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  • The Threats to Kill Oswald – Part 1

    The Threats to Kill Oswald – Part 1

    The Threats to Kill Oswald – Part 1

    By Paul Abbott

    The incarceration of Lee Harvey Oswald, the alleged killer of President John F. Kennedy and Police Officer J.D. Tippit, and his mistreatment at the hands of the Dallas Police across the weekend of November 22nd has been well established. But the matter of the alleged threats made against his life over the course of the night before his murder at the hands of Jack Ruby has largely been glossed over in the broader scheme of things. But just how they unfolded and were responded to has largely withstood any in-depth scrutiny ever since.

    The Curry Storm

    At approximately 11.30 am on Saturday, November 23rd, Jesse Curry, the Dallas Police Chief, was in his office on the southwest corner of the Third Floor of Dallas City Hall. Seated opposite him were a group of reporters, including the Associated Press’ Peggy Simpson and NBC’s Tom Pettit. It was one of the many occasions that weekend where he would hold court with the members of the press – to the point where he would be directed to stop doing so by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and President Lyndon Johnson across that weekend. Curry’s regard and synergy with the press were legendary and certainly a theme throughout his tenure as chief. In fact, in early 1958, he issued a memorandum to all Dallas police personnel essentially instructing them to provide the media with as much access and assistance as possible. Basically, he regarded them as a PR arm for the department and at that time, with the reputation that Dallas had for crime and corruption, it was clearly a mitigation strategy on his part.

    During Curry’s mini press conference with Simpson, Pettit and others, an interesting exchange took place:

    Curry: (to persons unknown) … They say he.. he said he was a communist…

    Pettit: Hey Chief, did the FBI or your department have him (Oswald) under surveillance prior to yesterday?

    Curry: No, sir, we didn’t have knowledge that he was in the city.

    Pettit: Did the FBI?

    Curry: I understand that they did know he was here and that they interviewed him … oh … a week or two ago.

    Pettit: Did they warn you of his presence in the city?

    Curry: No, they had not.. at the time .. until yesterday.

    Pettit: Do you think they should have?

    Curry: Well, they usually do. They keep us informed. If we don’t have knowledge of it, they usually liaise with us… usually let us know when these communist sympathizers or subversives come into the city. And why they hadn’t got round to informing us of this man, I don’t know.

    This frank exchange would be widely reported and circulated, sparking the wrath of the FBI hierarchy up to and including Director Hoover. The implication of course being that Chief Curry was deflecting all blame on the FBI for failing to detect and stop the communist Oswald and prevent the November 22nd killings. In fact, what Curry was saying to Pettit was completely reasonable. And evidently correct, as the FBI was monitoring Oswald at the time, and they did not alert the DPD to him prior to President Kennedy’s arrival. What followed was an effort by the FBI to mitigate any fallout from Curry’s statement by having Special Agent in Charge in Dallas, Gordon Shanklin, contact Curry and have him retract what he said to Tom Pettit. A summary memo from the FBI’s Cartha De Loach shows that Shanklin was successful in doing this and that Curry even apologized and said that he did not ‘mean to place any blame on the FBI’. The damage control continued with the FBI using their proven media contact on the ground, the Washington Star’s Jerry O’Leary, who was in Dallas to cover events that weekend, to also get in touch with Chief Curry and ‘make him go on record regarding the falsity of his allegations’.

    All of this resulted in Curry speaking to another group of reporters (including Tom Pettit) out in the hall on the Third Floor of City Hall just after 1 pm that same day. He led with the following statement:

    There has been some information that has gone out. I want to correct anything that might have been misinterpreted or misunderstood. And that is regarding information that the FBI might have had about this man (Oswald). I do not know… if and when the FBI has interviewed this man. The FBI is under no obligation to come to us with any information concerning anyone. They have cooperated with us in the past one hundred percent. Any time there’s any information that they feel that might be helpful to us, they have always come to us. Uh.. last night someone told me.. I don’t even know who it was, that the FBI did know this man was in the city and had interviewed him. I wish to say this. Of my knowledge, I do not know this to be a fact and I don’t want anybody to get the wrong impression that I am accusing the FBI of not cooperating or withholding information because they are under no obligation to us but have always cooperated with us one hundred percent. And I do not know if and when they have ever interviewed this man.

    While this episode started and ended within a couple of hours, I think it has been totally overlooked and underestimated in the scheme of things. Think about it…with all of the world focusing on him, his police department and their handling of the man suspected of killing President Kennedy, the Dallas Chief of Police publicly acknowledged that his department was usually alerted by the FBI about people like Lee Oswald (‘communist sympathizer / subversive’) but they were not in Oswald’s instance. It remains a shocking admission.

    No wonder the FBI was quick to act in response to Curry’s initial statement. The implications were doubly negative for them. If they did not know about a ‘communist sympathizer or subversive’ in Oswald, it was a massive oversight on their part that would rightly bring their competence into question. On the other hand, if they did know about Oswald, why did they not alert the DPD to his presence in Dallas? The implication would transcend just incompetence. Thankfully for us, the subsequent years have proven that the FBI was well and truly aware of Oswald, and was monitoring him, so this question, I think, lies at the center of a lot of the intrigue around Lee Oswald, his framing for the November 22nd killings and his own murder.

    What is clear in the Curry matter is that the FBI instantly threw all of its efforts into mitigating any blame it would receive for Oswald and the events of November 22nd, as well as asserting itself as being in control. This is a crucial point to keep in mind for the rest of this article.

    Come the latter hours of that Saturday, the media that had engulfed Dallas City Hall to cover Oswald’s incarceration were starting to dissipate. This was because it had been purported that Oswald had been charged with Kennedy’s murder, so their assumption was that there would be fewer and fewer opportunities to see and ask him any questions. The broader implication being that he would soon be moved to maximum security at the County Jail.

    The matter of transferring Lee Oswald from the City Hall to the County Jail was something that was still only notionally being discussed across the DPD hierarchy that afternoon. In ordinary circumstances, the transfer of a prisoner from City Hall, or any police station, to the County Jail, where they would await sentencing, was the responsibility of the local sheriff. The principle being that the sheriff would present at the police premises the necessary paperwork to take custody of the prisoner from that moment on. Only in extraordinary circumstances, which the weekend of November 22nd clearly presented, would this protocol ever be deviated from. However, in a subsequent statement that he gave, Dallas Sheriff Bill Decker testified to not being notified by the DPD of any plans or intent they had for them (the DPD) or the Sheriff’s Department to facilitate Oswald’s transfer to the County Jail. In fact, he only found out his information on this front through members of the media.

    And examining the statements of Chief Curry and his captain for the Homicide and Robbery Bureau, J.W. Fritz, who had Oswald in custody, shows that the transfer had not been discussed between them at any great length.

    From Curry’s perspective, he was being asked the question by the media about the transfer, so he in turn asked Fritz if he thought he’d be done with his questioning of Oswald that (Saturday) afternoon, so he could be transferred. Fritz said that he still needed more time, which was his right, as it was much easier to interrogate a suspect at City Hall than at the County Jail. Between the two, it was generally agreed that Oswald would stay another night at City Hall for further questioning and be transferred the next morning. On this, Curry duly told the press that Oswald would be transferred the next day at 10 am:

    Over the years, this point has been muddled as Curry telling reporters that if they were at City Hall by 10 am on the Sunday, they won’t have missed the transfer. But using articles) published that weekend, it was clearly reported that Curry stated the transfer would begin at 10 am. (Abbott, Death to Justice, p.363

    As Saturday evening turned into night, Dallas City Hall quietened down to a near state of normalcy, with there only being a handful of reporters staying around in case Oswald was instead transferred that night. We are now able to examine the alleged threats to Lee Oswald’s life in the early hours of Sunday, November 24th, on behalf of a ‘committee’.

    Below is a list of the people who had firsthand, evidential dealings with receiving and acting upon the threats:

    • Police Chief Jesse Curry – DPD
    • Sheriff Bill Decker – Sheriff’s Dept.
    • Captain William B. Frazier – DPD
    • Captain J.W. Fritz – DPD
    • Vernon R. Glossup (civilian clerk) – FBI
    • Deputy C.C. McCoy – Sheriff’s Dept.
    • Special Agent Milton L. Newsom – FBI
    • Captain Cecil E. Talbert – DPD

    Using statements and quoting specific points that each of these people provided to either the FBI or the Warren Commission, we can piece together a chronology when it comes to the receiving and handling of these threats.

    Threat Timeline:

