: Who Benefits?

    Once a supporter of Red hunter Joe McCarthy, Bobby had grown a great deal since his brother’s death. He became the champion of the disenfranchised. He marched for civil rights, and lashed out at the inefficiencies in our social system. He was not a supporter of welfare handouts but of jobs for all. He was often accused of being “angry”, and retorted “I am impatient. I would hope everyone would be impatient.” “I think people should be angry enough to speak out.” Another favorite: “It is not enough to allow dissent. We must demand it.” As Richard Goodwin has written, it was the very qualities that people most appreciated that caused the establishment to loathe and fear him. The people loved a Senator who would stand up and tell it like it was, without fear, without softening rhetoric. The establishment wanted him to go away.

    Bobby Kennedy had more enemies it would seem then his brother. Where John Kennedy played the politician, Bobby Kennedy played the populist. A famous episode recounted by Richard Goodwin shows how radical Bobby had become. The State Department had threatened to cut off aid to Peru over a dispute Peru had with the International Petroleum Company, a Standard Oil subsidiary. Kennedy had been outraged at the State Department, saying, “Peru has a democratic government. We ought to be helping them succeed, not tearing them down just because some oil company doesn’t like their policies.” But when Kennedy was confronted with what he considered excessive anti-Americanism from a Peruvian audience, Kennedy turned the tables on them. Goodwin recounts what transpired as follows:

    Irritated by the attacks, Kennedy turned on his audience. “Well, if it’s so important to you, why don’t you just go ahead and nationalize the damn oil company? It’s your country. You can’t be both cursing the U.S., and then looking to it for permission to do what you want to do. The U.S. government isn’t going to send destroyers or anything like that. So if you want to assert your nationhood, why don’t you just do it?”

    The Peruvians were stunned at the boldness of Kennedy’s suggestion. “Why, David Rockefeller has just been down here,” they said, “and he told us there wouldn’t be any aid if anyone acted against International Petroleum.”

    “Oh, come on,” said Kennedy, “David Rockefeller isn’t the government. We Kennedys eat Rockefellers for breakfast.”

    Bobby had outraged the CIA by exercising heavy oversight after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Richard Helms, the friend of the Shah and a key MKULTRA backer, held a special animosity for Bobby Kennedy. And Bobby was the one who asked, immediately after the assassination, if the CIA had killed his brother. What might Bobby have uncovered had he been allowed to reach the office of the Presidency? Powerful factions hoped they’d never have to find out.

    Kennedy himself expected tragedy for his efforts. “I play Russian roulette every time I get up in the morning,” he told friends. “But I just don’t care. There’s nothing I could do about it anyway,” the fatalist explained, adding, “This isn’t really such a happy existence, is it?”58

    The assassination of both Kennedys guaranteed the elongation of our involvement in Vietnam, a war that personally brought Howard Hughes and everyone involved in defense contracts loads of money. Killing Bobby prevented any effective return to the policies started under John Kennedy, and prevented Bobby from opening any doors to the truth about the murder of his brother. And killing Bobby removed a thorn in the side of many in the CIA who felt he had treated them unkindly and unfairly.

    Who killed Bobby? One man gave me an answer to that. I interviewed John Meier, a former bagman for Hughes and by association the CIA. Meier was one of the tiny handful of people in direct contact with Howard Hughes himself. His position gave him entry to circles most people will never see.

    Meier had worked for Hughes during the assassination, and saw enough dealings before and after the assassination to cause him to approach J. Edgar Hoover with what he knew. For example, he knew that Thane Eugene Cesar had an association with Maheu. (Maheu also had an extensive working relationship with the LAPD. This partnership produced a porno film pretending to show Indonesian president Sukarno in a compromising position with a Soviet agent.59) According to Meier, Hoover expressed his frustration, saying words to the effect of “Yes, we know this was a Maheu operation. People think I’m so powerful, but when it comes to the CIA, there’s nothing I can do.”

    People will choose what they will believe. But the evidence is still present, waiting to be followed, if any entity has the fortitude to pursue the truth in this case to wherever it leads. And so long as Sirhan remains in jail, the real assassins will never be sought.


    © 1998 Lisa Pease
    Do not copy, repost, quote largely from, plagiarize, or distribute in any other form without the written permission of Lisa Pease.
    Links are welcome.


    Notes

    1. The SUS files begin with biographies of all the SUS members, including military service information.

    2. Robert A. Houghton with Theodore Taylor, Special Unit Senator (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 102-3.

    3. Jonn Christian and William Turner, The Assassination of Robert F. Kennedy (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1978), pp. 64-66.

    4. Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 20.

    5. Frank Donner, Protectors of Privilege, p. 249. For his efforts, Wirin, a native-born Russian, was branded a Communist. One can only wonder at the effect that had on his career or his subsequent actions.

    6. Mark Lane, Plausible Denial (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press), p. 52.

    7. Robert Blair Kaiser, R. F. K. Must Die (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1970) p. 102.

    8. Kaiser, pp. 103-104.

    9. In Kaiser’s own book, he writes that he had been the one to recommend the book to Sirhan (p. 239). But in his January 17, 1969 article for Life magazine, Kaiser writes that Sirhan “requested” the book Witness. Similarly, in RFK Must Die Kaiser writes that Eason Monroe, the president of the ACLU, had called A. L. Wirin after the assassination with the suggestion that Wirin approach Sirhan (p. 60). But in the Life article, Kaiser implies that Adel Sirhan brought Wirin into the case.

    10. Kaiser, p. 124.

    11. Brad Ayers, The War That Never Was (Indianapolis: Bobs-Merrill, 1976) and private correspondence.

    12. Klaber and Melanson, Shadow Play: The Murder of Robert F. Kennedy, the Trial of Sirhan Sirhan, and the Failure of American Justice (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997) p. 43.

    13. CIA document dated 3/18/68 referencing the “cleared attorneys’ panel”, quoted in Probe(7/22/97), p. 18.

    14. Kaiser, p. 128.

    15. Kaiser, p. 129.

    16. McKissack was later removed from the Sirhan defense team and replaced with Godfrey Isaac.

    17. Klaber and Melanson, p. 26.

    18. SUS Files, Index Card under Russell E. Parsons.

    19. Kaiser, p. 245. “In the forties…Russell Parsons was defending some well-known members of what is sometimes called The Mob….” See also the SUS final report (unredacted version), p.1430.

    20. Kaiser, p. 152.

    21. Frank Donner, Protectors of Privilege (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 261-263.

    22. Klaber and Melanson, p. 72.

    23. Klaber and Melanson, p. 72.

    24. A copy of this transcript is provided by Lynn Mangan in her monograph on the case on p. 214 (p. 3967 of the original trial transcript). Sirhan was not present in chambers when this agreement was reached.

    25. Kaiser, p. 296.

    26. Kaiser, pp. 302-303.

    27. Alan W. Scheflin and Edward M. Opton, Jr. The Mind Manipulators (New York: Paddington Press Ltd., 1978), p. 439.

    28. Kaiser, p. 86.

    29. Walter H. Bowart, Operation Mind Control (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1978), p. 58.

    30. Kelly makes a good case for De Salvo’s innocence, and the guilt of his closest associate, George Nasser. The lawyer in that case was F. Lee Bailey, a friend of Bryan’s. Bryan helped Bailey on two other famous cases. F. Lee Bailey was later to defend a mind control victim named Patty Hearst. (Curiously, her father’s first two choices for a lawyer for her defense were Edward Bennett Williams and Percy Foreman, the notorious lawyer who coerced James Earl Ray into pleading guilty, an act Ray forever after regretted.)

    31. Turner & Christian, p. 226, quoting Bryan’s KNX Radio Interview of February 12, 1972.

    32. Allen Dulles’ and Richard Helms’ participation in these programs is well documented. Lesser known has been the role the Rockefeller family funds played in developing these horrific programs. The Rockefeller Foundation, for example, set up the infamous Allen Memorial Institute at McGill University in Montreal. See Thy Will be Done by Gerard Colby (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), p. 265.

    33. George H. Estabrooks, Hypnotism (New York: Dutton, 1948), p. 172.

    34. Estabrooks, p. 199.

    35. John Marks, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate” (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1979), 1991 paperback edition, p. 204.

    36. Kaiser, p. 407.

    37. Kaiser, p. 114 and SUS I-613.

    38. Kaiser, p. 19.

    39. Noted in the interview of Samuel Strain, SUS I-62.

    40. Kaiser, p. 46.

    41. Kaiser, p. 305.

    42. The following account is taken from the SUS file on John Henry Fahey. This document is marked S.F.P.D. which presumably stands for the San Fernando Police Department. The interviewer is listed as “Fernando” and “Fdo”, and is likely Fernando Faura, a journalist who was hot on the trail of the polka dot girl.

    43. Kaiser, p. 174. This drawing is shown in Ted Charach’s video The Second Gun.

    44. Kaiser, p. 175. Gugas is a past president of the American Polygraph Association.

    45. Kaiser, p. 225.

    46. Supplemental Report Khaibar Khan Investigation, SUS Files, prepared by R. J. Poteete.

    47. “The Tehran Connection”, Time 3/21/94.

    48. Fred Cook, “Iranian Aid Story: New Twists to the Mystery”, The Nation (5/24/65), pp. 553-4.

    49. Cook, The Nation (4/12/65), p. 384.

    50. SUS Interview of Michael Wayne (I-1096).

    51. SUS files contain both proposed questions and actual questions/responses. There are several differences between sets of questions.

    52. SUS Interview of William Singer (I-58-A).

    53. SUS Interview of Gregory Ross Clayton (I-4611).

    54. Turner and Christian, pp. 167-168, sourcing a KFWB transcript.

    55. “Senator Felled in Los Angeles; 5 Others Shot”, The Evening Star (6/5/68).

    56. CIA memo to the Inspector General regarding DCD’s response to the Agency-Watergate File Review. Dated 24 April 1974; released 1994, CIA Historical Review Program.

    57. “Regarding” may also have been used in the sense of “While looking at”. In other words, Cesar may have shot Kennedy while not “regarding” him.

    58. “Kennedy Expected Tragedy to Strike”, Dallas Times Herald (6/6/68)

    59. William Blum, Killing Hope (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995), p. 102.

  • Harvey, Lee and Tippit: A New Look at the Tippit Shooting


    From the January-February, 1998 issue (Vol. 5 No. 2) of Probe


    At 10:00 AM on Wednesday, November 20, 1963, Dallas Police Officer J.D. Tippit was having coffee at the Dobbs House Restaurant. Another man, known to employees as a regular “coffee customer,” was complaining loudly about his order of eggs to waitress Mary Dowling. Tippit, a frequent customer, noticed the incident but said nothing. The man complaining was later identified by the owner and employees of the Dobbs House as “Lee Harvey Oswald.”

    On the morning of November 22nd, J.D. Tippit hugged his oldest son Allen and said, “no matter what happens today, I want you to know that I love you.” Such overt signs of affection toward his son were uncharacteristic of Tippit. This was the last time young Allen Tippit saw his father alive. Some time later, “Lee Harvey Oswald” was seen at the Top Ten Record Store-a block from the Texas Theater. Oswald returned a short time later and was in the small record shop at the same time J.D. Tippit was there. An hour later Lee Oswald walked into the Jiffy Store on Industrial Blvd near Dealey Plaza. He purchased two bottles of beer and was asked for identification by store clerk Fred Moore. When Oswald displayed his Texas driver’s license, Moore remembered the birthdate on the license as “October, 1939.” When Oswald returned a short time later he purchased “peco” brittle. Beer and peco brittle seemed an unusual combination and was remembered by Fred Moore.

    Neither the employees nor owners of the Dobbs House Restaurant, Top Ten Record Store or the Jiffy Store were called to testify before the Warren Commission. And with good reason. On November 20th and 22nd, “Lee Harvey Oswald” was working at the Texas School Book Depository (TSBD). He could not have been at the Dobbs House Restaurant nor the Top Ten Record Store in Oak Cliff, nor the Jiffy Store on Industrial Blvd.

    The Tippit shooting, like the Kennedy assassination, has befuddled researchers for years. One of the main problems has been witness testimony placing Oswald in different places at the same time. Was Oswald in the 6th floor window or the 2nd floor lunchroom of the TSBD at the time of the assassination? Did Oswald leave Dealey Plaza in William Whaley’s cab or in a Rambler Station Wagon? Was Oswald sitting in the Texas Theater or shooting Officer Tippit at 1:15 PM? If Oswald was in the Dallas Jail at 2:00 PM, who was the man, identified as “Lee Harvey Oswald,” driving a red Ford Falcon on West Davis Street in Oak Cliff-a car with license plates that belonged to J.D. Tippit’s best friend?

    Other questions remain unanswered. Why were the spent cartridges given to Officer Poe at the scene of the Tippit shooting not identified by him four months later? Was there enough time for Oswald to have walked from 1026 N. Beckley to 10th & Patton? Why did some witnesses identify Oswald as Tippit’s killer while others did not? The questions seem to multiply. The Warren Commission carefully chose a few select witnesses and questionable evidence to support their conclusion that Oswald shot Tippit. But when all of the evidence surrounding the Tippit shooting is properly examined, a far different picture emerges.

    Leaving Dealey Plaza

    Shortly before 12:30 PM a photograph captured the image of a man in the southwest corner window of the TSBD. (This photograph can be found in The Search for Lee Harvey Oswald on page 109.) The man appears to be wearing a white T-shirt and has a hairline nearly identical to a photograph of Lee Oswald taken by Robert Oswald (Lee, page 96-97). Arnold Rowland described a person wearing “a light-colored shirt,” probably the same man, at the west end window of the 6th floor 15 minutes before the assassination. The man in the window could have been “Lee Oswald” who had been impersonating and setting up “Harvey Oswald” as a patsy for the past three months. (See my two previous articles “Harvey and Lee” in the last two editions of Probe.)

    Jack Ruby telephoned a friend on November 22nd and asked if he would “like to watch the fireworks.” Unknown to Ruby, his friend was an informant for the criminal intelligence division of the Internal Revenue Service. He and Ruby were standing at the corner of the Postal Annex Building at the time of the shooting. Minutes after the shooting Phil Willis, who knew Jack Ruby, saw and photographed a man who looked like Ruby near the front of the School Book Depository.

    Harvey Oswald told police he had been in the lunchroom at the time of the assassination and had “committed no acts of violence.” Coworker Charles Douglas Givens remembered Oswald wore a brown, long sleeved shirt the day of the assassination. This brown shirt was noticed by Mary Bledsoe when Oswald boarded the Marsalis bus and again by cab driver William Whaley when he drove Oswald to Oak Cliff. Although many people have felt Whaley was not credible, I think there is reason to believe his original, pre-Warren Commission identification because of the other details he noticed, such as an identification bracelet on his left wrist. Oswald was later photographed wearing just such a bracelet and the bracelet appears in the Dallas Police inventory as well. Whaley described, in various separate reports, a dark or brown shirt with a light or shiny colored streak in it.

    Does this mean Lee Oswald (white shirt) and Harvey Oswald (brown shirt) were both in the TSBD at the time of the assassination? Did they both leave Dealey Plaza shortly after the assassination? Let us follow the evidence.

    On the Oak Cliff side of the Houston Street viaduct is the Good Luck Oil Company service station (GLOCO). Five witnesses saw J.D. Tippit arrive at the GLOCO station at 12:45 PM. He sat in his car and watched traffic cross the bridge from Dallas for about 10 minutes. There were no police dispatches ordering Tippit to this location. If Tippit was not somehow involved, why was he sitting there watching traffic? Within a minute of the cab passing the GLOCO station, Tippit left and sped south on Lancaster. Two minutes later, at 12:54 PM, Tippit answered his dispatcher and said he was at “8th and Lancaster”-a mile south of the GLOCO Station. He turned right on Jefferson Blvd. and stopped at the Top Ten Record Store a few minutes before 1:00 PM. Store owner Dub Stark and clerk Louis Cortinas watched Tippit rush into the store and use the telephone. Without completing his call or speaking to store personnel Tippit left, jumped into his squad car, and sped north across Jefferson Blvd. He ran a stop sign, turned right on Sunset and was last seen speeding east-one block from N. Beckley. Tippit was then two minutes (at 45 mph) from Oswald’s rooming house. Tippit’s whereabouts for the next 8-10 minutes remain unknown.

    Cab driver Whaley let Harvey Oswald off near the corner of Neeley and Beckley around 12:54 PM (Tippit was driving past 8th & Lancaster). Oswald walked 6 blocks to his rooming house arriving near 1:00 (Tippit was at the Top 10 Record Store). Housekeeper Earlene Roberts told Secret Service Agent William Carter (12/5/63) “Oswald did not have a jacket when he came in the house and I don’t recall what type of clothing he was wearing.” While inside his room, Earlene Roberts glanced out her front window and saw a Dallas police car drive by slowly and honk the horn twice. She told the Warren Commission the police car was #107. Tippit’s car was #10. If this car was not Tippit’s, then whose car was it? All other Dallas Police cars were accounted for that day. While in his room, Oswald changed pants and, if you believe the Warren Commission, picked up his gun. Yet Earlene Roberts cleaned his extremely small room. She never saw a gun, nor a holster. Housekeepers like Earlene Roberts usually do as thorough a cleaning job as a NY cleaning service like http://www.cleaningservicenewyorkcity.com/industrial-cleaning-services.html so it isn’t likely she missed a gun or holster in Oswald’s possession.

    On November 30th, FBI Agent Alan Manning interviewed Mrs. Evelyn Harris. In his summary of that interview, he wrote:

    the daughter of Mrs. Lucy Lopez, a white woman married to a Mexican, worked at a sewing room across the street from the TSBD. Her daughter and some of the other girls knew Lee Harvey Oswald and also were acquainted with Jack Ruby. They observed Jack Ruby give Oswald a pistol when Oswald came out of the building.

    This writer does not offer an opinion regarding the allegations stated in this FBI report. It is a fact that Oswald tried to fire a pistol in the Texas Theater (heard by Dallas Police officers and theater patrons). It is a fact that the FBI determined that this pistol had a defective firing pin. One has to wonder how a pistol with a defective firing pin could fire four shots at Officer Tippit and then fail to fire in the theater. If the girls are correct, Ruby could have intentionally given Oswald a pistol with a defective firing pin. This allegation was never followed up by the FBI, as there are no known interviews of these girls nor was Ruby ever questioned about this.

    Harvey Oswald left the rooming house wearing a “dark jacket” and was last seen by Earlene Roberts on the corner of Zang and Beckley around 1:03 PM. During the next few minutes Oswald managed to get to the Texas Theater, over a mile away, without being seen by anyone en route. The only explanation that makes sense is that he was driven to the theater-a two and one half minute ride-perhaps by Tippit.

    The Texas Theater

    Researcher Jones Harris interviewed Julia Postal in 1963. When Harris asked Julia Postal if she had sold a ticket to “Oswald” (the man arrested), she burst into tears and left the room. A short time later Harris again asked Postal if she sold a ticket to “Oswald” and got the same response. From Postal’s refusal to answer this question and her reaction to same, Harris believes that Postal did sell “Oswald” a theater ticket. On February 29, 1964 Postal told FBI Agent Arthur Carter “she was unable to recall whether or not he bought a ticket.” (A few months later, when the Warren Report was issued, Postal’s memory had improved. She was now certain the man did not buy a ticket. See page 178 of the report.)

    Butch Burroughs, an employee of the Texas Theater, heard someone enter the theater shortly after 1:00 PM and go to the balcony. Harvey Oswald had apparently entered the theater and gone to the balcony without being seen by Burroughs. About 1:15 PM Harvey came down from the balcony and bought popcorn from Burroughs. Burroughs watched him walk down the aisle and take a seat on the main floor. He sat next to Jack Davis during the opening credits of the first movie, several minutes before 1:20 PM. Harvey then moved across the aisle and sat next to another man. A few minutes later Davis noticed he moved again and sat next to a pregnant woman. Just before the police arrived, the pregnant woman went to the balcony and was never seen again. In addition to Harvey there were seven people watching the movie on the main level (six after the pregnant woman left). Within 10 minutes, he had sat next to half of them.

    We have followed the probable movements of the man wearing the “brown shirt,” Harvey Oswald, from the Book Depository, to the bus, to the cab and to the rooming house. We still don’t know how he managed to get from the rooming house to the Texas Theater without being seen. What about Lee Oswald, the man wearing the “white shirt,” and possibly seen by Arnold Rowland in the west end window of the 6th floor shortly before the assassination?

    The Man on the 6th Floor?

    Another man was seen on the sixth floor shortly before the assassination by Richard Carr. Carr described him as “heavy set, wearing a hat, tan sport coat and horn rim glasses.” Minutes after the shooting, James Worrell saw a person described as “5’10” and wearing some sort of coat” leave the rear of the Depository heading south on Houston Street. Carr saw the same man and recognized him as the man he had seen on the 6th floor of the Book Depository. The man walked south on Houston, turned east on Commerce, and got into a Rambler station wagon parked on the corner of Commerce and Record. The Rambler was next seen in front of the Book Depository by Deputy Sheriff Roger Craig. Craig saw a person wearing a light-colored, short-sleeved shirt, who he later identified as Oswald, get into the station wagon and then travel under the triple overpass towards Oak Cliff. Marvin Robinson was driving his Cadillac when the Rambler station wagon in front of him abruptly stopped in front of the Book Depository. A young man walked down the grassy incline and got into the station wagon which subsequently sped away under the triple overpass. A third witness, Roy Cooper, was behind Marvin Robinson’s Cadillac. He observed a white male wave at, enter, and leave in the station wagon. A photograph, taken by Jim Murray, shows a man wearing a light-colored short-sleeved shirt headed toward the Nash Rambler station wagon in front of the Book Depository. Deputy Sheriff Roger Craig, also in the photo, is pictured looking at the man and the station wagon. The Hertz sign, on top of the Book Depository, shows the time as 12:40 PM. The man in the white shirt, possibly Lee Oswald, left Dealey Plaza in the station wagon and was last seen heading toward Oak Cliff.

