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  • The JFK 10-Point Program

    The JFK 10-Point Program


    This essay was inspired by a conversation with Robert Mezzone, who provided invaluable feedback in its construction.

    – J.E.G.

    During the Coalition on Political Assassinations (COPA) conference in Dallas in 2007, an after-hours conversation concerning Lee Harvey Oswald became a heated discussion. I decided to play peacemaker. “Look,” I said, “At least there’s one thing we can all agree on. Lee Harvey Oswald didn’t fire any of the shots at the President.”

    The fellow next to me pipes up, “Actually, I disagree with that, I think he was one of the shooters. Now, you see, this is what happened … “

    Of course. There’s always one.

    I had another conversation recently that led me to start thinking the following: What are the basic things that 99% of Kennedy researchers can agree upon? Suppose we, as Kennedy researchers, were going to present a 10-point program the way the Black Panthers did. What sort of things would be on that?

    This is not a trivial point. It goes toward our survival in the system. It behooves us to be more organized in our presentations to the public, and to learn to master the ability to deliver succinct points which are universally recognized to be true. We have to deal with the world as it is in terms of realpolitik, and that means being able to effectively communicate our principles to the outside world.

    The downside to not coming up with some sort of organizational structure is that opposing forces are strengthened and even galvanized. It is perhaps constructive to look at another debate to see the possible outcomes.

    Zetetics

    By way of demonstrating that virtually any position can draw followers, let’s for a moment take a look at the Flat-Earth Society. They claim to practice zetetics, which in normal terms simply means “looking at things in a different way.” The concept of the flat Earth is frequently invoked in discussions about ideological dementia, but it may serve us well to remember that there really is a Flat-Earth Society, that there are people who subscribe to its tenets, and that they generate long, complex chains of reasoning that purport to debunk the theory of a Round Earth. Indeed, Alfred Russell Wallace, a contemporary of Charles Darwin, seriously studied and promoted the idea of a flat Earth. And even to this day, you can find people who seriously put forth the idea that the Earth is a flat disc, unmoving, in the center of the universe, while the other objects in the sky revolve around it in an ether rather than the vacuum of space.

    http://theflatearthsociety.org/forum/index.php

    Take a look at the forums, if you dare. There are some truly astonishing exchanges lurking there, as posters argue back and forth in continuous strings of escalating lunacy.

    Now superficially there are concepts in the JFK community that may look, from the outside, like this sort of craziness. For example, if one puts forth the theory that the President’s brain was substituted by conspirators, without going into the evidence, it probably sounds crazy to the average person. The difference between the ‘second brain’ thesis and the Flat Earth Society is that in the former example, researchers are driven toward the conclusion by the facts. Flat-Earthers, on the other hand, have to concoct elaborate theories because their fundamental premise is totally at odds with the known facts. No honest researcher into the JFK assassination begins from a standpoint of creating some bizarre theory; it isn’t the fault of researchers that so many facts turn out to have bizarre implications.

    The JFK Assassination

    Because any science allows for honest disagreement, dissension can be found in the ranks of the JFK community. And whereas Round-Earth scientists are in privileged position – they have the facts, the media, world opinion, and establishment behind them, we do not. We have the facts and arguably world opinion, but we are beset on all sides by a self-congratulating media and professional disinformationalists. And the establishment is most definitely not with us.

    There is thus a central paradox with respect to the JFK situation. The establishment thoroughly promotes the Flat-Earth idea and is forced to come up with elaborate theories (such as the Magic Bullet thesis) to overrule the known facts. Meanwhile, for those who have studied the matter, the conspiracy at the heart of the JFK assassination is as obvious and well-supported as the Round Earth.

    Bitter disagreements crop up. This was true almost from the very beginning, as John Kelin wonderfully documents in Praise from a Future Generation, which shows how the Garrison investigation drove a wedge between the earliest researchers that ended friendships and associations. From a scientific perspective, this comes as no surprise and is consistent with JFK research being a relatively “young” science. However, this chaotic state of affairs has some detrimental effects. From the standpoint of an outsider’s perspective, it can look as though nothing is agreed upon and that the JFK case is simply a haven for kooks hatching their private fantasies on one another.

    In other words, it’s a problem of public relations.

    So much valuable and astonishing research has been done, and it has been done by non-professionals as often as not over the years. What sometimes gets lost, I think, is the plot. You and I might disagree about the relative involvement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Kennedy assassination, or whether James Jesus Angleton was the prime mover or Lyndon Johnson, but in any such analysis there will be large areas of agreement between us. What I have tried to do is take those large areas of agreement and put them down as ten principles. These principles should underlie any discussion of the case. These represent areas of strength for the JFK community and should be promoted to the general public.

    I would suggest that it should be these elements which should be used in public pronouncements and to inform our organizational capacity. The “hard science” of the assassination can then be done within our own structures such as COPA or CTKA or the like. For the general public, however, these are easy-to-understand and simple areas in the investigation where the facts are overwhelmingly with us.

    So I present my 10-point program:

     

    1. It is both legitimate and important to question the government’s investigation of the Kennedy assassination.

    I think this is the most important statement in many ways. The media continually represents that our questions are at best unimportant and at worst ridiculous. As public citizens, we have the right to ask questions of our government and doing so makes us defenders of the Constitution, not “conspiracy buffs.” For the Posners and Bugliosis of the world who would say otherwise, we need only present the following statements for their perusal:

    “I never believed that Oswald acted alone, although I can accept that he pulled the trigger.” – Lyndon Johnson 1

    (Johnson also told Senator Richard Russell that he did not believe in the single-bullet theory either.)

    “It was the greatest hoax that has ever been perpetuated.” – Richard Nixon, speaking of the Warren Commission 2

    “Hoover lied his eyes out to the [Warren] Commission – on Oswald, on Ruby, on their friends, the bullets, the gun, you name it.” – Congressman Hale Boggs, one of the seven Warren Commission members 3

    “If I told you what I really know, it would be very dangerous to this country. Our whole political system could be disrupted.” – J. Edgar Hoover, in response to the question “Do you think Oswald did it?” 4

    “Goddamn it, Georgi … doesn’t Premier Krushchev realize the President’s position? Every step he takes to meet Premier Krushchev halfway costs my brother a lot of effort … In a gust of blind hate, his enemies may go to any length, including killing him.” – Bobby Kennedy to Soviet envoy Georgi Bolshakov 5

    (Bobby later enlisted Walter Sheridan to conduct a private investigation into the assassination, and planned to reopen the case if elected President.)

    “[I] never believed that Lee Harvey Oswald assassinated President Kennedy without at least some encouragement from others … I think someone else worked with him in the planning.” – Senator Richard Russell, one of the seven Warren Commission members 6

    “One of my greatest shames as a journalist is that I still don’t know who killed Jack Kennedy.” – Hunter S. Thompson 7

    “We really blew it on the Kennedy assassination.” – Dan Rather 8

    Now the point is not that all these people make it a fact that Kennedy was assassinated in a conspiracy. But how can it be impertinent to ask questions, if all these people – who presumably have far more access than we will ever have – don’t believe fundamental conclusions of the Warren Report? The matter is not settled, and we must keep asking.

     

    2. The medical and photographic record of the assassination does not support the government’s position.

    What is most readily understandable about the medical evidence is that eighteen witnesses at Parkland Hospital in Dallas, most of them doctors, all describe a blowout head wound at the back of the head. The autopsy photos entered into evidence do not show this wound.

    The medical evidence is the Pandora’s Box of conspiracy research, as Cyril Wecht, Gary Aguilar, and David Mantik, among others, have shown: The X-rays don’t match the eyewitness statements. The government somehow lost Kennedy’s brain. Dr. Humes testified to the House Select Committee on Assassinations that he burned not just his autopsy notes, but the first draft of his autopsy report. In 1968, a medical panel appointed by Ramsey Clark noted a 6.5mm fragment at the upper part of the rear skull in the x-rays that no one saw the night of the autopsy. Even though x-rays were taken that night. However, regardless of what one thinks of the various theories that have come about to explain the problems proposed by the medical evidence, we can all agree on the testimony of the Parkland doctors and what the “official” autopsy photos show and their manifest disagreement.

     

    3. The Zapruder film fails to support the government’s designation of a lone shooter.

    A tremendous controversy rests at the heart of the analysis of the Zapruder film. On one side are those who believe that the Z-film is the final record of the assassination; while on the other, there are those who believe that it has been altered beyond recognition. We might characterize this as the Robert Groden school v. the Jim Fetzer (or Jack White) school on this issue.

    More important than this discrepancy, however, is that however one looks at the film, neither interpretation supports Lee Harvey Oswald as the lone assassin.

    The Z-film, as everyone knows, shows the President moving violently backward upon the last shot striking his head. This movement supports the idea that the fatal headshot came from the front – specifically, the area around the grassy knoll. Now Groden himself has some amazing further revelations in his study of the Z-film, which he is going to publish soon, but I will say nothing of that here.

    Fetzer and Jack White believe they can prove that the film, rather than showing the actual assassination, has been altered into a kind of cartoon. I don’t wish to go into the reasons for that here, as they can do a much better job of explicating themselves than I can. However, if the Z-film has been altered, then obviously Oswald – at minimum – had at least one accomplice, presumably a capable film technician.

    Whether the Z-film has been altered or not, it contradicts the Warren Report‘s conclusions. (Like the other topics, there are further avenues; for example, Life Magazine published Z-film stills out of order in an apparent effort to fool the public, and the film itself was largely suppressed until Groden got his new rotoscoped version on Geraldo Rivera’s television program. However, the simple premise stands.)

     

    4. The initial tests performed by the Dallas Police and the FBI exculpate Lee Harvey Oswald.

    This one is also very simple. The FBI performed a nitrate test on Oswald to determine whether he fired a weapon. It was positive for his hands, and negative for his face, meaning that he had not fired a rifle that day but may have fired a pistol. However, since he worked with newsprint at his job, and nitrates can be contracted from newsprint, this is not definitive. In addition, no fingerprints were found on the alleged murder weapon, the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle. The Dallas Police found a palm print on it after Oswald was already dead, and after one of the finest fingerprint analysts in America, the FBI’s Sebastian LaTona, dusted the entire rifle and found nothing of value.

     

    5. The ‘magic’ bullet is precisely that.

    399

    This is the bullet which must have created seven separate wounds in both Kennedy and John Connally in order for Arlen Specter’s ‘magic bullet’ theory to be correct. If this bullet did not create all those wounds, then there are more than three shots and more than one shooter.

    When this bullet was found on a stretcher in Parkland Hospital, it had no blood on it. In fact, the bullet that struck Connally left some lead permanently in his wrist, while this bullet appears to be undamaged. Dr. Cyril Wecht, former President of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences and consultant to the House Select Committee on the Assassinations (HSCA), declared that this state of affairs is simply impossible, and he should know.

     

    6. The photograph of the man in Mexico whom the government says is Lee Harvey Oswald cannot possibly be Lee Harvey Oswald.

    oswald other
    Left: Lee Harvey Oswald.
    Right: The guy the Warren Commission claims is Oswald in Mexico City.

    Seriously.

     

    7. Lee Harvey Oswald was an FBI informant known to J. Edgar Hoover, and therefore cannot be declared to be an “unknown loser.”

    One of the anti-conspiracy advocates’ favorite tricks is to paint Oswald as a loser. The poor slob was just a lonely guy who wanted to be famous, and he could have been shooting at anyone. This was Norman Mailer’s premise in writing Oswald’s Tale. It underlies the idea that Oswald shot at General Edwin Walker, who was a right-winger.

    For a poor lonely slob, however, Oswald sure got around. He went to Russia claiming to be a defector, married the niece of a Russian Colonel, and then came back. Despite being a Marine and former radar operator who threatened to give away secrets to the Soviets, he was never charged with anything, and the CIA has always unconvincingly denied debriefing him upon his return. He was paid both by the Russians, the American military, and given money by the State Department. Then he was allowed to bring his Soviet wife Marina back to the U.S. with him. All this took place during the height of the Cold War. Unusual, to say the least.

    During the Warren Commission hearings, reports were discussed that Oswald was an agent of both the FBI and CIA. For instance, Texas Attorney General Waggoner Carr and District Attorney Henry Wade told the Warren Commission that Oswald was an FBI informant, made $200 a month, and provided his informant number of 179. 9

    Dallas DA Wade told Carr that his source told him Oswald had a CIA employment number. In addition to that, a June 3, 1960 FBI memo features J. Edgar Hoover complaining that someone was using Oswald’s identity and he was requesting information on Oswald from the State Department to clarify the situation. Hoover began: “There is a possibility that an imposter is using Oswald’s birth certificate…” This is three years before the assassination. FBI employee William Walter later confirmed that, in 1963, he saw an informant file with Oswald’s name on it. Hoover would later point out to Lyndon Johnson that the person in Mexico City neither looked nor sounded liked Oswald. 10

     

    8. Gerald Ford has admitted to moving Kennedy’s back wound, an act that cannot be objectively reconciled with an attitude of pursuing the truth.

    On July 2, 1997, the Associated Press ran a story in which Gerald Ford admitted that he raised the back wound several inches in the Warren Commission to better convict Lee Harvey Oswald as the lone assassin. Ford stated that he was only attempting to be “more precise” and that his change had “nothing to do with conspiracy theories.” Ford thus admits to falsifying the Warren Report. 11

     

    9. Whatever Jim Garrison’s motivations or the eventual failure of his trial, he was right about Clay Shaw, who did turn out to be a contract agent of the CIA, and did correctly identify the link between Lee Harvey Oswald and Guy Banister.

    Whatever one thinks of Jim Garrison, and he remains a polarizing figure to this day, there are two things on which he was indisputably right:

    The first is that Clay Shaw was definitely a contract agent with the CIA. Richard Helms testified in court (very reluctantly) that Shaw had this “domestic” relationship with the agency, as Mark Lane documents in regard to the civil trial of E. Howard Hunt v. Liberty Lobby. 12

    The second is that he discovered that 531 Lafayette Street and 544 Camp Street led to the same building, which meant that the supposedly Marxist Oswald was sharing an office with rabid right-wing reactionary Guy Banister. Banister’s connections (to the Bay of Pigs invasion, among other things) blow up any notion that Oswald was either a leftist or a lone nut. 13

     

    10. The Mob didn’t do it. (At least, not by themselves.)

    “I don’t doubt their involvement, Bill, but at a lower level. Could the Mob change the parade route, Bill? Or eliminate the protection for the President? Could the Mob send Oswald to Russia and get him back? Could the Mob get the FBI, the CIA, and the Dallas Police to make a mess of the investigation? Could the Mob get the Warren Commission appointed to cover it up? Could the Mob wreck the autopsy? Could the Mob influence the national media to go to sleep…This was a military-style ambush from start to finish … a coup d’Ètat with Lyndon Johnson waiting in the wings …” 14

    – Kevin Costner as Jim Garrison in the film JFK

    Lamar Waldron’s fantasies aside, these questions remain just as good now as they were in 1991.

    The Mob-did-it theories have been such a fertile area for the government (cf. Robert Blakey for just one example) that I think that we, as researchers, have to put some limits on the idea. Anyone who proposes that the Mob did it on their own or that the Cuban invasion somehow backfired on JFK, barring some new and stunning evidence, is simply not one of us. The Mob position is too damaging and the evidence too scant.

    That may sound dogmatic, but let’s go back to my Flat-Earth example for a moment, with a little twist. As researchers, we’ve compiled a large assortment of facts. And when we look at the total facts involved, in order to say the Mob is the prime mover in the assassination, we are forced to ignore the larger context of the Cuban invasion, Operation Northwoods, the Vietnam War, the reduction of the oil depletion allowance, and the sheer vastness of the operation required to kill the President and cover up the piles of evidence contradicting the official story. In other words, we have to do a series of logical backflips in order to leap over all the contrary evidence, rather than accepting what is staring at us right in the face. Mob-did-it is, now and forever barring some astounding, paradigm-changing evidence, in the Flat-Earth category. Did the Mob have some level of involvement? Sure. Probably, even. Were they running the show? Absolutely not.

    The investigative process is a scientific one at its best, and that means weeding out the ideas that don’t work as well as promoting the ones that do. As Karl Popper noted, knowledge proceeds by falsification. By falsifying certain notions and promoting those where the evidence is irrefutable, we present a more unified front to the world and help to streamline and organize our public relations. It may not be to everyone’s taste, but it has to be done, if we are to ultimately win over the generations to come.


    End Notes

    1. This quote comes from the telephone recordings of the Johnson White House and was publicized in The Atlantic Monthly in 2004 by, of all people, Max Holland! http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200406/holland

    2. This quote comes from the Nixon tapes and was first reported by the BBC. John McAdams, who operates the “Kennedy Assassination Home Page,” disputes Nixon’s meaning in this comment. The interesting thing about his discussion of the context is that I believe the additional commentary further implicates Nixon rather than absolves him, but that is a discussion for another day. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1848157.stm

    3. This quote can be found in many places, but one interesting discussion – because it occurs in a mainstream magazine – is from the November 1998 issue of Texas Monthly. http://www.texasmonthly.com/preview/1998-11-01/feature23

    4. Once again, this quote can be found many places, but one book that contains many such quotes is Larry Hancock’s Someone Would Have Talked (JFK Lancer Productions & Publications: 2006).

    5. David Talbot, Brothers (Free Press: New York 2007), 32.

    6. Gerald McKnight, Breach of Trust (University Press of Kansas: 2005), 297.

    7. Maureen Farrell, “JFK, 9/11 and Conspiracy Theories,” http://www.buzzflash.com/farrell/03/11/far03002.html

    8. David Talbot, “The Mother of All Coverups,” http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2004/09/15/warren/

    9. Jim Garrison discussed this information in an October 1967 interview with Playboy Magazine. It was ironically first reported in Gerald Ford’s book Portrait of the Assassin.

    10. For a great discussion of the “Mexico City stuff,” see John Newman, Oswald and the CIA (Sky Horse Publishing: New York 2008), 352-391.

    11. “Gerald Ford forced to admit the Warren Report fictionalized,” Associated Press, 2 July 1997.

    12. Mark Lane, Plausible Denial (Thunder’s Mouth Press: New York 1991), 218-225.

    13. For an excellent discussion of Garrison’s New Orleans discoveries, see James DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed (Sheridan Square Press: New York 1992), 130-146.

    14. The screenplay for JFK was written by Zachary Sklar and Oliver Stone, based on the books On the Trail of the Assassins by Jim Garrison and Crossfire by Jim Marrs.

  • When Sonia Sotomayor’s Honesty, Independence, and Integrity Were Tested


    A MEMORANDUM TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, UPON ITS HEARINGS WHETHER TO CONSENT TO THE APPOINTMENT OF THE HON. SONIA SOTOMAYOR TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

    Sonia Sotomayor’s Collaboration in a Judicial Deceit and Cover-Up While a Federal District Judge and a Member of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals Raises Troubling Questions

    WHEN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY’S CULTURE OF COLLEGIALITY BECAME A CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE


    “The American legal system is an adversarial system of justice. What that generally is understood to mean is that parties are entitled to put their case before a judge and a jury in the way they want, have their evidence challenged and tested by their adversaries in the way their adversaries want, and the trier of fact or law then decides the issues as presented by the parties.”

    Sonia M. Sotomayor, “No Lawyer, Bad Lawyer – What’s a Judge to Do?,” Jon Newman Annual Lecture on Law and Justice, University of Hartford, October 20, 2008. pg 4.

    “Under Rules12(b)(6) and 12(c), where a motion for judgment on the pleadings or to dismiss for failure to state a claim requires the court to consider matters outside of the pleadings, the motion must be treated as a summary judgment motion, and “all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (c). We have observed that . . . “[a] district court may not convert a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment without sufficient notice to an opposing party and an opportunity for that party to respond,” Groden v. Random House, 61 F.3d 1045, 1052 (2d Cir. 1995).”

    Scaglione v. Mamaroneck Union Free School Dist., 144 Fed.Appx. 120, No. 04-1054-cv, 2005 WL 6818 (2d Cir. March 25, 2005)

    * * *

    Citations for the Cases Under Discussion

    Scaglione v. Mamaroneck Union Free School Dist., 144 Fed.Appx. 120, No. 04-1054-cv, 2005 WL 6818 (2d Cir. March 25, 2005)

    Groden v. Random House, Inc., et al., 1994 WL 45555, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11794, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1266, 1994-2 Trade Cas. P70,702, 22 Media L. Rep. 2257 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1994)(No. 94-Civ. 1974); Groden v. Random House, Inc., et al., 1994 WL 519871, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13416 (S.D.N.Y., September 23, 1994) (No. 94 Civ. 1074 (JSM)); Groden v. Random House, Inc., et al., 1994 WL 681770, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17296 (S.D.N.Y., December 5, 1994) (No. 94 Civ. 1074 (JSM)); aff’d 61 F.3d 1045 (2d Cir. 1995).

    * * *

    Introduction and Summary

    Probably the worst fear that any average citizen has in dealing with a local, state or federal government official is the fear of running up against a brick wall: not having a chance to tell his side of the story. When people are not allowed to present evidence on their own behalf, their basic citizenship is being denied. The authorities are saying, “Go away. We don’t want to interact with you.”

    Besides the opportunity to state our case – to present evidence – we also trust that the people who make decisions over our lives will be neutral; that, if they are not entirely free of bias, which is very difficult, they will at least be able to suppress their bias in an effort to be fair and objective. We also expect people in authority to be free of ties to the parties in dispute. Finally, we expect that, whatever the outcome of our problem, the rules – both the procedural rules and the rules that assign legal responsibility – will be applied consistently with the experience of others in the community.

    We justifiably expect these norms. When they are violated, what is important is the opportunity to appeal to other decision makers to correct any inaccuracy or unfairness. All of this assumes the integrity and the honest motives of those who exercise decision-making authority in our society.

    In the civil lawsuit that Robert J. Groden brought on February 17, 1994, against Random House, Inc., The New York Times, and Gerald Posner, each of these legitimate expectations was seriously compromised by multiple lies that were told by judges who were sworn to uphold the law and seek the truth.

    Lawyers are indoctrinated in the belief (“delusion” might be a more apt term) that judges are incapable of lying; they merely commit “error” or “abuse of discretion.”

    However, when judges falsify the procedural facts of their written opinions to conceal what actually occurred in pre-judgment proceedings – i.e., when they lie to the press, the public, the bar, and other courts about the facts of a case – the descriptive application of such lawyerly, dignified, felicitous, and neutralizing verbal formulae as “injudicious,” “unsound,” “abuse of discretion,” or “error of law” deforms language itself and camouflages something infinitely and egregiously more threatening, coercive, and destructive of the judicial process. Such linguistic anaesthetization deeply and subtly oppresses an attorney who seeks to represent his client and at the same time maintain proper decorum toward – and his future relationship with – the courts. It overlays the respective roles of supposedly neutral judges and the lawyer-advocate with a connivance, or a tacit collaborative agreement, to pretend that intentional falsehood and deception are something altogether different. It places him in conflict between his untrammeled loyalty to his client and his role as an officer of the courts.

    This Memorandum deals with what until now had been the hidden history of a legal matter that ranged between 1994 and 2000, and in which Sonia Sotomayor played a role, both as a United States District Court Judge and as a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. I say “hidden history” because the matter played out just as the World Wide Web was in its infancy, and mostly in unpublished court decisions and administrative proceedings still not readily accessible to the general public or to journalists.

    While sitting as a federal district court judge, Sonia Sotomayor was also a member of an executive committee of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York: the Committee on Grievances. In that capacity, she became intimately familiar with the facts of Robert J. Groden’s lawsuit against Random House, Inc., The New York Times, and Gerald Posner, in which I represented Bob Groden as his attorney, and she played a role in my disbarment following the Groden litigation upon the complaint of the district court judge who presided, John S. Martin, Jr. Later, as an appellate judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Sotomayor cited the appellate Opinion written in the Groden case by her mentor, Judge Jon O. Newman, almost as if her citation was an inside joke among her colleagues, knowing that Newman had falsely portrayed the facts of that case, nevertheless promoting it (and not so coincidentally, protecting her mentor’s reputation) in a deeply dishonest manner.

    When Sotomayor wrote for the Second Circuit in the Scaglione case quoted above, she knew full well that Groden had been purposely, willfully, and deliberately denied that “reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent” to defeat his opponents’ motion to dismiss his case. The Second Circuit has repeatedly promoted its Opinion in Groden as valid precedent for this “reasonable opportunity” principle without ever admitting to the underlying procedural facts of the Groden court record, which reveal that he was deprived of the very opportunity to which they say he was entitled.

    Sotomayor superficially appears to be a rather sympathetic figure from an earthy background. Such people, however, do not always remain loyal to their roots when ushered through the Ivy Leagues and the halls of judicial power. When Sonia Sotomayor had the chance to “speak truth to power” – indeed, when she herself was the power – when she had the chance to expose the denial of a litigant’s due process right to be heard, Sotomayor did not merely remain silent; she protected her judicial colleagues and directly participated in sinking injustice into an embarrassed silence. At a crucial moment in the history of the controversy over President John F. Kennedy’s assassination, she helped to denigrate a true patriot in American history and destroy his life; helped to destroy his attorney’s career and his life; and failed to meet the test of honesty, independence, and integrity. As accomplished a legal technocrat as she may be, the spirit of the law and justice does not reside in this woman, Sonia Sotomayor, and it is doubtful she may be trusted to perform the role of a principled legal decision-maker in the nation’s court of last resort. Public confidence in that Court’s role and function in government requires that the Senate refuse to give this nomination its consent.

    True copies of five documents indispensable to an understanding of this matter are attached to this Memorandum as exhibits.


    The Groden v. Random House, Inc. Litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York

    Nature of the Groden v. Random House, Inc. Lawsuit

    During two weeks in August 1993, Random House published an advertising campaign for the sale of its book, Case Closed, in The New York Times. It consisted of four separate advertisements. After twice promising readers to name “the guilty” in the assassination of President Kennedy, the last two ads named and depicted Robert J. Groden as one of six persons boldly accused of being “GUILTY OF MISLEADING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC” regarding the assassination. Each in the series of four advertisements ran in two separate editions of The Times that were disseminated nationwide. The last two advertisements attributed a quote to Groden – purported theory of responsibility for the assassination of the President. The source and origin of the quote were not otherwise specified. Beneath the photos appeared the legend in bold: “ONE MAN. ONE GUN. ONE INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION.” Readers were solicited to purchase Case Closed by Gerald Posner.

    Mr. Groden in the Fall of 1993 had a competing book of his own entering the marketplace, The Killing of a President. This had been publicized in the trade press, also some mass media, during the spring and summer of 1993. Besides this new book, Groden also produced and simultaneously released a video product for the home market, JFK: The Case for Conspiracy.

    Mr. Groden retained me in September 1993. On February 17, 1994, once his pecuniary damages appeared ascertainable, I filed a Complaint with a jury demand on his behalf in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Random House, Inc., The New York Times, and Gerald Posner. Groden v. Random House, Inc. et al. was a trade regulation case in which Mr. Groden claimed violation of the New York Civil Rights Law ßß 50-51 (commercial misappropriation of name and likeness), and the federal Lanham Act ß43(a) [15 U.S.C. ß1125(a)] (false advertising).