    • At the County Jail, Deputy Sheriff C.C. McCoy was working the night shift which consisted of taking phone calls from all manner of citizens, near and far, who were calling to do anything from express their condolences to warning of a group of ‘fourteen thousand negroes’ who were coming to town to get ‘this bunch’ straightened out. Also on duty were fellow personnel by the names Kennedy, Watkins and ‘Virgil’.
    • At approximately 2:00 am, McCoy even received a call from Sheriff Bill Decker. During this call, he and Decker discussed when Oswald’s transfer would take place and that it should be while it was still dark. They even speculated when it became light (6:30 am or 6:45 am) and agreed that McCoy would call Decker back at 6 am to see about getting Oswald transferred before first light.
    • At 2:15 am, McCoy received another call. This time it was from a man who, according to a statement he later provided, ‘talked like a w/m (white male) and he stated that he was a member of a group of one hundred and that he wanted the Sheriff’s office to know that they had voted one hundred per cent to kill Oswald while he was in the process of being transferred to the County Jail. And that he wanted this department to have the information so that none of the deputies would get hurt.’ McCoy said ‘The voice was deep and coarse and sounded very sincere and talked with ease. The person did not seem excited like some of the calls that had received running down this department, the police department and the State of Texas.’ McCoy said that he had his colleague, ‘Virgil’, listen to part of the call.
    • At 2:30 am, civilian clerk for the Dallas FBI office, Vernon R. Glossup, received a call from an unknown male who also spoke in a calm voice and asked to talk to the man in charge. According to his own statement, Glossup said he ‘told the caller that the SAC (Special Agent in Charge) was not present at that time and asked if someone else could help him. The caller then said, “Wait a minute,” and apparently turned the phone over to another man. I am not certain there were two different voices; however, the tone of the unknown caller’s voice changed somewhat at this point. The voice at this point was calm and mature in sound, and this person stated as follows: “I represent a committee that is neither right nor left wing, and tonight, tomorrow morning, or tomorrow night, we are going to kill the man that killed the president. There will be no excitement, and we will kill him. We wanted to be sure and tell the FBI, Police Department, and Sheriff’s Office, and we will be there and will kill him.” With that, the caller hung up. Glossup transcribed the call in a memorandum for Special Agent Milton L. Newsom, who contacted the Sheriff’s Department at 3:00 am to see if they too had received any such calls. Newsom then called the Police Department at 3:30 am to ask the same and advise of the threat that Glossup had received.
    • Sheriff Deputy McCoy concurred that he received a call from Newsom and that he merely asked if ‘we’ (the Sheriff’s Department) had received any calls threatening Oswald’s life. McCoy said that he had, so Newsom instructed him to contact Dallas Police ‘and give the same information to them.’ According to his statement, McCoy did call the Dallas Police Department but could only recall that he ‘talked to someone in Captain Fritz’s office.’ McCoy stated that he was told by a member of the DPD that they (Dallas Police) hadn’t received any threatening phone calls.
    • Still with McCoy and his statement, he ‘received one other call regarding the transfer of Oswald, and when I answered the telephone, a male voice asked if this is the Sheriff’s office, and I said that it was. He said, “Just a minute,” and then another male voice stated that Oswald would never make the trip to the County Jail. McCoy said he could not determine whether or not this was the same voice that called earlier on behalf of a ‘committee’.
    • At City Hall, Captain William B. Frazier was the ranking officer on duty there that night. He testified to the Warren Commission of being contacted by FBI Agent Milton Newsom between 3:00 am and 3:45 am. He quoted Newsom as telling him that he (Newsom) ‘received a threat from some man to the effect that a group of men of 100 or 200’, Frazier said he couldn’t recall exactly, ‘were going to attempt to kill Oswald that day sometime. That he (the caller) didn’t want the FBI, Dallas Police Department or the sheriff’s office injured in any way. That was the reason for the call.’
    • To somewhat corroborate McCoy’s account, in the same testimony for the Warren Commission, Frazier said he spoke to someone with the surname of, or similar to, ‘Cox’ or Coy’ from the Sheriff’s Department. Frazier testified that he wasn’t clear on the time of the call, but he and McCoy discussed Oswald’s transfer and that McCoy told him that Sheriff Decker recommended that it be brought forward. And if so, there could be two supervisors from the Sheriff Department on hand at the County Jail to receive Oswald.
    • Frazier said that he next called Captain Fritz at his home to tell him of the threats against Oswald and that he would need to be transferred. Fritz told him it was Chief Curry’s decision to make, as he wanted Oswald transferred in the morning. However, when Frazier tried to also reach Curry by phone at home, the line was out of order.
    • At around 6:00 am, McCoy called Bill Decker as agreed and told him who was on duty and how they could carry out Oswald’s transfer if required – including hiding Oswald down in the footwell of the car. He was told by Decker to hold off on any plans until he spoke with Captain Fritz.
    • At 6:15 am, Frazier was at the end of his shift and about to be relieved by Captain Cecil E. Talbert. In the handover, Frazier said that he advised Talbert of the threat situation with Oswald and that both Sheriff Decker and Agent Newsom were anxious to transfer him.
    • According to Talbert’s statement for the Warren Commission, he must have been advised of the issue to reach Curry, as he said that he got the telephone company to put a buzzer on his phone line to determine if the line was faulty. It was, so he sent a squad car to Curry’s house to brief him on the situation and have him call City Hall… if he could.
    • Despite the issues with his phone, Curry soon called Talbert back at City Hall and was briefed on the threats. All Curry did was instruct Talbert to tell Newsom and Decker that he would contact them when he was in his office between 8:00 am and 9:00 am later that morning.

    With all of the above told, no more was done to address the threats to Lee Oswald.

    As the morning rolled on, the transfer at least had some planning put toward it. Once Curry and Decker decided between them that the DPD would facilitate the transfer, it was decided that Oswald would be taken in an armored truck for the twelve-block journey to the County Jail. Acting on orders from Curry, Deputy Chief Batchelor contacted a local armored car company, and they sent two people carrying armored trucks to City Hall’s Commerce Street ramp exit.

    At the last minute, at approximately 11:15 am, Fritz recommended that Oswald instead be placed in the back of an unmarked squad car and that it follow behind the armored car, which in turn would be empty and a decoy. His justification for this was that if there was an attack launched on Oswald during the transfer, a vehicle such as an armored car would be too awkward to maneuver and evade. With that, the transfer finally got underway with a group of detectives and Fritz leaving the Third Floor with Oswald – and the rest is tragic history. Jack Ruby was able to access the basement and be in a position to shoot, and ultimately kill, Oswald when he and his escort emerged into the basement and were walking to the car.

    While there are clear gaps in some of the timings and accounts around the threats response (for example, McCoy’s statement does not include any mention of speaking to Decker after he had both received and received word of the threat calls), it is clear that there was some effort by he and the DPD’s Frazier to bring about Oswald’s transfer early to pre-empt any threat against his life. The roadblocks were Captain Fritz and Chief Curry.

    When first told of the threats by Frazier, Fritz basically put his hands up and said, ‘Not me, not my call.’ What any competent leader within a hierarchy ought to have done, in this instance, was say, ‘It is the Chief’s call… so try and reach him to find out. If you can’t reach him, call me back because we’d best still get the transfer underway.’

    However, if Jesse Curry’s phone line was not a factor and he was reached by Frazier, it would not have made a difference. We can be sure of this because he scuttled any chance to respond accordingly when he instructed that Newsom and Decker be told that he would arrive at City Hall in a couple of hours’ time. That was it. That was how he responded to the word of the threats. There was no action to effect an earlier transfer there and then. If he did decide to do something about it, Curry wouldn’t have had to do much other than give the approval. Between his personnel, and perhaps a quick phone call by him to Sheriff Decker, Oswald’s early and safe transfer would have been incredibly easy to carry out.

    The burning question is why Curry didn’t want to have Oswald transferred at that point in time? At 10:20 am later that morning, when speaking to reporters, Curry not only mentioned the threat made to Oswald overnight, he also said that he could’ve been transferred early as a result but he (Curry) chose not to because he didn’t want to go back on the original time he told the press (Abbott, Death to Justice, p.112). Apparently, it was as simple as that. On top of it all, Curry actually laid out to the reporters that Oswald would be transported to the County Jail in an armored car. Talk about infuriating!

    Having uncovered just how the verifiable threat episode involving the FBI, Sheriff and DPD took place, in Part Two, we will analyze this episode in the context of the furor that Chief Curry started with his candidness on the morning of Saturday when speaking with the press and how the FBI ultimately took the early lead in investigating President Kennedy’s assassination.

    Click here to read part 2.

  • Jeff Meek’s Interview of Joan Mellen

    Jeff Meek’s Interview of Joan Mellen

    The Other Official JFK Assassination Investigation

    by Jeff Meek

    (Originally published as The JFK Files – #40 – December 2023)

    In this column I’ve written about the Warren Commission and their 1964 conclusion that there was no conspiracy in the death of President Kennedy and also about the House Select Committee on Assassination’s 1979 conclusion that there was a conspiracy to kill the president. Here in this edition of “The JFK Files” I’m writing about the only other official investigation into Nov. 22, 1963, that being New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison’s probe into the murder.

    It began just as a rumor that Garrison was making inquiries about the murder, but the cat was out of the bag on March 1, 1967, when Garrison announced that he had arrested New Orleans businessman Clay Shaw for conspiring to kill Kennedy. It was a bold move and attracted a lot of attention, including from the CIA. Two years later the 3-week trial began, and the case went to the jury on Feb. 28, 1969. Hours later on March 1, Shaw was acquitted.

    In 1991, Oliver Stone’s blockbuster movie “JFK” captured the attention of millions. I remember after watching it I was disappointed that Stone had focused on such a discredited investigation, but I was happy that the movie brought attention to the case which in short order resulted in the 1992 JFK Records Collection Act and in 1994 the Assassination Records Review Board that successfully forced agencies and departments to release millions of pages of documents.

    For this column I sought out Joan Mellen, a recognized expert on the Garrison – Shaw case. What she shared with me about certain aspects and people involved in the case were a real eye opener. Mellen is a former professor of English at Temple University and author of 2 dozen books. In the JFK research community, she is seen as one of a very few who have dug deep into the Garrison – Shaw case.

    She first met Garrison shortly after the trial. Her husband had previously sent him clippings from Italian newspapers about an entity called Permindex which was based in Switzerland, founded by the CIA, and had Clay Shaw on its board of directors. None of this information could be used at the trial because it was considered hearsay. In gratitude, Garrison invited Mellen and her husband to come to New Orleans, which they did and sat down together for dinner one evening.

    I asked Mellen what she saw as the biggest surprise of the Garrison – Shaw trial. “The fact that Shaw lied many times. And Garrison was right about everything. He saw Oswald’s movements as those of a CIA operative. Everyone that Oswald saw was CIA.”

    It is now well documented that Shaw was a CIA “active contact” for the CIA’s Domestic Contact Service. Shaw’s CIA contact in New Orleans was case officer Hunter Leake, who reported to Bill Weiss. Another CIA document shows that the CIA was worried about being connected to Shaw. From a CIA document: “We are somewhat more concerned about how we should respond to any direct questions concerning the Agency’s relationship with Clay Shaw.” Still another document refers to Shaw as being highly paid by the CIA. Thus, when Garrison began digging into all this the CIA began sabotaging the case. Mellen believes that Shaw was an Oswald caretaker in New Orleans.

    One example of how Garrison’s case against Shaw was sabotaged relates to a man by the name of Thomas Bethell who came to New Orleans to volunteer in Garrison’s office. Bethell was Oxford University educated and was brought on to Garrison’s staff. But Bethell turned out to be anything but helpful because he turned over a list of trial witnesses, which was not required, to Shaw’s lawyer Salvatore Panzeca. Garrison filed charges against Bethell, but nothing came of it and there was no punishment.

    Mellen also mentioned James Kirkwood who wrote a book, “American Grotesque.” Mellen said Kirkwood was a CIA plant. His job was to write favorably about Shaw. “The book was the idea of CIA,” Mellen told me. Later, Kirkwood’s editor said that had he known of the Kirkwood – Shaw relationship, he would never have signed on to do the book.

    There were many other plants as well. House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Deputy Legal Counsel Robert Tannenbaum was shown a document that listed CIA plants inside Garrison’s office. Nine names were on that list. Ask yourself this question. If there was no Shaw – CIA connection, why plant people in Garrison’s office? Answering that Mellen said, “because Shaw was their guy.” Tannenbaum also found a memo from CIA Deputy Director Richard Helms that revealed how the CIA followed, harassed, and attempted to intimidate Garrison’s witnesses.