    Scene of the Shooting

    Twenty minutes later, in Oak Cliff, a man resembling Lee Oswald is seen hurrying past the 10th Street Barber Shop-a block from Jack Ruby’s apartment. Mr. Clark, a barber, said he saw a man he would bet “his life on” was Oswald passing his shop in a great hurry. At 1:00 PM bricklayer William Lawrence Smith left his construction job for lunch at the Town and Country Cafe-two doors west of the 10th Street Barber Shop. While walking east to the cafe a man, who he later identified as Oswald, walked passed him heading west-toward 10th & Patton. A minute later, Oswald was seen by Jimmy Burt and William. A. Smith walking west. The Warren Commission told us Oswald was walking east.

    The clock read 1:04 PM as Helen Markham left the washateria of her apartment house near the corner of 9th & Patton. While walking south on Patton she noticed a police car driving slowly east on 10th Street. One half block in front of Markham, on the opposite side of Patton, cab driver William Scoggins was eating lunch in his cab. Scoggins noticed a man walking west as Tippit’s patrol car passed slowly in front of him. Jack Tatum, sitting in his red 1964 Ford Galaxie a block east, noticed the same man turn and walk toward the police car. Tatum turned left onto 10th street and drove slowly west past Tippit’s car. Tippit was then talking to the man through the passenger side car window. Tatum said “it looked as if Oswald and Tippit were talking to each other. There was a conversation. It did seem peaceful. It was almost as if Tippit knew Oswald.” Tatum noticed that the man had dark hair, was wearing a white T-shirt, white jacket and had his hands in his pockets. Seconds later Tatum drove past Helen Markham, who was standing at the corner of 10th & Patton, waiting for him to pass. The police car was stopped 100 feet to the east. She noticed a man was talking to the policeman through the car window. Domingo Benavides, in his 1958 Chevrolet pickup, was driving west on 10th Street approaching Tippit’s car. Jimmy Burt and William Arthur Smith were sitting on the front porch at 505 E. 10th.

    Officer Tippit got out of his patrol car and was walking to the front of the car when the man pulled out a gun and shot him. Startled by the shots, Benavides turned his truck into the curb and ducked under the dash-he was 20 feet away. William A. Smith and Jimmy Burt ran towards Burt’s car. Markham fell to her knees, covered her eyes, and began screaming.

    When Jack Tatum heard shots, he stopped his car, looked over his shoulder and saw Tippit lying on the ground. He saw the gunman walk around the rear of the police car, then turn and walk along the driver’s side of the car to where Tippit had fallen. The man then shot Tippit in the head. Tatum said “whoever shot Tippit was determined that he shouldn’t live and he was determined to finish the job.” Smith and Burt jumped in Burt’s 1952 blue Ford and sped to the scene of the shooting-less than a block away. Burt got out of the car in time to see Tippit’s assailant hurrying south on Patton Street. Smith described Tippit’s killer as wearing a white shirt, light brown jacket, dark pants and dark hair.

    After the Shooting

    Frank Wright and his wife (a half block east at 501 E 10th), and Acquilla Clemmons (one block west at 327 E. 10th) heard shots, but did not actually see the shooting. Wright, nearly a block east, said he saw a man standing over a policeman who had just been shot but did not see a gun. The man got into a car facing the opposite direction and drove off. The car was described by Wright as a gray, 1951 Plymouth coupe. Wright is the only witness who claimed the assailant drove off in a car. Clemmons, nearly a block west, said she saw another person that appeared to be involved with the shooter in some way. She is the only witness who implied that two people were involved in the shooting.

    We know Arthur Smith and Jimmy Burt, a block east, drove to the scene of the shooting within a half minute. Burt jumped out of his car and ran to the corner, a distance of 100 feet, in time to see the assailant scurrying south on Patton. Jimmy Burt may have been the second man seen by Clemmons. Burt quickly returned to his car and immediately drove off. Burt may have been the man seen by Frank Wright (a block east) leaving in a car described by Wright as a “grey, 1951 Plymouth coupe,” although Burt left the scene driving his two tone blue 1952 Ford.

    Wright’s wife called the police to report the shooting. After several minutes Domingo Benavides got out of his pickup and tried to use the police radio. Mr. Bowley, who was driving west on 10th Street and did not see the shooting, stopped and used the police radio to report the shooting. Bowley looked at his watch-the time was 1:10 PM (Commission Exhibit 2003). Helen Markham, who was walking to catch the 1:12 PM bus for work, said the shooting occurred at 1:06 PM. Deputy Sheriff Roger Craig was aiding in the search of the TSBD building. When he heard the news that a police officer had been shot he looked at his watch and noted the time was 1:06 PM. An original police transcript, found in the National Archives, lists the time of transmission as 1:10 PM. If Markham, Bowley, Craig, and the original Dallas Police broadcast times are correct, Tippit was shot prior to 1:10-when Harvey was very likely sitting in the balcony of Texas Theater. If Tippit was shot as early as 1:10, “Harvey Oswald” could not possibly have ran from his rooming house to 10th & Patton, a distance of 1.2 miles, in 6 minutes. In addition to this time problem, not a single witness, in heavily populated Oak Cliff, saw anyone resembling Harvey Oswald after the Tippit shooting (except Mrs. Roberts and those at the Texas Theater).

    In order for the Warren Commission to assert that Oswald killed Tippit, there had to be enough time for him to walk from his rooming house to 10th & Patton-over a mile away. The Warren Commission and HSCA ignored Markham’s time of 1:06 PM, did not interview Bowley (1:10 PM), did not ask Roger Craig (1:06 PM) and did not use the time shown on original Dallas police logs. Instead, the Warren Commission (1964) concluded that Oswald walked that distance in 13 minutes. The House Select Committee on Assassinations (1978) determined the time was 14 minutes, 30 seconds. Both concluded Oswald was last seen at the corner of Beckley and Zang at 1:03 PM. Either of their times, 13 minutes or 14 minutes and 30 seconds, would place Oswald at 10th & Patton at 1:16 PM or later. The time of the Tippit shooting as placed by the Commission,1:16 PM, contradicted the testimony of Markham, Bowley, Craig and the Dallas Police log. Another problem for the Warren Commission to overcome was the direction in which Oswald was walking. If he was walking west, as all of the evidence suggested, he would have had to cover even more ground in the same unreasonably short period of time. The Dallas Police recorded that the defendent was walking “west in the 400 block of East 10th.” The Commission ignored the evidence-5 witnesses and the official Dallas Police report of the event-and said he was walking east, away from the Texas Theatre.

    Whose Jacket is it Anyway?

    An ambulance was dispatched from Dudley Hughes Funeral Home (allegedly at 1:18 PM) and arrived within a minute. Tippit’s body was quickly loaded into the ambulance by Clayton Butler, Eddie Kinsley (both Dudley Hughes employees) and Mr. Bowley. Tippit’s body was en route to the Hospital by the time the Police arrived. Dallas Police Officer Westbrook found a brown wallet next to where Tippit had fallen. He showed the wallet to FBI Agent Barrett. The wallet contained identification, including a driver’s license, for Lee Harvey Oswald. It seems unbelievable that anyone would leave a wallet, containing identification, next to a policeman he has just shot. But Barrett insists Oswald’s wallet was found at the Tippit murder scene. If Tippit’s assailant was the man who impersonated Harvey Oswald for the previous two months, setting him up for the assassination, then the wallet was left at the scene of the Tippit shooting for the authorities to find. Perhaps this was Lee Oswald’s last act of setting up Harvey as a “patsy.” If so, it left Lee without identification and gave the police a reason to search for that cop killer, Lee Harvey Oswald.

    Virginia Davis saw Tippit’s killer, possibly Lee Oswald, cross her yard at 400 E. 10th while shaking the empty shells out of his gun. Virginia found an empty shell and turned it over to Dallas Police Detective Dhority. Barbara Davis, Virginia’s older sister, found a second shell and turned it over to Dallas Police Captain George M. Doughty. Domingo Benavides found two more empty shells and pointed them out to Officer J. M. Poe. Poe wrote his initials on the inside of the shells and put them in an empty cigarette package.

    Lee Oswald hurried south on Patton and passed within 60 feet of Ted Callaway, manager of Harris Brothers Auto Sales (501 E. Jefferson). Callaway noticed Oswald’s white “Eisenhower type” jacket and white T-shirt. When shown the brown shirt worn by Harvey Oswald when arrested, Callaway told the Warren Commission “Sir, when I saw him he didn’t have-I couldn’t see this shirt.” He noticed Oswald’s face was “very flush” and had dark hair. Sam Guinyard, who worked as a porter for Callaway, told the police he saw a “white man” running south on Patton.

    Warren Reynolds saw a man “run south on Patton toward Jefferson Street and then walk at a fast rate of speed west on Jefferson.” He last observed the individual turn north by the Ballew Texaco Service Station. When later shown a photograph of Oswald, Reynolds said he would hesitate to identify Oswald as the individual he saw. L. J. Lewis, standing beside Reynolds, observed the same man and said he “would hesitate to state whether the individual was identical with Oswald.” Harold Russell and B. M. Patterson were with Reynolds and Lewis at the time of the shooting. They identified the individual they saw as Oswald from a photograph.

    The man wearing a white shirt and jacket hurried west on Jefferson and passed the Ballew Texaco Station. Mary Brock said an individual with a “light complexion” and wearing “light clothing” walked passed her at a fast pace with his hands in his pockets. Five minutes later Reynolds and Patterson appeared at the station making inquiry as to whether she had noticed a man pass the station. She advised that she last saw the individual when he proceeded north behind the station. Mrs. Brock identified the individual as Oswald from a New Orleans police photograph, but not until ten months later.

    According to the Warren Report, Tippit’s killer discarded a light-colored jacket underneath a 1954 Oldsmobile in the parking lot next to the Texaco station. This left him wearing only a white T-shirt. The jacket, soon found by police, was later described (CE 2003) as a grey man’s jacket, “M” size in collar (medium, even though all of Oswald’s other clothes were sized small), zipper opening, name tag “created in California by Maurice Holman.” There were numerous laundry marks-“30” and “650” in the collar, K-42 printed on a Tag-O-lectric type marking machine. On the bottom of the jacket was another laundry tag “B-9738.” The cleaning tags and laundry marks noted on the inside of the jacket suggest it was professionally cleaned on several occasions. The FBI tried and failed to locate a cleaning establishment from which any of these cleaning tags originated. The FBI examined all of Oswald’s other clothing and failed to find a single laundry tag or mark. Marina told the FBI (CE 1843) that “Lee Harvey Oswald” had only two jackets, one a heavy jacket, blue in color (later found at the TSBD), and another light jacket, grey in color. She said both of these jackets were purchased in Russia. Neither of these jackets were ever sent to any laundry or cleaners anywhere-she recalled washing them herself.

    According to DPD and FBI interviews of witnesses on November 22nd and 23rd, Tippit’s killer was described as a white male, wearing black or dark pants; black shoes; black or dark brown hair; flush, light or red complexion; white shirt or white T-shirt, and a white or tan or otherwise light-colored Eisenhower type jacket. Police broadcasts (CE 1974) described the suspect as a “white male, about 30, 5’8,” black hair, slender, wearing a white jacket, white shirt and dark slacks.” The descriptions of Tippit’s killer by several witnesses and police broadcasts are reasonably consistent with each other, but not with the Oswald arrested minutes later at the Texas Theater.

    Man in the Balcony, Man in the Alley

    Johnny C. Brewer claimed that on the day of the assassination, he saw a man standing in the lobby of his shoe store at about 1:30 PM. He watched the man walk west on Jefferson and thought (Brewer says he is not positive) that he ducked into the Texas Theater. It was not until December 6th, two weeks after Harvey Oswald’s arrest, that Brewer described the man he saw as wearing a brown shirt. He asked theater cashier Julia Postal if she had sold the man a ticket. Postal replied “she did not think so, but she had been listening to the radio and did not remember.” She did remember, when testifying before the Warren Commission, that she sold 24 tickets that day.

    The Texas Theater has a main floor level and a balcony. Upon entering the theater from the “outside doors,” there are stairs leading to the balcony on the right. Straight ahead are a second set of “inside doors” leading to the concession stand and the main floor. It is possible to go directly to the balcony, without being seen by people at the concession stand, by climbing the stairs to the right. Brewer walked through the first and second set of double doors to the concession stand. He asked Butch Burroughs, who operated the concession stand, if he had seen the man come in. Burroughs said that he had been busy and did not notice. Brewer checked the darkened balcony but did not see the man he had followed. Brewer and Burroughs then checked and made sure the exits had not been opened. Brewer then went back to the box office and told Julia Postal he thought the man was still in the theater and to call the police.

    Julia called the police. Police broadcasts at 1:45 PM reported “Have information a suspect just went into the Texas Theater . . . Supposed to be hiding in the balcony” (17H418). When the police arrived, they were told by a “young female,” probably Julia Postal, that the man was in the balcony. The police who entered the front of the theater went to the balcony. They were questioning a young man when Officers Walker, McDonald and Hutson entered the rear of the theater. Hutson counted seven theater patrons on the main level. From the record, these seven would break down as follows:

      2 Two boys (half way down center section searched by Walker & McDonald while Hutson looked on)
      1 Oswald (3rd row from back-center section)
      1 Jack Davis (right rear section-Oswald first sat next to him)
      1 Unknown person (across the aisle from Davis-Oswald left his seat next to Davis and moved to a seat next to this person; Oswald then got up and walked into the theater lobby)
      1 George Applin (6 rows from back-center section)
      1 John Gibson (1st seat from the back on the far right side)

    Oswald bought popcorn at 1:15 PM, walked to the main floor and reportedly took a seat next to a pregnant woman. Minutes before police arrived, this woman disappeared into the balcony and was never seen again. She was not one of the seven patrons counted by Officer Hutson.

    Captain Westbrook and FBI Agent Barrett came into the theater from the rear entrance minutes later. Westbrook may have been looking for “Lee Harvey Oswald”-identified from the contents of the wallet he found at the scene of Tippit’s murder.

    From police broadcasts, the police were looking for a suspect wearing a white shirt, white jacket, with dark brown or black hair, and hiding in the balcony. But their attention quickly focused on a man wearing a brown shirt with medium brown hair, on the main floor. When this man was approached by Officer McDonald, he allegedly hit McDonald and then tried to fire his .38 revolver. Several police officers and theater patrons heard the “snap” of a pistol trying to fire. A cartridge was later removed from the .38 and found to have an indentation on the primer. An FBI report described the firing pin as “bent.” The man in the brown shirt, Harvey Oswald, was subdued by Officers Hawkins, Hutson, Walker, Carroll and Hill, and then handcuffed. Captain Westbrook ordered the officers to “get him out of here as fast as you can and don’t let anybody see him.” As he was taken out the front, Julia Postal heard an officer remark “We have our man on both counts.” In an FBI report, we find the following:

    this was the first time that she [Postal] had heard of Tippit’s death, and one of the officers identified the man they arrested by calling out his name, “Oswald”.… (Emphasis added. FBI report 2/29/64 by Arthur E. Carter.)

    If the person who identified Oswald by name was Captain Westbrook, he could have obtained Oswald’s name from identification-perhaps the Texas driver’s license-in Lee Oswald’s wallet found at the scene of the Tippit shooting. If someone other than Captain Westbrook identified Oswald by name, then someone in the Dallas Police had prior knowledge of Oswald. Identification of the policeman who made this statement might have aided in answering this question.

    Harvey Oswald, the man wearing the “brown shirt,” who probably bought a ticket from Julia Postal, bought popcorn from Butch Burroughs at 1:15 PM, sat next to Jack Davis before the main feature began at 1:20 PM, sat next to another identified patron, and then sat next to a pregnant woman (who disappeared), was brought out the front entrance and placed in a police car. En route to City Hall, Oswald kept repeating “Why am I being arrested? I know I was carrying a gun, but why else am I being arrested?” In light of the above, it was a good question to pose.

    The police (Lt. Cunningham and Detective John B. Toney) did question a man in the balcony of the theater. Lt. Cunningham said “We were questioning a young man who was sitting on the stairs in the balcony when the manager told us the suspect was on the first floor.” Detective Toney said “There was a young man sitting near the top of the stairs and we ascertained from manager on duty that this subject had been in the theater since about 12:05 PM.” Notice that both Cunningham and Toney say they spoke to the “manager.” Manager? We know from Postal’s testimony that the owner of the theater, John Callahan, left for the day around 1:30 PM. The projectionist remained in the projection room during Oswald’s arrest. Julia Postal remained outside at the box office. Burroughs was the only other theater employee and, according to his testimony, he “stayed at the door at the rear of the theater” (near the concession stand), “did not see any struggle” and then “remained at the concession stand” during Oswald’s arrest. Burroughs never left the main level of the theater. Clearly, neither Postal, Burroughs, nor the projectionist (the only theater employees on duty) spoke to these officers either in the balcony or on the stairs in the balcony. Someone either identified himself as a theater “manager,” or the officers mistook someone as the theater “manager,” or these officers were lying about speaking to the “manager.” The “manager” and the person whom they questioned in the balcony remain unidentified.

    Oddly, and inconsistently, the police homicide report of Tippit’s murder reads “suspect was later arrested in the balcony of the Texas Theater at 231 W. Jefferson.” Detective Stringfellow’s report states “Oswald was arrested in the balcony of the Texas Theater.” After (Harvey) Oswald’s arrest Lt. E..L. Cunningham, Detective E.E. Taylor, Detective John Toney, and patrolman C.F. Bentley were directed to search all of the people in the balcony and obtain their names and addresses. Out of 24 (the number of tickets Postal said she sold) theater patrons that day, the Dallas Police provided the names of two-John Gibson and George Applin. If the names of the other 22 theater patrons were obtained, that list has disappeared. The identity of the man questioned by police in the balcony remains a mystery. He was not arrested and there is no police report, record of arrest, nor mention of any person other than Oswald. What happened to this man? What happened to the list of theater patrons?

    Captain C.E. Talbert and some officers were questioning a boy in the alley while a pickup truck was sitting with the motor running a few yards away (24H242). Talbert was one of the few DPD officers at the Texas Theater who did not write a report of Oswald’s arrest to Chief Curry (16 officers wrote such reports). Talbert’s testimony before the Warren Commission runs for over 20 pages. At no time was he asked about his involvement at the Texas Theater or his questioning of a young man in the alley behind the theater.

    Bernard Haire, owner of a hobby shop two doors from the theater, walked out the rear of his shop shortly before 2:00 PM and saw police cars backed up to Madison Street. He watched as the police escorted a man from the rear of the Texas Theater wearing a “white pullover shirt.” They placed the man in a squad car and drove away. He noticed the man was very “flush” in the face as though he had been in a struggle. Haire’s description of this man-“white shirt” with a “flush face”-is consistent with witness statements of Tippit’s killer before, during and after the shooting. For 25 years Mr. Haire and other witnesses thought they had witnessed the arrest of Oswald behind the Texas Theater in the alley. When told Oswald was brought out the front of the theater Haire asked “Then who was the person I saw police take out the rear of the theater, put in a police car, and drive off?”

    Collins Radio and the CIA

    Shortly after 2:00 PM, Mr. T. F. White observed a man sitting in a 1961 red Ford Falcon, with the engine running, in the El Chico parking lot behind his garage. This is five blocks north of the Texas Theater. As Mr. White approached the car, the driver turned and looked at him. The driver then sped off in a westerly direction on Davis Street. Mr. White, who later saw Oswald’s picture on TV, said the man in the Falcon was identical to Oswald and wore a “white T-shirt.” When told by the FBI that Oswald was in jail at 2:00 PM, White still maintained that the man he saw driving the red Falcon was “possibly identical” to the Oswald he had seen on TV after the assassination. This Oswald “sighting” shortly after Harvey Oswald’s arrest at the Texas Theater could have been a case of mistaken identity. But Mr. White, who had been given police training, wrote down the vehicle’s license plate number. The plates belonged to a blue 1957 Plymouth 4 door sedan-not a 1961 red Ford Falcon. The Plymouth belonged to Carl Mather, a long time employee of Collins Radio and close friend of J.D. Tippit. Newsman and former Dallas Mayor Wes Wise heard of the unusual Oswald sighting. Mr. Wise and fellow news reporter Jane Bartell questioned Mather about the incident over dinner. Mather was so nervous he could hardly talk and said little. In 1977 the HSCA wanted to interview Mather about this incident. He agreed, but not before he was granted immunity from prosecution by the Justice Department. Mather was interviewed by the HSCA, but most of the documents relating to that interview remain classified in the National Archives. Why?

    One possible reason is Oswald’s prior connection to Collins Radio and what Collins Radio actually represented. Oswald, in the company of George De Mohrenschildt, had once visited the home of retired Admiral Henry Bruton, who was an executive of Collins Radio. This was reported by the HSCA in a manuscript called “I’m A Patsy” by De Mohrenschildt. Bruton and his position with Collins is also mentioned in Edward Epstein’s book Legend. Bruton had been a lawyer in Virginia before becoming a Navy intelligence officer. Bruton’s specialty was electronic surveillance and this is what he was bringing to Collins Radio. In April of 1963, the Wall Street Journal announced that Collins would construct a modern radio communications system linking Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam. On November 1, 1963, the New York Times reported that Fidel Castro had captured a large boat called the Rex which was being leased to Collins Radio at the time. The next day, one of the captured Cuban exiles aboard the Rex confessed that the boat had been used to ferry arms into Cuba and that “the CIA organized all arms shipments” (New York Times 11/3/63). According to Bill Kelly (Back Channels, Summer 1992), the Rex was the flagship of the JM/WAVE fleet, the CIA’s super station in Miami. According to Kelly, Castro announced that the arms shipments were meant for an assassination attempt on top Cuban leaders. What a provocative scenario: five blocks from where Oswald was arrested we have an Oswald double in a car traced to Tippit’s friend and the friend works for a CIA associated company that plays a role in the plots against Cuba and Castro.