    The Groden case did not begin as a politically-oriented case pursued for political purposes, but as a commercial case grounded in traditional commercial theories to recover commercial damages. Originally, the only issues we raised were the misappropriation of Mr. Groden’s name and photograph in the defendants’ print advertising, and the misattribution to him of a quotation that he never wrote or uttered – a quotation expressing a political conspiracy theory that Mr. Groden never espoused and does not hold.1

    In fact, both Mr. Groden and I disclaimed at the earliest opportunity any desire to make his case a platform for testing the Warren Report’s and Posner’s version of the Kennedy assassination. For example, my Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint began:

    “The assassination of President Kennedy, which is rapidly passing from the sphere of current affairs into history, has been the subject of impassioned debate since it happened more than thirty years ago. This case is about neither the assassination nor the relative merits of that debate. Rather, it concerns the civilized norms of and proscriptions against certain forms of behavior in the commercial marketplace. That the assassination and collective memory of that event deeply touch the facts of this case, invites the constant danger that a fact pattern which, if it concerned any other subject, would be mundane, may obscure and overwhelm the very clear applicability of settled principles with unseen and unfortunate consequences.”

    Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, dated May 20, 1994 (Document No. 12, Docket No. 94 CIV 01074 (JSM))

    To us, the fact that the subject of the assassination was involved was initially no more than coincidental to the fact pattern. In other words, this was a case of commercial exploitation of Groden’s personality and renown by a market competitor in an advertising campaign to sell a book that dealt only in passing with Groden himself.

    Other than to allege the falsity of the advertisement in general terms, Groden’s original Complaint did not specifically assume any burden of proving the falsity of the “One Man. One Gun. One Inescapable Conclusion” assertion in the ad as part of his Lanham Act claim. Furthermore, we did not claim that Case Closed was false, or that it falsely attacked Groden. Our position was that Posner had the right to his views, the problem involved here being one of unfair competition.

    Almost from the outset of the district court litigation, the defendants admitted that the sole purpose of their advertising campaign was to promote the sale of Case Closed. Their obvious intent was to promote the salability of the Random House book by attacking and discrediting a direct competitor (i.e., negative comparative advertising) in the marketplace for books on the subject of John F. Kennedy’s assassination.

    The thrust of the case, therefore, was to secure for Mr. Groden (and other critics of the government’s response to the assassination) the same limited protections for commercial marketing that are guaranteed to any other seller of a product or service, including communicative, without fear of having their personalities and good will with the the public exploited, and their books bulldozed, by wealthier and more powerful interests who, notwithstanding their own exercise of civil liberties, unmistakably seek also a commercial gain.

    Procedural Chronology of the Groden Case

    April 1, 1994, the defense firm notified me that they desired to make a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and enclosed a copy of their proposed Notice of Motion without supporting papers. A pre-motion conference with the presiding judge was set under his Individual Rules.2

    At the outset of that initial conference in chambers, the presiding judge expressed some concern whether we were “going to litigate the Kennedy assassination.” We did not regard litigating that subject as strictly required to secure Groden’s recovery under either of his pleaded causes of action. I asked, but was specifically directed by the presiding judge not to take any discovery of the defendants while their motion was pending.

    Defendants served their motion papers May 4, 1994. The final version was styled as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or “in the alternative, granting summary judgment.”

    The attorneys for the parties exchanged papers on the motion, and oral argument was scheduled for June 24, 1994.

    Up to that point, the simple essence of the defendants’ arguments was that the first amendment should protect advertising for a book if it accurately reflected the book’s contents. 3 They did not claim anywhere in their briefing that the advertising campaign made a true statement about the Kennedy assassination. They did not argue anywhere that it was a statement of opinion about the Kennedy assassination. They did not so much as even suggest that one side of the assassination controversy was right or the other wrong.

    So long as they did not claim at any point in their papers that their book was true, or that what the book said about Groden was true, I was unconcerned. We were there about an ad campaign, not a book.

    Raising a New Argument and Interjecting the Milkovich Doctrine

    On June 24, 1994, during oral argument of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, their counsel, Victor A. Kovner, made a remarkable and bold new contention not contained in his briefs. The Kennedy assassination is such a controversial and seemingly irresolvable topic, he argued, that since no one has ascertained with any certainty what happened during the assassination, the ad must be taken as merely opinion. (They were apparently reluctant to expound this argument in plain written English on the public record while they were promoting Case Closed‘s strident, anti-conspiracy defense of the lone assassin thesis.) To my mixed pleasure and concern, I heard the judge say to Mr. Kovner, “You’re going to have more of a problem under the Lanham Act.” 4

    In a follow-up letter to the presiding judge dated July 5, Kovner advanced the completely new and novel suggestion that the standard laid down by the Supreme Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) for distinguishing actionable statements of fact from protected opinion in common law libel cases should govern the same distinction in Lanham Act cases. Milkovich had never before been applied to a false advertising case. 5 (See Attachment No. 1.)

    In his letter to Judge Martin dated July 5, 1994, Kovner described how this came up:

    “At that argument, Your Honor addressed the issue of whether the advertisement’s headline “GUILTY OF MISLEADING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC” could be found to constitute a “false or misleading” statement actionable under ß 43 (a)(2) of the Lanham Act. Specifically, Your Honor questioned whether this statement misrepresented plaintiff’s “product” – whatever that may be – as opposed to misrepresenting defendants’ product, the book Case Closed. Since this issue was not the focus of plaintiff’s complaint or papers and thus was not discussed in detail in defendants’ moving or reply papers, the Court may find helpful supplemental briefs by the parties . . . on this limited issue.”

    Letter to The Honorable John S. Martin, Jr. from Victor A. Kovner, July 5, 1994. Joint Appendix at 206. Groden v. Random House, Inc., et al., 61 F.3d 1045 (2d Cir. 1995)(Docket No. 94-9100).

    This much we can derive from what Kovner wrote: At the oral argument, Judge Martin guided him in substance: “You’ve covered the point about the ad representing the theme of the book, but what about the ad’s attack against Groden?” This was a glaring “blind spot” in Kovner’s entire submission.

    Judge Martin’s question went to this principle of advertising construction in trade regulation jurisprudence: “Statements susceptible of both a misleading and a truthful interpretation will be construed against the advertiser.” 6 In other words, even if it were true that the ad accurately described the book, it might still be a false negative comparative advertisement as respects Groden.

    Here is the way Mr. Kovner summarized and finessed the new argument in his July 5 letter to Judge Martin:

    “Defendants’ supplemental brief would demonstrate that under both standard First Amendment analysis and false advertising cases applying ß 43(a), a verifiable false fact must be present for an action to proceed. See, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990); . . . . Thus, finding a statement of fact in the observation that Groden’s conspiracy theory, as quoted in the advertisement, was “misleading” would require this Court to determine the truth or falsity of the conclusion of the Warren Commission.”

    Letter to The Honorable John S. Martin, Jr. from Victor A. Kovner dated July 5, 1994. Joint Appendix at 206. Groden v. Random House, Inc., et al., 61 F.3d 1045 (2d Cir. 1995) (Docket No. 94-9100).

    This issue raised by Kovner was not only outside the scope of Mr. Groden’s original Complaint, but was of a very different order of magnitude than the issues that either side had argued in their previous written submissions on defendants’ motion to dismiss. Kovner was now challenging us, in effect, with the assertion that proving the Warren Commission’s Report false was a logical requirement for Groden to prove his case, but that he could not do so because no one else had yet been able to prove it false. That assertion arguably rose to the level of injecting an issue of fact into the dispute at bar. The questions were now on the floor whether the court should/would apply the Milkovich standard to Groden’s lawsuit, and whether the advertisement stated or implied provable facts about Groden’s work that were capable of being objectively characterized as either true or false.7

    The Concept of Summary Judgment

    The key to understanding the significance of Kovner’s letter to the judge, and of what happened next in the Groden case, lies in the legal concept of “summary judgment.” Summary judgment is a method for expediting the resolution of a lawsuit without the expense and length of a trial when there are no material issues of fact outstanding between the parties. When such issues exist, they must be resolved by a trial. (When Robert Groden filed a Complaint in his lawsuit, he demanded a trial by jury. Sometimes, people ask for a trial by a judge alone.) The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that there are no material issues of fact that would affect the outcome of the case, and that applying rules of law would require a judgment in his favor. The party opposing summary judgment must demonstrate either that there are factual issues for trial, or that, if there is agreement upon the facts, the law favors him instead.

    Because summary judgment has the potential of depriving a litigant of his day in court, a number of procedural rules and formal requirements have grown around it. However, exactly how much it takes to persuade a court that there either are or are not sufficient factual issues to warrant a trial was left in some doubt by a series of Supreme Court decisions in 1986, known as the Celotex, Anderson, and Matsushita “trilogy”.

    If, prior to Judge Martin’s dismissal of the case, there was any argument made by the defendants that hair-triggered summary judgment, this was it, because it challenged us to come forward with proofs. But the parties had already submitted their papers and their memoranda, and the motion had been orally argued.

    Meeting the Defendants’ New Issue

    I replied to Mr. Kovner’s letter with a letter of my own, addressed to Judge Martin and dated July 8, 1994. (See Attachment No. 2.)

    First, I noted that the defendants’ motion had been fully argued and submitted, and I objected to expanding the scope of the motion, While expressing plaintiff’s willingness to litigate further “if it will assist the Court in rendering a decision.”

    Turning to the new issue proposed by the defendants, I wrote:

    “The twin statements “Guilty of Misleading, etc.” and “One Man. One Gun. One Inescapable Conclusion” are false statements. They state facts that are objectively verifiable, and are made in connection with products and services in interstate commerce, both the plaintiff’s and the defendants’.”

    I concluded the letter with the following:

    “In oral argument, counsel raised the suggestion that, since the Kennedy assassination is such a controversial and seemingly irresolvable topic, the ad must be construed as stating an opinion. The Kennedy assassination happened over thirty years ago. Over half the population has no personal recollection of that weekend. The controversy is not a real controversy in the sense that, were the Government to reveal tomorrow that there was a conspiracy to kill the president, our lives or our society would change one iota. Also, as a private citizen, Mr. Groden is not in any position to affect the ultimate outcome of that controversy.

    “On the other hand, President Kennedy was either killed by one man or more than one man. This is, however, a matter that is capable of resolution. . . .

    “We offer to prove, through what the Government has represented to be the original autopsy X-rays of President Kennedy now reposited in the National Archives, the Zapruder film, and other demonstrative evidence, that there is a reasonable medical and scientific basis for concluding that President Kennedy was assassinated by more than one gunman, so that a jury may decide who is guilty of misleading whom. Groden cannot try the case of Oswald’s guilt or innocence in a civil action in the Southern District of New York, nevertheless, we can make a showing that there are substantial reasons to believe that Kennedy was shot by more than one gunman. Moreover, we will show that plaintiff’s belief that there was a conspiracy in the assassination is long-held, sincere, and well-founded in objective evidence. These showings would unquestionably render the advertisement false.”

    Letter to The Honorable John S. Martin from Roger Bruce Feinman, Esq. dated July 8, 1994. Joint Appendix at 209-11. Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045 (2d Cir. 1995) (Docket No. 94-9100).

    Judge Martin did not respond to my letter dated July 8, 1994. I called his chambers and asked his law secretary whether the judge would take any further submissions. I was told by his law secretary that no further submissions would be taken.

    After writing my letter to Judge Martin, I amended Mr. Groden’s Complaint as of right, served the defendants, and filed the Amended Complaint with the Clerk of the Court. The Amended Complaint added a new defendant, and furthermore contained the following additional language at paragraph 83:

    “83. The claim in the advertisement that there was only ‘one man, one gun, and one inescapable conclusion’ about the Kennedy assassination was a materially false and misleading representation of fact, either in whole or in part. There is serious and substantial cause for a reasonable doubt that one man, acting alone, shot and killed President Kennedy, and to otherwise believe that more than ‘one man, one-gun’ was involved. In the alternative, President Kennedy was in fact assassinated by at least two gunmen.”

    The Grant of Summary Judgment

    Judge Martin issued his Memorandum Opinion and Order granting summary judgment to the defendants and dismissing Mr. Groden’s case with prejudice. The defendants’ new “Milkovich argument” was central to his Opinion dealing with the Lanham Act branch of the lawsuit:

    “The issue is therefore whether or not the statement in the Advertisement, “GUILTY OF MISLEADING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC,” could be reasonably interpreted as stating or implying provable facts about plaintiff’s work. Cf. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990)(in context of state defamation laws, distinguishing between statements,of opinion which imply false assertions of fact and statements of opinion – which merely articulate subjective assertions).”

    “The proliferation of theories about the Kennedy assassination is proof that there is no universally accepted factual answer to the question, “Who killed President Kennedy?” The statements “GUILTY OF MISLEADING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC” and “ONE MAN. ONE GUN. ONE INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION” could not reasonably be interpreted as stating anything other than a subjective belief. Therefore, the challenged statements are inherently different than the type of factual representations covered by the Lanham Act.”

    “The Court rejects plaintiff’s assertion that each statement in the Advertisement is capable of objective verification. While this may be true hypothetically, the known evidence concerning the Kennedy assassination and the extensive debate over the Warren Commission’s findings demonstrate that the actual facts will never be verifiable to everybody’s satisfaction.”

    Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stated in pertinent part:

    “[I]f the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment . . . all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.”

    In his decision, Martin included the following statements:

    “Plaintiff has failed to establish any factual dispute on the threshold element of a false advertising claim: falsity.”

    And,

    “Plaintiff has failed to establish any genuine issue for trial on his false advertising claim.”

    In truth, Martin had refused to permit us the opportunity to meet the defendants’ argument with evidence, the nature and substance of which we had apprised him we were prepared to submit.

    Martin made no direct reference to, neither did he evaluate, my offer to submit those proofs that we were prepared to submit in opposition to summary judgment had we been given the opportunity. Quite the opposite, it would be fair and natural to infer from Martin’s decision that he had given Mr. Groden the opportunity to submit evidence on the Milkovich question, but that Mr. Groden was unable to meet his burden of proof, and that “the known evidence” does not admit to ascertaining the truth. This clear implication was nonetheless false.

    The Judgment, dated August 25, 1994, read:

    “[T]he Court on its own initiative having treated the motion as a motion for summary judgment … the complaint is hereby dismissed for the reasons stated in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order, dated August 23, 1994.”

    (emphasis supplied). Doc. No. 15, Groden v. Random House, Inc., et al., 1994 WL 45555, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11794, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1266, 1994-2 Trade Cas. P70,702, 22 Media L. Rep. 2257 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1994)(No. 94-Civ. 01074). (See Attachment No. 3.)

    When he issued his Opinion on August 23, with its false account of the procedures leading to his award of summary judgment, Judge Martin made sure that it went to the district court’s press office, and it was immediately publicized over the wire services and other media (I first learned about it through a phone call from an Associated Press reporter). There could not have been a better way to intimidate the lawyer who had taken this case into abandoning it as hopeless as soon as he read the decision, instead of vigorously pursuing corrective remedies, nor to confront a lawyer with the implicit threat that challenging this instantly and highly publicized decision would entail challenging the honesty and veracity of the judge, with all of the dire consequences such a challenge might portend. Martin was not going to alter that decision, let alone admit that he had refused our offer to submit evidence.

    It bears repetition and bold emphasis that Martin had raised a substantive issue in Mr. Groden’s case that we did not originally raise; prodded the defendants to advance a brand new argument after their motion to dismiss had been fully argued and submitted; then undercut us at the very instant that we sought to join this new issue – his issue. He used this belated argument, for which he allowed no contradiction, as a pretext to go beyond the four corners of Groden’s original Complaint and – in the manner of a preemptive strike – undermine and denigrate the significance of what my client had attempted to accomplish for three decades. It had been a particular concern of mine to protect Groden from this exact kind of overreaching. He had come to court to redress serious economic injuries inflicted upon him by the defendants, nevertheless he ended up suffering further gratuitous injury at the hands of the presiding judge.

    “The known evidence” that he “knew” about was not identified to Mr. Groden or me before Judge Martin issued his decision, or to the public and the legal profession through the decision itself. How that “known evidence” demonstrated anything, or would if it were identified, was left unclear, so that its relevance could not be evaluated. It certainly did not include “the known evidence” that he refused to examine.

    There is no requirement that a jury verdict put an end to all public controversy and debate. The “actual facts will never be verifiable” statement was an unwarranted and indefensible question-begging assumption. Judge Martin had our written offer to submit proof, which he refused to allow before issuing his decision. Since no competent or admissible evidence concerning the Kennedy assassination was before him when he wrote these words, they clearly showed that he was proselytizing on the merits or the importance of the controversy surrounding the Kennedy assassination.

    Among the other major flaws in this argument were its fallacious appeal to ignorance – we cannot infer objective probability or improbability, let alone truth or falsity, merely from the failure to demonstrate them in the past – and its fallacious appeals to popularity and to common knowledge: The merits of something are one matter and its popularity another; the issue in the Groden case was not what is commonly known (or believed) but what is true.

    More than the mere denial of an opportunity to be heard, Martin’s false account of the procedural facts of the Groden case was an integral, indispensible, incorporeal supporting element in the overall thrust of his Opinion, which conveyed to the press, the Bar, the general public, and other courts his “message” of what the Kennedy assassination controversy supposedly meant to him. For we need not concern ourselves with truth or falsity if people will never be able to agree upon the truth in the first place. Of course, this makes the whole discussion seem pointless.

    Post-judgment Proceedings

    September 1, 1994, within ten days after Martin granted summary judgment to the defendants, I submitted to the district court on Mr. Groden’s behalf a bare Notice of Motion to Reconsider, Reargue, Alter, Amend, Modify, Vacate and Voluntarily Recuse. Pursuant to Martin’s Individual Rules, the proposed Notice of Motion was served and submitted to chambers without any supporting papers, pending a motion conference. The Notice of Motion asserted numerous errors of fact, law, or both, also several grounds for recusal. Because the document incorporated on its face the names of the witnesses whose affidavits we sought to present, among other items, it evinced our clear intent to submit to the District Court the evidence that it had prevented us from submitting before the Opinion, Order, and Judgment dismissing the action.

    Although Victor Kovner never answered the Amended Complaint, on September 8, 1994. he did write a letter to Judge Martin requesting a conference to discuss the Notice of Motion. However, for more than three weeks after service of Groden’s Notice of Motion upon both chambers and the defendants, Martin never scheduled a conference or responded in any other way.

    Meanwhile, I was informed for the first time that a parallel lawsuit directed at the Random House ad had been brought by Mark Lane in the District Court for the District of Columbia; that a motion for summary judgment was pending there; and that Groden’s defendants in New York had submitted a copy of Martin’s decision to the D.C. court.

    Now, time was of the essence. Given his extravagant ridicule of the entire subject of President Kennedy’s assassination, and his refusal to allow me to submit evidence on a question that he himself had raised, it was a foregone conclusion that Martin would deny my motion to re-open his judgment. I had to make an effort to expand the Groden record, giving Martin issues that he could not determine as matters of law absent a jury. I had to get my evidence into the appellate record of that case.

    Then, on September 23, 1994, I was telephonically notified by Martin’s law clerk that, without ever having conferred upon Mr. Groden’s motion; without having received any papers in support or in opposition; and without having heard any oral argument, the court had issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying the Motion to Reconsider, Reargue, Alter, Amend, Modify, Vacate and Voluntarily Recuse, and dismissing the Amended Complaint on his own initiative.8

    Addressing what he characterized as “personal attacks,” which he also called “hysterical,” Martin publicly accused me of disciplinary violations, referred his accusations to the grievance committees of both the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, and ordered me to show cause why I should not be sanctioned under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I was ordered to submit papers by October 14. The hearing date of the Order to Show Cause was October 21.

    With the issuance of Judge Martin’s Memorandum Opinion and Order of September 23, there was still no evidence in the official record of the Groden case that we had, by way of my letter to the court dated July 8, offered to make an additional factual showing to defeat defendants’ argument that the statements in their advertising campaign should be considered mere opinion. Thus, there was still no means for Mr. Groden to seek effective appellate review of Judge Martin’s refusal to allow him to submit those proofs to defeat the grant of summary judgment. Technically, I could not have properly or permissibly advised the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that this had even occurred without “testifying” for my client dehors the record.

    I resolved to seize the occasion of responding to Judge Martin’s Order to Show Cause, and to submit to the record those proofs that he prevented me from submitting earlier to preclude summary judgment, or later in support of the Notice of Motion to Reconsider, etc., together with further proofs relating to the quotation used in the advertisement. We might not be able to require the Second Circuit to consider these materials, since they entered the record in post-judgment proceedings and Martin had shown no willingness to take cognizance of them, however, at least the materials would be in the record for the Second Circuit to see for themselves, instead of my asking them to use their imagination.

    Friday, October 14, 1994, I served and filed with Martin’s chambers a set of papers and a videotape cassette of exhibits in response to the Order to Show Cause.9 An additional set was filed with the Clerk of the Court the following week. Demonstrating the good faith and substantive factual bases for plaintiff’s Motion, I included in these papers and the videotape cassette the nature and kind of showing I would have made upon the Motion to Reconsider, etc., but which Judge John Martin prevented me from making.

    During Mr. Groden’s subsequent appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, this evidence was included in the Joint Appendix and record on appeal.

    Thursday afternoon, October 20, I served, and Friday morning, October 21, I filed on behalf of Mr. Groden a Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ß 144. On this second disqualification motion, Judge Martin would have yet another chance to reconsider and either amend or affirm his previous findings.

    Friday afternoon, October 21, I appeared with Mr. Groden and his wife in court. The transcript, a copy of which Judge Martin later sent to the Grievance Committee of the Southern District court, which included Judge Sotomayor, shows that, while I referred more than once to Martin’s refusal to allow me to support the September 1 Notice of Motion, neither he nor defendants’ counsel contradicted that assertion in any way. (See Attachment No. 4.)

    The transcript of that hearing also shows that Judge Martin made no comment respecting the materials I submitted to his chambers one week earlier.

    By order entered December 5, 1994, Judge Martin denied the second recusal motion.

    John Martin had no less than four separate and distinct opportunities to calmly and dispassionately assess Mr. Groden’s good faith showing; after summarily dismissing his original and Amended Complaint, Martin’s option of vacating his judgment, at the very least to reconsider or amend his purported findings, subsisted to December 5, 1994, the day he filed his last substantive Memorandum Order in this case. The extended post-judgment proceedings etched a clear portrait of Martin’s repeated refusal to allow Mr. Groden a fair opportunity to be heard so that his conduct cannot be attributed to mere mistake or abuse of discretion.

    Evidence That More Than One Gunman Assassinated President Kennedy

    For readers with no interest at all in the subject of President Kennedy’s murder, the governing purpose of this section is to compare and contrast the Milkovich issue as it was raised and discussed by Judge Martin and his law school classmate, Victor A. Kovner, Esq., in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York with the body of relevant, competent and admissible evidence, including medical expert affidavits and exhibits, photographs and films, scientific analysis of those films, eyewitnesses and earwitness statements, and official government documents that we submitted to the official record of Mr. Groden’s lawsuit, bearing in mind that the judge had precluded us at the outset from taking any discovery. That evidence included the following:

    1. An affidavit (JA 213-223) with accompanying illustrated exhibits (JA 224-235) from Dr. Randolph H. Robertson, M.D., the first board-certified diagnostic radiologist in private practice to have been afforded access to original X-rays and photographs from the Kennedy autopsy;
    2. An affidavit from Dr. Cyril H. Wecht, M.D., J.D., then the Coroner Of Allegheny County (Pittsburgh), and one of the most experienced and respected forensic pathologists in the world, Dr. Wecht accompanied Dr. Robertson on the last of his four examinations at the National Archives, so that Robertson could explain his findings to Wecht with the benefit of the original materiais arrayed before them. Dr. Wecht has been there before, but he is not a specialist in radiology. He concluded that his earlier stated opinion of this matter was erroneous and concurred in Dr. Robertson’s findings.
    3. Authentication of the autopsy x-rays through the sworn testimony and expert report of a reknown forensic odontologist, Dr. Lowell Levine, D.D.S. (JA 252);
    4. An Affidavit of Francis X. O’Neill, Jr., dated November 8, 1978 (JA 266). O’Neill was an FBI agent who witnessed the Kennedy autopsy;
    5. Hand drawings by Francis X. O’Neill, Jr., attested and witnessed (JA 280-281), and illustrating his observation of the gunshot wounds sustained by President Kennedy;
    6. A true copy of the official form FD-302 report by FBI Special Agents Francis X. O’Neill, Jr. and James W. Sibert, another eyewitness to the autopsy, dated November 26, 1963;
    7. A hand drawing by another autopsy eyewitnesses, Richard A. Lipsey, attested and witnessed (JA 280), depicting the wounds to President Kennedy;
    8. A hand drawing by Secret Service Agent Roy H. Kellerman attested and witnessed by staff counsel of House Select Committee on Assassinations (JA 279). Kellerman was one of the two Secret Service Agents who rode in the front bench seat of the presidential limousine during the assassination, and who both attended the autopsy;
    9. Extracts of sworn testimony before the Warren Commission of Roy H. Kellerman (JA 286), and
    10. William Greer, Special Agent, Secret Service, who drove the death limousine and also attended the autopsy (JA 291);

    11. Official contemporaneous signed statements of Secret Service Special Agent of the White House Detail, George W. Hickey, Jr. (JA 294). Hickey was riding in the Secret Service follow-up car immediately behind the presidential limousine, and witnessed the assassination;
    12. The affidavit of plaintiff Robert J. Groden, a photooptical technician and an expert on the film and photographic evidence in the Kennedy assassination who was retained as such by the House of Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations, dated October 12, 1994 (JA 236);
    13. Video Exhibits (in a videotape cassette enclosed in an envelope attached to Document 19) including:
      1. Detailed blow-ups from the Zapruder film of the assassination (Exh 2-5, 10, 11);
      2. Details from the Orville Nix film of the assassination (Video Ex 9, 11)
      3. Statements by journalists Robert MacNeil (Ex 6), an earwitness to the assassination, and Mary Woodward (Video Ex 7), an eyewitness;
      4. Statement by Bobby Hargis, the Dallas motorcycle policeman who was riding to the immediate left-rear of the presidential limousine at the time of the assassination (Video Ex 12);
      5. Interviews with assassination eyewitnesses Marilyn Willis (Video Ex 18) and Malcolm Summers (Video Ex 19);
      6. Interviews with the Parkland Hospital doctors who attempted to rescuscitate Kennedy (Video Ex 14-16);
      7. An interview with former FBI agent O’Neill (Video Ex 17); and
      8. Other narrative and visual material placing the evidence into appropriate background and context;
    14. Portions of the technical analysis of the Zapruder film by the photo-analytical consulting firm, Itek Corporation (JA 297); and
    15. Warren Commission Exhibit No. 387, the official autopsy protocol re John F. Kennedy (JA 283).

