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Gordon Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster
Virtual JFK 3
Part One of this essay reviews the film accompanying this book, which has the same title.
Part Two of this essay reviews the book accompanying this film, which has the same title.
See the Virtual JFK web site
In my discussion of the book Virtual JFK: Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived I first mentioned the name of Gordon Goldstein. Goldstein was to be the co-author, with McGeorge Bundy, of a book Bundy was going to write about his experiences with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson over the Vietnam War. That book was never completed because Bundy died before it was finished. The two had worked on it together for a bit less than two years. From the description of the travail here, plus what Goldstein was able to salvage, it would have been a real contribution to the literature. After Bundy passed away, Goldstein wanted to complete the book on his own. But Bundy’s widow would not allow it. So what he decided to do was to compose this memoir of his many months working with Bundy, and to also offer his own view on the Vietnam issue. Lessons in Disaster is not the book that might have been, but it’s still an interesting effort that is worth reading. Among other things, it gives us an insight into what one of the people directly involved in an epic tragedy thought of that terrible episode many years later. Or as Bundy said to Goldstein before they started, “I was part of a great failure. My wish now is that we had done less.” (p. 24)
It is interesting to note how this effort began. In 1995, Robert McNamara published his book In Retrospect. In that book, he admitted to three things: 1.) The Vietnam War was a huge mistake 2.) He had determined by April1966 that it could not be won in a military sense (McNamara p. 261), and 3.) President Kennedy would not have Americanized the war and escalated it as President Johnson did ( ibid p. 96).
(Let me interject something here as a personal sidelight. Although McNamara does not specifically mention John Newman in that book, Newman told me that he had several talks with McNamara before he started writing it. John was surprised at how many things McNamara had forgotten about, especially from the Kennedy years. I asked him how that could be so: How McNamara could have not recalled how different Kennedy’s plans had been? Newman replied, “Jim, if you were part of a decision that eventually took the lives of over 58,000 Americans and over two million Vietnamese, you would want to forget about the option you discarded too.”)
When In Retrospect created the controversy it did, Bundy was asked to appear on a TV show to discuss the book. He did so. During the program, one of the other guests spoke up in defense of McNamara. He said, “You have a guest on your program, McGeorge Bundy, who was certainly as complicit as McNamara. I don’t know why McNamara should take all the heat.” (Goldstein, p. 22) A few days later, McNamara called Goldstein, and the book project began. Goldstein had worked with the former National Security Adviser while completing his Ph. D. in International Relations at Columbia. Unfortunately, Bundy died in the fall of 1996 before the book was completed. Before the two started in earnest, Bundy told Goldstein something that was to pithily sum up everything that followed, “Kennedy didn’t want to be dumb. Johnson didn’t want to be a coward.”
McGeorge Bundy was Boston Brahmin. He was born there in 1919. His mother was related to the Lowell family, which was an institution in the area. His father Harvey was educated at Yale, where he was a member of Skull and Bones, and then went to Harvard Law School. In 1931, Mac Bundy joined his brothers Bill and Harvey Jr., at the famous boarding school of Groton, whose motto was “To serve is to rule.” (p. 7) Past attendees had been people like Dean Acheson and Franklin Roosevelt. After achieving a perfect SAT score, he went to Yale and joined Phi Beta Kappa. Like his father he joined Skull and Bones. After graduating, Bundy went to Harvard for post graduate work. During World War II, he joined the Navy and became an aide to Rear Admiral Alan Kirk. After the war, he co-authored a book with Secretary of State Henry Stimson. In 1948, he worked on the presidential campaign of Tom Dewey as a speech writer. After that he went to the Council on Foreign Relations to do a paper on the Marshall Plan with the help of Allen Dulles and Dwight Eisenhower. (p. 11) In 1949 he took a teaching position at Harvard in the Government Department. In 1953, at the young age of 34, he became Dean of Harvard faculty. It is here that Bundy met Senator John Kennedy, who was a member of the Harvard Board of Overseers. (p. 14) When Kennedy won the election for president in 1960, Bundy became his National Security Adviser. There is little doubt that, as Goldstein mentions, he revolutionized the position. He actually brought it out of the shadows and made it a position of primacy in the Cabinet.
Bundy left the White House in 1966 to run the Ford Foundation. While there, the Pentagon Papers were published. Two Bundy assistants tried to coax him into making pubic the memos he had written under Johnson expressing the doubts he had about the war at the time. (p. 17) Bundy, out of the loyalty he felt to LBJ, decided not to. ( I should note here something the author leaves out of his outline of Bundy’s career. In a famous article published in the seventies in Penthouse, it was revealed that Bundy was the secretary of the Bilderberger Group, working directly under David Rockefeller.)
In 1979, Bundy left the Ford Foundation and, amid great controversy—since, due to his involvement with Vietnam, most of the faculty did not want him there—became a professor of history at New York University. While there in 1984 he talked to journalist David Talbot about the subject. He told Talbot that he did have doubts about the war, “and it can be argued that I didn’t press hard enough.” (p. 19) He did not go any farther and told him he would sort it out later. He did with Goldstein.
II
One of the reasons I have detailed the remarkable pedigree of Bundy is that it proves the opposite of what one would expect. Namely that things like Ivy League credentials, secret societies, upper class origins, and Eastern Establishment connections really don’t mean that much on their own. Why? Because Bundy was not a good National Security Adviser. Although Richard Goodwin and Arthur Schlesinger tried to talk Bundy out of it, Bundy OK’d the Bay of Pigs invasion to Kennedy. (p. 38) Even though Bundy possessed a memo that the operation would not succeed unless it was fully supported by the CIA and Pentagon, he did not forward it to the Oval Office. (p. 40) Bundy offered to resign in the wake of that fiasco but Kennedy would not accept his resignation. He probably should have. Because later in1961, Bundy was one of the advisers urging Kennedy to commit American troops to Vietnam. Then in 1962, Bundy first backed air strikes to solve the Cuban Missile Crisis. He then switched to McNamara’s suggestion of a quarantine around Cuba during the Missile Crisis. He then switched back to the Pentagon plan for surgical air strikes, 800 of them. (pgs. 72-73) Although he later said that he switched at Kennedy’s request, this reason never surfaced until many years after. As Goldstein notes, at the time, Ted Sorenson said that Kennedy was actually a bit disgusted with his National Security Adviser.
But as Bundy noted to Goldstein, one thing to note about Kennedy’s management of the Bay of Pigs was this: Under very strong pressure from the CIA and the Pentagon, Kennedy did not commit the American military to save the day. (p.44) Bundy also noted another pattern to Goldstein. During the Laotian crisis of the same year, the Pentagon wanted JFK to commit combat troops because if not, as Admiral Arleigh Burke said, all of Southeast Asia would be lost. (p. 46) Again, Kennedy did not go along. After calling for a high alert on Okinawa, Kennedy instructed Averill Harriman to produce a diplomatic solution. (p. 45) And he was so appalled by the advice he was getting that he now requested both Sorenson and Bobby Kennedy sit in on National Security Council meetings. (p. 46) Bundy told Goldstein that, after the way Kennedy handled Laos, he saw that, unlike many others—for instance, LBJ—President Kennedy had not bought into the Domino Theory. The idea that if one country went communist, it would take several nearby nations with it.
Goldstein does a nice job at this point in sketching the background of the Vietnam crisis as Kennedy first inherited it. After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Ngo Dinh Diem then rigged the plebiscite in order to succeed the proxy French emperor Bao Dai. But as the communist insurgency in the countryside grew larger, Diem’s security forces, led by his brother Nhu, became more brutal and repressive. Captured rebels were beaten, had their legs broken, and females were raped. (p. 51) In 1959, Diem restored the guillotine. Traveling courts in the countryside were now authorized to behead convicted communists. (ibid) Goldstein sums up the scene upon Kennedy’s ascendancy to the White House: “By 1961, as Kennedy assumed power in Washington, the situation in South Vietnam was characterized by an ascending nationalist and communist movement and an oppressive regime that was progressively losing control of the country and credibility with its people.” (ibid)
What follows is one of the highlights of the book. Goldstein enumerates the number of times Kennedy turned down requests to commit combat troops to save the day before the White House debate over the Taylor/Rostow mission in November of 1961. He starts out with the request of Gen. Ed Lansdale in January of 1961. (p. 52) In April of 1961, McNamara suggested the same. (p. 53) That same month, Kennedy rejected a backdoor: he refused combat troops as trainers. (p. 54) He was asked twice in May and turned down both requests. (ibid) By July he had turned down a total of six requests. (p. 55)
On July 15th, Max Taylor and Walt Rostow again requested combat troops. Bundy kept notes on this colloquy which Goldstein prints here. He wrote, “Questions from the president showed that the detailed aspects of this military plan had not been developed … the president made clear his own deep concern with the need for realism and accuracy in … military planning. He had observed in earlier military plans with respect to Laos that optimistic estimates were invariably proven false in the event … He emphasized the reluctance of the American people and of many distinguished leaders to see any direct involvement of US troops in that part of the world.” Rostow and Taylor tried to argue back but Kennedy said, “Gen. DeGaulle, out of painful French experience, had spoken with feeling of the difficulty of fighting in this part of the world.” Vice-President Johnson then called for a firmer military commitment to the region, including Laos. Kennedy resisted by saying, “Nothing would be worse than an unsuccessful intervention in the area, and that he did not have confidence in the military practicability of the proposal which had been put before him.” (pgs 56-57) This now made seven rejections of American direct intervention in seven months.
On October 11th, Deputy Defense Secretary Alexis Johnson joined the push for combat troops. Again, Kennedy did not agree. But he did authorize a mission to South Vietnam by Max Taylor and Walt Rostow. (p. 57) At this time, the hawks in the White House begin to leak stories that Kennedy would now probably commit troops to Vietnam. When Kennedy saw the stories, he himself leaked a story denying it. (ibid)
On October 20th, Frederick Nolting, the American ambassador in Vietnam, requested combat troops for flood relief purposes. Taylor was on the scene, and he agreed with the request—if he did not put Nolting up to it. Kennedy consulted with an agricultural expert and turned it down. Taylor then talked to the press about the issue. Kennedy telegrammed Taylor to stop doing so. (p. 58)
When Kennedy received the Taylor/Rostow report, it again requested the sending of combat troops to Vietnam. And it couched the request in dire terms. It said if such a commitment was not made, the fall of South Vietnam would likely follow. (p. 60) The formal White House debate over the recommendation was taken up on November 7th. In addition to Taylor and Rostow, Defense Secretary McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Bundy, and the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff told Kennedy to send combat troops. On November 15th, Kennedy closed the debate. At this point, Goldstein makes two cogent observations. There were only two people in the entire White House who sided with Kennedy on this issue. They were George Ball and John Kenneth Galbraith. When Ball personally approached Kennedy since he thought he might be weakening and could give in, Kennedy replied to him: “George, you’re just crazier than hell. That just isn’t going to happen.” (p. 62) And after this debate, Kennedy told Galbraith he was going to send him to Saigon. He wanted him to render a report also. (p. 61) Knowing what it would say, he would only give it to McNamara. And McNamara would now become Kennedy’s point man on his withdrawal plan. The third result of this debate was Kennedy’s issuance of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 111, which increased the number of advisers to above 15,000, with no provision for combat troops.
When Bundy reviewed all the above with Goldstein, he was impressed with both Kennedy’s insight and his steadfastness. He also told Professor James Blight, one of the co-editors of the fine book Virtual JFK, that Kennedy simply did not think that combat troops would work in South Vietnam. Because he did not see the struggle as a conventional war but as a classic counter-insurgency conflict. Bundy and Goldstein came to the conclusion that much of this was instilled in Kennedy from his visit to Vietnam in the early fifties during the last throes of the French imperial war there. (p. 235) Another strong influence was his discussion of the issue with Douglas MacArthur. The general told Kennedy it would be foolish to fight a large land war in Southeast Asia. He told him that he could pour a million men into the struggle and still be outnumbered. (p. 235) Alexis Johnson was skeptical of MacArthur’s stance but he admitted that it made a profound effect on President Kennedy. Max Taylor agreed with him. He said MacArthur’s analysis made a “hell of an impression on the President.” (ibid) Kennedy later told Bundy’s assistant Michael Forrestal “that the odds against an American victory over the Viet Cong were 100 to 1.” (p. 239) Since, as Bundy said, Kennedy did not buy into the Domino Theory, those odds were simply not worth it. Consequently, Bundy saw these ten rejections in eleven months as Kennedy’s final decision on the issue. And Bundy described a following meeting in January of 1962 in Palm Beach, Florida where Kennedy emphasized the advice and support role to be played by the Americans. (p. 71) That was a line Kennedy was not going to cross. And he didn’t.
III
After receiving Galbraith’s report, McNamara went to work on putting together the withdrawal plan. While he did that, the increased advisory team sent in by NSAM 111 managed to keep the lid on a deteriorating situation. But in 1963, things started going downhill fast. In January of that year, the Viet Cong defeated a regular detachment of the South Vietnamese army at the battle of Ap Bac. (p. 72) As things began to spiral downward, the reactions of the Ngo brothers worsened. Diem demanded that all public gatherings, even funerals, would have to have official state sanction. He even asked for total control over all anti-guerilla operations from the US. Then the epochal Hue crisis broke out in June. In response to a discriminatory edict passed by Diem, a huge Buddhist rally took place in the city of Hue. After a day of speeches, a radio station was bombed with many protesters standing outside. In the resultant chaos, shots were fired into the crowd. Several people were killed and even more were wounded. (The best account of this incident is by Jim Douglass, in JFK and the Unspeakable, pgs. 128-131) As a result of the crackdown ordered by Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, one of the monks leading the demonstration set himself on fire. (Goldstein, p. 75) This horrifying image was captured on both film and photograph and was relayed all over the world. Making it worse was the heinous reaction of Nhu’s wife, Madame Nhu (aka The Dragon Lady). She ridiculed his martyrdom as a “barbecue” and said if any others did the same “we shall clap our hands”. (ibid p. 76) Unfortunately for her, seven others did do the same. (ibid) This chain reaction mushroomed into a huge political crisis since it spawned marches, demonstrations, work stoppages and hunger strikes. (Douglass, p. 133) In reply, Nhu ended up arresting over 1,400 Buddhists.
It was against the backdrop of this image of a collapsing government and an intractable leader that a small cabal in Washington and Saigon decided to take the next step and remove Diem and his brother from power. Goldstein does a decent job describing the events that led to the eventual coup and deaths of the brothers. (pgs. 76-81) But the best, most detailed description of how it began is by John Newman in his masterful book, JFK and Vietnam. There had been a small group in State and on Bundy’s staff that was waiting for an event like this to get rid of Diem. The group consisted of Averill Harriman and Roger Hilsman at State, and Michael Forrestal of the NSC. While Kennedy was away, Hilsman began sending cables to his ally William Trueheart in the Saigon embassy threatening to ostracize Diem. This was in defiance of Kennedy’s wishes. (Newman, p. 336) But once Henry Cabot Lodge had arrived as the new ambassador in Saigon, this group took an even bolder step.
As with the sending of the threatening message, they waited until a strategic moment when all the principals of government were out of town. This came on the weekend of August 24-25th. JFK, McNamara, Bundy, Rusk, and CIA Director John McCone were all out of Washington. Three cables came in from Lodge and the CIA officer in contact with the South Vietnamese army, Lucien Conein. The message was that the Army was unhappy with the Ngo brothers and if the USA indicated to the generals that it “would be happy to see Diem and/or Nhu go, and the deed would be done.” Lodge added that he did not think it would be that easy. It could be a “shot in the dark”. (Newman, p. 346) This was all that Hilsman-Harriman-Forrestal needed. They sent a cable back on the 24th. It said that Diem must be given a chance to oust Nhu, “but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem. You may also tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown … ” (ibid)
Forrestal was given the job of getting this cable cleared. He read it to Kennedy over the phone. Kennedy did not understand why it had to be sent that day. But he said to see if others would OK it, especially McCone. Kennedy probably said this because he knew McCone would not approve it. (ibid p. 347) But, in fact, McCone was never shown the cable. (ibid, p. 351) The cabal also fudged getting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Maxwell Taylor to approve it. Hilsman and Forrestal concocted a story that said that no clearance from the Defense Department was required, meaning McNamara and Alexis Johnson. And further, that Taylor had approved it without question. Neither of these is true. (ibid p. 348) In fact, Taylor never approved the cable. When he saw it he perceptively thought, ” … my first reaction was that the anti-Diem group centered in State had taken advantage of the absence of the principal officials to get out instructions which would never have been approved as written under normal circumstances. ” (ibid p. 349) He also thought it would have never even been passed around if Bundy had been in town. Yet, Taylor did not call Kennedy to tell him what he thought was actually happening. The cable was sent that Saturday night.
On Monday, Kennedy was upset at what had happened: “This shit has got to stop!” When Forrestal offered to resign Kennedy replied with, “You’re not worth firing. You owe me something, so you stick around.” (ibid, p. 351) But the problem now was that in Saigon, Lodge had immediately jumped on the cable. And, seemingly as if he was part of the plan, he bypassed putting pressure on Diem to fire his brother Nhu, and instead he went straight to the generals. This was on Sunday, the 25th, less than 24 hours after getting the Saturday night cable. (ibid, p. 350) Bypassing Diem was a crucial switch from the original cable, which said that Diem was to be given a chance to oust his brother Nhu. (ibid, p. 346) So now, by the end of Sunday the 25th, the effort to overthrow Diem was in motion with almost irreversible momentum. Even though Kennedy advised Lodge that he was against it and wanted to work with Diem, even though RFK was against it also, Lodge and Conein had cast their lot with the coup plotters. (Goldstein, pgs. 81, 86-88) This ended, of course, with the coup finally succeeding in early November. With the cooperation of Lodge and Conein, the Ngo brothers were not just ousted, they were killed. (Douglass deals with this episode exceedingly well on pgs. 206-210) The death of the brothers deeply troubled Kennedy both morally and religiously. He ordered a complete review of how the August 24th cable was sent, why it was so urgent to do on the weekend, and why it was skewed so much in favor of the generals. (Goldstein p. 90)
In the aftermath of the coup, Bundy felt that perhaps the USA was now more committed to South Vietnam. But Kennedy did not waver from his withdrawal plan as helmed by McNamara. Goldstein quotes McNamara as saying to his biographer, “I believed that we had done all the training we could. Whether the South Vietnamese were qualified or not to turn back the North Vietnamese, I was certain that if they weren’t it was not for lack of training. More training wouldn’t strengthen them; therefore we should get out. The president agreed.” (ibid p. 84) Therefore in early October, NSAM 263 was issued. This stated that the US would withdraw a thousand advisers by the end of 1963. The White House announcement coupled with this issuance said that it was the first step in the eventual removal of the bulk of American personnel by the end of 1965. (Newman, p. 402) And after November coup, Kennedy said in a speech on November 14th that he did not want the US to put troops in Vietnam. His intent was to bring the Americans home. (Goldstein, pgs 95-96)
As Goldstein notes, this was all changed by what happened in Dallas a week later.
IV
Like most current scholarship, Goldstein describes the sea change that took place on the Vietnam issue after Johnson took over. Bundy told Goldstein that LBJ was not going to jeopardize his election by losing any aspect of the Cold War. (pgs. 98-99) He also told Goldstein that he did not really want to serve under LBJ, but he felt he had to until at least November of 1964. Bundy, and others, felt the real successor to JFK was Bobby Kennedy. (ibid)
The National Security Advisor states that there is no doubt that, from the first day, Johnson was preoccupied with Vietnam. (p. 105) For instance, Rusk said, “The President has expressed his deep concern that our effort in Vietnam be stepped up to the highest pitch, and that each day we ask ourselves what more we can do to further the struggle.” (p. 105) McCone said, “Johnson definitely feels that we place too much emphasis on social returns; he has very little tolerance with our spending so much time being “do-gooders”. (ibid) Johnson told McNamara that the USA was not doing everything it should in Vietnam. (p. 106) He sent McNamara to Saigon in order to give him a ground level report. Right before Christmas of 1963, McNamara returned with a bad report. (ibid, p. 107) The South Vietnamese had been lying about their progress in the war. A month after that, the Joint Chiefs sent a proposal to the White House recommending bombing the North and the insertion of US combat troops.
This is quite interesting of course. Not just because of the speed of the reversal. That has been noted by several other authors. But because the fulcrum of Kennedy’s strategy had been to partly base his withdrawal strategy on the false reports he knew he was getting from South Vietnam. In fact, this was one of the main themes of Newman’s milestone book. Namely, that Kennedy knew these were wrong. But he was going to utilize them to base his withdrawal plan on. But the Pentagon and the CIA finally understood what Kennedy was up to and began to change these reports. And they backdated the changes to July, 1963. (Newman, pgs 425, 441) McNamara had to have known this, since Kennedy had appointed him to run the withdrawal plan. But like the others, he understood a new sheriff was in town. So McNamara presented to LBJ the revised figures, the ones done as a reaction to Kennedy’s withdrawal strategy. In light of this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) responded with plans for both an American air and land war in Vietnam. On March 2, 1964 the JCS passed a new war proposal to the White House. This one was even more ambitious. It included bombing, the mining of North Vietnamese harbors, a naval blockade, and possible use of tactical atomic weapons, in case China intervened. (Goldstein, p. 108)
Johnson said he was not ready for this proposal since he did not have congress yet as a partner and trustee. (ibid, p. 109) But he did order the preparation of NSAM 288. This was essentially a target list of bombing sites that eventually reached 94 possibilities. (Edwin Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, pgs 24-25) By May 25th, with both Richard Nixon and Barry Goldwater clamoring for bombing of the north, LBJ had made the decision that the US would directly attack North Vietnam at an unspecified point in the future. (ibid, p. 26) In fact, the specific campaign, with the steps involved leading to a continuous air campaign, had already been mapped out in time intervals. This plan included the passage of a congressional resolution. (ibid, p. 27) The rough draft of the resolution was drawn up by a young lawyer in the State Department. (ibid) In June, Mac Bundy’s brother, William Bundy, finalized it. That month, Johnson began to lobby certain people in congress in advance. ( ibid, p. 26) On June 10th, McNamara said, “that in the event of a dramatic event in Southeast Asia we would go promptly for a congressional resolution.” (ibid) But Bill Bundy added, the actual decision to expand the war would not be made until after the election. (ibid, p. 44) This is precisely what happened.
As Goldstein points out, there were other views being voiced at the time. People like Sen. Richard Russell, journalist Walter Lippmann, and French Premier DeGaulle were all pushing for a neutralization plan. It’s interesting to compare Johnson’s reaction to DeGaulle with Kennedy’s. Whereas Kennedy took DeGaulle’s opinion very seriously, Johnson told Bundy to call DeGaulle and get him to take back his appeal for neutralization. (Goldstein, p. 111) Considering all of the above, the only thing Johnson needed now was a casus belli—the “dramatic event” McNamara spoke of. LBJ himself had planted the seed for one.
As John Newman notes, when Johnson became president, he altered the rough draft of NSAM 273 in more than one way. The most significant alteration was probably to paragraph seven. (Newman, p. 446) In the rough draft prepared by Bundy, it allowed for maritime operations against the north—but only by the government of South Vietnam. (ibid, p. 440) This was changed by LBJ. He struck the sentence specifying that maritime operations be done by the South Vietnamese government. (ibid, p. 446) Probably because this would have taken time, since South Vietnam had no sophisticated navy to speak of. As Newman writes, “This revision opened the door to direct US attacks against North Vietnam, and CINCPAC OPLAN 34-63, which became OPLAN 34A, was promptly submitted to the White House…” (ibid)By December 21, 1963—less than one month after Kennedy was killed—McNamara presented Johnson with a paper entitled “Plans for Covert Action into North Vietnam”. (ibid) One of the actions was to couple OPLAN 34A with DESOTO patrols in the Tonkin Gulf, all along the coast of North Vietnam. OPLAN 34 A consisted of hit and run strikes by small, quick patrol boats manned by South Vietnamese sailors. But outside of that, almost everything else about those missions was American in origin. The DESOTO patrols were completely American. These were destroyers manned with intelligence collecting machines to collect data on where things like North Vietnamese radar installations and torpedo boat harbors were. In other words, they worked in tandem.
The first naval operations went into effect in February of 1964. (Moise, , p. 6) The destroyer used at that time was called the Craig. The destroyer used for the second set of missions, beginning in July, was the Maddox. An important part of the mission was to “show the flag”. (Moise, p. 55) And part of that was violating the claim the North Vietnamese made about the limits of their territorial waters. They said the limit was twelve miles. Yet on the July/August missions both the attacking patrol boats and the Maddox were in violation of that limit. Not just in relation to the mainland, but also relative to the islands off the coast, which were also attacked. (Moise, p. 68) As many authors have concluded, the design and action of the mission was a provocation. (ibid, p. 68) In fact, people inside the White House, like Forrestal and McCone, later agreed it was. (Goldstein, p. 125)
There were two incidents that took place in the first week of August, which gave Johnson the pretext to pass his resolution. On August 2nd the Maddox was attacked by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Although torpedoes were launched, none hit. The total damage to the destroyer was one bullet through the hull. (Moise, p. 80) When the Defense Department briefed the senators on this first incident, they misrepresented it. They said the North Vietnamese fired first, that the USA had no role in the patrol boat raids, that the ships were in international waters, and there was no hot pursuit. These were all wrong. (Ibid, p. 87)
At this point, Captain Herrick of the Maddox suggested the missions be stopped. They were not. And the mission was given direct orders to violate the twelve mile territorial waters claim. Which they did. (ibid, p. 95) LBJ himself authorized the new OPLAN 34A attack on August 3rd. (ibid, p. 105) On this particular DESOTO patrol, the Turner Joy joined the Maddox. On August 4th, the Turner Joy reported that torpedo boats were approaching her. This message was relayed to Washington. McNamara used these messages in his discussion with Johnson. The Turner Joy then opened fire, eventually expending 300 shells. It was later discovered that they were firing at nothing. No attack took place that night. And in fact, the records of the Turner Joy were later altered ” to make the evidence of an attack seem stronger than it actually was …” (ibid, p.147)
The morning he first heard of the second incident, Johnson marched down to his National Security Advisor’s office. Bundy told Goldstein that this, in itself, was quite unusual. (Goldstein, p. 126) LBJ then told Bundy, “Get the resolution your brother drafted.” Bundy replied, “Mr. President, we ought to think about this.” Johnson said, “I didn’t ask you what you thought, I told you what to do.” (ibid) That exchange should throw the final pile of dirt on the myth of Johnson as the “reluctant warrior”
But it’s actually worse than that. Because today there is a debate on whether this exchange took place after the phony news of an actual attack, or whether Johnson talked to Bundy just upon hearing that the torpedo boats were approaching. According to Goldstein’s chronology, LBJ told Bundy to get the resolution out before any of the phony news of an attack got to him. (ibid pgs 126-127) Which would mean of course that the attack, which did not occur, was superfluous to Johnson. He was going to use the non-event to get his pre-planned resolution through congress. And in fact, during a meeting on August 5th, Bundy actually said that the evidence for the first attack had stood up, but the evidence for the second attack was questionable. (White House Memorandum. 5 August, 1964.) In 2003, the National Security Archive, released a memo saying that on August 4th, Herrick had actually relayed a message to McNamara saying that the evidence for the second attack was doubtful. McNamara later believed that LBJ did what he did because he did not want to be attacked by the hawks as being weak or indecisive. In other words, he was protecting his right flank. (Moise, p. 211) But at the same time, by campaigning with slogans like “I will not send American boys to fight a war Asian boys should be fighting”, he disguised his real designs from his Democratic base. (Goldstein, p. 129)
Sticking with his plan, Johnson took out the target list prepared by NSAM 288. He ordered air strikes that very day. But before the planes actually hit their targets, Johnson went on national television to announce the retaliation late on the night of August 4th. This alerted the North Vietnamese anti-aircraft batteries. So in the wee hours of August 5th, two pilots were shot down. (ibid, p. 219) But in another sense, the air strikes did the trick. Johnson’s approval ratings on his handling of the war went up drastically. (ibid p. 226) Afterwards, Johnson continued to deceive congress. He told Sen. William Fulbright that OPLAN 34A was a South Vietnamese operation. ( ibid p. 227) The Tonkin Gulf resolution was passed by both houses, almost unanimously. The whole idea in ramming it through was to change the outline of the event from a provocation by the US into America being a victim of North Vietnamese aggression.
On August 7th, LBJ sent a message to Maxwell Taylor. He wanted a whole gamut of possible operations presented to him for direct American attacks against the North. This was received in the White House two days later. The target date for a systematic bombing campaign against the North was set for January of 1965. (Moise, p. 244) As we will see, Johnson missed this target by one month.
After Johnson ordered the reprisal bombing for the non-existent second attack, the government of North Vietnam met. They decided that direct American military intervention in the South was on its way. They also concluded that a continuous bombing campaign was also probable. They decided the public had to be made aware of the coming onslaught. In September, they also began to send the first North Vietnamese regulars down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. (Moise, p. 251)
All the above was made possible by the alterations in NSAM 273, which Johnson made four days after Kennedy was killed. In other words, LBJ was going to war over one bullet in a destroyer’s hull.
V
The last part of Lessons in Disaster describes Bundy’s slightly less than two years in the White House as Johnson implemented his plan to Americanize the war. If ever there was a case for dramatizing John Newman’s axiom about 1964, it is in these pages. Newman said that Kennedy was using the 1964 election to disguise his withdrawal plan; Johnson used the election to disguise his intervention plan. In fact LBJ had once said, Vietnam could not be lost before the election, but it also could not blossom into an all-out war before it either. (Goldstein, p. 133) In fact, CIA analyst Ray Cline had told Bundy that if America waited to intervene until after the election, it would still allow time to save the day. (ibid pgs. 136-37)
For this book, Bundy threw himself into a review of Vietnam policy, especially under Johnson. The State Department had issued a report saying that a sustained aerial war would not be effective there. And it would not stop Hanoi from aiding the Viet Cong. Bundy ignored these warnings. He favored an air campaign. So did Max Taylor. LBJ disagreed. He told Taylor, “I have never felt this war will be won from the air, and it seems to me that what is much more needed and would be more effective is larger and stronger use of Rangers, and Special Forces, and Marines, or other appropriate military strength on the ground and on the scene.” (ibid, p. 151) Gen. William Westmoreland, the commander in South Vietnam, also agreed in a ground war. In February of 1965, Bundy was touring the country. The Viet Cong attacked an officers HQ in Pleiku, where several Americans were killed and even more injured. Bundy recommended air strikes in retaliation. When Bundy got back to Washington, he asked Johnson about his recommendation. LBJ replied, “Well, isn’t that all decided?” (ibid p. 158) And it had been. Operation Flaming Dart quickly escalated into Rolling Thunder, the greatest aerial bombardment campaign the world had ever seen. Johnson wanted Eisenhower’s approval for it first. He got it in spades. Eisenhower even recommended tactical nukes if necessary. (p. 161) The Domino Theory was quite powerful.
The only person actually arguing with Johnson, in both public and private, was Vice-President Hubert Humphrey. When he addressed a long memo to Johnson arguing against escalation on quite practical grounds e.g. the instability of the South Vietnamese government, LBJ went ballistic. He barred him from any future meetings on Vietnam, and actually wanted surveillance put on him to see who he was talking to. (p. 162)
Once the air war escalated, Westmoreland argued for troops to protect the air base at Da Nang. Interestingly, Taylor argued against it since it would break the line in the sand that Kennedy had drawn. (p. 163) LBJ sided with Westmoreland. And the first American combat troops arrived in Vietnam in March of 1965. Within two months of his inauguration, Johnson had begun both the air and land war he had been planning for over a year.
Johnson’s next step was to ask the Secretary of the Army how many troops it would take to win the war. The response was 500,000 men and at least five years, probably more. (p. 165) On April 1st, just three weeks after the Da Nang landing, Johnson began to pour in the combat troops he felt he needed to win. The first contingent was of 20,000 men, and LBJ specifically changed their mission from base protection to offensive operations. By April 20th, Westmoreland was asking for an increase to 82,000 troops. He got them. (p. 171) At this point, Taylor understood what Johnson’s aim was: He was going to give the military all the men it needed as fast as possible to win the war. He was right. Westmoreland asked for more combat troops on June 7th. He got 42,000 more. He then asked for 52,000 after that. He got them also. By the end of 1965, Johnson’s first 11 months in office, there were over 175,000 combat troops in Vietnam. Under Kennedy there had been none.
Bundy understood by the end of 1965 that Westmoreland was committed to a war of attrition. He felt he did not do enough analysis of what the war was devolving into. He didn’t press the story of what the real prospects for success were. He didn’t measure the strengths and weaknesses of each side. He didn’t ask: What kind of war will this be?, or How many losses will we sustain? (pgs. 178, 182) He had become a staff officer aiding his commander instead of a detached analyst measuring options in advance and giving the president the ups and downs of each option he takes. He felt that one of his greatest failures was that he never commissioned a detailed study as to what it would cost the USA in every aspect to completely secure South Vietnam. He failed to do this because he was initially in favor of intervention. He later told Goldstein that it was a serious error and he failed to ever address it. (p. 185) Bundy felt that another failure of his was that he did not understand that in this kind of war, numerical success did not equal military victory. Therefore Westmoreland’s famous “body count” tally was not a good barometer of how the war was actually progressing. (p. 188) The incredible thing was that the worse it got, the more people like Eisenhower and Rusk urged Johnson on. And the more troops LBJ committed. But yet, Westmoreland wanted still more. By the second half of 1965, he wanted a doubling of the troop commitment, and a tripling of the air war. (pgs. 201-202) This is where Bundy and Johnson began to part company. Another issue where they parted was on how much to tell the American public. Bundy thought Johnson had to sell the war more to keep America committed. Johnson wanted to keep it low profile. (p. 198)
But there was something else that bothered Bundy about Johnson’s constant escalation. That’s because he found out the reason the military always got what they wanted. It was because the White House debates were nothing but a piece of choreographed stagecraft. The director being Lyndon Johnson, on instructions from Westmoreland. Bundy discovered that Westmoreland had a secret telegram channel to Johnson. Through this he would make a request, and Johnson would then OK it. It was at this point that LBJ would call the meeting on the requested escalation—after it had been approved. (pgs. 214-15) It was all meant to give people like him the feeling that they had a say in the decision, when they really did not. The decision was a fait accompli.
Bundy felt that both he and Johnson got caught up in the whole war of attrition fallacy: That even if they achieved only a stalemate, that was better than losing because it would show the world the USA was not a paper tiger. (pgs. 221-222) This was the level of sophistication that was guiding the decisions of this great epic tragedy by the end of 1965.
After it was all over, and the recriminations and many books had been written about it, Bundy decided to look back on his role in the debacle. One of the first books he read was David Halberstams’s The Best and the Brightest. A book in which he figured prominently. Although he thought it was an entertaining and informative read, he concluded that the central thesis was just wrong. (pgs. 148-49) It was not the advisers—the best and brightest—who did the staff work who got us into the Vietnam War. It was the difference in the men who occupied the Oval Office. It was the difference between Kennedy and Johnson.
And with that, Lessons in Disaster joins a growing list of books that now almost fill up a shelf. In fact, we have now had two in the last year: Goldstein’s and Virtual JFK. It’s a shame it took so long for the truth to arrive. But finally, as Michael Morrissey wrote years ago, the second biggest lie about Kennedy’s assassination can be laid to rest.
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James Blight, Virtual JFK (Part 2)
Virtual JFK: Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived
Part One of this essay reviews the film accompanying this book, which has the same title.
Part Three, Virtual JFK 3: Gordon Goldstein’s Lessons in Disaster
See the Virtual JFK web site.
It’s not possible for me to make a joke about the death of John F. Kennedy.
—Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.
This Vonnegut quote appears on the first page of Virtual JFK. It was a good signal for me. One of the things it conveyed was that finally, after so many years, the mainstream academic community was going to seriously look at a painful but glaring question: If President Kennedy had lived, would he have withdrawn from Vietnam and not have Americanized that war?
In 2005, a little less than twenty scholars and former policy makers gathered at a place called the Musgrove Conference Center at St. Simons Island, Georgia. The subject was this very question. All of those involved had a distinct interest in either the Kennedy presidency, the Johnson presidency, or the Vietnam War. Many of them had studied all three. To give you an idea of who was there let me mention who several of the attendees were. Jamie Galbraith is the son of one of Kennedy’s chief advisers and confidantes, John Kenneth Galbraith. He is a Professor of Government and Business relations at the University of Texas at Austin. Inspired by what his father told him about Kennedy and Vietnam, he has been an intelligent, articulate, and authoritative proponent of Kennedy’s desire to withdraw all forces by 1965. Frederick Logevall is a Professor of History at Cornell who in 1999 wrote an extraordinary volume called Choosing War. This was an exhaustive study of Johnson’s decision making from Kennedy’s death until the great escalations of 1965 and beyond. A rather surprising revelation of the book was that, far from stumbling errantly into a colossal debacle, Johnson fully understood and measured what the potential costs in blood and treasure would be. His generals told him in 1965 that the conflict in Vietnam would take 500,000 troops to fight and would last anywhere from five to twenty years. Johnson gave the military 538,000 troops and much more. Chester Cooper was an assistant to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and later worked for Asst. Secretary of State Averill Harriman. He was closely involved in the formation of Vietnam policy under both men and under both presidents. Tom Hughes worked for Chester Bowles, a chief Kennedy adviser during the campaign of 1960. Once Kennedy was elected, Hughes worked first for Bowles and then succeeded Roger Hilsman as director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department. He stayed there for the great escalations of 1965-68. Another policy-maker in attendance was Bill Moyers. Moyers first worked for Lyndon Johnson on his senatorial staff. He then worked for JFK as Deputy Director of the Peace Corps. When Kennedy was killed, he reverted back to being an advisor for Johnson and then rose to Press Secretary. He parted ways with LBJ over Vietnam and left the White House in 1966.
The point is made. It’s an impressive yet relatively mainstream roster. Some of the other participants are Frances Fitzgerald, author of the Pulitzer Prize winning book about America in Vietnam, Fire in the Lake; Tim Naftali, co-author of One Hell of a Gamble, a history of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Russian viewpoint; and Marilyn Young, Professor of History at NYU and author of The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990. The three people who essentially arranged and ran the conference were David Welch, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto; Janet Lang an associate professor at the Watson Institute, and last but not least, James Blight a Professor of International Relations at Brown. Blight has been part of a few books on the Kennedy presidency, especially dealing with the Missile Crisis.
They have made an interesting volume. It’s uneven, and in the purest sense, not really a book. But it’s interesting, even compelling, nevertheless. When I say it is not really a book, what I mean is that it is more an oral history plus a document annex. But since the discussions are footnoted, the oral history has a real basis in fact. And since all the participants were issued a thousand page briefing book of the most currently declassified documents on the Vietnam War, most of the discussion is state of the art. Further, the conference organizers arranged for audiotapes to be piped into the room so that the latest declassified phone calls and taped meetings could be heard too. Blight did his homework well. Many of the things that I talked about that were missing from the film of the same name, do appear here. And to say the least, the document annex is quite forceful. A matter I will get to later.
The conference lasted for two days. And the discussion centered on whether or not there was continuity or breakage between Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Vietnam policy. The book acknowledges the fact that, as John Newman noted in Vietnam: The Early Decisions (edited by Lloyd Gardner and Ted Gittinger), the myth of continuity has been chiefly maintained by prominent mainstream academics. (p. 158) So this conference was a milestone in that regard. It was precipitated by the influence of Newman’s compelling and fully documented 1992 book, JFK and Vietnam. (Newman is mentioned at several points in the discussion.) Prior to that volume some writers had talked about this breakage in policy. But it had been sporadic, the evidence mostly anecdotal, and not really sustained. In fact all the material I could summon for my first book Destiny Betrayed, could not even flesh out a moderately sized book. To give these people their due though, they included Roger Hilsman in To Move a Nation, Ted Sorenson in his book Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger in his long biography Robert Kennedy and His Times, Ralph Martin in A Hero for our Time, and Dave Powers and Ken O’Donnell in Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye. The last is the most interesting. Although it was published in 1972, the same year as David Halberstam’s best-selling The Best and the Brightest, it took serious issue with that standard reference book which argued for continuity. It went on for several pages (pgs. 13-18, 442-444), sternly denying there was any continuity at all. Actually taking issue at one point with proclamations made by Johnson in his memoirs. (This is a theme, Johnson’s attempt to rewrite the record, that I will take up later.) Like Newman would argue in 1992, that book said that Kennedy had decided not to commit combat troops to Vietnam as early as 1961. They based this on two long discussions Kennedy had on the issue with French Premier Charles DeGaulle and General Douglas MacArthur.
In another form, the two authors who wrote about this subject in essays prior to Newman were Fletcher Prouty and Peter Dale Scott. Scott based most of his work on the Pentagon Papers. Prouty worked from that, plus his own experience inside the Pentagon. He wrote about Kennedy’s plans to withdraw in his fine book The Secret Team (pgs. 401-416), and in a short essay in High Treason (466-473). Scott wrote two interesting essays on the subject. One was originally published in Ramparts and the other in the Gravel edition of the Pentagon Papers.
But, as I said, John Newman’s book went much further than any of the above. So much further, that the publisher ditched the book. As Galbraith writes in his fine 2003 essay in Boston Review, 32,000 copies of JFK and Vietnam were initially printed in 1992. After 10,000 were sold, Warner Books ceased selling the hardcover. Even though the book had high visibility because of Oliver Stone’s film JFK, the company never spent anything on promoting the book. Incredibly it was never reprinted in trade paperback. When Newman complained about this in 1993, the company quietly returned his rights. But in spite of this, because the book was so well-documented, contained so much new material, and was so convincing in its argument, it has had a strong influence with both public opinion and with scholars.
Let me note an important point here in order to give Newman’s book its full due. Even though the books and essays noted above had interesting snippets of information, and Scott and Prouty had serious arguments to make, their cumulative impact was minimal. Outside of those interested in President Kennedy’s assassination, and to a lesser degree, his short presidency, they made the briefest of ripples into the general public, the mainstream press, or the halls of academia. The double impact of the film JFK plus the publication of Newman’s book had the effect of a shotgun blast at close range. Newman had labored over his book for ten years. Completely by coincidence, it was being finished at the time Oliver Stone was filming his movie of Jim Garrison’s book On the Trail of the Assassins. And it fit in perfectly with the film because this is something that Garrison sincerely believed in at the time of his prosecution of Clay Shaw. (He had garnered this from things like the Sorenson book plus another source that I will reveal in Part Five of my review of Reclaiming History, which discusses Vincent Bugliosi’s treatment of both Garrison and Stone.) So in the immense controversy that followed the film—and actually preceded it—Newman’s book figured prominently. For instance, when it came out in 1992, Arthur Schlesinger reviewed it on the front page of the New York Times Book Review.
After the controversy subsided, Newman’s book began to have an impact in academia. The reason it took awhile is because his book absolutely humiliated many of the previous standard bearers in the Vietnam field. Like say Halberstam, and Stanley Karnow, and William Conrad Gibbons. The book was so clear and logically argued that the question became: How could all of these so called “scholars” have acted like lemmings and missed this easily delineated dividing line? In the aforementioned Gardner book, Newman states that the underlying tow is the collective attempt to deny that the Vietnam War was, contrary to popular belief, not an inevitable tragedy. (p. 158) That who actually occupies the Oval Office does make a difference. (p. 159) And Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived furthers this argument substantially. Once an historical paradigm is set, it is very difficult to surmount it. Even if it is wrong. That’s because, contrary to popular belief, there is strong pressure in the academic world not to rock the boat, not to break out of preconceived paradigms. That is, to become part of the Establishment. Much of this comes down through the influence of foundations, conservative think tanks, and of course, the CIA’s influence on campus. Two men written about in Probe previously, Thomas Reeves and Max Holland, are good examples of this.
But, for reasons stated above, JFK and Vietnam could not be denied. Slowly but surely it began to turn the paradigm around. The shocking thing about the book is that, not only did it enrage the conservatives; it also infuriated the so-called Leftist leaders at the time, namely Alexander Cockburn and Noam Chomsky. Galbraith’s 2003 article in Boston Review, using the since declassified record, negates the rather silly arguments of both polemicists. (And I will detail this further in Part Five of the Bugliosi review.) And the great triumph of Newman ‘s work is that the documents declassified by the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) only fortify what he wrote. Because of that, other historians who wrote after him, followed in his footsteps: LBJ broke with Kennedy’s policies on Vietnam. This included David Kaiser in American Tragedy, Robert Dallek in An Unfinished Life, and Howard Jones in Death of a Generation. Two other books which should be mentioned in this regard which favor Kennedy not Americanizing the war, but are more equivocal in their judgments, are the works of the aforementioned Logevall and Lawrence Freedman’s ironically titled Kennedy’s Wars. (I say “ironically” because the book comes to the conclusion that Kennedy was determined not to get involved in any wars.)
II
This book takes a leap forward. Because at the end of the conference a vote was taken on whether, if he had lived, Kennedy would have Americanized the war. Half the respondents said he would not have and would have withdrawn. Thirty percent said he would have escalated as Johnson did. And twenty percent said it was too difficult to say. (p. 210)
Let me add here, the discussion of the issue is quite wide ranging. As the film did, the book takes in the other opportunities Kennedy had to get involved in wars, which he refused to do. The authors put great weight on Kennedy’s acceptance of failure at the Bay of Pigs rather than sending in American forces, which Admiral Arleigh Burke wanted him to do. As many commentators do, including myself, they see this as a defining moment in President Kennedy’s presidency. In the document section of the book, they print three memoranda that depict Kennedy’s reaction to the disaster he was led into by the CIA. Clearly, Kennedy went through a definite pattern after the Bay of Pigs: shock and dismay at his advisers, feedback as to what exactly had gone wrong, and how the debacle had now placed America in the eyes of its trusted allies abroad. In other words, he grew from the experience. And the book also notes briefly, the two reports that were issued as a result of the Bay of Pigs: the presidentially commissioned Taylor Report, and the internal CIA report by Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick. Both of the reports concluded that the operation was poorly planned and weakly reviewed. As writers like Paul Fay have noted, Kennedy vowed that he would never again accept the advice of his CIA and Pentagon advisers without grilling them at length and in depth.
What is important about this episode is that it occurs just seven months prior to the first dramatic milestone in Kennedy’s conduct of the Vietnam War. In the fall of 1961, Maxwell Taylor and assistant National Security Adviser Walt Rostow went to Vietnam. They then delivered a report to Kennedy in late October. The recommendation was that, since the Viet Cong were gaining strength and Ngo Dinh Diem’s position was weakening, the time had come for the USA to commit combat troops to the conflict. The debate on this issue lasted for over two weeks. It appears that the only person resisting the siren song of direct military intervention was President Kennedy. One of the real valued documents included in the book is what is probably the only set of notes taken on this debate. They are by White House military aide Col. Howard Burris (pgs 282-283). They deserve to be summarized and paraphrased at length. Here is the gist of it:
Kennedy stated that Vietnam is not a clear-cut case of aggression as it was in Korea. He says that the conflict in Vietnam is “more obscure and less flagrant.” Kennedy notes that in a situation such as Vietnam, allies are needed even more since the USA would be subject to intense criticism from abroad. He compared the record of the past, where the Vietnamese had resisted foreign forces who had spent millions against them with no success. He then compared the situation in Berlin with Vietnam, saying that in Berlin you had a well-defined conflict whereas the Vietnam situation was obscure. So obscure that you might soon even have Democrats in his own party bewildered by it. Especially since you would largely be fighting a guerilla force, and “sometimes in a phantom-like fashion.” Kennedy said that because of this, the base of operations for American troops would be insecure. At the end of the discussion Kennedy turned the conversation to what would be done next in Vietnam, “rather than whether or not the US would become involved.” I should add, during the talk, Kennedy turned aside attempts by Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Lyman Lemnitzer to derail his thought process. Kennedy had learned his lesson well.