    Meanwhile, Harvey Oswald was sitting in the police station, accused of crimes he did not commit. When questioned by the Dallas Police, he said he had walked out the front of the TSBD, boarded a bus, taken a cab to North Beckley, and then gone to a movie. Harvey Oswald’s statements to the Dallas Police follow and agree with witness identification of the man wearing the “brown shirt.” He maintained his innocence and described himself as a “patsy” but to no avail. The Dallas Police charged him, one “Lee Harvey Oswald,” with murder. Sheriff Bill Decker provided the Warren Commission (12H51) a file titled “Harvey Lee Oswald, W M 24, murder…..11/22/63 of John Fitzgerald Kennedy.” At least the Sheriff’s department got his name right.

    The Trouble with Transcripts

    As far as the authorities-Dallas Police, FBI, CIA, White House-were concerned, they had their man. Harvey Oswald was not believed when he said he was in the lunchroom at the time of the shooting. Roger Craig was ignored when he said he saw Oswald leave Dealey Plaza in a Rambler Station Wagon. Markham, Bowley and Craig, who said the shooting occurred at or before 1:10 PM, were ignored. Their statements were supported by the original police transcript ( CE 705). When CE 705 was introduced into evidence by the Warren Commission on April 22, 1964, a serious conflict arose. The transcripts showed Tippit’s last attempted transmission to the dispatcher at 1:08 PM and the report of his murder, by Bowley, at 1:10 PM (the same time noted by Bowley on his watch). It was obvious that Oswald could not have walked from his rooming house (1:04 PM) to 10th and Patton by 1:08 or 1:10 PM. A solution to the problem created by this exhibit was required. The Warren Commission requested the FBI to prepare a new transcript. In July of 1964, an FBI agent allegedly listened to the original dispatch patrol car transmissions at Dallas Police Headquarters. The original transcript described police officers only by their assigned numbers. The new transcript listed the officers by number and name. But Tippit’s name and number (no. 78) were deleted from the new transcript. The transmissions at 1:08 PM were now listed as having been made by police officers #55 and #488 (CE 1974). Neither the names nor police identification numbers were identified or given for those two particular officers. Numerous changes can be found by comparing the old and new transcripts. The new transcript reports the Tippit murder by Bowley at 1:19 PM, nine minutes later than in the original. In the original transcript, when Bowley is reporting the shooting to the dispatcher, an unknown person in the background said “No. 78, squad car #10” This unknown person was familiar enough with police terminology to refer to Tippit as number 78 and his car as a “squad car.” The new transcript, as created by the Bureau, identified the unknown person in the background, as the “citizen” and “dispatcher.” How this FBI agent was able to listen to the voice of one unknown person and divide that conversation into the citizen (Bowley) and the dispatcher has not been explained. The Commission used the items in the new transcript to certify that Oswald now had enough time to go from the rooming house to 10th and Patton and shoot Tippit.

    Strange Evidence

    The empty shells obtained and initialed by Officer Poe at the scene of Tippit’s murder were apparently not the same shells the Warren Commission held as evidence. When the Commission’s shells were shown to Poe months later, he could not find and identify the marks he remembered making. Two .38 Remington-Peters and two .38 Winchester-Western hulls were found. But only one Remington-Peters slug and three Winchester-Western slugs were removed from Tippit’s body. The .38 revolver taken from Oswald had been rechambered (slightly enlarged) to accept .38 Special cartridges. When discharged through a rechambered weapon, .38 Special cartridges “bulge” in the middle and are noticeably “fatter” than cartridges fired in an unchambered revolver. The empty cartridges, found in the National Archives, appear normal in size, indicating that they were fired in an original .38 revolver-not in a rechambered revolver such as the one taken from Harvey Oswald at the Texas Theater. The revolver taken from Oswald at the Texas Theater was not the gun used to kill Tippit. The Warren Commission tells us that Oswald ordered the .38 pistol from Seaport Traders in Los Angeles, via REA Express. But they have never explained how REA Express delivered the pistol C.O.D. to P.O. Box 2915 in Dallas. Who would deliver a gun C.O.D. to a post office box? Who paid REA? How were they paid? Who signed for the delivery? These riddles have yet to be answered.

    A Question of Shirts

    The Warren Commission did not ask Butch Burroughs what time “Oswald” snuck into the balcony nor what time he sold “Oswald” popcorn (1:15 PM). Jack Davis was not interviewed by the Warren Commission. He could have told them Oswald (man in brown shirt) was sitting next to him before 1:20 PM. On November 22nd not a single person who saw Oswald before, during or after Tippit’s shooting described him as wearing a brown shirt. Witnesses said he wore a “white T-shirt and a white or light-colored jacket.” There was no mention of a brown shirt by Johnny Brewer for two weeks; by Sam Guinyard for three months; by Julia Postal until February 29, 1964. The jacket found under the Oldsmobile at the Texaco Station was made in the U.S. (the label read “created in California by Maurice Holman”); yet Marina said Oswald owned only two jackets-both purchased in Russia. Marina was never asked about this contradiction. Neither Westbrook nor FBI Agent Barrett were questioned by the Warren Commission about Oswald’s driver’s license.

    Some witnesses identified the man in police custody as Tippit’s killer, some did not. Laurel Kitrell-long time employee of the Texas Employment Commission-had the opportunity to interview both two “Lee Oswald”s in October, 1963 and recognized they were different people. She said they were “very similar in appearance, but different.” Witnesses saw someone resembling Lee Oswald (white shirt, flush face, black hair) briefly before, during, and after the Tippit murder. When they saw Harvey (brown shirt, brown hair) in the police lineup, they may have mistaken him for Lee.

    This is what I think happened to Tippit and Harvey Oswald. What about Lee? At 2:00 PM, while Harvey was in police custody, someone matching Lee’s description was seen driving west on Davis Street in a car as seen by T. F. White. Lee was seen twelve hours later at the Lucas B & B Restaurant (two doors from Ruby’s Vegas Club) with Jack Ruby. Head waitress Mary Lawrence was well acquainted with Ruby-she had known him eight years. She reported seeing Oswald and Ruby together early in the morning (1:30 AM) of November 23rd, following the assassination. Two days later she received an anonymous phone call. A male voice said “If you don’t want to die, you’d better leave town.”

    Did Lee Oswald and Tippit know each other? Was Tippit involved? They were seen at the Dobbs House on November 20th and the Top Ten Record Store on the morning of November 22nd. Tippit was at the GLOCO Station when Oswald’s (Harvey) cab crossed the Houston St. Viaduct. Tippit spoke to and was possibly shot by “Lee Oswald.” License plates from the car of Tippit’s close friend, Carl Mather, may have been seen on a car driven by Lee Oswald shortly after the assassination. There are either a lot of Oswald/Tippit coincidences or Tippit was somehow involved.

    Who was the unidentified FBI agent who made numerous changes to the police broadcast? Did people within the Dallas Police Department participate in a cover-up of the Tippit murder? Were they aware of two “Oswalds”? Who changed the time of Tippit’s murder from 1:10 PM to 1:19 PM on DPD police broadcasts? What happened to Oswald’s driver’s license? We know a Lee Oswald showed a Texas driver’s license to Fred Moore at the Jiffy Store on Industrial Blvd on the morning of November 22nd. Dallas Police Captain Westbrook reportedly found Oswald’s driver’s license at the scene of the Tippit murder later that afternoon. Detective Paul Bentley, when interviewed on WFFA TV on Saturday, November 23rd, said “there was a Dallas Public Library card. He had other identification such as a driver’s license and credit cards, things like that in his wallet” (credit cards for Oswald?) Why was the license not listed on police inventory reports? How did the license get from the scene of Tippit’s murder to the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS)? A Texas driver’s license belonging to Lee Oswald turned up at the DPS the following week. Aletha Frair, and 6 employees of the DPS saw and handled Oswald’s driver’s license. It was dirty and worn as though it had been carried in a billfold. Mrs. Lee Bozarth (employee of DPS) stated that she knew from direct personal experience there was a Texas driver’s license file for Lee Harvey Oswald. The DPS file had been pulled shortly after the assassination. Who pulled Oswald’s file from the DPS? What happened to this file and driver’s license? Lt. E..L. Cunningham, Detective E.E. Taylor, Detective John Toney, and patrolman C.F. Bentley were directed to search all of the people in the balcony and list their names and addresses. What happened to that list? Why were none of these officers questioned about their knowledge of such a list? Why are there no police or FBI interviews of the theater patrons? Why were Lt. Cunningham and Det. Toney not asked about the man they questioned in the balcony? Why was Bernard Haire, who saw the police take a man from the rear of the theater, never interviewed by the FBI nor asked to testify before the Warren Commission or the HSCA? Why was Captain Talbert not asked about the man he questioned in the alley behind the theater? Why was neither T. F. White nor Carl Mather questioned by the Warren Commission? When finally questioned by the HSCA 15 years later, why did Carl Mather insist on being granted immunity before he testified? Why is his testimony still classified? Why do police reports state that Oswald was arrested in the balcony? Why does Sheriff Decker’s file list the assailant’s name as “Harvey Lee Oswald”?

    Because these questions, although unanswered, have a common thread. These questions-if properly answered-could expose a government agency’s creation, manipulation, and control of both Harvey and Lee Oswald. That agency is the CIA.

  • The Posthumous Assassination of John F. Kennedy

    The Posthumous Assassination of John F. Kennedy


    This two part essay appeared originally in Probe back in 1997. No article we ever published ever generated as much discussion and feedback as this one did. If it can be said that any piece ever put us “on the map” so to speak, this one did.

    Looking back, one reason it had so much resonance is that no one had ever done anything like it before. That is, explored at length and in depth both the provenance and the evolution of these “JFK scandal stories” over a number of years. By the term evolution I mean how they morphed over time at each appearance into something they were not when they first appeared.

    The other point that made this such an attention grabber was the fact that certain personages somehow appeared on the scene directly or on the periphery. People whose presence should have caused alarm bells to go off with intelligent and sophisticated observers: Frank Capell, Robert Loomis, Ovid Demaris, Liz Smith, James Angleton, Timothy Leary etc. As the essay makes clear, these people had agendas in mind when they got into this racket. Others, like Robert Slatzer, as we also show, were just money grubbing hustlers. But the net effect is that by reinforcing each other, they became a business racket, a network creating its own echo chamber.

    It was not an easy piece to write. I learned a lot doing it, but I came away with a lot of dirty knowledge about how power in America works. And the lengths the other side will go to in order to snuff out any kind of memory of what America was at one time.

    We decided to repost this essay in the wake of the current Mimi Alford episode. This fits in with the essay because the book was published by Random House, home of Bob Loomis who retired last year. The Alford book was likely his parting shot at the JFK researchers, who he despises so much that he launched the now discredited Gerald Posner on them. Also, we cannot help but note how quickly the MSM has fallen head first for the woman without asking any cautionary questions. Like, for example, “Why did you wait nine years to publish?”, right on the eve of the 50th anniversary. Which corresponds neatly with her alleged discovery by Robert Dallek back in 2003, at the 40th anniversary. Neither did they ask her how she got to Random House. Another pertinent query: “Why are you and your handlers writing that you were not
    named previously when, in fact, Dallek did name you in the trade paperback version of his book?”

    Further, no one has called her on her comment that during the Missile Crisis JFK told her that he wished his kids grew up “better red than dead”. In other words, he was ready to surrender to the Russians and Cubans and let them take over America instead of insisting the missiles in Cuba be removed. Hard to believe that even the MSM could buy this one sInce it contradicts everything in the newly adduced documentary record. During the Missile Crisis, Kennedy moved a 200,000 man army into South Florida. Two invasion plans of Cuba had been drawn up during Operation Mongoose. Either by invasion or by bombing, the missiles were going to be removed. It was not Kennedy who tried for a deal first. It was the Russians through ABC reporter John Scali. Five hours later, NIkita Khrushchev cabled a long, emotional, rambling letter requesting the outline of an offer to remove the missiles.

    But the Missile Crisis has always been perceived by the MSM as being Kennedy’s shining moment. (In my opinion it is not. Vietnam is, but they are still in denial on that one.) So they first sent Sy Hersh out to try and smear Kennedy’s masterly performance during the episode. That did not work, so now they take a second swing at it. With no one asking why this is bizarre story is at odds with the taped conversations of the crisis. We have little doubt that this book is being passed around the studios by Random House to make a TV movie for the anniversary next year — perhaps the rightwing Starz Channel will pick it up.

    In the classic film “Z”, after the generals have killed the liberal candidate for Premier, an excellent scene follows. Seated at a long table, the plotters pass around a dossier. They then agree that the next step is to “Knock the halo of his head.” The timely delay in the Alford book’s appearance, the push by Random House, and the inclusion of the goofy “better red than dead” exchange, these all demonstrate that the book and this woman are best understood under that shadow. Which we try and illuminate in this essay.


    Part I: Judith Exner, Mary Meyer, and Other Daggers

    (Click here if your browser is having trouble loading the above.)


    Part II: Sy Hersh and the Monroe/JFK Papers: The History of a Thirty-Year Hoax

     

    On September 25, 1997, ABC used its news magazine program 20/20 to take an unusual journalistic step. In the first segment of the program, Peter Jennings took pains to discredit documents that had been about to be used by its own contracted reporter for an upcoming show scheduled for broadcast. The contracted reporter was Seymour Hersh. The documents purported to show a secret deal involving Marilyn Monroe, Sam Giancana, and President John F. Kennedy. They were to be the cornerstone of Hersh’s upcoming Little, Brown book, The Dark Side of Camelot. In fact, published reports indicate that it was these documents that caused the publisher to increase Hersh’s advance and provoke three networks to compete for a television special to hype the book. It is not surprising to any informed observer that the documents imploded. What is a bit surprising is that Hersh and ABC could have been so naive for so long. And it is ironic that ABC should use 20/20 to expose a phenomenon that it itself fueled twelve years ago.

    What happened on September 25th was the most tangible manifestation of three distinct yet overlapping journalistic threads that have been furrowing into our culture since the Church Committee disbanded in 1976. Hersh’s book would have been the apotheosis of all three threads converged into one book. In the strictest sense, the convergent movements did not actually begin after Frank Church’s investigation ended. But it was at that point that what had been a right-wing, eccentric, easily dismissed undercurrent, picked up a second wind–so much so that today it is not an eccentric undercurrent at all. It is accepted by a large amount of people. And, most surprisingly, some of its purveyors are even accepted within the confines of the research community.

    The three threads are these:

    1. That the Kennedys ordered Castro’s assassination, despite the verdict of the Church Committee on the CIA’s assassination plots. As I noted last issue, the committee report could find no evidence indicating that JFK and RFK authorized the plots on Fidel Castro, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, or Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam.
    2. That the Kennedys were really “bad boys,” in some ways as bad as Chicago mobsters or the “gentleman killers” of the CIA. Although neither JFK nor RFK was lionized by the main centers of the media while they were alive, because of their early murders, many books and articles were written afterward that presented them in a sympathetic light, usually as liberal icons. This was tolerated by the media establishment as sentimental sop until the revelations of both Watergate and the Church Committee. This “good guy” image then needed to be altered since both those crises seemed to reveal that the Kennedys were actually different than what came before them (Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers) and what came after (Nixon). Thus began a series of anti-Kennedy biographies.
    3. That Marilyn Monroe’s death was somehow ordained by her “involvement” with the Kennedy “bad boys.” Again, this was at first a rather peculiar cottage industry. But around the time of Watergate and the Church Committee it was given a lift, and going back to a 1964 paradigm, it combined elements of the first two movements into a Gothic (some would say grotesque) right-wing propaganda tract which is both humorous and depressing in its slanderous implications, and almost frightening in its political and cultural overtones. Egged on by advocates of Judith Exner (e.g. Liz Smith and Tony Summers), this political and cultural time bomb landed in Sy Hersh’s and ABC’s lap. When it blew up, all parties went into a damage control mode, pointing their fingers at each other. As we examine the sorry history of all three industries, we shall see that there is plenty of blame (and shame) to be shared. And not just in 1997.

    As we saw in Part One of this article, as the Church Committee was preparing to make its report, the Exner and then Mary Meyer stories made headlines in the Washington Post. These elements–intrigue from the CIA assassination plots, plus the sex angles, combined with the previous hazing of Richard Nixon over Watergate–spawned a wave of new anti-Kennedy “expose” biographies. Anti-Kennedy tracts were not new. But these new works differed from the earlier ones in that they owed their genesis and their styles to the events of the mid-seventies that had brought major parts of the establishment (specifically, the CIA and the GOP) so much grief. In fact we will deal with some of the earlier ones later. For now, let us examine this new pedigree and show how it fits into the movement outlined above.

    Looking for Mr. Kennedy (And Not Finding Him)

    The first anti-Kennedy book in this brood, although not quite a perfect fit into the genre, is The Search for JFK, by Joan and Clay Blair Jr. The book appeared in 1976, right after Watergate and the Church Committee hearings. In the book’s foreword, the authors are frank about what instigated their work:

    During Watergate (which revealed to us the real character of President Richard M. Nixon–as opposed to the manufactured Madison Avenue image), our thoughts turned to Jack Kennedy….Like other journalists, we were captivated by what was then called the “Kennedy mystique” and the excitement of “the New Frontier.” Now we began to wonder. Behind the image, what was Jack really like? Could one, at this early date, cut through the cotton candy and find the real man? (p. 10)

    In several ways, this is a revealing passage. First of all, the authors apparently accept the Washington Post version of Watergate–i.e. that Nixon, and only Nixon, was responsible for that whole range of malfeasance and that Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein got to the bottom of it. Second, it seems to me to be a curious leap from the politically misunderstood shenanigans of Watergate to the formative years of John Kennedy’s college prep days and early adulthood, which is what this book is about. It takes JFK from his days at the exclusive Choate School in Connecticut to his first term as a congressman i.e. from about 1934 through 1947. I don’t understand how comparing the political fallout from Watergate with an examination of Kennedy’s youthful years constitutes a politically valid analogy. Third, the Blairs seem a bit behind the curve on Nixon. If they wanted to find out the “truth” about Nixon all they had to do was examine his behavior, and some of the people he employed, in his congressional campaign against Jerry Voorhis, his senatorial campaign against Helen Douglas and, most importantly, his prosecution of Alger Hiss. These all happened before 1951, two decades before Watergate. Nothing in JFK’s political career compares with them.

    The book’s ill-explained origin is not its only problem. In its final form, it seems to be a rush job. I have rarely seen a biography by a veteran writer (which Clay Blair was) so poorly edited, written, and organized. The book is nearly 700 pages long. It could have been cut by a third without losing anything of quality or substance. The book is heavily reliant on interviews which are presented in the main text. Some of them at such length–two and three pages–that they give the volume the air of an oral history. To make it worse, after someone has stopped talking, the authors tell us the superfluous fact that his wife walked into the room, making for more excess verbiage (p.60). And on top of this, the Blairs have no gift for syntax or language, let alone glimmering prose. As a result, even for an interested reader, the book is quite tedious.

    The Blairs spend much of their time delving into two areas of Kennedy’s personal life: his health problems and his relationships with the opposite sex. Concerning the first, they chronicle many, if not all, of the myriad and unfortunate medical problems afflicting young Kennedy. They hone in on two in order to straighten out the official record. Previous to this book, the public did not know that Kennedy’s back problem was congenital. The word had been that it came about due to a football injury. Second, the book certifies that Kennedy was a victim of Addison’s disease, which attacks the adrenal glands and makes them faulty in hormone secretion. The condition can be critical in fights against certain infections and times of physical stress.

    Discovered in the 19th century, modern medication (discovered after 1947) have made the illness about as serious as that of a diabetic on insulin. I exaggerate only slightly when I write that the Blairs treat this episode as if Kennedy was the first discovered victim of AIDS. They attempt to excuse the melodrama by saying that Kennedy and his circle disguised the condition by passing it off as an “adrenal insufficiency.” Clearly, Kennedy played word games in his wish to hide a rare and misunderstood disease that he knew his political opponents would distort and exaggerate in order to destroy him, which is just what LBJ and John Connally attempted to do in 1960. The myopic authors save their ire for Kennedy and vent none on Johnson or a potentially rabid political culture on this issue.

    The second major area of focus is Kennedy’s sex life. The authors excuse this preoccupation with seventies revelations, an apparent reference to Exner, Meyer, and perhaps Monroe (p. 667). Kennedy seems to have been attractive to females. He was appreciative of their overtures. There seems to me to be nothing extraordinary about this. Here we have the handsome, tall, witty, charming son of a millionaire who is eligible and clearly going places. If he did not react positively to all the attention heaped on him, I am sure his critics would begin to suggest a “certain latent homosexual syndrome.” But what makes this (lengthy) aspect of the book interesting is that when the Blairs ask some of Kennedy’s girlfriends what his “style” was (clearly looking for juicy sex details), as often as not, the answer is surprising. For instance, in an interview with Charlotte McDonnell, she talks about Kennedy in warm and friendly terms adding that there was “No sex or anything” in their year long relationship (p. 81). Another Kennedy girlfriend, the very attractive Angela Greene had this to say:

    Q: Was he romantically pushy?

    A: I don’t think so. I never found him physically aggressive, if that’s what you mean. Adorable and sweet. (p. 181)

    In another instance, years later, Kennedy was dating the beautiful Bab Beckwith. She invited Kennedy up to her apartment after he had wined and dined her. There was champagne and low music on the radio. But then a news broadcast came on and JFK leaped up, ran to the radio, and turned up the volume to listen to it. Offended, Beckwith threw him out.

    Another curious observation that the book establishes is that Kennedy did not smoke and was only a social drinker. So if, as I detailed in the Mary Meyer tale, Kennedy ended up a White House coke-sniffer and acid head, it was a definite break with the past.