    Space doesn’t allow me to give more examples of CIA infiltration into the matter, but I want to share one very interesting aspect of the case that was unknown to the Warren Commission and well researched by Mellen. I’m talking about an Oswald sighting in Clinton, Louisiana in the summer of 1963. In the late 1970’s the HSCA investigated this lead and found 6 witnesses “credible, significant and truthful.” Clinton is about 130 miles from New Orleans, is the county seat for East Feliciana Parish and was being targeted by the Congress of Racial Equality for a voting rights campaign.

    Oswald first showed up in nearby Jackson, Louisiana, seeking employment at East Louisiana State Mental Hospital. Oswald was told a job there would require him to be a register voter, so he went to Clinton for that purpose. The Clinton witnesses gave physical descriptions that matched Oswald, along with other observations, like Oswald showing his Marine Corps discharge papers as a form of identification. Some witnesses added that Oswald was with 2 older men who were identified as Shaw and David Ferrie.

    The front page of the New Orleans Times-Picayune, Feb. 7, 1969, (see caption) shows that a trial witness, Corri C. Collins, testified that he saw a black Cadillac pull up with 3 men in it. He identified Oswald as the man who stepped from the rear seat, pointed to Shaw as the driver and identified Ferrie as the man sitting next to Shaw in the car.

    Mellen learned that the HSCA refused to authorize investigation of Oswald’s appearance at the hospital. HSCA Investigator Robert Buras was permitted to talk only to Clinton witnesses already identified. Buras was also barred from going to Clinton or Jackson. Mellen points out that this is disturbing seeing as others had more information to share. From Mellen: “An example is Ronald Johnston, the Baton Rouge private investigator who telephoned the committee saying he knew 2 witnesses who had seen Oswald and Shaw together at the Clinton courthouse, as well as at the hospital.”

    Mellen got to know Dr. Frank Silva, the medical director at the hospital. Silva told Mellen that Oswald was ranting about being a Marine and killing Castro.

    So why was Oswald asking about jobs at the mental hospital, I asked Mellen. “He wasn’t interested. He was under orders. He went there with 2 CIA guys (Shaw and Ferrie). Oswald asked what jobs were there.” She explained that Garrison thought that if Oswald was working at this mental asylum and later shows up in Dallas, after the killing, Oswald would be looked at as being crazy.

    Getting back to Ferrie, he was a suspect within days of the assassination, but nothing came of it. I have in my possession the audio recording of a November 1963 Secret Service interrogation of Oswald’s wife Marina and near the end of the recording an agent asked Marina if she knew the name Ferrie. She said she did not. The point is that in 1963, investigators were aware of a possible involvement by Ferrie and a link to Oswald. In 1993 a photo tuned up that showed Ferrie and Oswald together at a Civil Air Patrol function, thus there’s photographic proof the 2 men knew each other.

    Ferrie, well known in some circles as a pilot, used a New Orleans attorney named G. Wray Gill in 1963 in litigation concerning his (Ferrie) dismissal by Eastern Airlines. Another client of Gill’s was Carlos Marcello, head of organized crime in Louisiana. Ferrie is alleged to be a pilot used in anti-Castro operations and was associated with former FBI agent Guy Banister, who is also linked to Oswald.

    In the summer of 1963 Oswald was seen and filmed handing out pro-Castro leaflets. On those leaflets was stamped the address of 544 Camp Street, which was the location of Banister’s office. Several witnesses stated they saw Oswald at that Camp Street address. Ferrie was a crucial witness in the Garrison case, but just as he was about to be brought in for questioning, he was found dead in his apartment on Feb. 22, 1967. Apparent cause of death – a brain hemorrhage.

    In summary the point is that Garrison was on to something, found Oswald – Shaw – CIA links and had the CIA very worried about where his investigation might lead. But in many respects his case was sabotaged and, in the end, made to look foolish. Within just a few hours, Shaw was acquitted of all charges.

    One has to wonder how history would have changed had D.A. Jim Garrison been allowed to investigate without interference. It would be another 10 years before the case came to light again when, in 1976 the HSCA began their 2-year JFK assassination probe which also suffered from CIA lies and interference, just like in the Garrison case.

    This article barely scratches the surface of Mellen’s research. For more, pick up a copy of her 2013 edition of “A Farewell to Justice.” You can find it on eBay and Amazon.

  • Luna Committee Discovery makes MSM

    Luna Committee Discovery makes MSM

    The latest discovery of the Luna Committee made at the request of Jefferson Morley has made the MSM. Take a look.

  • The JFK Files Volume II: Pieces of the Assassination Puzzle

    The JFK Files Volume II: Pieces of the Assassination Puzzle

    The JFK Files Volume II: Pieces of the Assassination Puzzle

    By Jeffrey Meek

    Jeffrey Meek is the only writer I know who is allowed to pen a regular column on the JFK case. He writes for the Hot Springs Village Voice newspaper. He has now published his second collection of articles from that paper and added two long essays he wrote for the new version of George magazine. I have previously reviewed his first collection on this site. (Click here for that critique https://www.kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/the-jfk-files-pieces-of-the-assassination-puzzle)

    The main title of this anthology is The JFK Files, Part 2. This second collection leads off with an interview of the late Jim Gochenaur. People who have watched Oliver Stone’s JFK Revisited will know who Jim was. Jim was interviewed by the Church Committee. As the witness says here, and he said to Stone off-camera, that interview transcript went missing. When he arrived in Washington, he was first interviewed by staffers Paul Wallach and Dan Dwyer, and then by Senator Richard Schweiker himself. Schweiker, of course, made up half of the subcommittee running the inquiry into the JFK case for Senator Frank Church. The other half is Senator Gary Hart.

    What makes that loss even odder is that the man he was interviewed about, Secret Service agent Elmer Moore, was also brought in for an interview. The transcript of that interview is available. Jim met Moore back in early 1970 in Seattle when he was doing an academic assignment concerning the JFK case. The following year, he went to visit Moore in his office. Moore agreed to talk to him about his Secret Service inquiry into the JFK case, which began about 72 hours after Kennedy was killed. But he would only speak to him on condition that he took no notes or made no tapes, and he understood that if anything he said appeared in public, Moore would deny it. (p. 5)

    Since most of this site’s readers have seen Stone’s documentary, I will not repeat the things that Jim said on camera for this review. There are some things that Stone and I did not cover in that interview (we did that one jointly). For example, Jim told Jeff that Moore considered George DeMohrenschildt—nicknamed The Baron–a key player in the case. But unfortunately for Moore, he could not get access to him once President Johnson put the FBI in charge of the investigation. Moore also told Jim that he could not understand why Captain Will Fritz did not make a record of his questioning of Oswald, since he knew that there were two stenographers on hand for the Dallas Police. (p. 6). Moore also had a print copy of one of the infamous backyard photographs of Oswald with a rifle and handgun. Jim noted that one could easily see a line through Oswald’s chin. I don’t have to inform the reader why that is of central importance.

    Jim was also interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). Strangely, that was only a phone interview. Even though the HSCA lasted much longer than the Church Committee and was a direct investigation of the JFK case, the Church Committee was chartered with only inquiring about the performance of the FBI and CIA for the Warren Commission. But further, Jim said they were more interested in another acquaintance he made in Seattle, namely, former FBI agent Carver Gayton. Gayton had told him that he knew James Hosty–whom he met after the assassination. The former Dallas agent told Carver that Oswald was an FBI informant. (p. 11) This action by the HSCA is odd since Jim always insisted that Moore was a more important witness than Gayton was. This two-part interview with Jim Gochenaur is one of the volume’s three or four high points. Made all the more important and poignant since Jim has passed.

    II

    Another interesting interview that Jeff did was with a man named Lee Sanders. Sanders was on the Dallas Police force at the time they were participating in a reconstruction of the assassination. This was for the acoustics testing that the HSCA did towards the end of their term. Sanders was involved with crowd and traffic control during a five-day assignment. Live ammunition was being used in these tests. (p. 49)

    Sanders said that the DPD’s best marksman, a man named Jerry Compton, took part in the tests. He and an FBI sharpshooter took their shots from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. Between test firings, Compton would come down out of the building. Sanders overheard Compton say that they were having problems repeating what the Warren Commission said Lee Oswald had done. As Meek writes, “The scuttlebutt from other officers was that there must have been other shooters.” (p. 49). Sanders then added, “We just didn’t think that one guy could have done this. We didn’t say that in public because it wouldn’t have been good for your career, not if you wanted to stay in good stature with the department.”

    Meek interviewed former Commission counsel Burt Griffin about his 2023 book, JFK, Oswald and Ruby: Politics, Prejudice and Truth. As an interviewing journalist, Meek is rather merciful with Griffin. His technique was to let him burn himself. Griffin tells Jeff that Jack Ruby shot Oswald out of anti-Semitism. He wanted to be seen as an avenger due to the infamous black bordered ‘Wanted for Treason’ ad in the papers. That was signed by a Bernard Weissman. This is Griffin’s money quote about Jack Ruby: “He was convinced at the time, and for the rest of his life, that antisemites were involved, with the goal being to blame the Jews for the president’s assassination.” (p. 56) Griffin properly labels this as his conclusion. He then adds that Jews were being blamed for the attack on General Walker in April of 1963. He then states, “So, antisemitism was an important factor in Dallas at the time.”

    Griffin then continues in this nonsensical vein by saying that there is no evidence that anyone else was involved in the JFK assassination except Oswald. He then adds the antique adage that the Commissioners always use: that the Commission’s goal was to locate a conspiracy. And if he could have done so he would have had an acclaimed political career. Meek does not say if he giggled during these comments. I assume he did not. His goal was to keep Griffin spouting these absurdities, which Griffin did by using Howard Brennan as a reliable eyewitness to the assassination.

    Something puzzling comes up next. It appears to be Griffin who surfaces the fact that the Commission has Jack Ruby entering the basement through the Main Street ramp. The book says that Sgt. Patrick Dean was the head of security, and Dean said no, Ruby did not come down that ramp. ( Meek, p. 57) But if one reads the Warren Commission volumes, one will see that it was Dean who was the first person to say that Ruby proclaimed he did come down the Main Street ramp. And this was right after the shooting. This information is also contained in Paul Abbott’s recent book about the shooting of Oswald by Ruby. (Death to Justice, pp. 226-27) In fact, Abbott implies that Dean might have manufactured this quote by Ruby since, initially at least, no one else heard it. It did not catch on as a cover story for the DPD until November 30th. (ibid) In fact, according to one disputed journalistic account, Dean even said he saw Ruby come down the ramp, which was not possible. (Abbott, p. 229).