One of the most important discoveries in the volume is that in the mid-nineties, National Security Advisor Bundy had decided to write a book about his experience with Kennedy and Johnson over Vietnam. His co-author on that endeavor was at the Musgrove Conference. His name is Gordon Goldstein. The two had worked on the book for two years. But Bundy unfortunately passed away in 1996 before it was finished. Goldstein says that one of the great surprises he had in working on the book was that Bundy had virtually no memory of the debate in November of 1961. (p. 76) In fact, Goldstein says that Bundy was actually surprised at 1.) How hawkish he was in the 1961 debate, and 2.) How resistant at all costs Kennedy was. At this time, Bundy actually wrote a memo to Kennedy in which he recommended a force of 25,000 troops be sent because South Vietnam actually wants to be part of the USA! (pgs 280-281) How resistant was Kennedy to all this? When General Max Taylor tried to sneak 8,000 combat troops in for “flood relief” purposes, Kennedy consulted with an agriculture expert to prove you didn’t need them for that purpose. (p. 77) After two years of delving into the record, Bundy had come to the conclusion that Kennedy would not have committed combat troops to Vietnam. As he told Goldstein: “Kennedy very definitely was not going to Americanize the war in Vietnam; and Lyndon Johnson very definitely, from the moment he succeeded Kennedy was going to do whatever it took to win the war in Vietnam, including sending US combat forces in large numbers … ” (p. 53, emphasis added. The phrase in italics is a key point I will return to later.) This now makes it unanimous. The three men in closest proximity to Kennedy concerning military strategy are now on record as saying that Kennedy was not going to commit troops to Vietnam: McNamara in his book In Retrospect, Taylor (pgs. 357, 365), and now Bundy.
Another point the book makes is that it nails Walt Rostow. As I said, Rostow accompanied Taylor on the Vietnam trip of 1961. Rostow was one of the biggest hawks in the White House up until Kennedy’s 11/61 decision to increase the advisors but not to send in combat troops. This decision was memorialized in NSAM 111, in late November of 1961. Right after this, Kennedy got so tired of Rostow’s memoranda suggesting further American commitment to Vietnam-like invading the north with a million man US army—that he took him out of the White House and placed him in the Policy Planning Department of the State Department. (p. 182) Now, Rostow writes his myriad hawkish memos for Rusk to read. And they seem to have had an effect. Because when Johnson took over, Rusk now became a real hawk on the war. (p. 154) But further, when Bundy decided to resign as National Security Advisor, he suggested two men to replace him: Thomas Hughes or Moyers. Johnson rejected them both. He placed Walt Rostow in the job. Johnson had to have known what he was getting with Rostow. Because he was around for the debates of November of 1961. He knew that the Taylor-Rostow Report recommended American combat troops. He had to have known that Kennedy argued eloquently and soundly against the commitment of combat troops. After all, Howard Burris, the man who wrote the memo containing Kennedy’s arguments—which I quoted from above—was working for Johnson. So when LBJ rescued Rostow from his figurative Siberia in the State Department, he knew what he was getting. And he would have recalled him only if he knew that Rostow’s agenda coincided with his own. Which was to escalate the war. (p. 175) In fact, when Rostow was appointed National Security Advisor, he told Johnson about Kennedy’s “deep commitment to the independence of Vietnam from which he would not have retreated.” (p. 152) According to Chester Cooper, Rostow looked upon negotiations as tantamount to surrender. Rostow wanted a simple goal: an independent South Vietnam. By 1965-66, the actual goal of both Johnson and Rostow was this: “Bringing the Vietnamese communists to their knees via continuously escalating the level of punishment they received from US air and ground forces until the communists gave up.” (p. 179) This was nothing but a delusional fantasy. And Kennedy understood this in 1961 from 1.) His visits to Vietnam during the French imperialist war there in the fifties, 2.) Through his talks with MacArthur, and 3.) His conversations with DeGaulle.
After this November 1961 decision and the reassignment of Rostow, Kennedy went to Seattle and made a speech. This is the day after NSAM 111 is signed. He talked about how America had to be cautious on the world stage because any crisis might escalate into a catastrophic nuclear war. He specifically mentioned how the massive amount of US firepower could be rendered useless by guerilla warfare and infiltration. He then added that although the US could ship arms abroad, it was up to those peoples to use them correctly and for the right ideals. We could not impose our will on others, and there could not be “an American solution to every problem.” (pgs. 287-288) These were wise and prophetic words, which Rostow and Johnson did not understand or even wish to comprehend.
III
One of the most fascinating parts of the book is the discussion of the role of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in Kennedy’s administration. When Kennedy sent Rostow and Taylor to Vietnam in the fall of 1961, he seems to have understood what they would come back with. After all, JFK fully comprehended what Rostow was about pretty quickly. What I will discuss next reveals just how wise Kennedy had become and how smart he was at maneuvering the people in his own Cabinet after the Bay of Pigs. Almost concurrently with the trip by Rostow and Taylor, he also sent John Kenneth Galbraith to Vietnam. (p.129) He realized that what Galbraith wrote up would counter the Rostow-Taylor recommendations. It did of course. But Kennedy did not throw this report out for open discussion. He told Galbraith to give it to McNamara only. This becomes crucial in any discussion of Vietnam in the JFK administration. Because as the book notes, after the issuance of NSAM 111, the only person in the Cabinet who seems to understand what Kennedy is headed for is McNamara. And in fact, Howard Jones discovered that Roswell Gilpatric, McNamara’s Deputy Secretary, talked about the fact that Kennedy eventually entrusted his boss with putting together a withdrawal plan. He referred to it as “part of a plan the president asked him [McNamara] to develop to unwind this whole thing.” (p. 371) This began in earnest in 1962 when McNamara went to the Joint Chiefs and told them to put together a plan for withdrawal. As Jim Douglass wrote in his fine book JFK and the Unspeakable, the Chiefs dragged their feet on this one for a year. Finally at the so-called SecDef conference of May 1963, they presented a plan to the Secretary. He criticized it as being too slow. (pgs 288-291) After telling them to hurry it along, he had a taped conversation with Kennedy and Bundy in October of 1963. He told Kennedy the military mission of the US would be completed by 1965, and if it were not, the South Vietnamese would be ready by then to take it over. Bundy then interjects, “What’s the point of doing that?” McNamara replies, “We need a way to get out of Vietnam. This is a way of doing it. And to leave forces there when they’re not needed, I think is wasteful and complicates both their problem and ours.”
The above ARRB declassified tape was heard and shown on screen in the accompanying film to this book. When played at the conference its effect was startling. (pgs 100, 124) Why? Because mainstream writers like Karnow and Halberstam had always depicted Vietnam as McNamara’s War. Plus much of the documentation showing this as false had been concealed from the public. In fact, Goldstein actually asked, “Who is the Robert McNamara on these tapes?” To me the comment by Bundy—”What’s the point of doing that?”—is the key. As Gilpatric explained, and Galbraith elucidated, McNamara was appointed by JFK to be his point man on the withdrawal. He was going to drive it home with occasional encouragement from Kennedy. This “back channel” idea was endorsed by James Galbraith, who talked about it with his father. John Kenneth Galbraith told his son that JFK often operated like this. In James Galbraith’s words about McNamara at the conference: “Kennedy and he [McNamara] were agreed in advance that this was the course of policy they were going to follow. That was a position they didn’t share … with virtually no one else. They then imposed this, with McNamara playing the role of giving the argument he already knows Kennedy is going to accept, because Kennedy told him to do it.” (p. 129) This concept was posthumously endorsed through Bundy. When co-author Goldstein talked to Bundy about why McNamara switched so quickly from endorsing combat troops in November of 1961 to being so dovish a month later, Bundy said there was only one answer to explain the apparent paradox. Kennedy had asked him to do so. (p. 125) In fact, McNamara was so immersed in making the withdrawal plan work that he asked the State Department intelligence group (INR) to give him more optimistic scenarios of what was happening on the ground. (p. 117) According to Newman, this was probably done because once the CIA and Pentagon realized Kennedy was going to withdraw, they began to change their intelligence estimates from rosy to pessimistic. And further, they backdated the revisions to July of 1963. (Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 425, 441 Gardner and Gittinger, p. 172) Realizing Kennedy’s plan to use the false and rosy estimates to hoist them on their own petard—that is, to withdraw US forces since they were not needed anymore—the CIA and Pentagon began to fight back.
What this all says of course is that, as in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy understood that his Cabinet and military advisers were not giving him what he wanted fast enough. In October of 1962, he worked secretly through his brother Robert Kennedy, and to a lesser extent with Rusk. This time around he worked with McNamara, and to a lesser extent with Galbraith. With McNamara running interference, NSAM 263, ordering the withdrawal of the first thousand advisers from Vietnam was signed in October of 1963. (It should be added here that the death of the Nhu brothers in November of 1963 had no effect on the withdrawal plan. See page 372) The press release that announced NSAM 263 also stated that this first thousand troop draw down was part of a phased withdrawal of the major part of all US forces. And that withdrawal would be completed by the end of 1965. (p. 300)
Finally, when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Max Taylor wrote his memo on NSAM 263 to the service Chiefs, there was no mention about the withdrawal being contingent upon victory. (pgs 106, 110) This is a myth promulgated by anti-Kennedy polemicist Noam Chomsky. Virtually no one at this conference bought it.
IV
Ever since the portrayal of Lyndon Johnson’s role in the escalation of the Vietnam War was dramatically depicted in Oliver Stone’s film JFK, there has been an attempt by some e.g. Michael Beschloss and Vincent Bugliosi, to soften that image. What these two try to say is that Johnson was a reluctant warrior who was manipulated by others into plunging America into an epic tragedy that needlessly consumed the lives of over 58,000 Americans and two million Vietnamese. In other words Stone and John Newman (who served as a consultant on the film) got it wrong. They unfairly distorted what Johnson’s real role was in this affair. What this book shows, and with utter finality, is this: it is Beschloss and Bugliosi who have it wrong. If anything, Stone and Newman were being kind to Johnson. The reality is actually worse. And the recall of Walt Rostow to commandeer the escalation is only part of it. The book brings in a new angle: Johnson understood that he was breaking with Kennedy’s policy, and he consciously tried to cover his tracks.
The story begins with the alterations in NSAM 273. This was the rough draft of a presidential order as assembled by Kennedy’s advisers in Hawaii just prior to Kennedy’s trip to Dallas. The conference there was meant to make any necessary adjustments to Vietnam policy after the death of the Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother. Because of his murder in Dallas, the rough draft of this order, actually written by Bundy, was never signed by President Kennedy. The opening of the draft said that the US mission was still to assist the Government of South Vietnam against the Communist insurgency. It also mentioned that the US intended to withdraw as made clear by the White House announcement of October. Paragraph seven stated that there should be actions against North Vietnam using South Vietnamese resources, especially sea resources. (Newman, p. 440, emphasis added)
At Johnson’s first Vietnam meeting on November 24, 1963 there was a quite different tone and attitude than anything Kennedy had said with his Cabinet. The new president stated clearly, “I am not going to lose Vietnam. I am not going to be the president who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went.” He ordered South Vietnamese Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to “tell the generals in Saigon that Lyndon Johnson intends to stand by our word.” (Newman, p. 442) This is rather an odd thing to say. Because the word prior to Dallas was that the USA was intending to withdraw and turn the war over to South Vietnam. Johnson then said that he was unhappy with our emphasis on social reforms, he had little tolerance for the US trying to be “do-gooders”. (ibid, p. 443) He then added that he had “never been happy with our operations in Vietnam.” (ibid) His intent was clear: it was to win the war. (McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 102) He then issued a stern warning: He wanted no more dissension or division over policy. Any person that did not conform would be removed. (This would later be demonstrated by his banning of Hubert Humphrey from Vietnam meetings when Humphrey advised Johnson to rethink his policy of military commitment to Vietnam.) When the meeting was over, Bill Moyers remained in the room with Johnson. LBJ said, “So they’ll think with Kennedy dead we’ve lost heart … they’ll think we’re yellow …” Moyers asked whom he was referring to. Johnson replied the Chinese and the Russians. Moyers asked his boss what he was going to do now. Johnson said he was going to give the generals what they wanted, more money. LBJ continued by saying that he was not going to let Vietnam slip away like China did. He was going to tell those generals in Saigon “to get off their butts and get out in those jungles and whip the hell out of some Communists.” (Newsweek, 2/10/75)
It’s hard to believe, but it is imperative to remember: this is just 48 hours after Kennedy’s death. As the book notes, Johnson’s presidential style was completely different from Kennedy’s. And it locked him into his blinkered view of Vietnam. He tended to personalize the war. He was intolerant of dissent. He wanted to intimidate the opposition. Both in the White House, and on the battlefield. (p. 192) By the summer of 1965, Johnson had so cowed any dissent within his Cabinet that after he had already committed 85,000 combat troops to Vietnam, Gen Westmoreland actually requested another 85,000. LBJ called for a meeting and asked for a vote. The minutes of this meeting end with: “There was no response when the president asked whether anyone in the room opposed the course of action decided upon.” (p. 193) Westmoreland got his troops.
This drastic change in tone accomplished two things. First, it gave the signal to the hawks and closet hawks that, unlike with JFK, they would now have Johnson’s ear. Secondly, the altered intelligence reports about the declining fortunes on the battlefield would now have their intended effect. Bundy now changed the rough draft of NSAM 273 in accordance with Johnson’s “stronger views on the war”. (Newman, p. 445) First, in keeping with Johnson’s “no dissension or division” reprimand, the new NSAM expressly forbade any public criticisms of the war effort. Second, paragraph seven about South Vietnamese operations against the north was rewritten. And it was rewritten in a way that allowed the US to participate in these covert operations against North Vietnam. (ibid, p. 446) Thus began OPLAN 34A, which was submitted to Johnson less than a month later. Johnson approved it on January 16, 1964. This resulted in Operation DESOTO, consisting of US maritime patrols acquiring visual, electronic, and photographic intelligence in the Tonkin Gulf. These patrols began on February 28, 1964. In early August, the second patrol resulted in the North Vietnamese attack on the US destroyer Maddox. And this opened the door to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which Johnson vigorously pursued as his approval to begin the US air war against North Vietnam. And these first air strikes were considered by Ho Chi Minh to be acts of war by the USA. (p. 162) As the air war intensified—eventually turning into the colossal Operation Rolling Thunder—the US needed protection for the air bases being built. So in early March of 1965, just seven months after the Maddox incident, the first US combat troops arrived in South Vietnam. And 1965 was the year Kennedy had intended to complete his withdrawal plan—after he was reelected. Johnson did the opposite. He inserted combat troops after his reelection. As Newman notes in JFK and Vietnam, the November 1964 election was used by Kennedy to disguise a withdrawal. Johnson used it to disguise his plan for intervention. (Newman, p. 442) In fact, Johnson essentially said this to the Joint Chiefs in December of 1963. He told them at a Christmas party, “Just get me elected, and then you can have your war.” (Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, p. 326)
V
Much of the above is taken from Newman’s 1992 book. In working with John after meeting him in 1993, he told me that one of the problems he had in writing JFK and Vietnam was that the CIA eventually found out what he was doing. And they would visit archival institutions—like the Hoover Institute at Stanford—and remove certain things in advance.
This problem was alleviated by the arrival of the ARRB. I say alleviated. It was not completely cured. For instance, although the ARRB interviewed several people who attended the Honolulu Conference of November 1963, none of them could produce the stenographic record of the meeting. In late 1997, the Board released the records of the SecDef Conference in May of 1963. This was McNamara’s meeting with his Vietnam advisers in Hawaii. Clearly, at this meeting, McNamara is hurrying the withdrawal plan. And as I wrote in Probe, (Vol. 5 No. 3) “On page after page of these documents, at every upper level of the Pentagon, everyone seems aware that Kennedy’s withdrawal plan will begin in December of 1963 … and this would be the beginning of an eventual complete withdrawal by 1965.” (p. 19) How clear was the message McNamara was carrying for Kennedy? General Earle Wheeler wrote, “that proposals for overt action invited a negative PRESIDENTIAL decision.” (ibid, capitals in original) Compare this to Johnson’s telling the generals to get off their butts and whip hell out of some communists. Also, in the November 26th version of NSAM 273, Johnson ordered “intensified operations against North Vietnam” both overt and covert, covering “the full spectrum of sabotage, psychological and raiding activity.” Further, the intensified operations were also against the country of Laos. These operations could now be made without clearance from the State Department. Concerning Cambodia, the new order was to show that charges of US clandestine operations against that country were groundless—which they were not—with no actual measures taken to show they were. (ibid) The entry into Laos and Cambodia were also added by LBJ and Bundy and were definitely alterations of Kennedy’s policies.
But Virtual JFK: Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived goes even further in this regard. At the 11/24 Cabinet meeting mentioned above, McNamara must have gotten the message that the withdrawal plan was now in the crosshairs of a newly hawkish president. And this surely must have been even more evident when Bundy made the appropriate alterations to NSAM 273 that Johnson desired. But in a newly declassified phone call of 2/20/64 the point that there was a new sheriff in town was hammered home. Johnson told McNamara “I always thought it was foolish for you to make any statements about withdrawing. I thought it was bad psychologically. But you and the president thought otherwise, and I just sat silent.” (p. 310) This is stunning. It clearly denotes that Johnson was aware of what Kennedy was planning. And that he was planning it through McNamara. Further, that he was so opposed to it that he thought it was “foolish”. But since he was in a subordinate position he had to suffer through it. But now he was subordinate no more. And now he was telling the guy who he knew was running the withdrawal plan that it was over.
In another conversation, less than two weeks later, he actually makes McNamara take back what he said in 1963 about the initial thousand-man withdrawal and the eventual complete withdrawal in 1965. He begins to formulate excuses to say that the plan didn’t really mean that “everybody comes back, that means your training ought to be in pretty good shape that time.” And then Johnson tries to soothe McNamara’s silence over this contradiction—read “lie”—by saying that there was nothing really inconsistent in these new statements he wanted McNamara to make. (ibid) LBJ is consciously breaking with Kennedy’s policy and he is getting Kennedy’s point man on board as he tries to cover his tracks. In January of 1965, Johnson continues this strategy with McNamara. Johnson calls McNamara and tells him that at a Georgetown party the Kennedy crowd had got the word out that Johnson was using CIA Director John McCone “to put the Vietnam War on Kennedy’s tomb. And I had a conspiracy going on to show that it was Kennedy’s immaturity and poor judgment that originally led us into this thing, that got us involved … And that this was my game: to lay Vietnam off onto Kennedy’s inexperience and immaturity and so forth.” (p. 306) Johnson then continues by saying that since McNamara was part of Kennedy’s administration, that he did not resent very much what was said or he would have spoken up. (ibid) Johnson later had Rostow collect all of Kennedy’s public statements supporting the war to show there was no breakage in policy between the two men. Johnson’s co-opting of McNamara was now complete. The war that was unfairly tagged as McNamara’s War was really imposed on him by Johnson.
But even prior to these conversations, on February 3, 1964 LBJ revealed that he knew what he was going to do way before Rolling Thunder and the commitment of combat troops. In a phone call with John Knight of the Miami Herald, he said that there were three options he had. The first was to get out. But he said the dominoes would now start falling over. “And God Almighty, what they said about us leaving China would just be warming up compared to what they’d say now.” So getting out was eliminated. He then said that “you can sit down and agree to neutralize all of it. But nobody is going to neutralize North Vietnam, so that’s totally impractical.” So now, neutralization was eliminated. “And so it really boils down to … getting out or getting in.” (p. 211) Now if you compare the getting out option with the dominoes falling all over Southeast Asia , and even greater historical Red baiting than losing China, which option do you think Johnson had in mind? And further, what kind of foreign policy thinker compares losing a country the size of China with the narrow peninsula of South Vietnam? Answer: A thinker with—unlike Kennedy—no discrimination or sophistication. As Logevall notes here, Johnson was a hawk from the beginning. With him it was “We can fight them in South Vietnam, or we can fight them in San Francisco.” (p. 169)
But it was actually even worse than that. Johnson was so shallow in his foreign policy views that he actually compared losing South Vietnam with what Neville Chamberlain did with Hitler at Munich! He actually said this to biographer Doris Kearns. (Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, p. 264) He then added, “And I knew that if we let Communist aggression succeed in taking over South Vietnam, there would follow in this country an endless national debate … that would shatter my presidency, kill my administration, and damage our democracy.” (He was exactly wrong of course. It was his prosecution of the war that destroyed his presidency.) Incredibly, he then compared the loss of China and the rise of McCarthy and the Red Scare with the loss of South Vietnam. After comparing them, he actually said the loss of the latter would be worse! “Losing the Great Society was a terrible thought, but not so terrible as the thought of being responsible for America’s losing a war to the Communists. Nothing could possibly be worse than that.” This is ignorance that is almost beyond description.
But it is particularly stark when compared with what Bundy told Goldstein Kennedy was planning for in his second term. The goals were 1.) A reduction in East-West tensions 2.) Reduction in nuclear weapons held by the US and USSR 3.) Strict arms control, and 4.) Normalization of relations with China. (p. 227) If anyone thinks Bundy was talking through his hat, Dean Rusk vouched for the China venture.
Further contravening Beschloss and Bugliosi, Johnson could not wait for a confirmation of the second attack on the Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin. There was real confusion about whether such an attack occurred. And it turned out that it had not. But in listening to the dialogue between Admiral Sharp, McNamara and Johnson it became clear that Sharp’s efforts to discern the truth “were gradually eclipsed by the need LBJ felt to order some kind of retaliation and to do it quickly.” (p. 379) To me, all the above is indicative of a man who has been thoroughly indoctrinated into the complete, and false, paradigm of the Cold War. As Richard Mahoney showed in JFK: Ordeal in Africa, Kennedy had not been so indoctrinated. So the agony and depression LBJ felt as the Vietnam disaster unfolded was in part because he knew there were other options he could have chosen. And unlike Kennedy, he had not. As Moyers stated, “He knew more than anyone in the room what it was going to cost him: everything, as he kept saying, was on the table. His agenda, and lives, and knowing more than anyone else, he still made the choice. It was his to make; no one made it for him.” (p. 197)
The book is well worth buying. In my view, it closes the chapter on a debate that has been going on since 1992. As shown here, it’s a debate that should have never started.
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James Blight, Virtual JFK (Part 1)
Virtual JFK: Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived
Part Two of this essay reviews the book accompanying this film, which has the same title.
Part Three, Virtual JFK 3: Gordon Goldstein’s Lessons in Disaster
See the Virtual JFK web site.
Virtual JFK: Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived is introduced by historian James Blight as a “What if” film. That is, it tries to recast and reshape history as if some definite historical event had not happened. For example, what if Robert E. Lee had not invaded the North and met disastrous defeat at Gettysburg? What if Hitler had not overruled his generals and postponed the invasion of Russia until the next April, instead of the delayed June launch in 1941? Would world events have turned out differently?
The film takes this point of view with President John Kennedy and the war in Vietnam. The question: If Kennedy had lived, would the Vietnam War have escalated into the colossal disaster it did under President Johnson? Director Koji Masutani and James Blight take a rather unique approach to this question. What they do is examine the number of opportunities President Kennedy had to go to war previously in his administration. They then prognosticate what he would have done in Vietnam based upon that record. Although others have done this to a limited degree, I don’t recall anyone else doing it over the expanse of time and multiplicity of instances as Blight and Masutani do here.
The documentary begins with an aerial view over Vietnam while some statistics are shown to the viewer. They are quite familiar to anyone who has read up on this issue. There were 16,000 advisers in Vietnam during Kennedy’s last year in office. In 1968, right before the Tet Offensive, Lyndon Johnson had committed over half a million ground troops to the conflict. And the air war that raged over the country was the largest in history. Which, considering what the Allies did to Japan and Germany in 1944 and 1945, is saying something.
From here Masutani cuts to Blight in an image that seems borrowed from Errol Morris, the godfather of the modern documentary. Blight, just about full figure, is standing in front of what looks like a huge cyclorama, which is colored a kind of liquid silver. Blight begins with an explanation of the Cold War. How the accumulation of atomic weapons precluded any direct confrontation between the USA and Russia. Therefore, the American war in Vietnam started out as a proxy war with the Russians and Chinese aiding the north and the USA helping the south. The question then becomes, how did that initial proxy confrontation turn into direct American involvement on such a massive scale? And secondly, would Kennedy have gone along with it?
Here, Blight and Masutani begin an examination of six instances during Kennedy’s presidency. They posit each of these as incidents that Kennedy could have used as casus belli to escalate into war. In fact, Blight later adds that no other president he knows faced this many temptations in such a short period of time as President Kennedy. Which is probably true. At least I can’t think of another president who was faced with these many tension filled episodes in three years.
The first was the Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961. Here was a poorly planned and weakly reviewed operation left over from the Eisenhower administration. CIA Director Allen Dulles and Director of Plans Richard Bissell kept the written blueprints close to the vest. To the point they would not even let JFK take them home with him. And two predictions that the CIA made to Kennedy did not come true and sealed defeat for the invaders. First, there was no general uprising on Cuba to support the exile attack. And secondly, Castro was able to get enough armor into position to stop the beachhead from forming. At this point, Blight points out something that JFK did which sealed defeat for the Cuban exile force. Admiral Arleigh Burke was off the horizon heading a Navy fleet at the time. Realizing all would be lost if the USA did not intervene, he asked Kennedy for permission to intercede. Kennedy called Burke and told him not to. He had no desire to get into a war in a tropical jungle 90 miles away from Florida. Richard Nixon, the action officer for the operation under Eisenhower told Kennedy he would intercede if it were his call. And he later snickered about JFK choosing failure.
Blight very smartly emphasizes Kennedy’s altered demeanor after this debacle. Those close to him said Kennedy was shocked by what had happened. He would sit through meetings about it and not say anything for 45 minutes. Clearly, during those many days in his private purgatory, Kennedy was reevaluating those around him who had all endorsed the plan. This was a turning point in who he decided to trust from here on in.
The second incident mentioned is the Laotian Crisis of 1961. This is a subject that had been relatively ignored by most historians. So I am glad it gets brought up here. The best treatment of it that I have seen is in David Kaiser’s volume American Tragedy. When Eisenhower left office, he actually told Kennedy that Laos was more important on the world stage than Vietnam. Kennedy decided to act fast on this and negotiate a settlement with the Russians. The Pathet Lao, aided by both the Soviets and North Vietnamese, was making strong progress against the anti-Communist Prince Boun Oum. In early 1961, the Pathet Lao opened a strong offensive on the Plain of Jars, which the Royal Laotian Army under General Phoumi Nosavan could not contain. Kennedy alerted the Army and Navy units in the Pacific, CinCPac, to go on alert. With this stick in hand, Kennedy then began to extend the carrot of a cease-fire. This was achieved in Geneva, with fourteen nations convening a conference in May of 1961. As Blight notes, not one American combat troop set foot in Laos.
The third episode was the Berlin Crisis of late 1961. In the summer of 1961, the Russians and East Germans were worried about the great number of emigrants fleeing from East to West Berlin. They began to take up preparations to build the Berlin Wall. On August 13, 1961, the border between the two cities was closed. Then construction teams were sent out to start erecting the wall. On August 30th, JFK called up 148, 000 reservists. The KGB started a wide-ranging diversionary plan to stir up trouble in places like Central America and Africa. The crisis was clearly escalating into high gear. At this point, 10/22/61, Army General Lucius Clay decided to send diplomat Albert Hemsing to East Berlin to see if the Soviets and East Germans would allow him to travel into East Germany as provided for by the 1945 Potsdam Conference. They let him proceed. But the next day, a British diplomat was stopped and his passport was seized. Five days later, Clay asked Hemsing to try again. But, in advance, and without Kennedy’s permission, he sent tanks and an infantry battalion to a nearby airfield. Hemsing was allowed to proceed but the Russians now moved 33 tanks to the Brandenburg Gate. Clay’s tanks now moved opposite the Russian tanks. As the film notes, Kennedy called Clay and told him he wanted the tanks removed. Russian Premier Khrushchev and JFK now talked and decided to mutually remove the tanks. As the film notes, Kennedy ended up being grateful for the Berlin Wall. As historian John Lewis Gaddis notes, Kennedy later stated, “It’s not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war.” (The Cold War: A New History, p. 115)
The fourth incident took place in November of 1961 and concerned a crucial tactical decision about American involvement in Vietnam. In October of 1961, there was a debate raging within the administration on whether or not to commit combat troops to South Vietnam to support the failing regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. Kennedy decided to send Gen. Maxwell Taylor and National Security Assistant Walt Rostow to Vietnam for an on the ground inspection. While there, Taylor suggested to Diem committing 8,000 US combat troops to the area. Diem enthusiastically agreed. (John Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 133) When Taylor and Rostow returned, a two week long drama was enacted over their recommendation. On November 22, 1961 Kennedy issued National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 111. It increased the number of advisers, but it committed no combat troops. And further, it made no commitment to saving South Vietnam from communism. As John Newman notes, this NSAM was a milestone in Kennedy’s Vietnam policy. First, it drew a line in the sand: Kennedy was not going to commit combat troops to the area. Even when things looked desperate and the fate of the country was in the balance. Second, learning from the Bay of Pigs, he was now more than willing to buck the opinions of both the generals and his advisers on a subject they perceived as vital to American national security. (Newman, p. 138)
The fifth episode was, of course, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Here President Kennedy again refused to take the advice of both his military commanders and his chief advisers. As with Vietnam in November of 1961, when virtually everyone in the room told him to either invade or launch an air attack, he chose not to. Instead he decided to blockade the island. And meanwhile he worked out a back channel with the Russians through his brother Robert Kennedy and Russian diplomat Georgi Bolshakov. A potential attack on the island was averted. As was probably nuclear war. Since, as was later discovered, in addition to the atomic missiles the Russians had transported to the island, they had also given the Cubans tactical nukes which were portable. The Cubans controlled these. And if any American invasion had crossed the Caribbean, Che Guevara was urging Castro to use them.
The sixth and last incident was the announcement of Kennedy’s Vietnam withdrawal plan in the fall of 1963. This announcement actually began in earnest in May of 1963. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara made it clear at his conference in Hawaii with State Department and military personnel from Vietnam that President Kennedy wanted to begin a phased withdrawal. And he wanted the South Vietnamese to begin taking over the war. Secondly, he wanted to achieve a thousand man American troop withdrawal by the end of the year. (Newman, p. 359) This was then accelerated by the McNamara/Taylor trip to Saigon in September. And also by Kennedy’s hand in writing the report based on that trip. During which he explicitly told McNamara he did not want a coup attempt against Diem. (ibid, p. 401) The report included the thousand man withdrawal. This recommendation was then formalized in NSAM 263, which was signed on October 11th. The film includes little of the above factual background. It concentrates on a phone conversation between McNamara and JFK in which they discuss the need to find a way to get out of Vietnam. And it then follows this up with the McNamara-Taylor Report as the device to arrange the withdrawal around. Blight then intones that Kennedy was willing to risk failure in Vietnam rather than commit US combat troops.
The film then cuts to a snippet of the Zapruder film: Kennedy being assassinated in Dallas. We then watch the terrain of Vietnam from B-52’s flying overhead. Blight then says that with the historical models established beforehand, it seems unlikely that Kennedy would have committed to Vietnam.
The film concludes with what I think is its best section: the Johnson reversal of Kennedy’s policy. It takes a different angle here by saying that due to the landslide election of 1964, Johnson had heavy majorities in both houses of Congress. Therefore he had a wide leeway politically for whatever his policy in Vietnam was going to be. In February of 1965, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey wrote him a memo strongly advising LBJ not to continue the escalation of the war that he had started after the Tonkin Gulf Incident of August 1964. Which, of course, is just eight months after Kennedy’s death. Humphrey wrote that this policy had already damaged America’s credibility with its allies. But further, the South Vietnamese government was a mess, and it seemed the Viet Cong rebels were winning. To escalate further would involve the USA in a war that would be fought without the generals really knowing what they were doing. This was a prophetic warning. What did Johnson do in reaction to these wise words? As the film notes, he did three things: 1.) He had Humphrey blackballed from further policy meetings on Vietnam 2.) He had surveillance placed on him, and 3.) He told National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy to keep an eye on who Humphrey was talking to.
One month later, Johnson unleashed Operation Rolling Thunder in earnest. This would later evolve into the greatest air campaign in military history. That same month, the first detachment of 3, 500 Marines would land at Da Nang. This would eventually expand to 538, 000 combat troops at its pinnacle in 1968. The film notes that by the summer of 1965, five months after the Humphrey memo, 500 American troops were dead. By January of 1967 8,000 were dead. By March of 1968, 19, 000 were dead. As Newman notes, Johnson was so befuddled by what had happened, that around this time period he was actually wondering if his error had been waiting too long to commit combat troops! (ibid, p. 449)
And with this, the film makes an important point. It concludes that Vietnam wrecked Johnson’s presidency, ravaged his personality and character, and made his family rue the day that he ascended to the presidency. But whatever the personal consequences that make Johnson into a sympathetic figure, and no matter how reluctant he was in this new path, once he became president he committed to it completely. To the point that, as with Humphrey, he would harbor no contrary view. And, as the film notes, this was a huge difference with Kennedy. JFK learned his lesson well on those Cuban beaches in April of 1961. He learned not to implicitly trust his military advisers. Since they always thought they would win. And therefore, if unchallenged, would always paint a rosy scenario. And afterwards, he would have to clean up the mess.
The film is less than ninety minutes long. And I have added a lot of background detail in the above that is not actually in the film in order to flesh it out more for the reader. I actually wish the film had been longer so it could incorporate more of these facts and more of the revelations of the Assassination Records Review Board. Since these all but closed the book on this ersatz debate about JFK and Vietnam. The only two people who probably think Kennedy was not getting out at the time of his death are Noam Chomsky and Alex Cockburn. And they are not historians. They are political polemicists.
This now makes four mainstream historians who have come around to the view of Kennedy’s intent to withdraw from Vietnam as expressed in Oliver Stone’s film JFK. First there was David Kaiser’s American Tragedy in the year 2000. Second, there was Robert Dallek’s An Unfinished Life in 2003. Third was Howard Jones’ Death of a Generation published in 2004. And now there is Blight in this film and also an accompanying book. (I should also mention in this regard a volume that preceded these, yet was clearly in line with them: 1995’s In Retrospect, by Robert McNamara.)
Let me take a moment to pay tribute to the man I believe is behind this paradigm shift, which is one of the hardest things there is to achieve in the field of history. Clearly, but without naming him, this film owes its genesis to John Newman’s splendid 1992 volume JFK and Vietnam. That book was packed with so much factual data that no serious and interested person could dismiss it. Newman took ten years to complete that book. And finally it has begun to take hold in the halls of academia. Just three years after that masterly performance, Newman wrote another extremely important book called Oswald and the CIA. Perhaps no author achieved as much in such a short time as John did in this field. I understand he is retired from it now. He is therefore probably leading a much happier life. If so, works like this film are an homage to his earlier effort. We all owe him thanks.
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Douglas Horne, Inside the ARRB (Part IV)
Inside the ARRB, Vol. IV, by Doug Horne
A Nearly-Entirely-Positive Review
This is a Review of Volume IV, which includes
Part II: Fraud in the Evidence: A Pattern of Deception (continued)
Chapter 13: What Really Happened at the Bethesda Morgue? (and in Dealey Plaza)
Chapter 14: The Zapruder Film Mystery.
The death of a democracy is not likely to be an assassination from ambush. It will be a
slow extinction from apathy, indifference, and undernourishment.~ Robert Maynard Hutchins, Great Books (1954)
My title here is a parody of my review1 of Reclaiming History (2007) by Vincent Bugliosi. Since that review was (in my opinion) rather devastating for Bugliosi, my title was intended to be sardonic. Despite this, Vince lifted a few quotes from it (out of context and without my permission) and included them with his abbreviated paperback version, Four Days in November (2008). The total page count (CD included) of his massive doorstopper was about 2786, almost exactly three times as long as the 888-page Warren Report. Horne’s book, by contrast, is shorter: 1880 pages, including the front matter (pages i-lxxiii). I had stated that Bugliosi’s book was likely to stand forever as the magnum opus of this case, though not without serious flaws. As a magnum opus, however, Horne’s five-volume set is a serious challenge to Bugliosi, but with virtually none of Bugliosi’s flaws. The current review, however, focuses (almost) solely on Volume IV, which I regard as Horne’s set piece (as that phrase is used in literature and film, but not in soccer).
Although some men believe that women age like fine wine, in this case it is Horne himself who has aged well – he waited the better part of a decade after his experiences with the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) before beginning the serious work on his book. He does hint, though, that Bugliosi drop-kicked him (he is an Ohio State Buckeye fan) onto the playing field. Volume IV focuses on the two chief themes of the entire five-volume set: (1) the illicit surgery, before the official autopsy began, by pathologists James J. Humes and J. Thornton Boswell2 at the Bethesda morgue and (2) the Zapruder film riddles. It is likely that the success or failure of Horne’s work will rise or fall with this single volume. In this review, I shall address these two topics in sequence, critique a few puzzles, then draw some conclusions and finish with several suggestions. By way of a caveat emptor, I should confess that I initially encountered Horne at his first COPA (Committee on Political Assassinations) conference (when he interviewed with the ARRB), have intermittently met him since, and consider him a very good friend. He is also a very bright and strong-willed investigator.
Illicit Surgery at the Bethesda Morgue
In order to paint Humes and Boswell (H&B hereafter) as the morbid co-conspirators, Horne needs first to clarify the timeline – which he does brilliantly (see the Appendix at the end of this review). The ARRB learned, for the first time, that JFK’s body initially arrived at the Bethesda morgue at 6:35 PM local time (in a black hearse). That information derives from an after-action report (written on November 26, 1963) by Marine Sergeant Roger Boyajian.3 Quite astonishingly, Boyajian had retained a copy of his report, which he presented to the ARRB. His report corroborates the recollections of Dennis David4 who saw the light gray navy ambulance (with the bronze casket from Dallas) arrive at the front of the hospital, where he saw Jackie exit; its arrival time was either 6:53 PM or 6:55 PM (the sources vary).5 But just about 20 minutes earlier, David had directed his on-duty sailors as they delivered the body in a cheap casket, i.e., the entry described by Boyajian. David estimated (from memory) the delivery time as 6:40 PM, or perhaps 6:45 PM. His estimate is strikingly close to Boyajian’s recorded time of 6:35 PM. Horne concludes that this arrival time of 6:35 PM must now be accepted as a foundation stone in this case. As further corroboration for this time, he emphasizes that even Humes agreed with it: before the ARRB, Humes cited the initial arrival as possibly as early as 6:45 PM.6 In my opinion, therefore, it is very difficult to disagree with this early arrival time. If this is accepted, though, the repercussions are colossal – it means that the bronze casket (the one that traveled with Jackie) was empty. Horne next compiles a long table7 of witnesses to the cheap casket and the body bag, both of which were seen at this initial entry. He is also very persuasive here, although he rightfully credits Lifton with much of this groundbreaking work.
Now if the body arrived at 6:35 PM in a cheap shipping casket, when did it exit the bronze casket (the one that left Parkland)? Horne suggests that this transfer occurred right after the bronze casket boarded Air Force One. (Lifton again blazed this trail.) As corroboration for this, Horne8 describes JFK’s Air Force Aide, Godfrey McHugh, as perturbed about a delay caused by a ‘luggage transfer’ between the two official planes. After this transfer to a body bag, tampering became feasible. Horne suggests that an initial foray into the body took place in the forward baggage compartment prior to the flight to DC; the goal was to extract metal debris or a bullet from the throat wound. (It is not known whether anything was found.) Horne infers that a similar attempt was made on the brain, but that attempt likely foundered because the requisite tool (e.g., a bone saw) was missing.
The second casket entry (via a light gray navy ambulance) occurred at about 7:17 PM. James W. Sibert and Francis X. O’Neill, Jr. (the two-member FBI team) and Roy H. Kellerman and William Greer (both Secret Service) together delivered the (empty) bronze casket to the morgue.9 This time is consistent with the arrival time of the bronze casket (shortly before 7 PM) at the front of the hospital. The third casket entry (with the body inside) has traditionally been accepted as the official one – at 8 PM (in a light gray navy ambulance). It was delivered by the Joint Service Casket Team.10 The transfer of the body must have occurred (in the morgue) after the second entry at 7:17 PM. But it must also have transpired after the initial X-rays (for reasons to be discussed below).11 Finally, this transfer must have occurred well in advance of 8 PM so that the bronze casket could leave the morgue (Tom Robinson recalled this temporary departure12), be ‘found’ by the official casket team, and then delivered again at 8 PM. This sequence of three casket entries looks like a classic French farce, i.e., an affair concocted by a half-mad scriptwriter. Unfortunately, all of the evidence points strongly in the direction of three casket entries. Perhaps this would have been unnecessary, as Horne points out, if only Jackie had not insisted on staying with the bronze casket en route to the morgue. (She had declined a helicopter ride to the White House, which would have separated her from the Dallas casket.) Most likely the plan had been to surreptitiously transfer the body between caskets at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center. But Jackie’s unexpected decision to remain with the bronze Dallas casket waylaid those plans, which meant that Kellerman (who Horne nominates as the morgue manager) had to improvise on the spot. It was a highly risky business, during which this escapade was nearly uncovered, according to Horne.
Lifton had argued that body alteration had occurred somewhere before Bethesda. He believed that altering the geometry of the shooting through “trajectory reversal” – i.e., turning entrance wounds into exit wounds, and planting false entrance wounds on the body – was the primary reason for the illicit post mortem surgery, and that removing bullet fragments was only a co-equal, or even secondary, goal of the clandestine surgery.13 Horne takes a different tack: he believes that the reason for assaulting the body (before Bethesda) was merely to extract bullet debris, not primarily to alter wounds.
My own views come into play at this point. Before Horne’s work, I had become convinced that someone had messed with the throat wound, most likely to extract bullet fragments. The evidence for this was that the two sets of witnesses – those at Parkland vs. those at Bethesda – had disagreed so profoundly. Also, Malcolm Perry, the surgeon who performed the tracheotomy, claimed that he had left the throat wound ‘inviolate,’ meaning that it was easily visible after the tube was pulled. In addition, Charles Crenshaw insisted that the tracheotomy at Parkland was nothing like the one in the autopsy photographs. I also had my own (telephone) encounter with the autopsy radiologist, John Ebersole.14 I still sense the horror in his voice as he recalled the tracheotomy and declared that he would never do one like that. Horne’s witnesses (there are more) only validate my prior conclusion about throat tampering.
Before Horne’s work, I was uncertain about head tampering before Bethesda (although Lifton had made a strong case for it). Nonetheless, I had to agree that if the throat had been explored, then of course the head might also have been invaded. Although Horne is still open-minded about illegal tampering of the skull before Bethesda, he believes that such an event can be inferred from (1) Finck’s statement (to the defense team at the Clay Shaw trial in 1969) that the autopsy report (presumably an earlier one, as the extant one does not say this) described the spinal cord as severed when the body arrived at Bethesda and (2) Tom Robinson’s comment to the ARRB that the top of the skull was ‘badly broken’ when the body was received at Bethesda, but that the large defect (in the superior skull) in the autopsy photographs was ‘what the [autopsy] doctors did’ – i.e., that the missing skull was due to the pathologists, not due an assassin’s bullet(s).15 These reports therefore provide more evidence that the head was explored somewhere before Bethesda; the goal was to retrieve bullet debris, but it failed – because the brain could not be extracted from the skull. In summary then, the body arrived at Bethesda as follows: (1) with a radically enlarged tracheotomy16 and no bullet debris in the neck (perhaps there never was any, as I have suggested elsewhere17) and (2) with the same (right occipital) exit wound that was seen at Parkland and with a brain that had not been removed from the skull and that therefore closely, or possibly even exactly, resembled the Parkland brain. Most likely the brain still contained most, or even all, of the bullet fragments from Dealey Plaza. (These metal fragments are, of course, absent from the official record today.) Those are Horne’s conclusions about H&B, but let’s look at the evidence.
So why does Horne conclude that H&B illicitly removed (and altered) the brain shortly after 6:35 PM, before any X-rays were taken, and before the official autopsy began? He here introduces two intriguing witnesses – the two R’s, namely Reed and Robinson. Edward Reed was assistant to Jerrol Custer (the radiology tech), while Tom Robinson was a mortician. Rather consistently with one another, but quite independently, both describe critical steps taken by H&B that no one else reports. (Horne documents why no one else reported these events – almost everyone else had been evicted from the morgue before this clandestine interlude.) After the body was placed on the morgue table (and before X-rays were taken), Reed briefly sat in the gallery.18 Reed states19 that Humes first used a scalpel across the top of the forehead to pull the scalp back. Then he used a saw to cut the forehead bone, after which he (and Custer, too) were asked to leave the morgue. (Reed was not aware that this intervention by Humes was unofficial.) This activity by Humes is highly significant because multiple witnesses saw the intact entry hole high in the right forehead at the hairline. On the other hand, the autopsy photographs show only a thin incision at this site, an incision that no Parkland witness ever saw. The implication is obvious: this specific autopsy photograph was taken after Humes altered the forehead – thereby likely obliterating the entry hole.
Reed’s report suggests that Humes deliberately obliterated the right forehead entry; in fact, the autopsy photograph does not show this entry site. Paradoxically, however, Robinson (the mortician) recalls20 seeing, during restoration, a wound about º inch across at this very location. He even recalls having to place wax at this site. So the question is obvious: If Humes had obliterated the wound (as seems the case based on the extant autopsy photograph), how then could Robinson still see the wound during restoration? This question cannot be answered with certainty, but two options arise: (1) perhaps the wound was indeed obliterated (or mostly obliterated) and Robinson merely suffered some memory merge – i.e., even though he added wax to the incision (the one still visible in the extant photograph), he was actually recalling the way it looked before Humes got to it, or (2) the photograph itself has been altered – to disguise the wound that was visible in an original photograph. The latter option was seemingly endorsed by Joe O’Donnell, the USIA photographer,21 who said that Knudsen actually showed him such a photograph.
Regarding Robinson, Horne concludes that he arrived with the hearse that brought the body (i.e., the first entry). After that, Robinson simply observed events from the morgue gallery; contrary to Reed’s experience, he was not asked to leave. Just before 7 PM, Robinson22 saw H&B remove large portions of the rear and top of the skull with a saw, in order to access the brain. (Robinson was not aware that this activity was off the record.) He also observed ten or more bullet fragments extracted from the brain. Although these do not appear in the official record, Dennis David recalls23 preparing a receipt for at least four fragments.24
Contrary to Reed and Robinson, Humes25 declared that a saw was not important:
We had to do virtually no work with a saw to remove these portions of the skull, they came apart in our hands very easily, and we attempted to further examine the brain.
Although James Jenkins (an autopsy technician) does not explicitly describe the use of a saw, he does recall that damage to the brain (as seen inside the skull) was less than the corresponding size of the cranial defect; this indirectly implies prior removal of some of the skull.26
Horne adds an independent argument for multiple casket entries.27 Pierre Finck told the Journal of the American Medical Association28 that he was at home when Humes telephoned him at 7:30 PM. (In his 2/1/65 report to General Blumberg he cites 8 PM.29) Finck, as a forensic pathologist, had been asked to assist with the autopsy. As further confirmation for Finck’s overall timeline, he arrived (see his Blumberg report) at the morgue at 8:30 PM. But here is the clincher: during this phone call, Humes told Finck that X-rays had already been taken – and had already been viewed. On the other hand, the official entry time (with the Joint Service Casket Team) was at 8 PM! If that indeed was the one and only entry time, how then could X-rays have been taken – let alone developed and viewed (a process of 30 minutes minimum) – even before the official entry time? The only possible answer is that the body did not first arrive at 8 PM. Furthermore, Custer and Reed, the radiology techs, provide timelines consistent with much earlier X-rays; in particular, they recall seeing Jackie enter the hospital lobby,30 well after the 6:35 PM casket entry – an entry they had personally witnessed. In summary, eyewitnesses convincingly support a much earlier timeline than the official entry of 8 PM. Therefore, multiple casket entries are logically required. And that more relaxed timeline gave H&B time both to perform their illicit surgery and also for skull X-rays to be taken and read, most likely all before 7:30-8:00 PM.
The reader might well ask why Reed and Robinson (and Custer, too) were permitted to observe (at least briefly) this illegal surgery by H&B. Horne proposes that the morgue manager that night (Kellerman) was not present for the first casket entry – that’s because he was riding with Jackie and the bronze casket. Therefore, before he arrived (most likely that was shortly after 7 PM), there was no hands-on stage manager in the morgue. It is even possible that Kellerman himself ejected Reed and Custer as soon as he arrived. Robinson, on the other hand, dressed in civilian clothing, may have seemed to Kellerman a lesser threat, so Robinson stayed.