    The Blairs’ book established some paradigms that would be followed in the anti-Kennedy genre. First, and probably foremost, is the influence of Kennedy’s father in his career. In fact, Joe Kennedy’s hovering presence over all his children is a prime motif of the book. The second theme that will be followed is the aforementioned female associations. The third repeating pattern the Blairs’ established is the use of Kennedy’s health problems as some kind of character barometer. That because Kennedy and his circle were not forthright about this, it indicates a covert tendency and a penchant for covering things up.

    It would be easy to dismiss The Search for JFK as a slanted book, and even easier to argue that the authors had an agenda. Clay Blair was educated at Tulane and Columbia and served in the Navy from 1943-1946. He was a military affairs writer and Pentagon correspondent for Time-Life from 1949 to 1957. He then became an editor for the Saturday Evening Post and worked his way up to the corporate level of that magazine’s parent company, Curtis Publications. Almost all of his previous books dealt with some kind of military figure or national security issue e.g. The Atomic Submarine and Admiral Rickover, The Hydrogen Bomb, Nautilus 90 North, Silent Victory: the U.S. Submarine War Against Japan. In his book on Rickover, he got close cooperation from the Atomic Energy Commission and the book was screened by the Navy Department. In 1969 he wrote a book on the Martin Luther King murder called The Strange Case of James Earl Ray. Above the title, the book’s cover asks the question “Conspiracy? Yes or No!” Below this, this the book’s subtitle gives the answer, describing Ray as “The Man who Murdered Martin Luther King.” To be sure there is no ambiguity, on page 146 Blair has Ray shooting King just as the FBI says he did, no surprise since Blair acknowledges help from the Bureau and various other law enforcement agencies in his acknowledgements.

    The Ray book is basically an exercise in guilt through character assassination. This practice has been perfected in the Kennedy assassination field through Oswald biographers like Edward Epstein and Priscilla Johnson McMillan. Consider some of Blair’s chapter headings: “A Heritage of Violence,” “Too Many Strikes Against Him,” “The Status Seeker.” In fact, Blair actually compares Ray with Oswald (pp. 88-89). In this passage, the author reveals that he also believes that Oswald is the lone assassin of Kennedy. He then tries to imply that Ray had the same motive as his predecessor: a perverse desire for status and recognition. Later, Blair is as categorical about the JFK case as he is about the King case:

    In the case of John F. Kennedy the debate still rages. Millions of words have been written–pro and con. Yet no one has produced a single piece of hard evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald was anything more than a psychopath acting entirely on his own. (p. 106)

    I could continue in a similar vein with excerpts from this book and I could also go on with more questionable aspects of Clay Blair’s background. And I could then use this information, and the inferences, to dismiss The Search for JFK. I could even add that Blair’s agent on his Kennedy book was Scott Meredith, who was representing Judith Exner at the time. But I won’t go that far. I may be wrong, but in my opinion I don’t think the book can be classified as a deliberate distortion or hatchet job. Although the authors are in some respects seeking to surface unflattering material, I didn’t feel that they were continually relying on questionable sources or witnesses, or consistently distorting or fabricating the record. As I have mentioned, the book can be criticized and questioned–and dismissed–on other grounds, but, as far as I can see, not on those two.

    Dubious Davis

    Such is not the case with John Davis’ foray into Kennedy biography. The Kennedys: Dynasty and Disaster 1848-1983, was published in 1984, before Davis became the chief spokesman for the anti-Garrison/Mob-did-it wing of the ramified assassination research community. In its very title, his book is deceptive in a couple of interesting ways. First, from the dates included, it implies that the book will be a multigenerational family saga tracing the clan from Joe Kennedy’s parents down to youngest brother Teddy. But of the book’s 648 pages of text, about 400 deal with the life and death of John F. Kennedy. And more than half of those deal with his presidency. In no way is the book an in-depth family profile. Secondly, as any school boy knows, the word dynasty denotes a series or succession of at least three or more rulers. So Jack Kennedy’s two years and ten months as president constitute the shortest “dynasty” in recorded history. In reality, of course, it was not a dynasty at all and the inclusion of the word is a total misnomer.

    But there is a method to the misnoming. For Davis, it is necessary to suggest a kind of “royal family” ambience to the Kennedys and, with it, the accompanying aura of familial and assumed “divine right.” One of the author’s aims is to establish the clan as part of America’s ruling class, with more power and influence than any other. He is clear about this early on, when he writes that Joe Kennedy Sr. was richer than either David or Nelson Rockefeller (p. 133). As any student of wealth and power in America knows, this is a rather amazing statement. In 1960, according to John Blair’s definitive study The Control of Oil, the Rockefeller family had controlling interest in three of the top seven oil companies in America, and four of the top eight in the world. They were also in control of Chase Manhattan Bank, one of the biggest in the nation then and the largest today. They also owned the single most expensive piece of real estate in the country, Rockefeller Center in New York City. The list of private corporations controlled by them could go on for a page, but to name just two, how about IBM and Eastern Airlines. I won’t enumerate the overseas holdings of the family but, suffice it to say, the Kennedys weren’t in the same league in that category. JFK knew this. As Mort Sahl relates, before the 1960 election, he liked to kid Kennedy about being the scion of a multimillionaire. Kennedy cornered him once on this topic and asked him point blank how much he thought his family was worth. Sahl replied, “Probably about three or four hundred million.” Kennedy then asked him how much he thought the Rockefellers were worth. Sahl said he had no idea. Kennedy replied sharply, “Try about four billion.” JFK let the number sink in and then added, “Now that’s money, Mort.”

    Throughout the book, Davis tries to convey the feeling of a destined royalty assuming power. So, according to Davis, Kennedy was thinking of the Senate when he was first elected to the House. Then, from his first day in the Senate, he was thinking of the Vice-Presidency (p. 147). Epitomizing this idea, Davis relates a personal vignette about the Kennedy family wake after JFK’s funeral. Davis, a cousin of Jackie Kennedy, was leaving the hall and paused to shake hands with Rose Kennedy to offer his condolences (p. 450). Mother Kennedy surprised him by saying in a cool, controlled manner: “Oh, thank you Mr. Davis, but don’t worry. Everything will be all right. You’ll see. Now it’s Bobby’s turn.” Such coolness differs greatly from what is revealed in the recently declassified LBJ tapes in which, after the assassination, Rose could not even speak two sentences to the Johnsons without dissolving into tears. But the portrait is in keeping with the ruthless monarchy that Davis takes great pains to portray.

    As I said above, the main focus is Kennedy’s short-lived “dynastic” presidency. And this is where some real questions about Davis’ methodology and intent arise. As he does in his assassination book Mafia Kingfish, Davis proffers a long bibliography to create the impression of immense scholarship and many hours quarrying the truth out of books, files, and libraries. But, like the later book, the text is not footnoted. So if the reader wishes to check certain facts, or locate the context of a comment or deduction, he is generally unable to do so. But fortunately, some of us have a background that enables us to find out where certain facts and deductions came from. This is crucial. For in addition to his wild inflation about the prominence of the Kennedy family in the power elite, another of Davis’ prime objectives is to reverse the verdict of the Church Committee and place Kennedy in the center of the CIA plots to kill Castro.

    Pinning the Plots on Kennedy

    As I said in Part One of this article, there is no evidence of such involvement in either the CIA’s Inspector General report of 1967, or in the Church Committee’s report, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, issued in late 1975. In fact, both advance evidence and conclusions to indicate the contrary. So how does Davis propagate that the Kennedy brothers knew about, authorized, and encouraged the plots? The first method is by performing minute surgery on the 1975 report. Davis states that Allen Dulles briefed JFK on the plots at a November 27, 1960 meeting with the President-elect. He uses Deputy Director Dick Bissell as his source for this disclosure (Davis, p. 289). I turned to the committee report that dealt with Bissell’s assumptions on this matter (Alleged Assassination Plots p. 117). Here is the testimony Davis relies on:

    Bissell: I believe at some stage the President the President and the President-elect both were advised that such an operation had been planned and was being attempted.

    Senator Baker: By whom?

    Bissell: I would guess through some channel by Allen Dulles.

    The Chairman: But you’re guessing aren’t you?

    Bissell: I am, Mr. Chairman, and I have said that I cannot recollect the giving of such briefing at the meeting with the President in November….

    Even thought Bissell does not remember any briefing at this November meeting, Davis writes as if he does and uses him as a source. Yet the report goes on to say (Ibid p. 120): “Bissell surmised that the reasons he and Dulles did not tell Kennedy at that initial meeting were that they had ‘apparently thought it was not an important matter’.” (p. 120.) When Frank Church asked Bissell if that was not rather strange, Bissell replied, “I think that in hindsight it could be regarded as peculiar, yes.” (Ibid, p. 121.) Davis leaves these last two Bissell quotes out, probably because they would vitiate his “conclusion” that Dulles and Bissell informed JFK of the plots. Incredibly, Davis builds on this foundation of sand by postulating that the reason Kennedy decided to go ahead with the Bay of Pigs was that he knew the CIA would kill Castro by then and it would therefore be an easy victory! (Davis, p. 292.)

    Davis must know he’s on shaky ground, because he fishes for substantiation outside of the Church Committee report. Davis states that his quest for this led him to the home of none other than Richard Helms (Ibid, p. 289). Helms told Davis, “that he believed Bissell was correct, that, knowing him, he would not commit perjury before a Senate committee.” (Ibid). Davis leaves out the fact that perjury is precisely what Helms committed before a Senate committee in 1973 about CIA involvement in Chile. He also fails to tell the reader anything about the Helms-Bissell relationship, which makes his “vouching” for Bissell almost humorous. When the two were in the CIA, there were few rivalries more pronounced and few resentments more public than the one between Bissell and Helms, who resented his boss because Bissell kept him out of the loop on some operations. Helms, according to Evan Thomas’ The Very Best Men, was happy to see the Bay of Pigs capsize because it meant Bissell would be out and that Helms would move up ( p. 268). So, to most objective readers, if Helms has now swiveled to endorsing Bissell, there must be some extenuating circumstances involved. There are, and again, Davis does not tell the reader about them. As the Inspector General’s report tells us, when Dulles and Bissell began cleaning out their desks, a new team took over the Castro plots, namely Bill Harvey and Ted Shackley. The man they reported to was Helms, the highest link in the chain (Alleged Assassination Plots pp. 148-153). In other words, the alchemy of John Davis with Bissell helps get Helms off the hook for responsibility for the continuing unauthorized plots. And Helms needs all the help he can get. When John McCone (Kennedy’s replacement CIA Director) expressly forbade any assassination plots, Helms said he couldn’t remember the meeting (Ibid, p. 166). When evidence was advanced that, in direct opposition to Bobby’s wishes, Helms continued the Castro plots and allowed an operative to use RFK’s name in doing so, Helms said he didn’t remember doing that either (Ibid p. 174). On the day that RFK met with CIA officials to make it clear there would be no more unauthorized plots against Castro, Kennedy’s calendar reads as follows: “1:00–Richard Helms.” Helms could not recall the meeting (Ibid p. 131). With this much to explain away, Helms must have poured coffee for Davis the day they met.

    But Davis is not done. He also writes the following:

    Kennedy also met on April 20 with the Cuban national involved in the unsuccessful underworld Castro assassination plot, a meeting that was not discovered until the Senate Committee on Intelligence found out about it in 1975. That Kennedy could have met with this individual, whose name has never been revealed, without knowing what his mission had been, seems inconceivable. (Davis p. 297.)

    Imagine the images conjured up by this passage to a reader who has not read the report. I had read the report and I thought I had missed something. How did I forget about Kennedy’s private meeting with Tony Varona in the Oval office? JFK asks Varona why he couldn’t get at Castro and then pats him on the head and says try it again. When I turned to page 124 in the report, I saw why I didn’t remember it. The meeting, as described by Davis, did not occur. At the real meeting are Kennedy, Robert McNamara, General Lyman Lemnitzer “and other Administration officials.” Also in the room “were several members of Cuban groups involved in the Bay of Pigs.” The report makes clear that this was the beginning of the general review of the Bay of Pigs operation that would, within three weeks, result in the Taylor Review Board which would then recommend reforms in CIA control of covert operations. There is no hint, so pregnant in Davis’ phrasing, that anything about assassination was discussed.

    Womanizer and Warmonger?

    One of the more startling sections of the Davis book is his treatment of Judith Exner. From the above, one would guess that he thoroughly buys into the 1977 Exner-Demaris book. He does and he mentions her name quite often. What is surprising is that he goes even further. Apparently, Davis realizes his jerry-built apparatus of Bissell-Helms, and adulteration of the record will not stand scrutiny. So he calls up Ovid Demaris, coauthor of Judith Exner: My Story (p. 319). From this phone call, Davis is informed that Exner lied in the book. She did tell Kennedy about her affair with Sam Giancana and JFK got jealous. From this, Davis builds another scaffolding: he now postulates that Exner was Kennedy’s conduit to the CIA-Mafia plots to kill Castro (Ibid p. 324). What is breathtaking about this is that this is something that not even Exner had uttered yet, at least not for dissemination. And she won’t until her get-together with Kitty Kelley in the February 1988 cover story for People. This curious passage leads one to think that Davis may have planted the seed from which the Kelley story sprouted.

    To go through the entire Davis book and correct all the errors of fact, logic, and commentary would literally take another book. But, in line with my original argument about anti-Kennedy biography, I must point out just two parts of Davis’ discussion of JFK’s Vietnam policy. The author devotes a small chapter to this subject. In his hands, Kennedy turns into a hawk on Vietnam. Davis writes that on July 17, 1963, Kennedy made “his last public utterance” on Vietnam, saying that the U.S. was going to stay there and win (p.374). But on September 2, 1963, in his interview with Walter Cronkite, Kennedy states that the war is the responsibility of “the people of Vietnam, against the Communists.” In other words, they have to win the war, not Americans. Davis makes no mention of this. Davis similarly ignores NSAM 111 in which Kennedy refused to admit combat troops into the war, integral to any escalation plan, and NSAM 263, which ordered a withdrawal to be completed in 1965. This last was published in the New York Times (11/16/63), so Davis could have easily found it had he been looking.

    In light of this selective presentation of the record on Vietnam, plus the acrobatic contortions performed on the Church Committee report, one has to wonder about Davis’ intent in doing the book. I question his assertion that when he began the book he “did not have a clear idea where it would lead.” (p. 694) So I was not surprised that in addition to expanding Exner’s story, he uncritically accepted the allegations about Mary Meyer and Marilyn Monroe (pp. 610-612). As the reader can see, in the three areas outlined at the beginning of this essay, Davis hit a triple. In all the threads, he has either held steady or advanced the frontier. It is interesting in this regard to note that Davis devotes many pages to JFK’s assassination (pp. 436-498). He writes that Kennedy died at the “hands of Lee Harvey Oswald and possible co-conspirators” (p. 436). Later, he will write that Sirhan killed Bobby Kennedy (p. 552). Going even further, he can state that:

    It would be a misstatement, then, to assert that Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach and the members of the Warren Commission…consciously sought to cover up evidence pertaining to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. (P. 461)

    As the declassified record now shows (Probe Vol. 4 #6 “Gerald Ford: Accessory after the Fact”) this is just plain wrong. Davis then tries to insinuate any cover-up was brought on by either a backfiring of the Castro plots (Davis p. 454) or JFK’s dalliance with Exner (p. 498). As wrongheaded and against the declassified record as this seems, this argument still has adherents, e. g. Martin Waldron and Tom Hartman. They refine it into meaning that the Kennedys had some kind of secret plan to invade Cuba in the offing at the time of the assassination. This ignores the Church Committee report, which shows that by 1963, Kennedy had lost faith in aggression and was working toward accommodation with Castro. It also ignores the facts that JFK would not invade Cuba under the tremendous pressures of either the Bay of Pigs debacle, or the Cuban Missile Crisis in which Bobby backed him on both occasions. Reportedly, like Davis, Waldron likes to use CIA sources like Bill Colby (Mr. Phoenix Operation) on JFK’s ideas about assassination. Just as Newman corrected the Vietnam record in 1992, his long-awaited book Kennedy and Cuba will do much to correct these dubious assertions.

    “Liberal” Turncoats: Collier and Horowitz

    The same year that the Davis book appeared, another anti-Kennedy book was published. It was entitled The Kennedys: An American Drama, and was written by Peter Collier and David Horowitz. These two were both former editors at the liberal Ramparts publication. After the magazine folded, both began to write biographies of famous American families while on their way from the left to the extreme right. In order, the pair examined the Rockefellers, the Kennedys, the Fords, and the Roosevelts. As with Davis, it is interesting to note the difference in their treatments of the Rockefellers (1976) and the Kennedys (1984). In the earlier book, the authors note toward the end that they had access to the Rockefeller family archives (p. 636). In another book of theirs, Destructive Generation, they write that the Rockefeller book began when the pair were soliciting funds to keep Ramparts afloat (p. 275). This is how they got in contact with the younger generation of that clan. So when the magazine fell, they went to work on the family biography with access to people and papers that no outside, nonofficial authors had before. It is interesting that, in 1989, the authors wrote that when they started the Rockefeller book, they were expecting to excavate an “executive committee of the ruling class” and thereby unlock the key to the American power elite. But they found that they only ended up writing about American lives (Ibid). They ended up with that result because that seems to have been the plan all along. Towards the end of the book, the authors strike a rather wistful note, a sort of elegy for a once powerful family that is now fading into the background (The Rockefellers, p. 626). This is extraordinary. Consider some of the things the Rockefellers accomplished in the seventies: they were part of the effort to quadruple gasoline prices through their oil companies; David Rockefeller took part in the effort to get the American government to intervene in Chile in 1973; the Trilateral Commission, which the Rockefellers sponsored, funneled many of its members into the Carter administration; in 1979, Henry Kissinger and David Rockefeller convinced Carter to let the Shah of Iran into the country for medical treatment. The reaction in Iran helped give us Reagan-Bush. The rest, as they say, is history.

    In comparing the two books, one is immediately struck by a difference in approach. Whatever the shortcomings of the Rockefeller book, there is a minimal reliance on questionable sources. And the concentration on individual lives very seldom extends into a pervasive search for sex and scandal. This difference extends to even the photos chosen for the two books. The Rockefeller book is fairly conventional with wide or half page group shots or portraits. In the Kennedy book, even the one page of group shots are tiny prints. The rest are wallet-sized head shots that when leafed through, give the impression of mug shots.

    The accompanying text is suitable to the photo layout. There seems to me to be both a macro and micro plan to the book. The overall plan is to make Joe Kennedy a sort of manipulating overseer to his sons and, at the same time, make him into a status-seeking iconoclast whose beliefs and sympathies are contra to those of America. The problem with this is dual. First, it is the typical “like father, like son” blanket which reeks of guilt, not just by association, but by birth. Second, the blatant ploy does not stand scrutiny because what makes John and Robert Kennedy so fascinating is how different their politics and economics were from Joe Kennedy’s and how fast the difference was exhibited. To use just two examples from JFK’s first term in the House, Kennedy rejected his father’s isolationist Republican type of foreign policy and opted for a more internationalist approach when he voted for the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. Second, Kennedy voted to sustain Truman’s veto of Taft-Hartley which would weaken unions and strengthen American big businessmen–people like his father. From there on in, the splits got wider and wider. It is this father-son dichotomy that none of these books cares to acknowledge let alone explore–which reveals their intent. (An exception is the Blairs’ book, which does acknowledge the split on pp. 608-623.)

    In their approach to JFK, Collier and Horowitz take up where the Blairs left off. In fact, they play up the playboy angle even more strongly than the Blairs. When Kennedy gets to Washington in 1947, this note is immediately struck with “women’s underthings stuffed into the crevices of the sofa” (p. 189) and a “half-eaten hamburger hidden behind books on the mantel” (Ibid). The problem here is there is no source given for the first observation and the hamburger is sourced to none other than CIA-Washington Post crony Joe Alsop, the man who, as Don Gibson pointed out, talked LBJ into forming the Warren Commission (Probe Vol. 3 #4 pp. 28-30).

    This is typical of the book’s low scholarly standard. Both authors have advanced degrees from Cal Berkeley. Both had done some solid academic work in their Ramparts days. Yet neither has any qualms about the Exner or Mary Meyer stories. In fact they both jump on the Timothy Leary addition to the latter ( p. 355). This tabloid approach allows them to use none other than Kitty Kelley on Jackie’s reaction to Kennedy’s supposed White House affairs. Consider the following excerpt based on Kelley:

    She knew far more about these goings-on than he ever suspected and dealt with them through hauteur, as when she disdainfully handed him some panties she’d found in her pillow slip, saying, “Here, would you find out who these belong to. They’re not my size. (Ibid)

    With this kind of standard I’m surprised the authors did not use that other ersatz Kelley “bombshell” about Jackie, namely that JFK’s affairs drove her to electroshock therapy.

    Many of the sexual anecdotes go unsourced, but there is one that is footnoted that is quite revealing. The authors use it as a coda to a chapter on Jack’s early years in the House. This passage synthesizes the image they wish to depict: Kennedy as the empty vessel of his father who had his role as politician forced on him after Joe Junior’s death and who now uses sex as a release from his own vacuity. It deserves to be quoted at length:

    The whole thing with him was pursuit. I think he was secretly disappointed when a woman gave in. It meant that the low esteem in which he held women was once again validated….I was one of the few he could really talk to….During one of these conversations I once asked him why he was doing it–why he was acting like his father…why he was taking a chance on getting caught in a scandal…. He took awhile to formulate an answer. Finally he shrugged and said, “I don’t know, really, I guess I just can’t help it.” He had this sad expression on his face. He looked like a little boy about to cry (p. 214)

    Pretty strong stuff. What else could the authors ask for but young Jack confessing to their charge? But perhaps a little too perfect? After contemplating the words, I thought to myself that JFK was never this open to his girlfriends. Perhaps maybe Inga Arvad, who he wanted to marry, but very few others. So I flipped back to see who the source was. The footnote read “Authors’ interview with Priscilla McMillan.” I then remembered that, by this time, Priscilla had been classified by the CIA as a “witting collaborator.” I also recalled that years later, Priscilla changed her “Platonic” relationship with JFK for the National Enquirer. She was now saying that young Jack had actually made a pass at her.