    But here it states that Dean said that Ruby did not come down that ramp. It was then this dispute that caused a blow-up between Griffin and Dean. (Meek, p. 57). But yet in Seth Kantor’s book on Ruby he has excerpts from some of Griffin’s contemporaneous memos. This is what one of them says:

    If Dean is not telling the truth concerning the Ruby statement about coming down the Main Street ramp, it is important to determine why Dean decided to tell a falsehood about the Main Street ramp. (p. 288)

    In that memo, Griffin wrote that he thought Ruby came in some other way. And that Dean, who was responsible for security that day, “is trying to conceal his dereliction of duty.” In fact, Griffin even theorized that Dean “simply stated to Ruby he came down the Main Street ramp.” Evidently, through the intervening decades, something got lost in translation or dissipated down the memory hole.

    III

    One of the most fascinating tales in the book was not directly told to Meek. He relates it from an MSNBC show in 2013, an interview with HSCA staffer Christine Neidermeier. She said there was a lot of pressure for the committee to downplay any talk about conspiracy. It also became clear that it was going to be difficult getting straight answers from the CIA, and to a lesser extent, the FBI. (p. 69)

    She then related that she got a call from a man she thought was an FBI agent. Because he seemed to know everything she had told another agent. One of the things she said was that she leaned toward the conspiracy verdict since the HSCA could not duplicate what Oswald did in their rifle tests. The caller then revealed that he knew all about her classes at Georgetown, and also some of her friends. He then said that, with such a bright future ahead of her, maybe she should rethink her position. Niedermeier said this call rocked her back on her heels.

    Three other highlights of the book are interviews by Meek with Morris Wolff, Dan Hardway and Marie Fonzi.

    Wolff was a Yale Law School graduate who was employed by Attorney General Bobby Kennedy in his Office of Legal Counsel, where he worked on civil rights, and also contributed to the famous Peace Speech at American University. (Meek, pp 74-75) According to Morris, he was also a bicycle messenger between the AG and the president when Bobby wanted to get around J. Edgar Hoover. After JFK was killed, Bobby suggested that he go over to the staff of moderate Senate Republican John Sherman Cooper. According to Morris, when Cooper served on the Warren Commission, he was strongly opposed to the Single Bullet Theory. (p. 71)

    The interview with Dan Hardway was for a three-part review of the investigations of the JFK case by the federal government. HSCA staffer Dan tells Jeff that, at first, he and his partner Ed Lopez were stationed at CIA headquarters and allowed to have almost unrestricted access to requested files. That changed in 1978 when Scott Breckenridge, the main CIA liaison, told the HSCA that they were bringing in a new helper, namely George Joannides. George was coming out of retirement. And he assured the HSCA that he had nothing to do with the JFK case back in the sixties. (p. 150)

    As most everyone knows, this was false. Joannides was a CIA propaganda officer who was instrumental in running the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) faction of anti-Castro Cubans in New Orleans. And they had many interactions with Oswald in the summer of 1963. It was around the arrival of Joannides that Dan and Ed were moved out of the CIA offices and into a new building with a safe, and then a safe inside the larger safe. They would now have to wait for files and would get them with missing sentences. They would then have to turn over both the files and their notes into the safe at night. This might indicate that the pair were getting too close to Oswald’s association with the CIA and what really happened in Mexico City, which were the subjects they were working on.

    IV

    The closing three-part essay is an exploration of the life and career of the late Gaeton Fonzi. It is greatly aided by the extensive cooperation Meek had with his widow, Marie. Gaeton Fonzi began as a journalist, first for the Delaware County Daily Times and then for Philadelphia magazine. It was his meetings in Philadelphia with first Vince Salandria and then Arlen Specter that got him interested in the JFK assassination. After consulting with Vince, he was prepared to ask Specter some difficult questions about the Single Bullet Theory, which was the backbone of the Warren Report. Fonzi was troubled by Specter’s halting replies to his pointed questions. (pp. 172-73). He then wrote an article about this for Philadelphia called “The Warren Commission, The Truth and Arlen Specter.”

    In 1972, Gaeton moved south to Florida. He began working for Miami Monthly and Gold Coast. In 1975, he got a phone call that would have a great impact on his life and career. Senator Richard Schweiker was from the Philadelphia area and had apparently heard about Fonzi’s article about Specter. He and Senator Gary Hart now made up a subcommittee of the Church Committee. Their function was to evaluate the performance of the CIA and FBI in aiding the Warren Commission. Schweiker was inviting Gaeton to join as chief investigator, which he did.

    In only one year, that committee made some compelling progress. The combination of their discoveries and the broadcast showing on ABC of the Zapruder film helped cause the HSCA to be formed. Fonzi continued his work there and was hot on the trail of CIA officer David Phillips. That pursuit actually began under Schweiker. And when the HSCA began, the first Deputy Counsel on the Kennedy side, Robert Tanenbaum, went to visit the senator. After a general discussion, Schweiker asked Tanenbaum’s assistant to leave the room. The senator then opened a drawer and pulled out a folder made up largely of Fonzi’s work. He handed it to Tanenbaum and said, “The CIA killed President Kennedy.” (click here https://www.kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/robert-tanenbaum-interviewed-by-probe) That file is what got Fonzi the job with the HSCA.

    As we all know, once Tanenbaum and Chief Counsel Richard Sprague were forced to resign, the writing was on the wall for that committee. And Fonzi did a very nice job outlining this in his memorable book, The Last Investigation. That book was presaged by a long article Fonzi did for Washingtonian magazine, which had a significant impact on the critical community. (p. 174) Fonzi clearly implied in both the article and the book that the findings in the HSCA report were not supported by the research that the committee conducted. When the Assassination Records Review Board ordered the HSCA files declassified, this was proven out in spades.

    A column that Meek apparently got a lot of reaction to involved an interview with this reviewer. It was about John Kennedy’s evolving foreign policy views from 1951 until his death. This included his visit to Saigon and his signal 1957 speech on the Senate floor about the French crisis in Algeria. (p. 103) No speech Kennedy made up to that time elicited such a nationwide reaction as the Algeria address. The Africans now looked to Kennedy as their unofficial ambassador. Meek follows through on this with the Congo crisis: how Kennedy favored Patrice Lumumba, while Belgium and the CIA opposed him. This was at least partly the cause of Lumumba’s death in January of 1961, about 72 hours before Kennedy was inaugurated.

    There are two essays that I find problematic. The first is with Antoinette Giancana, daughter of Chicago Mafia chieftain Sam Giancana. As I have been at pains to demonstrate, the Mob had nothing to do with either Kennedy’s primary win in West Virginia or the result in the general election in Illinois. Dan Fleming proved the former in his important book Kennedy vs Humphrey, West Virginia, 1960. He conducted extensive interviews and found no evidence of any Mafia influence on anyone. And he also outlines three official investigations of that election, on a state level, on a federal level, and one by Senator Barry Goldwater, which all came up empty. As per Illinois, Professor John Binder did a statistical study showing that, in the wards controlled by Giancana, not only did the results not show his support for Kennedy, they indicated the contrary: that he might have discouraged voting for candidate Kennedy. That essay first appeared in Public Choice, and it has been preserved at Research Gate.

    The second essay I find problematic is the one dealing with the whole Ricky White/Roscoe white imbroglio from the early nineties. In August of 1990, Ricky White was presented as the son of the Grassy Knoll shooter, namely Roscoe White. Roscoe was also supposed to have killed Patrolman J. D. Tippit. Meek bends over backwards to be fair to Ricky White. I will not take up space to deal with all the problems with this story. But for a contrary view, I include a link to Gary Cartwright’s 1990 article critiquing this concept. (https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.7560/711990-014/html?lang=en)

    All in all, Jeff Meek has done some good work. We are lucky to have him toiling in the vineyards of the JFK case oh so many years afterwards. I hope he keeps it up.

  • The Schlesinger Memo: JFK v CIA – Addendum

    The Schlesinger Memo: JFK v CIA – Addendum

    The Schlesinger Memo: JFK v CIA – Addendum

    by James DiEugenio

    Addendum A – Highlights of PFIAB Meeting Notes

    Researcher David Denton uncovered a sheaf of documents that show why Kennedy wanted to reform the CIA. 

    The documents are sourced from the PFIAB. Though this advisory board has changed names over the years, Wikipedia describes it as ‘an advisory body to the Executive Office of the President of the United States. According to its self-description, it “provides advice to the President concerning the quality and adequacy of intelligence collection, of analysis and estimates, of counterintelligence, and of other intelligence activities.” ’ (link to the Wikipedia PFIAB page).

    See the next addendum for the entire file.

    This first highlighted section gives voice rather dramatically about his frustration at not knowing what the Agency was doing most of the time. 

    DiEugenioSchles Addend 01

    (pp 7-8, highlight 1)

    Denton also uncovered another group which shows how those close advisors around him are also frustrated with their lack of knowledge of Agency activities and the CIA’s apparent reluctance to let them know about them.

    DiEugenioSchles Addend 02

    (p 8, highlight 2)

    DiEugenioSchles Addend 03

    (p 9, highlight 3)

    DiEugenioSchles Addend 04

    (p 10, highlight 4)

    DiEugenioSchles Addend 05

    (p 11, highlight 5)

    DiEugenioSchles Addend 06

    (p 12, highlight 6)

    DiEugenioSchles Addend 07

    (p 16, highlight 7)

    DiEugenioSchles Addend 08

    (p 16, highlight 8)

    DiEugenioSchles Addend 09

    (p 19, highlight 9)

    DiEugenioSchles Addend 10

    (p 20, highlight 10)

    DiEugenioSchles Addend 11

    (p 22, highlight 11)

    Addendum B – Raw PFIAB Meeting Notes

    The entire raw PFIAB document may be found here or in the same file with highlighting (starting at page 7) from Addendum A here.

    Addendum C – Schlesinger Memo

    Thanks to attorney Andrew Iler, please view the rarely seen 1993 5-page CIA version of the Schlesinger memo that shows desired redactions here and the 15-page White House redacted version here. The unredacted version may be found here. The first version above shows just how strongly the CIA did not want this document out there in full, unredacted form.

    It took the ARRB to get it in that form. Why? Because it would show just what JFK was upset about: how the CIA was controlling policy. And how their policy in Cuba at the Bay of Pigs–one of direct intervention–opposed his. Secondly, although the memo is admirable, Schlesinger makes an error on page one. He assumes there was no CIA involvement in the attempts to overthrow de Gaulle over Algeria, and to aid the rebel group, the OAS in doing so. In the book JFK Revisited, Oliver Stone and I found several sources that indicate otherwise. (pp. 72,73) This information was found in American, French, and British sources.   According to David Talbot, Kennedy told the French ambassador that he had nothing to do with the attempted overthrow but he could not be sure if the CIA was involved. (The Devil’s Chessboard, pp. 412-419).