Several conclusions follow from the above analysis. First, the official skull X-rays31 do not show the condition of the skull or the brain as seen at Parkland. Instead, they were taken after tampering by H&B, perhaps even after significant tampering, especially if Robinson and Reed are correct. Furthermore, the massive damage seen in the photographs and X-rays was not caused just by a bullet or even by multiple bullets, but instead by pathological hands. In particular, for a single, full metal-jacketed bullet (the Warren Commission’s inevitable scenario) to generate such an enormous defect has always defied credibility.32 Likewise, Boswell’s sketch (for the ARRB) on a skull33 of this enormous defect only shows the condition of the skull after tampering by H&B – and does not reflect the skull as seen at Parkland. (The Parkland witnesses fully concur with this.) On the other hand, many witnesses at Bethesda saw the condition of the skull before such tampering began. These witnesses, both physicians and paraprofessionals, uniformly describe a right occipital blowout,34 consistent with a shot from the front. Leaving aside the pathologists, as many as eight Bethesda physicians may be on this list.35 In photographs,36 both Parkland and Bethesda witnesses demonstrate with remarkable unanimity, on their own heads, the location of this obvious exit wound on the right rear skull.
The X-rays do, however, show many small fragments distributed across the top of the skull.37 So why didn’t Humes extract more of these? I have previously proposed (based on their actual appearance – as viewed in detail on multiple occasions at the Archives) that they look more like mercury than like lead. If so, then Humes would not have been able to palpate them (mercury is liquid) and would therefore have been unable to remove them during his illicit surgery phase.
We could go on to ask: What other evidence exists for such illicit surgery? Lifton initially introduced this issue by citing the FBI report (by Sibert and O’Neill), which quoted Humes as describing surgery to the head.38 Sibert, in the 2000s, still insisted that they had quoted Humes correctly about such surgery.39 (I also heard Sibert say this in Fort Myers, Florida, during one of Law’s taping sessions.) Furthermore, the FBI had no reason to fabricate such a statement. On Lifton’s tape (which I have heard), he queries Humes about this; to me, Humes does sound remarkably suspicious and evasive. But the FBI men are not the only witnesses to his statement. Another is James Jenkins, who quotes Humes40 as asking: ‘Did they do surgery at Parkland?’ Furthermore, Humes was later told, when some skull fragments arrived at the morgue,41 that these had been ‘removed’ during surgery at Parkland. We all know that did not happen, so where did they come from? Horne implies that Humes himself had removed them during the illicit phase. Another supporting argument is the remarkable ease of removing the brain from the skull (during the official autopsy phase), but this is not so surprising if it had previously been removed during the unofficial phase. James Jenkins42 observed that the brainstem had been cut, as if by a scalpel (not severed by a bullet), which also suggests its earlier removal that evening (while Jenkins was absent). In any case, such an early removal was likely essential to successfully search for (and extract) bullet debris. Even Finck43 bears witness to a transected spinal cord: to the defense team at the Shaw trial in 1969, Finck stated that the autopsy report (presumably an earlier one, as the extant one does not say this) described the spinal cord as severed when the body arrived at Bethesda. Finck was still absent when the brain was removed, so someone must have told him this, most likely Humes.
Horne comments further on the throat wound. He concludes that H&B were well aware of this wound that night and he provides considerable evidence for this conclusion.44 However, given the absence of the throat wound from the FBI report, H&B probably learned of it only after the FBI left, i.e., after 11 PM.45 That information then led to the pathologists’ interim discussion of an exit through the throat, as later reported by Richard Lipsey.46 Horne even speculates that an early version of the autopsy report included exactly this scenario, which later had to be discarded because of timing data from the Zapruder film.
Regarding the throat wound I would add the following. Warren Commission loyalists like to cite medical articles that ER personnel cannot reliably distinguish entry from exit wounds. Even if true, though, that comment obfuscates the situation. To the contrary, in this particular case several facts trump those medical reports: (1) such a tiny exit wound could not be duplicated in experiments47 and (2) Milton Helpern (who had done 60,000 autopsies) said that he had never seen an exit wound that was so small (under similar conditions).48 Then there is the question of the magic bullet. As Horne summarizes, its provenance has been extensively investigated by Josiah Thompson49 (with recent assistance from Gary Aguilar). In the face of the persistent refusal of the pertinent witnesses to identify this bullet, most likely it would never have been admitted at trial – and that alone would thoroughly devastate any Warren Commission case.50 A final telling blow derives from the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC): before political leverage was exerted, their scenario actually included a frontal throat shot!51
The Zapruder Film Mystery
Based on his relentless defense of the extant film, Josiah Thompson can justifiably claim the title, ‘High Priest of Z Film.’ His initial claim derives from his work for LIFE magazine in the 1960s, which led to Six Seconds in Dallas (1967).He claimed (p. 7): ‘Quite obviously, the Zapruder film contained the nearest thing to absolute truth about the sequence of events in Dealey Plaza.’ His most recent public paper (2007)52 finalized his claim to the above title. Unfortunately for Thompson, Horne’s work has created deep fractures in his purported bedrock, and has pulverized some rockheads into finely ground sand.53 When Thompson wrote his ‘Bedrock’ article he ignored two witnesses54 who had been extensively interviewed by the ARRB (actually by Horne himself) and whose interviews were surely already known to Thompson, who is nothing if not a very bright detective. These witnesses were Ben Hunter and Homer McMahon, employees of the NPIC (a subsidiary of the CIA), who received the original (in their view) film from a Secret Service agent. The latter, in turn, had just couriered it from Rochester, New York, headquarters of Eastman Kodak. Moreover, this agent (‘Bill Smith’) specifically said that the film had been developed (sic) in Rochester. If that was true, then there must have been a second film, one not shot by Zapruder (his film, after all, had been developed in Dallas), but rather one filmed from a nearly identical site in Dealey Plaza.55
But Horne’s next stroke is the mortal blow to the Zapruder film, one beyond even the skills of a contemporary Parsifal. Horne details Peter Janney’s encounters (including seven interviews) with Dino Brugioni,56 a founder of the NPIC. John McCone, Director of the CIA, had telephoned the NPIC director, Arthur Lundahl (Brugioni’s superior), asking him to assist the Secret Service in analyzing the original (Zapruder) film.57 Beginning late on Saturday night (November 23), Brugioni viewed an original, 8 mm film and prepared briefing boards, which were presented to McCone the next morning. Amazingly, Brugioni stated that neither Ben Hunter nor Captain Sands were at his event.
(Brugioni did not recall ever meeting Homer McMahon; he could therefore not personally report whether or not McMahon was present at Event I on Saturday night. Of course, since Brugioni was positive that Ben Hunter was absent, and because Hunter and McMahon were linked by their recall of one another, then McMahon should not have been present at Brugioni’s event.) In a detailed analysis Horne shows convincingly that two separate events, both highly compartmentalized, occurred on successive nights. During these recent interviews, when Brugioni finally learned – after 46 years – of two unrelated events, both at NPIC, he was stunned!
Horne assembles a magnificent table58 that contrasts these two events: the Saturday night (November 23) event with Brugioni and the Sunday night event (November 24) with Hunter and McMahon. Horne demonstrates how compartmentalized these two events were: they differed in attendees, film format, and briefing boards. Brugioni knew Ben Hunter, but did not see him at his event. Brugioni had handled an 8 mm film (Hunter and McMahon had a 16 mm film) that he considered an original; that it was 8 mm is certain because NPIC had to purchase a projector (near midnight on Saturday) from a private local store. (The NPIC did not own its own 8 mm projector.) Brugioni also viewed photographs of the briefing boards currently in the Archives, which had been authenticated by Hunter and McMahon. However, Brugioni was certain that these were not his. He was even able to recall how his differed from these. Although Hunter and McMahon’s film reportedly came from Rochester, Brugioni was not told where his had originated (most likely it was Zapruder’s original – diverted from Chicago to DC that Saturday).
Based on these interviews, Horne draws several conclusions: (1) the CIA had an immediate and high level interest in the film; (2) the original film had been split from 16 mm to 8 mm in Dallas, just as the Dallas witnesses had agreed;59 (3) the extreme compartmentalization implies that the two films were different; (4) Brugioni viewed Zapruder’s original (8mm), whereas Hunter and McMahon viewed an altered film (in 16 mm, unslit format); (5) the alterations were done during the day on Sunday, November 24, in Rochester, New York; (6) most likely aerial imaging was used for these alterations; and (7) the three copies of the original (already in circulation60) then had to be replaced by copies of the newly altered film. The reason that Horne chooses Sunday is straightforward: LIFE‘s next issue reached the marketplace on Tuesday (November 26) and it contained images from the extant film (the one currently in the Archives). Some of these low resolution, black and white LIFE images (in Horne’s opinion – and mine, too) show signs of alteration, particularly the bizarre debris (sometimes called the ‘blob’) on JFK’s face and the disappearance of the white object in the background grass. Horne suspects that the alterations had all been completed by Sunday night, although he seems not finally wedded to this concept. In any case, Loudon Wainwright61 said that 31 frames were employed for that issue of LIFE. Although other frames might have been open to alteration after Sunday, it seems likely that these 31 frames would have restricted later changes. (There are fewer than 500 in the entire film.)
Horne next reviews the momentous technical issues that bedevil the extant film – anomalies that really should not be present. In fact, none of these would have been predicted for an original film. Even a single one casts doubts on authenticity, but when a complete list is compiled the evidence becomes overwhelming. Aside from image content issues (which are very serious) this technical list includes the following items: (1) the location of the punched number 183 is inconsistent on both the extant film and (in photographic images) on the extant copies, (2) the punched numbers unique to each of the three copies are quite strangely located, (3) the absence of intersprocket images on the three copies was not predicted by the Jamieson lab, which had exposed them, (4) Zavada could not reproduce the septum line, (5) the double registration of the Dallas processing edge print is odd, (6) no one in Dallas recalled the bracketing (by exposure differences) that is present in the three extant copies, (7) Zavada has shown remarkable indecisiveness about when Zapruder’s film was slit from 16 mm format to 8 mm, (8) the ‘full flush left’ issue62 was not resolved, and (9) claw flare is still a puzzle. That so many purely technical issues persist would, by itself, be a wonder if the extant film indeed were authentic.63
Horne also reviews the curious stories of Dan Rather64 and Cartha DeLoach.65 Both had been early viewers of the film and both had reported that JFK’s head had gone violently forward. To put this into perspective, the reader might ask himself this question: How many individuals have you met who, after once viewing the film, agreed with the reports of these two men? I have never met any.An actual Dealey Plaza witness, James Altgens, a photographer, also described JFK’s head as going forward.66 Horne also reminds us that early viewers of the film easily saw debris (possibly brain tissue) flying to the rear. One of these witnesses was Erwin Schwartz (Zapruder’s partner), who saw the film multiple times the very day that it was developed.67 Such backward-flying debris is nowhere seen in the extant film. Horne also notes the unrecorded turn from Houston to Elm (which both Zapruder and his secretary recalled filming) as well as the now-ancient problem of the limousine stop (first emphasized by Lifton many years ago). The discrepancies between the autopsy photographs, on the one hand, and the Zapruder film, on the other, are also reviewed. Horne offers likely explanations (of incompetent tampering) for these inconsistencies.
In an Addendum, ‘The Zapruder Film Goes to Hollywood,’ Horne recounts his viewing of HD scans based on a 35 mm ‘dupe negative.’ His Hollywood contact got her copy of the extant film (for $795) from a private laboratory, to which she had been referred by the Archives’ personnel themselves. (There is no other means to obtain such a copy, as the Archives do not directly reproduce copies.) Horne describes his viewing experiences with several Hollywood professionals (I have seen these, too). Quite striking were (1) the black patch over JFK’s head,68 (2) the oddly truncated corner of the Stemmons Freeway sign,69 and (3) the ‘blob’ on JFK’s face.70 The black patch, in particular, had sharp and geometric borders and was astonishingly black, especially when compared to earlier frames (before Z-313) of JFK’s head and also when compared to the natural shadow on the back and side of Connally’s head. I have since viewed the MPI transparencies (copied directly from the extant film at the Archives) at the Sixth Floor Museum in Dallas. These images, too, are quite striking. Since they are accessible by the public, anyone should be able see them, merely by arranging an appointment with the Museum. Horne concludes this section by printing his FOIA letter to the CIA and associated letters on this subject to President Obama, Senator Webb, and DCI Panetta (the CIA response is still pending). Among other items, he requested information on (1) the highly secret CIA facility in Rochester, New York (Hawkeyeworks), (2) the optical printer(s) available there in 1963, (3) the briefing boards prepared by Brugioni (which might still exist), and (4) Brugioni’s personal history of the NPIC. Brugioni told Janney that he himself had written this history, which included a brief mention of his Zapruder film event.
Aside from David Wrone (not discussed here, but worth reading about), the individual who fares worst as Horne’s mark is Roland Zavada, author of the now-infamous Zavada Report. Although this was purportedly a study to confirm the authenticity of the Zapruder film, no such claim is actually made in that report. After many tÍte-ý-tÍtes with Zavada, Horne concludes that Zavada has ruined his own credibility in matters of the Zapruder film.71 Horne especially, and appropriately, critiques him for his public dithering on multiple serious issues, all of which are well documented. I myself have accused him of frequently employing ex post facto logic.72 That may be appropriate in the courtroom but is wholly out of place in a scientific investigation. Horne specifically faults him for these items: (1) the printing aperture issue, (2) the bracketing issue, (3) the edge printing light issue, and (4) the inconsistent locations of the punched numbers on the copy films. I concur with all of these – and have previously so stated in print.
Critiques
It is impossible to write any comprehensive treatise about the JFK case and expect to go unscathed (as I well know). The data are simply too complex and, as Horne repeatedly emphasizes, they are too often corrupted. The sole recourse then for the investigator is simply to speculate, based on those data he considers most reliable. Horne clearly recognizes his vulnerability here. Horne and I differ, as he knows, on several issues, the most obvious being the role of Robert Knudsen in the autopsy.73
Horne concludes that none (or at least very few) of the autopsy photographs derive from the official photographer, John Stringer. Instead he nominates Knudsen as the source of the extant autopsy photographs. Knudsen was the social photographer for the White House and he told his family that he had been busy that night filming the autopsy (he was not home for three nights in a row). The embarrassing fact, of course, is that no one saw him there. Not even the Secret Service agents mention him, though they surely recognized one another from their White House duties.74 Horne regards the autopsy photographs as authentic (i.e., not photographically altered), chiefly based on his viewing of high resolution images at Eastman Kodak, in Rochester, while he served on the ARRB. (Nonetheless, he maintains that they are highly misleading.) On the other hand, I regard several images (certainly not all of them) as photographically altered, especially the posterior head images.75 An entire essay could be spent developing these divergent arguments (of photo-alteration vs. no alteration), but I shall not do so here. My viewing of the posterior scalp, with a large format stereo viewer (on multiple occasions and while sampling all imaginable photographic variations of the two pertinent images), repeatedly showed that the back of the head, precisely at the occipital blowout, did not yield a 3D image. This could only occur if the occipital area was precisely identical on the two photographs in the stereo viewer; such a resulting 2D image is exactly what would be expected if the same photographic patch (a soft matte insertion) had been used for each member of the pair. (Ordinarily the two images should have derived from slightly different perspectives.) Otherwise, the expected 3D images were readily obtained, both on other portions of these same suspect photographs and also on all other photographs that I examined. This impression of an anomalous area, precisely where the witnesses disagreed with the photographs – and only there – was inescapably striking to me. Unfortunately, Horne did not perform such stereo viewing, as he acknowledges with some regret.
In addition, other serious problems plague Knudsen’s role as assigned to him by Horne. Foremost is his statement to his own son: he rode in the limousine with the bronze casket.76 Now we know that the bronze casket arrived at the front of the hospital by 6:55 PM and that it arrived at the morgue by 7:17 PM. That is a very tight timeline for Knudsen, if he was at the morgue at all. In view of that, it does seem unlikely that he took very early photographs of the right upper forehead. By then (according the timeline offered by Tom Robinson, and also probably by Ed Reed), H&B had already committed at least some of their nefarious manipulations. Some skull X-rays may even have been taken by 7:17 PM. If that is true, how then could Knudsen have photographed the head before these alterations – as Horne claims he did? Perhaps he got there much earlier (and did not ride with the bronze casket), but no evidence exists for this. And Stringer himself clearly implies that photography began only after 8 PM. If both Stringer and Riebe are correct about this timeline, then what equipment did Knudsen use? And who set it up for him? That task would typically fall to an assistant, such as Riebe, but Ed Reed tells us that he saw no photographic equipment when he took the initial X-rays.77 And, since Knudsen was a total novice at an autopsy, how did he know to take two photographs from a similar perspective, in order to create stereo pairs?
Here is another major challenge to Horne’s scenario: he proposes that Knudsen took photographs after reconstruction by the morticians, when both Riebe and Stringer were absent from the morgue. Horne bases this on Riebe’s recollection78 that they had both left by then. Unfortunately, that is not what Stringer recalled. In fact, he clearly stated that he remained until reconstruction had been completed and that he did not get home until about 4 AM.79 Who would best remember Stringer’s presence during that time: Riebe or Stringer? Therefore, if Stringer stayed around, Knudsen gets left out. There is simply no need for two photographers. Furthermore, Stringer never saw Knudsen.80
The record shows Knudsen making many trips to develop the autopsy photographs. And, of all places, they went to the highly secret Anacostia facility. (Ordinarily, Stringer would have developed his own photographs; furthermore, he would never have used Anacostia.) That so many trips were required, over the next several weeks,81 is suspicious in itself. After all, there are only nine autopsy views and only 52 catalogued photographs.82 So why were so many trips necessary?
My conclusions about Knudsen, only briefly supported here, disagree with Horne’s. I instead conclude that Knudsen indeed worked with the autopsy photographs (in the darkroom, but not in the morgue), perhaps by improving them cosmetically for the Kennedy family – or by supervising someone else who did this. I suspect he was an unwitting conspirator, being played by his superiors. Furthermore, if the Oswald evidence photographs were doctored, if Dealey Plaza photographs were touched up, if the skull X-rays were altered (in the darkroom), if the Zapruder film was revised, then why would the autopsy photographs remain pristine? After all, it is much, much easier to alter a photograph than to correctly improvise a misleading autopsy scene in the morgue (especially a scene that was often described by attendees as a madhouse). Furthermore, time limits do not apply in the darkroom, where one can leisurely keep improving the image until success is achieved.
I also disagree with Horne about the semicircular defect (with apparent beveling), as seen in F8.83 This mysterious photo, which I consider to be the back of the head, was described as precisely that during the initial ‘military review’ by the autopsy personnel on November 1, 1966. In addition, Paul O’Connor (autopsy technician) clearly confirmed this.84 Horne concludes that this beveled defect represents an important exit site. Because it looks like an exit, I agree with Horne that the pathologists should have discussed it. In fact, they do not – and that is suspicious. However, Roger McCarthy,85 after his own experiments, concluded that such beveled defects can occur independently of exiting bullets or bullet fragments. Furthermore, this site does not fit with any other metal debris in the skull X-rays – certainly not the fragment trail across the top of the skull nor the two fragments removed by H&B – nor does it match the right occipital blowout. To finally bury this proposal, no witness at either Parkland or Bethesda observed a scalp wound that corresponded to this semicircular beveled defect, so it may simply be a red herring.
How many shots struck JFK’s head? Horne argues for three,86 which will perplex many a reader. Even critics of the Warren Commission typically argue for only two head shots at most. (The Warren Commission’s scenario was simple: a single shot entered at the rear, near the external occipital protuberance (EOP).)87 Although I agree with that shot, a second shot likely entered high on the right forehead, very near the hairline.) I confess that Horne has forced me to think again about a third shot. Although I had previously been inclined to ascribe the supposed left temple entry to observer error (confusing left for right – or perhaps just seeing a blood clot88), I am now more inclined to believe in such an entry. Horne cites the Parkland physicians – Marion Jenkins, Robert McClelland, Ronald Jones, and Lito Puerto (aka Porto)89 – who clearly reported a small wound in the left temple. Others include Dr. Adolph Giesecke,90 Dr. David Stewart,91 Father Oscar Huber,92 photographers Altgens93 and Similas94 and, more recently, Hugh Huggins (aka Hugh Howell),95 who was RFK’s emissary to the autopsy.
Although I was reluctant to visualize Greer with a pistol during the shooting, Secret Service agents did pull their pistols during the tussle over JFK’s body in the ER. It is even possible that Greer fired, though I can’t imagine what his target was. But it is most unlikely that he deliberately fired at JFK. That would have been far too risky – multiple witnesses would have fingered him, yet no one has done so. Furthermore, no photograph shows him doing this (although it is theoretically possible that such photographs have been culled or altered). Besides, although he may have disliked JFK, we have no evidence that he was involved in the plot to kill JFK.
In the end, though, I must admit that evidence of a third shot to the head persists. Perhaps the major clue is the right occipital blowout. The right forehead shot96 likely produced the debris across the top of the skull X-rays (neither the Warren Commission’s scenario nor the HSCA’s scenario match that trail), but that fragment trail does not fit (at all) with a right occipital blowout. Furthermore, if the bullet that caused the visible fragment trail had been mercury filled (as I suggested), then perhaps much of the mercury remained inside the skull. So what produced the occipital blowout? The Warren Commission shot (from the rear) surely could not do that. But a shot from the left front could be just right. What is odd, though, is that no witness at Bethesda, absolutely no one, ever reported such an entrance hole.97
Then there is the Clarence Israel story, related by Janie Taylor, a biologist at NIH, across the street from the Bethesda Hospital.98 Israel (now deceased), an orderly in the morgue that night, saw a doctor working at a ‘hurried’ pace to mutilate three bullet punctures to the head area. Like Jeremy Gunn, I don’t know what to do with this tale, although it is striking that three head wounds are cited.
Diana Bowron, a Parkland nurse,99 told Livingstone that less than 50% of the right brain remained (the right rear quadrant was most effected) and about a quarter of the left hemisphere was also missing. I am not aware of any other Parkland comments about the left hemisphere, and there is very little clear-cut information from Bethesda either. But if Bowron is correct, then her report constitutes powerful evidence for a left frontal shot. Of course, her report also flatly contradicts the official brain photographs, which show no missing left brain.100 The optical density data also support Bowron; they show that only 60-65% of the left brain was present, as measured on the AP skull at the National Archives.101 Of course, in view of Horne’s conclusions, some of this missing brain might have been due to H&B. But, even if H&B had removed this, that alone would be suspicious – i.e., they would have had no reason to excise left brain tissue at all unless trauma had occurred there.
To all of this, Horne adds the support of Dr. Charles Wilbur, who carefully reviewed the microscopic pathology report of the left brain sample.102 This showed ‘extensive disruption associated with hemorrhage.’ Wilbur concluded: ‘These observations rekindle my interest in the observations made in Dallas on the ER table (by several medical personnel) Ö that there was an entry hole in the left temporal region, in front of the ear and at the hairline.’ In conclusion, I would say that the left temple wound seems more likely than ever, especially with support from the optical density data.
It might have been expected the brain photographs would have resolved this mystery; unfortunately, they are not of JFK’s brain. Horne was the first to deduce, from multiple lines of disparate data (see his detailed table),103 that a surrogate brain had been introduced at a second brain examination. Even the (sole) autopsy photographer of the brain, John Stringer, stated in no uncertain terms that these were not his photographs. One reason was that they were on the wrong brand of film.104 My own optical density data (taken directly from the extant skull X-rays at the National Archives)105 are totally inconsistent with the brain photographs (which I have observed at the National Archives with Cyril Wecht). Insofar as the amount of residual brain goes, one can accept either the X-ray data as authentic or the brain photographs as authentic, but not both. They are inconsistent with one another – in fact, wildly inconsistent. To date, no Warren Commission supporter has come to terms with this intractable paradox. It should also be emphasized that the optical density data actually preceded Horne’s proposal, but these data are entirely consistent with his two-brain proposal.
I also object to Horne’s proposal that puncture wounds106 were deliberately created in the scalp that night.107 Oddly, he does not identify the perpetrator, or even who issued the order. Of course, none of that is in the official record. Horne proposes that the high posterior ‘red spot’ (selected by the HSCA as the official entry site – albeit persistently denied by the pathologists) was deliberately created that night. How the red color was achieved he does not say. And why that particular site was selected is also mysterious – did it fit better with the ‘sniper’s nest’ than did the EOP site? If so, who in the morgue would have known that so early in the game? But what madness it would be to create another wound! After all, H&B had already identified a lower (EOP) entry site; therefore this higher one would immediately imply two shots to the head – exactly what no one wanted that night. But Horne does not stop there; he also believes that the lower ‘white spot’ (very near the posterior hairline) was deliberately man-made.108 We might well ask why he takes these risks. But that question has a simple answer: because he refuses to consider photographic alteration, he has no choice. Think about this: that red spot nearly correlates spatially with the 6.5 mm object on the skull X-ray – as it should since both were fakes. However, what breathtaking serendipity such a match was for subsequent government panels – they had their entry site!109 But because Horne has boxed himself in (no photo-alteration allowed) his only option is to say that the red spot really was present that night. Unless photographic doctoring is permitted, that red spot could not abruptly appear later. But no one at the autopsy saw this red spot (let alone its creation) – and the pathologists forever adamantly refused to recognize it (despite Horne’s insinuation that they themselves had created it). All of this, taken together, is quite damning evidence in favor of (at least some) photographic alteration.110
Horne suggests that the original Zapruder film may have been shot at 48 frames per second, an option that was available on that camera:
Removing the Car Stop and the Exit Debris From the Film Would Have Been Simple if Zapruder Had Actually Filmed the Motorcade at ëSlow Motion,’ or at 48 Frames Per Second, Instead of at the Normal ëRun’ Setting of 16 Frames Per Second.111
Horne suggests that simple frame excision could then have eliminated much of the evidence of conspiracy. But this cannot work, as Costella has explained: the ghost images (in the intersprocket area) make this impossible.112 When Zapruder’s camera exposed one frame (call it number 10), the gate (the metal frame that actually admits light to the film) simultaneously exposed (in the intersprocket area) a modest portion of each neighboring frame (call these 9 and 11).113 When Costella examined the film he learned that these ghost images are, in fact, consistent with the central frame in each case – i.e., 10 is always adjacent to 9 and 11 (and this works for any three adjacent frames). In a sense then, each adjacent ghost image ‘belongs’ to its primary frame – and not to any other frame. On the other hand, if frame excision had occurred, each ghost image would become separated from its simultaneously exposed primary frame; i.e., such excision would have led to an adjacent ghost image exposed at a different time from the primary frame. For example, for excision of every other frame, 10 would end up next to 8 and 12; for excision of two of every three frames, 10 would end up next to 7 and 13. In either case, these ghost images would not match the frames next to them. And Costella emphasizes that enough information (e.g., motion blur) exists in these ghost images to permit such a deduction. The bottom line is that such inconsistencies are not found in the extant film. Furthermore, there is no escape from this problem, i.e., it is not possible simply to erase a ghost image from the intersprocket area – once there, it is always there. Partly based on this very powerful argument, Costella has argued that the extant film must be a fabrication, i.e., a re-creation using parts of multiple films (and probably only a rather modest portion of Zapruder’s film at most). At least one of these films must have been shot during the motorcade, but others could have been shot before or after, even some days before or after. These then had to be stitched together to compose the extant film. Even differences of perspective (as would be expected for films shot from slightly different sites) could be overcome by selecting only pertinent parts of frames.
Costella concludes that the Stemmons freeway sign is one example of such a cut and paste job. By analyzing the effects of pincushion distortion114 he concludes that the sign was placed into the film after the fact, i.e., it looks constant in all frames. On the other hand, if it had been shot from Zapruder’s camera, it should have experienced pincushion distortion: i.e., the sign would successively change its appearance from one frame to the next. Furthermore, after several frames, these changes would accumulate to become even more obvious. But the bottom line is that the Stemmons sign does not show such pincushion effects, which means that it was placed after the fact by the film forgers. This situation is closely analogous to the fake hairpiece on the back of JFK’s head, where the image looks 2D rather than 3D via the stereo viewer. In both cases, the same fake image was placed (into multiple photographs – or into multiple frames) in a manner that violates the basic rules of optics.
Based on these arguments, Costella concludes that it would have been impossible to alter the film without discarding essentially all of the intersprocket areas and starting all over. In that case, he argues, the total time for (final) fabrication would have taken much longer than several days. Although Horne does not require completion of a final film (i.e., the extant film) by Sunday night (November 24) he does suggest that the Jamieson copies were switched quite promptly, likely within several days. Such a prompt (yet final) switch implies a timeline that sharply contrasts with Costella’s more leisurely pace. Even David Healy (a professional video producer with decades of experience) emphasized in his 2003 Duluth lecture that even if an altered film had been viewed on Sunday night, November 24, it need not have been the final product (i.e., the extant film), but merely an interim film.115 Horne ultimately agrees that alterations might have continued for ‘several weeks’ afterwards, especially if a traveling matte had been employed.116
Costella also refers to the possibility that the proposed second film of the motorcade (by an unknown photographer – or photographers) might have been shot in 16 mm format. If so, that would have made forgery ever so much easier, particularly since the contemporaneous optical printers were not designed for 8 mm. It might also have made the subsequent first generation copies (the extant ones, which are probably not the Jamieson copies) appear more authentic after fabrication.
Costella goes on to wonder whether the splices in the film (e.g., between Z-208 and Z-212) were unavoidable during forgery for a simple reason: they may have contained telltale ghost images of bystanders who appeared under the left edge of the Stemmons sign.117 A splice is also present at Z-155 to Z-157. Curiously, this is close to frames where Michael Stroscio, a physicist, identified a possible shot at Z-152 to Z-153.118
There is a final, simple argument against a 48 fps scenario for Zapruder. If 48 fps had been used, then when the film was shown that weekend, all of the action would have appeared in slow motion – as if the actors were subject to the lesser gravity of the moon. However, no one reported such an odd effect, even though someone surely should have.
My final paragraph in this section is not really a criticism of Horne at all. It merely reflects an unblinking reality: no one (not even Bugliosi119) can address everything important in this case. I refer here to the police dictabelt and the acoustics data.120 Horne implies that the acoustics data support conspiracy – based on the number of audible shots and also on timing problems, i.e., two shots are only 1.66 seconds apart, an interval much too short for the Mannlicher-Carcano. However, he does not cite the work of Don Thomas,121 which reinvigorated this subject, nor does he mention the fallout from that work. The discussion continues; the interested reader may begin with Wikipedia for current references.122
Conclusions
I stand in awe of the scope, detail, and profound insights that Horne has achieved, especially in the medical evidence – to say nothing of his Olympian effort. Given the circumstances of its creation (mostly on weekends, within a cumulative time span of perhaps two years) it is nothing short of phenomenal. Contrast Horne’s effort with Bugliosi’s, which extended over several decades, and which may have included writing assistants and editors. Bugliosi also did not have to self-publish. The bottom line is that I feel a deep debt of gratitude to Horne for further disentangling this nearly half-century old Gordian knot. By contrast, I should emphasize that I never experienced that sensation with Bugliosi.
If H&B indeed played alterationists with the skull and brain (as I now accept), then Horne has initiated a paradigm shift in our understanding of the cover-up. But, as Horne acknowledges, this does not necessarily convert H&B into villains. After all, they may well have considered themselves to be heroic patriots, who single-handedly aborted World War III,123 depending on exactly what their military superiors124 had told them.
Josiah Thompson has proclaimed that the Zapruder debate has been a gigantic waste of time, because it is ‘junk science’ that has produced nothing.125 Like Einstein’s opinion of quantum mechanics,126 Thompson’s mind is stuck in the past. In fact, Horne has presented revolutionary new data about the chain of possession. In view of Thompson’s now-shaky bedrock, many will find this new information very convincing indeed – especially younger researchers new to the case, whose minds are still open. I have previously summarized traditional historical (and scientific) views that were later overturned,127 so no one should be surprised at this dÈnouement. Without nascent heretics, our world would soon become more impoverished. In retrospect, it was best not to offer obeisance to Roland Zavada (as the inerrant pope of the film), as Thompson implied we should do.128 The two-event sequence at NPIC has all the hallmarks of a covert operation – but for 46 years not even Brugioni knew what had transpired – and he wrote the history of the NPIC!Some of us did not need more evidence, but others did. These fence-sitters may now take their own time to decide. Some may even wish to make a pilgrimage to view the MPI transparencies in Dallas. The real point, though, as Horne states, is that the alteration of the film is, in itself, major evidence of a government cover-up. I could not agree more.
What remains controversial for many though is the timeline for alteration. Horne favors a very short timeline, while Costella prefers a distinctly longer one. The early appearance in LIFE of altered frames (e.g., the ‘blob’ on JFK’s face and the disappearance of the white object in the background grass) indicate that some frames had been altered before Sunday night, November 24. In addition, the Hunter/McMahon briefing boards show the extremely black patch over JFK’s occiput, as well as the blob. It is possible, though not certain, that incriminating flying debris was also removed by Sunday night. The Stemmons sign and the lamppost (both added after the fact, according to Costella) also appear in LIFE‘s first JFK issue, in low-resolution black and white photographs. Now consider this: McMahon concluded that JFK was hit by 6-8 shots, fired from at least three directions. Evidence for these shots is absent from the extant film, so he must have seen a different film (though probably not the original). If McMahon’s observations were correct, then he must have seen a partly altered film. That would leave time for Costella’s more leisurely scenario.
The chief argument for a short timeline is the need to dispose promptly of the Jamieson (first-day) copies; the problem, of course, is that the longer these persisted the longer the original images might be copied – or recalled – by others. Horne notes that the FBI returned its Jamieson copy to the Secret Service by Tuesday, November 26.129 However, we do not know the disposition of any other FBI copies, i.e., later generation copies made from the Jamieson copies (that the FBI might have already made by then).130 So perhaps this cover-up was a two-step process: (1) retrieve quickly all possible copies (including Jamieson copies and all those made from Jamieson’s)131 and (2) sometime later (e.g., within one or two months) replace those earlier ones by copies subsequently made from the extant film. Perhaps the FBI was even given some credible excuse for the delay in replacement (e.g., an improved quality copy was pending); in any case, it is likely that J. Edgar Hoover would have cooperated with any reasonable suggestion to abet the cover-up. But LIFE, too, had a copy. However, after their early assassination coverage, they had no need for the film, as a movie film. Given the role of C. D. Jackson (LIFE‘s publisher), first in the very expensive purchase of the film, and then in his sequestering of the film (with no profit accruing to LIFE), it is likely (especially in view of his longtime intelligence connections)132 that he also would have agreed to such a delayed replacement.
But there is still the matter of the three black and white copies of the extant film, discovered in the year 2000 by the Sixth Floor Museum among materials sold to Zapruder in 1975 by Time, Inc.133 Their format is 16 mm, unslit, with the motorcade on one side and Zapruder home scenes on the other (adjacent) side. These include markings on the film that identify specific frames actually printed in LIFE.134 An irresistible deduction from these markings, of course, is that the extant film had already been completed by that early date. In fact, however, all that is certain is that specific frames (those made public) must have been finalized by that date. On the other hand, if Costella’s more leisurely timeframe is adopted, that would imply that these black and white copies were only later placed into the LIFE collection – marked up appropriately after the fact – so as to give the impression that the markings (and the extant film, too) dated to November. Although this scenario may be true, no eyewitness to date has corroborated it.
Suggestions
The HD scans (cited above) of selected Zapruder frames should be scanned with an optical densitometer. If possible, multiple wavelengths (colors) should be employed. These scans should then be compared to controls, e.g., JFK’s head before Z-313 and Connally’s head (at most any time). This might quantify the magnitude of photo-alteration, thus making the conclusions more scientific. Further studies may be forthcoming from the Hollywood nexus. New films shot via a camera like Zapruder’s might yet provide further insights. Of course, if extant films (i.e., original ones, not altered ones) from Zapruder’s actual camera can still be located that would be even better. As Horne suggests, at the National Archives two autopsy photographs of the posterior scalp (from a matched pair) should be overlaid on a view box. If the images of the suspect area perfectly align, that would constitute powerful evidence of photo-alteration. Control areas should also be extensively compared, just to see what non-identical (but stereo-matched) pairs look like. Surprisingly, no one has done this.
There are three X-ray films of the bone fragments,135 which seems a bit excessive. Is it possible that these extra films were taken to replace those X-rays that had been discarded – in order that the total number of X-ray films remained fixed at 14? Is it even possible that these three films are identical to one another? If so, that would be even more suspicious. To check on this (for the first time – no one has done this), Horne suggests that the films simply be overlaid to see if they match precisely.
I have never looked for the head brace on the X-rays nor, apparently, has anyone else. Since the autopsy personnel did not recognize this, it would be useful to look for this on the X-ray films. (Custer told the ARRB that he had used a blanket behind the head, but Custer’s memory has not always been reliable.) In view of Horne’s proposal that Knudsen took autopsy photographs with the head brace (apparently while no autopsy personnel were present – because no one recalls this), the presence or absence of such a brace on the X-rays might shed further light on Horne’s proposed timeline for Knudsen (if he was involved at all).
The optical density data from the X-rays should be confirmed. The National Archives have their own densitometer(s); perhaps they would even assist with this. Actually the data need not be too extensive – even a few select data points inside the 6.5 mm object and inside the ‘white patches’136 could be highly confirmatory.
My observation at the National Archives of intact emulsion (where there should be none) over the T-shaped inscription on a lateral skull X-ray137 provided prima facie evidence that this X-ray must be a copy. That clearly means that (1) the original is missing and (2) the door lies open to alteration (during copying). Surprisingly, no one has yet attempted to confirm my observation (of the paradoxically missing emulsion), despite the fact that Chad Zimmerman and Larry Sturdivan had that opportunity after my observation became public.138 Furthermore, Bugliosi should be a bit red-faced that he did not accompany them at that critical moment. Even he could have made that observation.
Perhaps some other creative minds can think further about three head shots. My fear, though, is that this impasse may never be resolved due to insufficient data. Given the destruction inflicted on the skull by H&B (and perhaps by their predecessors), I am not even certain that a second autopsy would help to resolve that question.
Addendum: The 6.5 mm Mystery on the AP Skull X-ray
Although Horne’s discussion of the suspicious 6.5 mm object on the AP X-ray is in Volume II, I could not resist a few comments about it here.139 To date no one else has explained this object, not even the three experts interviewed by the ARRB.140 Furthermore, each one of the three autopsy pathologists (interviewed separately and under oath) denied either seeing or removing this thing at the autopsy.141 Even Larry Sturdivan142 admits that it cannot be a bullet fragment (this admission, almost by itself, destroys the case against the lone gunman), but then after his visit to the National Archives he had to confess that it remained as mysterious as ever. He did, however, offer one half-hearted proposal that he did not really endorse, namely that the fragment had been present on the AP X-ray, but had fallen off before the lateral was taken. (He necessarily assumed that the AP had been taken first.) But this does not explain an awkward fact: the lateral X-ray143 still shows a small metal fragment at precisely the expected site! Furthermore, this proposal disagrees with Reed’s sequence of X-rays: Reed said he took the lateral film first.144 In fact, the only viable explanation for this bizarre 6.5 mm object is photographic addition in the dark room.145 Horne recounts my own adventures with this fantastic forgery in some detail. Given that he began his odyssey as a layman in medicine and radiology, Horne offers a splendid summary of this entire subject.146
Appendix: Three Casket Entries
Time (PM) Casket Type Witnesses Remarks Paul O’Connor 6:35 Shipping Roger Boyajian Black hearse casket Dennis David Body bag Donald Rebentisch Floyd Riebe Note: this first entry was documented by Boyajian and corroborated by the above witnesses.147
7:17 Bronze viewing Jim Sibert Light gray navy casket Frank O’Neill ambulance (from Parkland) Roy Kellerman Empty casket William Greer Note: this second entry was documented in the report of Sibert and O’Neill.148
8:00 Bronze viewing Joint Service Casket Team Light gray navy casket Godfrey McHugh ambulance Body inside, wrapped
in sheets – no body bagNote: this third entry was supervised by Lt. Samuel Bird from Fort Myer.149
NOTES
1 Google: ‘A Not-Entirely-Positive Review.’ Also see Jim DiEugenio’s very extensive review of Bugliosi’s book, Reclaiming Parkland.2 Visit their photographs at Douglas Horne, Inside the ARRB (2009), Volume I at Figures 77-80.
3 Ibid. at Figure 68 and at xxxiii. A more detailed account is in Horne’s Appendix 38; see http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/docset/getList.do?docSetId=1932.
4 David Lifton, Best Evidence (1988), at 569-588.
5 For example, see Clint Hill’s statement at http://www.jfk-online.com/clhill.html:
‘The motorcade arrived Bethesda Naval Hospital at 6:55 p.m.’
Hill also describes landing with Air Force One at Andrews Air Force Base at 5:58 PM.6 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1002.
7 Ibid. at 989-992.
8 Horne cites William Manchester, Death of a President (1967).
9 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1006.
10 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 70.
11 The entire X-ray collection is listed in Ibid. at Figure 58.
12 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1007.
13 In retrospect, Lifton had been grievously misled by the HSCA’s false statements, namely that the autopsy photographs were authentic and that all the witnesses agreed with them. This falsehood was only discovered after the movie, JFK, triggered the release of multiple, sequestered witness statements that disagreed with the photographs.
14 James Fetzer, editor, Murder in Dealey Plaza (2000), at 433 and 436.
15 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1164.
16 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 60.
17 Fetzer (2000), supra, at 258-259.
18 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 40, shows a sketch of the morgue floor plan, including the gallery.
19 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1035, 1163-1171 and Volume II at 426 and 437.
20 Fetzer (2000), supra, at 250.
21 Ibid. at 242.
22 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1005.
23 Lifton (1988), supra, at 492 and 579.
24 Harry Livingstone actually prints a photograph of four fragments in High Treason (1998), at 562. Their provenance, however, seems uncertain.
25 Warren Commission Hearings, Volume II at 354.
26 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1042-1043.
27 Ibid. at 1000.
28 Breo, D.L., ‘JFK’s death, Part II – Dr. Finck speaks out, ëtwo bullets, from the rear,’ ‘ JAMA 268:1749 (1992).
29 http://www.jfk-assassination.net/weberman/finck1.htm. Or see Horne’s Appendix 29 or 7 HSCA 101, 122, 135, 191. The list of appendices is in Horne, supra, Volume I at xix-lii. The appendices themselves are at the Mary Ferrell website. See my footnote 3 for a link.
30 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1005.
31 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figures 37-38.
32 See Boswell’s sketch from the autopsy: Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 11.
33 Ibid. at Figures 12-15.
34 For two eyewitness sketches see Ibid. at Figures 21 & 30. Also see the sketch approved by Parkland physician, Robert McClelland: Ibid. at Figure 81.
35 Michael Kurtz includes George Burkley, Robert Canada, John Ebersole, Calvin Galloway, Robert Karnei, Edward Kenney, David Osborne, and John Stover; see The Assassination Debates (2006), at 39 and 126.
36 Robert Groden, The Killing of a President (1993), at 86-88.
37 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figures 37-38.
38 Lifton, supra, at 295-307.
39 William Law, In the Eye of History (2005), at 143-288.
40 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1036 and 1038.
41 See their X-rays in Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 39.
42 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1037.
43 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1036-1037.
44 Ebersole also confirmed a call to Dallas during our telephone conversations (see my footnote 14). He estimated the time as about 10:30 PM (Ibid. at 999). What struck me, though, is the reason why he recalled this event so clearly: he said that after they learned about the throat wound, they stopped searching for bullet debris on the X-rays (Fetzer (2000), supra, at 437). Quite interestingly, Stringer also seemed to recall such a telephone call (Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1011; Volume I at 166; or HSCA interview with John Stringer, Document 013617, at 4). Moreover, Stringer’s estimate of the time agreed with Ebersole’s estimate. Dr. Robert Karnei (resident pathologist) also recalled a telephone call to Parkland on that Friday night; see Harry Livingstone, High Treason II (1992), at 186.
45 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 999. Oddly enough, Malcolm Perry, before the Warren Commission, initially recalled his conversation with Humes as Friday night; see Warren Commission Hearings, Volume III at 380 or http://jfkassassination.net/russ/testimony/perry_m1.htm:
Mr. SPECTER – Dr. Perry, did you have occasion to discuss your observations with Comdr. James J. Humes of the Bethesda Naval Hospital?
Dr. PERRY – Yes, sir; I did.
Mr. SPECTER – When did that conversation occur?
Dr. PERRY – My knowledge as to the exact accuracy of it is obviously in doubt. I was under the initial impression that I talked to him on Friday, but I understand it was on Saturday. I didn’t recall exactly when.46 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 83.
47 Olivier, A.G., Dziemian, A.J., ‘Wound Ballistics of the 6.5 mm Mannlicher-Carcano Ammunition. US Army Edgewood Arsenal Technical Report CRDLR 3264.’ March 1965. Also see Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1083 and Kurtz, supra, at 35.
48 Kurtz, supra, at 35. Also see Marshall Houts, Where Death Delights; the Story of Dr. Milton Helpern and Forensic Medicine (1967).
49 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1089-1095. Also see Josiah Thompson, Six Seconds in Dallas (1967), at 176. Thompson here actually wonders if the bullet had been switched by government agents sometime after its initial appearance. Also see http://www.historymatters.com/essays/frameup/EvenMoreMagical/EvenMoreMagical.htm.
50 David Wrone has made a similar argument for the chain of possession of the Zapruder film; see Fetzer (1998), supra, at 265. Wrone claims that a good lawyer could have kept the film out of the courtroom (although it did surface for the Clay Shaw trial). Given the recent interviews with Dino Brugioni (see below), that argument today is stronger than ever.
51 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1208-1212; the NPIC proposed such a frontal shot at frame Z-190. Of course, there is also the article by Paul Mandel (Ibid. at 1202 and LIFE, December 6, 1963) about the Zapruder film: “Öthe 8 mm film shows the President turning his body far around to the right as he waves to someone in the crowd. His throat is exposed—towards the sniper’s nest—just before he clutches it.”
53 Ironically, a Captain (Pierre) Sands attended the Hunter-McMahon event (see below). The layman should understand that ‘rockhead’ is neither an epithet nor a pejorative for certain types of music lovers. It is merely a geological formation.
54 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1226-1227.
55 John Costella, an Australian Ph.D. physicist with expertise in optics, has offered very compelling physical arguments as to why more than just an original Zapruder film was absolutely necessary to fabricate the extant film. See James Fetzer, editor, The Great Zapruder Film Hoax (2003), at 145-238. One researcher has advised me that he has made some progress, but identifying the pertinent photographer(s) remains an open question.
56 Dino Brugioni, Photofakery: the History and Techniques of Photographic Deception and Manipulation (1999). His recollections of the Cuban missile crisis are documented at 109-110.
57 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1220-1243.
58 Ibid. at 1236.
59 This contradicts Roland Zavada’s final verdict on this question, although his initial conclusion had been precisely the opposite; see below for more on Zavada.
60 It is possible that some copies of these copies (sic) escaped the dragnet. Dan Rather, for example (The Camera Never Blinks (1977), at 127), claims that security for the film was extremely poor while he was at CBS. Multiple individuals have reported viewing a very different Zapruder film, actually one more consistent with the eyewitnesses (Fetzer (2000), supra, at 354). Millicent Cranor described to me a film that she saw in 1992 at NBC; she added that John Lattimer must have seen a similar film (Resident and Staff Physician, May 1972, at 60). The LIFE issue of October 2, 1964, had six different versions according to Paul Hoch and Vincent Salandria (Fred Newcomb and Perry Adams, Murder from Within (1974), at 143). In one version Z-323 had a caption that described JFK’s head as ‘snapping to one side’ (also see my footnote 67); another version replaced this frame with Z-313 and a caption describing JFK’s head as going forward.
61 Horne, supra, Volume IVat 1346. Wainwright was a LIFE employee who published The Great American Magazine – An Inside Story of LIFE (1986).This includes a (second-hand) account of these images in LIFE (November 29, 1963). He states that 31 enlargements were used in creating a sequential layout for that issue.
62 I recently viewed an original Zavada report; there is indeed one image of the red truck (Zavada Report (1998) at 1285) that does extend very near the left edge, just as Horne states. However, Horne’s point is that the images in the extant Zapruder film nearly always extend fully left, whereas Zavada’s test images only rarely show this phenomenon. Horne also cites the Janowitz/Myers film (Horne, supra, Volume IVat 1290), shot in Dealey Plaza with a camera like Zapruder’s. As he viewed it on a DVD it seemed to show ‘full flush left,’ but Horne noted that he personally could not authenticate this film and would really prefer to see a film actually shot through Zapruder’s camera. For more on this J/M film see http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=15326.
63 Many of these points had previously been made, as Horne acknowledges, both by Harry Livingstone and by me, although our work was admittedly based on Horne’s initial efforts. Horne emphasizes that he only read Livingstone’s book after he had done his own research. That the two of them reached so many common conclusions (they did indeed do so) is taken by Horne as (at least partial) verification of his own work. See Fetzer (1998), supra, and Fetzer (2000), supra, and also Harry Livingstone, The Hoax of the Century: Decoding the Forgery of the Zapruder Film (2004).