    With this in mind, it is instructive to note that in Destructive Generation, Collier reveals that in 1979 he started lecturing for the United States Information Agency (p. 275). The USIA has a long, involved association with the CIA and actually disseminated propaganda for the Warren Commission. The date of Collier’s work approximates the time when the Kennedy book idea was originated. Ignoring the shoddy approach and scholarly standards of the work, the New York Times, Washington Post, and New Republic all gave the book prominent and glowing reviews. In the latter case, Martin Peretz placed the book on the August 27, 1984 New Republic cover under the title “Dissolute Dynasty.” He then got longtime Kennedy basher Midge Decter to write a long review that branded the saga “a sordid story.” Right after this ecstatic reception, in 1985, Horowitz and Collier landed a feature story in the Washington Post as “Lefties for Reagan.” Two years later, the pair went on a USIA-State Department sponsored tour of Nicaragua. This was at a time when the CIA was dumping millions into that country in a huge psychological and propaganda war effort. That same year, with lots of foundation money, the pair arranged a “Second Thoughts” conference in Washington. This was basically a meeting of “reformed” sixties liberals bent on attacking that decade and anyone who wished to hold it up as an era of excitement and/or progressive achievement. Peretz attended that conference. Later, they sponsored another conference entitled “Second Thoughts on Race in America.” This might have been called the Washington Post take on race in the eighties since it featured such Kay Graham-Ben Bradlee employees as Richard Cohen, Juan Williams, and Joe Klein. Today, these two see themselves as armed guards protecting America from any renaissance of sixties activism after Reagan. They are quite open about this and Kennedy’s role in it in Destructive Generation: “Just as Eisenhower’s holding action in the Fifties led to JFK’s New Frontier liberalism in the Sixties…so the clamped-down Reaganism of the Eighties has precipitated the current radical resurgence….” Is one to conclude that Clinton is a radical? Was the Kennedy book a put-up job to place them over the top with their right-wing sponsors? Or do they really find Kitty Kelley credible? Could they really not have known that Priscilla Johnson McMillan was doing the same thing with Kennedy that she had recently done with Oswald in her book Marina and Lee? To put it another way: if your function is to discredit a decade, what better way to do it than to smear the man most responsible for ushering it in?

    A Question of Character, But Not Kennedy’s

    Which brings us to Thomas Reeves. By the nineties, the negative literature on the Kennedys had multiplied so much that it was possible just to put it all together and make a compendium of it. In 1991, Reeves did just that with his book A Question of Character. It obediently follows the path paved by its noted predecessors. In fact, many of his footnotes are to Davis and to Collier and Horowitz. Although Reeves is another Ph. D., he never questions the faulty methodology I have pointed out. On the contrary, by ignoring the primary sources, he can actually state that JFK authorized the Castro plots, and that John Davis is especially authoritative on the issue (p. 463). Predictably, he completely buys into Exner’s book and, like Liz Smith, tries to portray her as a victim of the Kennedy protecting “liberal media” (p. 424). He even endorses the Kitty Kelley 1988 People update of Exner’s story, finding no inconsistencies between that and the 1977 installment. And, like Collier and Horowitz, scholar Reeves has no problems using Kelley’s book on Jackie Kennedy as a source, although he does add that the tabloid queen’s works “must be approached cautiously” (p. 440).

    Any scholar who compromises this much, must have an axe to grind. So how ideological is Reeves? He can actually call the Washington Post a liberal newspaper (p. 151). He can use veteran right-wing hit man and Rockefeller agent Victor Lasky as a frequent source. He tries to imply that Lasky’s book on JFK, published in 1963, was banned shortly after Kennedy’s death by the “liberal media” (p. 3). What he doesn’t say is that it was reprinted in 1966.

    Reeves’ method here is to basically combine the Davis book with the Collier-Horowitz book. From the latter we get ladles of sex and women; from the former the notion that Kennedy was a Cold Warrior no different than Eisenhower or Nixon. Like Davis, Reeves performs gymnastics with the Cuba and Vietnam record in order to proffer this. In fact, Reeves is so intent on pommeling JFK that, at times, he reverses field and actually uses Bruce Miroff’s Pragmatic Illusions, a leftist critique of the New Frontier, as a source.

    But there can be little doubt about where Reeves stands. This is the man who once wrote a quite sympathetic book about Joe McCarthy (The Life and Times of Joe McCarthy). In his anthology of essays on the foundation system (Foundations Under Fire) his uncritical opening essay is by far the longest piece in the book. A fierce critic like Fred Cook gets only three pages. In his anthology of essays on McCarthy (McCarthyism), editor Reeves has to label critics of the champion Red baiter as “liberals.” Yet when people like Bill Buckley or Brent Bozell take the floor, no such label is necessary. In his latest book, The Empty Church, Reeves unremittingly pillories liberals for weakening the main Protestant churches in America. What is the cause of their shrinking numbers? The liberalism of the sixties of course. One long chapter is entitled “Stuck in the Sixties.” This last book was published four years after his Kennedy hatchet job, and was sponsored by something called the Wisconsin Policy Research Institute which sounds suspiciously like Horowitz’s Center for Popular Culture, which makes me wonder if Reeves followed an established course of career advancement.

    Reeves certainly did all he could to promote the Marilyn Monroe tale. Of course, he had an advantage. By 1991, when A Question of Character was published, the Marilyn Monroe thread of the movement outlined above was in full bloom. As if by design, this literature assimilated appendages from the other two threads: a distinct anti-Kennedy flavor, and the idea that the Kennedys ordered political assassinations. If one follows the pedigree of this lineage, the reasons for this become clear. The man who created the RFK/Monroe business, as we will see, was an incontinent Kennedy hater.

    In the Collier-Horowitz book, the authors allude to the pamphlet that started the industry. Describing Bobby’s 1964 campaign for a Senate seat in New York, they write:

    Meanwhile, right-wingers were circulating a pamphlet entitled “The Strange Death of Marilyn Monroe,” charging that Bobby had been having an affair with the film actress and, when she threatened to expose some of his dealings in appeasing the Castro regime, had her killed by Communist agents under his control. (p. 409)

    The authors fail to note the man who penned this work. His name was Frank Capell. Capell is usually described as an extreme right-winger associated with the John Birch Society. This is apt, but incomplete. As Jim Garrison once noted, the more one scratches at these Minutemen types, the more their intelligence connections appear.

    Swallowing Frank Capell

    Capell had worked for the government in World War II, but was convicted on charges of eliciting kickbacks from contractors for the war effort. After the war, in the Red Scare era, Capell began publishing a Red baiting newsletter, The Herald of Freedom. He was highly active in attempting to expose leftists in the entertainment industry. It was this experience that put him in a good position to pen his McCarthyite, murderous smear of Bobby Kennedy.

    But there is another element that needs to be noted about Capell: his ties to the FBI. As Lisa Pease noted in her watershed article on Thomas Dodd (Probe Vol. 3#6), Capell was one of the sources tapped by the Bureau in the wake of the assassination in order to find out who Oswald really was. His information proved remarkably penetrating, considering it came in February of 1964. Capell said Oswald was a CIA agent. Even more interesting, Capell stated in his FBI interview that this information came from “a friend of his…with sources close to the presidential commission” i. e., the Warren Commission. To have this kind of acute information and to have access to people around the Commission (which was sealed off at the time) strongly indicates Capell was tied into the intelligence community, which of course, is probably why the Bureau was consulting him in the first place.

    This is revelatory of not just the past, i.e. the origins of this myth, but of the present, i.e. why it persists. For as Donald Spoto reveals in his book Marilyn Monroe, one of the people who relentlessly pushed Capell’s fabricated smear was fellow FBI asset, Hoover crony, and Hollywood Red baiter Walter Winchell (Spoto p. 601). (For a full discussion of former ONI operative Winchell’s service in Hoover’s employ see Neal Gabler’s Winchell.) As William Sullivan has noted, the dissemination of Capell’s invention was encouraged by Hoover. Sullivan called Bobby a near-Puritan and then added:

    The stories about Bobby Kennedy and Marilyn Monroe were just stories. The original story was invented by a so-called journalist, a right-wing zealot who had a history of spinning wild yarns. It spread like wildfire, of course, and J. Edgar Hoover was right there, gleefully fanning the flames. (The Bureau p. 56)

    The Capell/Winchell/Hoover triangle sowed the seeds of this slander. But the exposure of this triangle does more. In the Vanity Fair article in which Judith Exner dumped out the latest installment of her continuing saga, Liz Smith revealed that she apprenticed at the feet of Walter Winchell in New York (January 1997 p. 32). This may explain why she took up her mentor’s cudgel.

    Capell’s work is, as Spoto notes in his Afterword, a frightful piece of reactionary paranoia. But there are two details in his pat anti-Kennedy tract that merit mention. First, Capell is probably the first to propagate the idea that RFK was indirectly responsible for his brother’s murder. He does this by saying (p. 52), that commie sympathizer Bobby called off the investigation of the shooting of General Edwin Walker in April of 1963, thus allowing that crazed Communist Oswald to escape and later kill JFK. This piece of rant has been modified later to fit into the stilted mosaics of people like Davis and Waldron. What makes it so fascinating is that, through the FBI’s own files, we now have evidence that Capell was deliberately creating a fiction: he had information that Oswald was not a communist, but a CIA agent.

    The second point worth examining about Capell’s screed is the part where he begins laying out the “conspiracy” to kill Marilyn, specifically, RFK’s motive for murder. Capell writes:

    But what if she were helped along into the next world by someone who would either benefit financially or who feared she might disclose something he wished to conceal. Suppose, for example, a married man were involved, that he had promised to marry her but was not sincere. Suppose she had threatened to expose their relationship (p. 28)

    This is as specific as Capell gets in outlining his reason for the “conspiracy.” I wondered where he got the idea of Monroe’s “going public” about an affair. As many writers have pointed out, this would have been quite out of character for her. Something that Jim Marrs recently sent me may help explain it. He sent me the full text of a memo that he references in his current book, Alien Agenda. The memo supposedly reports on information gleaned from an FBI wiretap of Dorothy Kilgallen’s phone. The document went from the FBI to the CIA, where it was signed by James Angleton. In it, a man named Howard Rothberg is quoted as saying that Monroe had conversations with the Kennedy brothers on top secret matters like the examination of captured outer space creatures, bases inside of Cuba, and of President Kennedy’s plans to kill Castro. He also said that she was talking about a “diary of secrets” (quotes in original) that she had threatened RFK with if he brushed her off. When I got this memo, I was struck by its singular format. I have seen hundreds of CIA documents, maybe thousands, and I never saw one that looked like this. (We can’t reproduce it because the copy sent to us is so poor). I forwarded it to Washington researcher Peter Vea. He agreed it was highly unusual. To play it safe, I then sent a copy to former intelligence analyst John Newman. He said that he had seen such reports. What he thought was wrong with it was that there were things in it that should have been redacted that weren’t and things exposed that should have been blacked out. For instance, there is a phrase as follows, “a secret air base for the purpose of inspecting [things] from outer space.” Newman notes that the brackets around the word “things” denote that it had been previously redacted. It should not have. The words “outer space” should have been redacted and they never were. On the basis of this and other inconsistencies, he decided it was a “good” forgery from someone who knew what they were doing. He told PBS this four years ago when they showed it to him. The fact that this document purportedly revealing sensitive information was exposed in 1993 when he saw it, before the JFK Act when into effect, justifies even more suspicion about its origin and intent.

    Spoto’s book adds more to the suspicion about the document, and perhaps the information in Capell’s pamphlet. Spoto notes that on August 3, 1962, the day the above memo was distributed, Kilgallen printed an item in her column saying that Marilyn was “vastly alluring to a handsome gentleman who is a bigger name than Joe DiMaggio” (p. 600). Spoto notes the source for Kilgallen’s story as Howard Rothberg, the man named in the memo. This is interesting for more than one reason. First, Spoto writes that Rothberg was “a New York interior designer with no connection at all to Marilyn or her circle.” (Ibid.) This means that he was likely getting his “information” through a third, unnamed source. Second, Rothberg’s name, and this is part of the sensitive information referred to above, is exposed in the document. This is extraordinary. Anyone who has jousted with the FBI or CIA knows how difficult it is to get “sources and methods” revealed. In fact this is one of the big battles the ARRB had to fight with the FBI. Yet in this document, both the method and the source are open. Third, to my knowledge, Kilgallen never printed anything specific from the document. Why? Assuming for a moment that the document is real, probably because she could not confirm anything in it. But interestingly, right after Kilgallen printed her vague allusion, Winchell began his steady drumbeat of rumors until, as Spoto notes, he essentially printed Capell’s whole tale (p. 601). From this, one could conclude that the Angleton memo could be viewed in two ways. Either it was, as in Newman believes, a “good” fake, or a false lead planted to begin an orchestrated campaign. More specifically, Rothberg was either a witting or unwitting conduit to the media for either Hoover or Angleton (or both). The quick Winchell follow-up would argue for Hoover. The Director would want someone else to lead the story before his man Winchell pushed it to the limit. The “diary of secrets,” so reminiscent of Mary Meyer (discussed in Part One of this article) would suggest Angleton.

    Capell was drawn up on charges in 1965. The charges were rather fatal to the tale told in his RFK pamphlet: conspiracy to commit libel. One would have thought this discreditation was enough to impale the tale. And it probably would have been had it not been for Norman Mailer. In 1973, Mailer published a book, Marilyn, (really a photo essay) with the assistance of longtime FBI asset on the Kennedy assassination Larry Schiller. He recirculated the tale again, inserting a new twist. He added the possibility that the FBI and/or the CIA might have been involved in the murder in order to blackmail Bobby ( p. 242). In 1973, pre-Rupert Murdoch, the media had some standards. Mailer was excoriated for his baseless ruminations. In private, he admitted he did what he did to help pay off a tax debt. He also made a similar confession in public. When Mike Wallace asked him on 60 Minutes (7/13/73) why he had to trash Bobby Kennedy, Mailer replied “I needed money very badly.”

    Swallowing Slatzer

    The worst thing about Mailer’s money-grubbing antics was that it gave an alley to run through to a man who had actually been at work before Mailer’s book was published. In 1972, Robert Slatzer approached a writer named Will Fowler. Slatzer had been at work on an article which posited a conspiracy to murder Monroe. Fowler read it and was unimpressed. He told Slatzer that had he been married to Monroe, now that would make a real story. Shortly after, Slatzer got in contact with Fowler again. He said he forgot to tell him, but he had been married to Monroe. The “marriage” was a short one: 72 hours. It happened in Mexico on October 4, 1952. Unfortunately for Slatzer, Spoto found out that Monroe was in Beverly Hills that day on a shopping spree and she signed a check dated October 4th to pay for the articles she purchased (Spoto p. 227). Since Slatzer says that the pair left for Mexico on October 3rd and stayed for the following weekend, this demolishes his story.

    But despite his fabrications, in 1974 Slatzer turned his article into a book entitled The Life and Curious Death of Marilyn Monroe. It went through at least three printings, including a mass paperback sale. Besides his “marriage” and his “continuing friendship” with Monroe, the other distinguishing aspect of the book is its similarity to Capell’s work. The first line is: “Bobby Kennedy promised to marry me. What do you think of that?” Slatzer, as if reading the Hoover/Angleton memo, saw her “diary.” One of the things in it is a mention of “Murder, Incorporated.” When Slatzer asks his “ex-wife” what that meant, Marilyn replies on cue: “I didn’t quite understand what Bobby was saying. But I remember him telling me that he was powerful enough to have people taken care of it they got in his way.” Another entry is about the Bay of Pigs. Slatzer says that Marilyn told him that Jack let Bobby handle “the whole thing” because JFK’s back was sore that day etc. etc. etc. The whole book is a continuation and refinement of the Capell hoax.

    But Slatzer got away with it. Today he still appears on talk shows and videos (e.g. Marilyn, the Last Word ) as Marilyn’s former spouse. In 1991, he actually sold his story to the ever gullible ABC. They made a film of his tall tale: Marilyn and Me.

    Slatzer’s book set a precedent in this field. Later, volumes by the likes of Milo Speriglio (whom Slatzer hired as an investigator), Anthony Scaduto, and James Haspiel, took their lead from Slatzer. They all follow the above outlined formula: the Kennedys were a rotten crowd (Collier and Horowitz); they were involved in political assassinations (John Davis); and both were having affairs with Monroe (Slatzer).

    Tony, How Could You?

    In the Monroe/Kennedys industry, 1985 was a pivotal year. Anthony Summers dove into the quagmire–head first. He published his Marilyn biography, Goddess.

    In it, he reveals (shockingly) that he bought into Slatzer. Slatzer is profusely mentioned in both the index and his footnotes. So are people like Haspiel and Jeane Carmen. Carmen is another late-surfacing intimate of Monroe. Carmen professes to have been Monroe’s roomie when she lived on Doheny Drive, before she bought her famous home in Brentwood. She began circulating her story after Slatzer did his bit. Of course, Marilyn’s neighbors at Doheny, and her other friends, don’t recall her (Spoto p. 472). But Summers welcomes her because she provides sexy details about Marilyn’s torrid romance with Bobby. A third peg in Summers’ edifice is Ralph de Toledano. Summers describes him as a “Kennedy critic” in the paperback version of his book (p. 453). This is like saying that Richard Helms once did some work for the CIA. De Toledano was a former OSS officer who Bill Donovan got rid of because he was too much of a rabid anticommunist. After the war, he hooked up with professional Red baiter Isaac Don Levine of the publication Plain Talk. Levine was another spooky journalist whom Allen Dulles, while he was on the Warren Commission, considered using to write incriminating articles about Oswald (Peter Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK p. 55). Later on, de Toledano found a home at former CIA officer and E. Howard Hunt pal Bill Buckley’s National Review. If one were to translate the Summers trio of Slatzer, Carmen, and de Toledano to the JFK case, one could say that he wedded Ricky White to Beverly Oliver and then brought in a journalist like, say Hugh Aynesworth, to cinch his case. And the things Summers leaves out are as important as what he puts in. For instance, he omits the facts that her psychiatrist did not know the drugs that her internist was prescribing; the weird nature and background of her house servant Eunice Murray; and her pending reconciliation with Joe DiMaggio which, of course, makes her “torrid romance” with Bobby even more incredible. The reconciliation makes less credible Summers’ portrait of an extremely neurotic Monroe, which he needs in order to float the possibility that she was going to “broadcast” her relationship with the Kennedys.

    Summers’ book attracted the attention of Geraldo Rivera at ABC’s 20/20. Rivera and his cohort Sylvia Chase bought into Goddess about as willingly as Summers bought Slatzer. They began filing a segment for the news magazine. But as the segment began to go through the editors, objections and reservations were expressed. Finally, Roone Arledge, head of the division at the time, vetoed it by saying it was, “A sleazy piece of journalism” and “gossip-column stuff” (Summers p. 422). Liz Smith, queen of those gossip-columnists, pilloried ABC for censoring the “truth about 1962.” Rivera either quit or was shoved out by ABC over the controversy. Arledge was accused by Chase of “protecting the Kennedys” (he was a distant relative through marriage). Rivera showed his true colors by going on to produce syndicated specials on Satanism and Al Capone’s vaults (which were empty). He is now famous for bringing tabloidism to television. Arledge won the battle. Rivera and Liz Smith won the war. Until 1993.

    The Truth About Marilyn

    In 1993, Donald Spoto wrote his bio of Monroe. After reading the likes of Haspiel, Slatzer and Summers, picking up Spoto is like going back into one’s home after it has been fumigated. Spoto is a very experienced biographer who is not shy about controversy. His biographies of Alfred Hitchcock and Laurence Olivier reveal sides of their personalities that they, and other writers, tried to conceal. Spoto is also quite thorough in obtaining and then pouring over primary sources. Finally, he respects himself and his subject, which allows him to question sources before arriving at a judgment on someone’s credibility. This last quality allowed him to arrive at what is the most satisfactory conclusion about the death of Monroe (Spoto pp. 566-593). The Kennedys had nothing to do with it. I have no great interest or admiration for Monroe as an actress or a personality. But I do appreciate good research, fine writing, and a clear dedication to truth. If any reader is interested in the real facts of her life, this is the book to read.

    Sy Hersh’s “Truth”

    Seymour Hersh apparently never read it. And in fact, as Robert Sam Anson relates in the November 1997 Vanity Fair, Hersh never thought there was a conspiracy in the JFK case (p. 108). But in 1993, a friend at ABC proposed an investigative segment for the network on the 30th anniversary of the murder. Apparently, the idea fell through. But by that time, Hersh had hooked up with an old pal, Michael Ewing. Hersh then decided that a book on the Kennedys–not necessarily the assassination– would bring him the big money that he craved. Through big-time talent agency ICM, the project was sold to Little, Brown for the Bob Woodward type of money that Hersh was so envious of: a cool million.

    Although Ewing appears to have been a major source for Hersh, Anson misses his true significance. Ewing was one of the people brought into the House Select Committee by Bob Blakey after Dick Sprague was forced out. Ewing has never complained in public about the failures of that inquest. There is a reason for this: he is a Blakey acolyte. Blakey liked him so much that he gave him a key assignment in 1978: close down the New Orleans investigation. The HSCA had found too much corroborating evidence supporting Jim Garrison’s allegations about certain people involved with Oswald in the summer of 1963. One of these witnesses described elements of a conspiracy in New Orleans which included David Ferrie and Clay Shaw. He also said that Shaw knew Ruby. He then passed a polygraph with flying colors. That was enough for Blakey. He switched investigating teams. Some of the people Blakey brought in knew nothing about New Orleans: they were actually pulled off the Martin Luther King side of the HSCA. The man brought in to actually bury Garrison was Ewing. Two of the people Ewing consulted with before dismissing Garrison were Bill Gurvich and Aaron Kohn, two men strongly connected to the FBI and whose credibility on Garrison is quite suspect.