    As Iler points out, multiple entities submitted different copies of the memo to the ARRB, this is why there are different RIF#s and different Originating Agencies listed. The two Originating Agencies for the documents linked above are (1) The White House and (2) The CIA. The RIF for the White House version does not appear to be a typical ARRB RIF sheet. Iler also notes that on both RIFs that there are no Opening Criteria pursuant to section 6 of the JFK Records Act. This is atypical.

    The documents may also be viewed at the Mary Ferrel Foundation:

    The White House Version (15 pages)
    RIF#: 176-10033-10145

    The CIA Version (5 pages)
    RIF#: 157-10002-10056

     

    Click here to read the main article.

  • The Schlesinger Memo: JFK v CIA

    The Schlesinger Memo: JFK v CIA

    The Schlesinger Memo: JFK v CIA

    by James DiEugenio

     

    As everyone who studies the presidency of John F. Kennedy knows, the seminal moment in his education about the treacherous ways of Washington occurred rather early.  It was in April of 1961 with his ill-fated decision to launch the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. As many commentators have said, the president had no real enthusiasm about this operation.  And even CIA Director Allen Dulles admitted as much. (Destiny Betrayed, by James DiEugenio, second edition, p. 36) When White House advisor Arthur Schlesinger asked the president what he thought about the plans for the operation, Kennedy pithily replied that he thought about it as little as possible. (ibid)

    Due to this reluctance, the CIA–in the persons of Dulles and Director of Plans Dick Bissell–had to entice Kennedy into going along with their concept. Therefore, they told him that Fidel Castro’s popularity was diminishing, that only 20 % of the public supported him, and that many native Cubans thought his regime would soon fall. The capper was this: if a rebellion would begin, the vast majority of the militia units would defect. (Peter Kornbluh, Bay of Pigs Declassified, pp. 294-95)

    But even with that, Kennedy decided to put the decision up for a vote of his advisors. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara described the scene in his memoir. As Kennedy went around the table, only one person dissented from approval.  And that person was not even a member of the administration–it was  Senator William Fulbright. (Robert McNamara, In Retrospect, pp.25-27) But everyone else, the Joint Chiefs, members of the National Security Council, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and McNamara himself, all endorsed it. In fact, McNamara had passed a note to Kennedy saying that the Pentagon predicted that, even if the attack did not succeed, it would lead to Castro’s downfall.

    Needless to say, everyone but Fulbright was wrong. But what made it even worse was this: the CIA had deceived Kennedy.  The truth was that Dulles and Bissell knew the operation would not succeed. This was first discovered by Attorney General Robert Kennedy as part of the White House inquiry into the debacle helmed by General Maxwell Taylor.  In his interrogation of Allen Dulles, RFK was simply stupefied at some of the answers to his questions.  For instance, if the initial assault failed, the fallback plan was for the brigade to resort to guerilla tactics.  The problem with this was that when the AG went to one of the Cubans involved in the training for the operation, Manolo Ray, he said they had no training at all in those kinds of maneuvers. But further to have resorted to that, the brigade would have had to retreat into the hills, which were about 80 miles away through swampland. (Michael Morrisey, “The Bay of Pigs Revisited,” at Mary Ferrell Foundation)

    From his experience questioning Dulles, Bobby Kennedy suspected his brother had been snookered.  He decided that Dulles had to go.  So he consulted with his father, Joseph Kennedy, and discovered that Robert Lovett and David Bruce, two scions of the Eastern Establishment, had tried to dispose of Dulles years earlier. RFK brought in Lovett to join him to talk about what Dulles had done both to the Agency in general, and to him personally regarding the Bay of Pigs. (DiEugenio, pp. 48-50). President Kennedy not only terminated Dulles, but also Bissell and Deputy Director Charles Cabell.

    II

    Bobby Kennedy was correct about the subterfuge. Many years later scholar Lucien S. Vandenbroucke discovered notes that Dulles had made concerning an article that he was going to pen for Harper’s about the Bay of Pigs.  It turns out that Dulles understood that the project was fey.  But what he was banking on was that Kennedy would intervene with American might rather than face a humiliating defeat. (Diplomatic History, Fall, 1984)  When Vandenbroucke published the article, Bissell replied in a letter.  The architect of the plan said that he and Dulles, “had allowed Kennedy to persist in misunderstanding about the nature of the Cuban operation.”

    It’s clear that the president was convinced by his brother and Lovett.  He said as much to his longtime friend Paul Fay. He confided that, when he first came into office, he was shocked at what poor judgment the military had shown. Being a former Navy man, as was Fay, he looked up to high officers. He assumed they had earned their stature by wise judgment and honest achievement. He now thought he was wrong. And he would not instinctively follow their advice in the future. Alluding to the Bay of Pigs, he said:

    They wanted a fight and probably calculated that if we committed ourselves part way and started to lose, I would give the OK to pour in what was needed. (Paul Fay, The Pleasure of His Company, p. 189)

    At this point we should note that Schlesinger wrote that it was Dulles’ assurances that the brigade could go guerilla that ultimately convinced Kennedy to put the operation to a vote. (A Thousand Days, p.257) It is also through Schlesinger that we know about the Lovett-Bruce report, since he found it among Robert Kennedy’s papers when he was writing his biography of RFK.

    This is all pertinent to the complete declassification of the 16-page Schlesinger memo that he wrote up for JFK in the wake of the Bay of Pigs. As David Talbot wrote in his book about Allen Dulles, Schlesinger saw the capsizing of that operation as an opportunity to “bring the CIA under presidential control, which neither Truman nor Eisenhower had been able to do.” (The Devil’s Chessboard, p.438) As a former OSS operative, Schlesinger thought he was the man to provide Kennedy with the plan to do so.

    Schlesinger decided to strike while the iron was hot. He wanted to propose something before any kind of official committee loyal to Dulles performed an apologia. As he wrote to Kennedy in the aftermath of the disaster, “It is important, in my judgment, to take CIA away from the Club.”  (Ibid) In that regard, Schlesinger had reservations about Taylor managing the White House inquiry into the operation.  To him, he was not the kind of crusader who would capitalize on the president’s initial response to “splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces.” (Talbot, p. 439)

    Although Kennedy stayed with Taylor for the analysis of what had gone wrong, Schlesinger convinced the president that he was the right choice to pen a reorganization plan for the Agency. He told JFK that he served in the OSS during the war, and had been a CIA consultant since.  He would not call himself a professional, but an experienced amateur. (ibid)

    According to David Talbot, Schlesinger took the job quite seriously.  He consulted with senate liberals like George McGovern, and a mysterious CIA whistle-blower who told him, “The Central Intelligence Agency is sick.” He also collected critiques from left-of-center journals like The Nation and The New Republic.  He handed the memo to the president on June 30th.  Before President Trump’s executive order, we only had the memorandum in partly censored from. We now have the whole memo, unredacted.

    III

    Schlesinger began his statement by saying that the CIA had simply been caught in too many overseas disasters. They had used up their allowed quota in that area. He then wrote that the problem as he saw it was “the autonomy with which the Agency has been permitted to operate.”  He then got more specific as to the causes:

    1. An inadequate doctrine of clandestine operations 
    2. An inadequate conception of the relationship between operations and policy
    3. An inadequate conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence.

    Schlesinger said that this autonomy, and the resultant three shortcomings, were the result of lack of input from the State Department.

    When the CIA began the State Department looked on this new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize firm control of CIA operations. It did not, for example, try to establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities; and some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA was up to in their countries. (p. 2)

    He then noted that after 1953, when the Director of CIA—Allen Dulles– and Secretary of State—John Foster Dulles– were brothers, this made the problem even worse. (This was, if anything, an understatement.) As a result, the CIA began to grow in stature and reach. CIA paid better and also Allen Dulles had protected his employees from McCarthy’s witch hunts.  This resulted in the employment and assignment of several capable and independent-minded employees. Thus began the more active role the CIA played in foreign policy.

    Schlesinger now comments that by the time State realized just how potent the CIA had become, the cat was more or less out of the bag. The CIA had assumed control over clandestine intelligence collection and operations, and even in the realms of political reporting and diplomatic conduct. (p. 2) Therefore with this non-supervision, the CIA developed a set of parallel functions to State and even Defense.  That is it had its own political desks, and “ in effect, its own foreign services”. Schlesinger added “it even has its own air force.” (p. 3). With its large budget, “The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristics of a state within a state.” (ibid)

    This power had been augmented by the fact that “there is no doctrine governing our conduct of clandestine operations.”(p. 3). As a result, the CIA has used the standard that if the communists do it, then we must do it, a sort of “fighting fire with fire” ethos. At this point, Schlesinger observed that those in power have not thought through this dilemma of how to maintain an open society alongside covert activities. Since America maintained freedom of speech and press, they could comment on the covert actions of the CIA.  He now stated that covert activity was allowable when it did not corrupt the principles of a free society.

    Schlesinger categorized some areas of CIA activity and to its relationship to the problem he had outlined. Going up the ladder from intelligence collection, to espionage, to covert action.  The last he found most objectionable.  And he cogently wrote that such operations which relied 

    …on the suppression of news, of lying to congressmen and journalists, and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken only when the crisis is so considerable that the gains really seem to outweigh the disadvantages.

    The author then said, these problems are co-existent with the size of the operation.  (As this writer would comment, obviously the Bay of Pigs would be a prime example of this.)  Schlesinger warned that before such an operation is launched the case for its overwhelming necessity must be made. (p. 4). 

    IV

    Schlesinger went on to observe that the above was not the only consideration. Another important aspect was that CIA activities should be “subordinate to US foreign policy.” Which they had not been. (p. 5) And this could be a problem at any level of Agency activity, including recruiting double agents. Because the proposed target might be leading the CIA into a trap. And since the Agency does these things by itself, the ramifications of failure are a blow to the State Department, who were unsuspecting. Schlesinger argued that State, along with the ambassador,  should be informed of the possible approach and they should be able to measure the risks and rewards, and hold ultimate veto power over the operation. (p. 5)

    Schlesinger now addressed a problem he himself encountered during the Bay of Pigs operation. Namely, that State had not cleared and did not even know who many of the operatives were. And in that operation, the CIA recruited many Cuban exiles of questionable character. (p. 6). In this memo, he refers to his experience of going down to Florida at Kennedy’s request and observing that representatives of the Cuban Revolutionary Council had been detained by Operation Forty operatives, a group of thugs with their own secret agenda who were running parallel to the main operation. This might be the first time the rubric had been used in White House memoranda. Schlesinger implies that these types of men would never have been cleared by State. (For a fuller discussion of what Schlesinger knew about Operation Forty, see DiEugenio, pp. 50-52)

    Since the CIA considered itself more or less independent of State, the latter did not find itself aware of many covert actions until they were about to be launched. Therefore this gives these projects their own momentum of inevitability. This makes the advocate appear tough and realistic and the man with reservations legalistic and soft. (p. 7). The inescapable outcome is that the CIA was creating policy. Yet this was something that Allen Dulles himself said at the inception of the Agency should not be done: “The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy.” (p. 7). Here, Schlesinger mentioned in passing the attempted overthrow of Sukarno in Indonesia in 1958, which was exposed as a CIA operation. Schlesinger strongly urged that this system be revised so that State can exercise control over covert actions which impact their policy.