    Competent medical and scientific evidence, corroborated by eye- and ear witness accounts of the assassination, showed that President Kennedy sustained two separate missile impacts to his head, instead of one as originally reported by the Warren Commission. This meant that at least four shots were fired during the assassination, as opposed to the alleged maximum of three shots from Oswald’s alleged weapon. Further, the two head shots occurred within such a minute interval of time as to physically preclude their having been inflicted by only one gunman using any weapon then available; the minimum time to operate the bolt-action mechanism of Oswald’s alleged weapon, as repeatedly tested by law enforcement agencies and experts, is far greater than the interval between the two separate hits. [JA 416] A digital enhancement of the Zapruder film demonstrated two separate and distinct impacts to the head, and this was also corroborated by measurements of the acceleration and velocity of the president’s movements as performed by photometric specialists at the Itek Corporation.

    The first shot to strike the President’s head came from behind the limousine in which he was riding. The available evidence is somewhat more equivocal regarding the directionality of the second strike, however, it affirmatively supports the conclusion that the second shot also came from behind the limousine.

    The sworn statements of trained law enforcement eyewitnesses to the President’s autopsy [JA 266 – 283, 286 – 293] corroborate the autopsy pathologists’ contemporaneous bench drawing [JA 226-27], their official autopsy report [JA 283], and schematic representations that they later prepared for the Warren Commission [JA 232] (the commission decided not to receive the X-rays and photographs into their record) in their location of one head wound. Expert evaluation of the autopsy x-rays and photographs confirm that wound location, but establish in addition the existence of a second, separate wound to the head. [JA 213ff.] (A panel of physicians appointed by then Attorney General Ramsey Clark in 1968 noted the second wound but overlooked evidence of the first, and conjectured that the autopsy pathologists had been mistaken by a factor of four inches in their location of a bullet’s entry.) A digital enhancement of the Zapruder film demonstrates two separate and distinct impacts to the President’s head. [VIDEO EXHIBITS 3, 4, & 5] That the effects of two distinct impacts are obvious only when the resolution of the film is enhanced and it is viewed in stop motion is corroborated by measurements of the acceleration and velocity of the head during the relevant Zapruder frames, as performed by photometric specialists at the Itek Corporation. [JA 297, see also Groden Affidavit at JA 236] Fragments of skull and brain tissue are seen to eject forward at the moment of the first impact. In another filmed view of the shooting taken by Orville Nix, a major fragment is seen to fly rearward at the moment of the second impact. [VIDEO EXHIBIT 9] At that point, contrary to what we were all led to believe many years ago, the president’s wife, far from attempting to escape the limousine, frantically retrieved that fragment. [VIDEO EXHIBITS 10,11] Radiological findings further confirm what the film unequivocally portrays at frames Z315-316, the elevation of the scalp in the rear of the President’s head at the time of the second impact [See, generally, Robertson Affidavit at JA 213 and Wecht at 382].

    Earwitnesses to the assassination heard a “double-bang” at the time the President sustained his head wounds. [JA 286 – 296; VIDEO EXHIBITS 6,7, & 8]

    Although some of the witnesses interviewed on film were not formally qualified under oath, all of them were alive and available to testify or to be deposed.

    The synergistic relationship between these independent sources of data hardly merits extended discussion: The medical evidence describes what the motion picture films portray; the mathematical evidence measures what the eye perceives; and both the autopsy and the film evidence propose what the closest witnesses to the assassination actually heard. Juries decide matters of historical fact on the basis of such evidence every day. The apologists, including Posner, merely speculate that a neuromuscular spasm or “reverse jet effect” occurred. The evidence, however, affirmatively proves two shots to the head.

    With only three weeks to put this material together, I believe that I established a serious issue warranting a hearing and/or trial.10

    Interestingly, at no point during the district or appellate court litigation did either the district court judge or the defendants ever advert to the plaintiff’s initial offer to make an evidentiary showing, or to our actual submission of the evidence during post-judgment proceedings.

    The Groden case marked a turning point in the history of the controversy over President Kennedy’s assassination. Until then, the federal government, its minions, and its sycophants could boast that, despite all their sniping, the critics of the Warren Commission had never been able to produce any credible, affirmative evidence that more than one gunman was responsible for the crime. The Posner Case Closed phenomenon was to put a cap on the case, marginalize the critics, and allow organized society to carry on, at least for the foreseeable future. What neither the Warren Commission’s apologists (including Posner) nor the critics could anticipate, however, was that the emergence of a coherent and cohesive body of evidence forcing the conclusion that at least one or two additional assassns may have escaped would mandate a drastically different tact by the established order. Now, instead of championing “one man, one gun, one inescapable conclusion,” there would no longer be any conclusion: They would simply throw Posner’s book into the dustbin of history together with all the rest, and let those dwindling numbers who were still absorbed by the subject argue among themselves on the Internet.

    If the courts assume to legislate a community norm for discussion of this subject, e.g., by declaring that it is all a matter of taste and not conducive to the application of rational processes for settlement of the dispute – in other words, once confrontation according to the rules of evidence and logic is decreed unnecessary – then they bring themselves into conflict with their own institutional nature and the freedom of advocacy.

    Judge Jon O. Newman (Earl Warren’s Former Law Clerk) Covers Up

    Mr. Groden filed a complaint of misconduct against Judge Martin with the Judicial Council for the Second Circuit on or about November 4, 1994.11 It was denied by then Chief Judge Jon O. Newman, who subsequently reserved Mr. Groden’s appeal in the Random House case for himself, presided, and wrote the opinion affirming the judgment of dismissal. Judge Newman was the late Chief Justice Earl Warren’s senior law clerk (1956-57).

    It is a bitter irony that, while serving as Chairman of President Johnson’s Commission to Investigate the Assassination of President Kennedy, Earl Warren refused to receive the vital evidence pertaining to President Kennedy’s autopsy that we attempted to get Judge Martin to review thirty years later; that Martin deliberately refused to look at it; and that Warren’s former senior law clerk, Jon Newman, had it in his record-on-appeal, yet chose to cover up for Martin’s actions. Here is how he did it:

    “In any event, Groden had ample opportunity to present evidence outside the pleadings, and in fact he did so, submitting affidavits, Warren Commission testimony, and technical data concerning the Kennedy assassination.”

    Newman falsely declared that the district court had allowed us to submit our evidence, and even implied that Judge Martin had given it due consideration! Newman, who had the full record in front of him, kept from his readers that the defendants raised a new issue at the last minute, but that Martin refused to receive evidence going to that issue and, in fact, tried to prevent us from submitting it into the record of the case.

    “The District Court … rejected the Lanham Act claims because appellant had failed to present facts supporting his claims of false advertising . . .”

    He did not mention my July 8, 1994 letter to Martin.

    “In this case, Groden had sufficient notice that appellees’ motion might be converted and a sufficient opportunity to present any evidence relevant to the resolution of the action.”

    “Initially, it is doubtful that the District Court acted sua sponte, as Groden contends, since the motion before the Court explicitly sought summary judgment as an alternate form of relief to a Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal.”

    In other words, according to Newman, the judgment filed in the official court record stating that Martin had converted the defendants’ Motion on his own initiative was a false instrument, and Groden was a liar.

    Newman passed over the amendment of Mr. Groden’s Complaint to claim that more than one gunman killed President Kennedy as nothing but “… a new substantive paragraph clarifying the Lanham Act claim.”

    “Appellant thereafter moved for reconsideration of the dismissal ruling and for recusal of the District Judge. Judge Martin denied rehearing and dismissed the amended complaint, concluding that nothing new had been alleged. The recusal motion was denied for lack of any factual basis.”

    Demonstrating an intricate capacity for denial, deflection, and distortion, Newman clearly implied that Groden’s Motion had been fully litigated; in truth, Martin never held a motion conference and would not permit me to submit papers or argue the Motion.

    Finally, in his Opinion dated July 28, 1995, Judge Newman divined “[Groden’s] real interest in filing this lawsuit – an attempt to use a district court trial as a forum for ascertaining the facts concerning the Kennedy assassination.” Groden v. Random House, Inc., et al., 61 F.3d 1045 (2d Cir. 1995)

    Quite the opposite, these judges had something they wished to say about how they felt about the Kennedy assassination controversy, and the efficacy of Bob Groden’s calling, and they were not about to let evidence, or even argument, stand in the way of their pompous pronouncements.

    Newman did more than make himself an accessory to the deceit by the district court; he embellished and improved upon it.

    What Did Sonia Sotomayor Know, and When Did She Know It?

    The Hon. Sonia Sotomayor was a Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and a member of its Committee on Grievances. Indeed, the record of the disciplinary proceeding reflects that Judge Sotomayer was one of the original recipients of a September 27, 1994 internal court memorandum that Judge John Martin wrote to his colleagues complaining against me. Judge Sotomayer is now a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

    This is not a case where the author of a judicial opinion has fallen victim to a deceit foisted upon her by her own judicial brethren. Sotomayor was all too familiar with the facts of the Groden case.

    The Committee on Grievances reviewed and deliberated upon an uncontested record consisting of documents that were submitted by both the Committee’s counsel and me. These included virtually the entire contents of the District Court’s and Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ files from the Groden v. Random House, Inc., et al., litigation. The District Court, both in its final disbarment order and while defending itself from an appeal, represented that it conducted a de novo review of these submissions, which means that it did not simply rely on briefs or selected excerpts of the record, but reviewed all the evidence submitted in the matter.

    During the Groden litigation in the District Court

    Of particular interest is a contemporaneous fax by the Grievance Committee of the full transcript of my appearance in front of Judge John Martin on October 21, 1994. (See Attachment No. 4.) (The fax header identifies the Committee Chair, Judge Robert P. Patterson, Jr., as a recipient.) Besides indicating that the Committee was secretly monitoring the Groden post-judgment proceedings, this transcript records me referring repeatedly to Martin’s refusal to allow me to submit papers in support of, or to or orally argue, the September 1 Notice of Motion, and it further reflects that neither Martin nor defendants’ counsel contradicted that assertion in any way.

    Thus, months before Newman wrote his appellate affirmance of Martin’s dismissal of the case, Sotomayor and her colleagues knew that (a) both sides in the Groden litigation had requested a pre-motion conference; (b) Martin had refused to hold one; (c) Martin had instead denied me the opportunity to submit supporting affidavits, appurtenant exhibits, and a Memorandum of Law; and (d) had denied me any opportunity to argue the Motion.

    Besides having this faxed transcript in their hands even as the Groden post-judgment litigation continued, Ms. Sotomayor and the Committee on Grievances had the same transcript in the Joint Appendix to Groden’s appeal, which was among the many documentary materials submitted to them in the subsequent disciplinary proceeding. Both in my appellate briefs and in my submissions to the Grievance Committee, I repeatedly emphasized Martin’s obstructionist conduct. Thus, upon their de novo review of the evidence and briefs, Judge Sotomayor and her colleagues had full notice and knowledge of what had occurred.

    Following the appeal in Groden to the Second Circuit

    On December 18, 1995, the widely-circulated official newspaper of the law profession in New York City, The New York Law Journal, published a full column-length letter by me, replying to an earlier article about the Groden case. (See Attachment No. 5.) Besides its publication in the newspaper, I later included a copy of this letter in my later submissions to the Grievance Committee. Here is a relevant excerpt:

    For the first time in history. substantial relevant, competent and admlssible evidence was presented to a court of law through the affidavits of medlcal experts, official government documents (including eye- and earwitness accounts), and nearly two dozen film exhibits on videocassette to support Mr. Groden’s contention that President John F. Kennedy was shot by at least two gunmen, and that the defendants’ advertising campaign was literally and explicitly false, disparaging, and anticompetitive. Initially, notwithstanding our written offer of proof, the district judge refused to allow us to submit this material in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.”

    (Respondent’s Exhibit 9, Letter to the Editor, “Additional Comment on Lanham Act Suit,” The New York Law Journal, December 18, 1995), In the Matter of Roger Bruce Feinman, S.D.N.Y.(Docket No. M-2-238).

    Besides having access to the entire record, it is indisputable that Ms. Sotomayor and her colleagues actually reviewed and examined it.

    De Novo Review of the Evidence

    The Committee on Grievances retained an attorney, Steven C. Krane, Esq., to defend it against my appeal from its disbarment order to the U.S. Court of Appeals. In Mr. Krane’s appellate brief and oral advocacy before that Court, he asserted both in writing and orally on behalf of the Committee on Grievances that the entire Committee had actually reviewed and examined the evidence before issuing its Order.

    In his “Brief for the Appellee,” Mr. Krane asserted: The district court “examined the evidence (including that submitted by Mr. Feinman) and made its Order.”12

    The district court conducted a “de novo review of the panel’s findings.”13

    According to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ audio recording of Mr. Krane’s appearance on July 17, 1998, the following colloquy occurred between the presiding member of the Court, Judge José Cabranes, and Mr. Krane:

    “BY THE COURT: Judge Patterson’s Order is on behalf of the Committee

    KRANE: Yes, it is.

    THE COURT: – on behalf of the committee of six district judges?

    MR. KRANE: Yes it is. The Findings and Recommendations were reviewed by all six judges, and Judge Patterson signed the Order as Chair at-the time of the Committee on Grievances.

    Audio tape of proceedings held by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Matter of Roger Bruce Feinman, Docket No. 97-6064 (July 17, 1998) (on file with Calendar Clerk, Tape #278).

    Upon information and belief, when Mr. Krane appeared before the Second Circuit Court, he acted within the scope of his representation, with full authority as an attorney on behalf of the Committee on Grievances. Accordingly, both his written and oral assertions before that Court bind the Committee as having been made by their agent, at their behest, and with their knowledge, consent, and full blessing.

    The evidence, and the conclusions that logically flow from that evidence, are therefore inescapable: Sonia Sotomayor was fully apprised and aware that Jon O. Newman filed a false account of the Groden case in his Opinion affirming the judgment of the District Court dismissing Mr. Groden’s case. She had the facts even before Newman published his Opinion. Nevertheless, she twice subscribed to that false account, first when she ratified the disbarment of Mr. Groden’s attorney, and later, when she cited and promoted Newman’s Opinion in the Groden case.

    The Deleterious Effect of Falsifying Judicial Decisions

    Lying may be entrenched in public and private life, but it has no place in judicial decisions.

    A judicial opinion is an official act on which others rely. It decides a case and pronounces the law. A judge who decides a case without weighing one party’s evidence is denying the possibility that evidence will sway him. Such a judge is unlikely to be a person of integrity.14

    Writing an opinion without presenting a truthful account of the procedure or a meaningful account of one side’s arguments is propaganda. A judge who sets out to write a decision in which he knowingly falsifies the procedural facts of the case to achieve a desired result is perforce a dishonest judge. He has filed a false instrument with the clerk of his own court. He has obstructed justice. An appellate judge who would cover-up for the wrongdoer, going so far as to applaud his action as “appropriate” in any sense of that word, would be little more than a common criminal disguised in judicial robes. The fact that a judge’s recitation of the relevant facts in his decision cannot be trusted is crippling. Lawyers throughout the country rely on these written decisions in arguing their own clients’ cases. Other judges in other state and federal courts rely on these decisions in deciding those other cases. Once it spreads through the literature (and the spread can be fairly rapid) the consequences of this kind of misrepresentation – this fiction – can be practically irreversible absent some dramatic countermeasures.

    In the final analysis, this is not a question of “disagreeing” with the decisions of the Groden courts: One must disagree with them only in the same broad sense that one must condemn all forms of willful fraud and deceit. These judges did not make mistakes; what they did, they did knowingly, intentionally, and with malice. These judicial opinions were deliberately written with the purpose and intent of deceiving their audience. They falsify the facts of the Groden case. The inference that naturally flows from this falsification is that these Judges resorted to expedient lies to gain credibility and acceptance for decisions that could not otherwise stand up to scrutiny. They are obviously documents constructed to be used for polemical purposes. They have the smell of dead fish.

    The Disciplinary Proceeding

    In a post-judgment Memorandum Decision and Order issued on September 23, 1994, District Judge John S. Martin, Jr. publicly accused me of knowingly making false accusations against him on September 1, 1994, in the 28 U.S.C. ß 455(a) recusal branch of a bare Notice of Motion to reconsider his dismissal of Mr. Groden’s complaint, and next in a letter dated September 19, 1994, that I wrote to Judge Royce C. Lamberth of the District Court for the District of Columbia. There were five recusal allegations in the motion and Judge Martin refused to comment on two of them. He also refused to allow me to support, litigate, or argue any of them.

    In that letter, I referred to Martin’s “crooked and corrupt decision in our case.” I have never seen any reason or need to retract or apologize for that characterization.

    Notwithstanding Judge Martin’s representation that he was referring his complaint to the Disciplinary Committee of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, First Department, no complaint was referred to that or other state court authorities. Instead, he sent his complaint against me to each individual member of the federal district court’s own Committee on Grievances, including Judge Sotomayor, then he continued to preside over post-judgment proceedings in Groden until mid-January 1995. All the while, he apparently funneled Groden suit papers to the Committee on Grievances.

    From that point, Ms. Sotomayor and her colleagues lay in wait, detained any disciplinary action, and did not even notify me that they were coming after me – not until after the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Martin’s dismissal of Mr. Groden’s case, and after Groden’s alternate appellate remedies had expired.

    So, I argued Mr. Groden’s case to the Second Circuit without full knowledge of the Grievance Committee’s actions and future plans. Had those been timely revealed and all the facts then been known, it is a fair assumption that Mr. Groden’s appeal would have been argued differently, and possibly by another attorney. In effect, the Southern District’s Grievance Committee became a silent party to the Groden litigation.

    There is no justification in principle for using disciplinary charges as a delayed action fuse. Serious allegations of ethical violations, if meritorious, should neither be detained nor reserved for the time and forum most advantageous or convenient to a complaining judge and his judicial colleagues. The Grievance Committee never deigned to explain the delay, either in notification of the charges or the activation of the actual disciplinary proceeding.

    The Southern District court’s disciplinary procedures, which were thoroughly revised within weeks after my disbarment, had clearly contemplated proceedings that were merely reciprocal or derivative of state court and state bar association disciplinary matters. They did not permit an attorney accused of professional misconduct to compel either the testimony of non-cooperative witnesses or the production of documents not under his control. I declined to appear before a court-appointed panel of attorneys in private practice, objecting to the panel mechanism upon Article III and Appointments Clause constitutional grounds. There was no evidentiary hearing in the disciplinary matter.

    Additionally, the structure of the federal district court does not allow one judge to rule directly on the legality of another judge’s judicial acts or to deny another district judge his or her 1awful jurisdiction. This, plus the employment of “law of the case,” inter-panel accord, or presumption of regularity principles, effectively precluded me from challenging any aspect of the trial and appellate court rulings in Mr. Groden’s case. Indeed, the attorney advisory panel appears to have relied solely upon Judge Newman’s Opinion and affirmance of Judge Martin’s judgment in Groden as the basis for determining that I made false accusations against Judge Martin.

    The Grievance Committee placed the advisory panel under extraordinary pressure. Whenever I provided extensive submissions in response to the charges, they were amended expansively with new charges, until I ceased answering altogether. Under the original charges of alleged disciplinary violations, the panel was unable to adduce a shred of relevant, competent, or admissible evidence of knowing or reckless falsehood under DR 8-102(A) on any of the stated counts. They were forced to resort to other theories of professional misconduct.

    Nevertheless, despite the extraordinary and clearly improper pressure exerted upon the panel, they completely exonerated me of two complaints that Judge Martin had emphasized in his public denunciation of September 23, 1994, and concluded that my first motion for his recusal – on the grounds of Martin’s past ties to potential witnesses in Mr. Groden’s case – had sufficient factual bases.

    Immobilized by the incontrovertible documentary evidence of a judicial deceit, the panel was then reduced to the silliness of employing their brilliant and expensive prose to express their theory of what constitutes felicitous writing. Having found that it was ethically permissible for me to seek Martin’s disqualification for bias on certain grounds, the attorney advisory panel launched against my alleged rhetorical inferiority with an orgy of self-congratulation. They proposed to disbar me for want of style, taste and discernment.

    For example, if I called Martin’s disposition of the Groden case and his intemperate Memorandum Opinion of September 23, 1994, “more the products of ill will than honest intellectual inquiry,” then my bourgeois plain-spokenness, sniffed these polished and refined partners from the vaunted elite law firms, grated on their sensitive ears and offended their delicate tastes.

    I was accused essentially of failing to maintain proper decorum, as though I were a mere spectator at a football game who impulsively ran onto the field to run interference for my home team’s wide receiver and had to be ejected from the stadium.

    The disciplinary process had no other purpose than to defame and discredit me; to defuse my justifiable criticism of the judges involved in Mr. Groden’s matter; and to protect their reputations. It’s goal was to hermetically seal judicial lies perpetrated against a litigant, his attorney, the press, the Bar, the general public, and other courts. A strong indication of the urgent, imperative nature of this goal was that, despite the lack of any interpersonal contact between the Committee on Grievances or its advisory panel and me, I was precluded from ever applying for reinstatement as an attorney without producing “a psychiatric evaluation stating that Mr. Feinman is in good health.” In other words, they had no means through which to attack the credibility of my dissection of this judicial fraud, and it was apparently a struggle for them to impeach my sanity as well, albeit they gave it their best shot. Shades of “re-education” in the former Soviet Union and Communist China.

    The Culture of Collegiality

    One judge lies; the others swear by it.

    That is the sum and substance of the problem facing the Judiciary Committee and full Senate in the matter of the Sotomayor nomination.

    There is a culture of collegiality among the incumbents of the Second Judicial Circuit, grounded in the general motive to preserve and continue their future relations and interaction, both formal and informal. Although their tenure is constitutionally guaranteed, from a practical standpoint, they must rely upon one another’s cooperation. However, when this culture of collegiality – this community of interest that the federal judiciary has created – encapsulates a closing of the ranks behind two judges without any regard to whether the facts supported their rulings – much like volunteering a passcard to enjoy their gated enclave – then what becomes of due process? Of Article III judicial independence?

    In a form of emotional blackmail reminiscent of the children’s fable about The Emperor’s New Clothes, the judges who presided in the Groden matter made their colleagues their willing accomplices in order to avoid the social and political costs of exposing and condemning their deceits. They counted on the decisive role being played, not by facts, evidence or law, but by cherished beliefs and comforting assumptions about the honesty, integrity and good faith of judicial officers and the common interests they supposedly share. It is clear that Sonia Sotomayor followed and complied.

    Despite her strong familiarity with the Groden matter and subsequent disciplinary proceeding as a district court judge, she nevertheless cited to Newman’s opinion in the Groden case as an appellate judge, as though it related the true facts. She knew what had happened. She knew that she was promoting a false and fraudulent account of the procedural facts in Groden. She could have washed her hands of the fraud, and refrained from giving it practically her support. Instead, she kept silent; she went along. She put her colleagues’ reputational interests ahead of repudiating false and fraudulent judicial misrepresentations.

    Covering up must be seen for what it is: taking on a shared responsibility for her colleagues’ malfeasance.15

    If, while sitting as both a district court and a circuit court judge, Sotomayor would not expose her colleagues’ manipulation or disregard of the facts in Bob Groden’s matter, can she be trusted to perform the role of a principled legal decision-maker?

    It is not merely her truthfulness; the issue is her willingness and backbone to transcend twenty years of acculturation as a member of the federal judiciary – including the personality cult surrounding that master of mythology, Jon O. Newman – and to stand up to expose a wrong committed in her presence and with her approval. It is her ability to think and act in an independent manner, paying no special deference to her colleagues. It is her ability to withstand the stress of going it alone.

    The collegiality problem in the Second Circuit has previously reared its head in slightly different form, when Senator Bob Dole and former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, among others, repeatedly criticized Judge Harold Baer, Jr., also of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, and accused him of harboring a prejudice and bias that infected his decision in a drug case.16 In the case of Carol Bayless, Baer suppressed 80 pounds of cocaine and heroin, with a street value of $4 million dollars, found in the back of a rental car with out-of-state license tags, at 5:00 a.m., after police officers observed four men loading duffel bags into the trunk of the car, and after at least one of the men fled upon seeing the police. Judge Baer incorporated into his decision on that search-and-seizure problem a personal stereotype he had about what the white police and the black street denizens of Harlem were like, and how they were prone to behave. He let that stereotype infiltrate his reasoning and judgment, and he apparently did this without having heard all of the available evidence. Because he allowed his personal and highly prejudicial generalization of life on the streets of Harlem to invade his evaluation of the issue before him, Judge Baer effectively precluded the prosecution from bringing out the truth at the trial of the matter.

    For a very brief while, the obsequious and sycophantic letter-writing, editorializing, and speechmaking hierarchy of the law profession found in Harold Baer a cause as convenient to their political agendas as it befit their unctuous sanctimony. Although Baer later admitted he had made a mistake, that was not before a tremendous public furor erupted over criticism of the judiciary as posing a grave threat to the foundations of the country. Leaders of the bench and bar rushed to publish articles condemning the criticism of judges. They stood reflexively together to defend a judge under attack, even though he had committed a grave error.

    Amid that frenzy of adulation for the federal judiciary from the vaunted dignitaries of the Bar, on March 28, 1996, four senior judges of the Second Circuit injected themselves into the public debate over the boundaries of criticism directed against federal judges by issuing what one major newspaper called an “extraordinary public statement”17 brazenly condemning criticism of federal judges. Perhaps not so coincidentally, just eight months earlier, two of the judges (Newman and Feinberg) had upheld John Martin’s rulings in the Groden matter. Although criticism of Baer posed no realistic threat to the judiciary, such attacks, they pontificated, “threaten to weaken the constitutional structure of this nation.” Embellishing their sanctimonious demagoguery, they said,

    “Attacks on a judge risk inhibition of all judges as they conscientiously endeavor to discharge their constitutional responsibilities.”18

    How did the attacks upon one threaten all? The high priests did not deign to explain.

    The judges apparently felt so strongly about the need for them to defend judges against attack that they deemed it “overriding” of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.

    The hallmark of the Groden case, and the related disciplinary proceedings that followed it, is that, between all the federal district and appellate court proceedings, eleven district judges and a “baker’s dozen” of Second Circuit judges were exposed to the full Groden record, whose pertinent aspects were highlighted in the numerous briefs, motions, and petitions that I filed from 1994 through 2000. There wasn’t a single whistleblower concerning Groden’s attempts to meet the Martin-Kovner argument with a showing of evidence, or the lies that covered up his thwarted efforts. Not one, including Sotomayor, deemed the denial of Groden’s basic, unquestionable procedural and due process rights worthy of mention – not even in an obscure footnote. Not a single judge raised his or her voice in protest against the perversion of the judicial process. They were more concerned with their institutional priority of upholding the reputation of the federal judiciary than with a plain, ordinary citizen’s simple claim to due process – the right to present his evidence and arguments in court, and to have them weighed before losing his legal rights and more. They stood as one to protect the church of the federal judiciary in preference to exposing a rank and odious injustice. Like John Martin’s “actual facts” or Jon Newman’s “true facts” of President Kennedy’s death, the plain facts of Mr. Groden’s case lie buried beneath a small avalanche of glib citations, including that endorsed by Ms. Sotomayor during her own federal tenure.