    At the beginning of his project, Hersh declared that Ewing had “an I.Q. of about 800 and government documents coming out of his ears.” (Anson p. 120) It is questionable whether Hersh was ever going to do a book about the Kennedy murder. But if he was, Ewing would give him several advantages: 1) He was anti-Garrison. As has been shown by Summers, Davis, and David Scheim, being anti-Garrison is always a plus for media exposure. 2) If they found a conspiracy, Ewing’s history would guarantee it would be mob-oriented. Another plus for media exposure. 3) As Anson reveals, Ewing has now broadened his character assassination talents from Garrison to the Kennedys (p. 110). Like John Davis, and against the record, Ewing believes RFK was not only in on the Castro plots but controlled them to the point of choosing which mobsters to use. His source on this? A “senior CIA official” (Anson p. 115). Did Ewing follow the Davis example and lunch with Richard Helms?

    Not since Gerald Posner has a book on the JFK case been as touted as Hersh’s. It started in Esquire with a teaser article in its September 1996 issue. In July and September of this year, Liz Smith kept up the barrage of pro-Hersh blurbs in her column. The September 23rd notice stated that Hersh’s book would focus on the Kennedys and Monroe and how RFK had Monroe killed.

    As everyone knows by now, the whole Monroe angle blew up in Hersh’s face. When Hersh had to reluctantly admit on ABC that he had been had, he did it on the same spot where Rivers, Summers, and Sylvia Chase had played martyrs for the tabloid cause, namely 20/20. On September 25th, Peter Jennings narrated the opening segment of that program. With what we know in November, Jennings approach reveals much by what was left out. Hersh appeared only briefly on the segment. He was on screen less than 10% of the time. The main focus was on the forensic debunking of the documents (which we now know was underplayed by ABC.) Jennings cornered Lex Cusack, the man who “found” the papers in the files of his late father who was an attorney. From published accounts, the documents were supposedly signed by five people: JFK, RFK, Monroe, Janet DesRosiers (Joe Kennedy’s assistant) and Aaron Frosch (Monroe’s lawyer). They outline a settlement agreement between JFK and Monroe signed at the Carlyle Hotel in New York on March 3, 1960. The documents set up a $600,000 trust to be paid by contributions from the individual Kennedy family members to Monroe’s mother, Gladys Baker. In return for this, Monroe agrees to keep quiet about her relationship with JFK and any underworld personalities she observed in Kennedy’s presence. The latter is specified as being Sam Giancana. Kennedy had a lawyer out of his usual orbit, Larry Cusack of New York, do the preparation.

    Just from the above, one could see there were certain problems with the story. First, its details could have been culled from reading the pulp fiction in the Monroe field: the idea that JFK had a long, ongoing affair with Monroe; that she had threatened to go public with it; that the Kennedys were in league with Giancana; that the family would put up money to save JFK’s career etc. All this could have been rendered from reading, say two books: Slatzer’s and Thomas Reeves’. Even the touch about the Carlyle Hotel–Kennedy’s New York apartment–is in the Reeves book. In other words, it is all too stale and pat, with none of the twists or turns that happen in real life. Secondly, are we to truly believe that the Kennedys would put their name to a document so that a woman blackmailing them would have even more power to blackmail them in the future? Or was that to lead into why the Kennedys had her killed?

    Hersh has leapt so enthusiastically into the “trash Kennedy” abyss that these questions never seem to have bothered him. Anson depicts him as waving the documents over his head at a restaurant and shouting, “The Kennedys were…the worst people!” Lex Cusack showed them to Hersh a few at a time, wetting his appetite for more at each instance. Hersh then used the documents to get Little, Brown to give him $250,000 more and to sell ABC on a documentary.

    Jennings said on the 20/20 segment that the flaw in the documents was in the typing part of them and not the actually penmanship. As subsequent facts have shown, this is not actually true. Linda Hart, one of the handwriting analysts hired by ABC (who was slighted on the program) later said that there were indications of “pen drops” in John Kennedy’s signature, i.e. someone stopped writing and then started up again, a sure indication of tracing. Also, when I talked to Greg Schreiner, president of a Monroe fan club in Los Angeles, he told me that the moment he saw Monroe’s signature, he knew it was not hers. Interestingly, he had met with Hersh this summer. Hersh had told him about the documents and Greg asked to see them. Hersh refused.

    Another interesting aspect of the exposure of Hersh’s “bombshell” was aired in the New York Times on September 27th. In this story, Bill Carter disclosed that there were doubts expressed about the documents by NBC to Hersh many months ago. Warren Littlefield, an NBC executive, said that Hersh had tried to peddle a documentary to them based on the documents. After NBC sent their experts to look at them in the summer of 1996, he told Hersh that in their opinion the documents were questionable. He said that NBC’s lawyers were more specific with Hersh’s lawyers. This was backed up by David Samuels’ article in The New Yorker of 11/3/97. So Hersh’s denials on this point, mentioned by Carter, ring hollow.

    What makes the hollowness more palpable is one of the typing inconsistencies in the documents. On the Jennings segment, former FBI expert Jerry Richards showed one of the most blatant errors in the concoction. The typist had made a misspelling and had gone back to erase it. But the erasure was done with a lift-off ribbon which was not available in 1960 and was not sold until the seventies. This erasure is so clear it even shows up in photos in the Samuels article. Hersh has been a reporter since the early sixties. For at least two decades (before computers came in), he made his living with a typewriter. Yet, in all the hours he spent looking at these papers, this anachronism never jumped out at him?

    That Hersh could be such an easy mark, that he was so eager to buy into the Summers-Haspiel-Slatzer concoction tells us a lot about what to expect from his book. As Anson notes, Hersh has been talking not only to CIA officials, but also to Secret Service people and, especially to Judith Exner. The reasons for the CIA to lie about the Castro plots have already been explained. At the beginning of part one of this piece, I mentioned that many in the Secret Service hated Kennedy, realized they were culpable in a security breakdown, and, like Elmer Moore, worked hard to cover up the true circumstances of Kennedy’s murder. About Exner’s motives, I can only speculate. Will Hersh have her now say that she saw Marilyn with Kennedy and Giancana in Hyannis Port on a sail boat eating pizza? From Anson’s description of panting-dog Hersh, delivering Exner to him was a little like giving Geraldo copy of Goddess.

    Mega-Trasher, or Just Mega-Trash?

    Hersh’s book promises to be the mega “trash Kennedy” book. And, like any hatchet man, Hersh tries to disguise his mission. In the Vanity Fair article, his fellow workers on the ABC documentary say, “there have been moments when, while recounting private acts of kindness by JFK, Hersh has broken down and wept.” (Anson p. 122) This from a man who intimidated witnesses with his phony papers and waved them aloft while damning the Kennedys with them. I believe his tears as much as I do the seance that Ben Bradlee and Jim Angleton attended to speak with the spirit of Mary Meyer (see Part One). At the end, Hersh joins in the con job: “I would have been absolutely devoted to Jack Kennedy if I had worked for him. I would have been knocked out by him. I would have liked him a lot.” (Ibid) With what Anson shows of Hersh, I actually believe him on this score. He would have loved his version of Kennedy.

    Anson’s article begs the next question: who is Hersh? As is common knowledge, the story that made Hersh’s career was his series of articles on the massacre of civilians at the village of My Lai in Vietnam. Hersh then wrote two books on this atrocity: My Lai 4 and Cover Up. There have always been questions about both the orders given on that mission and the unsatisfactory investigation after the fact. These questions began to boil in the aftermath of the exposure of the Bill Colby/Ted Shackley directed Phoenix Program: the deliberate assassination of any Vietnamese suspected of being Viet Cong. The death count for that operation has ranged between twenty and forty thousand. These questions were even more intriguing in light of the fact that the man chosen to run the military review of the massacre, General Peers, had a long term relationship with the CIA. In fact, former Special Forces Captain John McCarthy told me that–in terms of closeness to the Agency–Peers was another Ed Lansdale.

    By the time Hersh’s second book on the subject appeared, the suspicions about the massacre, and that Peers had directed a cover up, were now multiplying. Hersh went out of his way to address these questions in Cover Up. On pages 97-98 the following passage appears:

    There was no conspiracy to destroy the village of My Lai 4; what took place there had happened before and would happen again in Quang Ngai province–although with less drastic results. The desire of Lieutenant Colonel Barker to mount another successful, high enemy body-count operation in the area; the desire of Ramsdell to demonstrate the effectiveness of his operations; the belief shared by all the principals that everyone living in Son My was staying there by choice because of Communists…and the basic incompetence of many intelligence personnel in the Army–all these factors combined to enable a group of ambitious men to mount an unnecessary mission against a nonexistent enemy force, and somehow to find the evidence to justify it all.

    I won’t go into all the things that must be true for Hersh to be correct. I will add that in the definitive book of the subject, The Phoenix Program, My Lai is described as part of the Colby/Shackley operation.

    After My Lai, the New York Times assigned Hersh to the Watergate beat. The paper was getting scooped by Woodward and Bernstein at the Washington Post. For a “crack” reporter, Hersh did not distinguish himself, especially in retrospect. He basically followed in the footsteps of the Post. i.e. the whole complicated mess was a Nixon operation; there was no real CIA involvement; whatever Hunt and McCord did, no matter how weird and questionable, they did for the White House. As late as the December 12, 1992 edition of The New Yorker, Hersh was still hewing to this line in his article entitled “Nixon’s Last Cover Up.” In spite of this, at times Hersh actually did favors for the White House. As Ron Rosenbaum describes in Travels with Dr. Death, Hersh circulated some dirt on Dan Ellsberg (p. 294).

    Anson mentions a famous anecdote about Hersh’s reporting on Watergate (p. 107). Hersh got wind of a man involved in the Watergate caper by the name of Frank Sturgis. Sturgis was getting ready to talk during the early stages of the unfolding Watergate drama. Sturgis was working with Andrew St. George, a good, relatively independent journalist. The pair were going to write a book about Sturgis’ experience in Watergate, but Hersh threatened to expose them first if they did not cooperate with him. In return, Hersh promised not to name St. George and to run the completed article by them first. St. George kept his side of the deal. Hersh broke his. St. George was named in the piece twenty-three times.

    But there is another aspect to this story not mentioned by Anson. When St. George did publish a piece on Watergate in Harper’s, it was based on his talks with another Watergate burglar, Eugenio Martinez. It gave strong indications of the CIA’s role in Watergate, and that Howard Hunt was a double agent inside the Nixon camp. A few years later, in High Times (April 1977) sans Hersh, Sturgis now spoke. He depicted Watergate as a war not with Sam Ervin and the Post on one side and Nixon on the other; but as the CIA versus Nixon. None of this was in Hersh’s piece, which presented the typical White House-funneling-“hush money”-to-the-burglars story which could have been written by Woodward.

    Next for Hersh were his exposures in the New York Times of CIA counter intelligence chief James Angleton’s domestic operations. Domestic ops were banned by the CIA’s original charter, although they had been done ever since that Agency’s inception. But at Christmas, 1974, Hersh’s stories were splashed all over the Times. Hersh won a Pulitzer for them. One would think this would be a strong indication of Hersh’s independence from, even antagonism for the CIA. One would be wrong. As everyone familiar with the Agency’s history knows, in 1974 there was a huge turf war going on between Angleton and Colby (formerly of the Vietnam Phoenix program). Angleton lost this struggle, largely through Hersh’s stories. But the week before Hersh’s stories were printed, on December 16, 1974, Colby addressed the Council of Foreign Relations on this very subject and admitted to the domestic spying (Imperial Brain Trust p. 61). Why? Because their selective exposure could be used to oust Angleton. Many now believe that Hersh’s stories were part of Colby’s campaign to oust Angleton, sanctioned by the CIA Director himself.

    Next up for Hersh was the story of the downing of KAL 700. This was the curious case of the Korean Air Liner shot down over Russian air space after having drifted off course. Many suspected that, as with the My Lai case, there was more here than met the eye. The long length of time that the plane had been off course, as well as its failure to respond to signals, led some to believe that the Russians had no choice but to shoot down the plane. In fact, many articles appeared, for example in The Nation, to support that thesis. The Reagan administration wanted to portray the incident as an example of Soviet barbarity (shades of Basulto’s Brothers to the Rescue). They, and specifically Jeanne Kirkpatrick, treated the downing as a great propaganda victory. In his book, The Target Is Destroyed, Hersh ended up siding with the administration.

    Which brings us to the nineties. Everyone knows that the broad release of Oliver Stone’s JFK in 1992 put the Kennedy assassination back into play. The pre-release attack against the film was unprecedented in movie history. That’s because it was more than just a movie. It was a message, with powerful political overtones that dug deeply into the public psyche: a grand political conspiracy had killed the last progressive president. That Vietnam would have never happened if Kennedy had lived. That JFK was working for accommodation with Castro at the time of his death. That the country has not really been the same since.

    The preemptive strike was successful in slowing up the film’s momentum out of the starting block. But the movie did increase the number of people who believe the case was a conspiracy into the ninety-percent range. The following year, in anticipation of the 30th anniversary of the murder, Gerald Posner got the jump on the critics with his specious book on the case. The media hailed him as a truth-teller. The critics were shut out. No nonfiction book in recent memory ever received such a huge publicity campaign–and deserved it less.

    Looming in the Background

    After Jim Marrs debated Posner on the Kevin McCarthy show in Dallas, he chatted with him. Marrs asked him how he came to do the book. Posner replied that an editor at Random House, one Bob Loomis, got in contact with him and promised him cooperation from the CIA with the book. This explains how Posner got access to KGB turncoat Yuri Nosenko, who was put on a CIA retainer in the late seventies. At the time of Posner-mania, Alan Houston wrote Mr. Loomis, who also edited the Posner book. In a reply dated 10/27/93, Loomis revealed much about himself:

    I have no doubt that you really believe what you are saying, but I must tell you that your letter is one of the best indications I’ve seen yet as to why the American public has been misled by ridiculous conspiracy theories.

    You have proved nothing insofar as I can see, except for the fact that you simply can’t see the truth of the situation. My feeling is that it is you and others like you who have perverted the historical record and, in an inexcusable way, pardoned the murderer.

    Readers of Probe know that Loomis is not a new pal of the CIA. In our Watergate issue (Vol. 3#2), we wrote about the long, controversial career of journalist James Phelan, a strong supporter of the Warren Commission and harsh critic of Jim Garrison and his “wacky conspiracy theories.” Phelan always strongly denied he was compromised in any way. Even when confronted with documents showing connections to government agencies (like the FBI) he still denied it. When Phelan did his book on Howard Hughes–which completely whitewashed the ties of the eccentric billionaire to the CIA–that “instant” book was a top secret project of Random House, handled by Bob Loomis.

    Needless to say, Loomis was Hersh’s editor at Random House on both his My Lai books. David Halberstam, in The Powers That Be, noted that it was Loomis who put Hersh in contact with St. George and Sturgis during Watergate (p. 681). According to his secretary, Loomis worked closely with Hersh on The Target Is Destroyed. Certainly, one of the most ridiculous statements made by Hersh would be music to Loomis’ ears. Hersh’s Holy Grail on the assassination conspiracy, the cinching piece of the puzzle, would be “a reel of tape of Oswald getting briefed by Giancana” (Anson p. 120). With what serious people have learned about Oswald today, through work by Phil Melanson, John Newman, and John Armstrong, this is preposterous. The Blakey-Davis whim about the Mafia hiring a “hit man” who couldn’t hit the side of a barn and used a $12.95 bolt action rifle to do the job, went out the window when the HSCA closed down. But “crack” reporter Hersh still buys into it. As he does the idea that Sirhan killed Bobby Kennedy, proven by the fact that he wrote a blurb praising Dan Moldea’s 1995 whitewash of that case.

    Behind all the sordid details of these articles there is a bigger picture to be outlined. One of the main parts of it is the increasing ascendancy of tabloid journalism into the major media outlets, and with it, its concomitant attachment to the lives of celebrities. More often than not, that translates into the endless search for sleaze and scandal. This chain on the lives of the Kennedys has been well described in these articles. The overall tendency has become so prevalent that, as many have noted, tabloid sales in the U.S. have declined of late because the mainstream media have now bowed to these tendencies so much that much of their news has seeped over, thereby blurring the lines between the two. In my view, some of the milestones in this trend have been examined in this article: in the nonfiction book field it would be the Collier-Horowitz book; in magazine journalism, the Kitty Kelley article on Exner; in television, the 1985 Rivera controversy about Summers’ book.

    This blurring of tabloid and journalistic standards inevitably leads to a blurring of history. With people like Kelley, Rivera, and Exner commenting, the Kennedys get inserted into a giant Torbitt Document of modern history. With people like Davis translating for them, RFK does not pursue Giancana, they are actually pals in MONGOOSE. The Kennedys agree with the Joint Chiefs: we should invade Cuba. And then escalate in Vietnam. Disinformation feeds on disinformation, and whatever the record shows is shunted aside as the tabloid version becomes “accepted history,” to use Davis’ phrase (p. 290). The point of this blurring of sources is that the Kennedys, in these hands, become no different than the Dulles brothers, or Nixon, or Eisenhower. In fact, Davis says this explicitly in his book( pp. 298-99). As I noted in the last issue, with Demaris and Exner, the Kennedys are no different than Giancana. And once this is pounded home, then anything is possible. Maybe Oswald did work for Giancana. And if RFK was working with Sam, then maybe Bobby unwittingly had his brother killed. Tragic, but hey, if you play with fire you get burned. Tsk. Tsk.

    But beyond this, there is an even larger gestalt. If the Kennedys were just Sorenson-wrapped mobsters or CIA officers, then what difference does it make in history if they were assassinated? The only people who should care are sentimental Camelot sops like O’Donnell and Powers who were in it for a buck anyway. Why waste the time and effort of a new investigation on that. For the CIA, this is as good as a rerun of the Warren Commission, since the net results are quite similar. So its no surprise to me that the focus of Hersh’s book has shifted between Oswald did it for the Mob, and an all out trashing of the Kennedys.

    The standard defense by these purveyors is that they go on the offense. Anyone who objects to their peculiar blend of misinformation, or questions their sources or intent is labeled as “protecting the Kennedys,” or a “disappointed Kennedy fan,” or a “hagiographer.” Tactically, this is a great cover to avoid the questionable credibility of people like the Alsops, Priscilla Johnson McMillan, or a flimflam man like Slatzer. It also avoids acknowledging their descent into the ranks of Hoover and Angleton. When Summers’ book on Hoover came out, which followed much the same line on the Kennedys as Goddess, he got a guest spot on The Larry King Show. There, Hoover aide Cartha De Loach called his book a collection of “sleaze.” Summers fought back by saying that Hoover and De Loach were peddling “sex tapes” about Martin Luther King to the press. At that point, if Larry King weren’t such a stiff, he would have stepped in and noted, “But Tony, we expect that kind of thing from a guy like Hoover. What’s your excuse?”

    So Where are the Kennedys?

    In a deeper sense, it is clear now that no one in the major media was or is “protecting the Kennedys.” The anti-Kennedy genre has now become self-sustaining. Summers used the Collier and Horowitz book for Goddess. He even uses Priscilla McMillan to connect JFK with Monroe! (p. 244) Will Liz Smith call him on this? Will Ben Bradlee? Far from “protecting the Kennedys” the establishment shields these writers from potentially devastating critiques. The reason being that the Kennedys were never part of that establishment. No one protected JFK in Dallas. No one protected RFK in Los Angeles. The ensuing investigations did everything they could to protect the true murderers; to hell with the victims. And since the Church Committee showed in public that the Kennedys were not business as usual, there has been an intense and incessant effort to reverse that verdict; in essence to rewrite history. People like Slatzer, Davis, and now Hersh have made their living off of it.

    The Kennedys themselves deserve part of the blame. In Samuels’ article in The New Yorker, Kennedy family lawyer Myer Feldman says that he advised the Kennedys not to even comment on Hersh, let alone sue (p. 69). If I were advising, I would have urged a lawsuit as far back as 1984 with both the Collier-Horowitz book and the Davis book. I would have loved to hear how the two former leftists had no idea that Priscilla Johnson was associated with the CIA, had tied up Marina Oswald for years, and then issued a tract on both Oswald and the assassination that James Angleton himself would have written. I would have also loved to hear Davis explain how he could have completely misrepresented the Church Committee report to his readers. I would also like to ask him how many people he thought would read the actual report versus how many would pick up the paperback version of his book (which features a blurb by Liz Smith). To me what these authors have done at least suggests the “reckless disregard” rubric of the libel statute.

    To be fair to the Kennedys, it is hard to castigate a family which has sustained so many tragedies. Andy Harland called up Steve Jones after reading his article in The Humanist (Probe Vol. 4 #3 p. 8). He was an acquaintance of Peter Lawford’s who talked to him a few times about the assassination. Jones’ notes from that phone call includes the following:

    Lawford told him that Jackie knew right away that shots came from the front as did Powers and O’Donnell. He said shortly after the funeral the family got together…. Bobby told the family that it was a high level military/CIA plot and that he felt powerless to do anything about it…. the family always felt that JFK’s refusal to commit to Vietnam was one of the reasons for the assassination….Lawford told him that the kids were all told the truth as they grew up but it was Teddy who insisted that the family put the thing to rest.

    Evidently, Teddy wanted to preserve his career in the political arena and knew that any airing of the case would jeopardize it. Which was probably true. Under those circumstances, the Kennedys can’t even protect themselves.