64 Rather, supra, at 127.
65 Noel Twyman and I independently discovered DeLoach’s report in his autobiography, Hoover’s FBI: The Inside Story by Hoover’s Trusted Lieutenant (1995), at 139. DeLoach does not comment on his obvious disagreement with the extant Zapruder film.
66 Fetzer (2003), supra, at 200.
67 Also see a review by Richard J. DellaRosa at http://www.jfkresearch.com/book_review.html: ‘When interviewed in the 1990s, Zapruder’s business partner, Erwin Schwartz, said that he vividly recalled watching the film and remembered seeing JFK’s head suddenly ëwhip around to the left’ and saw an explosion of blood and brains from his head and that it had been blown out ëto the left rear.’ ‘ Also see my footnote 60.
68 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figures 87-88.
69 Ibid. at Figures 85-86.
70 Ibid. atFigures 89-90.
71 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1281.
72 See the Preface (by me – but amputated by Harry) to Harry Livingstone, The Hoax of the Century: Decoding the Forgery of the Zapruder Film (2004).
74 Ibid. at 251.
75 Ibid. at Figure 65 (autopsy photographs 43 & 44).
76 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1003 (footnote 3).
77Horne, supra, Volume II at 435. Gunn: Did you, at any point, see photographers in the morgue?
Reed: Yes, I did. But they didn’t have their equipment. There was no equipment at that time with them.78Horne, supra, Volume I at 237.
79 Ibid. at 165 and 167. Of course, both men could be right. Stringer might have been only temporarily absent – shortly after Riebe left. Stringer also added a major observation: no photographs were taken either during or after the embalming. Although Godfrey McHugh reported the opposite, I would be inclined in this case to believe the photographer.
80 Ibid. at 250. Also recall that Knudsen claimed to be the sole autopsy photographer; by implication, therefore, he did not see Stringer.
81 Fetzer (2000), supra, at 275.
82 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 57.
83 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1027. Also seeHorne, supra, Volume I at Figure 66 (autopsy photographs 17&18, 44&45). Larry Sturdivan precisely identifies this site with a pointer; see JFK Myths (2005), at 195 (Figure 44). These sites are also identified in PowerPoint slides from my November 2009 lecture in Dallas; see the Mary Ferrell website at http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/index.php/Main_Page. Alternate websites, with slightly updated slides, are at http://www.assassinationscience.com and http://www.assassinationresearch.com.
84 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1027. Stringer also disagreed with Michael Baden’s orientation (Horne, supra, Volume I at 165).
85 Fetzer (2000), supra, at 282.
86 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1147-1155.
87 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 47.
88 Horne, supra, Volume II at 642.
89 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1150. Also see Horne, supra, Volume III at 757, 765-769.
90 Warren Commission Hearings, Volume VI at 74. However, Giesecke also thought the occipital wound was on the left side. He later admitted that he had described the wrong side: http://www.assassinationresearch.com/v4n2/v4n2part1.pdf.
91 Harold Weisberg, Post-Mortem (1969), at 60-61.
93 Fetzer (2003), supra, at 200.
94 New York Times, November 23, 1963; Edgar F. Tatro, The Quincy Sun, November 21, 1984, at 1-17.
95 Bill Sloan, JFK: Breaking the Silence (1993), at 183.
96 See the incision in the high right forehead, near the hairline, in Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 62.
97 The autopsy photo of the left lateral head also does not show such an entry hole: Ibid. at Figure 59.
98 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1063-64.
99 Ibid. at 1045 (footnote). Also see Harry Livingstone, Killing the Truth (1993), at 195.
100 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 35.
101 David W. Mantik and Cyril H. Wecht, ‘Paradoxes of the JFK Assassination: The Brain Enigma,’ in James DiEugenio and Lisa Pease, editors, The Assassinations (2002), at 264.
102 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1151. Also compare Wilbur’s description of the wound location to that of Dr. Marion Jenkins before the Warren Commission: http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/russ/testimony/jenkins.htm.
103 Horne, supra, Volume III at 777-844: ‘Two Brain Examinations – Cover-up Confirmed.’ The relevant table is at 791. Horne’s ARRB memo was dated June 2, 1998. Only while writing this review did I recall that I had asked this same question some years earlier. See Harry Livingstone, Killing Kennedy (1995), at 268 (footnote): ‘Is Boswell describing different brains on these two occasions?’ Horne, however, was the one who pursued the question fully.
104 Horne, supra, Volume I at 42-43.
105 Mantik and Wecht (2002), supra, at 250-271.
106 These sites are precisely identified in PowerPoint slides from my November 2009 lecture in Dallas; see the Mary Ferrell website at http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/index.php/Main_Page. Alternate websites, with slightly updated slides, are at http://www.assassinationscience.com and http://www.assassinationresearch.com.
107 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 999.
108 In his defense, Horne notes that Lipsey recalled seeing the white spot – and also recalled the pathologists’ discussion of it – during his HSCA interview. He even recalled it well enough that he identified this site on a sketch. See http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/med_testimony/Lipsey_1-18-78/HSCA-Lipsey.htm. As further corroboration, Horne adds that Robinson also recalled a probe entering low on the back of the head.
109 For an unbiased perspective, however, see the summary reports of the three medical experts for the ARRB (Horne, supra, Volume II at 583-587). None of them could identify such an entry site on the skull X-rays – and there was great uncertainty about the red spot, as well. For full summaries see Horne’s Appendices at the Mary Ferrell website or visit my November 2009 lecture (about these experts) at the same website: http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/index.php/Main_Page.
110 Most likely the red spot was simply added in the darkroom; after all, that site fit much better with the ‘sniper’s nest’ than did the EOP site. The white spot was merely an oversight. When the darkroom magicians covered up the large skull defect they simply neglected to extend their new (photographic) hairpiece inferiorly enough.
111 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1335.
112 See these ghost images in Fetzer (2003), supra, at 210.
113 Each intersprocket area therefore contains two ghost images: one from the frame before and one from the frame after the primary frame that was exposed.
114 Fetzer (2003), supra, at xi, 23, 35, 164-169, 209.
115 Horne, supra, Volume IVat 1309. Healy has suggested two weeks for the complete job (Ibid. at 1339).
116 Ibid. at 1341 (footnote).
117 Ibid. at 220.
118 Fetzer (1998), supra, at 343-344.
119 See my footnote 1.
120 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1127-1131 and 1213.
121 Thomas, Donald B., ‘Echo correlation analysis and the acoustic evidence in the Kennedy assassination revisited.’ Science & Justice (The Forensic Science Society) 41: 21ñ32 (2002).
122 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictabelt_evidence_relating_to_the_assassination_of_John_F._Kennedy.
123 LBJ later gave Humes a personal set of presidential cufflinks, which Humes wore during his ARRB visit.
124 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1188. Horne cites these superiors as Edward C. Kenney (Surgeon General of the Navy), Calvin Galloway (Commanding Officer of the Bethesda National Naval Medical Center), and George Burkley (White House Physician). All were admirals. Also see Vincent Palamara’s summary at http://www.assassinationresearch.com/v4n2/v4n2part3.pdf.
125 Josiah Thompson: ‘One way of looking at this continuing argument is to see it as a gigantic waste of time, as a prime example of junk science from educated people who ought to know better. It may have amusement value in some chronicle of ësilly science,’ but, in terms of knowledge about the Kennedy assassination, it has produced literally nothing.’ See his entire essay at
http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/index.php/Essay_-_Bedrock_Evidence_in_the_Kennedy_Assassination.126 Rebecca Goldstein (a MacArthur Genius Fellow), The Mind-Body Problem: A Novel (1983), at 140-141.
127 Fetzer (2000), supra, at 371-411.
128 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1290. At the 2003 Pittsburgh conference, Cyril Wecht set his sails in precisely the opposite direction – he advised his audience not to trust the experts but instead to do their own analysis; see www.cyrilwecht.com/journal/archives/jfk/index.php. I very much side with Wecht.
129 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1199.
130 The National Archives does possess later generation copies of the extant film, labeled as being from the FBI.
131 Costella implies that this collection process was not entirely successful, i.e., that there were ‘multiple films’ in circulation, ‘not one.’
132 Ibid. at 1202.
133 Ibid. at 1199.
134 That issue was dated November 29, 1963, but most likely it first appeared on newsstands on Tuesday, November 26.
135 Horne, supra, Volume II at 389.
136 For an image of the white patch, see Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 67.
137 See my November 2009 lecture at http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/index.php/Main_Page. Alternate websites, with slightly updated slides, are at http://www.assassinationscience.com and http://www.assassinationresearch.com.
138 Sturdivan, supra, at 193.
139 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 38; look inside JFK’s right orbit for this white object. Also see Fetzer (1998), supra, at 120-137.
140 Horne, supra, Volume II at 583-587. Detailed summaries of the experts’ opinions are in Horne’s Appendices; see the list of appendices in Horne, supra, Volume I at xix-lii. The appendices themselves are posted at the Mary Ferrell website (see my footnote 3 for a link).
141 Horne, supra, Volume II at 564 (Humes), at 573 (Boswell), and at 580 (Finck).
142 Sturdivan, supra, at 193.
143 Horne, supra, Volume I at Figure 37.
144 Horne, supra, Volume II at 426, 430-431.
145 Fetzer (1998), supra, at 120-137. Also see my lecture (November 2009) at the Mary Ferrell website (see my footnote 137). Alternate websites, with slightly updated slides, are at http://www.assassinationscience.com and http://www.assassinationresearch.com.
146 Horne, supra, Volume II at 546-554.
147 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1002-1013.
148 http://www.jfklancer.com/Sibert-ONeill.html. Or see Thompson, supra, Appendix G. The time of 7:17 PM appeared in their interview with Arlen Specter (March 12, 1964): FBI 62-109060-2637 at 2. Also see Lifton, supra, at 484-485.
149 Horne, supra, Volume IV at 1008 and Volume I at Figure 70. Also see Military District of Washington, Bird Report and Lifton, supra, at 399, 406-407.
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Sirhan – Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
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Douglas Horne, Inside the ARRB
Jim DiEugenio’s review of Inside The ARRB originally appeared in four installments. These have been combined into a single article here for convenience.
Volume One
Douglas Horne’s five volume set is formally titled Inside the Assassination Records Review Board: The U.S. Government’s Final Attempt to Reconcile the Conflicting Medical Evidence in the Assassination of JFK. In almost record time it has become an object of heated and almost embattled controversy. There was at first a barrage of advance, and pretty much unqualified, praise from certain quarters of the research community. The book was then attacked by both Krazy Kid Oswald advocates and certain Warren Commission critics. In reading Horne’s series two things strike me about the book’s reception. First, the reaction seems to me to be predictable since Horne is postulating a rather radical interpretation of the medical evidence and the Zapruder film. Second, although Volume Four was released first, and has generated the most controversy, it seems rather shortsighted to concentrate on that particular book in explaining this work. To understand Horne, and where his book is coming from, one has to read Volume I first. I read it twice and consider it crucial in any evaluation of this rather large outpouring of writing and research.

Doug Horne (CTKA file photo) The first time I ever heard of Horne was through the estimable and respected lawyer-researcher Carol Hewitt. It was around the summer of 1996, and through her output in Probe, Carol had developed a reputation as an important writer and careful researcher. Since I edited her essays, I had developed a professional relationship with her. So around this time, or a bit later, I had a phone conversation with her at her home in Florida. She asked, “Jim, have you heard of this ARRB guy named Doug Horne?” I said no I had not. She said words to the effect that Horne had become friends with David Lifton when the latter was speaking in Hawaii. He then secured a position on the ARRB and he was now trying to bolster Lifton’s theories and discredit those Lifton disagreed with, e.g., John Armstrong and his Oswald doppelganger concept. It’s clear that Carol was correct. All one has to do is read the rather long Preface to the first volume to understand that. For there Horne discusses Lifton’s Hawaii speech and their following friendship. (p. lxix) Further, in the photo section of the volume you will see two pictures of Lifton. One is with Horne outside the National Archives. The important point about the photo is that it was taken in 1999, after the ARRB closed shop. Horne’s friendship with Lifton began before he took his position and continued after his ARRB function was completed.
This is important in any analysis and/or evaluation of Inside the ARRB. And in fact, Horne clearly explains why in his Preface. He says that he has read Best Evidence four times. (For comparison purposes, I have not read any assassination book from cover to cover more than twice.) And the praise he lavishes on that book is, to say the least, lush. He is so intent on enshrining it in the pantheon that he indulges in a technique that, heretofore, only Gus Russo and David Heymann had used. He says Best Evidence was a nominee for the Pulitzer Prize. (Horne, p. 4) This startled me since I had never even heard Lifton say this. I also found it hard to believe that a committee as mainstream as that body would so honor a book that postulates a conspiracy in the JFK case – and a rather extreme one at that. So I went to the Pulitzer site. As with Russo and Heymann, I discovered that Best Evidence was not a finalist that year. It may have been submitted for consideration. But as Lisa Pease noted in her review of Heymann’s trashy book Bobby and Jackie, scores of people do that.
In measuring the importance of Best Evidence, Horne writes that Lifton reminded us that gunshot wound evidence is a road map to any shooting, and it is evidence that trumps all eyewitness testimony and human recollection. (p. lxi) After this, he calls Best Evidence a “paradigm-buster”. (ibid) He continues his medical evidence primacy argument by saying that such evidence was used to counteract the impact of the Zapruder film when it was shown in 1975. He then adds, “…the medico-legal evidence from an autopsy will always outweigh eyewitness testimony. [Therefore] the debate had grown tiresome and inconclusive …” before Lifton published his volume. (p. lxiii) In discussing the House Select Committee on Assassinations, he talks about the differing recollections of medical observers of Kennedy’s body, those in Dallas, and those at Bethesda. Although the HSCA sided with the latter’s observations, Horne writes: “What if both groups of medical witnesses – all medical professionals – had told the truth and provided an accurate description of the President’s wounds at the time they saw them.” (p. lxiv) And with this, the author now introduces the critical concept of “old paradigm” research versus “new paradigm” research. For anyone familiar with these rubrics and line of argument, it follows naturally that, to Horne, Best Evidence represents the new paradigm and Josiah Thompson’s Six Seconds in Dallas represents the old paradigm.
The reason I use the phrase “follows naturally” is that this demarcation of “old and new” is familiar to anyone who has read Best Evidence, which was published back in 1980. In fact, Lifton begins the book with a recital of the major points the critical community had achieved until that time. He also discusses the methods of research such as reading documents and considering redactions, and minutely examining photographs from Dealey Plaza. After many rather condescending pages of this review of the state of the evidence at the time, the author then launched into the chronicle of his “search for new evidence” in the JFK case. This is why he calls Part 2 of the book, “A New Hypothesis”. As Roger Feinman pointed out in his essay Between the Signal and the Noise, there is in Best Evidence a not so subtle disdain for what the critical community had accomplished up to that time. And as Feinman also noted, in an odd way, Lifton seemed to actually defend the Warren Commission against the polemics of Sylvia Meagher, Mark Lane and Thompson. For instance, Lifton wrote that some critics did not understand the “best evidence” concept and how the Commission had relied on the autopsy as a talisman for all that came afterwards. Lifton continued in this vein by writing that the critics “actually believed the Commission first decided Oswald was the lone assassin” and then colluded with the pathologists, namely James Humes, to concoct a lone assassin autopsy report. (Lifton p. 144. All references to Best Evidence are to the trade paperback, 1988 edition.) Right after his long prelude, Lifton began to concentrate on pathologist James Humes as a “central figure” in his book. From there, Lifton proceeded to put together his rather dramatic reconstruction of what really happened in both Dealey Plaza and at Bethesda. To say that it was a radical scenario is putting it mildly.
But to return to the point, it is really Lifton who started this whole “old paradigm” versus “new paradigm” mode of thinking about assassination literature. For Horne to adapt it shows the clear and deep influence of Best Evidence on his thinking. In retrospect, it is hard not to detect a bit of self-promotion at the expense of those who came before him in Lifton’s gambit. And I don’t believe it’s merited. Why? Because as Pat Speer has pointed out on his web site, the first real milestone in the medical evidence did not come from the HSCA or Best Evidence. The first real giveaway movement was from the proponents of the official story itself. In 1968, Attorney General Ramsey Clark tasked Dr. Russell Fisher with reviewing the work of the autopsy surgeons: Humes, Thornton Boswell, and Pierre Finck. Fisher and Clark did three things that do not happen in normal medical practice. They moved the head wound up 4 inches, they noted particles in the neck, and they saw something that the pathologists had not seen: a 6.5 mm fragment in the cowlick area at the rear of the skull. As Speer notes, the Fisher panel was put together to specifically negate the work that Thompson had done on the ballistics and the autopsy. So in other words, Thompson, the “old paradigm” guy had actually been the first to rock the official story of the medical evidence in the JFK case. In my view, these movements of wound location, and the appearance and notation of fragments in the neck and high in the head – largely endorsed by the HSCA – have caused defenders of the official story many more problems than the more dramatic parts of Best Evidence. Again, this was caused by the author that both Horne and Lifton consider “old school”, i.e., Josiah Thompson. (For the exact way Thompson caused it, see my review of Reclaiming History, Part 4, Section IV)
The next big crack in the medical evidence occurred in 1969. And it was caused by the inquiry of another man who Lifton showed clear disdain for: Jim Garrison. Lifton actually called the Garrison investigation “a farce”. (Lifton, p. 717) At the trial of Clay Shaw, under sharp cross-examination by Garrison’s assistant DA Alvin Oser, Pierre Finck finally raised the curtain on the autopsy. He admitted that it was largely controlled by the military officers in attendance. He also admitted that he did not examine the president’s clothes, and he did not see the autopsy photos until 1967. (James DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, pp. 290-309) The impact of Finck’s testimony was greatly underplayed by the media. But to serious students of the Kennedy case it went a long way in explaining just why the autopsy was so deficient in every aspect.
Lifton’s book was published a year after the HSCA released its Final Report. The HSCA acknowledged that a serious difference existed with the observations of the back of Kennedy’s head between the Dallas doctors and the personnel at Bethesda. Many of the former witnesses said they saw a rather large hole in the rear of Kennedy’s skull. Yet the famous back of the head photographs, which are in Horne’s book and labeled Figures 64 and 65, depict no such wound. In fact, the head seems intact and untouched. Therefore the HSCA said the Dallas doctors were wrong about this. They added that the observations of the Bethesda doctors differed from the Dallas doctors on this issue. And since the Bethesda doctors had the body in front of them for hours instead of minutes, they were correct. Since Lifton’s book was published many years before the ARRB declassified the HSCA files, Best Evidence made much of this discrepancy. In fact it was one of the main underpinnings of Lifton’s theory of body hijacking and alteration. (Which we will discuss later.)
But when the ARRB did declassify the HSCA medical files on this subject, it turned out that this was all a subterfuge. The medical personnel at Bethesda largely agreed with the Dallas observers about a gaping hole in the back of Kennedy’s skull. The witness statements were all there in the newly declassified files which Robert Blakey and Michael Baden had chosen to keep hidden from the public. Gary Aguilar did a magnificent job in collecting and collating these newly declassified witness affidavits. He put them on a chart and showed that, except for a small minority, most of the witnesses from both locations agreed that there was a gaping hole in the rear of the skull and where it was located. (See Aguilar’s essay in Murder in Dealey Plaza, especially pages 188, 199. In my view, this is one of the three or four best long pieces written on the medical evidence since the ARRB closed shop in 1998.) What had happened was that the HSCA realized that if these statements were published then the Dallas vs. Bethesda dichotomy would be largely minimized. And you would have a near unanimous verdict that this hole in the rear skull existed. This would create serious problems for the official story in two ways. First, the avulsive nature of the wound strongly suggested a front to back trajectory through the skull. Second, these observations would bring into doubt the autopsy photos mentioned above which reveal no trace of such a violent wound in the rear skull area.
As noted above, Aguilar’s work on this issue posed a problem for Lifton’s theory. Because now the split between the Dallas observations and the Bethesda observations were at least slightly ameliorated. Milicent Cranor’s essay on Malcolm Perry, “Ricochet of a Lie,” posited another problem for Best Evidence. Her work poses a question about the differing size of the tracheotomy. As Robert McClelland stated at the Lancer Conference in 2009, a wide tracheotomy was not unusual practice for Parkland. And for Malcolm Perry to have seen the organs in the throat that he reported on, he almost had to have cut a wider tracheotomy than he let on about.
This brings us to the main thesis of Best Evidence. Lifton was making the following proposals:
- All the shots in Dealey Plaza came from the front
- The Parkland Hospital doctors saw this evidence
- The body was then hijacked as it left Air Force One
- The body was then altered to show shots from the rear
- The conspirators dug out the bullets from the body
- The Commission was fooled by this alteration
There were always very serious problems with these proposals. For instance, the nature of John Connally’s wounds and the testimony of Dr. Robert Shaw make number one nearly impossible to believe. Concerning number two, since Kennedy’s body was not flipped over, the Parkland personnel could not see Kennedy’s back wound. (Lifton postulated that this was later “punched in”. See p. 376)) There isn’t any credible evidence for the casket being secretly diverted to another hospital. (The author suggests Walter Reed. See p. 681) Further, Lifton could come up with no credible witnesses to his pre-autopsy extensive surgery. Finally, as the declassified records of the Warren Commission show, at the very first meeting of December 5th, the fix was in against Oswald. This was before there was any discussion of the autopsy report. So the idea that the Commission based their guilty verdict of Oswald on Humes was not valid.
Consequently, Best Evidence has not worn well. Today, there are very few medical experts inside the research community who back the book. On the other hand, the book has plenty of critics, e.g., Feinman, Milicent Cranor, Cyril Wecht. As for myself, although I found Best Evidence entertaining to read, and thought the book contained some interesting information and anecdotes, two things troubled me. First, Lifton’s concentration on the medical evidence implicitly discounted other physical evidence that I felt was more solid and probative than what he was relying upon. Second, the author had a troubling tendency to take a piece of evidence that was not really well-grounded and then use it as a springboard to launch into all kinds of hyper-dramatic criminal scenarios. As Gary Aguilar once said to Lifton: Extravagant claims demand extravagant evidence. One example of this would be the sentence in the FBI’s Sibert-O’Neill report on the autopsy, which states that Humes noticed surgery of the head area when he looked at Kennedy’s body for the first time. What Lifton did with this piece of hearsay was rather remarkable. Just consider how he begins Chapter 8 shortly after he surfaces it: “I arose on Sunday morning convinced I had discovered the darkest secret of the crime of the century.” (Lifton, p. 181) This is before he even talked to Humes. For when he did, Humes denied any such pre-autopsy surgery. (ibid p. 256) But that didn’t matter to the author. He deduced that Humes was just covering up.
Speaking of this specific accusation, Best Evidence severely dissipated for me on April 3, 1993. That is when I heard Lifton speak during a famous debate on the medical evidence in Chicago. This was part of a conference sponsored by Doug Carlson and called the Midwest Symposium. Lifton’s presentation consisted of two main parts. The first consisted of him rattling off about 20 almost violently accusatory charges he would ask Humes about if he ever got him on the witness stand. From this artillery barrage against the doctor, one would have guessed that people like Arlen Specter, J. Edgar Hoover, James Angleton, and Allen Dulles were all guiltless in the cover-up of the Kennedy murder. Humes was the real linchpin of the plot. And it was his work that gulled these four fine men. (I have little doubt that Lifton supplied similar questions to Horne in preparation for Humes’ ARRB deposition. And it was these “When’s the last time you beat your wife?” type queries that Jeremy Gunn bawled Horne out about behind closed doors. See Horne, p. 85)
Lifton concluded in Chicago by playing a tape recording of a phone conversation he had with Humes concerning this subject, i.e., pre-autopsy surgery. In his book, due to Lifton’s description of phrasing and pauses, plus the author’s seemingly telepathic attribution of hidden knowledge to the pathologist, Humes’ words carried a certain sinister weight to them – almost like the pathologist was hiding something in this regard. But when the tape was played, this all but evaporated. It was clear to me – and many, many others – that Lifton had left out the tone and inflection of the doctor’s voice and words. And these betrayed that Humes was actually playing with Lifton: a playfulness grounded in his being taken aback by the insinuation, so much so that he didn’t take it seriously. I found it hard to believe that Lifton could not detect this when most of the spectators I talked to could. This indicated to me that the author had lost critical distance from his subject.
II
In spite of all the above, Horne still genuflects to Best Evidence. To the point that he essentially admits that the main reason he joined the ARRB was to prove or disprove Lifton’s thesis. (p. lxviii) Sealing and qualifying this emotional bond is the following statement: “David Lifton’s work has been a great inspiration to me over the years, and he and I eventually became very close personal friends, as well as fellow travelers on the same intellectual journey.” (p. lxix) In light of the warm feelings betrayed in that statement, it is hard to believe that Horne expended a lot of time on disproving Lifton’s thesis. In fact, I feel comfortable in writing that if Horne had never read Best Evidence, he would never have written his series or joined the ARRB.
All the above introductory material is necessary to understand my decidedly mixed feelings about Inside the ARRB. There seem to me a lot of good things in Horne’s very long work. And I will discuss them both here and later. But where the author gets into trouble is when he tries to fit the interesting facts and testimony he discusses into an overarching theory. Because as we will see, although Horne has revised Best Evidence, he still sticks to the concept of pre-autopsy surgery, and extensive criminal conduct by the pathologists. And as Lifton clearly suggested in his book, Horne will also argue that the Zapruder film was both edited and optically printed. (Lifton pp. 555-557)
For me, the most interesting chapter in Volume I is also a disappointing one. And it has little, if anything, to do with Horne’s attempt to revive and revise Best Evidence. Horne entitles it “Prologue: The Culture of the ARRB”. Here he offers his insights into the personalities and stances of the people he worked with and for at the Board. Specifically the other staffers, the Executive Director, and the ARRB members. I thought this chapter was both valuable and unique for the simple reason it had not been done before from anyone who was actually there at the time. One of the most startling revelations is that Executive Director David Marwell regularly talked to and lunched with the likes of Max Holland, Gus Russo, and the anti-Christ himself Gerald Posner. (p. 13) In fact, when Marwell was hired he told a newspaper interviewer that he found much of value in Case Closed. Although this was startling, it only set the stage for what the book reveals about that body as a whole: information the research community did not know at the time and which now sets off retroactive light.
For beginners, not one Board member – historians Anna Nelson and Henry Graff, Dean Kermit Hall, archivist William Joyce, or Judge Jack Tunheim – believed Kennedy was killed by a conspiracy. (p. 10) Further, Horne estimates that well over half of the staff members believed Oswald did it. To the point that many exhibited a prejudice bordering on condescension toward those who did not believe the Warren Commission fairy tale. (p. 11) Chief Counsel Jeremy Gunn actually told Horne not to talk to the Board members about conspiracy angles, no matter how well founded they were. (p. 12) Why? Because the Board members were so mainstream oriented they would probably doubt his suitability for the ARRB.
Horne believes this was done by design. It originated with the Board members in their choice of Marwell. It was then transmitted from Marwell to his hiring of staffers. Horne observes that Marwell’s orientation resulted in the following: 1.) Few staffers were concerned with the conflicts in the evidence 2.) Most were not well versed in the nuances of the case, and 3.) Most did not even have a natural interest in the Kennedy assassination. This fulfilled Marwell’s mandate of having an ARRB staff that was “neutral”. But it also resulted in a staff that was way behind the curve when it came to fulfilling their mandate of looking for records, interviewing witnesses who knew where the records were and/or could resolve conflicts in the evidence. I can certify this as true. When the ARRB started up, Anne Buttimer, their first chief investigator, called me and discussed the New Orleans aspect of the case for about an hour. From her questions I could tell she did not know a lot about that famous milieu. Anne eventually quit. (Horne does not mention Buttimer or why she left.)
The Board members never got any briefing in any controversial evidentiary aspect of the case. When Marwell gave Jeremy Gunn permission to interview some medical witnesses, Gunn’s first chosen assistant dragged his feet in preparation for the depositions. He then secretly lobbied Marwell to halt the medical deposition process completely. (p. 15) While this interview process was ongoing, not one Board member read a single deposition Gunn had done. (p. 17) It wasn’t until the end of the ARRB, when the medical investigation gained some publicity, that three of the Board members asked to read these now “hot” items. (ibid)
How obsessed was Marwell and the Board with the image of “neutrality”? There were no wall photos or portraits of President Kennedy in the waiting room or foyer of the ARRB offices.
Did the ARRB do a good job? That is open to question today, especially with the new discoveries about the documents they missed. The most famous example being the George Johannides documents which were originally kept from the HSCA. But consider this about the HSCA’s Lopez Report on Mexico City: the Board never found out what happened to the annex of that report entitled “Was Oswald an Agent of the CIA”. It is not attached to the report today. Further, the Board never surfaced the working notes Ed Lopez and Dan Hardway made while assembling that report. Even though Lopez strongly recommend they do so since he filed the notes every day in the safe the CIA had built at HSCA headquarters. Finally, the Board never even seriously contemplated interviewing Ruth and Michael Paine. Even though much interesting material had been declassified about them, which authors like Carol Hewitt and Steve Jones utilized to the couple’s detriment.
Up to now, these failings were generally written off due to lack of time and money. But with what Horne reveals here, there may have been more to it than that. The ARRB’s effort to appear “neutral” may have meant sacrificing some important opportunities and not following up on others. While in operation, this failing was generally kept from the public because the Board had two good front people who managed to shield the inner dynamic. They were Tunheim and public relations director Tom Samoluk. But this new information sheds light on the Board members’ desire to proclaim that they declassified no “smoking guns”. But since the Board members were already convinced the Warren Commission was correct, those proclamations are hollow since they were predictable. With what Horne writes about here, it appears the Board members saw their mission as declassifying as much as possible, looking as neutral as possible in the process, and then proclaiming that the two million new pages didn’t make any difference anyway. The Warren Commission got it right back in 1964.
I wish Horne had spent more time and length on this chapter. It only fills 14 pages. If I had been advising him, it would have easily been two or three times as long. And his contribution would have been comparable to Edward Epstein’s Inquest or Gaeton Fonzi’s The Last Investigation. In other words an explanation of not just what happened, but why and how it went down that way.
III
After this, and throughout the rest of this volume, Horne concentrates on the investigation of the medical evidence by the ARRB, as headed by Jeremy Gunn. Before approaching that inquiry and evaluating it, let me add some qualifications to this ARRB endeavor. As others, like medical investigator Pat Speer, have written, one has to qualify some of this testimony simply because it came so late in the game. From the chart Horne produces on pages 59-64, the ARRB medical interviews started in early 1996 and extended to October of 1997. So the witnesses were addressing the issue anywhere from 33-34 years after the fact. Further, many of the witnesses were quite old at the time. And although I am not that old, I can attest to the fact that memories do not get better as one gets older, they usually get worse. Third, because of all the controversy on this issue, plus the fact that it is politically charged, testimony tends to get altered or fudged. And Horne describes two witnesses who changed their stories on an important issue: John Stringer and Floyd Riebe. In 1972, autopsy photographer Stringer – who, incredibly, was not contacted by the Warren Commission – said that the damage to Kennedy’s skull was in the rear. He then changed his story for the HSCA and ARRB. He now said it was on the right side above the right ear – which coincides with the autopsy report. (p. 183) Riebe, Stringer’s assistant, earlier told researchers about this gaping hole in the back of Kennedy’s head. When Gunn showed him the alleged autopsy photos which show an intact rear skull, he now agreed that this is what he saw that night. (p. 229) Further, Stringer says that Riebe took no photographs. (p. 166) Riebe has always said he did. Although the number and type have slightly varied through the years. (See chart on page 226) Further, Robert Knudsen, a White House photographer who insisted that he, at the very least, developed photographs from the autopsy is not even known by Stringer! (p. 177) I found this remarkable. Gunn asks Stringer about Knudsen in more than one way. Yet Knudsen’s name is so foreign to Stringer that he actually asks Gunn if Knudsen was a doctor. (The Knudsen mystery is an interesting episode which I will return to later.)
Having established these serious qualifications, let me state why I think they exist. It is not the fault of Doug Horne, or Jeremy Gunn, or the ARRB. In my view, and disagreeing with David Lifton, this much varied and at times, unfathomable and irreconcilable medical record is owed to one man above all: Arlen Specter. It is not possible today to read Specter’s 3/16/64 examination of the three pathologists and not be disgusted. Specter understood that something was seriously remiss with the medical evidence in the JFK case. So he decided to cover up the many discrepancies in the record. He did things like deep-sixing the testimony of Jim Sibert and Frank O’Neill since it would wreck the single bullet theory and raise questions about the trajectory of the fatal head shot. The Commission did not print the death certificate signed by Kennedy’s personal physician George Burkley because Specter understood that it would show that the wound in the back entered too low to exit the throat. Specter then cooperated in a scheme to misrepresent the Kennedy wounds before the Commission. After rehearsing both men over a period of weeks, he had Humes and Boswell testify to false drawings prepared by student illustrator Harold Rydberg. In these drawings the back wound was raised into the neck area, and Kennedy’s head position was magically anteflexed to allow for the shot in the lower skull to exit above the right ear. (See my review of Reclaiming History, Part 4, Section III.) Specter understood that if he did otherwise, this would open up a Pandora’s Box of questions that would unravel the official story forever. So he did what his masters on the Commission wanted: He deliberately concealed the truth. And this robbed us all of a true cross-examination of the medical witnesses at the time when they were not old and infirm and when their memories were fresh.
The fact that Specter did what he did guaranteed that pieces of the story would dribble out piecemeal over the years. And this made the purveyors of the official deception alter the official story, e.g., as did the Fisher Panel. So today, the JFK medical record is scattered all over the place. So much so that one can marshall evidence for both versions of the official story: the Warren Commission’s with low skull wound entry and a neck-throat wound; or the HSCA’s with high skull wound entry and upper back wound. Third, one can argue that the evidence is authentic and still argue conspiracy, e.g., Pat Speer, Dr. Randy Robertson and Roger Feinman. Fourth, one can make a case for what can be termed moderate alterations, that is the x-rays and photos have been tampered with, e.g., Robert Groden, Harrison Livingstone, Gary Aguilar, Cyril Wecht, Doug DeSalles and many others. Fifth, one can argue for a radical alterationist view. That is the body was hijacked, wounds were physically altered, and the x-rays were also, e.g., Lifton and Horne. But the very fact that one can make all five arguments should tell almost everyone that something is wrong someplace. Because this does not happen in real life.
As I pointed out, Horne is in the last school. He therefore – and somewhat understandably – picks and chooses things to bolster his view. This mars the book, and I will explain why later. But I want to make the point that when Horne does not adhere to this practice he reveals a lot of valuable and interesting information. And although one can say that much of it is in other books, I know of no other volume that has as much of it between two covers. (Or in this case, ten covers.)
Some of the remarkable testimony includes autopsy photographer John Stringer saying that he shot no basilar views of Kennedy’s brain. (p. 41) Yet there are basilar – that is, shot from below – views in the autopsy collection. If Stringer says only he shot all the autopsy photos, then who took these shots? Stringer also says that he recalled the cerebellum being damaged. (p. 43) This is the part of the brain almost at the stem, low in the rear of the skull. This damage is not depicted in the extant photography. As Horne appropriately notes, both of these observations by Stringer lead one to question the condition of the brain as depicted in the present pictures. Stringer was the official photographer and he’s raising questions about the authenticity of his photos. These two particular questions lead one to doubt the rendering of what the HSCA artist Ida Dox depicted as an almost intact brain. Especially when one factors in how many witnesses said that Kennedy’s brain was not just blasted, but that much of it was gone. (For example FBI agent Frank O’Neill said half of it was gone. See p. 45) One does not have to agree with Horne – that there were actually two viewings of the brain and that Pierre Finck was snookered by the dastardly duo of Humes and Boswell – to understand that something is wrong here. Especially when there is no official weight given to the brain at the autopsy, but later it weighed in at 1500 grams – which is actually at the top end for an intact brain. This is very hard to believe. Especially considering the fact that so many witnesses saw a brain that was nowhere near intact.
IV
Jeremy Gunn’s questioning of the pathologists was interesting in multiple aspects. The highlight for me is when he got Jim Humes to admit that not only did he burn the notes from his autopsy, but that he also burned the first draft of that report. (p. 95) In his discussion of this issue in the End Notes to Reclaiming History, Vincent Bugliosi tries to say that Humes became confused on this point. (Bugliosi EN pp. 276-280) The problem with Bugliosi trying to say that is that Humes testified to it three times. And Horne prints them all. (p. 95) When Gunn asked him why he burned the draft, Humes replied, “I don’t recall. I don’t know … You’re splitting hairs here and I’ll tell you it’s getting to me a little bit, as you may be able to detect.” (ibid) Clearly, Humes did something he should not have done. He does not want to reveal why he did it. And he is angered that he is finally being exposed on this point.
Another fascinating point Gunn uncovered is that Humes never saw the Burkley death certificate that I mentioned earlier. (p. 97) Which depicts the back wound much lower than where the Warren Commission said it was. One has to wonder if Specter deliberately kept it from him, since it would have blown to smithereens the phony Rydberg drawings. Humes is kind of pathetic when asked his reason for not dissecting the neck wound the night of the autopsy: “But it wouldn’t make a great deal of sense to go slashing open the neck. What would we learn? Nothing you know. So I didn’t – I don’t know if anybody said don’t do this or don’t do that. I wouldn’t have done it no matter what anybody said. That was not important.” (p. 99) I love the use of the word “slashing”. I mean what else do you do when you dissect a wound track? And the rhetorical question of “What would we learn?” is almost priceless. Well Jim, how about if the back wound exited the throat? And then him not knowing if anyone said not to do so, this is obviously in reference to Pierre Finck’s testimony at the Clay Shaw trial where he said Humes was told not to dissect the track of the back wound. Humes was clearly in denial on this whole dissection issue. Again, he knows he did something seriously wrong and can’t admit it.
Thornton Boswell stated that he suspected that Malcolm Perry’s tracheotomy was cut over a bullet wound. (pp. 109-110) Which is quite interesting since the official story has always been that Humes did not realize this until the next morning when he called Dallas. But Gunn never asked the obvious follow up question: If you did, did you tell Humes that at the time? (If Gunn did pose this query, Horne did not include it here.) Boswell differed with Humes as to when the composing of the autopsy report began. Boswell said it started on Saturday during the day. (pp. 116-17) Humes said he did not start it until Saturday night and completed in the wee hours of the morning on Sunday. Finally, Boswell saw a probe go in the back. (p. 120) But it only went in three inches.
Pierre Finck also agreed that the probe did not go through the body. (p. 122) But as Horne notes, the significant thing about Finck was how many times he said, “I can’t remember” or “I can’t answer that.”(ibid) For instance, when asked who told him that he could not see the president’s clothing after he asked for it, Finck said he couldn’t recall who. (p. 124) And further, many times he would ask for a document and then read his answer from that record.(p. 123) Finck was intent on being evasive and giving away as little as possible. This was probably a reaction to his all too revealing testimony at the Shaw trial.
Robert Karnei was the fourth pathologist on hand that night, although he did not participate in the autopsy. Karnei saw the actual probe that Finck inserted in Kennedy’s back. He also says it did not go through the body. But beyond that, he insisted that there were photographs taken of this. He was clearly agitated when he was told those photographs do not exist today. (p. 127) According to Karnei, no exit for the wound in the back was ever found. He recalled the pathologists searching for one until almost midnight. (p. 128) So clearly, in opposition to Humes, the failure to dissect the back wound created a real problem. Finally, Karnei said that he did hear from someone that Humes had called Dallas that night to learn about Perry’s tracheotomy. (p. 128) I should add here, John Stringer also stated that Humes called Dallas that night. (p. 165) By the end of the night, did Humes know about the throat wound? If he did, could he not admit that because the many probe attempts could not connect the back wound with the throat wound?
From here, Horne goes into a thorough chronicling of the photographs taken the night of the autopsy. Near the beginning of this section, Horne adduces more evidence that Arlen Specter and the Warren Commission lied about their access to the autopsy photographs. One of the excuses the Commission always gave for doing such a poor job was that they did not have access to the autopsy photographs and x-rays. People like Specter and John McCloy usually blamed this on the Kennedy family. But as time has gone on, more and more evidence has accrued that reveals this to be a deception. For the Commission did view the autopsy photographic record. And Horne adds to that growing accumulation here. Secret Service officer Robert Bouck told the HSCA that he recalled that a representative of the Warren Commission looked at the autopsy photographs. Horne feels this had to be either J. Lee Rankin or Specter. Further, there is a Treasury Department memorandum noting that the Warren Commission was briefed on the autopsy procedures by using the actual x-rays to do so. (p. 135)
Another curious point that Horne develops is that at least some of the photos were not developed at either Bethesda or the Secret Service lab. Some of them were developed at the Navy Processing Center at Anacostia where color prints were made from positive transparencies. (p. 135) Why some of the films were taken there is not clearly known. When Gunn asked Stringer about this, the photographer said that the Anacostia lab was larger and more secret. (p. 208)
But as early as 1966, for a Justice Department review, Humes, Boswell and Stringer all stated that some pictures were missing. Stringer specified three of them to be gone, including a full body shot taken from overhead. (p. 146) But this fact could not be admitted to the public at the time. Especially since the first books critical of the Commission were now entering the market. So Justice Department official Carl Belcher arranged for another lie to be formalized. Belcher requested that some of the Bethesda witnesses sign a false inventory saying that at this 1966 review all the autopsy photos taken in 1963 were accounted for. Yet to get himself off the hook, Belcher had his name removed from the final draft of the false document. Horne discovered this by uncovering the fact that the preliminary draft did contain his name. (pp. 146-47) Stringer admitted to Gunn that he knew the inventory list was false before he signed it. He said he was told to sign it anyway. (p. 206) As to why Stringer knowingly signed a false document, I wish to relate one of the most memorable exchanges in all the ARRB depositions. After Gunn noted to Stringer that certain protocol was not followed in the taking of photographs, he asked him why he did not object. Stringer replied, “You don’t object to things.” Gunn replied with, “Some people do.” Stringer shot back with the following rather pithy remark, ” Yeah, they do. But they don’t last long.” (p. 213) Those eight words tell us all we need to know about how the lid was kept on the autopsy cover up for so long.
After his ARRB testimony, Gunn and Horne came to believe that by the time of the HSCA, a total of five views taken by Stringer had disappeared. (pp.182-83) Reinforcing this was one of the real finds of the ARRB: an interview done with photographer Karl McDonald. After taking the formal picture of the Board members, Marwell found out that McDonald had been the medical photographer at Bethesda for eight years. Further, that he had been tutored by, and worked with, Stringer. (p. 152) And he had ended up by being that institute’s senior instructor in medical photography. In his ARRB interview he shed a lot of light on just how bad the extant pictorial record of Kennedy’s autopsy is.
He first said that he always developed his own pictures. He never sent anything to Anacostia. He also said that he was always sure to take a battery of full body shots – of which none exist in the Kennedy case. He testified that there was always an autopsy card included with each and every photo. The card included an autopsy number and the year. Again, none exist in the Kennedy case. He said for trauma shots – places on the body where bullets impacted – he always took three views: wide-angle, medium shot, close-up. In light of the above strictures, Gunn asked him to give an overall grade to what purports to be Stringer’s work today. McDonald replied that he would grade the collection with very low marks. This was the guy who was taught photography procedure by Stringer. Did Stringer forget the very lessons he once gave? Not likely.
V
I will conclude this review of Volume I by discussing what can only be called the enigma of Robert Knudsen. Knudsen has been discussed before by other writers, like David Mantik. But in light of the fact that Horne spends seven pages on him (pp.247-254), and he implies that he may have actually taken at least some of the autopsy photographs in existence today, I think it’s necessary to write a bit about the unplumbed mystery of the man. Because, to me, he has been ignored for too long.
One way to begin to point out the strangeness of Robert Knudsen is with this fact: Although Stringer denied knowing who Knudsen was, Knudsen had Stringer’s name and phone number in his appointments book. (p. 252) Which strongly implies that Knudsen did know Stringer. The question obviously becomes: How could Knudsen know Stringer if Stringer didn’t know Knudsen? And in fact, if Stringer did know him, is he feigning that he did not? If so, why? Because as we will see, under the circumstances we will describe, it is hard to believe that Stringer completely forgot about the man.
Knudsen was one of two White House photographers in 1963. The other was Cecil Stoughton. (p. 249) As he revealed in his HSCA interview, Knudsen began his career as a Navy photographer who was then detailed to the White House in 1958. (8/11/78 HSCA transcript, p. 4) Generally speaking, Knudsen covered President Kennedy on state trips, and Stoughton covered the First Lady. (p. 250) In fact, Knudsen was scheduled to cover the Dallas trip. But he injured himself the week before. Therefore he did not accompany President Kennedy to Texas, Stoughton did. (ibid) At around 3:00 PM on the afternoon of the murder, Knudsen received a phone call. He was ordered to go to Andrews Air Force Base to meet Air Force One and to accompany the body of President Kennedy to Bethesda. And thus begins a fascinating puzzle. For, as Horne writes, there is no documented evidence that Knudsen was ever interviewed by the Warren Commission. (If this is true, the fact that the Commission never talked to either Knudsen or Stringer tells us plenty about Specter’s investigation of the autopsy.) The first, and only, on the record interview with Knudsen about this subject came with Andy Purdy of the HSCA. And that transcript was classified by Robert Blakey and Michael Baden. The ARRB declassified it in 1993. And on the version of the audiotape at the History Matters site, Knudsen’s voice is not audible on the actual recording. It sounds like a woman who is phrasing the transcript for copying purposes is repeating his words. (See for yourself.)
How did the HSCA find out about Knudsen and the autopsy? In 1977, Knudsen gave an interview to a trade magazine in which he said that he was the only photographer to record Kennedy’s autopsy. (Horne, p. 250) What makes this odd is not just that Knudsen was not on the Bethesda staff, but that Stringer and his assistant Floyd Riebe have always maintained that they were the only photographers in the morgue that night. There were no civilian photographers taking pictures. Obviously, Knudsen did not have to say what he did to a magazine. But since the HSCA had been convened in 1976, after the electrifying viewing of the Zapruder film on ABC in 1975, Knudsen may have felt compelled to reveal what he knew.
Unfortunately for Gunn and Horne, Knudsen had passed away before the ARRB was formed. But the Board got in contact with the survivors of his family, his widow and two children. What they told the ARRB about the aftermath of Knudsen at Bethesda makes the story even more tantalizing. They told the Board that Knudsen disappeared for three days after he was called to report the day of the murder. (ibid) He didn’t return home until after Kennedy’s funeral on the 25th. Knudsen told his son Robert that he had been present at the beginning of the autopsy. (ibid) Further, he told his family that he had photographed probes going into he back of President Kennedy. Which, as noted before, do not exist today. In a statement that is hard to reconcile with the record, Knudsen told them that he was the only one with a camera in the morgue. (Horne, p. 251) He also told his son that he did not recognize 4 or 5 of the photos shown to him by the HSCA. And at least one had been altered. Hair had been drawn in on it to conceal the missing portion of the top-back of Kennedy’s head. (ibid) In keeping with many other witnesses, Knudsen told his wife that much of Kennedy’s brain was blown away. (ibid) When Knudsen tried to get a copy of his HSCA transcript, he was told that “there was no record of him or his testimony.” (ibid)
I have saved for last what is probably the most fascinating piece of information that the ARRB garnered from Knudsen’s survivors. All three of them said “Knudsen appeared before an official government body again some time in 1988, about six months before he died in January of 1989.” They all agreed “Knudsen came away from this experience very disturbed, saying that four photographs were missing, and that one was badly altered.” Gloria Knudsen continued by saying that Knudsen felt “that the wounds he saw in the photos shown to him in 1988 did not represent what he saw or took.” (p. 252) One reason he was disturbed by the experience was that “as soon as he would answer a question consistent with what he remembered, he would immediately be challenged and contradicted by people whom he felt already had their minds made up.” (ibid) Knudsen told his wife that he knew who had possession of the autopsy photographs he took. That based on that, he could then find out who had made some of them disappear and who had altered the back of the head picture. But he was not going to stick his neck out on something this huge because he had a family to protect. (p. 253)
Andy Purdy’s HSCA interview with Knudsen is a disappointment. As Horne notes, Purdy concentrates almost completely on the photo negatives that were sent to the Navy Photographic Center at Anacostia. Knudsen notes that this was done because of the color facilities there. And Navy officer Saundra Spencer handled the color operation there. (HSCA transcript, p. 47) Secret Service photographer Jim Fox accompanied Knudsen there. According to Knudsen they were ordered to do this by George Burkley on the morning after the autopsy. (ibid, p. 5) Knudsen told Purdy that afterwards, Burkley ordered seven prints made. (ibid, p. 8) Which, as Purdy later noted, was an unusually high number that no one else recalled. Knudsen noted that after he turned in the work product to the White House, he never saw the photos again until Purdy showed them to him that day. (ibid, p. 16) When asked, he distinctly recalled photos of a large cavity in the back of Kennedy’s head and a side view with probes going through the body. (ibid, p.22) Unlike others, the views he saw showed the probes extending all the way through the body. Again, Purdy reminded him that no one else recalled such a photo. There was another photo of the chest cavity which Knudsen recalled that today is not in existence. (ibid, p. 39)
Now, Knudsen said that it took about two hours for him to develop the color photos at Anacostia. But yet he told Purdy that the four-day period of the assassination and its aftermath were like a fog to him. He recalled working continuously through it. (ibid, pp. 9-12) This period roughly coincides with how long his family said he was gone from home. Incredibly, Purdy never asked the obvious question: “Mr. Knudsen, if the processing took two hours, but you worked for 3-4 days, what did you do the rest of the time?” And as Horne notes, even though Knudsen told the trade magazine the previous year that he actually took photos of the autopsy, Purdy never asked him any direct questions on this point. Like, how many pictures did he take, what kind of camera did he use, when did he take the shots, and did he give his photos to Stringer or Riebe?