    Nonetheless, it is Sotomayor, not her colleagues in the Second Judicial Circuit, who now stands for elevation to the nation’s court of last resort. And that is what casts her conduct in such a worrisome light. Can a judge who was willing to lend herself to a judicial lie – an outright fraud perpetrated upon a litigant, the organized Bar, the press, the public, and the courts of other jurisdictions – be trusted to sit on a court from which no further appeal can ever be taken? This is a question too critical to be left in the hands of lawyers and judges. For the sake of our democracy, it must be answered by the people themselves and their representatives in the United States Senate. Therefore, Professor Feldman’s cautionary notes merit at least a brief pause at the sound of the two-minute warning in this game. For all must understand that federal judges enjoy life tenure, and that the next Associate Justice of the Supreme Court may enjoy a tenure lasting as long as 35 years. Assuming his re-election, Mr. Obama’s maximum tenure is eight years, nevertheless, the rest of us will live with his choice for decades to come. The stakes could not be higher.

    Postscript

    Jon O. Newman continues to hear a reduced appellate caseload as a senior judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

    Although she has sat with Newman on dozens of appellate panels since she ascended to that Court nine years ago, the number of dissents from his opinions that Sonia Sotomayor has filed may be counted on the fingers of one hand.

    The Honorable John S. Martin, Jr., having failed to advance to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States, eventually became dissatisfied as a federal district judge and decided that his time was actually worth far more than a public servant’s salary – as much as $1,000 per hour, or so he proclaimed to the trade press – so he resigned from the federal bench in 2003 and returned to the private practice of law. Although he attempted to cloak his retirement from the judiciary as a “resignation in protest” against the harshness of federal sentencing guidelines, such noble pretensions contrasted starkly with his imposition of perhaps the cruelest and most unusual criminal sentence in United States history, condemning Luis Felipe, leader of the Almighty Latin King & Queens Nation, to a living death – life plus 45 years in solitary confinement, to be served incommunicado, i.e., without visitation, and completely isolated from all except his lawyer.

    Martin continues to practice law in a private partnership on Fifth Avenue in New York City.

    Due to the deaths of key witnesses during the intervening years since the Groden lawsuit, Martin was, and will likely remain, the only federal trial court judge in history who – at his own instigation, it bears emphasis in bold – was ever presented with a body of relevant, competent, and admissible evidence (medical, scientific, eyewitness. earwitness, photographic and motion picture) that two gunmen shot President Kennedy, but who turned aside and refused to even look at it, not less than four times.


    NOTES

    1. Although not identified in the ad campaign, the quote came from a 1989 book called High Treason, the product of two men, Mr. Groden and Harrison E. Livingstone. That book contained separate copyright notices, Livingstone’s clearly indicating that he owned the sole copyright to some of the work. [JA 68] Later paperback editions completely eliminated Mr. Groden’s copyright interest. [JA 300] During litigation in the U.S. District Court of Random House’s motion for summary judgment, conflicting evidence about the authorship and copyright ownership of High Treason was submitted, and there was no evidence in the record that Mr. Groden had ever held himself out to the public as co-author of the entire work, or that he had any control over the original publication and later revisions of the book.

    2. Judge Martin’s Individual Rules as then in force are reproduced in the Joint Appendix at 302-04. Groden v. Random House, Inc., et al., 61 F.3d 1045 (2d Cir. 1995)(Docket No. 94-9100).

    3. Document No. 9, “Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment,” Groden v. Random House, Inc., et al., 1994 WL 45555, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11794, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1266, 1994-2 Trade Cas. P70,702, 22 Media L. Rep. 2257 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 19941 (No. 94-Civ. 1074).

    4. Although Martin had extensive and longstanding personal and professional ties with the Department of Justice (as Assistant Solicitor General he participated in the extradition of James Earl Ray following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; as U.S. Attorney in Manhattan he prosecuted members of the Weather Underground; and he had previously employed the in-house lawyer for Random House who was supervising both the Groden litigation and a parallel lawsuit brought by Mark Lane in the District of Columbia), during the Groden litigation Martin seemed more impressed by the “old school” ties he shared with the defendants’ lead outside counsel, his Columbia Law School classmate, Victor A. Kovner. Indeed, in a September 23, 1994, post-judgment Memorandum Order and Opinion, Martin called his connection to Kovner “a far more significant fact” in his dismissal of Groden’s lawsuit than his Justice Department connections and experiences. Kovner was Bill Clinton’s chief New York fundraiser, friend, confidant and, according to one newspaper columnist, a “judge maker”. Kovner’s wife, Sarah Schoenkopf Kovner, was Special Assistant to Clinton’s Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna E. Shalala. One of his law partners, Laura Handman, was the wife of Clinton’s former White House Deputy Chief of Staff, Harold Ickes. The Kovners accompanied the Clintons to Israel during the Groden litigation, although their role in Mideast diplomacy was never clarified. While Kovner’s motion to dismiss Groden’s lawsuit was pending, he and Martin dined together at New York’s Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, a fact they never disclosed to Mr. Groden’s attorney.

    5. That case holds that there is no first amendment privilege for expressions of “opinion” per se, since such expressions often imply an assertion of objective fact. An allegedly libelous (hence, false and defamatory statement, is not protected under the first amendment if it states or implies assertions of fact which are provable as false. As Mr. Kovner correctly noted, therefore, the test, was “verifiability,” or whether the statement was capable of being objectively characterized as true or false.

    6. Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1962), citing United States v. Ninety-Five Barrels of Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438, 443 (1924) (“Deception may result from the use of statements not technically false or which may be literally true.”).

    7. Kovner’s raising an important argument for the first time in a post-submission letter under the guise of a request for further briefing did not seem to trouble the District Court, neither did it trouble the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, as we’ll see later.

    8. (Joint Appendix at 177. Groden v. Random House, Inc., et al., 61 F.3d 1045 (2d Cir. 1995)(Docket No. 94-9100))

    9. Joint Appendix 184-352. Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045 (2d Cir. 1995) (Docket No. 94-9100) and the videocassette enclosed in an envelope attached to Document 19, Groden v. Random House, Inc., et al., 1994 WL 45555, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11794, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1266, 1994-2 Trade Cas. P70,702, 22 Media L. Rep. 2257 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1994)(No. 94-Civ. 1074). (see also, Respondent’s Exhibit 5 and the videocassette submitted to the U.S.D.C.-S.D.N.Y. Grievance Committee in Matter of Roger Bruce Feinman, Docket No. M-2-238.)

    10. This case would have been for me to try, not Mr. Groden. Consistent with my duty to exercise independent judgment on behalf of my client, the evidentiary showing that we wished to make in opposition to summary judgment was entirely my work product and responsibility — conceived, ordered and compiled by me based upon my own studies of the Kennedy assassination during the past 30 years, and Mr. Groden merely assisted me in editing a videocassette of exhibits; consulting with me about the contents of his affidavits; and reviewing and signing the affidavits that I drafted for him, adding a few of his own personal touches as he and I felt appropriate.

    11. In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, No. 94-8563 (Jud’l. Council of the 2nd Cir.).

    12. Brief for the Appellee Committee on Grievances of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, dated July 10, 1998, at p. 13, U.S.C.A.2d (Docket No. 97-6064).

    13. Id. at 21, n. 10.

    14. Stephen L. Carter, Integrity. Basic Books, New York: 1995

    15. Sissela Bok, “Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life.” Second Vintage Books Edition (1999) at 158.

    16. See, e.g., The New York Daily News, Saturday, January 27, 1996, p. 5.

    17. The New York Times, March 29, 1996, p. B1,4

    18. Joint statement of Jon 0. Newman, J. Edward Lumbard, Wilfred Feinberg, and James L. Oakes, former chief judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, March 28, 1996.

  • Pat Speer, The Mysterious Death of Number Thirty-Five

    Pat Speer, The Mysterious Death of Number Thirty-Five


    speer dvdA new video documentary on the medical evidence in the JFK case is raising the bar on Kennedy research productions.

    In The Mysterious Death of Number Thirty-Five, longtime researcher Pat Speer was aided by two skillful technicians, director Braddon Mendelson and music composer Scott Douglas MacLachlan. These two men, especially the former, were very helpful in making Speer’s documentary aesthetically pleasing.

    (One of my pet peeves in the Kennedy research field is that many independent video productions e.g. Shane O’Sullivan’s DVD RFK Must Die! look like they were made in 1965. That is, at about the skill and technical level of Emile D’Antonio’s talking head film of Mark Lane’s Rush to Judgment. With all the incredible advances in computer programming we have today, this is completely unnecessary. For a very reasonable price one can put together a slick looking production. And make no mistake, the skill in presentation makes a difference in the effective delivery of the message.)

    In this regard, Speer was well served by his cohorts. This film should serve as a model for how to represent the research community in this digital day and age. It is not in the technical stratosphere of Robert Stone’s Oswald’s Ghost, but 1.) Speer didn’t have Stone’s bucks, and 2.) Speer has actually dug beneath the surface of the Warren Commission pabulum. And what he shows us is stark, black, and even worse, proved that way by their own words and deeds.

    If you have read Part Four of my review of Vincent Bugliosi’s Reclaiming History, you can see I used some of Speer’s material in my critique of the former DA’s discussion of President Kennedy’s autopsy. Although Speer has a wider range of interest in the JFK case, he has spent most of his time studying the medical evidence. (Although this may be changing. In a recent appearance on Len Osanic’s Black Op Radio, Speer hinted that he may be doing an essay on the legitimacy of the evidence found at the so-called sniper’s nest.)

    This documentary has five major sections. The first is an examination of some of the work of Dr. Michael Baden for the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). The second section deals with how the Warren Commission made the Single Bullet Theory (SBT) work. The third part is about the reaction of the government to the critical works about the Warren Commission, which emerged in 1966-67, and how high officials forced the pathologists to switch their stories and dissimulate in public. Part four deals with the true orientation of the famous “mystery photo” of the autopsy. It is sometimes called the “skull wound” photo. It is a crucial piece of evidence since allegedly it is the only photo taken of the skull with the scalp refracted and a hole evident. The last part of the documentary is a slide show, which Pat uses to discuss various pieces of medical evidence that are quite puzzling when they stand alone. So he places them in context with other exhibits to try and explain their meaning.

    The first section is slightly humorous, in that it shows us an alleged authority tripping up over the evidentiary flip flops necessitated by upholding the official story. Speer shows us some rarely seen House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) footage of Michael Baden up on a stage introducing the “Mystery photo”. One reason the picture is called that is because the photo is posed and shot so badly that it is hard to orient the picture. Therefore it is not easy to orient as part of President Kennedy’s head. Surely, Baden is clueless as to what it represents. When he placed the picture on an easel for public display, instead of placing it right side up, it was upside down. Which disorients top, bottom, left and right. We then watch as he begins to lecture about it, saying that it depicted the front of Kennedy’s skull and the defect on it was a beveled wound of exit. He actually quotes pathologist Jim Humes as saying this. Yet, pathologists Humes, and Pierre Finck both originally wrote – and we see their original typed words on screen – that they could find no exit near that point. We then see how Baden got the HSCA artist to draw an illustration of a bullet exiting at this point – above the forehead on the right side – with no bone above that trajectory. Yet, as Speer informs us, the Ramsey Clark Panel – appointed to review the medical evidence in 1968 – also wrote that there was no exit in the forehead above the right eye.

    Speer closes this section with what made these gyrations necessary. He poses this question: Why all this thrashing about by Baden in 1978? Didn’t the original autopsy team of Humes, Finck, and Thornton Boswell identify what this photo really represented? The answer to that question is: Yes, they did just that. But here’s the problem: Unlike Baden, they said the photo depicted the posterior of Kennedy’s skull. Yep, not the front, but the back. So it was imperative that Baden change the positioning of the photo. If he left it as a posterior photo it would appear as an exit in the back of the head – which meant the shot came from the front. Anything exonerating Oswald was altered by Robert Blakey’s HSCA. And Baden, like Arlen Specter, was eager to make a national name for himself. Therefore, he fumbled with the photo in public. Not really caring if it was right side up, upside down, or sideways. After all, he was just reading a script.

    The second section deals almost exclusively with the Warren Commission and their struggle to make the SBT work – whatever the cost. The night of the autopsy, the pathologists could find no exit for the back wound. And the FBI report dutifully recorded this. But as the story goes – and as I wrote in my Bugliosi review there is reason to doubt it – Humes talked to the Dallas doctors the next day and discovered a tracheotomy incision was made over a neck wound. This now became the exit for the back wound.

    Yet, at the Warren Commission executive session hearing of 1/27/64, Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin exclaimed that the back wound was too low to match the throat wound. Knowing this, the Commission sent Specter into action. Humes and Boswell were sent to meet with a young medical illustrator named Harold Rydberg. Rydberg was supposed to draw illustrations of both the wounds in the head and the wound in the back. There was a serious problem with the meeting. Humes and Boswell came to meet him with nothing: no photos, sketches, measurements. And we know this to be true not just from Rydberg, but as Speer shows, through the notes of his commanding officer, Captain Stover. The doctors now instructed Rydberg to draw a fallacious portrait of the back wound to cure Rankin’s problem. With nothing to go by except the pathologists’ words, he did. Rydberg raised the wound in the back above the wound in the neck. (Speer even shows a Warren Commission internal memo where Specter admits there is a discrepancy between the Rydberg drawings and the actual wound locations.)

    To underline Specter’s perfidy, the film then moves to the Dallas reconstruction of the shooting. Specter later admitted that a Secret Service officer had shown him the autopsy photos that day. (There is a question about who it is. It may be Elmer Moore or Tom Kelley.) As shown in the film, the photo of Specter lining up this reconstruction used by the Commission does not reveal the accurate white dot on the model locating the back wound. But Speer shows us another photo, which does show it. And at this location, from the high sixth floor angle, the trajectory would not have exited the throat. It would have been too low. During his Warren Commission testimony of 6/4/64, FBI agent Lyndal Shaneyfelt was careful to dance around this issue saying that the trajectory “approximated” the entrance wound. But in private, Rankin was much more candid about the Commission’s aim: “Our intention is not to establish the point with complete accuracy, but merely to substantiate the hypothesis which underlies the conclusions that Oswald was the sole assassin.” (Memo of 4/27/64) Note the use of the word “hypothesis”. Rankin knows they never proved their case. Even today, it is still shocking to read something as cavalier as that about the assassination of President Kennedy. Which clearly connotes the irresponsible attribution of murder to a man who was never allowed a defense.

    The film goes on to show just how conscious the dog and pony show was. When Kelley testified before the Commission on 6/4/64, he let it slip that the wound was located in the shoulder area. Specter quickly covered up for him by saying it was actually in the neck. Speer tops this section off by repeating the declassified revelation that Commissioner Gerald Ford then changed the wording of the Warren Report by moving the location of the back wound from the back to the neck. The coda to this segment is the audiotapes of the famous phone call between LBJ and Commissioner Richard Russell. This is where they both admit that they don’t believe the SBT. Which, ipso facto, makes them conspiracy theorists.

    Section Three begins with the tumult caused in 1966-67 by the publication of books by authors who actually read the Warren Commission volumes and found them remarkably unconvincing. Speer here uses the famous memo from former Warren Commission counsel David Slawson, originally discovered by Gary Aguilar. Lawson worked in the Justice Department at the time, and he understood what was at stake – namely the undoing of the entire Commission, and the staff’s pubic disgrace and humiliation. So Slawson wanted to head the critics off at the pass. On 11/20/66 he wrote to Attorney General Ramsey Clark, “If public opinion continues to develop as it has over the past few months, we may soon be forced with a politically unstoppable demand for a free-wheeling re-investigation of all aspects.” Slawson had no intention of risking being tarred and feathered in public.

    So what Slawson and Clark helped plan was a narrowly focused counter-attack. What this consisted of was bringing in the pathologists and rehearsing them on how to address the critic’s points through the media. So in late 1966, Boswell was released from his vow of silence and allowed to talk to the press. And he now magically moved up the wound in the back to the neck so it would correspond more with the Rydberg illustration. Which, of course, it did not.

    But further, the counter-attack fostered by Slawson now also employed his boss, Warren Commissioner John McCloy. In 1966 CBS had planned to air a public debate about the Commission’s conclusions. This would give both sides equal time. But as this idea went up the corporate ladder, the concept was first smothered and then completely skewered. In 1967, McCloy was brought in to be a special, but secret adviser to the now infamous series. This Eastern Establishment paragon flew into Washington and met with people like Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara. Now, Pierre Finck was ordered back from Vietnam to join the two other autopsists for another viewing of the photos and x-rays. In January of 1967, Clark told LBJ that the doctors were defensive about their work and worried about their reputations. But he figured he could get them to sign affidavits in a couple of days. It took more cajoling and arm-twisting than that. It took five days. But by the end of January, the Mystery Photo had been reoriented. It was now rotated from the back to the front of the head.

    Jeremy Gunn of the Assassination Records Review Board interviewed the pathologists about this reversal that took place from 1966 to 1967. To say the least, they were non-committal. They now had hazy memories about how it happened. As they should have. Because the affidavits they signed were not written by them. They were written by the Justice Department. The doctors were now reduced to the level of prop masters. And they reluctantly went along with it.

    The last segment consists of Speer demonstrating through four landmarks in the photo that he has oriented the picture correctly. The autopsists originally had it right. It depicts the rear of the head. And through his study of the photo and the x-rays he believes that two shots hit the president’s head, one from the front and one from behind. The small entrance wound is down low near the base of the skull. The larger exit wound is above it. This idea, originally expressed by Ray Marcus back in the mid-sixties, gets evidentiary back-up here. The film advances evidence concerning entrance and exit holes in the photos, x-rays, and with primary documentation. The fact that the pathologists were forced to retreat by Ramsey Clark, shows them professionally compromised for the third time in just four years. The first time was by the military the evening of the autopsy. The second time was by Specter and the Commission. The third time was by Clark and his preparations for the review suggested by Slawson.

    The appendix to the documentary is a slide show in which Speer presents some fascinating exhibits in the medical evidence. These constitute neat little lessons in certain aspects of the case. In almost every instance, we see how drawings and exhibits were falsified in order to accommodate Oswald as the lone assassin. My favorite is Speer’s critique of the HSCA’s trajectory analyst Tom Canning. And how he had to alter his measurements and drawings in order to accommodate the medical evidence. Even to the point of shrinking Kennedy’s head!

    One of the best aspects of the film is the way the film-makers actually use the words of the investigators themselves to show their true intentions at the time. And this shows that the JFK/Oswald travesty was no accident. It was designed to deceive. Its not an original device by any means. It goes back to Marjorie Field’s aborted sixties book The Evidence. But it’s nice to see it used in a different medium.

    I have two main criticisms of the show. First, I disagree with some of the interpretations of the evidence and testimony. Speer is trying to show how the official story – in and of itself – exonerates Oswald. In other words, he does what he does without questioning the validity of the actual evidence. In courtroom terms, it’s called using your opponent’s evidence against him. As I showed in my aforementioned critique of Reclaiming History, I disagree about the provenance of certain aspects of the evidence. For example, the 6.5 mm fragment that no one can recall from the night of the autopsy. Speer also believes the photos are completely genuine. Even the famous back of the head photo, which looks as if the pathologists reassembled the back of JFK’s head. And afterwards, they then gave him a hair cut and combed his hair. Combed it right over that big hole that upwards of forty people saw in both Dallas and Bethesda. He may be doing this because he really believes it. Or perhaps he sees this as the safest, most acceptable, most mainstream way to challenge the official findings. Either way, in my view, it leaves certain matters unexplained. Secondly, although the documentary is good enough as far as it goes, I don’t think it covered as much as it should have. In other words, it could have been longer and therefore more complete as to the medical evidence. I hope that another installment is issued.

    But in spite of that, it’s worth owning and watching. It has new and fascinating information in it. And it also reveals just how hard the forces of the cover-up must work to keep the autopsy evidence in this case in check. Because with the revelations of the Assassination Records Review Board and the work of people like Speer and others e.g. Gary Aguilar, David Mantik, Milicent Cranor, Randy Robertson, this area has become one of the greatest liabilities for upholders of the Warren Commission. And recall, this type of evidence is usually titled by rubrics like “hard evidence” or “best evidence”. As is shown here, the so-called “best evidence” does the opposite of what the Warren Commission says it did. It exonerates Oswald and indicates conspiracy.

  • Specter’s Switch: an update


    As recently as March 18th Arlen Specter’s office released a statement stating almost unequivocally that he was going to run for re-election as a Republican. Five weeks later he changed his mind, and it is pretty clear why. It is being reported that Specter’s own internal polling showed him going down to a crushing defeat in the Republican Primary, even in a three-way race with Pat Toomey and Peg Luksik (an anti-choice activist who could be expected to split the conservative vote — in theory an advantage for Specter). Ironically, an F&M poll that was about to be released, but was recalled after the Specter announcement and then was released to political bloggers, had Specter eking out a 3-point primary win against Toomey and Luksik, but even that poll showed a dramatic Specter decline from March when F&M had him ahead by 15-points.

    So just when all seemed bleak for Arlen Specter, along came Ed Rendell, Joe Biden, Harry Reid, et al and threw him a lifeline he would have been insane to refuse. If he switched his party registration and agreed to run for re-election as a Democrat they would clear the Primary field for him; raise tons of money for his campaign; preserve his Senate seniority; and award him a major committee chairmanship upon his return to the Senate as a Democrat. In return the Democrats reportedly asked only that he support the Obama agenda, at least when it came to cloture votes to cut off filibusters, and that he support the Obama healthcare reform agenda. That’s a pretty sweet deal for someone facing political extinction as his only alternative.

    In the six days after announcing his “conversion” (and if you were listening you would have noticed that he had lots of bad things to say about the Republicans, but virtually nothing positive to say about the Democrats), Specter has done the following:

    • Announced that the Democrats cannot count on him to be a 60th vote against cloture (the process for cutting off a filibuster which requires a 60-vote super-majority).
    • Announced that he would continue to oppose Employee Fair Trade Act (when that Act was introduced in the last session Specter was a co-sponsor, and he only changed his mind after Toomey announced his Primary challenge necessitating a Specter shift to the Right. One would think that now that he is a Democrat another flip-flop might be in order, but that apparently would conflict with Specter’s principles)
    • Announced that he would continue to oppose Obama’s nominee to be Head of the Office of Legal Council, Dawn Johnsen (the Right opposes her nomination largely on the grounds that she is in favor of investigating torture allegations during the Bush Administration and is strongly pro-choice). It is hard to fathom what someone who voted to install Alberto Gonzales in that job could find objectionable about Ms. Johnsen.
    • Voted against Barack Obama’s budget along with all the Senate Republicans.
    • Voted against the “Helping Families Save Their Homes” Act, again joining all the Senate Republicans.

    On the May 3rd edition of Meet the Press, Specter told David Gregory that he was misquoted when the media reported that he had told President Obama that he would be a “loyal Democrat” and would support the Obama agenda. He also stated unequivocally that he would not support the Obama healthcare reform plan because it included a “public plan,” and was going to be introduced via a process that would prevent the Republicans from filibustering it.

    It now appears that Congressman Joe Sestak (Pa – 7) is considering defying the Party Leadership’s effort to clear the field for Specter by announcing his own run for the Democratic Senate nomination. Sestak is not as progressive as I would like for him to be, and he is unlikely to support the kind of health care reform I seek (and like Specter I am opposed to the public plan, but for very different reasons), but at least he is a Democrat, and he is apparently not a Party insider. He also has a campaign war chest of over $ 3 million which makes him a viable contender.

    I cannot support Arlen Specter for the Democrat nomination to be our Senator. For now, I will be taking a close look at Joe Sestak. I hope the rest of you will do the same. We need to find a viable candidate to run against Arlen Specter in next year’s Democratic Primary. So far Sestak seems to be the only one who is both viable and possibly willing. It is time to launch a Stop Specter movement before it is too late. Let’s prove that our Primary means something, and that it is still the Democratic voters who decide who their candidates will be rather than Party Leaders in Washington and Harrisburg.

    – Jerry Policoff

  • Gus Russo Marches On: Or, Rust Never Sleeps


    The current issue of American Heritage (Winter 2009) contains an article that is actually featured on the cover. It is called “Did Castro OK JFK’s Assassination?” It is by Gus Russo and Stephen Molton, and it is meant as a combination summary/excerpt from their new book Brothers in Arms. After having read Russo’s first book on the JFK case Live By the Sword, and then suffered through both the TV specials he worked on – for PBS in 1993, and ABC in 2003 – I admit I didn’t have the stomach to read the whole book. But I felt it necessary to at least comment on the book via the article. I thought that would spare me a lot of unnecessary work and mental anguish. I was right.

    Anybody who understands the game that Russo learned to play can quickly guess what the book is going to be like from the title. The work will generally concentrate on the USA/Cuba policy from about 1959-1963 to the near absence of anything else in the Kennedy presidency. It will then use many questionable sources from both the CIA and Cuba to cast the Kennedy brothers in the worst light. It will also try and take advantage of the reader’s lack of knowledge of the JFK case in order to distort certain subjects and episodes. The overall aim is twofold: 1.) To slightly modify but support the Warren Commission, and 2.) To trash the Kennedy brothers. These two aims are inextricably linked in the Russo/Molton scheme. That’s because the design is the oldest one in the CIA playbook on the JFK case: Blame the assassination on Oswald, the Cuban sympathizer out to avenge the plots against Fidel Castro by killing the US head of state. This, of course, is what David Phillips thought of doing by bribing an Antonio Veciana relative working for Cuban intelligence in 1964. (See Gaeton Fonzi’s The Last Investigation, p. 143). But Phillips tried to work this same deception even earlier, on 11/25/63, right after Oswald was killed by Jack Ruby. At that time he was using another asset of his from Nicaragua, Gilberto Alvarado. On that day, Alvarado walked into the American Embassy in Mexico City. He told the authorities there that in September, he had seen Oswald with two Cubans at the Cuban consulate. They passed money to Oswald while talking about a murder plot. (See Anthony Summers, Conspiracy, pgs 415-419) In the former case, Phillips called off the effort, perhaps because the earlier Alvarado effort had fallen flat. Alvarado first failed a polygraph and then confessed to manufacturing the story. On the subject of Phillips’ propaganda about the JFK case, in part three of my review of Reclaiming History, I note that Ed Lopez and Dan Hardway of the House Select Committee on Assassinations came to an interesting conclusion about all these “Oswald killed JFK for Castro” stories which surfaced in the wake of the JFK murder. Namely, that every story in this regard was linked to a David Phillips asset. The CIA/Phillips ploy had at least three goals. First, to conceal the actual perpetrators of the plot. Second, to take advantage of Oswald’s undercover intelligence status. Third, to attempt to provoke a full invasion of Cuba in retaliation for the murder of the American president. This last is something that the CIA and Pentagon wanted Kennedy to do for three years. Yet he refused.