    This is understandable in human terms. But the compromise allows the likes of Reeves, de Toledano, and Hersh to take the field with confidence. The Kennedys are silent; they won’t sue; it must be true. As a corollary, this shows that the old adage about history being written by the victors stands. In this upside down milieu, all the Kennedys’ sworn enemies can talk to any cheapjack writer with a hefty advance and recycle another thrashing. Mobsters and those in their employ, CIA officers and their assets, rabid right-wingers et. al. Escorted by these writers, they now do their dances over the graves of the two men they hated most in life and can now revile in death. There is something Orwellian about this of course.

    The converse of this thesis is also true. The voices the Kennedys symbolized are now squelched. Collier and Horowitz are intent on never letting the ghost of the sixties reappear. The poor, the weak, minorities, and the left’s intelligentsia must not be unsheathed again. (As Todd Gitlin notes in his book The Sixties, on occasion, the Kennedy administration actually had SDS members in the White House to discuss foreign policy issues.) The image of JFK on national television giving hell to the steel companies; of Kennedy staking out his policy for detente at American University; of RFK grilling Sam Giancana and Jimmy Hoffa; of Bobby going through the personnel list at the State Department to be sure there was no Dulles still on the payroll; these images have to be erased. Most of all, the RFK of 1965-68, angry at the perversion of his brother’s policies, must be subverted. Who of the elite would want people to remember RFK saying these words:

    What the Alliance for Progress has come down to then is that [the native rulers] can close down newspapers, abolish Congress, fail religious opposition, and deport your political enemies, and you’ll get lots of help, but if you fool around with a U.S. oil company, we’ll cut you off without a penny. Is that right?

    It was no day at the beach answering that kind of question with Bobby staring a hole through you.

    By 1963, after the Bay of Pigs, the Missile Crisis and the cries for escalation in Vietnam, Kennedy was moving toward the Sorenson-Schlesinger side of the White House. By 1968, RFK was further to the left than that, being hooked up with labor leaders like Walter Reuther and Cesar Chavez. As Otis Chandler, a firm member of the establishment, said after Bobby’s death: “I guess there’s no one to stand up for the weak and the poor now.” That memory is now being replaced by those of RFK cavorting with Monroe on the beach; of JFK drinking martinis with Monroe’s buddy Giancana; and the Kennedys trying to take her life as they tried with Castro. In the Anson piece, Hersh talks about changing the way people think about the Kennedys. Talk about reversing the Church Committee. That was just the beginning. These people could teach Orwell something.

    What will the future bring? Will Exner, still dying of cancer, demand a DNA sample from John Kennedy Jr. to prove Jackie was really his mother? Will Summers file a lawsuit demanding the government turn over RFK’s private snuff film of Monroe’s murder? Will Hersh now say that he was duped on the Monroe docs but now he has the real McCoy: it was Jayne Mansfield all along. With Liz Smith as the moderator, satire is impossible in this field.

    But down deep, submerged but still present, there is a resistance to all this. The public knows something is wrong. Two years ago, CBS and the New York Times conducted a poll which asked the respondents: If you could pick a President, any President, which one would you choose to run the country today? The winner, in a landslide, was John F. Kennedy who doubled the tally of the second place finisher. In 1988, Rolling Stone surveyed the television generation, i.e. the below forty group, on their diverse opinions and attitudes. Their two most admired public leaders were Bobby Kennedy and Martin Luther King, dead twenty years before, when many of those polled were infants or not even born. This holds not just in America. In Pete Hammill’s 1995 book Piece Work, he relates an episode in his life when his car broke down in the Mexican countryside. He walked to a poor, “Third World” style hut which had no amenities except a phone. Before he left, he thanked the native Mexicans who lived there and took a look around the dilapidated, almost bare interior. The only decorations he saw were a plaster figurine of Che Guevara, and near it, a photo of John Kennedy.

    It’s that international Jungian consciousness, however bottled up, ambiguous, uncertain, that must be dislodged. In a sense, this near-maniacal effort, and all the money and effort involved in it, is a compliment that proves the opposite of the position being advanced. This kind of defamation effort is reserved only for the most dangerous foes of the status quo, e.g. a Huey Long or a Thomas Jefferson. In a weird sort of way, it almost makes one feel for the other side. It must be tough to be a security guard of the mind, trying to control any ghosts rising from the ashes. Which, of course, is why Hersh has to hide his real feelings about his subject. That’s the kind of threat the Kennedys posed to the elite: JFK was never in the CFR (Imperial Brain Trust p. 247); Bobby Kennedy hated the Rockefellers (Thy Will be Done pp. 538-542). For those sins, and encouraging others to follow them, they must suffer the fate of the Undead. And Marilyn Monroe must be thrown into that half-world with them. At the hands of Bob Loomis’ pal, that “liberal” crusader Sy Hersh. As Anson says, he must just want the money.

  • What Did Otto Otepka Know About Oswald and the CIA?


    From the March-April, 1997 issue (Vol. 4 No. 3) of Probe


    Otto Otepka once told journalist Sarah McClendon that he knew who had killed JFK, but would say no more on the subject.1 What might he have been in a position to know?

    As head of the State Department’s Office of Security (SY), Otto Otepka was responsible for issuing or denying security clearances for State Department personnel. He took his job very seriously. In 1958, Otepka was awarded for Meritorious Service by no less than John Foster Dulles. The award lauded Otepka’s “loyalty and devotion to duty” as well as his “sound judgment, creative work and unusual responsibilities”, adding that Otepka “reflected great credit upon himself and the Department and has served as an incentive to his colleagues.”2

    Not a McCarthyite

    Otepka has often been unfairly portrayed as a right-wing clone of Senator Joe McCarthy. But the record does not support this caricature. In fact, Otepka crossed swords with Joe McCarthy in 1953 over Wolf Ladejinksy, a State Department agricultural expert who had once been employed by a Soviet trade agency. Despite such an obvious affiliation, Otepka’s evaluation cleared Ladejinsky of McCarthy’s unfair charges. Otepka himself has stated,

    I thought my whole record would prove I was not a McCarthyite. I had never approved of Senator McCarthy’s tactics. Everyone in the security field knew that.3

    November 5, 1963, Otto Otepka was unceremoniously fired from State based on charges that were unfounded.

    How did Otepka fall so far from grace? And could it have had anything to do with his investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald?

    Otto Otepka’s troubles started in December of 1960. Otepka’s biographer William Gill clearly believes that Otepka’s problems stemmed originally from Otepka’s continued denial of a security clearance for the former OSS veteran Walt Rostow. Otepka had denied him clearance twice before, and in December of 1960, Dean Rusk, newly appointed Secretary of State, visited Otepka in person to ask what Rostow’s chances would be of getting cleared at that time. Otepka was unable to give Rusk any reason to believe Rostow would ever receive clearance, and Rusk subsequently placed Rostow in the White House as a member of Kennedy’s personal staff, specifically as McGeorge Bundy’s second in command on national security matters.

    Walt Whitman Rostow was the brother of Eugene Rostow. In Professor Don Gibson’s article about the creation of the Warren Commission, (Probe, May-June 1996) Gibson revealed Eugene Rostow’s primary role in the formation of that body. Eugene’s call was made less than two and a half hours after Oswald was killed. Walt Rostow also shared something in common with the CIA’s legendary Counterintelligence Chief, James Angleton. He did not believe in the Sino-Soviet split.4 Rostow was no communist, but in fact a hawkish Cold Warrior.

    Walt Rostow was one of Kennedy’s “counterinsurgency” experts. “He made counterinsurgency seem profound, reasonable, and eminently just,” said author Gerald Colby in his book Thy Will Be Done. Walt Rostow – like Dean Rusk, Roswell Gilpatrick, Edward Lansdale, Paul Nitze, Harland Cleveland, Roger Hilsman, Lincoln Gordon, Adolf Berle, McGeorge Bundy and Henry Kissinger – came to work in the Kennedy administration directly from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund’s Special Studies Project. This group had been hand-chosen by Nelson Rockefeller to assist him when he himself was seeking the Presidency. Author Colby called this “Nelson’s Secret Victory”, pointing out that while Kennedy knew many powerful people, they were mostly politicians, not men with experience in foreign affairs. The Rockefeller family network, and Nelson’s group in particular, provided a large assortment of bright, qualified men. However, with such a homogenous group surrounding him, Colby noted, “there was no one to advise the young president on the wisdom and efficacy of such covert operations as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA’s secret war in Indochina, Project Eagle, or Lumumba’s murder.”5

    Otepka’s biographer doesn’t seem to understand the distinction between Kennedy and this group. He insinuates that Bobby was behind Walt Rostow’s rise and Otepka’s fall. Bobby was originally the true believer in counterinsurgency as a means for conducting limited warfare and thus saving a greater number of lives than in outright war, which at that point in time seemed to mean nuclear war. But Bobby became disenchanted himself with both Rusk and Rostow and their type of counterinsurgency. Colby includes the text of one of Bobby’s speeches as released to the press, in which was written, “Victory in a revolutionary war is not won by escalation, but by de-escalation.” Kennedy did not actually speak these words when the speech was delivered, but the words were widely quoted by the press.6

    Investigating Oswald

    Was the denial of clearance for Rostow the trigger for Otepka’s eventual downfall? Or could it have been a letter that went out a few weeks earlier? In a letter dated October 25, 1960, Hugh Cummings of State’s Intelligence and Research Bureau wrote a letter to Richard Bissell at CIA, requesting information on defectors to the Soviet Union. Number eight on the list of eighteen names was Lee Harvey Oswald. In the book Spooks, Jim Hougan writes that,

    According to Otepka, the study on defectors was initiated by him because neither the CIA nor military intelligence agencies would inform the State Department which defectors to the Soviet Union were double agents working for the United States.7

    Although Otepka remained in the dark, within the CIA there seemed to be fewer questions as to for whom Oswald worked.

    When State’s request came to CIA, Bissell turned the request over to two places: James Angleton’s Counterintelligence (CI) staff, and Sheffield Edwards’ Office of Security (OS) staff. In OS, Robert Bannerman, himself a former SY official and a colleague of Otepka’s, told his people to coordinate their response with CI. Evidently, Bannerman knew that Angleton’s CI staff, as opposed to the Soviet Russia Division (SR), would have the answers State needed. Paul Gaynor, of OS’s Security Research Staff (SRS), also seemed to have special knowledge that Angleton would be the appropriate person to handle this request. He passed Bannerman’s request for a coordinated response for State to Marguerite Stevens of SRS.

    John Newman, in Oswald and the CIA, describes the unusual nature of Gaynor’s framing of this request:

    This request, as Gaynor relayed it to Stevens, however, was worded in a peculiar way, as if to dissuade her from doing research on seven people. Bannerman specified that he wanted information on American defectors other than Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin, and five other defectors regarding whom Mr. Otepka of the State Department Security Office already has information. One of the “five other defectors” that Stevens was not supposed to look into was Lee Harvey Oswald.8 [Newman’s emphasis]

    Readers of Probe will remember from the last issue how CIA told the Headquarters offices of the FBI, State and INS that the CIA had already given information (re Oswald’s Mexico City trip) to the field offices of the same entities, which proved to be a lie. Is this a similar lie? Did Otepka have the information already? No, according to Otepka. In addition, we know now that Angleton’s CI/SIG chief, Birch D. O’Neal, prepared his own response regarding these “defectors”. And 10th on the list was Oswald. And more importantly, Oswald’s particular entry was marked SECRET.9 And again, as described in the last Probe, SIG – the Special Investigations Group – contained Angleton’s private handful of his most closed-mouth associates.

    It’s significant that both Bannerman and Gaynor knew that the appropriate area for responding to inquiries about Oswald was Angleton’s CI staff. It’s interesting too how Gaynor relayed a response to a subordinate, Marguerite Stevens, in a manner that did not indicate to her that someone else in CIA had information on Oswald.

    Another significant element in CI/SIG’s response was that it included a known lie. Oswald was listed as having “renounced” his citizenship.10 Although Oswald had attempted renunciation, he had not followed through and was still considered by both governments a citizen of the United States. Newman muses of this assertion, “Was CI/SIG truly incompetent or spinning some counterintelligence yarn?”11 The latter seems more likely, in light of other events.

    The Opening of Oswald’s 201 File

    Late November, 1960, Angleton’s staff sent Bissell their proposed response to State, which Bissell signed and forwarded. Yet we are to believe that, despite this obvious flurry of attention, just a few days later, on December 9, 1960, CI/SIG’s Ann Egerter opened a 201 file in the name of Lee Henry Oswald. Newman has stated that he thinks this name might have been the result of a simple mistake. While this response seems strained for a file that was restricted, as this one was, this explanation is even more weak in light of the recent attention focused on one Lee Harvey Oswald preceding the opening of this file. In fact, Egerter herself directly related the opening of the file to State’s request for information when deposed by the HSCA. Does this make any sense? It seems more like Egerter was trying to hide the CIA’s knowledge of Oswald, than preparing to divulge more of it.

    Newman raises an interesting issue by quoting a memo from the man who later took Angleton’s position, George T. Kalaris. Kalaris gave a different version of why the 201 file was opened at that time, which states flatly:

    Lee Harvey Oswald’s 201 file was first opened as a result of his “defection” to the USSR on 31 Oct 1959 and renewed interest in Oswald brought about by his queries concerning possible reentry into the United States.12

    One of Oswald’s own letters supports Kalaris’ assertion. Oswald wrote to the American Embassy in Moscow in early 1961:

    Since I have not received a reply to my letter of December, 1960, I am writing again asking that you consider my request for the return of my American passport.13

    Newman quotes from an ABC Nightline broadcast from 1991, in which ABC claims that the KGB had intercepted this letter and that the original still exists in Soviet files. Newman further points out that only some extraordinary source or method could have relayed this information to the CIA so quickly for them to open the 201 file by December 9th. Even if Oswald wrote on December 1st, how did the CIA, continents away, learn the contents of a letter in the cold war Soviet Union within eight days? And more importantly, what would that indicate about the level of interest the CIA really had in Oswald, to be monitoring him so closely? In addition, Newman points out that,

    Throughout Oswald’s stay in the Soviet Union, an Agency element which appears regularly on cover sheets for Oswald documents is CI/OPS, which means “Counterintelligence Operations.” If Oswald was a dangle, this might suggest that it was a counterintelligence operation run by Angleton.

    Whatever the truth of the opening of the 201 file and the true purpose of Oswald’s trip to the Soviet Union, Otepka’s request for information sparked a chain of communications to Angleton’s unit, which then lied about Oswald in response. And Otepka’s life irrevocably changed. From December 1960, whether due to his refusal to clear Rostow, his poking into Oswald, or some other reason, Otepka started being taken off any “sensitive” security cases. It seemed Otepka’s reputation for meticulous attention to detail and thoroughness was making him a problem in SY. Why? Who was threatened by a man doing a good job?

    Downward Spiral

    An incredible, three year campaign unfolded against Otepka. Because of his stellar record, no one dared fire him. But all kinds of efforts were spent trying to make him want to quit, starting with his removal from the most sensitive cases in December, 1960. The first public attack began when stories appeared in the press that State – and specifically Otepka’s security area – would be undergoing a “reduction in force.”14

    Shortly thereafter, Otepka was called before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS), of which Senator James Eastland was Chair and Senator Thomas Dodd a vocal member. Otepka had gotten to know Jay Sourwine, the subcommittee’s Chief Counsel. Informally, Otepka had shared some of his concerns for what he saw as a loosening of the clearance procedures with Sourwine. Sourwine and the subcommittee quickly began, with Dodd presiding, to hold what came to be known as the Otepka hearings. In the subcommittee’s subsequent report, the members concluded that the release of the news stories was meant to cause Otepka’s voluntary resignation.

    Since this effort failed, other steps had to be taken. Otepka’s superior in SY tried to entice Otepka into taking a position in a different division. But Otepka refused, and none too soon, since that division was dissolved a mere two months later.15 Next, Otepka was shifted into a position that was essentially a demotion. Still, Otepka hung on, trying to do the job he felt needed to be done.

    Otepka had found that Rusk had appointed a number of officials to State under a blanket waiver that effectively backdated security clearances for the new officials. Otepka tried to raise his concern with his superiors, and urged them to go to SISS. But SY just wanted Otepka to look the other way.

    In 1962, John Francis Reilly took control of SY. From the very beginning, he too seemed to be on a mission to get rid of Otepka. Otepka’s biographer relates this encounter, just weeks into Reilly’s term:

    Smiling broadly, [Reilly] asked, “Where’s your rabbit’s foot?” Mystified, Otepka raised his eyebrows in question. Reilly laughed and, maintaining his air of benevolent affability, he explained that Otepka had just been selected to attend the National War College. This was an honor usually reserved for Foreign Service officers marked for higher things. Being human, Otepka was naturally pleased. Reilly seemed genuinely delighted that such good fortune had befallen a member of his staff and just for a moment, Otepka was taken in. He accepted the appointment with thanks, and perhaps with a sense of relief that he could escape, at least temporarily, from the strained atmosphere that prevailed in SY. Reilly shrewdly asked him to put his acceptance in writing.

    That same day, May 7, Otepka wrote Reilly a memorandum formally expressing his willingness to attend the War College for ten months beginning in August. However, he could not resist adding, tongue in cheek, that the appointment had come as something of a surprise to him because the State Department had repeatedly assured him, the Congress, and the public that he would be kept in a responsible position in the Office of Security. Reilly returned this memo with the request that Otepka delete his comments on the Department’s premises. Otepka complied.16

    Reilly, however, overplayed his hand. His overdone praise made Otepka a bit uneasy, and he decided to do a little checking on his own. What he found was that his appointment had not been entered with the regular nominations, but was entered as a last minute emergency-type nomination. Otepka then asked Reilly if by accepting, he would still be able to return to his post at State. Reilly admitted he would have to fill Otepka’s spot, and there would be no place to which Otepka could return. With that, Otepka rejected this “honor” and chose to remain in place.

    Less than a week after Otepka’s refusal, Reilly placed his first spy, Fred Traband, in Otepka’s office. More would follow. Reilly also brought in a National Security Agency (NSA) alumnus, David Belisle, to work with Otepka. Belisle brought with him a new “short form” procedure to rush through people’s security clearances. Otepka was appalled, but powerless. Belisle took away Otepka’s card-file index, the product of years of work. Otepka was removed from the FBI’s after-hours call list, which was another demotion. For a short time, Otepka was seriously thinking of quitting. Ironically, it was his buddy, Jay Sourwine, who talked him out of it. Ironically because it was this very relationship that most contributed to Otepka’s eventual downfall.

    Sourwine started working on Otepka to get him to divulge what was really going on behind the scenes at State. But as usual, being a by-the-book person, Otepka insisted on following protocol. If Sourwine wanted him to testify before SISS, the subcommittee would have to formally request his testimony. And then, Otepka insisted on getting clearance from his superiors before testifying. Was Sourwine truly interested in helping Otepka, or was he part of a plot to entrap Otepka into saying something that would finally provide the justification for Otepka’s ouster?

    In mid-February, 1963, Otepka was formally notified that his appearance was requested before SISS. Otepka testified to the subcommittee on four different occasions. At the very first hearing, Sourwine asked the question relating to the cause of Otepka’s appearance before the committee in the first place. He asked if Otepka had been subjected to any “reprisals” from State because of his previous testimony. But Otepka was wary of saying anything that could make his already uncomfortable situation at SY worse, and defended both State and their treatment of him. Otepka defended his own actions, but would not point an accusatory finger at anyone else. Sourwine continued to press the matter with more subtle questions, until he got Otepka to talk about a case where Otepka conceded to being pressured to put through two security clearances where he didn’t feel one was justified. Otepka’s refusal to clear the persons delayed the formation of the committee to which these people had been appointed for over a year. And in the end, through Otepka’s persistence, they were both dropped from the committee.17

    One of Otepka’s biggest heresies, however, was disclosing to the Senate subcommittee that, despite the subcommittee’s earlier report and recommendations from the earlier Otepka hearings, State had continued to process under blanket waivers nearly 400 people in the roles of file clerks and secretaries. As author Gill put it, “it is often easier for an obscure clerk or a trusted secretary to waltz off the premises with a top-secret document than it would be for an official at the policy-making level who is afraid he is being watched.”18 This greatly alarmed the senators, but Otepka added one more piece of information. There was an effort underway to reinstate Alger Hiss to the State Department. Knowing what we know today, one might wish that effort had been successful. But at the time, all that was known was that Hiss had been convicted of perjury and had been accused of espionage.

    High-Tech Harassment

    Shortly after the third or fourth appearance, Otepka began noticing trouble on his phone line. Chatter could be heard sometimes, other times calls wouldn’t go through, and sometimes there would be an amplification effect. Otepka was being bugged. And not just through the phone. Listening devices were installed in his office. What could someone possibly fear that Otepka might be discussing to warrant such intense surveillance?

    And then there was the night Otepka had been working late, stepped out for dinner, and then returned to work some more. Imagine his surprise when, around 10pm, David Belisle and another NSA spook entered his office, thinking he was gone for the night. Belisle made the flimsy excuse that he had been concerned by a cleaning woman he claimed to have seen entering Otepka’s office. But Otepka had been sitting there for some time, and called Belisle on this lie.19

    When Otepka’s regular secretary fell sick, one Joyce Schmelzer was placed in his office with orders to spy on Otepka. One of her tasks was to gather the burn bag each night, mark it with a big red “X”, then call to alert another SY member that Otepka’s burn bag was on the way down. The trash was searched regularly for any incriminating information that could be used against Otepka.

    For weeks, his house was under surveillance. His wife, tired of seeing the man in the car parked across the street every night, called the local police. After the police forced the man to identify himself (he worked for a private security firm), the man never reappeared.

    Was Otepka keeping people with carefully constructed communist-like backgrounds from being placed, on behalf of intelligence agencies, in State for official cover? It would seem his offenses must have been extraordinary to warrant such high-level harassment. Was someone out to discredit Otepka in case he later spilled the beans on one particularly sensitive case?