Now, as is his usual tendency, Horne makes an extreme assumption: There were actually two sets of photographs made and Knudsen shot pictures of the intact back of the head. And he did it at the request of Humes, Boswell and Finck. (Horne, p. 247) Or as he puts it, it was an “intentional creation by higher authority of a fraudulent photographic record designed to replace the real photos taken by Stringer and Riebe of a huge occipital defect in the head …”(ibid) Which ignores the fact that, as I noted, Knudsen saw just such a photo. Horne even uses the testimony of a friend of Knudsen’s, USIA photographer Joe O’Donnell to make his case. Yet this is a man who, as his own family has noted, was likely suffering from dementia brought on by his failing health at the time the ARRB interviewed him. After all, he had two rods in his back, suffered three strokes, had two heart attacks, incurred skin cancer and had part of his colon taken out. Not the best witness. (NY Times, 9/15/2007) Further, O’Donnell had been known to testify falsely about photographic records before. (ibid)
To me, the incomplete evidentiary record does not conclusively lead to Horne’s bold conspiratorial denouement. The case of Robert Knudsen, as I said before, is and remains a mystery. What it actually reveals about the JFK case is that there has never been anywhere near a first-class criminal inquiry into what really happened. In any professional inquiry, with say someone like Patrick Fitzgerald in charge, Knudsen would have been called in under oath with an attorney. He would have been warned in advance that he was expected to answer all questions under penalty of perjury. If he refused to answer he would be charged with contempt. He would have been asked to bring in any corroborative witnesses and exhibits. He would have been asked specifically, “Did you take any autopsy pictures at any time in 1963?” If he said yes, he would have been asked specific questions about when and where he took them and with whom. He would have been specifically asked if he worked with anyone else in making them. Stringer would have been asked the question, “Do you recall anyone else taking pictures at the autopsy?”, and also, “If you did not know Knudsen then how did he get your name and phone number?” And this inquiry would have been followed to its ultimate destination: to find out if Knudsen took or did not take any photos. To me that is where the status is of the evidence concerning Knudsen. I believe Horne goes too far in making his assumptions about the man.
But to give Horne his due, at least he brings these matters to the attention of the reader. That is to his credit, since very few others have done it. And no one else has done so in such a complete way.
Volume Two
The second volume of Doug Horne’s Inside the ARRB ostensibly deals with the following topics: a second section on autopsy photography, a very long section on the x-rays (about 200 pages), interviews with the morticians from Joseph Gawler’s Sons, and Horne’s report on the ARRB interviews with Parkland Hospital staff. But as we shall see, it actually deals with a lot more than that. For it is here where Horne begins to reveal his revisions to David Lifton’s Best Evidence concerning the skullduggery he believes happened at Bethesda before the autopsy.
I
Volume II picks up with a continuation of Horne’s discussion of what he perceives as Robert Knudsen’s role in autopsy photography. As I noted at the end of my review of Volume I, Horne and I have a disagreement about just what that role was. Horne believes Knudsen took a second set of pictures. I believe that whatever Knudsen’s role was, it is mysterious and unproven. But Horne does good work in reviewing just how many different photographic views were actually taken of Kennedy’s body and what is missing from the collection today.
He also sticks with Knudsen’s friend and professional colleague Joe O’Donnell as a witness for Knudsen taking a second set of autopsy photos. (See, for example, pp. 285-86) As I noted in my previous installment, the deceased O’Donnell has some real credibility problems. But in spite of that, in this volume, Horne uses and then extends him. He is now a witness to Zapruder film alteration. This deserves some elaboration.
O’Donnell stated that he showed Jackie Kennedy the Zapruder film a few weeks after the assassination. (Horne, p. 287) The two were in the projection room alone. Jackie was unsettled by the sight of the head shot. She told him she never wanted to see it again. O’Donnell took this to mean she wanted it excised from the film. He then said he cut out about ten feet from the film. (ibid)
This tale poses further problems for O’Donnell as a witness. First, as we shall later see – according to Horne – he is altering the film a second time. Because in his discussion in Volume 4, Horne believes the film was altered shortly after the assassination at a CIA photographic center. Yet O’Donnell here is talking about a few weeks afterwards in Washington. Secondly, O’Donnell says that he showed the widow an original version, not a copy. (ibid) But he says this film was in 16 mm format. The Zapruder film was shot in regular 8 mm. So how could this be an original? Third, if O’Donnell actually cut about ten feet out of this film, then you have some real statistical problems. Thirty seconds of 16 mm film is about 18 feet long. Considering the fact that the Zapruder film is less than thirty seconds long, the man chopped off more than half the film. How could any editor, no matter how gifted, put together a film with any continuity after eliminating over half the sequence?
But when one analyzes it, this story is even more untenable. O’Donnell says that Jackie told him she did not want to see the head shot again. The actual head explosion takes only a matter of several frames. So why did O’Donnell cut out over half the film? Further, has anyone ever reported seeing a 16 mm version of the Zapruder film without the head explosion? This all seems not just untenable, but rather wild. Yet Horne actually takes the time to consider O’Donnell seriously. In fact, he composes a topic heading (not included in his Table of Contents) entitled “Analysis of the O’Donnell Interviews” (See p. 287). For all the reasons I have noted here and in Part One of my review, I would have just discarded the man as a witness. Horne does not. This may owe to Horne’s desire to give Knudsen his previously mentioned secret photographic assignment. Therefore he uses O’Donnell, even with all his credibility problems.
There is another indication of Horne’s strong desire to keep Knudsen’s “second set of photos” secret assignment. Toward the end of Volume I Horne made his first notable mentions of Knudsen and O’Donnell. (See pp. 252-254.) But there, he also mentions Dr. Randy Robertson. He states that it was Robertson who first brought O’Donnell to the Board’s attention. Robertson, a board certified radiologist, has done some interesting work on the Kennedy autopsy. So when he heard that O’Donnell was in his vicinity, he talked to him. After listening to his unusual statements about Knudsen’s photographs of the autopsy, Robertson then called Knudsen’s widow, Gloria. After this, he relayed some of this information to the Board so they would follow up on it. In Volume I, Horne described his own conversations with the widowed Gloria Knudsen. Through information garnered from her, Horne wrote that 1.) Randy told her that he was the only person with access to the JFK medical materials 2.) Randy found Gloria through the ARRB 3.) Robertson challenged the woman on whether or not her husband had actually taken autopsy photographs.
I have the good fortune of knowing Randy Robertson. As do several people in the JFK research community. When I read the above, I decided to get in contact with him. Why? Because it just does not sound like him. To the people who know him, Randy is the epitome of the well-mannered southern gentleman.
In my conversation with him he said he had just one phone call with Gloria. Since he had been at the National Archives, he sent her some autopsy materials. He discussed nothing of substance with her at all. And he represented himself as no one except who he was, i.e., a board certified radiologist who had seen the autopsy materials. He found out about her through O’Donnell and the ARRB declassified documents. In their brief call, he did not challenge any specific claims of her husband. In fact, at the time, he did not even know that Knudsen claimed to have taken any autopsy photographs. (Communication with Robertson, 5/31/10)
But further, Randy told me that Horne did not interview him for his book. Which is odd. To most people, what Knudsen’s widow said about Robertson would be perceived as rather derogatory. After all, the first two statements are lies, and the third is a direct challenge to her dead husband’s credibility. As I noted, it would also seem to be out of character to anyone who knows the man. Consequently, as a matter of fairness, one would extend Randy the courtesy of a conversation. And then one would at least state his denials in a footnote at the bottom of the page. According to Randy, Horne didn’t do the former, so he couldn’t do the latter.
But there is also an evidentiary issue here. For if Randy is accurate about his version of the call, then it touches on the credibility of Knudsen’s widow. Which, apparently, is an issue that Horne does not want to surface.
In the first part of this review, I noted Horne’s strong allegiance to Best Evidence. That characteristic is manifest through Volume II. For me, one of the most difficult things to accept about Lifton’s book is his explanation for the apparent intactness of the rear skull in the back of the head photos. In fact, I recall having an argument with another fan of Best Evidence in Dallas at the ASK Symposium in 1993. The argument consisted of whether or not Lifton said that these dubious photos were achieved through posing and altering of the skull in order to conceal the gaping hole beneath, or whether they were done by photographic alteration. The fan said that Lifton was not certain on this issue. I said that I recalled he was pretty close to being that. It turned out I was right. In a conversation Lifton had with HSCA investigator Andy Purdy, Lifton agrees that he believed that “somebody rebuilt the back of the head” before photography. (Best Evidence, p. 560) Later on, in discussing the findings of the HSCA, Lifton concurs with their verdict, i.e., that the x-rays and photos of Kennedy were not altered and that they represented JFK. (ibid, p. 659)
The work of others in the interim makes this statement dubious today. By others, I mean Robert Groden, Gary Aguilar, David Mantik and Milicent Cranor. (Cranor knows more about the medical evidence – and in finer detail – than anyone I have ever encountered.) We will see why later, when Horne discusses the work of David Mantik on the skull x-rays. But to be brief, it seems to me hard to believe that neither set of images were altered. Yet Horne comes down on the Best Evidence side with the photographs. He says they were not altered. (Horne, p. 290) To be exact, he writes that “I believe the autopsy photographs showing the back-of-the-head to be intact are not photographic alterations, but instead represent fraudulent (but authentic) images showing the result of major manipulation and relocation of scalp by the pathologists after the autopsy … .” (ibid) When one looks at these pictures, this is a difficult hypothesis to maintain. For, as Cyril Wecht has said, it would take more than one expert surgeon hours to perform such faultless reconstructive surgery. And where were they that night? Who was such a highly skilled reconstructive surgeon at Bethesda? No one that I can see. Horne’s thesis seems to be that the autopsy pathologists somehow arranged what was left of Kennedy’s multi-fractured – even fragmented – skull, and then seamlessly fit the torn scalp over that rebuilt mess. Then Knudsen shot the pictures. To me, and many others, the easier and more sensible process would have been to insert a matched matte over certain parts of the skull. This is what Robert Groden has argued for in such books as High Treason.
But further, in this volume, Horne now says that Knudsen was picked for this job by Robert Kennedy! What is the evidence the author lists for this? As far as I could discern it’s this: Knudsen’s son told the ARRB staffers that his father was close to both RFK and JFK. (Horne, p. 297) And because of that, Horne now says that somehow RFK was in on the cover-up of his own brother’s murder. The author is using the hearsay testimony of both O’Donnell and Knudsen’s surviving family for a lot of mileage.
II
One of the sub-sections in the first chapter of this volume is entitled “Vincent Madonia and Autopsy Photography” (p. 292) Madonia was involved in the transfer of photographs from the Secret Service to Evelyn Lincoln at the White House. He was also mentioned by Knudsen in his HSCA testimony as one of those he encountered in the processing of pictures at Anacostia. (ibid)
Madonia told the ARRB that there was a Secret Service/White House processing facility at Anacostia. Outside of that, I thought his testimony was rather weak and indefinite. He could not be specific about what autopsy photographs he developed, since he said he developed hundreds of pictures of all kinds that weekend. (p. 296) All he could recall was that President Kennedy looked “pretty beat up”. (p. 294) In fact, he made a point about not being too curious about the pictures, because he felt that “the less I know about it, the better.” (ibid) Madonia was not even positive about Knudsen being there, or if he was, when he saw him. (p. 293) All in all, I just didn’t think there was a heck of a lot of value in what he said.
Imagine my surprise when, about forty pages later, Madonia now constitutes evidence “that a compartmented operation was taking place” concerning the autopsy pictures. Horne now postulates that Madonia was unwittingly part of a “culling” operation. The aim of which was to delete the pictures taken early and include the ones taken later, that is, the reconstructed ones shot by Knudsen. (p. 331)
When I read this, my eyebrows arched. For two reasons. First, as I wrote above, Madonia’s statements are rather anodyne, nebulous, and non-distinctive. Second, Horne did not mention anything about such a “culling” operation when he first discussed Madonia. So, using my notes, I went back and reread this section to see how I had missed all of this rather important material.
As far as I can deduce, this is what Horne uses to say that Madonia is part of a “compartmented culling operation”: Madonia told the ARRB that ‘agents did come back for some photos which “may have been about the autopsy” during subsequent weeks, during a couple of subsequent visits. Other than the subsequent visits having taken place, he could not remember any specific details about the work done.’ (p. 294. Italics added.) To be brief but direct: I find this testimony rather unconvincing for the uses that the author makes of it.
But it brings up an important criticism of Inside the ARRB. As John Costella has pointed out, the organizational guides to the book make it difficult to go back and locate details like the above. The entire set of books is 1,807 pages long. Yet no individual Table of Contents is over a half page in length. This particular volume is over 400 pages long. Horne lists four chapters in his Table of Contents. This averages out to one heading per hundred pages. Yet, as I noted above, Horne does divide his chapters into sub-chapters. Why did he not list these in his Table of Contents? I don’t understand why this was not done, simply as an organizational guide for the reader.
The lack of an upfront descriptive guide for a very long work would be ameliorated if there were an overall or individual volume index. There are neither. As Costella noted, this is also hard to comprehend. Maybe Horne didn’t have the money to pay an indexer. But the software exists today with which you can arrange your own index. In fact, John Armstrong did just that with his important work Harvey and Lee. That book has 983 pages of text. With such skimpy Contents pages, and with no indexing of any kind, it is quite hard to locate specific points. Especially when they are strung across five volumes.
This is unfortunate. Because whatever one thinks of Inside the ARRB, Horne uses a lot of valuable and interesting primary source material of many types. Therefore, the book could have been quite useful as a reference work. But how can one use it as such if it is so hard to locate the data inside? But secondly, Horne sometimes refers to matters he previously noted. But in so doing he often fails to use page references – which was the case in this Madonia instance. I found the questionable Madonia reference because I take copious and paginated notes. I do that for these reviews. But who else does? No one that I know. Again, Horne was not served well by whoever was advising him in this very long travail.
Saundra Spencer is a more interesting witness than Madonia. She also worked at Anacostia. She recalled seeing a photo of a hole in the rear of Kennedy’s skull. Which, of course, is not there today. (p. 302) She also said she saw a full-length picture of the body, which is also absent. (p. 314) And, as we saw in Volume I, was standard practice. But Spencer also presents some problems as a witness. Her description of the anterior neck wound is unlike what anyone recalls, a clean pristine wound like a thumb puncture. (p. 316) Horne is honest enough to note that the famous paper discrepancy that she noted may not be as clear-cut as some have stated. (Horne, p. 330) Spencer brought some paper with her that she had used on the job to compare with the autopsy photos in existence. She said the paper used in the extant photos was different. When Horne took both samples to Kodak, they said the Kodak logos and watermark on the Spencer paper, though a bit darker, were actually the same size. And the experts there had no reason to believe that these autopsy photos were not developed at Anacostia. (ibid)
In this volume, Horne reviews the testimony of the pathologists and tries to get specific about what autopsy photographs are not in existence today: the photo of the bruise of the chest cavity, a photo of the inside of the skull, and one of the interior of the thorax. (pp.335-340, 373-74) These are all crucial photos because they depict places where one can see bullet impacts. And as the ARRB was told, Stringer taught his students to do three exposures of these areas. Today we have none.
From here, Horne goes into a discussion of what the panel appointed by Attorney General Ramsey Clark did in its review of the medical evidence in February of 1968. This panel met for only a short period of time, less than a week. (p. 344) Yet, its findings were held back from the public until January 16th, 1969! Yep, for about ten months. Ramsey Clark and the Justice Department decided to announce the findings right on the eve of the Clay Shaw trial. This was part of the huge effort waged by Washington and aimed at 1.) Burying the Garrison investigation in a tidal wave of propaganda, and 2.) Capsizing his inquiry by subversion.
As most observers know, the Clark Panel was headed by pathologist Russell Fisher, and is sometimes called the Fisher Panel. Fisher moved the entrance wound in the rear skull up four inches into the cowlick area from its original location at the external occipital protuberance (EOP). Horne tells of a related problem encountered by the ARRB. That body hired three experts to look at the x-rays. None of them could find an entrance wound at that point. (p. 346)
Horne also notes that Humes slightly altered his own location for the EOP entrance for the HSCA. For the HSCA he moved his entrance wound from the right and slightly above the EOP to below it. (p.347) But, of course, this was only a prelude to what the HSCA did to Humes. They eventually made him move the wound from the EOP to where the HSCA Panel wanted it, up into Fisher’s cowlick area. Horne notes that Dr. Charles Petty of the HSCA Panel later revealed that Humes was coerced into doing this. (p. 355) This kind of dancing around of wound locations over decades does not happen in real life. And it is all very interesting material to go over, for it poses what is today one of the weakest parts of the official story. Namely, how and why did this shift occur? But again, in my view, Horne overplays his cards. Under the influence of Best Evidence, this is how far he pushes the issue in posing a hypothetical question for pathologist Jim Humes: “Dr. Humes, did you participate in a cover up of the medical evidence by manipulating loose scalp to cover an exit defect in the posterior skull, and by simulating a higher entry wound (more consistent with being shot from the Book Depository) by puncturing the scalp in the cowlick area.” (p. 364) To which I am sure Humes would have readily broken down, started weeping, and admitted to such culpability.
Horne closes his section on the autopsy photographs with something which, for me, is even wilder. So much so that I actually find it hard to write about it. So I will deal with it briefly just to get it out of the way. By using the mention of the word incision by a pathologist, the questionable testimony of Dennis David about the late Bruce Pitzer, and the equally questionable testimony of Joe O’Donnell about Robert Knudsen, Horne stitches together something about an “incised wound” being present on the autopsy photos. This is how much he wants to revive Best Evidence. (pp. 382-84) He then says that Robert Kennedy ordered Knudsen to take these shots and that somehow those photos got to Pitzer. He couches this all with Lamar Waldron type qualifiers like “it is just possible” and “then it would be theoretically have been possible” etc. Why he included it at all mystifies me.
Did Horne have an editor? Someone who knew him well and who he trusted would get tough with him when necessary? Unfortunately, it does not appear that he did.
III
From here, Volume II proceeds to a long discussion of the autopsy x-rays. Horne begins by saying that there were officially 14 x-rays taken of President Kennedy. (p. 389) He then brings up an interesting point. The official story maintains that the x-rays were taken the evening of the 22nd at Bethesda. Yet the Harper fragment – a rather large piece of what most observers believe to be occipital bone – did not arrive in Washington for a couple of days after that. (pp. 393-94) So can these x-rays be genuine as they appear to show an intact back of the skull? (According to a man Horne holds in high esteem, this may be possible since David Mantik says the depictions are not fully intact. See Murder in Dealey Plaza, edited by James Fetzer, pp. 227, 281) The absence of the Harper fragment also touches on the question of the photographs, which show a perfectly intact posterior skull also. (Horne, p. 394)
From here, Horne proceeds to discuss at extreme length the ARRB depositions of Ed Reed, Jerrol Custer, and the HSCA testimony of John Ebersole. Custer was the assistant to Ebersole, who maintained he was Acting Chief of radiology at Bethesda. Reed was a student of Custer at the time.
Horne begins by quoting Ebersole saying that someone from Dallas had called and said that there had been an exit wound of the neck that had been stitched up. Further, that he had seen such a sutured wound when Kennedy’s body was placed on the table. (p. 399) This is obviously faulty information that Ebersole gave the HSCA. As far as I know, no one else is on record as saying this, and I can recall no author ever using this information to prove any point. But not only does Horne use it, he goes on for two pages about it. Since it is clearly an outlier, I would not have used this particular testimony for anything. Yet Horne uses it to say that Dallas did communicate with Bethesda. Yet that can be established by other testimony – and Horne admits this. (p. 400)
His second purpose in using it is to say that this was part of the cover up in process at the time to conceal an anterior throat wound. To which I reply: If so, it wasn’t very smart or effective was it? Because no one has ever used this singular information to conceal that since. And, of course, Horne then uses this orphaned story to further the thesis of his friend David Lifton. He writes the following in that regard: “I conclude that David Lifton was correct when he speculated in Best Evidence that conspirators had retrieved the bullet from a frontal shot that impacted the anterior neck just below the larynx to the right of the midline, by probing deep inside the tracheostomy incision … with forceps, and that in doing so they had greatly enlarged the wound … Suturing the enlarged tracheostomy may have been an attempt to disguise the amount of damage inflicted by the clandestine probing.” (ibid)
How “clandestine” can clandestine be? No one saw or did the suturing in Dallas, and no one saw it except Ebersole in Bethesda. In further undermining this Liftonesque “clandestine” thesis, the wide throat wound is quite obvious in the extant photos. So the clandestine operation hid nothing. Somehow, like with O’Donnell, Horne just can’t admit that Ebersole was either wrong, or he relayed some misinformation. Anything that supports Best Evidence, no matter how weakly substantiated, is somehow in bounds.
From here, in his next few pages, Horne now proposes something that I think is even wilder than the above (pp. 401-08). What he seems to be saying there is this: What most everyone thought were late arriving bone chips from Dallas that night … well … they weren’t really from Dallas. Horne clearly implies that what was happening was that the Secret Service was stage-managing an illusion worthy of the likes of Genet and Balanchine. In reality, these pieces of skull matter were actually part of the pre-autopsy surgery done somewhere nearby, and the Secret Service was somehow concealing all this and saying the chips came in from Texas.
What is the evidence that such a rather complex, bizarre scenario was occurring? From what I can see it is this: In referring to a rear skull wound before the Warren Commission, Secret Service agent Roy Kellerman used the phrase that this “skull part was removed”. (p. 403) To Horne, Kellerman gave the pre-autopsy plot away with the use of the word “removed” instead of using the word “missing”. The author then combines that one-word confession with the “surgery to the head area” hearsay that is in the Sibert-O’Neill report. And from what I can discern, that is the foundation for a fantastic plot that eluded so many for so long. (Horne goes into this aspect more a bit later in the volume. But it is not at all clear that what he is discussing at that point is the same pre-autopsy surgery instance discussed here.)
At this point, the author goes into his long, detailed summary and analysis of the ARRB depositions of both Reed and Custer. Reed says that he recalled taking two skull x-rays (p. 429). When in fact there are three in existence today. Further, Reed told Lifton that the skull exit was posterior parietal in location. But to the ARRB, he said this wound was anterior parietal. (p. 424) This is a quite significant divergence. But further, Reed went on to say that he did not see any wounds in the back of Kennedy’s head and the scalp was intact. (ibid) He further added that he precisely recalled the time distance between the lateral and anterior-posterior skull x-rays since he had them developed on his own. (p. 432) Custer contested this later.(p. 432) Reed also said there were eight x-rays taken of Kennedy’s extremities. Yet there are four in existence today. (p. 433) At one point, when speaking about a technical matter concerning x-ray film exposures, Horne says that Reed went “on and on here, making no sense whatsoever.” (p. 428) Reed also said that, unlike anyone else, he saw the famous and mysterious 6.5 mm fragment on the skull x-ray that night! (p. 446) This is the disk shaped bright object at the rear of the skull table that, today, anyone can notice. Yet, the doctors, FBI agents, and other radiologists did not note that evening. Yet somehow Reed did. And somehow he did not alert anyone to this enormously important observation.
But beyond the above, there are things in Reed’s deposition that Horne does not mention. Reed told Jeremy Gunn that he recalled being ordered to set up a catheter room for President Johnson since he had had a heart attack. (ARRB deposition, p. 17) He was not sure about when the autopsy ended. It may have been at 1:00 AM, or it may have been at 10:00 PM. (ibid p. 39) And Reed was even worse at when the body was first placed on the table. He says it was between 4-4:30 PM. This is way too early for even the earliest estimates. (ibid p. 76) And what makes all the above a bit worse is the fact that when Gunn asked Reed to characterize his memory of the autopsy events, he rated it at “about 95% correct.” (Horne, p. 423)
Now, even leaving some of the above items out, Horne still states in several ways that Reed left something to be desired as a witness. For instance, Reed said he had briefly read Ebersole’s deposition when it was first written. Horne writes that when he heard this he “began to get a sinking feeling.” (Horne, p. 423) Why? It was highly improbable since Ebersole’s HSCA deposition was classified and not declassified until 1993. (ibid) Horne further adds that Reed was “not the kind of witness you want to have before you at a neutral, fact-finding deposition …” (ibid)
In the face of the above, the reader may be surprised to learn that the author then uses Reed as his prime witness to Jim Humes eliminating the evidence of a frontal shot to Kennedy’s head. (p. 437) During his ARRB testimony, Reed described Humes as taking out a mechanical saw and applying it to Kennedy’s forehead. He mentioned it only in passing and Jeremy Gunn made nothing of it. But Horne combines this with the testimony of mortician Tom Robinson and Dr. Boswell’s ARRB drawing to postulate this other part of his Best Evidence revision. Let me describe how he uses Robinson and Boswell.
At the beginning of Volume I, Horne goes through what he considers are his personal highlights of the Gunn/Horne medical review for the ARRB. One of these is a diagram by Dr. Boswell of how he remembered Kennedy’s head wound. This was a very large wound that extended from the back of the skull far forward to near the forehead. As per Tom Robinson of Gawler’s mortuary, Horne quotes him as saying he saw some sawing also. (p. 613) Robinson also told the ARRB that he thought the damage to the top of the skull was caused by the pathologists. (p. 630) From this, Horne stitches together his revival and revision of Lifton’s original “pre-autopsy surgery to the head” theory.
He then goes on to explain why this was necessary. He gives three reasons, all of them reminiscent of Best Evidence. First, to remove bullet fragments from the brain that would reveal the existence of a crossfire in Dealey Plaza. Second, to change the appearance of an exit wound in the rear of the skull to more of a blowout wound toward the front of the head indicating a shot from the rear. Third, to remove brain tissue containing a track from front to back. (p. 630)
In my review of Volume I, I mentioned that one of my problems with Best Evidence was the fact that Lifton would take a piece of rather inconclusive evidence and use it to launch into a rather hyper-dramatic conspiratorial scenario that eliminated other alternatives. In my view, Horne does the same thing. For instance, as Custer and others have stated, the condition of Kennedy’s skull when it arrived at Bethesda was that parts of it were so multi-fractured that it was fragmented. Custer once used the word “egg-shells” to describe how fragile and brittle the condition was. (Horne, pp. 456, 602-13) If this were so, then as the body arrived and as the pathologists handled the skull, would it not then fall apart as they progressed? And therefore, is it not possible that what Boswell drew – which is another outlier that Horne likes to use – was his memory of this wound later on?
Second, if this sawing was part of a covert operation that the military honchos told Humes to perform, why on earth would they let people like Reed and Robinson see it? And why would they then let Humes talk about it to the Warren Commission, which he did? Third, if the objective was to eliminate the wound to the temple, then why did Robinson still see this wound later? (p. 599)
Further, like Lifton, Horne gets so involved building these Seven Days in May type plots, that he doesn’t seem to notice when they don’t jibe with the results of what actually happened. For instance, why would it be necessary to remove the evidence of a crossfire from Kennedy’s brain when Horne writes as fact that the brain in evidence is not Kennedy’s?
As per altering the existence of an exit wound to the rear, the problem here is that too many witnesses saw such a wound in Dallas. The drawing in Josiah Thompson’s Six Seconds In Dallas by Dr. Robert McClelland was something that would forever haunt the official story. (See Thompson, p. 107) Thompson describes McClelland’s memory of this wound as such: “McClelland is quite clearly describing an impact on the right side of the head that blasted backward, springing open the parietal and occipital bones and driving out a mass of brain tissue.” (ibid) Thompson then linked McClelland’s testimony to that of others in Dallas to show that this was clearly what most of the Parkland Hospital witnesses recalled: an avulsive, exit wound to the rear of the skull. Also, if the objective of the military brass in attendance was to alter this exit appearance, why did so many of those witnesses say they saw something pretty much the same as was seen in Dallas? As I noted in my review of Volume I, Gary Aguilar has proven this was the case. Is it not then more logical and deductive to postulate that the picture of the rear skull is in fact an alteration done by photography?
Clearly, what Horne is describing in this whole pre-autopsy wound alteration scenario is similar, but not the same, as what Lifton described in Best Evidence. But as I noted in Part One of this review, Lifton seemed to say that the pre-autopsy cutting took place at a different location, not at Bethesda. Horne says that it took place at Bethesda. But to show just how wedded to Best Evidence Horne is, please note the following ( I actually had to read this part over twice). If the pre-autopsy surgery was done at Bethesda, then this would seem to bring into serious doubt another very controversial aspect of Lifton’s theory. Namely, the body-snatching from one casket to another. As Roger Feinman has noted in Between the Signal and the Noise, Lifton tried to minimize alternative ways that people could have seen a different casket both upon arrival and inside the morgue. (See here.) For instance, there was a decoy ambulance, the first casket Kennedy was in was damaged, and there was another body ready for burial in the building. But in spite of all this, Horne still wants to insist on this casket-snatching plot. Even though his revision renders it unnecessary! So how does he preserve Lifton in that regard? Let me quote the author: “…the alterations were attempted elsewhere, in a very hurried and inexpert manner – probably in the forward luggage compartment of Air Force One on the ground at Love Field, prior to takeoff…” (Horne, p. 636) This idea – of alterations on Air Force One – has been so discredited by so many different authors that it actually unsettled me when I read it. In his allegiance to Best Evidence, Horne just disregards the serious problems with this concept.
And since I am describing Horne’s reliance on Best Evidence, I should note another parallel: Horne also insists that Kennedy’s corpse arrived at Bethesda in a bodybag. As Feinman has pointed out, no one ever really made a point of this until the testimony of Paul O’Connor for the HSCA. (See Best Evidence p. 595) Lifton then used this to say that the corpse was “intercepted”. Now, as other witnesses noted – and Horne notes elsewhere – the body was wrapped in sheets. But there was a clear plastic liner that the corpse was lying on. (Lifton, ibid) Now what Horne does not note, and neither did Lifton as I recall, was that between the time Kennedy was shot in 1963 and the beginning of the HSCA in 1976, a rather significant historical event happened. Namely the Vietnam War. For a period of about ten years, the American public was inundated, saturated, overwhelmed, by pictures, video, and reports of the so-called Living Room War. One of the most memorable phrases and images was of soldiers being brought home in “bodybags”. The phrase was repeated so many thousands of times that it became epitomic of that war – almost a part of America’s collective unconscious of the time period. But somehow Lifton and Horne leave all this psychological conditioning and how it can influence memory out of their works. Yet to me, it seems of the greatest importance as to how this angle first surfaced when it did.
IV
Horne goes on at almost stultifying length detailing the testimony of Jerrol Custer. How long does he spend on this? I counted: it’s 84 pages.
There are some things of value here. For instance, Custer said that Ebersole tore a page out of the Duty Log book (Horne, pp. 490-91) Custer said he saw a large fragment fall out of Kennedy’s back. (p. 475) According to Custer, Finck relayed an order from the gallery telling Humes and Boswell to stop a certain procedure. (p. 477) Unlike Reed, Custer says he did 5 skull x-rays and he feels some are missing today. (p. 525) Custer also felt that Ebersole was not honest about his actual position at Bethesda, or the number of people in the morgue that night. According to Custer, Ebersole was not an administrator but an on call resident radiologist. (p. 537) Ebersole never carried any cassettes to be x-rayed, since he never left the morgue. As per the number of people in the morgue, Custer says Ebersole greatly underestimated this number to the HSCA. In response to looking at Ebersole’s HSCA testimony on this point, Custer commented: “Oh, come on. It was pure mayhem. The gallery was completely full … there was definitely more than 15 people in the morgue at that time. The commotion was astronomical … .he was questioned by the HSCA panel to the fact, were there any controlling factors in the gallery that controlled the morgue – the morgue procedure at the time? “No, there were not.” Come on. There were two men that constantly stood up, directed which way things would go.” (p. 537-38)
As Horne notes, Custer is not a trained radiologist. But Horne has him commenting on the anterior-posterior skull x-rays at length – for 6 pages. He then has Custer go on about the lateral x-rays for 12 pages. And the other body x-rays for another 6 pages. To me, there is no way that the testimony of Custer merited this almost embarrassing length. Horne could have dealt with all the important matters in his interviews and depositions in at least half the length. That way his book would have been shorter and easier to read. Someone needed to tell the author: at times, less is more.
It is an oddity of this volume that its most valuable contribution is not by either Horne or by the ARRB. It is by another researcher who discovered his evidence pretty much independently of the ARRB. Horne presents a comprehensive review of the work of David Mantik on the skull x-rays. Mantik, a radiation oncologist, has been doing fine work on the Kennedy x-rays for a number of years, actually, for well over a decade. Perhaps no other writer or researcher has made a more compelling case that these x-rays have been altered. And because Mantik’s work is not nearly so reliant on testimony, statements, and depositions done over a period of 40 some years, his work has more intrinsic value than the other things Horne presents here. I was fortunate enough to see Mantik’s first public presentation at the Dallas ASK conference back in 1993. So, of the six sources that Horne lists for his review on the subject, I have firsthand knowledge of five of them. This includes three public presentations in Dallas and Washington, and Mantik’s two long essays in the anthologies edited by James Fetzer, Assassination Science and Murder in Dealey Plaza. (The sixth source appears to be notes Mantik prepared for a co-authored article he did with Cyril Wecht for the anthology edited by Lisa Pease and myself, The Assassinations.)
As the reader can see, Mantik’s work on the Kennedy autopsy x-rays has been out there now for about 17 years. It has become famous in the community because of its originality and its direct challenge to the authenticity of the x-rays. Horne’s contribution is that he collects it all in one place, and he then presents it clearly and understandably. In the early days, Mantik had a slight problem in making his insights and discoveries accessible to the layman. He has improved in that regard. But by going back and collecting his early work, Horne provides a service to the reader that is singular in the literature.
Mantik’s first presentation in Dallas in 1993 dramatically and unforgettably contrasted the x-rays of Kennedy’s skull in vivo, with those done post-mortem. In referring to the former, he said they look like other x-rays. In referring to the latter, Mantik said at the time, “I have never seen x-rays that look like this.” It was easy to see why. The post-mortem x-rays have a jarring chiaroscuro effect – especially in the rear of the skull – that makes it look like someone deliberately whitened that part of the x-ray. Some commentators have tried to account for this high contrast effect by blaming the portable machines in use at the time, and saying that they were over-exposed by Custer. The problem is that even allowing for that, the pattern produced is not the same as is exhibited on these x-rays. That is, the high contrast is evenly distributed throughout the film, not concentrated in a particular area. The fact remains: no one has ever produced x-rays that look like this.
Except David Mantik. At his office in Rancho Mirage, Mantik showed me how this can be achieved very simply. It only took him a few minutes in his darkroom to achieve this effect. Mantik believes that if this was done with the Kennedy x-rays, then it most likely was done in order to conceal a blow-out exit wound in the rear of the skull.
Another discovery by Mantik makes the above conclusion hard to deflect. Mantik was granted permission by the Kennedy family to look at the autopsy materials at the National Archives. And he has done so on several occasions. On one visit he took an instrument which measures optical densitometry. That is, it measures the amount of light that passes through a surface, in this case a developed x-ray film. As Horne notes on a chart, if the film had an OD reading of zero, this would mean that a hundred percent of light could pass through the film. If the OD reading was ‘1’, only ten percent as much light could pass through compared to zero. And that ratio is the same up to a reading of 4. As Horne notes, “the differences between each whole number on the OD scale is one whole order of magnitude, i.e., a factor of ten.” (Horne, p. 543) The instrument that Mantik brought allowed him to take OD readings at intervals of 0.1 mm apart on the film. Mantik’s previous research revealed that on usual x-rays, the normal range of OD measurement is 0.5 for the lightest areas, and 2.0 for the darkest. (ibid) In other words, the lightest areas transmitted about three times more light than the darkest ones. Well, on the JFK x-rays, the lightest areas transmit about 1100 times more light than the dark areas. Mantik concludes that this is almost surely a physical impossibility. (ibid, p. 547) Clearly, these numbers support the idea that the white patch is artificial, i.e., it was superimposed.
Horne does a nice job summarizing Mantik’s OD readings on the mysterious 6.5 mm fragment also. (pp. 549-551) Mantik compared OD readings on the 6.5 mm fragment with those of the 7 x 2 fragment, the one that was removed the night of the autopsy. He also compared his 6.5 mm readings with those of Kennedy’s amalgams. These readings revealed that on the anterior-posterior x-ray, the 6.5 mm fragment is “more dense than all of the dental amalgams combined.” (p. 551) It was also denser than the 7 x 2 fragment. Yet the 7 x 2 fragment was less dense on the anterior-posterior x-ray than the amalgams.
But paradoxically, on the right lateral x-ray, the 6.5 mm object is much less dense than the dental amalgams. (ibid) This would seem to indicate that the 6.5 mm fragment was superimposed on the A-P x-ray only. And that it was imposed over a much smaller fragment. Finally, the OD readings reveal no entrance hole where the HSCA says there is one, that is near the 6.5 mm fragment. (p. 553)
At Cyril Wecht’s superb Duquesne Conference of 2003, Mantik supplied one more compelling piece of evidence that strongly indicates that the x-rays in evidence today are not originals, but copies. On the left lateral view, there is a hand drawn symbol shaped like a capital letter ‘T’ on its side. As Horne describes it, this appears to be scratched out on the “skull x-ray in front of the cervical spine and directly underneath the jaw.” (p. 562) It was made by scraping off some emulsion on one side. Let me quote Horne on what this likely means and why: “However when Mantik closely examined the surfaces of the emulsion on either side of the lucent ‘T”, he found no disruption or damage whatsoever to the emulsion on both sides of the x-ray film. Mantik said … that the emulsion on both sides of the film in this area was as smooth as new ice in a hockey rink.” (Horne, p. 562, italics in original) As Mantik himself commented, this certainly is evidence that this film is a copy, or else the emulsion would not be so smooth.
At the 2003 conference, Mantik stated that this is probably the most important discovery he made in his nine visits to the archives. It is consistent with his OD findings, and his x-ray duplicating experiments with both the white patch and the 6.5 mm fragment. Yet it is independent of them in means of proof.
Horne also discusses Dr. Humes’ observations about the 6.5 mm fragment when confronted with it by Jeremy Gunn. At first, on two occasions, Humes admitted that he himself did not recall seeing the 6.5 mm. fragment at autopsy. (pp. 564, 569). Later on, realizing that this would create a serious problem that he had acknowledged for the first time in over 35 years, he tried to bail himself out by grasping at straws. (As noted in Pt. 1 of this review, Humes has a history of creating improbable cover stories when caught in corners like this.) He now actually tried to say that the 7 x 2 fragment might have been the 6.5 fragment! (p. 570) As Horne properly notes, this is hard to swallow. The first fragment is narrowly oblong in shape and was taken from the front of the skull; the latter is circular in shape and is located at the rear of the skull. Unless all three pathologists were visually impaired and had lost their powers of depth perception for this one instance, this makes for a high improbability. Further, the idea that neither the pathologists nor the FBI agents would have had this recovered as evidence, that doubles the improbability. (p. 570) Horne rightly notes that neither Thornton Boswell nor Pierre Finck recalled the 6.5 mm fragment either. (pp. 573, 580)
Horne also comments on Gunn’s questioning of Humes about the non-existent trail of particles going from the low back of the skull to the top front of the skull, a trail which he wrote about in his autopsy report. Humes was forced to admit an odd thing during his deposition: the trail does not exist on the extant x-rays today. When pressed on this rather baffling issue, Humes replied in his own defense: “I didn’t write it down out of whole cloth. I wrote down what I saw.” (p. 571) He then added that the fact that it is not there today leads him to think that, “Well, there’s aspects of it I don’t understand.” (ibid) When the lead pathologist from the original autopsy feels that way about his own work, I then have to concur.
As stated above, Horne’s summary and review of Mantik’s milestone work on the x-rays is the highlight of this volume. Mantik’s discoveries about the x-rays are largely made up of observable data that is difficult to discount. On the basis of that data – plus the primary source evidence about the disappearing trail of particles, and a 6.5 mm fragment that the pathologists did not see that night – it is difficult not to conclude that someone fiddled with the x-rays. The reasons being to: 1.) Cover a back of the skull blow out exit, and 2.) To raise the trajectory of the entrance wound while making it align with the ammunition from the rifle in evidence. Mantik also adds that a third reason may have been to erase evidence of two bullet trails through the skull. (p. 554)
V
The last two chapters of Volume II deal with the ARRB interviews of the morticians from Joseph Gawler’s Sons, and a review of interviews done in Dallas with certain 1963 staffers from Parkland.
There were three men interviewed by the ARRB from Gawler’s: Joseph Hagan, Tom Robinson and John Van Hoesen. Generally speaking, after the discussion of Mantik’s fine and provocative work, Horne slips back into his Best Evidence revision and revival mode here. He even tries to revive the idea that a helicopter may have been used to transport the casket elsewhere. (p. 591)
I must note here a trait that jarred me and I thought similar to Lifton’s: the tendency to run the length of the football field with one questionable piece of evidence. Hagan was being interviewed by the ARRB over 35 years after the fact. He said that when he arrived the autopsy was nearly finished and he added that photos were being taken. But he qualified this by saying that he could remember no details about this, that is, what views were shot, how many cameramen there were, or what the equipment being used was. (p. 593)
Now, any lawyer or private investigator will tell you that its details that give a witness credibility. Usually, the more details that one recalls the better the memory of the event. And also the more realistic the memory. Hagan recalled next to nothing about the matter. But yet Horne strongly implies that Hagan was “witnessing photography by Robert Knudsen of a charade that both Knudsen and he both thought was “the end of the autopsy.” (ibid) Not only does Hagan’s hazy memory not justify this conclusion, but sometimes Horne gets so involved in what is now post-autopsy intrigue, that it is hard to understand precisely what he is talking about. What does he mean when he says that Knudsen thought he was involved with the “end of the autopsy”? Recall, Knudsen died and therefore was never cross-examined under oath by the ARRB. In his sworn testimony to the HSCA he was never questioned on this point, i.e., on whether or not he took autopsy photos. But not only does Horne think he did, he actually imagines that he was unwittingly being duped by higher-ups in the chain of command.
Like Lifton with Humes, Horne imputes cover up motives to those who disagree with the main tenets of Best Evidence. For instance, Hagan made a notation that Kennedy’s body was removed from a metal shipping casket at Bethesda. But he told the ARRB that he never actually saw any casket that night and that someone else delivered this information to him. He also confirmed that the casket Kennedy arrived in was damaged, a handle had broken off and that it was then picked up months later at his place of work. Horne now asks about this testimony: “these remarks by him made me wonder whether he was really being forthcoming about whether or not he had seen a shipping casket at the Bethesda morgue the night of the autopsy.” (p. 597) It wouldn’t be possible for Hagan to look at the casket later on at work?
Robinson was an interesting witness. He recalled seeing a wound about the size of an orange in the back of the skull between the ears. (p. 599) Robinson was also one of the several witnesses who Horne names who saw a wound in the temple near the hairline that was small enough to be hidden by hair. This latter description also guarantees this was an entry wound. Robinson said this wound “did not have to be hidden by make-up, and was simply plugged by him with some wax during the reconstruction.” Finally, he recalled it being about a quarter inch in diameter. (p. 600) Unlike with Hagan and the post-autopsy pictures, Robinson’s memory of this wound in the temple is vivid enough so that it cannot be easily dismissed.
Finally, there is a point of confirmation and corroboration made by Robinson. He told the ARRB that the gallery was pretty much filled, that there were way too many people there. He then added that the atmosphere was like a “cocktail party”. He later added that it was even like a “circus”. (p. 611) He felt that there were people in attendance “who clearly had no business being there, and that there was continuous and loud discussion from the gallery which he thought was both improper and distracting”. (p. 611) It is one of the continuing mysteries of this case that no one has been able to explain precisely why all these people were there and who invited them and why they were not asked to leave.
The volume concludes with a chapter entitled “A Short trip to Texas”. Gunn and Horne went to Texas in 1997 to interview three Parkland staffers who had not been formally interviewed by the Warren Commission: Dr. Charles Crenshaw, Dr. Robert Grossman, and Nurse Audrey Bell.
Much of what Crenshaw observed has been published in two books of his and discussed by others as a result of his lawsuit against JAMA. But I must note that Horne gets a couple of details of the latter wrong. First, Crenshaw did not win a large settlement against JAMA. In this day and age, a bit over $200,000 cannot be considered large. Second, editor George Lundberg was not fired because of this incident. He was fired because of a later controversy over the Clinton impeachment scandal.
For me, the two most important bits of information to come out of this visit were the following. First, when Bell saw Perry on November 23rd, Saturday morning, she said that he looked like hell. He replied to her that he “had not gotten much sleep because people from Bethesda Naval hospital had been harassing him all night on the telephone, trying to get him to change his mind” about Kennedy being hit by an entrance wound in the neck. (p. 645) Appropriately, Horne now goes into the whole controversy surrounding Secret Service Agent Elmer Moore. This was the man sent to Washington within 24 hours of the murder. He was then detailed to Dallas to ascertain what happened and then to cover up its true circumstances. (pp. 651-654) Horne adds one important piece of evidence to the Secret Service cover up.
Arlen Specter had requested of the Secret Service that they obtain for him videotapes and transcripts of the Perry press conference from Parkland on the 22nd. James Rowley of the Secret Service wrote to Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin that, “The video tape and transcript … mentioned in your letter has not been located. After a review … no video tape or transcript could be found of a television interview with Dr. Malcolm Perry.” (p. 647)
In light of the above it is rather odd that the ARRB found a transcript of the Perry conference that was time stamped “Received US Secret Service, 1963 Nov 26 AM 11 40, Office of the Chief”. In other words, Chief Rowley was deliberately lying about this transcript. It did exist, and he had it in his possession for months when he lied to Rankin. The problem was that what Perry said contradicted the notion of Oswald as the lone killer. Therefore, he understood that early. This was probably why he was complicit with Elmer Moore’s mission to Dallas to talk Perry out of his story.
Let me conclude with a memorable interview that Gunn and Horne did with Grossman, who is a neurosurgeon. He said he saw a hole near the external occipital protuberance in the back of the skull. And through it he observed what he thought was cerebellum. (P. 655)
He was then shown the famous Ida Dox drawing prepared for the HSCA which depicts an intact rear of the skull. He replied quite simply with “That’s completely incorrect.” Grossman insisted without qualification that “there had been a hole devoid of bone and scalp about 2 centimeters in diameter near the center of the occipital bone.” Unfortunately, this was not tape-recorded. But as Horne notes, “it will always be one of the most vivid memories that I have from all of our interviews and depositions.” (p. 656)
I’ll say.
Volume Three
I
Volume III of Inside the ARRB includes the end of what Doug Horne calls Part 1, and the beginning of Part 2. Horne defines Part 1 as a review of the work of the ARRB, especially the value of the witness depositions. That takes up a little more than a hundred pages of this volume. Then he launches into Part 2 of the book. This is entitled “Fraud in the Evidence”. Part 2 will continue into and take up all of Volume 4, which includes his (quite naturally) very long discussion of the Zapruder film. Then Volume 5 is called “The Political Context of the Assassination”.