    Russo reactivated this tall tale in his previous book, and he and Molton try and dress it up and rerun it again here. Predictably, they begin the article by apologizing for the Warren Commission. They write that the Warren Report was “in hindsight, as accurate as possible.” (p. 20) So clearly they are headed for the concept that certain intelligence operations Oswald crossed over had to remain hidden by the US government. Then the authors pull something that seemed to me to be really dishonest. To impress upon the reader the idea that upper echelon leaders understood that the Commission could not tell the whole truth for national security reasons, they relate the famous conversation of September 18, 1964 between President Johnson and Warren Commissioner Richard Russell. In a taped call of that day, they both said that they did not believe the main conclusion of the Warren Report. In fact, Russell said, “I don’t believe it” and LBJ replied with “I don’t either.” (Ibid) The authors try and present this as both men not believing in the element of a conspiracy involving Oswald as the sole assassin. In other words, they understood Oswald was being egged and urged on by shadowy Cuban intelligence (G-2) cohorts. Yet, as Gerald McKnight makes clear in his fine study of the Commission, this is not what the two were discussing. Russell was talking to Johnson about his resistance to the single bullet theory that was being rammed down his throat by Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin. (Breach of Trust, pgs 283-284) So the proper contextual grounding of this phone call cannot be a conspiracy with just Oswald as the lone gunman. What the two men are objecting to, the SBT, is the basis of Oswald as the lone assassin. Without it, there is more than one assassin. By not fully informing the reader of the context, Russo and Molton distort its meaning.

    Russo and Molton follow this up with another distortion in aid of their “Oswald as Castro agent” agenda. They try to say that Johnson and Robert Kennedy controlled the Warren Commission investigation. In their terms, they “directed its focus.” (Russo and Molton p. 20) See, LBJ and RFK suspected the whole Oswald retaliation story and wanted to keep it from the public. This is more malarkey. The Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) has now declassified every transcript of the Warren Commission executive sessions. In addition, the working papers of the Commission, as held by Rankin, were also turned over. McKnight based his definitive volume about the Commission largely on these ARRB materials. There is no trace in them of any direct influence by Johnson or RFK. The Warren Commission needed no such help in centering on Oswald alone as the killer. In reading the transcripts of the executive sessions and the testimony in the Commission volumes, it seems clear that the most influential commissioners were Allen Dulles, Gerald Ford, and John McCloy. And these three had their minds made up virtually from the beginning. In fact, in a famous anecdote, Dulles passed out a book at an early meeting that described previous presidential assassinations as the work of disturbed misfits. (McKnight, p. 92) Further, Rankin was a longtime crony of J. Edgar Hoover, and the Commission was overwhelmingly reliant on the FBI for its information. The FBI had closed the case against Oswald in early December. And on December 12, 1963 Hoover told Rankin that a.) Oswald was a skilled marksman, and b.) The bullet on Connally’s stretcher had come from Oswald’s rifle. (McKnight, p. 94) These were both false statements. Today, the former is universally agreed upon as false by everyone except Russo. The latter would be proved false by a later interview of Parkland Hospital employee O. P. Wright, one of the two men who first discovered the bullet. (Josiah Thompson, Six Seconds in Dallas, pgs. 175-176) And that Hoover lied about this key fact, and that Rankin accepted the lie tells you all you need to know about the report being, in the authors’ words, “as accurate as possible.” It also tells you why both LBJ and RFK were essentially irrelevant to the proceedings of the Commission. Once the FBI verdict was submitted, Hoover was not going to let the Commission stray from its essential findings. And with McCloy, Dulles, and Ford involved, he didn’t meet much resistance. (I will touch on Johnson’s actual influence later.)

    But in spite of all the errors, distortions, and misrepresentations on just the first page of the excerpt, Russo and Molton insist they actually have the truth. And they add that they will now piece together and “tell the real story for the first time.” (Op. cit. p. 20)

    They begin by saying that Kennedy was in the grip of a Cold War paradigm that was especially true for Cuban relations. They say that President Eisenhower and Vice-President Richard Nixon had been plotting a coup in Cuba. Further, that assassination was part of it. Thus the historical backdrop is dubious at the start. It is true that Eisenhower did OK a plan to overthrow the Castro government. But he was urged on in this by CIA Director Allen Dulles. It was Dulles who first proposed the trade embargo on Cuba and urged Eisenhower to try and spread it to all American allies in order to isolate the island. Many commentators, including Harry Truman, have said it was this move which almost guaranteed that Castro would be thrown into the arms of the Russians. Which may have been the crusty old Director’s aim all along. (I have always respected Dulles’ brains as much as I didn’t the uses to which he put them.) In fact, in this whole preliminary Cuban/American discussion, there is no mention of Dulles or the CIA! Which is incredible. Because it is Dulles and the Agency which will continue with the overthrow plot and push it on the new president after Eisenhower leaves office. This resulted in the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion. And its utter failure caused President Kennedy to fire its main architects, Dulles, Deputy Director Charles Cabell, and Director of Plans Dick Bissell. If you can believe it, in this article, the authors never mention this crucial information.

    Instead, they jump immediately to November of 1961 and Operation Mongoose. And then they distort that also. They say that RFK was closely involved with Mongoose but they leave out the main reason: after they were deceived on the Bay of Pigs, the Kennedys did not trust the CIA anymore. If you leave out the Bay of Pigs debacle, you can shove that crucial fact under the rug. And because this is Gus Russo, the essay tries to state that the Kennedys were part of the CIA’s attempts to assassinate Castro. The problem here is that both the CIA Inspector General Report on the plots to kill Castro, and the records of Mongoose have both been declassified by the ARRB. No reasonable person can state today that those records reveal what Russo says they do. In fact, Russo still uses the notorious liar Sam Halpern to try and insinuate the opposite. Halpern has been exposed many times by, among others, David Talbot and myself as being a fabricator on this issue. Russo and Molton then write that the Missile Crisis was precipitated over Mongoose. Yet in what is probably the best book on the Missile Crisis, The Kennedy Tapes, the authors disagree. In a long and detailed analysis based on declassified Soviet records, they note that Khrushchev first surfaced the idea of shipping nuclear missiles to Cuba in April of 1962. Why? This is one month after the US had completed its installation of Jupiter missiles in Turkey. (Ernest May and Philip Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes, p. 674) That same month, the US resumed nuclear tests in the Pacific. The combination of these two events – both in April of 1962 – coincide with Khrushchev’s first private discussions of the matter with friend and Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan and then with defense minister Rodion Malinovsky. (Ibid p. 675) Further, when Castro was first approached about the installation, he was reluctant to accept it. He felt – correctly – that Cuba was being used to change the global balance of power. (Ibid p. 676) Castro felt that the deployment of the nuclear missiles would itself create an intense crisis. By ignoring all this new, relevant and documented information, the authors can then distort the causes of the Missile Crisis.

    When Russo and Molton go outside of Cuba, they have the same monomaniacal agenda. They actually can write that after Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam were killed, “Fidel became even more certain that he was the next hit on the Kennedys’ list.” (p. 24) This is ridiculous. In the case of Diem, Jim Douglass’ fine book JFK and the Unspeakable shows in exquisite detail that the responsible parties for the murder of Diem were Henry Cabot Lodge and Lucien Conein. (See especially pages 202-209) Not only did Kennedy not know what the two were up to, he was so distraught by what had happened he decided to fire Lodge. As for Trujillo, he had become such a brutal dictator, even his Latin American neighbors urged the US to get rid of him somehow. Yet, there is no evidence that Kennedy ever knew of, let alone approved of a plot. The actual assassination of the man was more or less a spur of the moment outburst. (See William Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History pgs. 196-197)

    Around this point in the excerpt, Russo and Molton go into high gear and begin to describe their plot to kill President Kennedy. To say it is flimsy is to give it too much credibility. Predictably, they trot out the mildewed and disputed Daniel Harker AP story from September of 1963. Every writer in this vein – Jean Davison for example – uses this reportage and none of them seem to note that Castro disputes the story as written. (HSCA interview of Castro 4/3/78) And they also fail to note that there are two stories from this Castro encounter at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana. The second one, reported by the UPI and printed in the NY Times of 9/9/63 does not say the same thing as the Harker AP story. The latter quotes Castro as saying “If US leaders are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe. Let Kennedy and his brother Robert take care of themselves, since they too can be the victims of an attempt which will cause their death.” (p. 25) The UPI fourteen-paragraph story had none of this in it. As the authors note, the Harker story appeared in the New Orleans Times Picayune. The unproven assumption is that Oswald read it and this helped ignite his homicidal tendency to kill Kennedy. So Russo and Molton give us a disputed newspaper story that was assumed to be read by Oswald as key evidence in motivation.

    What is the rest of the plot? Well, essentially it is a rerun of the script Gus Russo wrote for German film director Wilfried Huismann. The film he made out of Russo’s work was called Rendezvous with Death and was shown on German television in January of 2006. This documentary was so full of holes, and used so many dubious witnesses that Russo apparently decided to clean it up the second time around. For instance, it actually relied on the David Phillips inspired and aforementioned Gilberto Alvarado story as its keystone. Even though that fable has been discredited for decades. Yet Huismann and Russo did not tell the audience this. Nor did they tell them about Phillips’ association with Alvarado or how this paralleled other efforts by Phillips. I should also add here that in the original telling, Alvarado said he saw Oswald and the two G-2 agents in Mexico City on September 18th. Yet Oswald was not supposed to be in Mexico at that time.

    Russo and Huismann then built on this phony foundation with people like Pedro Gutierrez. In the Gutierrez instance, Phillips found someone who got the date right. This guy said he saw Oswald in Mexico City on September 30th. But he says he saw a payoff to Oswald right in front of the Cuban Embassy! That G-2 would arrange the murder of JFK right in front of CIA cameras is ludicrous.

    Russo also got his Witness for All Seasons, Martin Underwood, a posthumous gig. Why, I don’t know. Maybe the Germans didn’t know about his poor track record. But it seems whenever Russo needs someone to bolster some unbelievable point of his, he trots this guy out. Underwood was an employee of Mayor Richard Daley who Daley loaned to Kennedy as an advance man for his 1960 campaign. Russo originally tracked him down for Sy Hersh and ABC to bolster one of the many fallacious tales spouted by the late Judith Exner. For the shameless Hersh, Underwood said he saw Exner leaving a train with a bag of money in Chicago when she met Sam Giancana. Well, when Underwood was called to testify before the ARRB about this incident the Hersh/Russo/Exner fabrication collapsed. Underwood “denied that he followed Judith Campbell Exner on a train and that he had no knowledge about her alleged role as a courier. ” (ARRB Final Report, p. 136)

    For the German TV special, Underwood – who later worked for LBJ – passed on a secret report, which he only wanted revealed after his death. The secret report alleged that Winston Scott, CIA Mexico City station chief, told Underwood that one of Castro’s top G-2 agents, Fabian Escalante, was in Dallas on the day of Kennedy’s murder. And the CIA missed that fact. The implication being that the Agency’s miscue caused JFK’s murder.

    One problem with this is that, contrary to the claim above, Underwood told this story while he was alive. And a further problem with it is that he could produce no “report” when the ARRB asked him for it. Russo had given the ARRB notes, but Underwood said he wrote those notes for use in Hersh’s book. That is, they were written in the nineties, not in the sixties when Russo and Huismann say the “Underwood Report” originated. Yet Underwood insisted Scott had told him this. But when he did send the ARRB his notes from Mexico, they only briefly mentioned Scott, and there was no mention at all of the JFK assassination. When the ARRB asked him to testify under oath, Underwood wisely and understandably declined. (ARRB Final Report, p. 135) One last problem with the fabled “Underwood Report”. Scott’s biographer, Jefferson Morley, spent years researching the man’s life. In 2008, he published his book on Scott, entitled Our Man in Mexico. There is no mention of either Underwood or the Escalante story in the volume. Did Scott only tell the Escalante story to Underwood? Why?

    Realizing this was all thin gruel for anyone familiar with the JFK case, Russo and Huismann came up with a new witness. This is a guy named Oscar Marino – which is a pseudonym. Marino said that Oswald volunteered to kill JFK. And Russo and Molton repeat this claim for this article. What is this based upon? Well, when Vincent Bugliosi called Russo, Russo said it was based upon Alvarado’s allegation! (Reclaiming History, End Notes, p. 736) With that, we know what to think of Marino. He has all the credibility of Underwood. But that didn’t matter to Russo and Molton. As I said, they repeat the quote here. (p. 29)

    In American Heritage, Russo and Molton say that Oswald’s shooting at Gen. Walker in April of 1963 was supposed to be an audition for G-2. Further, the authors say that Oswald ordered the rifle used in that shooting, the Mannlicher Carcano. Here is the problem with that. If this is so, then the bullet changed both color and caliber from April to December. Because as Gerald McKnight notes, the original bullet was silver in color and not of the 6.5 caliber used in the Carcano. (Breach of Trust, pgs 48-49) The FBI and Warren Commission altered its color and dimension to incriminate Oswald. Somehow, Russo and Molton leave out that pertinent fact.

    From here, the authors transition to Oswald’s trip to Mexico City. They say that Oswald was declined for a visa to Cuba at the Cuban Embassy because of his erratic behavior. Not accurate. Whoever was at the Cuban Embassy – Oswald or an imposter – was declined because he wanted an in-transit visa to Cuba. The ultimate destination was Russia. Oswald could not get a visa at the Russian Embassy. This is why the Cubans turned him down. They then relate how Oswald went to a local university to get some student leftists to vouch for him in his pursuit of a visa. They say that when Oscar Contreras, the leader of the group, called the Cuban Embassy he was told to forget it since Oswald was unstable. Again, not accurate. Eusebio Azcue told Contreras that he should forget Oswald – or whoever impersonated him – because he was probably an agent provocateur. In other words, he was a CIA operative. This is why Contreras did not help. (Gaeton Fonzi, The Last Investigation, p. 290) This undermines their whole thesis. So the authors leave it out.

    The excerpt/summary ends in a crescendo of unintended satire. The authors write that because of the assassination, LBJ ended the secret war against Cuba. But the assassination almost forced a nuclear war against Russia based upon Oswald’s activities in Mexico City. (Russo and Molton, p. 29) What the authors leave out is that Johnson now eliminated the back channel Kennedy had been working on to create dÈtente with Castro. And that move caused the freeze out in relations between the two nations to persevere for 45 years. They also leave out the fact that the fear of atomic war with Russia was largely created by the phony Mexico City tapes the CIA sent to Dallas and Washington the night of the assassination. The ones that contained an imposter’s voice, not Oswald’s. And the whole idea that Oswald was meeting with a KGB agent in Mexico City to plan the murder of Kennedy was a fiction set up before the fact by James Angleton and David Phillips. (See John Newman, Oswald and the CIA, Chapters 18 and 19.) It was this false pretense which threatened atomic war that frightened Johnson. (James Douglass, JFK and the Unspeakable, p. 231) This fear was used to coax Earl Warren into helming the Warren Commission and conducting it in such a shameful manner. This also undermines their phony thesis.

    That’s pretty important information to keep from the reader. But its par for the course for Russo and Molton. American Heritage should be ashamed of itself for putting such a worthless piece of tripe in its magazine. Let alone on its cover. Shame on you.

  • Dick Russell, On the Trail of the JFK Assassins – Richard Case Nagell: The Most Important Witness, Part 2


    In reviewing Dick Russell’s new anthology book, On the Trail of the JFK Assassins, I noted how it revealed just how long the author had been writing about the JFK assassination. It goes back to at least 1975. And in my review I noted the multiplicity of subjects Russell had covered in that regard. These two factors, hitherto not fully revealed, shed backward light on his earlier JFK book, The Man Who Knew Too Much, in both its incarnations (1992 and 2003).

    Nagell1
    Richard Case Nagell
    Nagell2
    Richard Case Nagell

    When I first read Russell’s 1992 version of the book I was disappointed in the work. That book got a lot of exposure and was strongly pushed by its publisher. Russell got TV exposure and also an article in the LA Times. I thought the book was bloated, confusing, maddeningly meandering, and – most of all – wasteful.

    Why the last? Because, like others e.g. Jim Garrison, I have always believed that Richard Case Nagell was one of the most important witnesses there was in the JFK case. The only two rivals he has in regard to a conspiracy before the fact are Sylvia Odio and Rose Cheramie. Yet in the 1992 version of the book, Nagell’s story got lost. Actually, the better phrase would be it got buried. And today, in the aftermath of the current anthology, I think we can see why. In 1992 Russell was so eager to put so much of what he had been working on in the last 17 years into that book that he lost sight of the forest for the trees. This was unfortunate since, as anyone can see from reading On the Trail of the JFK Assassins, nothing else Russell wrote about in the JFK case ever approached the importance of Nagell. I could have easily foregone every sentence about Mark Gayn, and the Japanese International House etc. in the 1992 book for just one more section about Nagell. Russell did not understand this. And neither did his original publisher. This is what editors are for. To give a book wholeness and perspective. To tell a writer when he is wrong.

    Lachy Hulme finally did that. Hulme is an Australian actor who Russell is lucky enough to have as a friend. Hulme has a strong interest in the JFK case. And he understood the mistake Russell made in his first book. He convinced Russell to reissue the book in 2003 and he helped him edit out a lot of the pork. As we shall see, not quite all of it. But a very large portion of it. The text now comes in at a much more manageable 466 pages. The appendices and footnotes are about another hundred. The important thing is that now the Nagell story stays on center stage. It is not frequently consigned to sideshow status. Or, at times, completely absent. And that is the way it should be. Nagell should be the star – the name above the title. Sharing it with no one.

    Russell explains why right at the start. A most compelling piece of evidence that Nagell had at the time of his arrest in September of 1963 was a near duplicate of Oswald’s Uniformed Services Identification and Privileges Card. (See p. xvii) As Russell notes, it had the picture and the apparent signature of Oswald on it. Russell did not recall this card in the Warren Commission volumes. Neither did two other researchers he consulted with at the time. (ibid) The only other place the card had appeared was in an obscure book by Judy Bonner called Investigation of a Homicide. Bonner had gotten the card from the Dallas Police. But there is something even more interesting about the mystery. In the card seized by the Dallas Police, there is an overstamp that appears which says “October 1963”. In the version that Nagell had, the imprint does not appear. Why? Because Nagell was in jail after September 20, 1963. Also, the photo of Oswald in the Nagell version is different. That photo is from a different ID card. And on that card, Oswald used his Alex J. Hidell alias. As Russell notes, this second card is believed to have been fabricated by Oswald himself, including the added picture. In other words, Nagell had to have been very close to Oswald prior to his September 1963 arrest. For he actually had access to Oswald’s identification cards. Some versed in espionage would say that this indicates Nagell might have been either a “control agent” or a “surveillance operative” for Oswald. (The cards are pictured in the photo section of this book.)

    From this information in the Preface, Russell cuts to chapter one of the text. It is aptly titled, “The Man Who Got Himself Arrested”. At this time, Nagell had other things in his possession similar to what Oswald had in November: names in their notebooks, Cuba-related leaflets, and miniature spy cameras. (p. xviii)

    Russell details Nagell’s actions in El Paso on the morning of 9/20 better than anyone ever has. Nagell first went to a nearby post office before entering the bank. He mailed five hundred dollar bills to an address in Mexico. He then mailed two letters to the CIA. (p. 1. Later on, the author reveals that one was addressed to Desmond Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald was heavily involved in both Clandestine Services and Cuban operations at the time.)

    From the post office, Nagell walked over to the State National Bank. There was a young police officer in plain sight. Nagell walked over to a teller and asked for a hundred dollars in American Express traveler’s checks. (ibid) But before Nagell could retrieve the checks, he turned and fired two shots into a wall right under the ceiling. He calmly returned the revolver to his belt and walked out the front door into the street. He stepped into his car and waited. When no one came out, he pulled his car halfway into the street. He saw the policeman from inside and stopped his car. When the policeman came over to his car with his gun pulled, Nagell put his hands up and surrendered.

    The arresting officer was one Jim Bundren. When Bundren searched Nagell one of the odd things he found on him was a mimeographed newsletter from the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). (p. 2) When Bundren notified the FBI, lest the arresting officers forget, Nagell asked them to get the machine gun out of the trunk of his car. Of course, there was no machine gun. But there was a suitcase, two briefcases filled with documents, a 45-rpm record box, two tourist cards for entry into Mexico (one in the name of Aleksei Hidel), a tiny Minolta camera, and a miniature film development lab. As previously noted, the personal effects Nagell had uncannily resemble Oswald’s.

    On the way to the El Paso Federal Building, Nagell issued a statement to the FBI: “I would rather be arrested than commit murder and treason.” (ibid)

    Now, to anyone familiar with the JFK case, just the above would be enough to certify that Richard Case Nagell was in the know about who Oswald was and what was going to happen. But Bundren related to Russell an incident that makes it all even clearer. At a preliminary hearing for Nagell, the defendant related to the officer the obvious: that he wanted to be caught. To which Bundren replied that he knew Nagell was not out to rob the bank. The following colloquy then occurred:

    Nagell: Well, I’m glad you caught me. I really don’t want to be in Dallas.

    Bundren: What do you mean by that?

    Nagell: You’ll see soon enough. (p. 3)

    When Kennedy was assassinated, the full impact of Nagell’s prediction did not hit Bundren. But when Jack Ruby shot Oswald, it did. Bundren exclaimed to himself, “How the hell would he have previous knowledge of it? How would he know what was coming down in Dallas?” (ibid) When Bundren went to the FBI to try and talk about Nagell’s stunning prognostication, the agent he knew there told him he was not at liberty to discuss it. Bundren concluded from the experience that “Nagell know a lot more about the assassination then he let on, or that the government let on. Its bothered me ever since.” (ibid) Indicating Bundren was right about what the government knew, Russell notes at this point that one of the notebooks seized from Nagell that day was not returned to him for eleven years. The other notebook was not returned at all.

    As Nagell told Russell, the CIA was not the only government agency he tried to notify in advance of the murder. He also was in contact with the FBI. In fact, an FBI agent’s phone number was in his notebook. But that wasn’t all. He also had written down the names of two Soviet officials, six names under the rubric of CIA, a LA post office box for the FPCC, and an address and phone number for one Sylvia Duran of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico. This last was in Oswald’s notebook also. (p. 6) And not revealed until many years later, Nagell had a Minox miniature spy camera in the trunk of his car upon his arrest. The same kind of spy camera that the FBI tried to deny Oswald had for many, many years. (p. 6)

    I think it’s important to note: If the above was part of the contents of the notebook that the FBI finally returned to Nagell, imagine what was in the notebook they never returned to him.

    On March 20, 1964 Nagell wrote a note to Warren Commission Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin. In that correspondence Nagell revealed his warning to the FBI. But he also revealed that he had made a request through the prison authorities for the Bureau to get into contact with the Secret Service about an upcoming assassination attempt. The date: November 21, 1963. Incredibly, Nagell’s name does not appear either in the Warren Report or in the accompanying 26 volumes.

    But probably the most interesting correspondence to survive is a letter that Nagell wrote to Senator Richard Russell. Russell was the former Warren Commissioner who had expressed doubts about what the Commission was doing. So much so, that he had conducted his own mini-investigation using his own investigators. Apparently, Nagell had heard of this. And in this letter Nagell, for the first time, revealed some of the specifics of what he knew about Oswald. He began by saying that he had been monitoring Oswald in both 1962 and 1963. This surveillance, plus information gathered from others, led him to conclude that: 1.) Oswald had no real relations with the FPCC 2.) He also had no real relations with pro-Castro elements, but he was gulled into believing he did 3.) He had no real relations with any Leftist or Marxist group 4.) He was not an agent or informant, in the generally accepted sense of the word. 5.) He was involved in a conspiracy to murder President Kennedy which was not communist inspired or instigated by a foreign government. (p.7, Russell’s italics.)

    The date of this letter is January 3, 1967. Before any of the discoveries of the Garrison investigation were made public. Before the domestic publication of the works of Mark Lane or Sylvia Meagher. In fact, Nagell was still in prison when he wrote it. And he had yet to be visited by any investigator for Jim Garrison.

    Later on, in a letter to Representative Don Edwards, Nagell revealed that his letter of warning to the FBI was specifically addressed to J. Edgar Hoover. He wrote it using one of his aliases, Joseph Kramer. In it he said that Oswald was part of a conspiracy to murder President Kennedy which he thought would take place in late September of 1963. (The mistaken date is why Nagell did what he did in El Paso on September 20th.) He gave the Bureau a complete description of Oswald including his true name, physical description, two aliases and his residential address. He conveyed certain data about the plot including one overt act which was a violation of federal law. And he used the name Kramer because two FBI agents in Miami knew him by that alias at the time.

    No wonder Garrison called Nagell the most important witness there is.

    II

    Russell reveals in his anthology that he first discovered Nagell through his meeting with Richard Popkin. He had gone to California to meet Popkin while on assignment for the Village Voice. But before actually meeting the most important witness, the author decided to stop in El Paso to do some research through the local papers.

    He discovered some interesting facts. When he appeared before the court on November 4, 1963 Nagell told the judge, “I had a motive for doing what I did. But my motive was not to hold up the bank. I do not intend to disclose my motive at this time.” (p. 13) Russell also discovered something that is interesting because it did not happen. Even though two FBI agents were in on his arrest, and the Bureau confiscated his belongings, no FBI representative testified at his trial. (p. 14) This is especially intriguing since, in a newspaper story of 1/24/64, Nagell revealed that the FBI had asked him about Oswald and Oswald’s activities. (p. 14) After he was convicted, Nagell leaped to his feet and shouted, “Why weren’t the real issues brought out in court!” Later adding, “They will be some time.” (p. 16)

    After his trip to El Paso in October of 1975, Russell then traveled to Los Angeles to meet Nagell for the first time. At this meeting Nagell was not really forthcoming but he did reveal that he had a photo of Oswald in his trunk at the time of his arrest, which the FBI never returned to him. (p. 26) That his mother and sister were both interviewed by the FBI after the assassination. (Which, of course, is strange since Nagell is not in the 26 volumes of the Commission.) Researching Nagell’s appeals case, Russell discovered a filing made in 1974 which was quite revealing about Nagell’s monitoring of Oswald. He wrote that although he was under contract to the CIA in 1962-63, he came to the conclusion that his inquiries in the time period which concerned not just Oswald but people like Manuel Artime and Vaughn Marlowe, were also being done for a “foreign nation”, that is the Soviets. (p. 29) This holds out the possibility that someone in the CIA was working with the original KGB agents who hired Nagell to prevent the assassination of JFK.