    Schlesinger now addressed an issue that had been partly censored before the Trump order.  It is a subject he called “The Controlled American Source”. Today we call it the use of CIA employees acting under State Department cover, many of them in foreign embassies with diplomatic titles. Schlesinger pointed out that the Agency has nearly as many employees overseas under these covers as actual State Department employees. (p. 7) Again this was something Dulles had warned against.  In the Dulles-Correa-Jackson report of 1948, the authors wrote that this practice should be kept at a minimum and the CIA should find its own covers to lessen reliance on State. The reverse had happened. And at some embassies, in certain sections, the number of CIA people outnumbered the actual State Department employees. (p. 8). And at times the higher-up CIA people advocate for different policies than State;  Schlesinger mentioned Laos as an example. What made it worse was that these CIA people had access to the local presidents and/or prime ministers.

    The memo also mentions Paris as another example of this trend. There were 128 CIA people in that embassy and the Agency occupied the top floor of the building. They tried to dominate conversations with certain important political personalities. (p. 8). So far from weening itself off of this usage, the Agency was now committed to it for overseas cover. Schlesinger noted the obvious dangers in all this and strongly recommended it be curtailed. (p. 9)

    V

    Kennedy’s advisor now turned to the subject of paramilitary warfare. He began by saying, “There is almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political context than paramilitary warfare.”(p. 9) Schlesinger warned of a situation that Kennedy was familiar with: when the opposition has the support of the populace, it is much more difficult to defeat. (p. 10) So Schlesinger pointed out that this kind of low-level fighting needed a political goal for it to be successful.  And he quoted a leader familiar with all this, Mao, to back up this idea. Schlesinger concluded that this type of warfare “cannot be considered as primarily a military weapon.  It is primarily a political weapon….” (ibid)

    He then pointed out how the British model for policy control worked.  There, they kept “clandestine activity under strict Foreign Office control.” (p. 11) He then recommended this system for adaptation in the USA.  He warned JFK about the problem that State might be reluctant to do so.  He wrote that they had to overcome “inbred habits of diffusion, negativism and delay and to take a firm and purposeful grip on the situation.” (p. 12) He also pointed out that in the British system, clandestine collection of intelligence is done by the intel service. But the analysis and estimating part was in the Foreign Office. In America, the CIA did both.

    Schlesinger said that it was Dulles himself who argued for this method back in 1947.  Dulles said that facts should not be blinded by policy. The presidential advisor countered with the argument that if one is too much in favor of a covert action, one will select intelligence to support that operation. Which we have seen, and as Schlesinger wrote, was very much the case with the Bay of Pigs project. What was needed was an analysis by a joint group of authorities familiar with the aim of the project but not directly involved with it.

    In conclusion, Schlesinger states that what he was proposing was “a fairly drastic rearrangement of our present intelligence set-up.” (p. 14) He was also pleading for a stronger role for the State Department. He even suggested changing the name from CIA to National Information Service. (p. 15) And each and every covert activity would need to be cleared in advance by the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence. (p. 15). He also suggested changing the responsibility for collection and interpretation of data. He would retitle this to the Foreign Research Agency.  

    David Talbot pointed out that Schlesinger sent rough draft copies of the memo to future Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, diplomat Chip Bohlen, and speechwriter Ted Sorenson. Once it was sent to the White House, and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy was a recipient, the Dulles forces began to organize a counterattack. Maxwell Taylor argued against it by saying this was no time for major surgery since it would hurt morale. On the same grounds, Taylor also argued against changing the title. (Talbot, p. 440)

    Two weeks after his memo was submitted, RFK told Schlesinger that his reorganization plan was on hold until they could find a proper candidate to helm the plan. That man ended up being Fowler Hamilton. Hamilton was a Wall Street lawyer, a former prosecutor in FDR’s Justice Department, and was also a bombing analyst in the Army Air Force. Schlesinger thought he was qualified. But the reaction to Fowler was very strong. So Kennedy turned to Republican John McCone. 

    Schlesinger was quite disappointed in this choice. He protested that he was the wrong man for his plan:  “He sees the world in terms of a set of emotion-charged stereotypes.” (Talbot, p. 441). Schlesinger was correct on this. But some of the reforms that he had recommended came to pass: Kennedy issued orders that ambassadors should lead foreign policy in foreign countries. He also requested that the Joint Chiefs be more vigorous and direct in advice to him on paramilitary projects like the Bay of Pigs. Third, that all paramilitary operations be presented to a Strategic Resources Group which would appoint someone to run the operation. (DiEugenio, pp. 52-53) 

    But Schlesinger’s bold and reformist plan more or less died when Fowler was rejected. Kennedy apparently did not want a full-fledged internal battle on his plate at the time. So he settled for a piecemeal reform plan. It took the 9-11 disaster for an office superseding the CIA to be created: the Director of National Intelligence. But the very fact that JFK commissioned such a study, that he seriously entertained it, and that he had someone in mind to man it, tell us how opposed he was to what Dulles had created, represented, and run.  And how it had all combined to create the Bay of Pigs debacle, or what he called, “the worst experience of my life.” (DiEugenio, p. 52) 

    Click here to read the addendum.

  • The Anna Paulina Luna Task Force

    The Anna Paulina Luna Task Force

    The Anna Paulina Luna Task Force

    Mark E. Adamczyk Esq.

    If you are interested in the history of the JFK assassination and want to know what actually happened to President Kennedy on November 22, 1963, you have probably heard or read about the recently-appointed “Task Force on the Declassification of Federal Secrets”. This is a congressional panel established by the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Accountability, chaired by Representative Anna Paulina Luna (R-Fla.). 

    The stated primary mission of the task force is to investigate and recommend the declassification of long-held government records related to significant historical events and topics of public interest.  The task force was formed in response to President Trump’s executive order signed on January 23, 2025, titled “Declassification of Records Concerning the Assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert F. Kennedy, and the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.,” which mandates federal agencies to prepare plans for releasing these records. According to journalist Jeff Morley, both CIA Director John Ratcliffe and DNI Chair Tulsi Gabbard are in favor of the order.

    As of today, the task force has made notable headlines. On February 25, 2025, Representative Luna announced via X that she met with the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), securing a commitment to make declassified JFK files publicly accessible through a dedicated NARA website. She indicated that documents would be uploaded in real time once declassified, and she addressed efforts by some within the NARA agency to delay access, claiming those “obstructionists” were being removed. Additionally, Luna has scheduled the task force’s first hearing for March 26, 2025, which will focus specifically on the JFK assassination. This hearing aims to examine evidence and interview firsthand witnesses, including doctors who treated Kennedy at Parkland Hospital in Dallas, where the task force plans to travel as part of its investigation.

    A visit to Dallas to interview the Parkland doctors and a tour of Dealey Plaza would be educational for the task force.  Representative Luna has publicly questioned the official Warren Commission findings, asserting her belief in a “two-shooter” theory based on conflicting evidence and abnormalities she claims were overlooked.  

    But here’s the problem: Why spend the task force’s time and money investigating things we have known for years?  As written by JFK Assassination Chokeholds co-author Paul Bleau, we already know that over forty witnesses, including almost all of the medical personnel at both Parkland and Bethesda Medical Center—where the autopsy was held—clearly saw the massive injury to the back of JFK’s head, describing what could only be an exit would.  The evidence we already know makes it all but impossible to conclude that there was not at least one shot fired at JFK from the front of his limousine, which vitiates the Warren Commission’s conclusion that only three (3) shots were fired by Lee Harvey Oswald from the rear.  

    The task force is on the correct path by investigating NARA and the Archivist’s inaction and failures under the JFK Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act). Pursuant to the JFK Act, the Assassination Records and Review Board (ARRB) in the 1990s already made final declassification decisions on the thousands of assassination records still withheld in full or in part.  Under the exhaustive rights afforded to agencies still seeking postponement of assassination records to this day, they already had their complete legal opportunity to appeal those final declassification decisions to the ARRB and the President for continued postponement.  

    Which brings us back to the focus that should be front and center for Representative Luna’s task force – the Archivist.  As discovered by JFK Assassination Chokeholds co-author Andrew Iler, the ARRB’s final declassification decisions from the 1990s have been buried at NARA.  Why?  The Archivist should immediately be called into an oversight hearing with the task force to explain why NARA did not follow the ARRB’s final agency orders on postponed assassination records and release them as ordered by the ARRB.  The Archivist should be compelled to explain why it is nearly impossible to find the ARRB’s final declassification orders at NARA.  The path to the proper declassification of the JFK assassination records lies in the ARRB’s final orders.  

    The final point, and this is critical, is revealed in comments recently made by Representative Luna in an interview with Clayton Morris on Lear Redacted.  Luna stated that she is confident, based on discussions with the White House and Gabbard (Director of National Intelligence), that there will be a full release of assassination records through the efforts of the task force.  I have no doubt in Representative Luna’s confidence, and her energy and passion on this effort should be commended.  

    However, here is the troubling comment Luna gave in the interview.  The Archivist has apparently told Representative Luna that even if President Trump orders the declassification of assassination records, the President’s decision then needs to go back to the originating agency for a “re-review” by the agency head.  Representative Luna disagrees with NARA’s assessment, and she is correct.  The Archivist’s position is directly contrary to the JFK Act.  Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) standards, an agency head does have the authority to make declassification decisions in their discretion.  The JFK Act is not FOIA, and it is not close.   Under the JFK Act, the final declassification decision, short of the President, was with the ARRB and only the ARRB.  If the ARRB ordered the full release of a record by a specified date, the agencies (many years ago) had a final 30-day right of appeal.  And the following is important: Short of an appeal based on clear and convincing evidence justifying continued postponement, the Archivist had a legal duty to release the assassination record and publish it for public disclosure. 

    Luna said that if a record is ordered declassified, then “do it, and call it a day…declassification does not need to go through bureaucratic nonsense.”  Again, she is correct.  Under the standards of the JFK Act, only the President in 2017 had the final call on declassification. And any further Presidential decisions for continued postponement must be stated in a public Presidential certification stating a current identifiable harm to the United States or a living person.  