As indicated previously, Horne needed a good and tough editor. If he had one, his series could have easily and logically been divided into three neat volumes of Parts 1, 2, and 3. This would have let him thematically divide up the book into a comprehensible structure. The more accessible structure, plus pruning at least a couple of hundred pages, would have made the book easier to read and understand.
In concluding his review of the ARRB medical depositions, Horne will now first review the testimony of FBI agents Jim Sibert and Frank O’Neill. This takes about 75 pages. Then Chapter 9 reviews Jeremy Gunn’s group interview of the Parkland Hospital emergency room doctors. For Horne, this is relatively brief, about 35 pages.
I must comment on a recurring trait of Horne, because, on the second page of this volume, Horne comments on it himself. Although in strictest terms, the book is not an oral history, in many ways and on many pages, it is. Because Horne quotes at length from ARRB depositions. Now, oral history has real value. In fact, one of the better books on the medical evidence in the JFK case is an oral history, i.e., William Law’s In the Eye of History. There is nothing wrong with an author writing an expository introduction to an interview with one of his oral history subjects: Who is this person, why are they important, who else has interviewed them, what is new in this interview etc.
Horne goes way beyond that. Let me use his own words to describe what he does that is rather unusual: “I have taken the liberty of engaging in lengthy, speculative discussions of the probable importance of various entries in these reports … Sibert and O’Neill participated in, and witnessed, key events … It does no good to simply report what they told someone about what they saw … without giving it context and discussing what it means in relation to what others witnessed that evening. Engaging in open, responsible, and detailed speculation now about the meaning of the observations and recollections of James Sibert and Frank O’Neill … will considerably streamline the writing (and reading) of Part II when I lay out my conclusions about what I believe really happened during and after the autopsy on President John F. Kennedy.” (pp. 668-69)
Is Horne serious about the last part? The book is over 1,800 pages long. Where did he “streamline” anything? Part 2, which he says he actually did ‘streamline’, clocks in at 600 pages. What Horne is doing is justifying his frequent interjections into the oral history portions of the book. It is a practice that I have never seen any other author do to the extent he does. And in such a derogatory and, at times, personal way. When Dr. Petty is questioning Jim Humes about when the x-rays were taken, he is “peddling pure bullshit”. Horne actually inserts that phrase into the dialogue, like a stage direction. (p. 933) Frank O’Neill also indulges in “bullshit” (p. 724) And, of course, Horne really let’s them have it when they contradict Best Evidence. If the FBI agents say they never lost sight of the casket, they must be lying and he wants them to “come clean”. But Horne understands why they are lying: it’s because they let the conspirators get away with murder. (p. 726) At one point, O’Neill is accused of saying what he does because he hates David Lifton. (p. 719) Ironically, Horne even accuses O’Neill of being in love with the sound of his own voice. (p. 731) This from a guy who wrote a book that is close to 2,000 pages long.
And since I am mentioning a form of editorializing, let me bring up a point that John Costella did. The accepted academic tradition in adding stress, emphasis, or drawing attention to a passage is the use of italics. Again, Horne goes beyond that tradition. He uses both bold italics and underlining. Often in the same passage. I think I get the point Doug.
Let’s get back to facts. The testimony of Sibert and O’Neill is quite important for several reasons. First, it shows just how thoroughly compromised Arlen Specter was from the start. Specter talked to the agents informally. He never swore them in for a formal deposition. Why? Because he did not want their testimony in the record. In fact, the Sibert-O’Neill report is not in the Warren Commission volumes. The main reason being that they were told by the doctors that the back wound did not penetrate the body and that it came in at an angle of 45 degrees. Those two observations completely destroy the single bullet theory. Which it was Specter’s function to create and uphold. In the memo of his 3/12/64 interview, he writes that Sibert did not take any notes that night, and O’Neill took only a few. Both statements are completely false. (See p. 680) But further, in this memo on the meeting, Specter was careful not to ask the agents about the difference between the “non-transiting” bullet of their report, and the “transiting” bullet in the autopsy report. As Horne notes, “Specter did not want any indication in the official record that he was even aware of any discrepancy between the FBI report … and the autopsy report in evidence, CE 387.” (p. 673) Especially when it undermined the official mythology.
When interviewed by the HSCA, the agents said that they learned that the projectile that caused the back wound ended up on a stretcher at Dallas. They learned this from a phone call that night. (p. 681) They also said that there was no discussion in the morgue that ever considered the throat wound a wound of exit. (ibid)
Both men seriously questioned the back of the head photo. Sibert said he did not recall seeing the skull that intact: “I don’t remember seeing anything that was like this photo.” (p. 691) He then went on to add that “the hair looks like it’s been straightened out and cleaned up more than what it was when we left the autopsy.” (ibid) When Jeremy Gunn asked him if he recalled anything like that photo from the night of the autopsy, Sibert said, “No. I don’t recall anything like this at all during the autopsy.” (p. 692) When O’Neill saw the same picture, his reaction was similar. He said it looked like the photo had been, “…doctored in some way.” (ibid) He also did not recall the hair being so neat and clean. As for the depiction of the wound, he said “there was more of a massive wound”. (p. 693)
I would be remiss if I did not note two areas that, in reading Horne, he is greatly preoccupied by. From way back when the self-published manuscript Murder from Within was issued (1975), its authors – Fred Newcomb and Perry Adams– have posited a theory of the crime that implicates LBJ and the Secret Service as the prime suspects. David Lifton was close to Newcomb at one time. In fact, he actually once said that this book stole his idea of body alteration. And it does posit that theory.
Newcomb and Adams went way beyond the accepted knowledge of the Secret Service failure to protect Kennedy in Dealey Plaza. They seemed to imply that the Secret Service were the actual assassins, and that Roy Kellerman was actually a “stage manager” of the cover-up. In an interview in 1992, Newcomb stated that “In order to cover-up the shooting of JFK by Greer, the wounds had to be altered to make it appear that he was shot from the rear instead of the front. Control of the president’s body was paramount. The Dallas coroner at one point wanted to open the ceremonial coffin to do an autopsy in Dallas. Secret Service agent Roy Kellerman pulled a gun to stop him…” In fact, as one can read from this last linked page, many of Lifton’s concepts were clearly shared with Newcomb. Who came up with them first is probably a matter of conjecture. But it’s fairly clear that the whole Bill Cooper hoax, that is using a very bad copy of the Zapruder film to insinuate that Greer shot Kennedy, most likely originated with that book.
Since Horne is enamored of all things in Best Evidence, Roy Kellerman now becomes a “stage manager” in the cover-up. That is, when certain skullduggery is going on, it’s Kellerman who is somehow involved in making sure certain people are present in the morgue and certain people are not. Which is odd, since most people believe that the military brass was actually controlling things. But Horne actually goes well beyond that point. In one rather outlandish excerpt, Horne seems to say that Kellerman was actually involved in the pre-autopsy surgery. As far as I could see, this was based upon the memory of a co-pilot on Air Force One who said he recalled that Kellerman had blood on the front of his shirt. (Horne, p. 696. There is no date given for when this interview took place.) So based upon this, Kellerman now joins Humes in pre-autopsy surgery. And he’s not even a doctor. Whether or not this memory is accurate, when it was recalled, whether it dovetails with anyone else, these questions are all left suspended. Assumedly, such questions are not to be asked. And the further unspoken corollary is that if this info is accurate, there can be no other way that Kellerman got blood on his shirt.
Hmm. Talk about a hanging judge.
Just let me note one sequence in the book that shows just how “stage-managed” Horne wants us to believe the conspiracy was. Let me describe what he projects as about a 40-45 minute time stretch at Bethesda that night. (p. 735) This is what Horne says happened from about 7:17-8:00:
- An inspection is made to see which wound alterations are necessary to the skull.
- Pictures are taken to record the true nature of the shots, and are later destroyed.
- Pre-autopsy surgery is done to remove the brain and to remove bullet fragments from a frontal shot.
- Further surgery continues as openings are made on the skull above the right ear and on top of the head.
- More surgery is done to camouflage evidence of a frontal shot.
- X-rays are taken after evidence of a frontal shot is surgically excised.
- A special photo shoot is arranged to take pictures of the president, but these do not include the back of the skull.
- The circumstances of this special photo shoot are now disguised and dismantled, and the body is transferred to the Dallas casket to be wrapped in sheets.
Kellerman must have been one heck of a stage director. In fact, I would say he missed his calling. I mean, he managed all this without any rehearsal time. He should have been on Broadway.
And we are also to believe that no one noticed the before and after difference in the corpse’s appearance.
II
The last chapter in Part 1 is Horne’s description of both the attempt to interview the Parkland Hospital doctors and the highlights of this group deposition. For Horne, this is a relatively brief chapter, about 35 pages. But I thought it was interesting because it gave us some insights into the workings of the ARRB and the relationship between Jeremy Gunn and Horne.
The mission of the ARRB was to locate and make public as many hidden records as possible pertaining to the John Kennedy murder case. But there was also a clause written into the legislation which permitted them to explore and clarify certain ambiguities in the evidentiary record. Jeremy Gunn did this in several instances. But, by far, the one instance the Board took the most time and energy to do so was in the medical field. Nothing else was even close. Whether this was a good decision or a bad decision is not really the subject of this book or this review. But it is an unalterable fact.
Now Horne not only wanted to do this, he also wanted it structured in a certain way. He wanted the depositions of the Dallas doctors taken first, and then the autopsy pathologists. (p. 742) Now from what Horne revealed about the temperament of the Board, and the ties that David Marwell had with people like Gus Russo, Max Holland, and Michael Baden, this was not going to be easy to attain. But evidently, at the beginning, Jeremy Gunn had some capital with Marwell and the Board. So Marwell had Gunn’s request to interview the pathologists approved. This seemed to me to be a good idea at the time since the examination of the three pathologists by Arlen Specter was pretty much a joke. Clearly, Specter understood something was weird about the autopsy, so his examination of Humes, Boswell, and Finck actually defines the phrase “dog and pony show”.
Secondly, although the HSCA had written a report and included a lot of their inquiry into the medical evidence in it, Robert Blakey had classified much of it. Therefore, once this was declassified, there would be more information with which to prepare depositions for the three autopsy doctors.
Third, as I noted in my review of Volume II, there were some Dallas personnel who had not been formally deposed by the Warren Commission. So Gunn and Horne interviewed Nurse Bell, and Doctors Grossman and Crenshaw.
But, by 1995, there had been quite an extensive record established of interviews with the rest of the Dallas treating physicians who were in the Parkland emergency room. In addition to the interviews done by the Warren Commission and the HSCA, these men had agreed to be interviewed both by the press and private researchers. And generally speaking, they had done this often. So the question then became: Could a compelling case be made for ‘clarification of the record’ with these subjects? I mean, the ARRB never even seriously considered interviewing Ruth and Michael Paine. Even though neither one had been deposed by the HSCA. And much evidence had surfaced in the interim that would seem to warrant a ‘clarification of the evidentiary record’.
But Horne urged such a process. Further, he wanted the Dallas doctors interviewed before the Bethesda personnel. This, of course, was in keeping with what he perceives as the “Dallas Lens” vs. the “Bethesda Lens”. Which is the way one would probably structure a criminal inquiry, or the presentation of a court case. (Horne, p. 742) But the point to remember is this: The ARRB was not such an inquiry. Not by any means. For Gunn and Marwell to go just as far as they did in this field could have been construed as pushing the envelope.
But something changed that made the Dallas excursion possible. David Marwell stepped down as Executive Director to take another job. (p. 743) Most of the staffers then thought Gunn would be promoted almost automatically. It actually took three weeks. (ibid) Horne notes that this betrays the fact that the Board was never completely comfortable with Gunn as they had been with Marwell. That probably owes to the fact that Marwell was never a critic of the official story. Gunn let it be known at a speech at Stanford University, he was. (See Probe Vol. 5 No. 5) In fact, according to Horne, Gunn had actually applied for the Executive Director’s job originally. But the Board was not interested in hiring him for any position. Once Marwell was installed, it was his idea to hire Gunn. (pp. 743-44) Gunn eventually became General Counsel and in that office he earned the enmity of three Board members. (Horne does not name them. But they most likely are the late Kermit Hall, Henry Graff, and Anna K. Nelson.) But once Marwell left, Gunn did not want to push the issue of deposing the Dallas doctors further with the Board.
So Horne decided to do an end-run around Gunn. He wrote a memorandum to Gunn and PR officer Tom Samoluk, enclosing five blind copies for the Board members. Understandably, Gunn got angry with Horne. (p. 746) Samoluk and another staffer tried to arrange a peace meeting. This did not work, but Gunn stated something interesting and relevant at the time. He said that Anna Nelson had recommended against hiring Horne because he would try to solve the assassination. (ibid) Which Gunn evidently was beginning to think Horne was trying to do. (I would disagree with Gunn on this score. As Horne wrote in Volume I, he was actually trying to prove or disprove Best Evidence.)
Samoluk’s attempt at reconciling the two failed. Horne writes that this was the end of the working relationship with Gunn.
In light of what I already wrote about the prolific public record of the Dallas treating physicians, one really has to wonder why Horne did what he did. Jeremy Gunn went about as far as one could be expected to go in this regard. And if there is a guy I would like to talk to and try to have a candid conversation with on the Board, it is him. I can imagine the book he could write. Horne now has no relationship with the man. (ibid)
Further, shortly after this imbroglio, Gunn decided to quit the ARRB. (p. 748) Horne is not specific about why. He just writes that he heard it was over a matter of principle and he actually tendered his resignation before he had secured another job. To say the least, it would have been interesting to know why Gunn left. As I noted in my review of Volume I, I really wish Horne had filled out this behind the scenes part of the book, because no one else has.
It was decided to go ahead and interview some of the Dallas doctors. But there were three serious problems with the process. First, the – now rudderless – ARRB agreed to do the interview in Dallas, not Washington. Therefore, approval had to be granted to move the autopsy materials to Texas. The approval was denied. Horne points the figure for the failure at Archivist Steve Tilley who told reporter George Lardner, “I was the one who turned off the transportation of those autopsy photos with Burke Marshall.” (p. 741 Marshall is the Kennedy representative on the deed-of-gift who has to approve requests to see the autopsy materials.)
Second, without Gunn at the helm, the ARRB was pretty much adrift at sea the last several months of its existence. There really was no attorney who was familiar enough with the autopsy issues to do the depositions. The new and final executive director, pretty much by default, was Laura Denk. Denk once told Horne that it really didn’t matter to her where the hole in Kennedy’s skull was located. (ibid) Which pretty much fulfills the original Board intent of hiring people who had no interest or aptitude about the subject.
Third, because the Board had essentially run aground, Gunn had to be recalled to do the interviews. But now it was decided that it would be a group interview of five doctors: Robert McClelland, Paul Peters, Ronald C. Jones, Charles Baxter, and Malcolm Perry. Which is pretty much inexplicable. I mean with all the Board had dug up just about Malcolm Perry, you could have spent hours just interviewing him. But further, Gunn seemed to be just going through the motions now. He did not bring with him the bootleg versions of the autopsy photos and he did not ask the doctors to draw on a skull their version of the head wounds. (p. 755)
But even with all those qualifiers, some interesting observations were recorded. Dr. Jones said he saw no damage on the right side of the head above the ear-which does exist on the autopsy photos. (p. 757) More than one witness saw a left temple wound. (ibid) Peters said he saw lacerated cerebellum through a hole in the rear of the skull. (p. 758-59) McClelland agreed with this blasted cerebellum observation. (p. 762) And Jones made a quite interesting comment. He said he did see a very small wound, which he thought was an entrance wound to the head. (p. 765) As I said, Gunn by now was just going through the motions. He didn’t follow up on this important detail in order to pin down the location and appearance.
For me, the most fascinating vignette from this interview was offered up by Jones. Gunn asked the subjects if anyone tried to get them to alter their stories. (p. 769) A question to which Perry should have jumped up at. But it was Jones who gave the interesting answer. He said that during his interview with Arlen Specter, he alluded more than once to the throat wound being a wound of entry. Specter seemed to question his expertise with projectiles. When Jones stepped down, Specter followed him out into the hallway. He then said, “I want to tell you something that I don’t want you to say anything about. We have people who will testify that they saw the President shot from the front. You can always get people to testify about something. But we are pretty convinced he was shot from the back.” Jones said that the message was that although he may have thought the neck wound was an entrance, it wasn’t. And that was that. Jones replied that he was only 31 at the time, so he didn’t say anything about this exchange. But he did think it was unusual. (p. 770)
I agree that it was. But he knew he could get away with it.
III
As Horne notes, the discussion of Gunn’s group interview ends Part 1 of the book, i.e., his review of the ARRB testimony. Part 2 is where Horne applies the work of the ARRB to describe as he calls it, “Fraud in the Evidence – A Pattern of Deception”. There are three chapters that deal with this in the volume: Chapters 10-12. The first is by far the best. In fact, it may be the highlight of the entire five volumes.
In the summer of 1998, Horne completed a long memorandum at the behest of Jeremy Gunn. In examining the history (and mystery) of the fate of President Kennedy’s brain, Horne had come to some rather surprising and startling conclusions. This memo was released to the press and it created a small buzz. What Horne was postulating was two things. First, that there were actually two examinations of the brain, one of Kennedy’s actual brain and one with a substitute brain. Second, that the photos of Kennedy’s brain in the National Archives today depict this substitute brain, not Kennedy’s actual brain after the shooting.
This memorandum gave Vincent Bugliosi an epileptic fit. As I noted in the first part of my review of Reclaiming History, since Bugliosi could come up with almost no new evidence to support the Warren Commission, he resorted to an extraordinary barrage of invective and insults in order to demonize and dehumanize the critics. Nowhere was that litany of belittlement more pronounced than in his discussion of Horne’s memo. He called it “obscenely irresponsible” and as Horne notes, that was actually the soft-edged part of the broadside. (Horne, p. 822) The problem with Bugliosi’s polemic in this regard is the problem with his entire book: He is wrong. Which is not to say that I agree with the entire Horne memorandum. I don’t. But when all is said and done, the weight of the evidence says that the pictures in the National Archives are not what they say they are. And that creates a huge problem for the purveyors of the official story. It’s a problem that, combined with David Mantik’s work on the x-rays, is fundamentally insurmountable.
First, let me assess what I believe to be the strengths of Horne’s work on the subject. Let us begin with something simple to understand. As I just mentioned in my review of the Dallas doctors group interview with Gunn, physicians Jones and McClelland both said the cerebellum was lacerated. FBI agent Frank O’Neill said half the brain was gone. And that a significant portion of the brain was missing from the rear. (Horne, p. 797) Mortician Tom Robinson said that a large percentage of the brain was gone “in the back” and “that the portion of the brain that was missing was about the size of a closed fist. ” (Horne, p.. 814) Dr, Boswell, during his ARRB interview, said that about a third of the brain was missing. (David Mantik, “The Medical Evidence Decoded” in Murder In Dealey Plaza, edited by James Fetzer, p. 284) In an interview he gave in 1992 to the Journal of the American Medical Association, Jim Humes said that 2/3 of the right cerebrum was gone. (ibid) Floyd Reibe recalled for the ARRB that he saw the brain removed but there was only about half of it left. (op cit, Fetzer, p. 212, in Gary Aguilar “The Converging Medical Case for Conspiracy”) James Sibert commented that “you look at a picture, an anatomical picture of a brain and it’s all – there was nothing like that.” (William Law, In the Eye of History, p. 257) James Jenkins said the brain was so damaged on the underside that it was hard to introduce needles for perfusion with formalin. (Harrison Livingstone, High Treason II, p. 226))
At Dallas’ Parkland Hospital Dr. Robert McClelland said that “probably a third or so, at least, of the brain tissue, posterior cerebral tissue and some of the cerebellar tissue had been blasted out.” (Robert Groden and Harrison Livingstone, High Treason, p. 42) Dr. Ronald Jones said that “as the president lay on the cart with what appeared to be some brain hanging out this wound with multiple pieces of skull next with the brain and with a tremendous amount of clot and blood.” (ibid) Dr. Perry described a gaping wound at the rear of the skull “exposing lacerated brain”. Further in his testimony before the Commission he states “there was severe laceration of underlying brain tissue.” (ibid, p. 47) Dr. Charles Carrico described an avulsive rear skull wound in which the brain had both cerebral and cerebellar shredded and macerated tissue. And this was exhibited both in the wounds and on the hanging skull fragments. (ibid p. 50) Before the body left, Nurse Diana Bowron packed the head wound with gauze squares at Parkland. She later recalled that much of the brain, about a half total from both sides, was gone. (Harrison Livingstone, Killing the Truth, p. 195)
All the above is consistent with what we see on the Zapruder film: a terrific head explosion with matter ejecting high into the air. It is also consistent with the very first witnesses in and around the car. As we all know, Jackie Kennedy turned over pieces of her husband’s skull and brain to a doctor at Parkland Hospital. Motorcycle cops Martin and Hargis recall being splattered with blood and brain. (op cit, Groden and Livingstone, p. 231) As Horne will reveal in Volume 4, a Secret Service agent later recovered a piece of the brain from the car.
Keeping all the above in mind about the extensive damage done, when one looks at the HSCA artist’s rendition of the existing brain, it is surprising to view a pretty much intact brain. (See Fetzer, p. 232) Even Earl Rose of the HSCA noted that the underside of this brain does not match the description of the head wound described by the pathologists (ibid. As we will see, there is a real question as to who shot the basilar, i.e., underneath, views of this brain) As David Mantik has written, there is minimal impact seen in the extant brain. There is some, but only some, impact seen in the right front. And even Dr. Humes was puzzled by this fact. Before the ARRB, he said, “…the structure which is on the right side of the brain appears to be intact – the cerebrum intact – and that’s not right, because it was not.” (ibid p. 264) And recall, that is the part of the extant brain that betrays impact. The rest is pretty much intact. So here you have a brain in the record whose appearance simply does not jibe with the evidence listed above, i.e., the witness testimony and the Zapruder film.
Neither does its weight. Which is 1500 grams. This is startling. Because the average weight of a brain for a 40-49 year old male is 1350 grams. If one even allows for a period of formalin fixing afterwards, Kennedy’s brain actually has more volume to it than a normal brain. Even though it had been blasted away, went flying through the air, and landed on other people in Dealey Plaza. Now, what makes this mystery even more intriguing is that the brain was not weighed the night of the autopsy in Bethesda. (David Mantik and Cyril Wecht, “Paradoxes of the JFK Assassination: The Brian Enigma” in The Assassinations edited by James DiEugenio and Lisa Pease, p. 253) As Mantik and Wecht write, this is inexplicable. And in fact, according to Boswell’s ARRB testimony, he recalled that it actually was weighed. (ibid) It is hard to gauge which is worse: if it was done and the results eliminated, or if it was not done at all. One wonders if this was part of the annotated record that was later destroyed.
The first date in the record for an actual weight is recorded by Pierre Finck. In a report he wrote for his military superiors in 1965, he wrote that the brain was weighed at 1500 grams on 11/29. (ibid, p. 255) And here another problem surfaces. For Humes said that Admiral George Burkley came out to Bethesda to get all the autopsy materials: “He told me the family wanted to inter the brain with the President ‘s body …” (ibid) So what was Finck looking at on 11/29? Humes realized this presented a problem so he changed his story later and said he gave the brain to Burkley within about ten days. (Horne, p. 829)
Further, Humes never tendered any receipts for this transfer to either the Commission or the HSCA. (ibid) And as we all know, Burkley later deposited the brain with White House secretary Evelyn Lincoln, who turned it over to Angie Novello, Robert Kennedy’s secretary. So Humes’ story about turning over the brain to Burkley sometime before the funeral on 11/25 appears to be problematic. And he seemed to realize this himself. What makes the intrigue deeper is that Burkley wrote in 1978 that he wanted to do further examination of the brain. (ibid, p. 256) Also, if Burkley had retrieved the brain for interment, then how long could the brain have been fixed in formalin? At most, a bit over two days.
Which leads to another problem: the purpose of formalin fixing is to section a brain to trace gunshot trajectories. According to Humes and Boswell this was not done. (Horne, p. 792) Which, again, is incredible in a gunshot to the head case. This may be why Humes first tried to say that Burkley called for the autopsy materials early. He may have thought this could be his excuse for the lack of sectioning, not realizing it created other problems for him.
The other problem is that photographer John Stringer said the brain was sectioned. (ibid) He said he recalled this since he photographed it. The problem is that under examination by the ARRB Stringer just about wrecked the thesis that it was he who took any archival pictures of the brain. First, as mentioned in Part 1, Stringer said he took no basilar views of the brain – but there are such underneath shots in the archives. He also said there were identification tags used in such shots. There are none in these photographs. (Horne, p. 806) Jeremy Gunn then asked him if based on those facts would he be able to identify the photographs before him as photographs of the brain of President Kennedy? Stringer said, “No, I couldn’t say that they were President Kennedy’s … All I know is, I gave everything to Jim Humes, and he gave them to Admiral Burkley.” (ibid.)
It then got worse. Stringer had identified to Gunn the types of film he used for both black and white and color pictures. The type of film used in the brain photos is Ansco. Stringer was genuinely puzzled when he discovered this because not only was it the wrong film, but it was used in a photographic technique called a press pack, which he did not use. This was betrayed by a series number in the pictures, something which Stringer was almost stunned to see. (Horne, pp. 807-08) Stringer also did not recognize the film used in the color shots of the brain either. (ibid, p. 809) And, of course, there were no photos of the brain as being sectioned. What is most puzzling about this last is that Stringer remembered photographing the sections using a light box. (p. 810)
To put it mildly, something is rotten in Denmark. When the pictures of an intact brain do not correspond to what the nurse who packed the skull in gauze packages recalled – along with about ten other witnesses – something is up. When Humes’ story about when he surrendered the brain to Burkley keeps on changing, something is up. When Humes and Boswell say the brain was not sectioned, but the guy who shot the sections says it was, something is up. And when that photographer who says he shot the photos, denies the photos in the Archives are his, then you have a real problem.
As I said, I don’t agree with everything that Horne wrote in this chapter. But I agree with enough of it to grant him his major point: The pictures of the brain in the National Archives are not of President Kennedy’s brain. And they therefore do not depict that actual damage done to his skull during the assassination. I believe the evidence for this is so powerful that it could be used in a court of law. And it is a strong indication of a national security cover-up.
IV
The next chapter in his Fraud in the Evidence section is entitled “The Autopsy Report – A Botched Cover Up”. In this chapter Horne essentially tries to show something that many people have suspected and even written about. In fact, I wrote about it in Part IV of my Reclaiming History review. Namely that the autopsy report was an evolving document that was not actually supposed to register the findings made at Bethesda that night. It was actually meant to disguise what the actual observations were.
Horne begins by enumerating all the serious problems with the actual autopsy procedure, e.g., the hair was not shaved, no proper labeling of pictures, clothing not checked by doctors etc. Even Michael Baden has noted just how bad it was. (pp. 845-46) Then after noting all this, he writes that the autopsy report in evidence, CE 387, is not the first version of the report. Which, of course, we know through Jeremy Gunn’s examination of Humes. For Humes admitted that he burned not just his notes, but also the first draft of the report.
Horne is going to count the Sibert-O’Neill report as his first draft of the autopsy protocol. I guess this will suffice, but there are some problems with doing so. First, the two FBI agents left that evening. So they had no consultation with the doctors afterwards and no consultation with their paperwork. They were also not privy to any of the work done afterwards on the body, like the supplemental report.
But even though it lacks detail and depth and technical expertise, we can grant Horne this step. Simply because whatever the failings of these two FBI agents, they are much more honest men than the pathologists. And we can see from above that they do not go along with either the Single Bullet Theory, or the intact back of the skull photos. At this point in the evolution of the autopsy, the back wound bullet had fallen out through cardiac massage.
This idea, that the back wound was a non-transiting wound was short lived. Horne says it didn’t last long because “after the FBI agents left the Bethesda Morgue, the pathologists established communication with Dr. Perry about the bullet wound he observed in the anterior neck…” (p. 851) Horne says that Humes always stated that this did not happen until Saturday, but this is not credible today. I agree. There is just too much testimony today to indicate that this was a cover story. And Horne points it all out. (pp. 851-854)
Horne makes a kind of odd choice for his second draft of the report. He wants to use the HSCA testimony of Richard Lipsey, aide to General Wehle, as an interim report. This is problematic since Lipsey’s testimony is oral testimony many years after the fact. Horne wants to use him because he told the HSCA that Kennedy was shot three times from behind. The FBI report says Kennedy was shot twice. (p. 857) According to Lipsey, the anterior neck wound was never a tracheotomy but known as a bullet wound of exit.
What is interesting about Lipsey’s testimony is that he allows for two entrance wounds on the neck. One up high, near the hairline, which exited the throat. A second one very low, or in the upper back. The first trajectory is one which people like Milicent Cranor and Pat Speer have written about as being possible. (See Cranor’s article in The Kennedy Assassination Chronicles, Summer 1999 issue, entitled “The Third Wound”.)
Image courtesy Pat SpeerLipsey’s version was then revised. Why? Horne says that it was because of the news of the hit to James Tague – which would have then given us four bullets. (p. 863) There was no footnote to this. And I found both the mention and the lack of footnoting puzzling. Because the time period the author is talking about is early morning on the 23rd. This is how Horne informs us: by the time the autopsy report was reviewed on the 23rd, “the entire nation, and indeed the world, had become aware one shot had missed, and had wounded bystander James Tague in the cheek, after striking a curb on Main Street In Dealey Plaza.” (p. 863 Let me add, that the lack of footnotes in parts of the book where Horne is making a presentation, rather than in quoting ARRB testimony, is a bit of a problem for his book. Just as the book has no index, it has no End Note section either. Horne lists the few he does use on the page, but there are many things that go unnoted and also, at times, he gives us very general references, like to a whole book.)
Now, one of the best pieces of reporting in the critical literature on the Tague hit is Gerald McKnight’s sterling volume Breach of Trust. If you read the two parts of that book which deal with the issue, you will see that what Horne is talking about seems highly improbable, if not impossible. (McKnight, pp.97-98, 228-33) The simple fact being that the Tague bullet strike was kept under wraps by the FBI. In fact, it was not even mentioned in the FBI report of December 9th. As far as media exposure goes, there was one story about it in the Dallas papers over the weekend. So what Horne is describing, “the entire nation and indeed the world” knowing about Tague, this is just plain wrong. Which brings into question his whole line of argument here. Was Lipsey’s testimony ever really an autopsy report version? If so, then what is the real reason it was altered? Horne’s thesis about Lipsey may or may not be true. Yet Lipsey’s bullet above the hairline, at a slightly different place than where the doctors placed it, seems to be an accurate observation. But if this is so, it may be that the location of this wound changed simply to make the head exit wound more viable. As I explained in Part 4 of my review of Reclaiming History, the location of this wound has always been a problem for an exit high on the right side of the head above the ear. This actual location, since it is slightly lower, makes it even more of one. And it may be that the pathologists juggled this location later in order to ameliorate that problem. Because the other two locations for an entrance wound are problematic, since it is difficult to discern an entrance with the naked eye looking at normal sized photos.
Horne then says that the pathologists first tried to explain the throat wound as a fragment from the head shot. (pp. 864-65) He bases this on a transcript from an executive session hearing of the Commission. This is the quote by J. Lee Rankin, “We have an explanation there in the autopsy that probably a fragment came out the front of the neck …” This is from a January 27, 1964 meeting, way after all parts of the autopsy protocol had been submitted. And Rankin is talking about other problems in the medical evidence here, like the back wound not lining up with the throat wound. Horne goes on to say that this excerpt of a sentence reveals Rankin’s apparent knowledge of “two separate and conflicting autopsy report explanations for the bullet wound in the throat.” Again, to me, this is an overstatement. We don’t know where Rankin got his “fragment theory” from. Is Horne actually saying that Humes forwarded to the Commission two autopsy protocols and said, “Pick the one you want. And then read parts of the one you discard into the record.” Highly unlikely. Rankin’s quote is an interesting one. In fact, some people, like Josiah Thompson used this idea. But to say it reveals what Horne says it does is, for me, a stretch.
Horne then slips back onto more solid ground. In his discussion of Humes’ testimony before the HSCA about the initial writing of his report and his destruction of it, Horne makes a good case that Humes lied, and the HSCA let him get away with it in public. First, as established by two witnesses, Humes had a report during the day on Saturday, so he could not have composed it on Saturday night as he told the Committee. (Horne, p. 867) Secondly, he told the HSCA that he incinerated only his notes. But he actually burned both the notes and a first draft. (ibid, p. 868)
The timing of this burning appears to be Sunday morning. (See Horne, Volume I, pp.94-96) Which is interesting. Because the reason for the destruction of the notes and the report may be the killing of Oswald by Ruby. More than one author, including Horne, has made a case for this. Realizing that no sharp defense lawyer was going to check his report against his notes, Humes may have felt free enough to discard both of them. And then to rewrite a document that was not bound by either. Humes also lied here about the reason for the burning. He told the HSCA that he did not want the bloodstained notes to end up in the hands of a meretricious souvenir hunter. The problem is the first draft had no blood on it since he wrote it at his home. (ibid, p. 96) Clearly, Humes was being dodgy about this entire issue. Which usually indicates the witness is concealing something.
For some reason, Horne does not follow the chronology of this revised draft. According to Gerald McKnight, parts of this were rewritten in the office of Admiral Galloway. (McKnight, p. 163) According to the HSCA testimony of Pierre Finck, all three pathologists were in Galloway’s office on this occasion. And they all ended up signing the end result. (ibid, p. 410) McKnight notes that the changes made in this version in Galloway’s office all align with the official story. For instance, “Three shots were heard and the President fell forward.” When we know the Zapruder film depicts Kennedy rocketing backward. But further, the ARRB let Humes get away with the statement that the autopsy report in the record today is based upon the notes also in the record. This cannot be true. As McKnight notes, 70% of the “facts and statements in the final autopsy draft do not appear in any published government records.” (ibid, p. 166) Now the autopsy in evidence was checked in at around 6 PM on the 24th. (ibid, p. 162) On November 26th Admiral Burkley sent it to the Secret Service. The question then becomes: What were these facts based upon if they are not in the extant notes? I was sorry to see that Horne did not address this important point. Because Humes said something interesting in this regard to Jeremy Gunn. When caught in his web of deceit about the burning, he said, “I don’t know what was the matter with it, or whether I even ever did that.” (ibid, p. 165) Did Humes preserve the notes and burn the draft instead? Realizing that later revisions would need to be based upon them? If so, someone else deep-sixed the notes.
What Horne does with the rest of this is, to me, questionable. In a rather weird argument, he goes back to the Rankin quote and then says that the “head fragment theory” was abandoned because of the Zapruder film. He bases this on Kennedy’s hands going to his neck before the head shot. (p. 873) I didn’t quite comprehend this argument. First, what was the evidence that the pathologists or Galloway saw the film before the 24th? If such evidence exists, Horne should have produced it. Second, can anyone see the neck wound on Kennedy at this instant in the film? If not, then this probably is not the reason it was abandoned, if it was ever really entertained.
Finally, Horne tries to advance one last argument for saying that two versions of an autopsy report were submitted to the Commission. He says that in addition to the autopsy materials submitted to the National Archives by the Secret Service, there was a memorandum noting another report in the 1966 Kennedy deed of gift. (Horne, p. 875) But this was one of the items not available when the transfer was made. The problem with Horne spending so much time on this is that there is no credible evidence that this was a different version than what the Secret Service had and turned over to the Archives. Admiral Burkley handled the autopsy materials that went to the Secret Service and the Kennedys. Are we to believe that he handed the former group one autopsy report, and then gave the Kennedys a different one? And that before making such a huge faux pas, that he never bothered to check if they were the same?
I agree with Horne that the autopsy protocol was an evolving document that would be very hard to defend in court. In fact, it would be quite vulnerable to attack on the grounds that it changed under special circumstances. I just don’t agree with some of the circumstances he adduces.
V
The last chapter of this volume is Chapter 12. It is entitled “The Autopsy Photographs and X-rays Explained”. In this, and the beginning chapter of Volume IV, Horne is going to try and explain what happened at the morgue, and in Dealey Plaza. Whenever someone tries to do this in the detail Horne does, it always puts me off. Simply because, lacking a detailed confession, one has to assume and speculate about certain things; Horne calls it “intelligent speculation”. (p. 909) In this day and age, I would prefer an author stick only with things about which he can be either sure, or fairly sure about. But allowing for that, there are three items of value in these last 100 pages.
The first is a topic that has been reviewed by two other writers in the field, namely Pat Speer and David Mantik. In my review of Speer’s video, I discussed his pungent comments on a highly controversial photo in the autopsy collection. (Click here.) That photo is sometimes called F8, or the Mystery Photo. Horne here calls it the Open Cranium photo. The reason it’s called the Mystery Photo is that it is one of the worst autopsy pictures ever composed or shot. It is shot from such a bad angle and distance that it is hard to figure what one is looking at. But the clear consensus in the critical community today is that the photo depicts the back of Kennedy’s skull with the scalp refracted. As Speer well illustrated, Michael Baden of the HSCA lectured the public about this photo by saying it depicted a beveled wound of exit. The problem is that both the original pathologists and the panel appointed by Ramsey Clark both said that there was no wound at the point Baden was talking about. In fact, Baden was so lost in orienting the picture that he placed it upside down on the easel during his lecture.
Horne notes the HSCA’s insistence at orienting this photo as frontal bone. Even when autopsy photographer John Stringer told them that Baden had oriented it incorrectly. (Horne, p. 900) Why all this Keystone Kops fumbling about? Because if the picture is oriented properly, that is as the rear of the skull, there goes the official story. Since it depicts external beveling, then the wound was made by a bullet from the front. What makes it even worse for the likes of Baden is that, back in 1966, when pathologists Humes and Boswell were classifying the photos for something called a Military Review, they labeled it as depicting the posterior of Kennedy’s skull! So in other words, the photographer and the original pathologists both say it is taken from the rear. But since it clashes with the Krazy Kid Oswald fantasy, this cannot stand.
In Speer’s video, he notes about four pieces of photographic evidence that strongly indicates the picture is taken from behind. In Jim Fetzer’s Murder in Dealey Plaza, David Mantik uses the Harper fragment, the x-rays, and an anatomic landmark in the color photos, to show the same, i.e., the photo is taken from the rear. (Horne, pp. 917-18) In addition, Admiral Burkley told author Michael Kurtz that the posterior skull wound had all the appearances of an exit. (Horne, p. 927) Today, it seems to me quite difficult to argue Baden’s point of view. Baden’s insistence shows just how much he had discarded logic and evidence once Bob Tanenbaum had left the HSCA and the Blakey-Cornwell regime was installed.
Horne includes an exchange between Allen Dulles and James Humes to illustrate the paradoxes that this photo holds. Dulles essentially asked Humes if the exit wound in the skull must have originated from the rear, that it could not have come from the front or side. (Horne, p. 922) Humes replied with one of the most bewildering and enigmatic answers in the volumes. He said, “Scientifically, sir, it is impossible for it to have been fired from other than behind. Or to have exited from other than behind.”
What on earth does this mean? If taken literally, Humes seems to be saying that the shot came in and exited at the same point. Which is not possible. Does he mean, as many critics suspect, that the exiting point for a frontal shot became an entrance point for a rear shot? If so, that might be an obtuse way of explaining this photo.
A second point developed in this chapter that is worth noting takes us back to Best Evidence country. As the reader will note, in his book, David Lifton postulated that all the shots came from the front. This gave the author a problem, in the sense that he now had to explain the physical evidence for shots from the rear. Lifton came up with the “puncture thesis”. That is, holes were battered into the body, including the back wound. In addition to the problem I mentioned in Part One, with the testimony of Dr. Robert Shaw about John Connally’s wounds, there is also the inconvenient eyewitness testimony about a back wound. This would include people like Secret Service agent Glen Bennett and Nurse Diana Bowron. In spite of this testimony, Horne stays true to his friend David Lifton. Horne writes that the back wound visible in the photos “could be a man-made puncture, inflicted upon the body after the conclusion of the autopsy to fool the camera.” (p. 985)
But this is only the beginning of Horne’s puncture trail. The ARRB had the autopsy photos enhanced and digitalized. In gazing at these new reproductions, Horne came to the conclusion that the famous “white spot” at the bottom of the photo, well Horne saw a puncture there also. This is how he explains it: “I believe this puncture was man-made – a deliberate, cynical act of forgery on the body of the President instituted after the formal end of the autopsy…” (p. 911)
And so is the “red spot”. This is the place in the upper part of the skull where most people see what they think is a spot of dried blood. The HSCA used this as their new entrance wound, replacing the one at the bottom of the skull that the pathologists designated. Well, Horne sees a puncture up there too: “I think the “Red Spot” in the cowlick is also a man-made puncture … because the conspirators managing the cover up were trying to solve several problems with one set of photos created after midnight.” (ibid. Need I add, Horne also believes Kennedy’s had was also battered pre-autopsy.)
Horne believes the actual entrance wound is 2.5 centimeters to the right and only slightly above the external occipital protuberance. According to the author, the punctures were all the result of confusion in the conspiracy. (p. 912) No comment.
I’ve saved what I think is something of real and lasting value for last. It does not originate with Horne but he wisely chose to include it in this volume. Although I think he erred by not including it in the previous chapter about the evolution of the autopsy report. Author Michael Kurtz interviewed Dr. Robert Canada, the commanding officer at Bethesda, in 1968. Canada told him that he observed a gaping wound in the lower right portion of Kennedy’s skull at autopsy. He said it was clearly an exit wound because the bone had exploded outward. Kurtz replied that this was at odds with the official autopsy report, which mentioned only a small entrance wound in the rear of the skull. Dr. Canada told Kurtz that “the document had to be rewritten to conform to the lone assassin thesis … Dr. Canada insisted that the contents of this interview be kept secret until at least a quarter century after his death.” (Horne pp. 927-28) In keeping with Canada’s wishes, Kurtz did not write about it until 2006 in his book The JFK Assassination Debates.
Needless to say, if Canada was telling the truth – which his 25 year embargo strongly indicates was the case – this bombshell revelation tells us just about all we need to know about the autopsy report in our hands today. It is a piece of fiction. And the pictures accompanying it were either altered or posed. And the men involved were intimidated into going along with a cover-up over the death of their Commander-in-Chief.
Canada was loyal to the end, and 25 years beyond that.
Volumes Four and Five
I almost don’t want to review the last two volumes of Doug Horne’s series entitled Inside the ARRB. For more than one reason. First of all, although this series is supposed to be about the medical evidence and testimony adduced by the Assassination Records Review Board, these last two volumes don’t really come under that rubric.
Volume IV has two chapters in it. Chapter 13 is entitled “What Really Happened at the Bethesda Morgue (And in Dealey Plaza)?” This is where Horne tries to theorize as to what actually happened during the autopsy and from there, what was the real firing sequence and angles in the Dealey Plaza. Chapter 14 is entitled, “The Zapruder Film Mystery,” and this relates only tangentially to the new medical testimony and declassified files of the ARRB. Volume V deals with what Horne calls “The Political Context of the Assassination”. And this really has absolutely nothing to do with the medical inquiry conducted for the ARRB by Horne and Jeremy Gunn. So in these two volumes, I think Horne has gone astray from what his subject matter is supposed to be about, and what is of real value in the book.
As noted in my previous three reviews, the book does have real value. But its value is in what Horne and Gunn discovered in their probe of the medical evidence. Here the author is largely stepping outside that boundary. The purpose of that is questionable. And in my view, in addition to losing its raison d’être, the series loses a lot of its steam.
I
As I mentioned above, much of Chapter 13 is given to a reconstruction of what Horne thinks happened both in Dealey Plaza and at the morgue. I could find very little of any new importance here. But there is one exception. That was an interview that Horne did with Secret Service agent Floyd Boring.
Boring began the interview with a rather bracing general declaration: “I didn’t have anything to do with it, and I don’t know anything.” (p. 1096) Horne describes this as an “attention-getter,” which it was. It was Boring who was supposed to have turned over the fragments found in the front area of the car to the FBI. Yet oddly, he at first denied inspecting the Presidential limousine. He then said he did, but did not recall when he did it: if it happened the evening of the 22nd or the next day. But further, he had no recollection of finding any bullet fragments in the car. (p. 1097) Horne handed him SA Frazier’s testimony describing this episode, but Boring’s memory was not refreshed. Horne speculates as to why Boring said this. It may be that he thought the ARRB was conducting an investigation into whether or not the fragments had been planted, and he wanted to avoid being a target of inquiry. (p. 1098)
But Boring really got interesting when he discussed his search of the follow-up car, sometimes called the “Queen Mary”. Completely unprompted by Horne, the witness told him that “he had discovered a piece of bone skull with brain attached in the footwell just in front of the back seat bench….” (p. 1097) He estimated it about 1 x 2 inches in size. He did not write this up and did not know the final disposition of this material. When Horne tried to correct him about where he found it, Boring insisted it was in the follow-up car. Which would be just about proof positive that Kennedy was hit from the front.
And someone must have told Boring that after the interview. For as Horne further notes, something weird happened after the Boring interview. Something that Horne says never happened to him during his tenure at the ARRB. Boring called him back the next day. He now said he could not have found the skull debris in the ‘Queen Mary,’ it had to have been in the presidential limo. (p. 1099) This retraction convinced Horne that someone had debriefed Boring after the ARRB interview.
A similar reversal happened with the heir to Admiral George Burkley. But this episode I had heard about before. Jeremy Gunn wanted to get Nancy Denlea, Burkley’s daughter and the executor of his estate, to sign a waiver to let the ARRB peruse the deceased admiral’s files at his attorney’s office for evidence. She agreed to this at first. So the ARRB sent her the written waiver. But she later called back and told counsel Jeremy Gunn she had changed her mind and would not sign. Again, Horne wonders if someone got to her. (p. 1054)
As most readers of The Assassinations (by Lisa Pease and myself) know, Robert Kennedy ultimately OK’d the dispersal of the Dallas casket into the ocean, a military dump off the Delaware-Maryland coast. (DiEugenio and Pease, p. 268) Well, skipping back into his Best Evidence mode, the author now tries to insinuate that somehow this was a deliberate and willful act done by RFK to somehow conceal the true facts of his brother’s murder. (pp. 1057-1062) Yep. that’s what he does. He actually says the casket was destroyed by RFK. Yet, in the documents Jim Lesar has collected at the AARC, this does not appear to be the case.
The movement to dump the casket was begun by the fact that Nicolas Katzenbach and Lawson Knott of General Services Administration were getting pressure from an associate of William Manchester and also from former Dallas mayor Earle Cabell. Cabell claimed to be outraged by the morbid curiosity attached to the object. (Letter from Cabell to Katzenbach, 9/13/65) Since he was now in congress, Cabell was probably sensitive to the fact that the casket drew attention to his city. Manchester was threatening to write about in 1968 – a threat which Kennedy did not appreciate. (Call between Knott and RFK 2/3/66) No one involved believed it had any value as evidence. So upon the recommendations of Katzenbach and Knott, Kennedy agreed to have the casket disposed of. Period.
Horne equates all this to RFK somehow being the prime engineer behind the casket’s disposal. Why would RFK be a participant in this diabolical effort? Not because of the pressure described above. No. According to Horne, it is because the casket had the potential to explode the medical cover up! (p. 1057) To me, this leap – and that is what it is – is completely unwarranted, perhaps a wee bit goofy. I mean, in 1966, Lifton had not published Best Evidence. He was still in his Ramparts days, that is, doing essays that resembled the work of Josiah Thompson. Without that impetus, how RFK could then divine such a thing as the casket’s importance in Lifton’s future book is completely illogical – since no one had written about it at the time. But how Horne can somehow fathom that Kennedy understood all that anyway – despite the fact that there is no reference to such a thing in the literature at the time – well, that is a mystery for the ages.