    As mentioned above, the FBI interviewed Nagell’s sister after the assassination. It is clear from reading this book that Nagell was quite close to her. Right after he was arrested, but before the assassination, he wrote to her that “I have refused to offer an explanation as to certain overt acts … Someday I shall explain everything in detail to you pertinent to this apparent disgrace.” (p. 37) His sister’s widower said that Nagell’s mission was to eliminate Oswald before the assassination. (p. 39) He also told Russell that the FBI visited them in 1965 to see some of the papers Nagell had sent to them. While they were on vacation, the FBI broke into their home and stole some of the documents. (p. 40)

    Nagell’s career in the armed forces was distinguished. In 1953, during the Korean War, Nagell attended the Monterey School of Languages. In 1954, he suffered through a plane crash. And although many have said that somehow this impacted him psychologically forever, the army cleared him of any kind of personality change afterwards. (p. 46) In fact, less than a month after the crash he was approved for a new intelligence assignment. (ibid) Working for Army Intelligence, Nagell opened the mail of suspected communists with postal inspectors right next to him. They broke into the offices of suspected communist organizations and stole whole file cabinets. (p. 47) It was in the winter of 1955-56 that the CIA first recruited Nagell. (p. 48) And in fact, the names of his two recruiters were found in his notebook. Russell called one of them and he confirmed that he had worked in the LA office of the CIA. (ibid) Later in 1956, Nagell was transferred to another intelligence agency called in the Far East called Field Operations Intelligence (FOI). FOI was involved in black ops: assassinations, kidnappings, blackmail etc. (p. 54)

    While in the Far East, Nagell worked in Japan. He used the aliases of Joe Kramer and Robert Nolan, and the CIA has certified this. (p. 61) It was at this time and place, Japan in 1957-58, that Nagell first met Oswald. This was after Oswald was observed outside the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo. (p. 72) Curious about what he was doing there, Nagell arranged to be introduced to the young Marine under an assumed name. (ibid) Also, Nagell told the author that both he and Oswald had girlfriends at the Queen Bee, a famous nightclub in Tokyo. (p. 76) Further, Nagell raised the possibility that Oswald was involved with him and a Japanese local in an attempt to get a Soviet intelligence officer named Eroshkin to defect. (p. 73)

    When Nagell left his Far East assignment in late 1959, he moved to Los Angeles, and a he got a job working for the state of California. But, he told the author, that he was still working for the CIA. Specifically, in the Domestic Intelligence unit, which would later be formalized under Tracy Barnes as the Domestic Operations Division. (p. 263) This is quite interesting of course since this part of the CIA was an illegal unit that was doing all kinds of weird things and it employed people like Howard Hunt, and according to Victor Marchetti, probably Clay Shaw. (William Davy, Let Justice be Done, p. 196) What makes it even more interesting is that former CIA agent Robert Morrow later revealed that in 1963, Barnes told him that he was aware of a plot to kill President Kennedy which included Shaw. We will refer to this fascinating aspect of the Nagell story later.

    After a shooting incident on the job, Nagell left his state employment. He secured a Mexican tourist card from the consulate in LA. From there, he went to visit a friend of his at the Hotel Luma in Mexico City. And this is where Nagell’s tale takes on a large and sinister dimension.

    III

    In 1966, Nagell hinted at what had happened to him in Mexico in 1962. He wrote his dear sister, “If it does eventually become mandatory for me to touch upon the events leading to my sojourn in Mexico in 1962 … (where and when it began), I shall do so, but only subsequent to being granted immunity from prosecution …”( p. 145) Nagell was now purely under the employment of the CIA. And a friend of his in Mexico, Art Greenstein, went to a party with him once where he later referred to someone he had talked to, his contact there, as a typical CIA agent. (p. 147) His mission was to serve as a double agent for the Agency in an operation against the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. The timing of this “disinformation project” was near the outset of the Cuban Missile Crisis. And since these kinds of operations were the domain of David Phillips–who had a Cuban desk in Mexico City–Nagell hinted to Greenstein that Phillips had been an accomplice in this project. It was after the completion of this mission, when the Missile Crisis was over, that Nagell first learned of a plot to kill JFK. And he learned of it in his double agent status through the KGB. (p. 152)

    In October of 1962, a Soviet contact of his told him that he had heard that a Cuban group named Alpha 66 had been talking about a plot to kill JFK. The reason being that they had gotten wind of Kennedy’s no invasion of Cuba pledge made to close the crisis. The contact asked him to investigate the rumor to see if it was true. If it was to try and ascertain those involved, the method to be used etc. (p. 154) Nagell had barely begun his inquiry when he was called to the Soviet Embassy. Something that had never happened to him before. He was told there that it was not just a rumor. He was briefed further, furnished a number of pictures, and told to return to the USA and continue his investigation in earnest. (ibid) Alpha 66, of course, was a violent Cuban group backed by the CIA. In fact, Antonio Veciana was probably its most famous member. And Veciana famously told investigator and author Gaeton Fonzi that David Phillips was his CIA handler, and he had seen Phillips meeting with Oswald in Dallas in the late summer of 1963. And before he left Mexico, Oswald’s Soviet contact showed him a photo of Oswald since they were suspicious of him from his Soviet sojourn. (p. 155) Though, at this time, not in relation to the plot to kill Kennedy. On October 21st, 1962 Greenstein saw Nagell off from the Hotel Luma. He asked Nagell if he would be hearing from him in the future, or if he would read about him in the papers. Nagell said that he would. Greenstein then said, “Something big?” To which Nagell replied, “Yes … something big.” (p. 160)

    He first journeyed to Dallas to inquire about the status of Oswald. At this time, Oswald had been back in Texas for about five months and was carefully ensconced in the White Russian community. This had been done with the help of George DeMohrenschildt. But only after the approach to Oswald had been approved by local CIA Station Chief J. Walton Moore. After doing this, Nagell then went to both Washington DC and New York City. While in Washington he was approached by what he thought was a Soviet agent and he reported this to his CIA handlers. He was then told to go to Miami and wait in a bar to be approached by a Soviet agent. (p. 163) At this time, not sure whom he was working for, caught up in a web of intrigue, Nagell journeyed both west to Tallahassee, and south to St. Petersburg. There he checked into a Bay Pines VA Hospital complaining of headaches, blackouts, and amnesia. This was on December 20, 1962. Some commentators have used this incident, and another to be described to discredit Nagell as being neurotic or worse. But what they always leave out is what Nagell told Russell about what he learned in Florida. He had penetrated a Cuban exile group who had planned on blowing up the Miami stadium where Kennedy was to speak to the prisoners released from Cuba in the Bay of Pigs exchange. (p. 164) Nagell was trying to keep a safe distance from the plot. So far from discrediting his story, this is consistent with what he did in El Paso in September of 1963. And Russell furnishes evidence of the plot. There is an intelligence report from the Miami Police Department that says that a local Cuban was overheard saying on the night JFK spoke in the Orange Bowl that “Something is going to happen in the Orange Bowl.” (ibid) Nagell was right. But the FBI and the VA tried to smear him anyway. The FBI file on Nagell excerpted the first line of the Bay Pines report which said, “Chronic brain syndrome associated with brain trauma…” (p. 179) The FBI left out the final line of the report which declared Nagell competent upon his departure. Further, the VA exaggerated his so-called “brain trauma”. It was actually diagnosed from his previous injury as “brain concussion, cured.” (p. 180) With a witness as good as Nagell, the Bureau pulled out all the stops. Especially when he blamed Hoover for not heeding his letter of warning previous to the assassination.

    Nagell then did some work in Miami. He was checking on an alleged relationship between Eladio Del Valle and New Orleans Cuban Revolutionary Council representative and former Batista official Sergio Arcacha Smith. (p. 182) He also was checking on an associate of Dave Ferrie. This is all extraordinary of course since Smith and Ferrie will soon figure prominently in Oswald’s life, in a most intriguing manner. Nagell was one heck of an investigator.

    In April of 1963, Alpha 66 announced the opening of a Los Angles chapter. (p. 208) Consequently, Nagell decided to move to LA temporarily in order to monitor this new branch opened up with much fanfare. Nagell picked up the scent of another plot to kill JFK when he arrived in LA in June of 1963. The man the plot focused around was Vaughn Marlowe, an executive officer with the LA FPCC. (p. 210) Marlowe had written a letter to Jim Garrison in 1967 telling him about Nagell and how, for reasons unknown, he had been tailing him back in 1963. Nagell revealed in 1964 that he was watching Marlowe since he was being scoped out by an Alpha 66 Cuban who would later visit Sylvia Odio in September of 1963. (p. 211) According to Nagell, the plot was to take place during JFK’s visit to the Beverly Hilton hotel for the premiere of the film PT 109.

    When Russell found Marlowe he told the author that Nagell approached him like some kind of double agent would. He told him he was a former Army Intelligence officer who actually wanted to help Marlowe in his social causes. (p. 213) Nagell later filed a report on Marlowe that was 23 pages long. Which he kept on microfilm. (ibid) The reason Marlowe was such an attractive candidate was that he was a stern critic of JFK from the left. He had a critical poster of JFK in his bookstore front window and he organized a demonstration against him around the time of the Missile Crisis. Finally, and this made him a better candidate than Oswald–Marlowe was an ace rifleman from his days in the service. After the assassination, Nagell wrote Marlowe a letter from prison telling him not to tell anyone that he mentioned the name of Oswald in his talks with him. Marlowe then got in contact with Nagell’s mother and told him he thought Nagell was somehow involved with the JFK murder. When she dodged the point he asked her if someone had told her not to talk about the JFK assassination with anyone and she replied they had. Many years later, in 1975, Marlowe finally located Nagell and wrote him a letter. He apologized for not doing more to help inform the public of why Nagell was in jail back in 1964. (p. 218)

    On June 4, 1963, three days before JFK was to arrive in LA, Nagell did what he had done in Miami. He attempted to check himself into a VA Hospital. This time, the resident psychiatrist apparently saw through the sham and he was not admitted. (p. 219) Meanwhile, one of the groups demonstrating around the Hilton was the civil rights group named the Congress of Racial Equality. A group that Marlowe had once worked with.

    Repeat: Nagell was a good investigator.

    IV

    From here, that is around July of 1963, Nagell began to monitor the plot that finally was enacted in Dallas. But when Oswald stepped onto center stage that summer, Nagell felt that something about the motivation behind the plot had changed. Why? Nagell wrote his friend Mr. Greenstein that the Cubans had gotten wind by now of the back channel Kennedy had been working on to effect a rapprochement with Castro. (p. 239) Two of the Cubans, Angel and Leopoldo, had convinced Oswald they were actually pro-Castro. And that they wanted to involve him in a plot to kill JFK. This was in reaction to plots enacted by the USA against Fidel. If he did so, Oswald would be furnished a “safe conduct” pass into Havana by the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Nagell told Russell he had been in Mexico City with Oswald, but not at the time of the notorious trip discussed in the Lopez Report. Nagell had told a friend of his, John Margain, about this trip. Russell later interviewed Margain and he confirmed certain details about it. (pgs. 240-241) Including the fact that Nagell told Margain that Oswald was being set up by the CIA and the Cuban exiles.

    From here, Russell describes some of the characters and events from Oswald’s last summer on earth. Which he spent in New Orleans with a now famous cast of characters. He quotes William Gaudet saying he saw Oswald leafleting and Oswald did not know what he was doing. Guy Banister had put him up to it. (p. 253) Russell also tells us that Nagell too had the famous Corliss Lamont flyer, “The Crime Against Cuba”, but he does not tell us which edition it was. Russell produces witnesses who say they saw Oswald and Ferrie at a Cuban exile training camp that summer. (p. 256) Interestingly, Russell discusses one Carlos Quiroga, a colleague of both Carlos Bringuier and Sergio Arcacha Smith. Quiroga has often been accused of acting as a double agent. That is of posing as a pro-Castro sympathizer. Which of course, is what Nagell described as what the plotters were doing around Oswald. When Garrison aide Frank Klein interviewed Quiroga in 1967, he tried to pin the assassination of JFK on Castro. At the end of his memo, Klein wrote “This man knows a lot more than is telling us.” (p. 261) Apparently, Klein was correct. Quiroga later took a polygraph test. He indicated deception on, among others, two key questions: did he know in advance JFK was going to be killed, and had he seen the weapons to be used in the assassination beforehand. (ibid)

    The above dovetails perfectly with a memo that another Garrison investigator wrote. This was one William Martin who was the first person Garrison sent to interview Nagell in prison. Nagell told Martin that in his work infiltrating the conspiracy, he was able to “make a tape recording of four voices in conversation concerning the plot, which ended in the assassination of President Kennedy.” (Garrison Memorandum of 4/18/67) When Martin questioned Nagell about who was on the tape, Nagell replied that one of them was named “Arcacha”, and another he only identified as “Q”. (ibid) (Although later, Nagell told Russell that Arcacha was discussed on the tape, not one of the actual speakers he had recorded. P. 275)) The first person referred to must be Sergio Arcacha Smith, and the second is very likely Quiroga. Further, when Garrison tested Quiroga with the question, “According to your own knowledge, did Sergio Arcacha know Lee Oswald?”, the criteria indicated a deception. (Davy, pp287-88) It very much seems that Quiroga was hiding his advance guilty knowledge. Of course, Martin turned out to be one of the several CIA agents who helped capsize Garrison. He may be the reason the tape never surfaced. (Or that may be due to new information to be discussed later.)

    As Russell notes, most of Nagell’s time from July to his arrest in September was spent on Oswald. And although Nagell was deliberately vague about exactly what he was doing, another source, besides Garrison, shed some backward light on those activities. In 1976, former CIA agent Robert Morrow wrote Betrayal, a fictionalized account of his days in the Agency leading up to the murder of Kennedy. In that account, he named a man who was almost eerily resembled Nagell. Except in that book, he was called Richard Carson Fillmore. It was not until many years later, in the nineties, that Morrow discussed openly who the actual people in the 1976 book represented. As we have noted, Nagell revealed he worked in the forerunner of the DOD from 1959 onward. In 1962, Tracy Barnes exercised control over this newly named and organized unit. With both Nagell and very likely Clay Shaw under him. Interestingly, Morrow knew that “Joe Kramer” was one of Nagell’s pseudonyms. (p. 264) Barnes told Morrow that he had sent Nagell to New Orleans to investigate certain goings-on with the Banister-Ferrie group in the summer of 1963. As Russell notes, Nagell corroborates this part of Morrow’s story in a letter to Greenstein he wrote in 1967. There he mentioned that he had received instructions from someone at CIA HQ to join a Cuban exile affiliate of Alpha 66 in New Orleans to “find out if things were real.” (ibid) Further, Nagell later told Garrison that “Angel” and “Leopoldo” both had worked with the group Movement to Free Cuba which was supervised by Barnes. Nagell also said at the time that Ferrie knew both of these men who, of course, ended up at Sylvia Odio’s home in late September of 1963. (p. 265)

    Let me mention another fascinating linkage between Nagell, Odio, and the Garrison inquiry. Sylvia Odio always maintained that the Caucasian who accompanied the two Cubans was referred to as one “Leon Oswald”. This, of course, corresponds with the name given to the man at Ferrie’s apartment discussing some kind of assassination plot as testified to by Perry Russo. Nagell told Russell that he knew both Oswalds, Lee and Leon. (p. 287) And he said the latter showed up on the fringes of the nascent conspiracy. Nagell added that Leon Oswald worked only with the anti-Castro Cubans and made no attempt to appear pro-Castro. He also said that this second Oswald was in Mexico City somewhere between July and September of 1963. Nagell wrote to Russell that Leon Oswald was eliminated in the latter part of September by mistake. (Russell surmises that it was probably by the KGB.) This new Nagell aspect now makes three witnesses who met someone referred to as “Leon Oswald”. All of the meetings taking place in a clearly conspiratorial aspect and pre-assassination. (I should add, there is a fourth witness to this Leon Oswald. It is Ferrie’s friend Ray Broshears who said Leon resembled the real Oswald. p. 367) It sounds very much like someone was trying to confuse things about multiple Oswalds before the fact. For instance, Nagell says that the Leon Oswald he knew was killed around the third week of September. If so, Angel and Leopoldo were still using that name with what was probably the real Oswald. Further, both the KGB and Barnes strongly suspected a conspiracy to kill Kennedy forming in New Orleans with Cuban exiles like Smith, and with CIA agents like Ferrie.

    Russell implies that by the end of August and in early September, Nagell realized he was in the middle of something very big and very evil. In late August Nagell communicated to Desmond Fitzgerald of the Clandestine Services that something was clearly transpiring. (p. 275) Except at this point Nagell apparently thought the actual assassination attempt would take place in the East, in the Washington-Baltimore area. In fact, he actually tried to join Communist Party cells at the time in those areas. (p. 276) Journeying to Mexico for further instructions, Nagell could not meet with his CIA contact there. But his KGB contact told him to try and separate Oswald from the conspirators by telling him he was being duped. And if this did not work, and the plot appeared to be heading forward, to eliminate him. (p. 278) Later, Nagell told the author “If anybody wanted to stop the assassination, it would be the KGB. But they didn’t do enough.” (ibid)

    From Russell’s narrative it seems that Nagell failed in his KGB mission. He could not convince Oswald to admit he was being used. Therefore the plot proceeded. Nagell describes a meeting with Oswald in Jackson Square where this confrontation occurred.( p. 282) What seems to be happening in this incident is that you have two agents from different parts of the CIA taking orders from different chiefs. Oswald connects through officers like David Phillips and Howard Hunt through to James Angleton. Nagell works through his Mexico City contact named Bob up to Tracy Barnes. I have never seen any evidence that connects Barnes to the conspiracy. I have seen a lot of evidence that connects Hunt, Phillips, and Angleton. Because of that unseen gulf, Nagell could not fulfill his mission. What made his dilemma worse is that he also could not bring himself to kill Oswald. Feeling lost and helpless, Nagell used his old stand by trick. He tried to check into a VA Hospital. This time in Los Angeles. Again, he couldn’t pass muster. (p. 278) Because of his failure, it appears that Nagell expected to be killed. For when he visited a friend in LA, he informed him of what to do with some of his possessions in case of his demise.

    I must note here that Russell insinuates an absolutely diabolical possibility in a chapter called “The Setup”. One of the reasons Nagell may have panicked is because the CIA was freezing him out. (p. 283) He got no reply from his communication with Fitzgerald. While in Mexico, his contact failed to meet him. His only communication about the plot was now with the KGB. Russell holds out the possibility that Nagell had been duped into thinking that he was working on this mission for both sides. When in fact the CIA was using him to both monitor and confuse the KGB effort to thwart the plot. This may be why Leon Oswald was mistakenly eliminated and why Nagell was confused about the conspiracy’s ultimate location. (Although, as seen by his conversation with Bundren, he ultimately found out its actual destination.) Another possibility is that someone in the know learned about Barnes’ efforts and told him to back off.

    Nagell became so confused that he actually thought of leaving the USA and going to Eastern Europe. And his KGB contacts agreed he should. Around September 17th, he mailed a letter to the FBI alerting them to the conspiracy. He then drove to El Paso. He was supposed to meet a contact across the border, in Juarez. (p. 290) Nagell was thinking of going from Mexico to Cuba. He cruised the streets for awhile and decided against crossing over and meeting his contact. He went to the post office, and as related above, mailed the money to Mexico and wrote the letters to the CIA. (Later on in the book, Nagell reveals to Russell that the five hundred dollars was for Oswald’s expense money on his Mexico trip. p. 290) He then walked over to the bank to purchase the American Express checks. Nagell told Russell there was a reason for this. As revealed in On the Trail of the JFK Assassins, Nagell was being paid by the CIA through this company. And there is strong evidence that Oswald was also. Since there was no robbery, Nagell believed he would be tried on a misdemeanor. And that all the things in his car, plus the purchase of the American Express checks would allow him to reveal the machinations of the plot in court. But as also revealed in the previous book, the prosecution vehemently objected to any mention of American Express. And many of the things in his car were disposed of. In his first interview with the FBI Nagell actually said, “all of my problems have been solved for a long time, and now I won’t have to go to Cuba.” (p. 292)

    Oh ye of too much faith.

    V

    While Nagell was in jail, the plot he monitored proceeded forward. Russell does an OK job of outlining it. For instance, he describes the incredibly important Hunt memorandum. This was an internal 1966 CIA memorandum describing the need for an alibi for Howard Hunt for November 22nd since he was in Dallas at the time. It came from James Angleton’s office. And as anyone knows who has read Mark Lane’s Plausible Denial, Howard Hunt never did have an alibi for where he was on 11/22/63. Yet people who worked with Angleton tried to give him one at the legal proceedings depicted in Lane’s book. (Lisa Pease probably did the best short treatment of this issue. See The Assassinations, pgs. 195-198) Russell also relates the information about David Phillips’ deathbed confession admitting he was in Dallas on the day of Kennedy’s murder. (p. 272) This comes through Shawn Phillips, David Phillips’ nephew. Shawn’s father was the writer James Phillips, David’s brother. The brothers had been estranged for a number of years. James had told his son that from conversations with his brother, he understood that David did not care for JFK at all. James also suspected that his brother had a serious role in his demise. After a period of estrangement, David called up James when he knew he was dying. At the end of the call, James asked his brother if he was in Dallas the day of JFK’s murder. The CIA officer started to weep and said that yes, he had been. Since this confirmed what he had long suspected, James hung up on him. (ibid)

    While in custody, Nagell wrote a letter to the FBI again. He stated that what he did on September 20th in El Paso came from a love for his country no matter how inappropriate or incomprehensible it appeared. This note was sent by air-tel to Washington the next day. Two days after, President Kennedy was killed. (p. 347)

    To complete the cover up, Nagell was sent to Springfield prison as part of his incarceration. He was part of their behavior modification program. (p. 385) As was also-and I suppose this was just a coincidence– Secret Service agent Abraham Bolden. (See James W. Douglass’ JFK and the Unspeakable, p. 216) It just happened that both men were intelligence officers who, based on their privileged knowledge, tried to blow the whistle on the Kennedy plot. The FBI fully took advantage of Nagell’s Springfield predicament by telling the Warren Commission that Nagell was psychologically disturbed and could not be trusted. (p. 386)

    The first judge at Nagell’s trial retired before the trial actually began. He was replaced by Homer Thornberry, a close friend of President Johnson’s. Further, the CIA friendly Texas attorney Leon Jaworski recommended Thornberry. (p. 391) After his conviction and sentencing, Nagell was dragged from the courtroom screaming that the FBI had allowed Kennedy to be shot. And further that they had questioned him about Oswald before the murder. (p. 393) The FBI agents on the scene made sure that Hoover was alerted to this fact. When he was sent to Springfield, Nagell wrote a letter to his sister saying he understood why he had been sent there: “If the American people think that only the Chinese are experts at brainwashing … I am afraid someday they will be in for a big surprise when it is discovered that the FBI is not too far divorced from Hitler’s Gestapo …” (ibid) While in jail, Nagell was visited by the CIA who told him to stop talking about Oswald. (p. 401) Nagell was then transferred to Leavenworth where he was tortured. (p. 404) On trips back to El Paso for hearings on his appeal, he was beaten up.

    Nagell’s attorney, Joe Calamia, was so intent on getting Nagell freed that he got his client to cooperate with the government in a psychological ruse. An army doctor named Edward Weinstein had once treated Nagell after an airplane crash in the service. Nagell actually told the FBI about Weinstein himself. But the court made it clear that Nagell now had to lie about this in order to have any chance upon appeal. In other words, Thornberry and the FBI were striking a deal with the defendant: We will give you a chance to go free if you go along with our deceitful discreditation of you as a witness. Urged on by Calamia, Nagell went along with this ploy, but he did so kicking and screaming. (p. 408) Eventually this is how Nagell was finally released. Weinstein said Nagell had suffered brain damage from his plane accident and therefore had “confabulated” his story about Oswald and what he did in the bank. Here is the problem with Weinstein’s thesis: Nagell underwent an EEG and psychological testing at Springfield. The examining doctor wrote: “I did not find any evidence or finding suggestible of brain damage.” (p. 407) This report was deliberately kept out of Nagell’s second trial. By both the defense and prosecution. Calamia made a deal with the devil to get his client out of jail. Nagell got out in April of 1968.

    When Nagell was released the CIA gave him $15,000. He then left for East Germany on a mysterious mission. Russell believes this may have been to be debriefed by the KGB. And Nagell has also written to Greenstein hinting at this possibility. (p. 427) The context of this debriefing would have been his meetings with Jim Garrison and his volunteering to appear as his witness at the trial of Clay Shaw. And if anyone doubts how important Nagell’s testimony would have been, consider this: On February 12, 1969 while in New York, a hand grenade was thrown at Nagell from a speeding automobile. After this, Nagell went to New Orleans. He told the DA he did not think it would be a good idea for him to testify at the Shaw trial. He then turned over the remnants of the grenade to Garrison and his staff. (p. 436)

    But this game worked both ways. Nagell’s ex-wife had split and taken his two children with her. As part of his dealings with the CIA upon his release, they told him the State Department would help locate his children who he thought were in Europe. While searching for them in Spain he told a consulate officer that if they did not keep their part of the bargain, he would reveal the whole story about President Kennedy’s murder to the media. (p. 437) The CIA took this very seriously and now had the press monitored to see if Nagell was talking. (p. 438) They also began tracking Nagell throughout Europe. Further, Russell checked every CIA name in Nagell’s notebook and they all were really with the Agency. A number of them were from Angleton’s staff. (p. 439)

    In the spring of 1970, Nagell was finally alerted to the whereabouts of his children. In a rather incredible revelation to Russell in 1993, Nagell’s son told him that he recalled being in East Germany as a small child with his sister. When he revisited Germany as an adult, he recalled some of the places he had been. But he added about the earlier sojourn, “It was not with our mother. We went by plane, with some blonde woman … A very strange situation.” (p. 445) Was the CIA using Nagell’s children as bartering chips for his silence?

    The other chip the CIA used was Nagell’s retirement benefits. Which he finally received after a protracted struggle. (p. 446) But the rest of his life was very much controlled. The government was not satisfied with smearing him as being “disturbed”. His files had him pegged as a racketeer “and associated with people I never even heard of.” (ibid) His mail was monitored and stolen. Many letters Russell wrote to Nagell during the writing of The Man Who Knew Too Much never got to him. (p. 449) His handlers ordered him to stay completely clear of Russell. When he would not they ordered him to clear any talks with the author beforehand. (p. 448)

    The day after the Assassination Records Review Board sent Nagell a letter requesting a deposition, he died. When the authorities broke into Nagell’s home they found a key ring with 19 keys on it. Six of them were for footlockers in which Nagell had stored his valuables concerning his CIA service and monitoring of Oswald. While living with a niece, Nagell had told her of the contents of one of these foot lockers. Pointing at a purple one, he said “This one contains what everybody is trying to get hold of.” (p. 451)

    Nagell’s son Robert found out the location of the foot lockers was Tucson. He went there and found five of them. The one that was missing was-no surprise– the purple one. And the day Robert went to Tucson, his house was ransacked while he was gone. Someone was definitely worried about what Nagell would leave behind. When the niece was shown the inventory of what was in the other lockers she said Nagell told her about a couple of audio tapes and a couple of photos. None of these articles survived.