    The correct legal path on the declassification process under the JFK Act is simple.  After the Archivist is compelled to make the ARRB’s final release decisions available and easily searchable, President Trump and his legal advisors need to review the ARRB’s final decisions in the Archivist’s possession.  If there is no longer a current identifiable harm in the withheld record to a living person or current intelligence source or method, the record must be released in full today pursuant to the JFK Act.  Further, President Trump needs to immediately order all originating agencies to turn over (to the Archivist) any assassination records that were not provided to the ARRB in the 1990s as required by the JFK Act.  The same Presidential review process would apply to those records as well.  The task force, with Congressional oversight powers in the JFK Act itself, has the authority to make sure all of this happens without further delay.  No further “plans” are necessary, especially not from the intelligence agencies who are determined to maintain secrecy.  

    In 2025, it is fiction to believe that a record from 1963 could still pose an identifiable harm.  Maybe a handful of records by a stretch of the imagination, but not thousands.  In short, President Trump should not tolerate more obstruction from the intelligence community.  As explained in JFK Assassination Chokeholds, the American people have already tolerated more than 60 years of obstruction of justice in the JFK case.  Unless President Trump can explain how and on what basis a withheld record still poses a current and identifiable harm to the United States or a living person, the record can and must be released today pursuant to the clear Congressional mandates in the JFK Act. 

  • Sky News Australia Interview of Jim DiEugenio

    Sky News Australia Interview of Jim DiEugenio

    Please watch the interview here.

    The SkyNews.com.au show notes are available here.

    Interview Transcript

    Well, it won’t be long until the world finally knows the truth about former US President John F. Kennedy’s assassination.

    Last month, President Trump signed an executive order to declassify the secret files on JFK’s 1963 death.

    Since then, the head of the task force that’s aimed at exposing federal secrets, Anna Paulina Luna, has declared that from what she’s seen so far, she believes the single bullet theory is faulty.

    She believes there were two shooters involved.

    Our first investigation will be announced, but it’s going to be covering on a thorough investigation into the John F. Kennedy assassination.

    And I can tell you, based on what I’ve been seeing so far, the initial hearing that was actually held here in Congress was actually faulty in the single bullet theory.

    I believe that there were two shooters.

    And we should be finding more information as we are able to gain access into the SCIF, hopefully before the files are actually released to the public.

    Now, most Americans do not believe that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone.

    So what has been hidden away for decades that we’re all about to find out when the JFK files are released?

    James DiEugenio is considered one of the best writers and researchers in America on JFK’s assassination.

    He’s written multiple books on the subject, including co-author of the JFK assassination chokeholds that prove there was a conspiracy.

    And he joins us on Power Hour now.

    James, thank you for joining us.

    We heard Anna Paulina Luna claim that she believes there were two shooters.

    That’s a conclusion, I believe, that you’ve come to as well.

    Can you talk to us about the evidence that support this?

    Yeah, well, I think it’s really good that she’s going to reopen this.

    And I think Trump signing that executive order was another really good thing.

    As per the belief that there was more than one shooter, there’s a Pruder film which shows Kennedy rocketing backwards when Oswald was supposed to actually be shooting from behind him.

    There’s the 42 witnesses at Parkland Hospital and at Bethesda at the morgue who did the autopsy that night who say that there was a big baseball-sized hole in the back of Kennedy’s head, which is strongly indicative of a shot from the front.

    All right?

    There’s also the fact that there was no sectioning of either wound.

    There was no dissecting of either wound, either the back wound or the head wound, to see if it was a through-and-through shot, if it did actually penetrate the body.

    There’s all this kind of evidence out there today that was not public back in 1963, which indicates that there was more than one assassin.

    And she’s correct.

    The Warren Commission report was, to put it mildly, you know, rather faulty.

    The Warren Commission determined in 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone.

    How did it get it so wrong?

    Well, there’s a lot of reasons why the Warren Commission report was faulty.

    You know, one of them was that they relied almost – about 80 percent of their work was based upon the work of the FBI.

    And the FBI, of course, did not do a very thorough investigation.

    To put it mildly, you know, J. Edgar Hoover was head of the FBI, was not in really friendly terms with Bobby Kennedy, who was at that time was about to resign.

    But he was the attorney general, all right?

    And if you recall, you know, this is very interesting.

    That weekend, Kennedy was killed on a Friday.

    That weekend, J. Edgar Hoover went to the racetrack.

    In other words, he didn’t even come into work on Saturday.

    He actually went to the racetrack with his second-in-command, Clyde Tolson.

    So it was not, you know – again, I’m being mild – it was not a very thorough investigation by the FBI for a lot of different reasons.

    Why has some of these files been kept secret for so long?

    The FBI says it’s discovered now 2,400 new documents related to JFK’s assassination.

    What are you expecting from them?

    You know, I’m really glad you brought this up because those 2,400 documents that the FBI has just found, those were not even previously reported.

    You know, everything was supposed to be declassified by 94 to 98 by the review board.

    Apparently, they didn’t even know about these documents.

    I think we’re going to find out a lot more about Oswald in New Orleans, and I think we’re going to learn something about Oswald’s reported visit to Mexico City, which was about in late September, early October of 1963, all right?

    And he was, of course, in New Orleans that summer before going to Mexico City.

    Oswald was, to put it mildly, a very, very interesting character, which the Warren Commission never even scraped the surface of, all right?

    Most people today who have studied this case don’t believe the Warren Commission verdict about him being a communist, all right?

    They think he was some kind of low-level intelligence agent.

    What do you make of the assessments that are out there?

    There are a few that it was a foreign adversary, the mafia, or the CIA.

    You know, seeing a lot of the theories that are exposed and all the research and investigating that you’ve done, what’s your assessment of them?

    I think that the most logical conclusion today, and that which most people who have researched this case believe, that it was kind of like a triangular kind of a plot involving the Central Intelligence Agency at one point, the Cuban exiles at another point.

    And then when Oswald was not killed the day of the assassination, the CIA brought in his ally that has organized crime, you know, who they have been trying to knock off Castro before.

    And they brought in the mafia to go ahead and send Jack Ruby in to silence Oswald.

    Donald Trump promised that he would declassify the files during his first term, but he was visited by the CIA, the FBI, I should say, the FBI, and was told by Mark Pompeo not to open them.

    Why do you think he delayed opening up the files?

    You know, that’s a very interesting question, because a week or so before, Trump had tweeted that I’m looking forward, you know, to declassifying the last of the JFK documents.

    Then the very day he was supposed to do this, he’s visited by the CIA and the FBI, and he backs out of it.

    Now, according to his talk with Andrew Napolitano, he said words of the effect that if they would have shown you what they showed me, you wouldn’t have done it either.

    And Andrew said, who is they, and what was it they showed you?

    Okay, you know, and then Trump said, well, next time I talk to you, and there’s not 15 people around, I’ll tell you what that meant.

    You know, so he’s never explained exactly what it was, all right, that gave him pause.

    The implication is that it didn’t look very good for the Warren Commission, you know, but we don’t really know that.

    But the fact that they both went in there on the last day, and they warned him not to do it, I think that’s a very, very revealing kind of situation.

    Yeah, it’s interesting, isn’t it?

    It just makes you wonder why the truth was covered up for so long.

    And do you think that trust will be restored in the government when these files are made public?

    Well, I’m sure you’re aware of this. 65% of the public does not believe the official story on the JFK assassination.

    And a lot of social scientists believe that the lack of the belief in government today, which is very low, and the lack of the belief in the media, which is almost as low.

    A lot of them attribute this to the 1963-1964 events.

    You know, they trace the fall of the belief in government and the media because it began in 1964 when the Warren Commission report was first issued.

    And it was so vigorously defended by the mainstream media in the United States.

    And this includes CBS, NBC, and the New York Times.

    So hopefully we’ll get some restoration of this when all these files are finally out there in the open.

    And perhaps when Representative Luna’s investigation takes place in an open environment.

    One of the worst things about the Warren Commission is that it was a closed, all closed hearings.

    You know, so this contributed to the cynicism about their verdict.

    It’s interesting you bring up the media.

    I wanted to get your assessment on what role the mainstream media really played in covering up the truth, I suppose.

    You know, has it been frustrating for you hearing a narrative on repeat that’s possibly not the truth?

    It’s always been my belief that the main obstruction between the American public and the truth about the JFK case is what is termed today the mainstream media.

    Because from the very beginning, you know, from the very beginning, 1963 and 1964, the mainstream media was out there, okay, defending the Warren Commission verdict.

    To give you one very good example, in the fall of 1964, on the day the Warren Commission report was issued, both NBC and CBS broadcast shows endorsing its verdict.

    Now, Gabriella, the Warren Commission report is 888 pages long.

    How could you possibly read that many pages in one day and then report its contents without even referring to the evidence behind it?

    Because that wasn’t released until a month later.

    And this is what I think, I believe, that has contributed to this air of cynicism about the media.

    They’re reporting on something they couldn’t fact check.

    It would be impossible to fact check it.

    It’s interesting, you know, you’re expecting quite a bit from these files.

    Do you think there’s, as you say, 65% of Americans don’t believe that the Warren Commission got it right?

    Is there going to be much in here that’s going to shock us?

    You know, I really, I wish I could say one way or the other, but since I’m supposed to be a responsible kind of a person, without reading this stuff, you know, I can’t really say that.

    Now, I do know people have gone down to Washington, like Andrew Iler, okay, and a lawyer from Canada.

    And he told me that a lot of these closed files deal with Oswald and Mexico City.

    And let me add one last thing about this subject.

    The review board, which expired in 1998, made what is called a final determination on all the documents that they saw, which means that they all should have been declassified in October of 2017.

    If the agency made a final determination, that’s what that means.

    So the question is, why are we here in 2025 still debating about these documents that should have been declassified almost eight years ago?

    This is what gives people an air of cynicism and skepticism about this case.

    Absolutely.

    Look, when we do finally get the truth, what does this mean for RFK Jr., for the whole Kennedy family?

    Well, that’s a very good question also.

    Bobby Kennedy Sr., okay, never believed the official story.

    And as his son, Robert Kennedy Jr., he has never believed the official story about what happened to his uncle.

    And I think that when all this stuff comes out, finally,  you know, they’re going to both be vindicated on this subject.

    Also, I should say one other thing, and this isn’t commonly known.

    John F. Kennedy Jr., JFK’s only son, never believed the official story either.

    And according to an old girlfriend of his that doesn’t like to talk about it, but she does write letters, you know, one of his goals was to enter the political arena and try to find justice for what really happened to his father.

    Now, that’s a very interesting story, which I believe is largely true, that very few people know about.

    Yeah, well, absolutely.

    It’ll be really interesting to see what happens, and importantly for that family.

    The task force aimed at exposing federal secrets is also going to investigate the assassinations of RFK and MLK.