But Horne goes even farther. He holds out the possibility that the missing autopsy materials – the brain, tissue slides, etc. – may have been deep-sixed inside the original casket. (p. 1061) He even says that if there is no record of these materials being dumped with the casket – and there is not – then perhaps RFK relayed a message to the Chief of Naval Operations not to include it in the inventory. (ibid)
This is what I mean about Horne needing an editor. First of all, although there is circumstantial evidence, there is no proof that it was indeed RFK who seized these materials. We simply do not know that with any real certainty. But second of all, if he did, it may not be that his intent was to cover anything up. It may have been just the opposite. One of the most interesting parts of David Talbot’s book Brothers, is that he reveals that RFK never believed the Krazy Kid Oswald story. Not for one instant. And from the beginning, he was sending out feelers to try and comprehend what really happened in Dallas. One of the things he was interested in was the physical evidence that “he thought might be vital in a credible investigation in the future – that is, one under his control.” (Talbot, p. 16)
Roger Feinman also believes this may be the case. Let me quote him at length in this regard:
Two different sets of photos of JFK’s mortal remains were prepared on the night of November 22-23, 1963. They were taken by different photographers and developed at different times. One set was developed on Saturday, November 23, the other not until Wednesday, November 27, after Oswald and Kennedy had been buried. The set that was developed first anticipated public disclosure in the event of a trial of the accused assassin. The set that was developed second was never supposed to see the light of day. Yet a third set, of an isolated formalin-fixed brain that carried no identifying information, was taken and developed later in conjunction with the purported supplemental procedure. The collection of photos that was ultimately deposited in the National Archives pursuant to a “deed of gift” from Robert and Jacqueline Kennedy, dated October 31, 1966, was culled from the totality of this source material, albeit who did the culling and for what purpose remain a mystery.
The available historical record implies that Robert Kennedy authorized an independent medical evaluation of whatever materials actually wound up in his possession, custody or control. But because the ARRB, guided by Douglas Horne in consultation with author David Lifton and a handful of other conspiracy advocates, were preoccupied by theories of body alteration and photo fakery, intimates of the Kennedy family and its closest allies were never pressed by the Review Board to clarify exactly how the materials were handled, and by whom, so that a complete documentary trail could be established and responsibility for any suppression justly assigned. Therefore, Mr. Horne’s speculations notwithstanding, any imputation of a cover-up to the Kennedys is not yet warranted. Their silence should not be taken as acquiescence in the official autopsy results; it may just as plausibly reflect unease and uncertainty.
The ARRB’s so-called “investigation” of the medical evidence was slipshod and fueled by a fervor for theories rather than a dispassionate and objective unraveling of the facts. I ascribe most of this failure to staff lawyers Jeremy Gunn and his predecessor as executive director, David Marwell, who should have known better than to give rein to a group of amateur detectives. I am particularly appalled by Mr. Gunn’s utter waste of the ARRB’s limited resources in the pointless persecution of Robert Groden, which yielded nothing of any tangible value either to the Board or to the historical record. They would have done far better to compile the areas of interest for formal investigation beyond the scope of the ARRB’s mandate, competence, and budget, and to present a compelling brief for further congressional oversight and follow-up that could not have been ignored without invoking a public outcry.
This leads to another issue. One that I was quite curious about. As previously mentioned, this was not the first time that Horne had floated this idea that Bobby Kennedy had a role in the cover up. Which is an idea that has been surfaced by the likes of Gus Russo before, but has never been able to attain any credibility, since there has never been any evidence for it. I mean, try and find any way that Bobby Kennedy had a hand in the Warren Commission proceedings. Well, I kept reading and reading in order to find some kind of key to why Horne had joined in the “RFK as part of the cover-up” ranks. I finally found it in Volume 5. Not surprisingly, it’s David Lifton.
Horne has gotten a look at one of the working drafts of Lifton’s long awaited biography of Oswald. He praises the book as presenting a persuasive case that the plot not only took out Kennedy, but the cover story about Oswald built in a fail-safe point against RFK. Namely that by making Oswald into a Castro sympathizer, Kennedy’s murder could be perceived as retaliation for the CIA plots to kill Castro. In which Horne thinks RFK was involved; in spite of the CIA Inspector General Report on this matter which exonerates both brothers. (pp. 1666-67) From other sources, I understand that Lifton was influenced by Joan Mellen’s thesis about RFK in A Farewell to Justice. How and why he should be so influenced is a mystery to me. (Click here for my review.) But apparently Horne then accepts this hoary, specious idea.
II
As I alluded to above, I take reconstructions of what happened in Dealey Plaza with a grain of salt. I feel that one researcher’s version is as good – or bad – as the next. I only even blink when something wild is written. Well, with Horne I blinked. More than once. First, he postulates five shots to the head, three from the front. (pp. 1150, 1153-54) This, to me, is incredible. In fact, I have never read of such a thing. And in keeping with his Murder from Within thesis, he writes that “The very unpleasant and tentative possibility exists that limousine driver William Greer fired a fourth head shot into the President’s left temple with his revolver.”
I don’t understand this. There is no evidence for this in the Zapruder film. There is no evidence for this in any picture I have ever seen. The single bit of testimony used most often to bolster it is the 11/22/63 affidavit of Hugh Betzner. In this affidavit, Betzner states he was shooting pictures when he “heard a loud noise” he thought was a firecracker. He then heard another loud noise. He then saw a “flash of pink” standing up and then sitting back down. (This is obviously Jackie Kennedy reaching out to the trunk of the car, after frame 313 and the head explosion.) He then writes that he saw, in either the limousine or the following car, someone with a rifle and someone in the limousine, or around the limo, with a handgun. He then said that the car disappeared beneath the underpass. And this is the best Horne can do in this regard. (He tries Jean Hill, but her affidavit is even less definite as to location than Betzner’s.)
To me, and to most, it’s not nearly enough. Besides the fact that the time frame by Betzner is ambiguous as to when he saw this happen, to have any credibility at all, it would seem to have to occur within the firing sequence of around Z frames 190-325. Not only does the affidavit seem to say it took place after that, but if it did take place at those frames, why on earth did no one else see it? Especially when the car was so close to so many witnesses on the grassy knoll? To me, to say they did not see it is sort of like all those witnesses in the pantry of the Ambassador Hotel who did not see Sirhan get his handgun to the back of Robert Kennedy’s skull. But in this case they missed a guy with a rifle also.
Furthermore, there is the matter of how this murderous scenario could have been presented to Greer. He had to have known that he was going to be driving a motorcade in the midst of crowds on both sides of him. Consequently, there would be at least scores of witnesses to him turning around and shooting Kennedy. In addition, he had to understand that many of these people would have Kodaks and also movie cameras to capture the moment. So therefore, it would not just be eyewitness testimony – there could be photos and films to prove his treachery. Further, he also knew there would be some law enforcement agents along the path that probably were not involved in the plot. If one of them saw him, and arrested him, and later a photo or film was adduced, Greer would be lost. And for what? Dealey Plaza provided an ideal ambush location for what snipers call an L shaped trap. So how could either the plotters or Greer possibly be convinced to go along with a scenario that was so high-risk for both of them? When it was so unnecessary. This is what I mean about Horne needing an editor. He apparently never thought of any of this.
There is one other thing that I wish to note about Chapter 13. And I think this will provide some insight into where Horne is coming from. The author devotes several pages to a statement by Josiah Thompson from 1988 and a speech Thompson made in 1993. (pp. 1132-1138) I was aware of both of these. And unlike Horne, I saw the speech in person in 1993, rather than watching it on DVD. In 1988, for a PBS Nova program, Thompson made the following comments: “In a homicide case, you get a convergence of the evidence after a while. There may be discrepancies in detail; but on the whole, things come together. With this case – it’s now 25 years – things haven’t gotten any simpler. They haven’t come together. If anything, they’ve become more problematical, more and more mysterious. That just isn’t the way a homicide case develops.” (Horne, p. 1133)
In 1993 at a conference in Chicago, Thompson repeated and amplified on these remarks. He said that it is easy to wreck the Magic Bullet fantasy. But it is much harder to say what actually happened in those six seconds in Dealey Plaza. Further, he said that in most cases – Thompson is now a private investigator – the actual circumstances of the crime are never in doubt. Not like this one. Horne then writes that this speech “really lit a fire under my ass.” (p. 1135) He then writes that this was one of the major reasons he joined up with the ARRB. In order to clear up some of the ambiguities in the record so these uncertainties would be removed. He also says that the reason he felt much of this murkiness existed was because of tainted evidence, and fraud in the record. (ibid)
As I said, I was actually in the audience when Thompson made this speech in Chicago. I had a quite different reaction than Horne’s. It did not light any fire underneath my behind. Quite the contrary. I was disappointed in both the content and tenor of Thompson’s remarks. And so were many others. Thompson was essentially saying that we were no closer to resolving this case than we were in 1967, when his book came out. In fact, we might be further away. (Horne, p. 1134) I strongly disagreed with this evaluation. And I don’t understand why Thompson said it. It is something that might have been scripted by the likes of Paul Hoch or Robert Blakey. And I don’t associate Thompson with either of those men. If you compare the state of the knowledge database in 1993 with 1967, to say there was not a ton of progress made is just plain wrong. It is to deny the contributions of writers like Henry Hurt, George Michael Evica, Howard Roffman, and Tony Summers (among others). It is to say that the investigation of Jim Garrison produced nothing of any evidentiary value. Which is ridiculous. To name just two things of the utmost importance: that inquest revealed the Clinton-Jackson incident, and it uncovered why Oswald was at 544 Camp Street. Even though, at the time, the roles and characters of people like the Paines, David Phillips, and J. Edgar Hoover had not been completely filled in, we clearly had enough information to understand approximately who they were. And through the 1969 testimony of Pierre Finck in New Orleans, we had gained valuable insight into why the autopsy on JFK was so poor. I could go on and on, but I did not accept Thompson’s thesis to any real degree.
I also did not agree with Horne’s major reason why he agreed with this flawed thesis, i.e., fraud in the evidence. Let me say first, there is no doubt that this occurred. And elsewhere, I have noted it. And Horne has pointed some of it out. But to me, this was not the real reason why the case was so unresolved (if one really believed that). To me, the real reason was the cover-up that took place almost immediately by those in charge of the inquiry. This would be, in order: the Dallas Police, the FBI, and the Warren Commission. If this would not have happened, the case would not be so murky. Just to take one example, if Oswald had lived to stand trial, who knows what would have happened? If someone other than Hoover had been in charge at the FBI, he may have cracked open the case. If Earl Warren had been allowed to chose Warren Olney as his Chief Counsel, again, things may have been different.
One thing that has become obvious since the releases of the ARRB, is that no real investigation was going to happen. (And the Powers That Be were not going to let Jim Garrison proceed unimpeded either.) One reason being that the cover up was built into the conspiracy. And unlike Horne, Lifton, and Joan Mellen – who somehow blame RFK for this – I believe the three telltale signs of this plan were all exhibited on that very day: 1.) The murder of Tippit; 2.) The Mexico City charade about Oswald, the Cubans, and Russians; and 3.) The unbelievable control exhibited by the military at the autopsy.
The first made sure the DPD would do all they could to railroad that “cop-killer” Oswald. The second ensured that the national security state would go into CYA mode about Oswald’s alleged dealings with the Russians and Cubans on the eve of the assassination. The third took away any possibility that the true circumstances of how Kennedy was actually killed would ever be revealed.
So to say we were no closer to what happened in 1993 than in 1967, I believe was just wrong. Although I like Tink Thompson and think his book is still a good one, I didn’t agree with what he said at all. To his credit, I think he has changed his tune today.
III
Chapter 14 is Horne’s very long essay on the Zapruder film. How long is it? Try almost 300 pages – 292 to be exact.
Before I get started, let me indicate where I am on this bitterly contested issue. I am an agnostic on this point. For three reasons. First, although there is some interesting stuff out there, I have not seen any overwhelming evidence that convinces me the film has been altered. Second, to me this dispute has the elements of an unnecessary sideshow. Because the film itself contains a variety of evidence revealing a conspiracy. To deny this is to deny reality. The two times the film was shown to a mass audience (i.e., in 1975 on ABC television network, and in 1991 via Oliver Stone’s film JFK), its effect was overpowering. Third, to argue that the film has been altered necessitates a whole other level of proof. Because now you have to, in turn, prove that other films and photos have also been altered. It’s something that I am not interested in spending years doing.
How did Horne and the ARRB get onto the Zapruder alteration business? It appears to be at Horne’s instigation. (p. 1186) Horne suggested an authenticity report be done through Kodak. According to Horne, he did not read the report until after the ARRB dissolved. (ibid) We will get to the results of that report later.
First, like many others in his camp, Horne tries to discount the impact of the film and its indications of conspiracy. (p. 1190) As noted above, I disagree with this. But I do agree that it is not possible to get a precise shot sequence from Zapruder. But I believe the main reason for that is the lack of a soundtrack. Horne then goes to a chronicling of the handling of the film and its first copies in the days right after the shooting. (pp. 1197ff) And here I must note something counter-productive to his argument. If you count up the times Horne describes screenings of the film in the first 24 hours, you will note something puzzling. Abraham Zapruder saw his film four times in 24 hours. His partner Erwin Schwartz saw it three times. Harry McCormack of the Dallas Morning News saw it twice. So did staff members at Kodak.
Which outlines a problem. If all these people saw the film more than once that soon, they had to have seen the original film. To me, that would have been a memorable experience. If the film was altered in any significant way, why did no one ever say it was altered from what they saw on the first day? I sure would have. And the wait was not until 1975. Because during the legal proceedings against Clay Shaw, Jim Garrison ran off many copies of the film for researchers like Penn Jones living in the Dallas area. Further, at the trial of Shaw, Zapruder was a witness. He was asked more than once if the film shown in court was the original. He replied in the affirmative each time. (Trial transcript of 2/13/69)
Horne realizes this is a problem for him. So he does something that I personally had not seen before. He says that when Life went ahead and raised its offer to Zapruder by an additional hundred thousand dollars, this was not just to purchase motion picture rights in addition to still picture rights. This was really to pay out hush money to Zapruder for him to shut up about the movie being altered. (p. 1242) I don’t quite understand this. First, did Dick Stolley – the Time-Life rep with Zapruder – know the film was going to be altered? And did he transmit these oral instructions to Zapruder? If so, what is the evidence for that? Second, once the agreement was signed, Zapruder was going to get his money as long as he did not sell any picture or movie rights on his own. Which he did not. Was there a clause in the contract that forbade him from even speaking about the film? If there was, Horne does not print it. Third, the true monetary value of Zapruder’s film was in the motion picture rights, which the family made tons of money off of, not the still picture rights. So the large increase in the offer seems quite logical – since Zapruder could have made real money by leasing out those rights.
Now, what Time-Life did with the film is reprehensible. Once they had the motion picture rights, they kept the film almost completely hidden for 11 years. (The exception being Garrison’s subpoena for the Shaw trial.) But that does not necessarily denote Horne’s alteration thesis. Most people know that men like Henry Luce and C.D. Jackson of Time-Life were staunch Cold Warrior types who dreamed of an American Century. And like John McCloy, they did not want to give away evidence that turned the USA into a version of a Banana Republic, and the Warren Commission into a kangaroo court. Especially after Life had been used to incriminate Oswald by putting one of the specious backyard photos on its cover, thereby greasing the skids for the Commission. So any dramatic evidence of conspiracy, which the Z film was and is, was going to stay under wraps with these guys.
Let’s get to what Horne considers his best evidence for Zapruder film alteration. I see this as three main issues:
- The “briefing board” matters at NPIC;
- David Lifton’s “full flush left” argument; and
- The “Hollywood Group” and the painted on black patch and head burst.
This first is an issue that Horne has written about previously. (See Murder in Dealey Plaza, (pp. 311-324) What Horne is saying is that what he thinks was the original was first sent to a CIA photographic plant in Rochester called Hawkeye Works, and then forwarded to the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in the Washington area. (Horne, p. 1220) The basis for this are 1997 interviews done by the ARRB with two men named Homer McMahon and Ben Hunter – and later interviews with Dino Brugioni. All three men worked at NPIC in 1963. Hunter worked for and with McMahon. McMahon said that a mysterious man named Bill Smith (not his real name) brought the Zapruder film to NPIC. Smith was supposed to be a Secret Service agent and they wanted the CIA to do an analysis of the film. Smith told McMahon that the original film had been flown from Dallas to a Kodak facility in Rochester, New York. It was developed there and he was delivering copies for analysis. (Horne, p. 1223-24) Briefing boards were made of certain enlarged frames.
Again, let us note that the two men were recalling something that happened 34 years previous – which is always tricky business in measuring credibility. Horne buys it all and says he believes that Bill Smith told the truth about the film he carried to NPIC and it being developed in Rochester. Yet, no one knows who Smith really is, and the ARRB never talked to him. But based on this decades-old testimony, Horne now says that “the extant film in the Archives is not a camera original film, but a simulated “original” created with an optical printer at the CIA’s secret film lab in Rochester.” (p. 1226)
Horne now goes to Brugioni and tries to get some tie-in between what Hunter and McMahon described and what Brugioni recalls. (p. 1231) Now recall, the above testimony is well over 30 years past the event. But Brugioni’s case is even worse. He was not interviewed until 2009! Which is almost half a century after the event. Yet Horne shows no trepidation about using the nearly five-decade-old memories of a man who was 87 years old at the time of the recall.
Brugioni first thought his work on Zapruder began on the night of the assassination. He then changed this to the next day. But he had previously told author David Wrone that he began his work on Sunday, the 24th. (p. 1231) He eventually decided that the start date was Saturday. The actual date of his briefing of Director John McCone would help here, but I could not find any written evidence for this exact date.
What is Horne getting at here? He is saying that these are two distinct events and the end product was two different films. Horne says that the Brugioni film was unaltered and the other McMahon-Hunter film was altered. Altered to what, he doesn’t say. But again, this scenario seems to present a problem. To go through everything the analysts did with the film would mean you would have had to study it. If the Brugioni film was unaltered, then why does no one recall any differences between what they saw at NPIC and what was later revealed in the film we have today? I don’t recall this question being addressed by Horne. Secondly, why on earth would the conspirators on this Zapruder film assignment bring both an altered and unaltered version of the film to the same place at the same time where both versions could be plainly seen and analyzed? Again, I did not see this question addressed by the author.
Why is it not posed? Probably because Horne needs this to be another “compartmentalized” operation. If the film Brugioni worked on for McCone is the same one that McMahon and Hunter got from Smith, then his thesis is pretty much gone. The problem is this: Because of the decades-old recall and the indefiniteness of the start and end dates for all three men, that possibility is a distinct one.
Let us now go to the Horne-Lifton “full flush left” (ffl) argument. What this means is that images on the Zapruder film bleed over into the sprocket area and even over it. Lifton believed this to be proof that the film we have is not the original but a copy, which was printed on an optical printer. Since, as he insisted, the Zapruder camera should not be able to produce this effect. Lifton also said that Kodak expert Roland Zavada had not been able to duplicate this effect in his authentication experiments for the ARRB. In fact, in a talk on You Tube for a conference by Jim Fetzer, Lifton actually said that he would take this ffl evidence “to the bank.”
Well, I hope not too many people took that advice. The check would have been returned for “insufficient funds”. First of all, according to Robert Groden, with an optical printer working one frame at a time with a shuttle mechanism, the image would not be allowed to stray outside the sprocket area. (Communication with Groden, 7/21/10) Further, as Tink Thompson pointed out in a post at the Spartacus Educational site in December of 2009, Zavada did produce frames where this effect was exhibited. But Horne and Lifton only consulted a low resolution B & W version of Zavada’s work, which made it difficult to discern. Thompson added in another post on 1/12/10 that the effect is seen clearly in high-resolution color versions.
Horne and Lifton then said that the experiment would have to produce continuous ffl to have accuracy. The problem here is that, for a second time, the pair seem to have ignored evidence to keep their thesis alive. Horne writes that three or four years ago he received a DVD of a film shot by Rick Janowitz. It was shot in Dealey Plaza on a same type camera as Zapruder’s Bell and Howell. (p. 1290) Horne admits that the film does “appear” to show consistent ffl. Yet he then writes that he has no way of authenticating this film. This is an odd argument to make. Janowitz is a research associate of Dave Healey and Scott Myers, whom Horne and Lifton know of. It would have been easy to call one of them, and in turn to be put in contact with Rick. He would have then testified to the terms of the experiment.
Craig Lamson also got hold of the Janowitz test film. He posted the results on the Spartacus site on January 22, 2010. The experiment shows that you can attain consistent ffl with a camera just like Zapruder’s. And the effect is in agreement with what is on the film.
Horne’s third major argument is that a “black patch” was inserted in the back of Kennedy’s head to conceal an exit wound there, and the front head wound is “painted in”. (ppg. 1358-61) The evidence for this is a group of Hollywood editors and restoration professionals who have made very high resolution scans of the film. Horne includes their comments on these scans: “Oh, that’s horrible, that’s just terrible! That’s such a bad fake.” Another is, “”We’re not looking at opticals; we are looking at artwork.”
Again, there are some problems with this. First, as Robert Groden has stated, you can see a hole in the back of Kennedy’s head in the Zapruder film. So whoever put the “black patch” on, did not do a very good job. Second, Kodachrome II, the film used by Zapruder is, for that time, and that gauge, very high quality film. So when one makes enlarged slides or still pictures from it, much of the information is preserved. If this painted on effect is not visible in 35 mm enlargements or 4 x 5 Ektachrome enlargements, then how could it be so obvious on a digitalized scan? With apprehension and curiosity, I await to see the results. It should be interesting.
Much of the rest of this chapter is Horne’s unrestrained and bitter attack on Roland Zavada. Zavada was the Kodak chemist who the company brought out of retirement to conduct the authenticity study of the film. His report concluded the film was genuine. Horne, the man who instigated the test, didn’t like that. So he wades into Zavada, fists flying. I won’t enumerate all the technical points, since to me they are arcane and somewhat boring. And as I say, I don’t have a dog in this fight. But I was put off by the personal insults Horne hurled at Zavada. On page 1283, he is referred to as “pathological.” On page 1292 he is termed an “intentional saboteur.” On page 1293 Horne scores a two-fer, Zavada is said to be “acting as a CIA agent” and also “to ignore or rewrite history.” He then says the man has destroyed his own credibility and should retire from any further involvement in the debate over the film. (p. 1281) This, from a guy who pushed the full flush left argument when, for years, he had evidence that undermined it.
Maybe the film has been altered. Maybe it hasn’t. As I said, I don’t have a dog in this fight. But the highly inflammatory language Horne uses here does not seem to do justice to this debate. (Click here for Zavada’s reply to Horne.)
IV
The last volume of the series has two chapters to it. Chapter 15 is entitled “The Setup – Planning the Texas Trip and the Dallas Motorcade;” chapter 16 is called simply “Inconvenient Truths.” The first deals with the origination and planning of the trip to Texas by the White House; the second with what Horne perceives to be the motivating factors behind the murder of President Kennedy.
This volume is 425 pages long. I took by far the least amount of notes on it than I did for any volume. If you know this material and have studied Kennedy’s presidency, there is very little that is new or enlightening in it. I feel safe in predicting that no one in the near future is going to do better than Jim Douglass at explaining the political circumstances of President Kennedy’s death. And, to his credit, Horne praises JFK and the Unspeakable. But I found very little original in this volume. And I didn’t think Horne brought any new insights into the material that he profusely borrowed. Further, as we shall see, he made two or three questionable choices in the sources he did use.
The first chapter in the last volume is again partly owed to David Lifton. Lifton believes Lyndon Johnson was an integral part of the plot, and that Jerry Bruno’s advance man work on the motorcade route is important to the workings of the conspiracy.
Like John Hankey, Horne feels that somehow John Connally was an agent of the plot. And that he and LBJ somehow lured Kennedy to Texas in the fall of 1963. How President Kennedy could be lured into doing something he did not want to do as major as this, escapes me. But this seems to be the premise of this chapter. Arthur Schlesinger, for one, did not see it that way. He wrote that, as the election approached, Kennedy looked to Johnson for help in Texas. He specifically wanted him to use his influence to help stop the warring factions of the Texas Democratic party. This meant the liberal and conservative wings as represented respectively by Sen. Ralph Yarborough and Governor Connally. (A Thousand Days, p. 1019) Ted Sorenson says much the same thing about the genesis of the Texas excursion: “His trip to Texas…was a journey of reconciliation – to harmonize the warring factions of Texas Democrats, to dispel the myths of the right-wing in one of its strongest citadels, and to broaden the base for his own re-election in 1964.” (Kennedy, p. 843) From these two men, who were both quite close to Kennedy, and worked with him at the White House, JFK wanted to go to Texas for quite practical political reasons.
But Horne sees it as otherwise. And he uses John Connally’s article in Life magazine of 11/24/67 to indict the governor. He goes after Connally for saying that he was not all that eager for Kennedy to go to Texas. (p. 1386) Which considering the fact he was much more moderate than Kennedy, and the ugly incident that had just occurred with Adlai Stevenson being spat upon, is kind of understandable. Horne counters this with a quote from Evelyn Lincoln’s book, Kennedy and Johnson, in which she writes that Kennedy told her that Connally seemed anxious for JFK to go. (ibid) But Horne does not supply the timeline for this quote. The reality as pointed out in our Hankey exposé is that Connally (who had become the point man with the White House on the excursion). (ibid, p. 1387) was reluctant at first, but once persuaded, was eager to get it over and done with as quickly as possible (Jim Reston, The Lone Star: The Life of John Connally pp. 240-260)
Connally and LBJ are not enough for Horne. He entitles one sub-chapter, “The Crucial role of Congressman Al Thomas in Luring JFK to Texas and Why It Matters.” Let’s be upfront about this: In Best Evidence, Lifton shows pictures of Thomas looking at Johnson after he was sworn in on Air Force One. Thomas appears to wink at LBJ after he has taken the oath. Consequently, this means he is part of the plot. Question: What if he had just shook hands with Johnson? What would that have meant to Horne and Lifton? More or less?
In talks with Jim Marrs, he has told me that it is not necessarily true that the choice of the Trade Mart necessitated the dogleg turns in Dealey Plaza. He has told me that all that was necessary was to place a relatively short wood platform on the road and the motorcade could have accessed the freeway from Main Street. (Horne, p. 1397) Connally opposed a parade route. The parade route was specifically organised by Secret Service men Winston Lawson and Forrest Sorrels, who overrode the Dallas authorities they were supposed to plan it with. Horne also makes much of the insistence by Connally of having the luncheon at the Trade Mart instead of the Women’s Center. Yes, the latter could accommodate more people, but Connally’s image as a business-oriented Democrat could be said it was more in keeping with the Trade Mart, Connally loudly voiced security concerns about the final venue’s size, referring to the Trade Mart’s balcony and 53 entrances. He was also uninformed of the actual parade route (WCR pp.27-30; Vince Palamara: Survivors Guilt pp.2-9)
To his credit, Horne uses much of Vince Palamara’s good work on the Secret Service and their incredible negligence in making the assassination possible. For instance, the number of motorcycles was reduced and, weirdly, they were placed to the rear. (p. 1401) And that this decision was later falsely placed on the president. He also mentions the quite curious behavior of Secret Service agent Emory Roberts in ordering Henry Rybka off the fender of the presidential limousine at Love Field. (p. 1410)
But after relaying this good information, Horne does something puzzling. He feels he has to justify why the Secret Service did what it did. So he then includes a weird section in which he uses the work of Sy Hersh and his thoroughly discredited hatchet job of a book, The Dark Side of Camelot. He tries to say that the agents resented covering up for Kennedy’s affairs and this caused “deep-seated feelings of disapproval and disloyalty” among the White House detail. (p. 1421) But not only does Horne use the Hersh book, he also uses the pitiful ABC documentary derived from it, Dangerous World. But even worse, he actually takes both of these seriously. All the way down the line.
Yet, right around when this show was broadcast, Probe did a two part series on this general subject. (Probe, Vol. 4 No. 6, Vol. 5 No. 1) It was entitled “The Posthumous Assassination of John F. Kennedy”. It was one of the most popular and influential essays we ever published. It went directly after both ABC and Hersh. And we exposed Hersh as being the long-term CIA asset he has always been. And we showed the serious flaws in Hersh’s book. But after all that, Horne wades into this dangerous morass and uses the most ridiculous parts of Hersh, e.g., that Kennedy had nude skinny-dipping swim parties at the White House when Jackie was away. It should be noted that some of the show’s charges were so outrageous, that the ARRB investigated them. They found out two interesting things: that one of Hersh’s sources would not testify under oath, and secondly, that he seemed to have been recruited for Hersh by another CIA friendly writer, namely Gus Russo.
Horne’s indiscriminate use of material is capped by his acceptance of one of the most dubious tales in the literature: the assassination eve gathering at the Murchison ranch. Not only does Horne buy it, but he uses the most updated version of it, that is with J. Edgar Hoover and John McCloy in attendance. (p. 1429) As Seamus Coogan noted in his essay on Alex Jones, this is hard to believe since both men were in Washington the next morning. Horne borrows heavily for this from what I think is Harry Livingstone’s worst book, Killing the Truth. For many of the ‘revelations’ in that book, Livingstone used a nameless man whom he simply called ‘the source.’ Uh-huh.
But Horne also uses two other questionable source books in the Texas aspect of his overall conspiracy. They are at about the level of the Livingstone book, maybe worse: Craig Zirbel’s The Texas Connection and Barr McClellan’s Blood, Money, and Power. (The latter is part of Alex Jones’ scripture on the JFK case.) To go through all the problems in using these two books would take an essay about half as long as this one. But to be brief, Horne wants to use Zirbel, because he describes an argument between Kennedy and Johnson about who is going to ride where in the motorcade. Allegedly, Johnson wanted to move Ralph Yarborough into the presidential limousine and have Connally ride with him. This would make no sense according to Schlesinger’s view of the whole enterprise, since the objective was to mend over the moderate vs. liberal split. According to Zirbel this happened on Thursday evening when LBJ entered Kennedy’s suite and has a knock-down, drag-out argument with him. One that was so loud that “the First Lady heard the shouting in the next room.” (Zirbel, pp. 190-91)
There are three problems with this as I see it. First, it must have been really late at night since the entourage did not arrive at the Fort Worth hotel from Houston until after 11: 15 PM. (See William Manchester, Death of a President, pp. 88-89) How would this allow for Johnson to get to the Murchison gathering at any kind of decent hour? And if it was that kind of scene, would not people notice him going out the front or back door afterwards? Or did he really go back upstairs to his room, and then sneak out even later?
Second, if this was the reason for the meeting, why would LBJ confront JFK with it directly? Wouldn’t it be more clever and less risky to just pull a last minute switch the next day? After all, according to Horne, the Secret Service is part of the plot. If Kennedy would object the next morning, at least it could be chalked up to a Secret Service error and not to LBJ.
Third, this whole nasty argument takes about a page in Zirbel’s book. Not one sentence is footnoted. But what Zirbel seems to have done is switched a meeting Manchester wrote about on the night before, that is on the 20th, to the 21st. (Manchester, p. 82) I think he failed to footnote it so you would not notice that he had lifted it and switched it from Manchester. Obviously if you switch it to Thursday night, you make it more sinister and it helps explain a conspiratorial problem for the Texas angle. Namely, if Connally and LBJ were part of the plot, why on earth would they allow Connally to be in the direct line of fire, from both the front and back? So by moving it to the night before, Zirbel makes it look like LBJ was trying to prevent that dilemma for his partner, Connally.
Horne hints at what Zirbel did, but he does not spell it out. (Horne, p. 1428) He also says that Manchester was not forthcoming about the details of this confrontation from the night before. But if you compare the two renditions of the two episodes, it is clear that Zirbel has borrowed much of what he writes from Manchester. Manchester wrote that the discussion was about Kennedy’s concern for Yarborough not being slighted. Zirbel expanded this into the seating arrangement argument. But since he does not footnote his version, we don’t know what his basis was for doing that. But most of the other details seem derived from Manchester.
Why Horne would source Barr McClellan’s book Blood, Money and Power is a complete puzzle to me. Seamus Coogan was criticized by George Bailey who runs the “Oswald’s Mother” site about his reference to the McClellan book as the worst in the last 15 years. Bailey said that no, Case Closed was the worst. Since the Posner book was published more than 15 years ago, Bailey was off base. Perhaps Reclaiming History could then qualify. But then, how many people have read that whole book? The McClellan book did get some publicity. This is unfortunate since it really is a very bad book. (One must differentiate between the book and the annex by the late Nathan Darby on the fingerprint evidence.)
One of the problems with it is that there is very little annotation to all of the most sensational charges. For instance, the author states that LBJ went into psychotherapy toward the end of his life and confessed to his doctor that he was behind the murder of President Kennedy. (McClellan, p. 3) What is his source for this? Not the doctor himself, nor any written report. It’s a conversation he said he had with a partner in Johnson’s law firm, Don Thomas. The obvious questions are twofold 1.) Why would the partner reveal this to McClellan? And 2.) Why would LBJ tell the partner? If you can believe it, the author says that Johnson wanted to somehow elevate his reputation out of the Vietnam gutter, and this is why he claimed credit for Kennedy’s murder. (ibid, pp. 283-84)
The entire text of the book is like this. One gets these sensational disclosures, and then one searches in vain for the backing in the End Notes. We are to believe that LBJ learned about the art of assassination from the attempt on FDR. (ibid p. 39) Thomas told McClellan that he was involved in the famous stealing of the 1948 senatorial election by LBJ from Coke Stevenson. Then you go to the sourcing. This is what it says: “The information came in many ways. Over drinks after work, during the firm parties, at early Saturday morning coffee, and just the daily office talk.” (ibid,p. 350) Sorry, not good enough.
McClellan later says that his boss, attorney Ed Clark, brokered a deal with Joe Kennedy to put LBJ on the 1960 ticket. When one looks for the sourcing on this, you will find: “The deal was advertised to clients on several occasions…” (ibid, p. 356)
But this is nothing compared to how McClellan deals with the actual facts of the assassination. He says that Clark started the plot going in 1962 by looking for a second sniper – the first of course being Mac Wallace. And he called Leon Jaworksi for help. When one goes to the footnote for this, you will find: “”Despite several solid leads and close ties to Clark, the better course for the present is to withhold judgment pending further research and strong corroborating evidence. At this time our leads are through Jaworksi and Cofield, and our key suspects fit into the Clark modus operandi. The accomplices may never be identified with certainty.” (ibid, p. 358) In other words, he has nothing to back up this assumption.
Later on McClellan writes that he doesn’t know how Wallace met Oswald, but they did meet, “and that they were together on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository when Kennedy was shot.” (ibid, p. 179) There is next to no evidence that Oswald was on the sixth floor that day. But further, the author then makes up a scenario for Wallace meeting Oswald. The problem is that it takes place at a print shop in Dallas in late 1962. Yet, Oswald did not print any flyers at that time! So how could it happen? (ibid, p. 267)
Further, in defiance of the ballistics evidence, the author has Oswald firing at Edwin Walker and killing Tippit. (ibid, pp. 211, 267) And in further defiance of the puzzling postal records, the author says Oswald ordered the murder weapons. (ibid, p. 267)
Backing up the whole Penn Jones/Madeleine Brown scenario, McClellan goes with the Murchison murder gathering on the eve of the assassination. (ibid, p. 271) During which the infamous ads that ran in the papers were on poster on the walls. And Mr. Clark predicted that very soon LBJ would be the new president. Cheers broke out among the partygoers. So now, even more details have been added to this ever-evolving story about the gathering.
McClellan says he has found out how Clark was paid for the operation. (p. 234) To say his evidence is unconvincing is to give it too much credit. He then says that although Mac Wallace died in a car accident, he was actually killed by people associated with Clark. (p. 242) This is his evidence: “The medical report shows extensive physical injuries that are not consistent with the damages to the auto.” (ibid, p. 362) This is weird because McClellan says that Wallace was in a weakened state by attempted carbon monoxide poisoning, and this is what caused the accident. How could that attempted poisoning cause “extensive physical injuries”.
Maybe someday someone will write a convincing and scholarly book on Johnson’s involvement in the JFK murder. But these two fall far short of that mark. And Horne should not have used them, since by doing so he implicitly recommends them. They are not worth recommending. Not by a longshot. In fact, once analyzed, they are the kinds of books that can be used to caricature researchers.
V
The last chapter in the book is titled “Inconvenient Truths.” In it, Horne tries to…well…it is hard to say what he is trying to do. I think he is trying to explain why the parts of the government turned on Kennedy. Specifically, the Pentagon, J. Edgar Hoover, and parts of the CIA – he specifically names James Angleton, David Phillip, Dave Morales, and Ed Lansdale as being in on the plot. (pp. 1628-47) And he tries to make it clear that his version is not just a Texas based one. For him, LBJ and Hoover are enablers. (p. 1800)
In this last chapter, I think Horne was trying to pull off what Jim Douglass did so memorably in his fine book, JFK and The Unspeakable. That is, he tries to define what made Kennedy a marked man in the eyes of some. Considering this section is almost 300 pages long and JFK and the Unspeakable is 393 pages of text, Horne sure had the space to do it in. In my opinion, he doesn’t even come close. As compared to Douglass’ original, smooth, and pungent approach, I thought much of Horne’s analysis was rather trite, dull, and in some places, coarse. For example, apparently still under the influence of Hersh’s trashy book, he writes that Hoover was a closeted homosexual who prosecuted gays yet engaged in “bizarre sex with other men in private that would have destroyed his career immediately if it had become publicly known. He despised John F. Kennedy first of all simply because Jack Kennedy was somewhat of a satyr, and loved being with women.” (p. 1496) Like many things in the book, this is not footnoted. Having read most of the important bios of Hoover, I don’t recall reading this in any of the four standards (by Powers, Theoharis, Gentry and Summers). I don’t even recall it in Tony Summers’ book, which actually concentrates on Hoover’s sex life. Now Horne inserts this questionable data in his text, yet I could not find any place where he mentions Oswald’s likely status as an FBI informant as a real reason for Hoover’s willingness to cooperate in the cover-up.
In this long last inchoate section, Horne relies almost completely on John Newman for his Vietnam material, even though we now have a small shelf of books on this issue, including books by David Kaiser and Howard Jones. He spends an inordinate amount of space on the Missile Crisis, and in my view, he slights the Bay of Pigs episode. At one point he actually says that JFK seemed “indecisive and unresponsive” during the Bay of Pigs. (p. 1534) I believe this is wrong in and of itself, but beyond that, it does not incorporate the fact that Kennedy did not fully understand what the CIA was doing to him until after the fact. Further, I actually believe that he never really understood that, in fact, if the invasion had succeeded, the Agency was not going to let the Kennedy Cubans take power in a new Cuba. In his discussion of the famous Harry Truman anti-CIA editorial of December 1963, Horne was unaware of the new bombshell revelations about Allen Dulles’ visit to Truman while he was on the Warren Commission. The CIA Director actually tried to get him to retract the essay.
Some of the elements that Horne throws in here as motivations for the conspiracy are just, well, kind of weird. I mean the Edward Teller-Robert Oppenheimer dispute over atomic energy? Never heard of that one in any JFK book. But somehow, Horne puts it in here. (p. 1680) Kennedy’s directive to seek out cooperation with the Russians on a voyage to the moon? Horne throws that in the mixer also. (p. 1681) And some of the political commentators he uses on the case are just as unusual. Whoever thought that we would see Noam Chomsky quoted in a pro-conspiracy book? Does Gary Hart strike one as being a profound thinker on the gestalt of the JFK case? Well, Horne seems to think so. (pp. 1672-74)
Then there are the rather jarring and simplistic errors, which betray the author’s need for both a proofreader and an editor. He calls Gaeton Fonzi’s wonderful and invaluable book about the HSCA, The Final Investigation. The author of the quasi-official history of the Bay of Pigs operation is called Dryden, when his last name is Wyden. The legendary CBS journalist – who George Clooney made a whole movie about – becomes William Morrow. And he ends, rather predictably, with an unwarranted slam at the Kennedy family. (p. 1767) The evidence of this last hodge-podge chapter shows that Horne’s reach exceeded his grasp.
I have been at pains to show what was valuable in this book. And there is much of value, if you are willing to spend a lot of time sifting through five volumes. How many people are willing to do so? After reading this and Reclaiming History, I think there is a message in the nearly 4,500 total pages. No one should ever write another book on this case as long as these. The length of the Bugliosi book was meant to be intimidating. I mean how could a book that long not be valuable? With Horne, I think he desired to spill out almost everything he felt and knew about the JFK case into one book. Unfortunately, that resulted in a rather unorganized and undisciplined approach – an approach that left out the most important person: the reader.
At the Actor’s Studio in New York there is a famous adage: “Bring it down,” meaning that, the less work expended conveying a thought or emotion, the better. Because, many times, more is not better. It’s just more.
If Inside the ARRB had been half as long, it might have been twice as good.
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Todd Leventhal: The Minister of Diz at Dealey Plaza
TODD LEVENTHAL – MINISTER OF DISINFORMATION
During the Cold War and the hot wars that followed, “disinformation” was the buzz word for the false and deceptive information surreptitiously promoted by communist and foreign intelligence services.
Promoting disinformation wasn’t something that the United States itself did, at least it wasn’t something they wanted anyone to believe they did, as it was discussed by John Barron and others who studied and wrote about the propaganda put out by the Soviets’ official Ministry of Dizinformation.
That the United States doesn’t engage in such psychological warfare is an urban myth quickly dispelled by Todd Leventhal, America’s Minister of Disinformation, whose official title is State Department Counter-Mis and Disinformation Officer. As such Leventhal has been the subject of a spate of recent publicity, especially in regards to debunking conspiracy theories.
We’ve heard from Leventhal before, pushing the Bush foreign agenda, disputing reports that Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq was a false pretense for war, and more recently as the State Department’s spokesman designated to officially debunk conspiracy theories that the federal government considers serious threats-like UFOs, faked moon landings, 9/11 missiles and President Obama’s birth certificate.
Leventhal’s official blog on debunking such “conspiracy theories” serves as fodder for legitimate journalists looking for a good column when news is slow, but most real conspiracy theorists considered him just another media spokesperson for the government, not unlike those who speak for the al Quada and the Taliban, and trusted as much.
But Leventhal recently created a mini-firestorm when some mainstream publications began commenting on his inclusion of the assassination of President Kennedy among the “conspiracy theories” worth debunking, and his ridicule of those who believe anyone other than Lee Harvey Oswald was responsible for the murder of Kennedy.
As the official State Department specialist and spokesperson whose job is to counter-misinformation and disinformation, Leventhal’s blog (since suspended but archived under Rumors, Myths and Fabrications1) touches on a number of controversial subjects, including AIDS, the moon landing and the war in Iraq, but the subject of the Kennedy assassination seems to have struck the most sensitive nerve.
THE MIS & THE DISINFORMED
On Leventhal’s official State Department web site, under the banner of “Countering Misinformation,” it is noted that, “The purpose of this webpage is to counter misinformation,” which is defined in parenthesis as “unintentional mistakes.” Their mission is also to counter “conspiracy theories, urban legends, and disinformation,” which also rates the definition of “deliberate falsehoods and distortions.”
Originally disinformation, as explained by John Barron2, was defined as not only “deliberate falsehoods and distortions,” but contained the caveat that the deliberate falsehoods and distortions were the product of a foreign intelligence network.
It was technically defined as “Deliberately misleading information announced publicly or leaked by a government or especially by an intelligence agency for the purpose of influencing public opinion or the government in another nation.”
Definition of Disinformation 3
While some frequent users of the word5 have adopted it and use it frequently to apply to anyone they happen to disagree with, the classical definition will be used here, in order to distinguish those who actually are agents and/or assets of a government intelligence function.
There are clearly identifiable and categorizable disinformation agents who promote real disinformation about the assassination of President Kennedy – intentionally wrong information meant to deceive for the purpose of influencing public opinion and the government at the behest of an intelligence agency. Issac Don Levine, Priscilla Johnson McMillan, David Atlee Phillips, Virginia Prewett, Hugh Aynesworth, Max Holland, Edward J. Epstein and Gus Russo come to mind right away.6
But there are others who echo the same Lone Nut theme who are not so obviously connected to an intelligence apparatus and, for psychological or personal reasons, appear to be just spouting plain old misinformation. In light of the strict, classical definition above, this would include academics like John McAdams, Ken Rahn and some of their cohorts like Dave Reitzes and David Von Pein. They all maintain the hoary misinformation of Oswald being both the sole assassin and a Lone Nut case, when it can be proved he was a Covert Operative and designated Patsy, as he claimed to be.7
As the official US Government web page on the subject explains, “Some groups and individuals spread disinformation deliberately, often to try to achieve a political purpose. The media and others can make errors due to sloppiness, misunderstanding, or urgent deadline pressures, resulting in misinformation that may linger long after the initial error has been corrected.”
So disinformation is deliberately wrong and has an intentional purpose, while misinformation is just plain wrong because people make mistakes or are often just wrong. So far so good, but then Todd Leventhal makes a big leaping jump when he says that, “Conspiracy theorists believe that vast, powerful, evil forces secretly manipulate events that actually have much less dramatic causes. Many believe urban legends, which often circulate by word of mouth or the Internet, because they put a widespread fear, hope, or suspicion into story form.”8
Leventhal goes from trying to correct mistakes and clearly wrong perceptions to branding most of the people of the world as irrational zombies who will believe anything and “spread fear, hope and suspicion into story form?”
Now they estimate that 75 to 80% of the people are so-called “conspiracy theorists,”9 and he’s put all conspiracy theories together in one big heap, even though, as John Judge likes to say, “not all conspiracies are created equal. “
And as the official government conspiracy debunking web site puts it, “Some topics have been the subject of misinformation and disinformation for decades. There are many myths about depleted uranium, probably because people mistakenly associate it with weapons-grade uranium or fuel-grade uranium, which are much more dangerous substances. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Milosevic’s Yugoslavia, and others have deliberately fanned these unwarranted fears. Soon after AIDS was first recognized, conspiracy theories began to appear blaming the U.S. government or others for this mysterious new disease. As Russian officials later admitted, the Soviet disinformation apparatus concocted false allegations about AIDS, blaming it on non-existent Pentagon experiments.”
Now there we have it, REAL Dizinformation – the now dizolved “Soviet dizinformation apparatus concocted false allegations about AIDS, blaming it on non-existent Pentagon experiments.” Now that’s REAL disinformation, as it is traced directly to the Soviets’ “disinformation apparatus.”10
But then there’s that “misinformation,” or mainstream media that repeats the disinformation or otherwise wrong stories, such as “Television programs and newspaper articles repeating totally false organ and eye trafficking allegations won the most prestigious journalism prizes in France in 1995 and in Spain in 1996.”
So people like to buy sensational stories like those on organ traffickers, and it wasn’t the first time that mainstream news editors and journalists were fooled, and prizes given out for bogus articles, as it happens all the time. Just off the top of my head I can think of three cases of Pulitzer Prize winning stories being proven false and the prizes retracted. 11
But it’s not just such false sensational stories that people soak up, there’s the false 9/11 stories, as Leventhal points out. “After the September 11 attacks, conspiracy theories and urban legends arose, including one that falsely claimed that no Jews had died at the World Trade Center because they had been forewarned. In each of these cases and many others, it is possibly to demonstrate the falsity of these charges to fair-minded observers. That is what this webpage seeks to do.”
Well okay, that’s a good mission, as stated – to demonstrate the falsity of such charges to fair-minded observers, but that’s not all Leventhal is doing.
But not many people would have even noticed the web site or what Leventhal was really doing if it wasn’t for some mainstream media stories, such as the one in the Scottish Daily Record, which announced (from the Daily Record- Best of Scottish News 17 August 2010)12 Leventhal with the headline that “White House launches new web site to debunk conspiracy theories.” Since the article is so short, I will quote it in its entirety:
“The White House has launched an official bid to shoot down conspiracy theories,” the Scottish news wrongfully announced, as Todd Leventhal’s position at the State Department preceded the reign of the Obama administration. Now that’s just plain old misinformation the Scotts on the other side of the pond just didn’t know.
The news story continued that,
“A new website aims to counter claims that the US government have been involved in top-secret plots and sensational cover-ups,” then zooming right in on the Kennedy assassination angle.
“The Conspiracy Theories and Misinformaiton page – posted by the US equivalent of the Foreign Office – insists that Lee Harvey Oswald killed John F. Kennedy alone, and that the Pentagon was not hit by a cruise missile on 9/11.”
For some reason they can’t discuss the JFK assassination alone, they have to mix it in with 9/11 or UFOs or Marilyn Monroe.
“The site also says officials have not covered up the existence of aliens and the moon landings were not faked and filmed in Hollywood. The internet has led to an explosion of outlandish theories and rumors about the US Government.”
Again dumping all “conspiracy theories” into one big heap, the article quotes the web sites as saying, “Conspiracy theories exist in the realm of myth, where imaginations run wild, fears trump facts and evidence is ignored.”
Then the article quotes our good friend and Lobster13 publisher Robin Ramsay, “an expert in conspiracy theories,” who said: “It will have about as much effect as a site appealing for sexual abstinence amidst the internet’s oceans of porn.”
Indeed, few would have noticed Leventhal’s web site and behind the scenes work if it wasn’t for these news stories, and Leventhal will certainly not convince the 80% of the world who are conspiracy theorists that they are wrong about the assassination of President Kennedy.