    Someone had even drilled a hole into his safe, and with a mirror determined the correct combination, and then plugged the hole again. What could someone possibly fear that Otepka might be discussing to warrant such intense surveillance? According to Otepka, the only sensitive material in the safe was his half-finished study of American defectors in the Soviet Union, with a yet to be completed determination on one Lee Harvey Oswald. When Hougan asked Otepka specifically if Otepka had been able to figure out if Oswald was an agent of the US or not, Otepka answered, “We had not made up our minds when my safe was drilled and we were thrown out of the office.”20

    Amazingly, the people involved in harassing Otepka did little to cover their tracks. It was an open secret that Otepka was being tapped. And Otepka still had many friends in State, who told him who was responsible for many of these activities. Meanwhile, Reilly was trying to undermine Otepka’s support on SISS. He told all kinds of lies about what Otepka had done on various security cases and directly contradicted Otepka’s testimony before the subcommittee. Otepka was appalled. The Senate subcommittee was in quandry about who to believe – Otepka, or his SY superior. Sourwine told Otepka he would need something other than his word. He would need documents. Again, one should consider what followed in regards to the question of whether Sourwine was engaging in some form of entrapment.

    Preparing the Defense

    For ten days, Otepka gathered his evidence. He prepared a 39 page brief with 36 attachments to support his own testimony and directly refute that of Reilly’s. Of the attachments, 25 were unclassified; six were marked “Official Use Only”, three were marked “Limited Official Use”; and two were marked “Confidential.”21

    Otepka was careful that none of what he divulged to the Senate subcommittee was information that in any way could compromise the national security of the United States. And even the two marked “Confidential” were mere transmittal memorandums for more sensitive attachments, and Otepka did not turn over the attachments.

    The piece d’resistance in this affair was the manipulation of evidence taken from Otepka’s own safe. Sensitive documents were “found” in his burn bag one night, with the classification tags illegally clipped off. Otepka claimed, and the State Department never denied, that the evidence seems to support the contention that the documents were planted in his bags for the sole purpose of discrediting him. The day after these documents turned up, SISS called several SY members to the Hill to discuss the bugging of Otepka. The first man called was the spy Reilly had planted in Otepka’s office from the beginning, Fred Traband. Traband was so unnerved at being called, however, that, while denying knowledge of the tapping, he told the story behind the burn bag operation. The next man, Terry Shea, not only acknowledged the burn bag story, but added that Reilly had personally searched Otepka’s files and safe. The rest continued to deny any participation in or knowledge of the tapping of Otepka.

    House of Cards

    On June 27, 1963, Reilly unceremoniously shunted Otepka out of his office into a new, make-work position reviewing and updating policy manuals. Otepka was ordered to turn over the combination to his safe (which still held the unfinished Oswald study) and was sent to another office on another floor. He was denied access to his former records. Many of Otepka’s staff were purged from their positions at this time as well. On his new office wall, Otepka hung these words from Prime Minister Churchill:

    Never give in. Never, never, never, never! Never yield in any way, great or small, large or petty, except to convictions of honor and good sense. Never yield to force and the apparently overwhelming might of the enemy.22

    Adrift without direction, Otepka took some time off, and then made the mistake of stopping by his old office for a look. Belisle heard about this and admonished Otepka to stay away. Otepka’s wife was surprised, when calling her husband at his office, to hear “Mr. Otepka is no longer here.” And Otepka’s phone was rigged so that he could receive no incoming calls himself. His buzzer was disabled. When a call for Otepka came in, a phone would ring in another location, where a secretary would have to answer the call, and then walk to his door, knock, and tell him to pick up the line, before he could receive the call. This also ensured no privacy, since anyone could be listening on the other end of his calls. One of the men involved in tapping Otepka, Elmer Hill, had his wiretap lab across from Otepka’s office.23

    Domestic Espionage?

    At the end of July, the other shoe dropped. Otepka was informed by the FBI that he was being formally charged with espionage. Years later, it was discovered this move was ordered by Rusk himself, and the order hand-delivered by Reilly to the Department of Justice. This, for turning documents over to a Senate subcommittee. He was also charged with having clipped security classifications from documents, something Otepka did not do.

    In our last issue of Probe, we told of another whistleblower, Richard Nuccio, and how he was punished for giving information to the congressional body legitimately designated to receive such. Peter Kornbluh, writing for the Washington Post, quoted a 1912 law which stated that “the right of employees …to furnish information to either House or Congress, or to a committee or member thereof, may not be interfered with or denied.” Otepka himself cited this same law to the FBI in defense of his own actions.

    Meanwhile, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee was going to bat for Otepka. They hauled before them what the committee later called the “lying trio” of Reilly, Belisle and Hill.24 All three were found to have committed perjury when they denied knowledge of the tap on Otepka.

    The Long Shadow of Walter Sheridan

    In an interesting and relevant side story, the tapes made from the bugging of Otepka’s office were passed to a man that was unidentified in the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee’s hearings. Jim Hougan, while researching a strange case of bugging on Capitol Hill, found a man, Sidney Goldberg, who claims that the man in the corridor was none other than Walter Sheridan.25 Walter Sheridan was the former NSA and FBI man who did so much to sabotage Jim Garrison during his investigation into Kennedy’s assassination. According to a source of Goldberg’s, Hougan wrote that Sheridan “disposed over the personnel and currency of whole units of the Central Intelligence Agency.”26 In addition, the same source claimed that Sheridan was behind the preservation of Belisle’s job with State when Belisle’s role in the bugging of Otepka was revealed. Belisle was not fired, but was transferred to Bonn, Germany. Sheridan denied having any role in these events. But is Sheridan to be believed, in light of the lies he put forth during the Garrison investigation?

    Despite the support of the committee, Otepka was on the way out. He was met at work on September 22, 1963, with a note saying “You are hereby notified that it is proposed to remove you from your appointment with the Department of State ….”27 Otepka was outraged at the charges:

    “I was not particularly disturbed by the charges regarding my association with Jay Sourwine or the data I’d furnished him for the subcommittee,” Otepka later recalled. “But I was shocked and angered to find that the State Department had resorted to a cheap, gangland frame-up to place me under charges for crimes it knew I had never committed.”28

    One would think that finally, Otepka’s ordeal would be over. One would be wrong. He had been fired from his career position at State. Yet even after this, Otepka was warned that his home phone was probably tapped! And just a few days later, the man who had originally divulged who was behind the tapping of Otepka, Stanley Holden, suffered a mysterious “accident.” Holden was a good friend of Otepka’s, and had himself been under surveillance. His face and tongue had been so badly cut that stitches were required. His own explanation of being hit in the face by a heavy spring did not seem to explain his wounds, and the rumor went around that he had been beaten up by those who didn’t like him talking.

    In a last ditch effort to preserve Otepka at State, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee wrote a brief letter, signed by every subcommittee member, which strongly urged Rusk to reconsider the decision to force Otepka out of State. But Otepka’s fate had already been sealed. On November 5, 1963, Otepka was finally formally ousted from the State Department. Just seventeen days later, Kennedy would be assassinated. And the killing would be pinned on the man Otepka was trying to investigate when he was removed from his office.

    Notes

    1. Sarah McClendon, Mr. President, Mr. President! (Santa Monica: General Publishing Group, 1996) p. 82

    2. William J. Gill, The Ordeal of Otto Otepka (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969), p. 56

    3. Gill, p. 232

    4. Gerald Colby and Charlotte Dennett, Thy Will Be Done (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1995), p. 553

    5. Colby and Dennett, p. 343

    6. Colby and Dennett, pp. 542-543.

    7. Jim Hougan, Spooks (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1978) p. 371

    8. John Newman, Oswald and the CIA (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1995), p. 172

    9. Newman, p. 172

    10. Newman, p. 172

    11. Newman, p. 173

    12. Newman, p. 176

    13. Newman, p. 177

    14. Gill, p. 117

    15. Gill, p. 123

    16. Gill, pp. 161-162

    17. Gill, p. 235

    18. Gill, p. 238

    19. Gill, p. 243

    20. Hougan, p. 371

    21. Gill, p. 254

    22. Gill, p. 280

    23. Gill, p. 285

    24. Gill, p. 289

    25. Hougan, p. 128. Hougan wrote of a wiretap that was discovered that ran from Capitol Hill to the Esso building, terminating not in the basement, where most lines terminate, but on the top floor behind a locked door to which the phone company didn’t even have access. The floor was leased to the Justice Department’s Bureau of Prisons, and the room was marked as a “restricted area”. Goldberg had a source that claimed Walter Sheridan was the ultimate recipient of this tap. In addition, Bernard Fensterwald appears in this story. When he heard that Goldberg was on the trail of the tap, he walked into Goldberg’s office and offered to help. Fensterwald convinced Goldberg to sign a statement that wasn’t true under the guise that this would help him. The situation became a nightmare for Goldberg. Fensterwald also played a role in protecting the tap. The tap was brought to the attention of Senator Long’s Ad-Prac committee by Bernie Spindel, a famed wiretapper himself. Spindel claimed government agents were constantly working on the tap. Fensterwald then committed a “blunder”: he requested information on the cable from the telephone company. This had the effect of sending a warning to whoever was bugging the hill. Because such requests took several days to process, the buggers had plenty of time to remove the tap that was under investigation. Why would Fensterwald, a sophisticated lawyer who sat on a committee specifically involved with wiretapping issues, make such an obvious mistake?

    26. Hougan, p. 128

    27. Gill, p. 291

    28. Gill, p. 293

  • No Lieutenant Columbo in Mexico City


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  • The Paines’ Participation in the Minox Camera Charade


    From the November-December, 1996 issue (Vol. 4 No. 1) of Probe


    Almost every JFK assassination researcher is aware that the Dallas police found and inventoried a tiny hi-tech Minox camera amongst Oswald’s personal effects during the search of Ruth and Michael Paine’s home after the assassination.This camera was later omitted from an inventory list once the FBI took over the investigation. What is not generally known is the Paines’ role in the “appearance-disappearance”charade.

    There were 3 separate inventory lists itemizing the evidence from the Paine household. This is typical of the routine procedures used by law enforcement in establishing chain of custody of physical evidence. First, there was the Dallas police list identifying a “small German camera and black case on chain and film”. A pedometer and camera timer were also itemized; there was no mention of a light meter but there was mention of a “brown case (camera) with long chain”.1 Then there was the joint DPD and FBI list which was prepared in response to the FBI’s assertion of jurisdiction over the crime. The camera is described in aggregate Item #375 as a “Minox camera” together with a pedometer and a camera timer; there is no mention of a light meter. Rolls of undeveloped Minox film and two rolls of exposed Minox film were also inventoried as Item #377. An unidentified electronic device in a brown case was listed as an unsubmitted and unnumbered item as having come from the Beckley Street rooming house.2 When the evidence was taken to Washington, D.C., the FBI Lab prepared its very own inventory by way of a third list; any reference to the Minox camera would disappear from this third list.3

    There were four separate sets of photographs of the items removed from the Paine household and Beckley Street residence. First, there were the photos made by the Dallas Police Crime Lab before the evidence was turned over to the FBI which shows the evidence grouped together on the floor of the police station and which depicts the Minox camera.4 At the joint police and FBI inventory of November 26th, a second set of photographs were taken depicting each individual item or selectively grouped items with the numbered photos corresponding to the numbered items. The items ranged from #1 through #455 and required 5 rolls of film. It was understood that the FBI Lab would develop these 5 rolls of film and furnish a set to Police Chief Curry. This intact set of photos from the original 5 rolls have disappeared from the National Archives – assuming that the FBI even turned them over to the Warren Commission or the Archives in the first place.5

    The third set of photos consist of 2 rolls of microfilmed photos which the FBI Lab made after developing the photos jointly taken in Dallas; this microfilmed series was furnished to the Dallas Police which in turn furnished copies to other agencies, including the Secret Service.6 In a letter dated December 3, 1963, Police Chief Curry advises the FBI that items #164 through #360 were missing and apparently did not record; he requests the FBI to re-photograph the items.7 The fourth set of photos consist of the FBI’s “re-photographed” items which were sent to the Dallas police to supplement the missing photos.8

    Not only were there missing frames but some of those that existed had been altered. The Minox camera itemized in #375 of the joint inventory list ceased to exist in the set of microfilmed photos first returned to the Dallas Police by the FBI. Photo #375 which was supposed to be a group photo of the Minox – along with several other camera items – is now just a Minox light meter.9

    It is generally unknown in the research community that much, if not all, of the evidence seized from the Paine household and Beckley Street residence was “loaned” to the FBI on the weekend of the assassination even before the FBI took charge of the crime. The FBI assigned number #Q-5 to the Minox camera and/or Minox film at that time. The evidence was returned to the Dallas police after the FBI’s inspection. It was then turned over once again to the FBI on November 26th when the FBI assumed jurisdiction.10 We know that the Minox film recovered from the Paine household was in possession of the FBI as of November 25th because on that date the FBI requested a comparison of the Minox film as recovered from the possessions of Oswald with Minox film designated as Specimen Q5. The laboratory results were that Minox film Q5 was not taken with the same camera as the other Minox film.11 Was the FBI comparing the Minox film later designated as Item #377 with the cassette still remaining in the Minox camera recovered by the Dallas police?

    The FBI’s early efforts to conceal the existence of the Minox camera did not stay secret for long. According to author Gary Savage, a controversy ensued within the first two months following the assassination when news reporters received information that the FBI had altered the inventory list. Furthermore, the FBI had pressured Dallas police detective Gus Rose to change his recollection of what he had found from a Minox camera to a Minox light meter. Detective Rose steadfastly refused to alter his findings and insisted that he found the camera in Oswald’s seabag the weekend after the assassination.12

    The FBI was now squarely in the middle of an evidence tampering dilemma before the Warren Commission investigation was barely underway. One solution would be to produce the original camera, or any Minox camera for that matter, in order to resolve the discrepancy. This is precisely what the FBI did.

    We now know that the controversy over the Minox camera reached the highest levels of the FBI because on January 27, 1964, Mr. William A. Branigan, Chief of the FBI’s espionage section, telephoned SAC Gordon Shanklin in Dallas to point out the inconsistency in the inventory lists. Branigan also advised Shanklin that the FBI Lab in Washington did not have the Minox camera in its possession.13 On January 28, 1964 Shanklin responded by advising FBI Inspector Moore of the FBI Lab that no such Minox camera had been found – only a Minox light meter.14 This, of course was an outright lie on Shanklin’s part. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover apparently found this reply unacceptable because on January 30, 1964, Hoover sent a teletype to Shanklin advising once again that the FBI Lab had all Minox related items except for the Minox camera. Hoover then instructed SAC Shanklin to immediately investigate this matter and to contact the Dallas Police, Mrs. Oswald and Mrs. Paine, if necessary.15

    In an effort to “locate” the camera, Dallas FBI Agent Bardwell Odum on January 30, 1964, contacted Ruth Paine to inquire into whether the Paines owned a Minox camera.16 Ruth recollected that her husband had a Minox which he had dropped into salt water several years ago; she was sure that he had thrown it away but she would ask him about it and get back to him. She also stated that the police took a Minox camera case along with a light meter belonging to Michael which may or may not have been a Minox light meter.17 The next day on January 31, 1964, Ruth Paine called Odum to tell him that her husband still had the camera and that it was in a coffee can in the garage.18 If this was true, one would have to conclude that the local police not only did a poor job of searching the garage the weekend of the assassination but also fabricated the Minox camera on both its original inventory list and joint DPD/FBI list. Since this was not the case, the collusion of the Paines is readily apparent.

    The rest of this article can also be found in The Assassinations, edited by Jim DiEugenio and Lisa Pease.

    Notes

    1 The first DPD inventory list, undated, was obtained from the Dallas Police Archives. It is attached to an undated joint statement of the officers which in turn is followed by a supplementary report dated 11/23. The inventory list does not seem to distinguished between those items recovered on the 22nd, and those items recovered on the 23rd pursuant to a search warrant. With respect to felonies, police officers have the power to search and seize what is in plain view. Closed containers, such as Lee Oswald’s boxes, envelopes, suitcases, and seabags, etc. would require a search warrant. While the weekend reports are somewhat sloppy in this regard, the undisputable fact remains that the Minox camera was recovered at that time regardless of whether it was the 22nd or the 23rd. This author has entertained the possibility that the police officers’ search on the 22nd went beyond proper legal limits and this was “rectified” by obtaining a search warrant the next morning.

    2 See Commission Exhibit #2003 at Vol. 24, p. 340. The evidence was delivered to the Dallas FBI office on 11/26. On forms supplied by the Dallas police, a detailed inventory list was prepared by police property clerk H.W. Hill and witnessed by FBI Agent Warren De Brueys and police captain J. M. English. The Minox camera is identified on Receipt No. 11192-G as one of the items voluntarily given to the police by Ruth Paine and Marina Oswald on the 22nd suggesting that the first police search went beyond its permissible scope as is often the case in criminal proceedings. The listing of the electronic device in the brown case from the Beckley Street address (set forth in the joint list at Receipt No. 11199-G) further clouds the issue of what items came from where and when – at least insofar as the weekend police search is concerned. The police department version in the Dallas Police Archives differs from the FBI’s list of the 26th in only one respect: the Dallas list contains the signatures of the FBI agents receiving the property. The accompanying affidavit of Dallas officer H. H. Hill describes the process by which a joint inventory was made wherein FBI Agent De Brueys called out the items, one by one.

    3 See evidence list set out in CD 735. Item 375 has been altered to omit the Minox camera and turn it into a Minox light meter. For some reason this list contains the Dallas field office file number instead of the Headquarters file number suggesting that the FBI’s own property list was prepared in Dallas before departure to Washington, D.C. We do know from an FBI document that Agent DeBrueys delivered the evidence to the FBI Lab on November 27th. Another document suggests that a 4th list was prepared by the FBI Lab which superseded all prior lists.

    4 JFK First Day Evidence by Gary Savage, pp.208, 210.

    5 See 11/26/63 report of FBI Agent Ronald E. Brinkley describing how the photos were made with the DPD photo-record camera. 5 rolls of photos were taken using 35mm Kodak High Contrast Copy microfilm. FBI agent James P. Hosty states in his recent book, Assignment: Oswald, p.77 that the photos were taken with a Minox camera. This is a mistake or falsehood on his part as Minox cameras use only Minox film. The documents setting forth the joint photo session with the Kodak film were supplied by Researcher John Armstrong and were obtained from the Dallas Police files. At Mr. Armstrong’s request, the National Archives searched for these 5 rolls of photos and could not locate them.

    6 See FBI agent Robert Barrett’s report of statement from Assistant Chief of Police, Charles Batchelor, dated 7/6/64, and available from the microfilmed collection of Dallas Police Archives. See also FBI memo dated 11/29/63 from Branigan to Sullivan.

    7 Curry’s 12/3/63 letter from the Dallas Police Archives furnished by Mr. Armstrong.

    8 Author’s conversation with John Armstrong whose opinion is based in part upon an undated FBI document bearing Agent Wallace Heitman’s name, referencing dates of 1/23/64 and 2/4/64 and referring to 85 photographs of Oswald’s belongings.

    9 Indeed there are two separate photos of #375, one still in the possession of the Dallas Police Archives showing the surrounding items covered up by scraps of paper and the one in the National Archives showing a blow up of the Minox light meter all by itself; copies furnished to author by John Armstrong. The National Archives also has a copy of the same DPD group photos that Gary Savage depicts in his book. However, these photos were enlarged, then cropped to omit the Minox camera featured in the top 1/3 of the original photograph. A copy of the NARA cropped photo was furnished to the author by Anna Marie Kuhns-Walko.

    10 See deposition of FBI Lab expert, James C. Cadigan, NARA: HSCA Record No. 124-10086-10013.

    11 The author’s copy of this document was furnished to her by John Armstrong without the benefit of a RIF cover sheet from the NARA. It appears to be part of report prepared by Dallas FBI agent, Robert Gemberling. Note that the Minox film analysis was filed away in a New York City FBI field office file #65-22483 of the Espionage-Russia division. According to John Armstrong, a FOIA request failed to turn up this file.

    12 See Savage pp. 212-215,and transcript of Gus Rose’s statement to the HSCA made on 4/13/78.

    13 FBI #105-82555-1643, memo dated 1/28/64.

    14 Ibid.

    15 FBI #105-82555-1580, teletype dated 1/30/64, RIF citation omitted. This teletype also clarifies the fact that there were two Minox cassettes, one of which contained film.

    16 Dallas FBI field office file, #100-10461, Odum report of 1/30/64 interview with Ruth dictated on 1/31/64 and typed on 2/3/64

    17 Ibid.

    18 FBI #105-82555/#100-10461, report of 1/31/64 interview with Ruth Paine, dictated on 1/31/64 and typed on 2/1/64

    19 FBI #105-82555/#100-10461, report of 1/31/64 interview with Michael Paine, dictated on 1/31/64 and typed on 2/3/64

    20 Ibid.

    21 Ibid.

    22 Ibid.

    23 Ibid.

    24 FBI #105-82555/#100-10461, Bulky Exhibit Inventory Receipts, two versions, dated 1/31/64 and 2/8/64

    25 2/2/64 cover letter with Airmail from Dallas to FBI Lab

    26 FBI #105-82555/#100-10461, report of 1/31/64 interview with Michael, dictated on 1/31/64 and typed on 2/3/64

    27 See Warren Commission Exhibit #2003 at Vol. 24, p. 333.

    28 FBI #105-82555/#100-10461, teletype dated 1/31/64

    29 Assignment: Oswald, p.86, by James P. Hosty

    30 See Warren Commission Vol. 9, p.444

    31 See Warren Commission Vol. 10, p.313 and p.325. It is not clear if Shasteen’s relationship with Odum originated with the FBI investigation into the assassination or if it was pre-existing.

    32 See HSCA, Vol. 12, p. 373

    33 See HSCA, Vol. 12, p. 390

    34 See p. 211 of Gary Savage’s book, JFK: First Day Evidence and Dallas Morning News reports by Earl Golz dated 6/15/78 and 8/7/78.


    Original Probe article

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