    The new edition of The Man Who knew Too Much closes with some compelling information not available to Russell in 1992. First, the author talked to a former military intelligence officer named Jim Southwood. Southwood actually saw the 112th Military Intelligence file on Oswald. The one that was famously destroyed after the assassination. (p. 456) While stationed in the Far East, he received a request from the 112th to do some research on Oswald and the DeMohrenschildts. Southwood told Russell that he discovered Oswald was under surveillance by both ONI and Army Intelligence while in Japan. One of the reports had Oswald frequenting gay bars. And one of them had him intimately involved with a Soviet Colonel named Eroshkin. Which, of course, would confirm Nagell’s story about his first encounter with Oswald. From perusing the file Southwood was convinced Oswald was some kind of intelligence operative. And although he could find no new info on the DeMohrenschildts, he did find out something quite interesting. All the info the 112th already had on Oswald came from that couple. And it was all of a prejudicial nature: he was a strange personality, he had weird sexual habits, and he needed to be watched at all times. As I noted in the review of On the Trail of the JFK Assassins, this contrasts dramatically with what the DeMohrenschildts toward Russell in 1975. And it is further evidence that they had been used earlier and felt badly about it later.

    Russell, with the help of Hulme, did a much better job of telling the above story in 2003 than he did in 1992. If anything, Hulme did not go far enough with the editing scissors. I would have cut out about sixty or so more pages. For example, the chapters on General Walker and the material on Charles Willoughby seem to me to have almost no relation to the Nagell story. Further, it seems that Russell never read the declassified Lopez Report, one of the crown jewels of the ARRB. Because in his discussion of Mexico City in late September, he makes some statements that are contradicted by that adduced record.

    But finally the Nagell story is in a manageable and understandable narrative form. To me it is one of the crucial and most powerful stories in the Kennedy literature. And for anyone to deny it, one must believe in something of a wild conspiracy theory. Witnesses like Art Greenstein, Nagell’s sister, his niece, his son-in-law, and his son must all be lying. And they all must be lying to the same effect. Jim Bundren and John Margain are lying and the lies just happen to coincide with what Nagell screamed out to the crowd after his conviction. When he was arrested, Nagell just happened to have all that paraphernalia in his car that was so similar to Oswald’s. And he then just happened to guess right at the mutual American Express payment method for the two spies. And Nagell just happened to have the phone number for Sylvia Duran before anyone knew how she figured in the plot. And he had a version of Oswald’s Uniformed Services Privilege Card before Oswald altered it. And somehow, what Nagell knew about the conspiracy just happened to partly coincide with what both Sylvia Odio and Rose Cheramie knew, down to the actual Cubans involved.

    Oh, really? Who is wearing the tin foil hats now? But that’s how good a witness Richard Case Nagell was.

    Appendix: Corroborating Evidence for Richard Case Nagell

    Exhibits


    Mexico tourist cards for Nagell and Aleksei Hidell (hard cover edition of Dick Russell’s The Man Who knew Too Much, p. 113)

    Nagell’s letter to J. Lee Rankin of March 20, 1964, about his prior attempts to warn FBI and Secret Service of an assassination attempt on President Kennedy (Russell, second trade paper edition, p. 7)

    Nagell and Oswald both had Sylvia Duran’s phone number at the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City (ibid, p. 6)

    Nagell had a duplicate of Oswald’s Uniformed Services Identification and Privileges card (ibid, p. xvii)

    Nagell had a copy of Oswald’s signed Social Security card (Ibid, p. 252)

    Witnesses


    Arthur Greenstein: Nagell’s friend in Mexico who he left while on assignment in late October of 1962. At that time, Nagell told him he would probably read about him in the papers since he was on to something big. (Russell, p. 160)

    Eleanore Gambert: Nagell’s sister, who he wrote to before the assassination about the bank robbery being a charade. (Letter of October 10, 1963) FBI interviewed her and her family after the assassination (ibid, p. 37–39)

    Louis Gambert: Eleanore’s husband at the time, present during the FBI interview, where a copy of Nagell’s warning to the FBI was produced (ibid, pp. 38–39)

    Roger Gambert: their son, who told Russell there was a break in at their home afterwards and some of the items from this file were now gone (ibid p. 40)

    John Margain: Nagell’s military and personal friend; a CIA acquaintance sent him an article about Nagell in 1968. Nagell had told Margain about his warning letter to the FBI and his visiting Mexico with Oswald. (ibid, 100–02, 240–41)

    Jim Bundren: Oswald’s arresting officer in El Paso in September. Nagell was waiting for him, and he told Bundren he “would rather be arrested than commit murder and treason.” He later told the guard that he really did not want to be in Dallas; when Bundren asked him what he meant by that, he said, “You’ll see soon enough.” (Russell, pp. 2–3)

    Prior attempts on JFK


    Vaughn Marlowe: Nagell tracked him as a member of the FPCC, and Marlowe later talked about Nagell visiting him before the assassination. Russell, p. 215)

    Bomb in Miami: In December of 1962, Nagell was in Florida penetrating a Cuban exile plot to bomb the Orange Bowl on December 29, 1962. There is a Miami Police report of January 3, 1963, on how certain Cubans did discuss such a bombing.

    Cross References in declassified Databases:


    Joe Kramer was the name Nagell said he used in his warning letter to Hoover in September of 1963. In a 1994 CIA release, it was revealed the CIA had Nagell files kept under this name.

    In Japan, Nagell said he saw files concerning Oswald’s relationship with a Russian colonel named Eroshkin. It was later revealed that military intelligence had files about Oswald in some kind of relationship with Eroshkin. (Russell, pp. 455–57)

  • Dick Russell, On the Trail of the JFK Assassins – Richard Case Nagell: The Most Important Witness


    Dick Russell’s new book is an anthology of his life’s work on the JFK assassination. And one of the most revealing things about the book is 1.) How long he has been at it, and 2.) How many pieces he has written on the subject.

    The author has had a long and varied career in journalism writing about many other subjects. Russell has written for several mainstream publications e.g. TV Guide and Sports Illustrated. In fact, he was on the staff of both those magazines. And he has published more than one acclaimed book. Two of them being Eye of the Whale, and Black Genius. The main area of interest in his writing career has been the environment. So it was a bit surprising to me to discover that Russell had spent so much time and effort on what most mainstream publishers consider an eccentric topic.

    At the beginning of the book, Russell describes how he graduated from the University of Kansas journalism school and almost immediately secured a job that many young writers would consider a godsend. He was a staff writer with Sports Illustrated. But he resigned just six months later. (Why he did so is not really explained.) While making a tour around the world he met a former friend of CIA Director Allen Dulles. This man told him that Madame Nhu had President Kennedy killed as an act of revenge for the death of her husband Diem. (Interesting that Dulles seems to be the first to spread this disinformation story.)

    A few years later, Russell was freelancing for journals like The Village Voice. He secured an assignment to write about the fledgling Assassination Information Bureau which was set up to cover the formation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). It was while doing this report that Russell first heard of Richard Popkins’s work on the programmed assassin Luis Castillo. The then editor of the Voice, Gloria Steinem’s former CIA colleague Clay Felker, tried to discourage him from hanging out with such goofballs. But Russell persevered. And so his JFK writing sidelight, and the book, was off and running.

    There are over forty chapters in the anthology. Not all of them are devoted to separate subjects. For instance, both the first and second chapters of the book are about Popkin and Castillo. The way one measures a book like this is by this question: How many of the essays are really important, insightful, and worth preserving? By that standard the book measures small. Many of the chapters are so ephemeral, I took almost no notes. Some of the work, like a section on Antonio Veciana, is just plain dated. I mean after Gaeton Fonzi’s marvelous The Last Investigation there is not much to add on this guy. And since Russell’s work on him was from the mid-seventies, it has been superseded many times. Further, some of the chapters just do not go anywhere. Or if they do, it’s not very far. Some examples here are the sections on Gordon Novel, Ronald Augustinovich, Gerry Hemming, Larry Howard, and Loran Hall. These are all quite interesting characters. And in their own ways – except for perhaps Augustinovich – they are important to the JFK case. That is, if they had been rendered in full. Or at least close to it. But Russell does not take their stories far enough to make the profiles really worth preserving, or even reading. This, of course, may owe to the fact that magazine pieces are not meant to be done in depth or at length.

    There are other pieces that I felt amounted to little more than meandering speculation. For instance, ever since Richard Case Nagell told Russell that David Ferrie hypnotized Lee Harvey Oswald, Russell has spent a lot of time and energy attempting to show that somehow, in some way, the CIA’s MK/Ultra program figured in the JFK assassination. Unfortunately, that misguided penchant appears again here. And at much too great a length for my taste. And, even worse, without any intrinsic evidentiary justification. The author here goes on for six chapters, from pages 236-277, revisiting this diaphanous concept. Much of this reads like the worst vein of Kennedy assassination research – right down there with the infamous Canfield-Weberman ear identification of Howard Hunt as one of the tramps in Dealey Plaza. It seems to me to amount to nothing more than conspiracy smoke. Largely because it is based on unnamed sources, strained associations, and unreliable witnesses e.g. Marina Oswald channeled through Priscilla Johnson.

    There are more questionable pieces. Russell did a couple of interviews with Marina Oswald in 1992. Now there is a woman who one could spend hours with talking about just two people: Ruth Paine and Priscilla Johnson. Russell does not do much with her. She says that the Warren Commission translation of her testimony makes her sound like a fifth grader. She says there are a few thing wrong with the backyard photos. In the original pictures she says the rifle was different, there were more angles, different photos, and the background stairs are in the wrong place. And that’s about it. (I should add: John Armstrong’s book goes further on both these matters than Marina does here.) The rest of the section deals with her attempts to try and legally reopen the case. Which consisted of one meeting with some lawyers in Cambridge. Was this really worth including? There is a mildly interesting chapter about the strange death of CIA officer John Paisley. But any connection to the JFK case here is rather strained. And there is a concluding interview with Doug Horne who did much of the medical investigation for the Assassination Records Review Board. This should have been a humdinger of an interview. For me it was not. Russell has never shown much interest in the physical evidence in the JFK case. And I thought this interview revealed that lack of interest. Having just done a lot of research in this area for Section Four of my review of Vincent Bugliosi’s Reclaiming History, I can see many relevant questions that should have been asked but were not. The value of this interview comes almost entirely from the subject and not the interviewer.

    With the (rather large) ration of negative aspects now delineated, I want to mention some of the book’s more positive attributes. Russell has always been good on the private investigation of Warren Commissioner Richard Russell. Russell was the Georgia senator who suspected from the start that the Commission was a dog and pony show governed by J. Edgar Hoover and Nicolas Katzenbach. So he used people on his personal staff along with other acquaintances to conduct his own inquiry. One of the people he consulted with was Colonel Philip Corso, a retired Army Intelligence officer who had been on the staff of the National Security Council under Eisenhower. Corso did some investigating for the Commissioner and found out some interesting tidbits. He concluded that the Mannlicher-Carcano could not have performed as the official story leads us to believe. (p. 126) He also concluded that there was a Second Oswald. (ibid) Further, that Oswald had gone to Russia as part of a fake defector program being run out of the Office of Naval Intelligence. (p. 127) After doing all this inquiry he told Russell that his opinion was the assassination was a project of rogue CIA agents and anti-Castro Cubans. (ibid) Russell tended to agree with him but he said he could never get the other members of the panel to believe him.

    The opening two chapters on Richard Popkin and the investigation of the Luis Castillo case are interesting. (And, by the way, it is through Popkin that Russell ended up learning about Richard Case Nagell. p. 17) For those unaware of this fascinating case: Castillo was captured by the intelligence forces of the Philippine government in 1967. They concluded that he was a programmed assassin whose mission was to assassinate President Marcos. Once he was in custody, the government hired a psychologist named Victor Arcega to try and deprogram him. It turned out that Castillo was a Puerto Rican who was raised in the USA. And further, he seems to have been programmed as an assassin in the USA. After being beaten by a fellow prisoner, Castillo did not want to go through any further deprogramming sessions. So Arcega left and moved to Los Angeles. He was there the night of the RFK murder. When he read up on the case of Sirhan and the Girl in the Polka Dot Dress, he recognized the parallels in the two cases. He decided to return to his native Canada.

    Chapters 5 and 6 about Senator Richard Schweiker of the Church Committee and the HSCA’s first counsel, attorney Richard Sprague, are also worth reading. Especially the latter. Compared to the vast majority of official investigators on the JFK case, these two men come off exceptionally well. Schweiker sounds like Jim Garrison: “The Kennedy assassination is a mirror image proposition. What makes it hard to know what happened is that you’re struggling to find out the real focus in the mirror. And you really need two reversible ones.” (p. 42) Here’s another Garrison echo: “The more witnesses we talk to, the more they raised the fact that the Warren Commission really is a house of cards. Now it’s just prodding, pushing, shaking the tree enough to have it fall.” (ibid) Schweiker had one of his staff members, Dave Marston, working the JFK case about 90% of his time. And another worked on it full time. Further, 8 of the 11 Church Committee members consulted with him on a regular basis. (p. 43) Schweiker’s exemplary efforts gave great ballast to the creation of the HSCA and the appointment of Richard Sprague.

    The Sprague chapter is even better. It begins with his appointment as Chief Counsel and all the anxious anticipation that this choice placed in those interested in the JFK case. It then follows through with the attacks on him in the media, his mini-war with Representative Henry Gonzalez, and his eventual forced resignation. Russell interviewed him in his office in Philadelphia as the HSCA was winding down under his successor Robert Blakey in the summer of 1978. Sprague comes off as a man who went into his new job with some hopes and ideals that were eventually crushed into the ground. Again, in some respects, he comes off like Jim Garrison. Consider this comment on the media: “I feel that for some reason – and to me it’s the most fascinating part of my whole Washington experience – there is some manipulation of the press that’s successful enough that it’s not interested in a real investigation … There was a total dishonesty in the reporting of newspapers that I would otherwise have confidence in, such as the New York Times and the Washington Post. This attitude by the press was most successful in taking advantage of … individual Congressmen who were manipulated such that the press could achieve a tone to kill the investigation.” And then comes the capper in this regard: ” … there is a greater ability to manipulate public opinion by certain agencies of government than I would have believed possible … . I’ve become more interested in the media than the assassination.” (pgs. 52-53) He then goes on to get specific about particular instances of this with David Burnham of the Times, and Jeremiah O’Leary of the Washington Star. (p. 52) He notes that once he was gone, Burnham was taken off the HSCA beat. Coincidence or conspiracy?

    Further, Sprague believed that it was his investigation of Oswald that made him a target of the media. Sprague came to the conclusion that there was more of a connection between Oswald and the intelligence community “than has ever surfaced.” (p. 56) Two of the areas he was interested in were Oswald in Mexico City and the puzzle of why Oswald was not debriefed by the CIA on his return from Russia. And further, he was not going to sign any non-disclosure agreements with the intelligence community. (p. 55) In other words: what he saw, the public would see.. And if he had to subpoena information, he would. In other words, we were finally going to get the whole story about Oswald. Sprague is convinced it was this uncompromising attitude in this area that got him sacked. As he tells it: “Because of where I was at, and the timing of these attacks, that convinces me that the motivation came to kill me off.” Sprague has nothing but disdain for Blakey and his investigation. He calls it a “charade” and a “fiasco”. (pgs. 55. 56) And he concludes by commenting on Richard Helms and James Angleton. (p. 57) He says that he had a source who told him Helms had gotten the word to a Kennedy family member that the Kennedys should not back a reopening of the JFK case. He concludes that “Obviously Helms himself was one of the people that I ultimately wanted very much to interview. But not until I would be thoroughly prepared.” (ibid) In his comments on Angleton, he very interestingly compares him to Tony Boyle in the Jock Yablonski murder case. Boyle is the man Sprague convicted for the murder of labor leader Yablonksi.

    Russell penned a well-written piece about Jim Garrison in 1976. This was an article printed in Harper’s Weekly entitled “The Vindication of Jim Garrison.” It was meant to coincide of course with the installation of the HSCA. Garrison describes a conspiracy made up of elements of the CIA, anti-Castro Cuban exiles, and parts of the Mob. (p. 97) In other words, he had Anthony Summers’ design before Summers did, and before the HSCA actually got going. From here, Russell then goes into a short narrative of the Garrison inquiry and quite properly writes, “The full story of how Garrison was hamstrung would fill a volume.” Which, we now know via declassified documents, is absolutely true. Unfortunately, no one has yet written that volume. But he does include Victor Marchetti’s discussion of CIA executive meetings in which the Agency’s attempts to torpedo Garrison were kept off the record. Comments were made that such matters would be discussed after the meeting, or “We’ll pick this up later in my office.” (p. 101) And Russell details some of the actual subterfuges, like the CIA paying for certain lawyers and the CIA cooperating with judges in not serving subpoenas. (p. 101) Again, things that we can prove today with documents.

    He concludes this profile of Garrison with revelations about David Ferrie supplied by his friend Ray Broshears. He first contrasts what Broshears said to him in the seventies with what Warren Commission lawyer Wesley Liebeler told the public in 1967: Liebeler had seen the FBI file on Ferrie and he announced there was nothing to indicate Ferrie was involved in the JFK case at all. (p. 107) Yet Broshears told Russell that Ferrie called him in San Francisco shortly before his death and told him he was going to be killed. “The next thing I knew, he was dead. They said he killed himself. But he didn’t. You know it, and I know it.”(ibid) About Ferrie’s trip to Texas on the day of the assassination: “David was to meet a plane. He was going to fly them [the assassins] on to Mexico, and eventually to South Africa.” But the call Ferrie got at the skating rink told him he was not needed for that assignment. (Ibid) And finally: “He told me Lee Harvey Oswald did not kill the president. He was very adamant about it, and I believed him. All the things he told me about Oswald, I doubt he could have shot a rabbit 50 feet away.” Obviously Broshears is one of the many key witnesses Liebeler never talked to.

    Another important witness, George DeMohrenschildt, agreed with Ferrie. He says Oswald was the most honest man he knew, “And I will tell you this – I am sure he did not shoot the president.” (p. 133) He also told the author that CIA station chief J. Walton Moore had cleared Oswald in advance for him to approach him. (p. 135) If he had not, he would never have spoken to him. Which, of course, tells us a lot about George DeMohrenschildt’s relations with the CIA, let alone Oswald’s. Personally, I am glad someone besides Edward Epstein has confirmed this story. The capper for me in this section on the DeMohrenschildts was a quote from his wife Jeanna: “Of course, the truth of the assassination has not come out. It will never come out. But we know it was a vast conspiracy.” (p. 135) Recall, this is the couple that originally did the Warren Commissions’ bidding by caricaturing Oswald mercilessly in their testimony as doing things like shooting off his rifle in public parks. Evidently, they later came to feel guilty about what they had been made to do.

    Chapter 33 chronicles the famous meeting in the Bahamas in 1995 between employees of Castro’s G-2 – including Fabian Escalante – and some selected Kennedy researchers. Also on hand were Arturo Rodriguez and Carlos Lechuga. Russell summarizes some important findings presented by Escalante. First, they had verified from their end that Maurice Bishop was David Phillips. Second, they had an informant in Eladio del Valle’s organization in 1962 who said del Valle had told him that Kennedy had to be killed to solve the Cuban problem. (As an aside here, Russell adds that Nagell told him that one of the two Cuban exiles manipulating Oswald was linked to del Valle.) Third, Escalante has become convinced that what caused the exiles to act was that word had leaked out about the Attwood/Lechuga talks authorized by JFK to create a dÈtente between the US and Cuba. Fourth, Escalante confirmed that the Daniel Harker story used by David Phillips, Gus Russo and others to lend some credence to the Castro did it angle was a distortion. He says that what Castro actually uttered was “American leaders should be careful because the anti-Castro operations were something nobody could control.”

    Finally, Escalante said that Phillips had arranged to have letters addressed to Oswald from Cuba. And he showed these in a slideshow. There were five of them: two from before the assassination, three from afterwards. One of the letters, intercepted by G-2, was dated November 14th and addressed to Oswald at a hotel in Miami where he was never at. Arturo Rodriguez concluded that the text was of a conspiratorial character and that all of the letters were written by the same person, “as part of a plan to blame our country for the assassination.” (p. 223) This would be the provocation for the invasion of Cuba, which – despite the claims of Lamar Waldron – Kennedy never authorized.

    I should conclude this review with a discussion of Chapter 34 where Russell adds some new information on Nagell. In 1967, Nagell had written Warren Commissioner Richard Russell about being assigned by the KGB to initiate certain action against Oswald, who was the “indispensable tool in the conspiracy”. (p. 225) That is, the Soviets had found out about a plot to kill Kennedy. Fearing they would be blamed for the murder, they hired Nagell to infiltrate the plot and stop it. A book published in 2007 by a former Romanian intelligence officer notes that in the spring of 1963 just such action was requested by a KGB Chief named General Ivan Fadeykin: that is, the search for an agent to neutralize Oswald.

    A second interesting development is support of Nagell’s testimony is this: Nagell wrote a friend of his that his intelligence work in 1962-63 was to be paid for through American Express. And, in fact, during his trial, the prosecution objected to any mention of American Express. Why? Well, when Oswald handed a note to Lt. Francis Martello in New Orleans, in the margin was the espionage number of Michael Jelisavcic. Who was this Jelisavcic? He was a CIA asset stationed with American Express in Moscow at the time of Oswald’s defection. The FBI was aware of this fact. Hoover wrote a note to an agent in New York that in any interview of Jelisavcic, he should be closely questioned about his name and phone number being in the address book of Oswald.


    (See Part Two of this review, Richard Case Nagell: The Most Important Witness which relates On the Trail of the JFK Assassins to the first and second versions of Russell’s The Man Who Knew Too Much.)

  • Robert Joling, J.D. & Philip Van Praag, An Open and Shut Case


    An Open and Shut Case is an indispensable volume for those with a serious interest in the Robert Kennedy assassination. While some of the information – and especially some of its core conclusions – are based on evidence that has been called into serious question, about which I will have more to say below, there is more than enough interesting and solid work here for this book to warrant a place on your shelves.

    The book’s title comes from a quote from the Police Chief Edward Davis, who said the RFK assassination case was clearly “an open and shut case,” based on the eyewitness and physical evidence in the case. That’s true, of course, but not for the official story. As An Open and Shut Case clearly shows, the eyewitness and physical evidence are absolutely consistent with two facts: at least two guns were fired in the pantry, and Sirhan’s gun did not fire any of the shots that hit Senator Robert Kennedy.

    The book is the product of a collaboration between Robert Joling, J.D., who has studied this case for years, and Philip Van Praag (the last name rhymes with “Craig,” not “bog”), who is much newer to the case and focused primarily on a newly surfaced recording from the pantry. Joling is a past president of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS) and was a licensed attorney for 57 years, 40 of which he devoted to criminal and civil trial work, including some homicides. Van Praag has spent 45 years working in the audio field, with 35 of those years devoted to magnetic media.

    The book’s authors met through the work of a third person, Brad Johnson, a producer at CNN International. Brad has been looking into this case for years, and has attempted to collect every possible video and audio recording of the assassination of Robert Kennedy. When he stumbled upon evidence of a recording made in the pantry at the time of the shooting, he tracked down a copy and searched for a qualified sound engineer to examine it. Johnson found Phil Van Praag, and Van Praag’s findings about this recording are detailed in the first chapter of the book.

    Just after midnight on June 5, 1968, Robert Kennedy finished his acceptance speech, having just won the California primary in the race for the Democratic Party’s nomination for the presidency. Kennedy exited the Embassy Ballroom of the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles and crossed east through the pantry area, an almost hall-like room, on his way to speak to the press in the Colonial room. Sirhan Bishara Sirhan (pronounced “Sear hahn”) stepped forward and fired a gun. Kennedy was taken to the hospital, where he died a day later. Five other people were also wounded by bullets, but none fatally so.

    The most famous of those wounded in the pantry, Paul Schrade, RFK’s union chair and an officer with the United Auto Workers union, contributed the Foreword to the book. Schrade opens with a quick summary of the case, and of his own initial rejection of the “conspiracy theories” about a second gun, which sprouted up within days of the assassination.

    Schrade had his eyes opened to the conspiracy aspect of the case by Congressman Allard Lowenstein (D-NY), who visited him at his home in 1974. Lowenstein took Schrade to visit Lillian Castellano and Floyd Nelson, two early and excellent researchers in the case. They showed Schrade solid evidence that more than eight bullets were fired in the pantry. Schrade joined their efforts, and, with the help of others, including the LA County Board of Supervisors and CBS, obtained an order for a court-appointed panel to re-examine the evidence. I’ll call this panel the Wenke Panel, for convenience, after the Judge who ordered it. A large part of the book focuses on the work of the Wenke Panel, and the final conclusions of the authors depend on the Wenke Panel’s findings, a problem to which we’ll return later.

    There are many anecdotes and interesting items learned firsthand by the authors which make this book truly “new,” and not just a retelling of the evidence of others. For example, Joling details how a personal acquaintance who worked for the CIA called him at one point, when Joling, as president of AAFS, had set up a special committee to review the firearms evidence in the Robert Kennedy case. His CIA associate said the Agency did not like what he was doing, and ordered him to stop. Joling became upset with his contact’s “‘hoity-toity’ attitude and demanding demeanor” and forcefully but politely told him he was not interested in the CIA’s “‘Sunday School’ games” and asked the person never to contact him again. Another time, Joling found a bug on his home office phone. Joling recounted other incidents of obvious harassment from people whose connections he could only suspect. He noted these only occurred at the height of his direct involvement with the case, and ended after the Wenke Panel concluded its work. Both Phil Melanson and Jonn Christian had accounts of being threatened, which are included here as well. The obvious question is, if there was no conspiracy, who was so intent on keeping these people from pursuing their work in the case?

    The most important new piece of evidence discussed in the book is the Pruszynski recording. While most people are familiar with the famous audio piece in which a reporter describes the aftermath of the shooting (“Get the gunä get the gunä take his thumb and break it if you have to!”), this new tape was lost to history until Brad Johnson, a producer for CNN International, rediscovered it by noticing a listing of it in the California State Archives record finding aid. And, unlike the other recordings, this one had captured the period of the shooting. Stanislaw Pruszynski, a print journalist, had inadvertently left his hand-held recorder and microphone on as Kennedy exited the stage and entered the pantry. Brad searched for a sound engineer willing to use his expertise to analyze the tape. He found Van Praag.

    The first chapter in the book deals with Van Praag’s work with this recording. The tape, according to Van Praag, shows at least thirteen distinct sounds, and possibly more, that match the sound pattern of gunshots. As the realization sets in that Kennedy has been shot, screams may have covered additional shot sounds. Since Sirhan’s gun could only hold eight bullets, this is prima facie evidence of two or more shooters.

    In addition, Van Praag noted that there were two pairs of sounds where the shots were too close together to have been fired from the same gun. Van Praag’s assertion that the two shots were fired too close together was tested on a 2007 Discovery Times cable TV special. A noted firearms expert could not pull the trigger on the Sirhan gun fast enough to make either of the double shots.

    In addition, Van Praag found that five of the shots, including one in each pair of the “double-shot” sounds, bore a distinctly different sound signature from the other shots. Van Praag sought a second gun that would leave the bullets marked in the same way as the Sirhan gun. The only gun known (to the authors) to have the same rifling characteristics as the Iver Johnson 55 Cadet in evidence for the crime was an H&R 922. Curiously, this is the exact model the guard Thane Eugene “Gene” Cesar owned. Cesar later claimed he had sold it before the assassination, when he had actually sold it after.