    It’s also going to look at the Epstein client list, the origins of COVID-19, UFOs, the 9-11 files.

    There’s so much that we’re going to learn about.

    What are you expecting from these other cases?

    You know, I thought that was really interesting.

    You know, there’s such a thing as picking up too much that you can carry.

    You know, that’s a lot of very serious cases for one committee to go into.

    You know, can you possibly do justice?

    I think it’s seven or eight cases to all those things.

    You know, but if they do, you know, and if they do find that something is faulty every place, well, then this really gives questions about, A, the mainstream media, and also our American historians, who seem to have been afraid to go into all the details about all of these cases, which the MLK, RFK, and JFK cases were really instrumental in what happened to America in the 60s.

    There would have been no Vietnam War if those three men had lived, which means about 58,000 Americans would be alive today and about 3 million Vietnamese.

    So there’s a whole change, a shift in the historical focus if those three people were killed by conspiracies.

    Where we are today in 2025, we are finally getting some truth, more transparency.

    Do you have faith going forward about the government in the U.S.?

    Do you expect there could be other instances being covered up in the future?

    Well, you know, it depends a lot on this congressional committee.

    You know, if these things are done in the open, and if they’re done with the best information that we have, and the committee members are really honest about their job, I think it might have a significant impact, you know, going forward.

    And I think it’ll be interesting to watch this.

    And, Gabrielle, I think one thing to look for is how much pressure from the outside is put on this committee.

    Because the MSM has a lot to lose if she comes out of the gate really swinging strong.

    Okay.

    Their credibility is going to be on the line.

    So that will be a very interesting tell about how that committee is going to deal with the pressures from the outside.

    They really don’t want this to happen.

    James DiEugenio, thank you so much for your time.

    How can we stay up to date with your work?

    Okay.

    I’m at kennedysandking.com.

    That’s my website.

    And I have a sub-stack under my name also.

    So that’s how you can read the most current information in this case.

    Thank you very much for having me on.

    Really appreciate you coming on the program.

    We’ll speak to you again soon.

    Okay.

    Bye-bye.

  • Cuba 1960 and Lansdale’s Playbook

    Cuba 1960 and Lansdale’s Playbook

    CUBA 1960 and LANSDALE’S PLAYBOOK

    By: Paul Bleau

    Introduction

    The CIA executive action program, code-named ZR RIFLE  ZRRIFLE, was in full display by mid-1960 in plans to remove Castro.  This was one year before William Harvey perfected it.

    The CIA tapped into regime change expertise from its Far East resources, who developed a strategy to devise an assassination attempt on Castro that would be blamed on Chinese Communists. This approach had been used successfully in the Far East and would be enacted for the eventual assassination of the Cuban leader JFK, according to most researchers.

    The 1960 plan involved CIA officers Desmond Fitzgerald, JC King, James Noel, and likely Ed Lansdale and David Phillips, who operated out of Cuba in 1959-60. The stratagem of blaming Chinese Communists may have been linked to American interests in the Far East. Most observers believe that by 1963, there was a shift to putting the blame squarely on the Soviets and Cubans for the assassination of JFK. While this focus was intensive, we may ask ourselves if the 1960 plot may have resurfaced as a contingency plan.

    In 1964, when Lyndon Johnson and the U.S. war machine were itching for its full-fledged military entry into the Vietnam arena, the U.S. fabricated the Gulf of Tonkin incident false reports of Vietnamese attacks on U.S. destroyers. Was there also a belated attempt to try and factor the Chinese into a conspiracy that eliminated JFK? 

    While the following December 1963 CIA file did not gather much interest, it is one of a number that began circulating right after the assassination 104-10308-10320 ATTRIBUTION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY’S ASSASSINATION TO AN ALLEGED CHICOM/CASTRO PLOT. In it, details are planted around Chinese and Castro sympathizers backing a plot, with funding received at an unidentified Wall Street Bank. Two individuals (Ramon Cortes and Inu Fernandez) are fingered as intermediaries present in Dallas and possibly being involved. (For more on Cortes, see State Secret -Chapter 6, Bill Simpich).

    Were there to be links between these two and Oswald? Was there some sort of tactic being contemplated here to help bolster motivation for a conflict on the other side of the world? We may never know the answers to these questions- it was sometime in early December 1963 that the CIA and Ambassador Thomas Mann in Mexico received their marching orders from Hoover and LBJ to stop arguing in favor of a Castro connection to a murder plot. In 1966, Mafioso Johnny Rosselli, who was the link between the mafia and the CIA in a partnership to eliminate Castro, said the following:  

    The last of the sniper teams dispatched by Robert Kennedy in 1963 to assassinate Fidel Castro was captured in Havana. Under torture, they broke and confessed to being sponsored by the CIA and the US government. At that point, Castro remarked that, ‘If that was the way President Kennedy wanted it, Cuba could engage in the same tactics’. The result was that Castro infiltrated teams of snipers into the US to kill Kennedy. 

    Roselli’s propensity to talk too much is what likely got him killed, chopped up, and put in a drum that was found floating in Dumfoundling Bay. Roselli was certainly wrong about Castro leading the operation; in fact, the super secret CIA Inspector General report on the plots was written to correct errors in his story. Rosselli may have been right about who some of JFK’s shooters were. He certainly was spot on about the tactics that were used if one considers the following CIA execution plan:

    File 104-10315-10011

    BleauCuba1

    This document is as explicit as it can get when it comes to directly evoking the use of the ZRRIFLE executive action program for the removal of Fidel Castro. Thrown right in the reader’s face is the subject of the Dispatch: “Proposed operation to have the Chinese Communists suspected of an assassination attempt.”

    There is a lot to unpack in this planned false flag:

    1. The record can be found at the Mary Ferrell Foundation: Title: DISPATCH: PROPOSED OPERATION TO HAVE CHINESE COMMUNISTS SUSPECTED OF ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT Pages: 2 Agency: CIA RIF#: 104-10315-10011 Subjects: ANTICASTRO PLOT 
    2. It is dated July 8, 1960, and is about a topic brought up on June 25, 1960
    3. It comes from the Chief of the Far East Division (Desmond Fitzgerald), sent to the chief of the Western Hemisphere Division (J.C. King), who relays it to the Chief of Station in Havana (James Noel)
    4. The subject is very straightforward: LCHARVEST PSYCH: Proposed Operation to have Chinese Communists blamed for Assassination Attempt
    5. LCHARVEST (TPFAST, TPTERRY, VLVIGOR) involved operations against Peoples Republic of China (PRC) scientists and efforts to monitor PRC state technology
    6. Chester Dainold is a pseudonym for Desmond Fitzgerald and Oliver G. Galbond, a pseudonym used by Colonel J.C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Operations, CIA (MFF).

    Fitzgerald headed the Far East Division between 1957 and 1962, when he worked closely with Ed Lansdale, a legendary PSYCHOLOGICAL OPS expert. In 1953, Lansdale was sent to Vietnam to act as a consultant for the French in their efforts to repel the uprising in their colony. The plan was to mount a propaganda campaign to persuade the Vietnamese people in the south not to vote for the communists in the forthcoming elections.

    “In the months that followed they distributed targeted documents that claimed the Vietminh and Chinese communists had entered South Vietnam and were killing innocent civilians. The Ho Chi Minh government was also accused of slaying thousands of political opponents in North Vietnam.” https://spartacus-educational.com/COLDlansdale.htm

    In late 1961, Robert Kennedy and the all-powerful SAG team tasked Lansdale to lead Operation Mongoose, a covert action program for sabotage and subversion against Cuba. Lansdale appointed William Harvey as his CIA point person, who maintained a CIA relationship with Roselli all the way to 1963, even though RFK had demoted him after the Missile Crisis. It was Desmond Fitzgerald who replaced Harvey.

    ZRRIFLE Plus

    The Executive Action program perfected by William Harvey in 1961 was really a spinoff of assassination programs used throughout the ages. Harvey learned about these in meetings with British and French intelligence who were well acquainted with the finer points of this science. e.g., British MI 5 officer Peter Wright. Mafia collaboration synergized these techniques.

    What is fascinating with the current file is the level of detail shared and that it predates Harvey’s work and is suggestive of what many have come to think about what took place on November 22, 1963. 

    Let us break down the plan and  then translate it to the JFK assassination conspiracy: 

    PROPOSED OPERATION TO HAVE CHINESE COMMUNISTS SUSPECTED OF ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT = PROPOSED OPERATION TO HAVE CASTRO BLAMED FOR JFK ASSASSINATION 

    BleauCuba2

    Replace this with JFK’s exposure in upcoming motorcades and appearances in crowded places.

    BleauCuba3

    Better yet, let’s plan the route ourselves with help from our CIA asset, Dallas Mayor Earle Cabell…   sketches and maps: As in Sergio Arcacha Smith’s possession of the sewage systems maps and David Ferrie’s sketch of Dealey Plaza… Places of vantage; like Dealey Plaza where there can be triangulation of fire… Routes of escape/ Exfiltrating… Through the railyards, in the Nash Rambler with a Latino getaway driver, through the panicked crowds, Red Bird Airport, the Flight from Dallas in a CIA plane… Locations of sites for caching the weapons… as in Julia Ann Mercer’s sighting of Ruby the morning of the assassination involved in delivering a package near the knoll, or Lee Bowers (railroad tower operator) seeing suspicious movements in the railyards and the TSBD being open to renovation teams during the days preceding the motorcade.

    BleauCuba4

    In other words, let us add touches such as an FPCC-linked, Castro-backed commie-assassin to the mix through impersonations, incriminating forged correspondence, false testimonies of assets alleging interaction between the patsy and the enemy as well as financial backing (recall the false testimony of Oswald receiving payouts in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City), back-yard photos portraying Oswald as an unhinged, well-armed Marxist fanatic, etc.

    BleauCuba5

    Simply put, we need more than just a good story… we need to set the stage with rumors and fabricate trails of “evidence” for the red herring to be believed: Planting wallets, leaking propaganda through media assets, tampering with evidence, framing patsies and opponents, etc. 

    Conclusion

    While some lone-nut theorists have often brought up the complexity of carrying out what many researchers have come to believe about the assassination, file 104-10315-10011 tells a compelling story: Regime change specialists like Lansdale, Harvey, Fitzgerald, and Phillips all had plenty of experience in the use of ZRRIFLE-like tactics during the decade that preceded Castro’s rise to power; they all likely became involved in applying these tactics for the elimination of Castro beginning in 1960; they were all omnipresent in regime change special ops aimed at Cuba in 1963 and these are the tactics that have been revealed with time, according to many researchers, to be the ones that were used to remove Kennedy.

    So yes, orchestrating a regime change is complex… Only real specialists can deliver something this grandiose.

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