    Cesar is a likely candidate for being a second shooter because the medical evidence shows RFK was shot four times, all from within a distance of one to four inches. The fatal shot, a shot behind Kennedy’s right ear, was made from a distance of not more than one and a half inches. The only person near enough to have made those shots, per the testimony of Cesar and others, was Cesar. Cesar held Kennedy’s right elbow in his left hand and was pulling him gently through the pantry. Kennedy stopped and talked to a few people, and was just turning front again to continue on his path when he was hit.

    Van Praag tested the same kind of gun that Cesar was using and found some remarkable correlations to the shot sound patterns on the Pruszynski tape. Van Praag dismisses the notion that these sounds could have been balloons or firecrackers, as those have a sharp attack but die off quickly, unlike bullet shots, which register a more symmetrical signature. In addition, Van Praag recorded some test shots from the same distances that Pruszynski was at various points during the recording, a crucial point other tests have not duplicated. Pruszynski was about 40 feet away as the shooting began, and then entered the pantry in the middle of the shooting.

    Van Praag is quick to point out problems with the tape. It was “enhanced” by the FBI to improve sound clarity. The tape is also out of sequence in a couple of places, suggesting the tape was likely edited. But the tape also contains some sound segments that authenticate it as having been made at the Ambassador Hotel that night, as they can be matched up to other audio from that night, and the sequence containing the shot sounds appears to be unedited and in its original order.

    The chapter on the sound evidence may be hard to follow for those not versed in sound technology. Maybe I was just tired when I read it, but I found Van Praag’s in-person presentation at the June 2008 COPA conference in Los Angeles much clearer. Having seen the presentation, the text makes more sense to me now than it did on my first reading of it.

    One chapter seems to have no purpose other than to attempt to discredit Sgt. Paul Sharaga of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). Sharaga claimed that, within a few minutes of the shooting, as he was setting up a command post at the southern end of the Ambassador Hotel, an older Jewish couple told him they had seen a girl in a polka dot dress run by with another man and that the girl was saying “We shot Kennedy.” Sharaga has often been used to buttress Sandy Serrano’s account of the same thing – a girl and a guy running down the back staircase in a state of glee, with the girl saying, “We shot him, we shot him.” When Sandy asked, “Who did you shoot?” the girl responded, “Senator Kennedy” and kept running.

    The book makes clear that the authors believe Sandy Serrano was telling the truth as she knew it, and includes in an appendix the transcript of her awful interrogation at the hands of Lt. Hank Hernandez, who had worked for Agency for International Development, a well-known CIA front in Latin America. But the authors question Sharaga’s veracity, as the tapes of the radio communication do not show any communication from Sharaga regarding a girl in a polka dot dress. Still, as the authors note, it’s possible Sharaga had a second avenue of communication available.

    The authors also fail to note that the LAPD did, in fact, put out an APB for a girl in a white dress with black polka dots, which wasn’t cancelled until days later. Since the LAPD clearly didn’t believe (or didn’t want to believe) Sandy Serrano or Vincent DiPierro, two witnesses with provocative accounts (DiPierro claimed a girl in a white dress with dark polka dots was chatting with and possibly even holding Sirhan until just before the shooting began), it seems likely that the APB went out because of other accounts, possibly Sharaga’s.

    In addition, Sharaga noted that when he said his suspect description was different from that of the suspect in custody and urged the dispatcher to continue to repeat his different description (of a tall, thin blonde man), Inspector Powers came on the radio and shut Sharaga down, saying that Rafer Johnson and Jesse Unruh had said there was only one shooter and not to “get anything started on a big conspiracy.” The authors ignore that Sharaga had that part right, and cut off the transcript before that exchange.

    The authors make a direct insinuation that Sharaga’s account is not reliable because, they say, when Powers implied that the “we shot him” statement might have been something like “he was shot,” Sharaga didn’t interject anything to correct him. Why should he? Sharaga didn’t hear the exchange, and it would be considered disrespectful for a lower level officer to argue with the Inspector over the airwaves. They suggest that Sharaga’s silence lowers his credibility. I disagree. They also point to the missing mention of a girl in a polka dot dress in the early traffic. But why did the police put out the APB for a girl in a polka dot dress? Whose account did they believe?

    I asked Van Praag if there was any possibility the police tapes had been altered. He declared that impossible, given that there were several tracks recording at the same time, and that no editing had been done.

    So perhaps Sharaga was indeed communicating through a second channel, something the authors themselves suggest, but discount, because no evidence for that has surfaced. But absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence, and while Sharaga’s initial report regarding a girl in a polka dot dress never surfaced, that doesn’t mean it didn’t happen. I’ve spoken to Sharaga and found him to be an honest, unembellishing witness. Given how the LAPD burned, lost, and otherwise destroyed evidence of conspiracy in this case, I think there’s an explanation we simply haven’t found yet that will reconcile Sharaga’s account with the extant evidence.

    And since the authors never really looked into the girl in the polka dot dress (this is evident by the fact that they say she was wearing a black dress with white polka dots, when over 20 witnesses reported a suspicious girl in a white dress with dark or black polka dots), the authors missed the fact that Serrano’s account also appears to have been corroborated by at least two additional witnesses not counting Sharaga. And when I talked to Sharaga, he told me he never even heard of Sandy Serrano until years later. I continue to find his account credible, and wonder where the rest of the story will ultimately lead.

    The best and weakest part of the book is, unfortunately, the same part – the ballistics discussion. The book spends a great deal of time and gives full credibility to the findings of the Wenke Panel.

    The panel did discover a couple of layers of deception, and for that they are to be commended. They were given a photomicrograph and told that it showed a comparison of the Kennedy neck bullet to a test bullet. The panel found instead it was a comparison of the Kennedy neck bullet to that of another victim, William Weisel. In other words, one of the pieces of evidence used to convict Sirhan was thrown into serious question by this finding.

    The panel also found that Sirhan’s gun could not be matched to any of the bullets recovered in the pantry, but since two of the victim bullets at least matched each other, there was no evidence of a second gun.

    Lowell Bradford, a forensic expert chosen by CBS to be a part of this panel, also noticed something unusual. The test bullets came from an envelope marked with the wrong gun number. The Sirhan gun was number H53725. The test bullets came out of an envelope in which the gun number was listed as H18602. (The LAPD responded that was a clerical error, and that the bullets had, indeed, been fired from gun H53725.)

    So the panel concluded that the LAPD had been playing fast and loose with the evidence. But had the panel looked at the evidence as closely as Lynn Mangan, Sirhan’s former neighbor and longtime researcher, did, they would have found something much more important, which would negate all their conclusions: not one of the bullets had the original markings etched into them at the time of recovery.

    When bullets are retrieved from victims in a crime, the police scratch initials and other markings so they can later prove those bullets were the ones they claimed them to be. This ensures the bullets cannot get accidentally or deliberately switched.

    But markings are only useful if people actually check for them later. If no one checks, the wrong bullet can be introduced into evidence. And that is exactly what appears to have happened with the three bullets the panel matched to each other – the Kennedy neck bullet, the bullet from William Weisel, and the bullet retrieved from Ira Goldstein.

    The purported Kennedy bullet should have had “TN31” marked on its base, placed there by Thomas Noguchi, who confirmed his markings in court, explaining that he always used his initials and the last two digits of the autopsy case number for such markings. But the “Kennedy” bullet the Wenke Panel examined had “DWTN” on its base, calling into serious question whether any conclusions based on this bullet have any relevance, since this bullet can not be linked to any bullet recovered from the pantry victims. The markings on the Weisel and Goldstein bullet the Wenke Panel examined also do not match the markings recorded into the official record when the bullets were first recorded.

    In other words, no conclusions from the 1975 panel are relevant, because the bullets the panel examined do not appear to have been the ones fired in the pantry! I’ll even suggest the substitution was deliberate, since the bullet marked DWTN was clearly supposed to indicate it had been signed by Thomas Noguchi, but Noguchi stated under oath he always uses his initials and the autopsy case number. So someone seems to have deliberately mismarked this bullet, hoping no one would notice. And had it not been for Lynn Mangan, they might have gotten away with it.

    In addition, according to a letter Larry Teeter (Sirhan’s attorney at the time) sent the California State Archives that was provided to me by Lynn Mangan (as part of the “Robert F. Kennedy/Sirhan Evidence Report” she put together with Adel Sirhan, Sirhan Sirhan’s brother), on August 3, 1994, Mangan, Teeter, and Adel took Lowell Bradford to the California State Archives to reexamine the bullets. Bradford noted that it was impossible to read the markings on the base of the bullets, as grease had obscured the markings on the ends of the bullets. Bradford stated the grease could further damage the bullets, prompting Teeter’s letter to the Archives asking that the grease be removed. Bradford was adamant, says Teeter, that the grease was not on the bullets when he viewed them in 1975. “There goes your evidence, down the drain,” Bradford said, per Teeter.

    Unfortunately, the authors do not appear to have been aware of this problem when they wrote their book. And that’s a big problem for the authors, as their thesis re the shooting in the pantry is woven inextricably to their mistaken supposition that Cesar had to have shot not only Kennedy, but Weisel and Goldstein too, since the three bullets the panel examined matched each other. The authors suggest that Cesar was firing almost by reflex, without even realizing he was firing. While I feel that argument strains credulity on the face of it, it’s also completely unnecessary if Cesar did not, in fact, shoot Weisel or Goldstein. And there is no evidence that he did, once you discount the seemingly irrelevant conclusions of the Wenke Panel.

    Without the Wenke Panel’s limitations, you have a much more plausible scenario: Cesar fired the shots that hit Kennedy and probably at least one that entered the ceiling tiles, as all of the four shots that hit Kennedy were from a distance of one to four inches (the neck bullet having entered from a distance not greater than one and a half inches) and in a back-to-front direction. In addition, all the shots were at an upward angle, and in two cases, very steep upward angles, so whoever made those shots may well have missed and hit the ceiling instead. If that was the case, it would match Van Praag’s analysis showing five shots that didn’t match a separate eight shots.

    Another part of the ballistics discussion focuses on the cannelure issue. Cannelures are ring-like groove markings on bullets. Different bullet types from different manufacturers have different numbers of cannelures. If bullets with different cannelures were found in the pantry, that would be good evidence of a second gun, because a shooter typically fills a gun from a single box of bullets, so the bullets found in the pantry should have all had the same cannelures if they all came from the same person.

    In 1974, a panel at the American Academy of Forensic Sciences discussed Ted Charach’s film “The Second Gun” and Pasadena criminalist Bill Harper’s photographs of the bullets. Harper’s photos showed a different number of cannelures between the Kennedy bullet and the Weisel bullet, indicating two different guns were likely used.

    Lowell Bradford, the expert CBS picked to join the Wenke Panel, concluded after examining the bullets presented to the Wenke Panel that the bullets did have the same number of cannelures, and that this was detectable in color photos and by direct examination, but not detectable from the black and white photos Harper had used. But what we don’t know is, which bullets did Harper originally photograph? If Harper was given the actual bullets to photograph, and we know that Bradford was given substitutions, it’s possible both were correct, but were looking at different bullets. In other words, I think Harper’s conclusions should stand unless disproven by an examination of the actual bullets from the pantry, not the ones Bradford examined as part of the Wenke Panel.

    As I noted, the ballistics discussion is both the best and worst part of the book. The worst parts are those that rely on the Wenke Panel’s findings, which, for reasons stated above, appear irrelevant. But it’s also the best section because authors present a great deal of information showing Dwayne Wolfer’s mishandling of the evidence in careful detail.

    The authors also did a fine job on the witness section. They present a table showing the closest witnesses, and their estimates of where Sirhan’s gun was relative to Kennedy, and the LAPD’s conclusions that each of those witnesses were wrong, because if even one of them was right, that meant Sirhan didn’t kill Kennedy, and that was clearly an untenable position for the LAPD to take.

    The book is also filled with interesting personal accounts, primarily from Bob Joling, as he had followed this case with great diligence for many years, and knew many researchers. For example, Joling describes how he worked with Lowell Bradford and Dr. Mike Hecker, who had analyzed the famous “Nixon tapes” to examine three other audio tapes made in the pantry. Hecker concluded the tapes showed conclusively there were ten shots fired. Joling thought this was solid evidence, and had Hecker sign an affidavit to that effect. But then they found out that these tapes were not made simultaneously, and all of them started immediately after the shots were fired. Hecker then rescinded his identification of the sounds as gun shots.

    Ironically, Joling’s experience of having once been burned didn’t make him twice shy when it came working with Van Praag. And that’s my only fear. While Van Praag’s work seems logical, I’m no sound expert, and I do not feel I am personally in any position to judge the veracity of his analysis. It sure fits into the story as we know it so far. It would make sense if it were true.

    The book is certainly easy to read, and clearly presented. So long as you understand that some of the material is incorrect (such as the girl wearing a black dress with white polka dots) and outdated (anything gleaned from the Wenke Panel bullet comparisons), there is still much to recommend here.

    One final caveat: the book makes reference to a DVD and lists items which can be found on the DVD. But the book being sold currently does not come with a DVD, because the rights to some of the video clips they wanted to use were too expensive to make distributing the DVD feasible. So just know that if you get the book, you will not, as of this review, get the DVD with it.

  • Lamar Waldron, with Thom Hartmann, Legacy of Secrecy – Update


    My review of Legacy of Secrecy was cross-posted at various sites on the web. And Ed Sherry did a mass mailing of it to his large JFK list. This caused some interesting feedback.

    First off, there was a primary witness involved who can shed some light on how President Kennedy felt about the contingency plans. Some of which, like OPLAN 312, I specifically mentioned in my review. Sherry was temporarily based at Homestead AFB in Florida in November of 1962. He was an Army Intelligence officer who monitored the plans and kept track of all circulating copies from dawn to dusk. While in Florida on TDY from Virginia, he was temporary custodian of all 48 copies of the Contingency Plan for two weeks. He knew the subject well as he had typed in many of the revisions and addendums to the original plan. When Kennedy visited the base in late November of 1962, it was Sherry who typed the briefing for him on the plan. About ten days after Kennedy left Florida, Sherry recalls getting a classified code word to cancel the plans and return home. Kennedy was going to keep his word to the Russians about his no invasion pledge of Cuba. Sherry recalls that there were a lot of unhappy officers when JFK canceled the plans. Recall, these were contingency plans JFK was cancelling.

    Second, another reader sent Sherry an e-mail concerning my review. Recall, according to Waldron and Hartmann, the coup was set for December 1, 1963. According to a CIA cable, the plotter in chief, Juan Almeida, was on a flight to Algeria on November 28th. He was the head of a 162 man Cuban delegation that had been arranged well in advance. This is incredible. What are we to believe in light of it? Almeida was going to run the coup and its resulting chaos from Africa? Further, this reader said the National Security Agency was monitoring traffic in Cuba closely at the time. They detected nothing suspicious going on there.

    But it’s even worse than that. The reader (who wishes to remain anonymous) told Waldron about this a long time ago. And in fact, when I learned this, it did ring a bell with me. And sure enough, it is in Legacy of Secrecy. On page 280, Waldron and Hartmann mention the flight to Algeria. Ignoring the fact that the trip had been prearranged, they now try to say that Almeida left because Castro suspected something was going on. But what is the evidence he suspected Almeida? The authors list none. So why did Almeida leave if the coup was to take place within 72 hours, and he was to be running it from the island? If you can believe it, and you probably can, the authors never answer that question. They never even pose it. Since the evidence indicates that Almeida left because there was no coup scheduled, and he was not a part of it. In their nearly fanatical clinging to a discredited theory, Hartmann and Waldron remind us of the likes of David Belin, David Slawson and, even worse, John McAdams.

    But perhaps even more shameful is the way their promoters cling to it also. In my review of Legacy of Secrecy, I mentioned one of them: Mark Crispin Miller. I also could have mentioned another, Gore Vidal. I know through two sources that Miller read my review of Ultimate Sacrifice. This did not stop him from promoting that book on his blog. And he later also praised Legacy of Secrecy. And in terms that are rather unrestrained. (In fact, they remind me of the bought and paid for movie blurbs that adorn the ads for so many lousy films these days.) Take this for example: “Legacy of Secrecy is the astounding sequel to their Ultimate Sacrifice, which came out in 2005; and this new volume is as thorough and meticulous in its research as it ground-breaking predecessor.” Further on, Miller writes, “…the authors demonstrate that the long suppression of the facts about Jack Kennedy ‘s murder set the stage for the killings, five years later, of both Martin Luther King Jr., and Bobby Kennedy.”

    All of this breathless hyperbole makes me ask a sensible question: Did Miller read the books? As I discussed in my review of the latter book, the authors demonstrate no linkage between C-Day and the murders of King and RFK. How the heck could there be? The book says Ray killed King, and the weight of the evidence dictates that Sirhan killed Robert Kennedy. Was Ray in on C-Day? Was Sirhan?

    And the last word I would use to describe the work of Hartmann and Waldron is “meticulous”. Even worse is ” ground-breaking”. What ground did they break? As I mentioned in my review of Legacy of Secrecy, Gus Russo wrote about the contingency plans years before Waldron and Hartmann did. And as I and others have proven nine ways to Sunday, the authors grievously mischaracterize them. And by doing so, they create a false theory, actually a misleading mythology. As for being meticulous, how can Miller write that with a straight face? What kind of meticulous writers deliberately disguise the source for Edwin Black’s wonderful work on the Chicago Plot? And once that is done, the same writers twist that work into something it is not. What kind of authors don’t even look up the proper date of Jim Garrison’s flight to New York with Russell Long? And then attribute something to those two men that could not have happened if they got the date right? Is hiding the name of Bernardo DeTorres from the reader “meticulous”? Is then altering his background from a dyed-in-the-wool CIA officer to a protÈgÈ of Trafficante meticulous? Yes, in one way it is: its meticulously misleading.

    Miller’s mindless praise for these two awful books is so skewed that it made me wonder if he, like Waldron and Hartmann, had an agenda. It turns out he does. And like Vidal, it is to denigrate Oliver Stone’s film JFK. Consider the following: “…the authors show that that long cover-up was driven not by an enormous dark alliance of complicit US agencies and corporations … but by a lot of entities compelled by motives infinitely more prosaic. (Bobby also helped maintain the cover-up.)” Further on, Miller continues that although there was a conspiracy and the Warren Commission was a crock, “all such secrecy was not proof of complicity, as Oliver Stone would have us all believe … Rather, that cover-up but [sic] motivated by a raft of other, largely more innocuous … concerns …”

    Of course, this is exactly what I wrote that the aim of Ultimate Sacrifice was. After my long analysis of how these “meticulous” researchers had altered the evidence, I concluded that they did this to detract from the real evidentiary trail and confabulate out of whole cloth an already discredited one: Robert Blakey’s Mafia did it theory. But they tried to disguise this around their phony C-Day scenario. Which has now collapsed.

    But none of this matters to Miller. Why?

    Because he has enlisted in the Noam Chomsky/Alex Cockburn ranks. Like them, he styles himself a leader of the Left. And he explains how that fits into his agenda about these two volumes: “These books are absolute must-reads because they liberate us from the dangerous assumption … that anyone who dares to speak up for the good will be cut down by violence, at the hands of an almighty, inescapable cabal. That fatalistic view is one that we cannot afford to hold-and one that is, in fact, unfounded, as these two books so powerfully demonstrate.”

    The last thing I would say is that these two books “powerfully demonstrate” their thesis. I have demonstrated that in detail. When the Cuban coup leader is in Africa, you have some problems. When neither the Secretary of Defense, or State, or National Security Adviser or Director of Plans for the CIA knows about your upcoming invasion, you have more problems. When your chief “confessor” is suffering from Alzheimer’s while a jailhouse informant is coaxing him, well, that’s the ball game.

    But, like Chomsky and Cockburn, this is beside the point for Miller. Facts don’t matter. And if facts don’t matter, then truth doesn’t matter either. Why? Because he knows what is good for the progressive public. And if they need to be served up pabulum, so be it.

    I disagree with Miller. But I agree with Bob Tanenbaum, the first Chief Counsel of the JFK investigation for the House Select Committee on Assassinations. And he knows a heck of a lot more about the JFK case than Miller or Vidal do. During a speech in Chicago in 1993, he outlined how the CIA, and especially David Phillips, obstructed his investigation into Oswald’s activities in Mexico City. And when he wanted to confront Phillips with perjury charges the committee backed down. He ended his speech by posing this question: “Does anybody really believe that certain people in the executive intelligence agencies are more equipped to handle the truth than the American people? If so, then we will redefine the nature of our democracy. And that’s something I’m not prepared to do.”

    That’s the real question about all this. The question that Waldron and Hartmann wish to disguise. The question that the likes of Miller and Robert Stone don’t think the American public can handle. So in this regard, and with an almost cosmic irony, Stone and Miller resemble the former heads of the major networks, i.e. Bill Paley and David Sarnoff. Except the pabulum that Waldron and Hartmann give the public is not the old pig in a poke of the Warren Commission. But Blakey’s Mob did it pig. A pig with lipstick, eye shadow, and mascara.

    But only someone either too ignorant or too willing to be gulled would have been taken in by the makeover.

  • William Olsson, An American Affair

    William Olsson, An American Affair


    They finally made a movie about Mary Meyer. And it was directed by a Swede. William Olsson directed An American Affair, which is his first feature. His first problem may have been agreeing to film this script. And I hope his unfamiliarity with American history was the reason it turned out as it did. Because although Olsson’s direction is nothing to write home about, the real problem is the screenplay by Alex Metcalf.

    This is one of those films that is not “based upon” a true story, but is “inspired by” actual characters and events. So although the main character is Mary Meyer, her name in the film is Catherine Caswell. (Get it? MM becomes CC.) Her estranged husband Cord Meyer also appears, except his first name is Graham. James Angleton is titled Lucian Carver. They didn’t have much of a choice with President Kennedy, so his name is the same.

    But the odd thing about the script is that none of these people features as the real main character. The protagonist—Adam Stafford—is a boy in what appears to be about the ninth grade. The film begins with him and it ends with him. The Meyer story is largely told through his eyes. And this is a problem I had with the film. Everything outside the Meyer story, and even a lot within the Meyer/Stafford story, seemed to me to be pretty much banal. It was essentially the teen Coming of Age Tale. And his coming of age is hurried along and impacted by his affection for and experience with the older woman across the way. This concept was not new in the film Summer of ’42. And that picture is nearly four decades old now. And like that film, when all is said and done, this picture does not really comment on the time frame it is based in. It more or less exploits it.

    Adam Stafford attends a co-ed Catholic school in the northeast. (Although I think the setting is supposed to be Pennsylvania, the actual shooting of the film took place in Baltimore.) After the story establishes some of the trite tumult a boy his age goes through—fights in school, Playboy masturbation fantasies—Catherine/Mary moves in across the street. Adam gazes at her sitting in her window one night, and becomes infatuated by her. She has just become estranged from her husband, and is living alone. So, as a way to get close to her, Adam volunteers to do some chores for her in her new house. She accepts and his parents do not find out about it until afterward. When they find out, they try to discourage him from working for her. Why? Since Dad is a journalist, they know something about her oddities. But Adam persists.

    It is through this rather thinly caused association that Metcalf brings in the controversial and hotly disputed details of the Meyer/Kennedy/Angleton tale. (Jim DiEugenio has done a lot of work on his subject. For his most recent take on those details, see his essay elsewhere on the site.) In the Metcalf rendition, Meyer is separated from Cord at the start. At the time we encounter her, the affair with Kennedy is taking place. Yet Cord/Graham is trying to win her back. Mary is an artist who also has other lovers and pot parties at her place. To spice up the plot, Adam accidentally happens to be present during both encounters. One reason Cord/Graham seems to want to get back with Mary is because he understands the diary she is keeping makes the man he works with Carver/Angleton suspicious of her. Why? Because the hint is clear that Carver is in on something having to do with Kennedy’s upcoming murder. In fact, in one of the most strained scenes in the film, Stafford sees Carver and Graham meeting in public with a Cuban named Valle—clearly meant to suggest David Ferrie’s friend and colleague Eladio Del Valle.

    To tie the story together, Stafford’s father is a journalist who is on assignment to Dallas, Texas in November of 1963. And, of course, Carver knows this in advance. Catherine senses something is about to happen and she tries to call and visit the White House to warn JFK. But he will not accept her calls or let her on the grounds. After the assassination, Adam steals the diary from Catherine. Catherine tries to get it back. But just as Adam has arranged to return it, Carver/Angleton visits Adam’s home and gets it from his parents. Adam finds out about this too late. He runs to Catherine’s house and finds Carver reading the diary in front of Catherine’s fireplace. He asks her where Catherine is. Carver says he thought she was meeting him. He runs to their meeting place and finds her dead body at the bottom of a long outdoor stairway. He pushes back her hair and sees what appears to be a bullet hole.

    The coda of the film is Adam receiving a posthumous package from Catherine in the mail. He and his parents open up the box. It is a four-panel painting of Adam.

    To say that Metcalf has taken some liberties with the story is putting it mildly. And a lot of the liberties he takes strain credulity. The idea that a behind the scenes CIA general like Carver would meet with someone like Del Valle in public, and then allow himself to be seen, is hard to swallow. When Catherine goes to Stafford’s house and tells his mother that the boy has something of hers, why does the mother not ask what it is? Why does Mary not tell his Mom to get it for her? The scene where Meyer throws a drink in Carver’s face after he makes a comment about her dead son is not set up enough to explain her motivation. Would Kennedy actually pull up in a presidential limo with Secret Service escort to see Mary at night in a heavily residential area? And smart aleck Metcalf had to throw in that fatuous fairy tale about Kennedy’s famous “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech being a mistranslation for a donut. For a thorough debunking of this urban legend, see this essay.

    Besides the hackneyed story elements, another reason the film never really becomes synoptic of its time is because of that ending I just described. Finishing as it does, the story becomes more about the relationship between Adam and Catherine than any of the historical elements in the picture. And also, that historical aspect leaves us with a question. If Carver/Angleton got the diary from Adam’s parents, why did he have Catherine killed? Which is what the film implies.

    Olsson has directed the film adequately in all aspects. Which means its rather commonplace in that regard. With the exception of Mark Pellegrino—who tries for the heartbreak of an estranged husband who still loves his wife—the acting is what I would call representational. That is, the cast looks like the people they are supposed to be, and they don’t make any blatant false moves. Which is OK for the Norman Rockwell type parents of Adam. But it’s not OK for someone acting the role of Catherine/Meyer and especially Tarver/Angleton. In those roles, the audience has the right and the assumption to expect some real creative acting. Acting of both skill and intelligence that carves the hearts and minds of the characters. To put it lightly, Gretchen Mol and especially James Rebhorn don’t fulfill the expectation. If you can imagine what say, the late Klaus Kinski could have done with the Angleton/Tarver role, you can see how pallid Rebhorn is.

    But alas, Kinski was an artist. Which is what none of the principals in this disappointment are. At least not yet.