As John Judge noted at that point, “In the official U.S. government website devoted to debunking conspiracy theories, JFK is lumped with all the nonsense of course,” and “we are allowed to believe anything but know nothing.”14
TODD LEVENTHAL – DEEP BACKGROUND
Todd Leventhal is profiled on official web sites as “the Department of State’s expert in this area,” and a professional who “has 12 years of experience in researching and countering disinformation, misinformation, urban legends, and conspiracy theories. He is available to respond to reasonable comments and requests in this area, and will do his best to provide accurate, authoritative information.”
On his archived blog page, under About the Author, it is noted that, “Todd Leventhal is the (State) Department’s expert on conspiracy theories and misinformation – stories that are untrue, but widely believed. He enjoys reading obituaries, which tell the personal stories of people who have shaped the fabric of American life. Todd became interested in international affairs after a four-month trip to the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India in 1972. He worked for Voice of America for seven years and bikes to work year-round.”
Under Full Biography, it adds nothing, but elsewhere15 we learn that he is Harvard educated and his office bureaucratically comes under “The International Information Programs Bureau of the U.S. Department of State” and has a small, two-person team, composed of Todd Leventhal and Sarah Womer, “who counter false stories.”
Todd Leventhal himself elaborated on his background when he wrote that,
“My interest in disinformation and misinformation has its roots in a four-month trip I took in 1972 to the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The Soviet Union’s militarization, lack of freedom, and gloominess made a huge impression on me and I began to read as much as I could about the Soviet Union and communism and decided to make this my career interest. After studying Soviet affairs, I moved to Washington, DC and eventually found a job countering Soviet disinformation at the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1987. The Soviets had a sizable bureaucracy dedicated to churning out lies about the United States and other countries. We were busy responding to requests from U.S. embassies to provide them with material to refute lies about the United States that had appeared in the local media. It was satisfying work and in 1988 I wrote and edited the USIA report Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost, in response to a request from the U.S. House of Representatives for a report on this issue. ëActive measures’ was the term the Soviet foreign intelligence service, the KGB, used for its clandestine political influence operations, which relied heavily on spreading disinformation.”
“In 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, his regime spread a great deal of disinformation about its occupation of Kuwait and the U.S. effort to help protect Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the Gulf and liberate Kuwait. I began to counter Iraqi disinformation and was the main U.S. official doing so during the Gulf War and its aftermath.”
(You can find material he wrote during that time here.16)
“Later, in 1999,” Leventhal continues,
“I wrote a monograph recounting these events, Iraqi Propaganda and Disinformation During the Gulf War: Lessons for the Future, which was published by the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research in the United Arab EmiratesÖ. After the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991, I wrote a report in 1992, Soviet Active Measures in the “Post Cold War” Era, which explained the more sophisticated and conciliatory political influence operations of the Gorbachev era.”
(This report has been posted on the Internet.17)
“After the Soviet Union collapsed, the main part of my efforts shifted to countering misinformation about the United States, especially what we called the ëbaby parts’ rumor. This rumor, which has first burst into the world media in 1987, falsely claimed that Americans or others were kidnapping or adopting children from Latin America or other regions to use in organ transplants. Despite the fact that there was no truth whatsoever to this story, it spread all over the world. I wrote about the “baby parts” rumor in a 1994 USIA report to the United Nations The Child Organ Trafficking Rumor: a Modern Urban Legend.”
“In 1996, I was displaced from my job in a reduction-in-force within USIA and did not return to countering misinformation and disinformation until October 2002, when I came to the Department of State (USIA became part of the Department of State in 1999), to resume my previous job. I countered misinformation and disinformation during the 2003 war in Iraq, and have continued since then.”
Leventhal shows us that fighting propaganda, mis and disinformation, and dishing it out, is a bi-partisan affair, and it doesn’t matter if the White House is occupied by a Republican or Democrat, conservative or liberal, the civil servant’s job goes on.
While the JFK assassination may have sparked the most recent public interest and response to Leventhal’s government work, others have written and complained about him before, especially journalist Larry Chin and investigative reporter Wayne Madsen.
In a 2006 story headlined, “Call the US State Department’s –counter-misinformation’ office what it actually is: official misinformation,”18 Chin wrote:
The US State Dept.’s “counter-misinformation” office headed by Todd Leventhal is the subject of a nationally syndicated article originally published in the Hartford Courant, and reprinted in major papers, including the San Francisco Chronicle. Leventhal, and the Bush administration’s “truth ministry” (the US State Department “Identifying Misinformation” Web Site) was previously exposed by Wayne Madsen as a shameless attack and cover-up apparatus. Madsen himself is the target of many of Leventhal’s attacks. Since Madsen’s 1995 expose, Leventhal’s ministry has obviously remained busy. Among Leventhal’s current targets, all of which he concludes (as an official asset of the US government) are myths: 9/11 “conspiracy theories,” US plans to invade Venezuela, and the US creation of Osama bin Laden.
Historians, investigators, journalists, researchers and academics know full well that a great number of Leventhal’s targeted items, notably the above, are not myths, “urban legends” or “conspiracy theories,” but fact, proven by official US government documents and credible mainstream news reports. The site identifies what issues this administration considers threatening enough to “debunk”— i.e. cover up, deny, and discredit. It identifies groups and individuals that the government wishes to undermine.
It is also no surprise that Leventhal’s office has resorted to a familiar trick: lump genuine facts and real history into one cesspool along with bad, genuinely “crackpot” material, so that the important facts and real history are flushed down the pipe. Anything deemed to be damaging to the image of the US government is fair game. This includes documented facts.
The site goes out of its way, for instance, to label John Perkins’ book, Confessions of an Economic Hitman, a work of fiction. The book details how Perkins sabotaged the economies of various nations while in the employ of the National Security Agency (NSA). Perkins responded to the State Department’s web site: “Their mission statement is a lie. So when they use their mission statement to say my book is a lie, I think it speaks for itself.”
The very existence of this “truth ministry” speaks volumes about what this country has become, and how low this administration has stooped. Again, see the original expose by Wayne Madsen.
The government has devoted an enormous apparatus (which includes the State Department, the CIA, a corporate media, a corrupted educational system, and more) to control what you think, openly manipulate reality, and cover up its malfeasance.
In Wayne Madsen’s April, 2005 article19 on Leventhal, titled: Bush administration’s “Ministry of Truth” attacks American journalists who fail to adhere to the official line, Madsen wrote:
After revelations that the Bush White House cleared a gay male prostitute as a daily credentialed member of the White House press corps and that the administration was paying journalistic shills like Armstrong Williams, Maggie Gallagher, Michael McManus, and Karen Ryan to pump out pro-Bush propaganda to the media, nothing should come as any surprise when it comes to the Fourth Estate’s buckling under to political pressure from the right-wing regime that rules America.
What is surprising is that, in addition to using the media to concoct favorable propaganda, the Bush administration maintains an office in the State Department that keeps an eye on American and other journalists and does not hesitate to attack them for straying from the party line. To show how much censorship exists in America today, this journalist would have likely never known about the existence of a one-man office in the State Department that acts to debunk and attack anything the Bush administration deems is false. Thanks to a recent report by veteran America watcher and journalist Jyri Raivio in Finland’s Helsingin Sanomat newspaper, it can now be reported in the United States that the State Department uses taxpayers’ money to attack American journalists who refuse to parrot the Bush administration’s disinformation and propaganda.
The head of the State Department’s Counter Mis-Information ëTeam’ is Todd Leventhal, a long-time neoconservative propaganda operative who once worked for the U.S. Information Agency’s (USIA) Bureau of Information to counter Soviet and other disinformation with his own Brand X of American disinformation. Raivio reports that Leventhal was part of the Bush administration’s effort to convince the world that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction {WMD). Leventhal also contends in the Helsingin Sanomat report that any suggestion that false WMD intelligence was cooked up by the Bush administration is merely a conspiracy theory and that the faulty intelligence on Iraqi WMD was merely a huge mistake.
Although he is basically a one-man show (he does have a full-time assistant and one part-timer), Leventhal does not seem to produce much for his work at the State Department. Leventhal was actually laid off by the State Department in 1996 after his Cold War-era counter-disinformation office was disestablished, but he was rehired in October 2003 after the White House decided to resurrect its propaganda effort under the rubric of ëstrategic influence operations.’ Leventhal’s attacks are narrowly focused on particular stories, sources, and journalists. His web site has an explanation of how to spot disinformation ó Leventhal contends that most conspiracy theories are rarely true and that they are spread by ideological extremists, that is liberals, because right-wingers like Leventhal would never be willing to address right-wing extremism (such as Fox News, the National Review, and The Wall Street Journal editorial page) in the media. Leventhal’s dismissing conspiracies as often untrue will, nevertheless, come as a great shock to the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, which has put away many a criminal based on violation of criminal conspiracy laws.Ö..
… … In what is frightening and amusing at the same time, Leventhal makes an offer to those who have questions about the news stories they are reading: ëIf you wish, ask us. We can’t respond to all requests for information, but if a request is reasonable and we have the time, we will do our best to provide accurate, authoritative information.’ The State Department’s website provides Leventhal’s phone number for those who wish to have him interpret the news for them: 202-203-7492. Just another friendly service from your taxpayer-funded Ministry of Truth!
THE MINISTER OF DIZ AT DEALEY PLAZA
That’s all a lead in to what the official government Minister of Mis and Disinformation has to say about the assassination of President Kennedy.
Last July on his blog 20, which is called “Rumors, Myths and Fabrications, Leventhal wrote, “Last week, I did a Web chat on conspiracy theories, in which I was surprised by the number of questions on the Kennedy assassination.
TRANSCRIPT OF WEB CHAT ON CONSPIRACY THEORIES –
FOUR QUESTIONS on JFK Assassination:
Q [Gerak]: Is the assassination of Kennedy a conspiracy?
Q [Olabisi]: the Mafia and US Govt killed Kennedy and not Oswald. That’s what I believe
Q [tito]: how about jfk assassination
Q [Alan]: The true story behind the Kenndey assassination. Rumour has it that the CIA plotted the murder.
A [Todd Leventhal]: The true story behind the Kennedy assassination is that Lee Harvey Oswald, acting as a lone assassin, killed President Kennedy.
A [Todd Leventhal]: The most comprehensive book on this subject is “Reclaiming History: The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy” by Vincent Bugliosi, published in 2007. In this 2,700-page book (which includes the attached CD)”, Bugliosi establishes clearly that Oswald acted alone.
A [Todd Leventhal]: From an early age, Oswald was a bitter, angry loner, ill-suited to working with, much less taking orders, from others. In grade school, he refused to salute the American flag. At age 13, he told his school psychiatrist “I dislike everybody.” He quit or was fired from every job he ever held, except the factory job he had in the Soviet Union. He defected to the USSR in 1959, requesting Soviet citizenship “because I am a Communist,” complaining that he “lived in a decadent capitalist society, where the workers are slaves.” Even after returning to the United States in 1962, Oswald remained strongly pro-Communist, idealizing Cuban communism-not the type of person who would be likely to want to work for the CIA, or whom they would be likely to entrust with the most sensitive mission imaginable.
A [Todd Leventhal]: The KGB observed Oswald while he was in the USSR and concluded that he was a “mediocre, uninteresting, useless man,” in the words of Vladimir Semichastny, who headed the KGB when Oswald lived in the USSR. Semichastny added, “I had always respected the CIA and FBI, and we knew their work and what they were capable of. It was clear that Oswald was not an agent, couldn’t be an agent, for the CIA or FBI,” noting that “Oswald’s actions in Minsk [where he lived in the USSR] were not those of a foreign agent. His primary interest was in attending dances.”
A [Todd Leventhal]: Bugliosi cites one of Oswald’s friends when he lived in Fort Worth, Texas, George de Mohrenschildt, who wrote: I never would believe that any government would be stupid enough to trust Lee with anything important … an unstable individual, mixed-up individual, uneducated individual, without background. What government would give him any confidential work? No government would.
A [Todd Leventhal]: In April 1963, Oswald attempted to kill retired General Edwin Walker, a fierce anti-Communist.This was the act characteristic of an unstable individual who hated anti-Communists, not that of a government agent. In August 1963, he planned to hijack a plane to Cuba-not a likely activity for a U.S. government agent. In September, he travelled to Mexico City, visiting both the Cuban and Soviet embassies in an unsuccessful attempt to travel to Cuba-the act of someone who hated America, not a U.S. government agent.
A [Todd Leventhal]: Bugliosi also points out that Oswald had no help from any co-conspirators when attempting to flee after killing President Kennedy, taking a bus and then a cab back to his room in Dallas.
A [Todd Leventhal]: Oswald only had a total of $183.87 to his name when he killed President Kennedy. He lived in a tiny (1.5 meters by four meters) room, which he rented for eight dollars per week. Nobody had paid him big bucks to be a hit man.
A [Todd Leventhal]: Oswald lived in a world of grandiose, make-believe delusions. He thought the USSR would be paradise; later Cuba. He told his wife that someday he would be “prime minister” of the United States – a job that has never existed. He was a nut obsessed with making his mark in history, which he, tragically, did, all by himself.
(Read more from the above quoted Web chat here.)
You would think that the official government spokesman on misinformation, disinformation and conspiracy theories would quote the Warren Report or the Final Report of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), the last official government body to investigate the assassination, but instead he quotes Vincent Bugliosi.
The former prosecutor who put Charlie Manson behind bars for engineering murders for which he was not even at the scene, can’t see the similar manipulations behind what happened at Dealey Plaza, and shamelessly promotes the official cover story of the event as if he’s solved the crime. The same exact information is provided at Leventhal’s web site.
As John Judge notes, “The sole source of evidence are two sophomoric essays by some government hack (Leventhal) who claims to have read Bugliosi and praises his conclusions as exhaustive. I am sure he neither fully read Bugliosi nor did he read much else on the case from his illogical commentary.”
Indeed, Bugliosi’s 2,700-page book (which includes the attached CD) is of biblical proportions, and certainly gives a false portrait of the designated Fall Guy and Patsy, one that is repeated, almost word for word, in the JFK Assassination section of Leventhal’s now suspended blog. It appears he merely quoted portions of Bugliosi and then read what he had prepared for the web site, which reads:
The most comprehensive book on this subject is the 1600-page book Reclaiming History: The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy by Vincent Bugliosi, 21 published in 2007. Bugliosi clearly establishes that Oswald acted alone.
In his profile of the mediocre, uninteresting, useless, unstable, degenerate, Lone Nut Loser and assassin, apparently based primarily on Bugliosi’s book, Todd Leventhal wrote:
Bugliosi also points out that Oswald had no help from any co-conspirators when fleeing after killing President Kennedy. He took a bus and then a cab back to his room in Dallas, and then hid in a movie theater. Oswald only had a total of $183.87 when he killed President Kennedy. He lived in a tiny (1.5 meters by four meters) room, which he rented for eight dollars per week. Nobody had paid him a lot of money to be an assassin.”
Oswald was obsessed with making his mark in history. He told his wife that someday he would be “prime minister” of the United States-a job that has never existed. He was a fool but, tragically, made it into the history books, entirely on his own.”22
The Leventhal/Bugliosi’s “portrait of the assassin” is wrong on a number of counts, the most significant being that the evidence and witness testimony convincingly indicates that Oswald wasn’t the Sixth Floor Sniper, was not the assassin of the President and was set up at the fall guy and Patsy, just as he claimed to be.
Besides this false and intentionally deceptive portrait of the Patsy, there are more realistic and perceptive profiles of Oswald, including the Covert Operational Personality (COP) for which Oswald sets the mold, and which I developed after reading the Secret Service/Justice Dept. Study of Assassins and potential threats to the president, which didn’t include any such personality profile or threat.
(Secret Service Study: http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.shtml)23
AMERICAN ASSASSINS AND THE ORIGIN OF THE LONE-NUT THEORY
Allen Dulles took a book with him to one of the first meetings of the Warren Commission, Robert Donovan’s The Assassins, which is about how American assassins appear to be psychologically deranged lone-nuts. Dulles gave out copies of the book to other commissioners and he recommended they read it. 24
As detailed by Donald Gibson in his The Kennedy Assassination Cover-up (2000)25, in which he wrote in the chapter Shaping the Investigation, Gibson wrote:
…Warren briefly mentioned the mental illness issue. Dulles then also brought this up and he began but did not get to finish a description of books he had been reading which focused on ‘the psychiatric angle.’ On December 16, Dulles was far more aggressive in his promotion of this “angle.” Dulles was handing out copies of a book which analyzed seven previous attempts on the lives of U.S. Presidents. Dulles gave this book to members of the Commission and to the Commission’s lawyers. As indicated by Dulles, the theme of the book was that such attempts were typically the acts of lone individuals, usually individuals with mental disorders.
As Gibson notes:
When Donovan later wrote the introduction to the Popular Library Edition of The Warren Commission Report on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, he applied his generalizations to the Kennedy assassination: “For the murder of President Kennedy was so horrifying, so senseless and heart-rending that the act was difficult to comprehend in terms of the average person’s experience. To anyone who happened to know the history of the assassinations of American Presidents, Lee Harvey Oswald conformed remarkably to the pattern of obscure misfits, loners, fanatics, cranks and mentally deranged and deluded men who committed these historic crimes. Indeed he even bore a vague physical resemblance to them. To millions everywhere, however, the crime in Dallas was too momentous in all its implications to be accepted as the pitifully simple thing it was, the solitary act of a deranged and deteriorating wanderer, taking his revenge on the world by destroying one of its finest living figures. Surely, it seemed to many-especially to many abroad-there must be further explanation, a more complex cause, a plot, a conspiracy.
Donovan uses about eight different terms to suggest Oswald was a lone-nut. The official line that developed during the hours immediately following the assassination has not changed[.]
If Dulles was more interested in determining the truth about the assassination, than promoting the bogus Lone-Nut theory, he would have the other commissioners read his own book, The Craft of Intelligence, 26 in which he quotes Sun Tzu’s ancient manual The Art of War. 27
In the very first chapter, on page one, under the title “The Historical Setting,” Dulles notes that:
In the fifth century B.C. the Chinese sage Sun Tzu wrote that foreknowledge was ‘the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy wherever they move’ÖRejecting the oracles and seers, …Sun Tzu takes a more practical view. What is called ëforeknoweldge’ cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations,’ he wrote, ‘It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation.’
(See: Foreknowlege and the JFK Assassination.28)
“In a chapter of the Art of War called ëEmployment of Secret Agents,’ Sun Tzu gives the basics of espionage as it was practiced in 400 B.C. by the Chinese,” wrote Dulles, “much as it is practiced today.”
According to Sun Tzu:
Now there are five sorts of agents to be employed. These are: native, inside, double, expendable and living.” A native agent is one of the nationality of the enemy. An inside agent is one who lives and works in the enemy’s camp. A double agent is an enemy agent who works for both sides. An expendable agent is one that can be cut loose after achieving his goal, while a living agent is one that can get into the enemy camp and return with information.
It appears from this description that in his short life of 24 years Lee Harvey Oswald had already served as three, maybe four of those types of agents, including inside, living, double and ultimately expendable. Despite Leventhal’s quoting of Bugliosi as saying Oswald was not the type of person the CIA or a secret organization would use, he actually fits the profile of the type of person they would use for certain missions and operations.
(See: Oswald and the Covert Operational Profile COP.29)
THE ASSASSINATION OF RABBI KAHANE:
WHY IT’S IMPORTANT TO DIFFERENTIATE LONE NUTS FROM COPS
As detailed in The Cell – Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It, by John Miller and Michael Stone, with Chris Mitchell (Hyperion, NY, 2002),30 on November 5, 1990, a 35-year old Egyptian-born militant named El Sayyuid Nossair assassinated co-founder of the Jewish Defense League (JDL) Rabbi Maier Kahane at a hotel ballroom in New York City.
In circumstances similar to the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy, Nossair almost escaped, having fled in a cab and shooting a policeman in pursuit, similar to the official scenario of Oswald’s escape from Dealey Plaza.
Later, at a packed news conference, the chief of detectives of the New York City Police Department Joseph Borelli announced that Kahane’s murder was the work of a “lone, deranged gunman,” with no ties to known terrorists or conspiracies.
But, before the day was out, detectives had tracked down Nosair’s rented house in Cliffside Park, New Jersey, where investigators carried out some 16 boxes of files that included training manuals from the Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, copies of teletypes for the Secretary of the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, bomb-making manuals, maps of landmark locations like the Statue of Liberty, Times Square, Rockefeller Center and the World Trade Center, and notes in Arabic.
According to John Miller, “The FBI now says it turned the files over to the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, after it was decided, following a series of meetings and phone calls, that the local prosecutor and the NYPD would have exclusive jurisdiction over the murder case. The Manhattan DA’s office won’t comment on what was done with the filesÖ but this much is certain: The bulk of the material remained untranslated and unread for nearly three years.”
In addition, the source of Nosair’s national security records (U.S. Army Special Forces Manuals from Fort Bragg) had been traced to Ali Mohamed, the double-agent trainer of the Blind Shek’s al Qaeda cell that was responsible for the first bombing of the World Trade Center.
Just as Joseph Boreli, the chief of detectives misdiagnosed the assassination of Rabbi Kahane as the work of a deranged Lone Nut, when in fact it was the work of a covert operative and a cell of Arab terrorist, the profile of Lee Harvey Oswald as a Lone Nut has prevented the proper investigation and prosecution of those actually responsible for the assassination President Kennedy. The local police in Dallas and the FBI conducted themselves in a similar manner in both instances, prefering to go along with the cover-up and put an end to the legal and judicial maneuverings rather than properly investigate and prosecute the crime.
As John Miller tried to explain this mindset, “Now this may come as a surprise, but I consider Joe Borelli to be a friend of mine. But back in 1991 he was a loyal general, not a revolutionary, and the prevailing theory in the NYPD was, ëDon’t make waves.’ That is why a commander in those days who uncovered corruption was blamed for causing scandal rather than rewarded for cleaning house. And why a commander who called the media’s attention to a serial rape suspect was rebuked for bringing pressure on the department instead of being applauded for warning the public. So in the Nosair case, when Chief Borelli turned a blind eye to the obvious, he was merely remaining true to the culture of the NYPD. The thinking was, don’t take a high-profile homicide case that could be stamped ësolved’ and turn it into an unsolved conspiracy. To do so would create a lot of extra work. Instead of getting the press and Jewish community stirred up about the bad guys still out there, it was just so much simpler to say, the bad guy got Kahane, we got the bad guy, and it’s all over. No pressure, no panic, no more headlines.” The same thinking that motivated the Dallas Police Department, the Dallas DA, the FBI and the Warren Commission, all “true to the culture” of corruption.
So it doesn’t seem like misinformed academics like John McAdams, Ken Rahn and their posse of disciples do much harm in promoting the Lone-Nut theory of the assassination, but they do provide the wrong and seemingly rational bases for others to adopt the same positions, those in positions of power, like Joe Borelli and Todd Leventhal, and those federal attorneys responsible for investigation and prosecution of political assassinations in the USA.
That is the reason why all of the government records related to the assassination of President Kennedy must be released to the public, why Congress must carry out its oversight responsibilities and why grand juries should be convened in the appropriate jurisdictions to determine the truth and whether justice can still be served. The effort must be made in the name of national security and to prevent such political assassinations from happening again.
Just as the Kahane assassination set the stage for 9/11, and could have possibly prevented additional terrorist attacks had the murder been properly investigated, the assassination of President Kennedy was perpetrated by more than just Lee Harvey Oswald, and represents something much larger, and had it been properly investigated, could possibly have prevented other political assassinations.
And until the issue is addressed, the assassination of President Kennedy is something that will continue to come back and haunt us until it is resolved to a legal and moral certainty.
Sources and Notes
1. Todd Leventhal’s blog: Rumors, Myths and Fabrications
2. John Barren – on KGB and Soviet Disinformation Dezinformatsiya; also this.
Disinformation Department (Department A) Department A was responsible for clandestine initiatives and campaigns to influence foreign governments and publics, as well to shape perceptions of individuals and groups hostile to Soviet interests. The majority of the Departments activities were implemented by other KGB elements, or other Soviet organizations.
3. Generic Definition of Disinformation
Disinformation is false or inaccurate information that is spread deliberately. It is synonymous with and sometimes called Black propaganda. It may include the distribution of forged documents, manuscripts, and photographs, or spreading malicious rumors and fabricated intelligence. … (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disinformation)
[Note: Black Propaganda is NOT synonymous with Disinformation. See: Linebarger, Paul; Psychological Warfare – International Propaganda and Communications by Paul M. A. Linebarger (1948, U.S. Army; Duell, Sloan and Pearce, N.Y. 1954; Arno Press, 1972) Black propaganda purports to emanate from a source other than the true one. This type of propaganda is associated with covert psychological operations. http://www.stentorian.com/propagan.html]
4. Classical Definition of Disinformation
Disinformation is deliberately misleading information announced publicly or leaked by a government or especially by an intelligence agency for the purpose of influencing public opinion or the government in another nation: “He would be the unconscious channel for a piece of disinformation aimed at another country’s intelligence service” (Ken Follett).
5. Conspiracy Nutter – Professor James Fetzer. (“One of the telling signs of many disinformation artists (who may or may not be gainfully employed by some “shadowy government agency”) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Henry_Fetzer – Disinformation) In Fetzer’s words, “in this day and age, we all have to become experts on disinformation … According to Fetzer, “disinformation… should be viewed more or less on a par with acts of lying. Indeed, the parallel with lying appears to be fairly precise. Misinformation Fetzer defines as “false, mistaken, or misleading information;” disinformation is misinformation propounded “in an intentional, deliberate, or purposeful effort to mislead, deceive, or confuse.” Fetzer describes five levels of disinformation. Fetzer’s Disinformation and the Use of False Information: (http://www.springerlink.com/content/g1u2q540010236xq/
6. The Dis-informed Lone Nutters with ties to intelligence agencies include Issac Don Levine, Henry and Clare Booth Luce, Priscilla Johnson McMillan, David Atlee Phillips, Virginia Prewett, Hugh Aynesworth, Joe Gulden, Edward J. Epstein, Gus Russo and Max Holland. (http://www.washingtondecoded.com/site/2008/06/simkin.html ).
7. The Mis-informed Lone Nutters include John McAdams, Ken Rahn, Vincent Bugliosi, David Von Pein, Dave Reitzes and Max Holland. (http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/oswald.htm), (http://www.kenrahn.com/jfk/JFK.html).
8. Leventhal web chat quote on what all conspiracy theorists believe. (http://www.america.gov/st/webchat-english/2009/July/20090714143549iaecnav0.4049581.html)
9. Public Opinion Polls on Conspiracy and JFK assassination. (http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=16209&st=0&p=197414&hl=+public%20+opinion%20+polls%20+&fromsearch=1& – entry197414)
10 Real Soviet Dizinformation – Blames AIDS on USA Chemical Warfare. (http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/events/events_detail/1593/)
11. Pulitzer Prizes for bogus mainstream media articles include the Washington Post reporter who made up a source for a heroin mother transmitting the addiction to her baby, which was withdrawn and given to Terresa Carpenter as runner-up for her story on a convict who promised to kill his wife when he got out of jail and did. Another WP reporter was fired for making up election coverage articles.
12. Scotland Daily Record article on Leventhal’s web site. (From the Daily Record- Best of Scottish News 17 August 2010 http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/science-and-technology/2010/08/02/white-house-launches-new-website-to-debunk-conspiracy-theories-86908-22457938/).
13. Robin Ramsey – Lobster UK (See: Lobster http://www.lobster-magazine.co.uk/)
14. John Judge (http://www.judgeforyourself.us/)
15. Web background on Leventhal. http://www.america.gov/st/pubs-english/2005/January/20050114144117atlahtnevel1.426333e-02.html
16. Leventhal’s Report on Iraqi disinformation during the Gulf War. http://intellit.muskingum.edu/othercountries_folder/iraq_dis.htm
17. Leventhal’s Report on “Soviet Active Measures in the Post-Soviet Era.” (http://intellit.muskingum.edu/russia_folder/pcw_era/index.htm#Contents.)
18. Larry Chin article on Leventhal. 2006 story headlined, “Call the US State Department’s –counter-misinformation’ office what it actually is: official misinformation,” (http://www.mail-archive.com/cia-drugs@yahoogroups.com/msg05936.html)
19. Wayne Madsen article on Leventhal. April, 2005 article titled: Bush administration’s “Ministry of Truth” attacks American journalists who fail to adhere to the official line. (http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/)
20. Web Site and Partial Transcript of Web Interview with Todd Leventhal. (http://blogs.america.gov/rumors – http://www.america.gov/st/webchat-english/2009/July/20090714143549iaecnav0.4049581.html – Also see: http://www.america.gov/st/webchat-english/2009/July/20090714143549iaecnav0.4049581.html#ixzz0yCA7ddBu ]
21. Reclaiming History: The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy by Vincent Bugliosi, (Vincent Bugliosi, Norton, 2007)
22. Lee Harvey Oswald Lone Nut Profile (per Bugliosi/Leventhal) (http://blogs.america.gov/rumors/author/leventhalta/)
23. Secret Service Study – Assassination in the United States: An Operational Study of Recent Assassination Attackers, and Near Lethal Approaches. (http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.shtml )
Also See: (http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ntac_jfs.pdf)
24. The Assassins, Robert J. Donovan (1955, Elek 1956) http://www.amazon.com/Assassins-Robert-J-Donovan/dp/B000UD4PG2. (Robert John Donovan (August 21, 1912-August 8, 2003) also wrote PT109 and biographies of Presidents and Eisenhower, and the introduction to a special edition of the Warren Report.
25. The Kennedy Assassination Cover-up (Donald Gibson in his The Kennedy Assassination Cover-up, 2000)
26. The Craft of Intelligence (Dulles, Allen. The Craft of Intelligence. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1963. New York: Signet Books, 1965. [pb] Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1977. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985. Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2006.) (Dulles credits: “For my remarks on Sun Tzu I am indebted to the recent excellent translation of The Art of War with commentaries by General Sam Griffith (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963).
27. The Art of War (Sun Tzu http://www.chinapage.com/sunzi-e.html) Also see: The Divine Skeim at Dealey Plaza http://jfkcountercoup.blogspot.com/2008/01/divine-skeim.html
28. Foreknowledge and the Assassination of President Kennedy (See: http://jfkcountercoup.wordpress.com/2009/08/22/foreknoweldge-and-the-jfk-assassination/)
29. Oswald and the Covert Operational Profile (COP) http://jfkcountercoup.blogspot.com/2009/08/covert-operational-profile.html]
30. The Cell –Inside the 9/11 Plot and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It (Hyperion, NY, 2002, by John Miller, Michael Stone, Chris Mitchell). P. 36-48.
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Malcolm Perry, MD Falls into the Kennedy Vortex
The recent death of Malcolm Oliver Perry, MD, [1] a key Parkland Hospital witness to President Kennedy’s wounds, provides an instructive opportunity to revisit not only some of the mysteries of JFK’s injuries, but also why, ironically, anti-conspiracy witnesses such as Dr. Perry make the case for conspiracy so compelling.
As so often happens with a witness showcased by the government, Dr. Perry’s downright odd, flip-flopping behavior strongly hinted that authorities were exerting themselves behind the scenes to push the anti-conspiracy line. His saga also suggests that not only did a respected independent physician bow to those authorities, but so also did the press.
Dr. Perry, an assistant professor of surgery at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical center, was one of the first physicians to attend to the president. And when he answered questions at a news conference shortly after JFK died, he was the first treating physician to speak publicly about Kennedy’s injuries.
It was Dr. Perry’s unrehearsed, seemingly pro-conspiracy remarks about JFK’s injuries given right after his death, and how they were given a vigorous anti-conspiracy spin by the government, a servile press and the cooperative physician-witness himself, that convinces skeptics to this day that their doubts are well founded.
Dr. Perry at Parkland Hospital on 11.22.63
Little more than one hour after JFK was pronounced dead at Parkland Hospital, Dr. Perry appeared alongside neurosurgery professor Kemp Clark, MD to answer questions at a press conference.
A newsman asked Dr. Perry: “Where was the entrance wound?”
Dr. Perry: “There was an entrance wound in the neck …”
Question: “Which way was the bullet coming on the neck wound? At him?”
Dr. Perry: “It appeared to be coming at him …”
Question: “Doctor, describe the entrance wound. You think from the front in the throat?”
Dr. Perry: “The wound appeared to be an entrance wound in the front of the throat; yes, that is correct. The exit wound, I don’t know. It could have been the head or there could have been a second wound of the head. There was not time to determine this at the particular instant …” [2]
Dr. Perry’s initial impression isn’t proof the wound in JFK’s throat was an entrance wound. But at no time before the press did he allow that the wound might have been anything but an entrance wound. With but one exception, that of the New York Herald Tribune, to which we will later return, early press accounts accurately reflected Dr. Perry’s words.
On 11.22.63 UPI reported that Dr. Perry had said, “There was an entrance wound below the Adam’s apple.” The New York Times reported that Dr. Perry had said, “Mr. Kennedy was hit by a bullet in the throat, just below the Adam’s apple … This wound had the appearance of a bullet entry.” [3] The Dallas Morning News reported, “The front neck hole was described as an entrance wound,” and it quoted Dr. Perry to say, “It did however appear to be the entrance wound at the front of the throat.”
The problem with this account arose with Oswald’s arrest. For if he had indeed pulled the trigger, he’d have pulled it from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository, above and behind JFK. Informed of the contradiction, Dr. Perry held fast to his initial impression. The Boston Globe‘s medical reporter, Herbert Black, asked Dr. Perry the next day how the throat wound could have been of entry if the gunman was behind the President. Perry answered, “It may have been that the President was looking sideways with his head thrown back when the bullet or bullets struck him.” [4]
The Trauma Surgeon vs. the Press
Arlen Specter and the Warren Commissioners saw these press accounts as a problem for the lone nut case they were building. So much so that Mr. Specter took the unusual step of contacting Dr. Perry and others Parkland physicians in Dallas the week before Dr. Perry testified formally to establish, as he put it, “for the record what was true and what was false on the statements (sic) attributed to them.” [5] Specter added that he had tried to obtain recordings of Perry’s public comments for Perry to review “prior to his appearance, before deposition or before the Commission,” but was unable to do so. [6]
The Commissioners were also concerned. Allen Dulles requested that Mr. Specter send Dr. Perry “the accounts of his press conference or conferences” for Dr. Perry to point out “the various points in these press conferences where you are inaccurately quoted, so we can have that as a matter of record.” [7]
There is no evidence that this was ever done. Perhaps the reason it wasn’t had something to do with the fact Dr. Perry proved to be a malleable and helpful a witness. Besides, considerable unpleasantness might well have ensued if Dr. Perry and The Commission had been forced to confront the doctor’s actual, pro-conspiracy statements.
For example, in contrast to his telling reporters on 11.22.63 that the bullet “appeared to be coming at” JFK, when Mr. Specter asked Dr. Perry, “What responses did you give to [reporters’] questions relating to the source (entrance or exit) of the bullets, if such questions were asked?”, he answered, “I could not. I pointed out that both Dr. Clark and I had no way of knowing from whence the bullets came.” [8]
Warren Commissioner Allen Dulles followed-up with: “Was there any reasonably good account in any of the press of this interview?” Perry: “No sir.” Rep. Gerald Ford then asked: “Were those reportings by the news media accurate as to what you and others said?” Perry: “In general, they were inaccurate.” [9]
The Warren Report summarized the bad reporting on Dr. Perry’s remarks, writing, “Dr. Perry stated to the press that a variety of possibilities could account for the President’s wounds.” And it quoted Dr. Perry to say, “I expressed it [his answers] (sic) as a matter of speculation that this was conceivable. But, again, Dr. (Kemp) Clark [who also answered questions at the conference] (sic) and I emphasized that we had no way of knowing.” [10]
To buttress that position, the Report added, “Dr. Perry’s recollection of his comments is corroborated by some of the news stories after the press conference. The New York Herald Tribune on November 23, 1963, reported as follows:
‘Dr. Malcolm Perry, 34, attendant surgeon at Parkland Hospital who attended the President, said he saw two wounds – one below the Adam’s apple, the other at the back of the head. He said he did not know if two bullets were involved. It is possible, he said, that the neck wound was the entrance and the other the exit of the missile.’” [11]
Of course The New York Herald Tribune did not corroborate Dr. Perry’s actual words. And there were no other news stories besides that of The Tribune that supported Perry’s fickle memory, at least none that I could find after a lengthy search. Like The New York Times and Dallas Morning News, they faithfully reflected what Perry had actually said. He had not offered the press a variety of possibilities about the throat wound; rightly or wrongly, he offered them only one – the throat wound was an entrance wound. There is less irony than one might imagine in the fact that the very press accounts that Dr. Perry denounced as false were true, while the one the Warren Commission touted as true was false. But by this time The Commission had what it wanted. So, rather than checking Dr. Perry’s account against the verbatim transcript, which should not have been difficult to obtain, the Warren Commission accepted the professor’s inaccurate testimony at face value, letting stand in the record a helpful, if false, slur against the press. The press, which could have checked Dr. Perry’s testimony against the original footage, obligingly never did; or at least it never complained about Dr. Perry’s false slur. Debunking accurate media reports wasn’t the only service Dr. Perry provided the Warren Commission.
Dr. Perry vs. Dr. Perry
Under oath before The Commission, Dr. Perry described the wound, saying, “In the lower part of the neck below the Adam’s apple was a small, roughly circular wound of perhaps 5 mm in diameter from which blood was exuding slowly. [12] A few minutes later, he elaborated, “this was situated in the lower anterior one third of the neck, approximately 5 mm in diameter. It was exuding blood slowly which partially obscured it. Its edges were neither ragged nor were they punched out, but rather clean.” [13]
This account more aptly described a wound of entrance, a fact not lost on his interrogator.
Mr. Specter again pressed Dr. Perry on the point, appearing to ask the same thing, only this time he said, “…was it ragged or pushed out in any manner?”
(Pushed out? This refers to the position of the edges: a wound’s edges are pushed out by an exiting bullet. Whereas punched out is an informal term used to indicate the condition of the edges. “Punched out” edges are clean and round, as if made by a hole punch.)
Dr. Perry’s answer was not very different this time: “…the edges were neither cleancut, that is punched out, nor were they very ragged … I did not examine it very closely.” [14]
Even though Mr. Specter had gotten Dr. Perry to perform satisfactorily, he wanted even more; he wanted Dr. Perry to say that he believed the throat wound was an exit wound. And Dr. Perry did say it, after Mr. Specter ran through an elaborate “begging the question” scenario.
Midway through his testimony, Arlen Specter asked Dr. Perry a series of questions he would ask most of the Parkland doctor-witnesses: “Based on the appearance of the neck wound alone, could it have been either an entrance or an exit wound?”
Dr. Perry: “It could have been either.”
Mr. Specter: “Permit me to supply some additional facts, Dr. Perry, which I shall ask you to assume as being true for purposes of having you express an opinion.
“Assume first of all that the President was struck by a 6.5-mm. copper-jacketed bullet fired from a gun having a muzzle velocity of approximately 2,000 feet per second, with the weapon being approximately 160 to 250 feet from the President, with the bullet striking him at an angle of declination of approximately 45 degrees, striking the President on the upper right posterior thorax just above the border of the scapula, being 14 cm. From the tip of the right acromion process and 14 cm. below the tip of the right mastoid process, passing through the President’s body striking no bones, traversing the neck and sliding between the large muscles in the posterior portion of the President’s body through a fascia channel without violating the pleural cavity but bruising the apex of the right pleural cavity, and bruising the most apical portion of the right lung inflicting a hematoma to the right side of the larynx, which you have just described, and then exiting from the hole that you have described in the midline of the neck.
“Now, assuming those facts to be true, would the hole which you observed in the neck of the President be consistent with an exit wound under those circumstances?”
Dr. Perry: “Certainly wound be consistent with an exit wound.”
Mr. Specter: “Now, assuming one additional fact that there was no bullet found in the body of the President, and assuming the facts which I have just set forth to be true, do you have an opinion as to whether the wound which you observed in the President’s neck was an entrance or an exit wound?”
Dr. Perry: “A full jacketed bullet without deformation passing through skin would leave a similar wound for an exit and entrance wound and with the facts which you have made available and with these assumptions, I believe that it was an exit wound.” [15]
Apart from the fact that the angle of declination Mr. Specter described – downward at 45-degrees – is much too steep to fit with the supposed bullet path from JFK’s back to his throat, his line of questioning is preposterous. It is a classic example of a well known logical fallacy, “begging the question,” in which the initial assumption of a statement is treated as already proven when, in fact, no evidence or logic is provided to show why that assumption is true in the first place. [16]
None of the Ivy-educated Warren Commission attorneys and staff, and none of the physicians subjected to this flawed and tendentious line of questioning, commented on the obvious logical defect in Mr. Specter’s line of inquiry. But Mr. Specter may have felt he achieved his goal.
A Very Private Conversation
Even though Dr. Perry swore that he believed the throat wound was an exit wound, he may not have actually believed what he said. On 2-14-92 an emergency room physician in Baltimore, Robert Artwohl, M.D. told an interesting tale in a “Prodigy” on-line post: Dr. Artwohl said that he had had a private conversation with Dr. Perry in 1986, and that Dr. Perry had said, “one of the biggest regrets in his life was having to make the incision for the emergency tracheotomy through the bullet wound, because he was certain that it was an entrance wound. He remembered making a very good mental note of the wound since he was cutting through it … speaking with Dr. Perry that night, one physician to another in (sic) Dr Perry stated he firmly believed the wound to be an entrance wound.” [17]
Dr. Perry and the Posterior Cranium
When doubts about the Warren Commission in the late 1970s led to a reexamination of the case by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Dr. Perry was interviewed by the HSCA’s Andrew Purdy, JD.
Perhaps the most telling aspect of that interview was Dr. Perry’s reaffirming his original description of JFK’s skull injuries. In a note written at Parkland Hospital and dated 11-22-63, Perry described the head wound saying, “A large wound of the right posterior cranium was noted.” [18] Dr. Perry testified to the Warren Commission that, “there was blood noticed on the carriage and a large avulsive wound on the right posterior cranium…” [199 and “I noted a large avulsive wound of the right parietal occipital area, in which both scalp and portions of skull were absent, and there was severe laceration of underlying brain tissue ….” [20] He told the HSCA much the same thing.
In an interview on 1-11-78 the HSCA’s Andy Purdy, JD reported that Dr. Perry had said he, “… believed the head wound was located on the ‘occipital parietal’ (sic) region of the skull and that the right posterior aspect of the skull was missing …” [21] and “I looked at the head wound briefly by leaning over the table and noticed that the parietal occipital head wound was largely avulsive and there was visible brain tissue in the macard (sic) and some cerebellum seen ….” [22]
Thus, on the day of the assassination, under oath before the Warren Commission a few months later, and again fourteen years after that, Dr. Perry gave a consistent description of JFK’s skull wound, saying that it involved the posterior skull, the “parietal occipital” area. And he added that he’d seen cerebellum, which is a small lobe of the brain located at the very rear and bottom of the skull. Similarly, author David Lifton reported that Parkland emergency nurse Audrey Bell, who couldn’t see JFK’s head wound though she was standing along JFK’s right side, asked Dr. Perry, “‘Where was the wound?’ Perry pointed to the back of the President’s head and moved the head slightly in order to show her the wound.” [23] These accounts would later prove problematic.
Dr. Perry vs. Oliver Stone and Charles Crenshaw, MD
Nothing more was heard from Dr. Perry about the Kennedy case until the Journal American Medical Association brought him back into the fray when it strode into the JFK case in a series of articles published in 1992. JAMA’s work was a spirited defense of the Warren Report that came in response to Oliver Stone’s film, JFK, and the publication of a pro-conspiracy book by Parkland witness Charles Crenshaw, MD, entitled JFK – Conspiracy of Silence. [24]
Dr. Perry was one of four Parkland Hospital physician-witnesses that JAMA had enlisted to both reaffirm the Warren Report and to discredit the dissident Dallas doctor. [25] JAMA wrote: “Since it is hard to prove a negative, no one can say with certainty what some suspect – that Crenshaw was not even in the trauma room; none of the four [Drs. Jenkins, Baxter, Carrico and Perry] recalls ever seeing him at the scene,” [26] and, “…Most of those who know the facts … question if he was involved in the care of the President at all…” [27] (emphasis in original) Ironically, in 1964 when one of JAMA’s sources, Charles Baxter, MD, was asked under oath by the Warren Commission, “Can you identify any other doctors who were there at that time?”, the first name Dr. Baxter gave was Dr. Crenshaw’s. [28]
Had JAMA, with its legendary research capabilities, merely glanced at the index published by Warren Commission, [29] it would have found that Dr. Crenshaw’s name appears in volume VI of the Warren Commission’s “Hearings and Exhibits,” on pages 31 – 32, 40, 60, 80 – 81, and 141, pages that more than confirm his presence in JFK’s trauma room. [This bit of irresponsible journalism ended up costing JAMA nearly a quarter of a million dollars, plus court costs, when Dr. Crenshaw successfully sued the Journal for defamation after JAMA refused to publish a correction. [30]
Among the claims Dr. Crenshaw had made was that JFK’s wounds were inconsistent with shots fired from behind. For example, the skull damage Dr. Crenshaw said he saw was not a blowout wound toward the right front of JFK’s skull, as the autopsy photographs seemed to show. Instead, Dr. Crenshaw said it involved the whole right side of the skull, including the back of JFK’s skull and the cerebellum – the parietal occipital region, in other words. [31] Well, that’s not far from how Dr. Perry had repeatedly described the wound over a span of fourteen years. But in the furious reaction to Mr. Stone’s movie and Dr. Crenshaw’s book, Dr. Perry suddenly remembered things differently.
Dr. Perry vs. Robert McClelland, M.D.
Pro-Warren Commission author Gerald Posner reported that Dr. Perry had told him, “I did not see any cerebellum.” [32] When told that Robert McClelland, MD, a close Parkland colleague and fellow witness, had said “I saw cerebellum fall out on the stretcher,” Mr. Posner claimed that Dr. Perry responded, “I am astonished that Bob [McClelland] would say that … It shows such poor judgment, and usually he has such good judgment.” [33] Mr. Posner did not point out to Dr. Perry that he had himself told the HSCA that he’d seen cerebellum. [34]
Mr. Posner also proved that, when dealing with a helpful anti-conspiracy witness, he wasn’t a stickler about following the advice he gave others: “Testimony closer to the event must be given greater weight than changes or additions made years later, when the witness’s own memory is often muddied or influenced by television programs, films, books, and discussions with others.” [35]
However, not everyone was so polite to Dr. Perry. In 1998, after JFK Review Board counsel T. Jeremy Gunn, JD, Ph.D. quoted Perry’s own Warren Commission description of JFK’s “right posterior cranium” injury, [35] Perry quickly retreated, lamely lamenting that, “I made only a cursory examination of the head … I didn’t look at it. I was in some kind of a hurry.” [37]
The lessons we learn from Dr. Perry about how investigator bias can influence how evidence is handled and how witnesses can be manipulated by investigators are scarcely new. The Warren Commission, the Journal of the American Medical Association and author Gerald Posner are staunch Warren Commission supporters. They therefore were naturally disinclined to check the record of a witness like Dr. Perry who told them what they wanted to hear.
One is left wondering why someone as accomplished, experienced and independent as Dr. Perry would seem to be so willing to make a fool of himself by contradicting himself and by not only turning on the press, but also on a colleague and friend, Dr. McClelland. While it’s unlikely we will ever know for sure what was behind all this, a seemingly credible witness has come forward with an intriguing tale that just might help us understand Dr. Perry.
A Knock on Dr. Perry’s Door
In a memo written to House Select Committee counsel, Robert Tanenbaum on 6.1.77, investigator Howard Gilbert described an interview with a man named James Gochenaur who had quite a story to tell about conversations he had had with a Secret Service agent named Elmer Moore. Agent Moore apparently told Mr. Gochenaur in 1970 that the Secret Service had sent him to Parkland Hospital to speak with the doctors about the wounds. Agent Moore told Mr. Gochenaur that he felt guilty about what he had done to Dr. Perry a few days after the assassination.
Gilbert: “All right. What did he (Secret Service Agent Elmer Moore) have to say about Kennedy? Or anything that indicates to you that he may have knowledge – ah, or may have done something wrong in the investigation.”
Gochenaur: “Ok, what he told me was this, he said that he had badgered Doctor Perry into changing his testimony, he did not feel good about that.”
Gilbert: “He – being Moore?”
Gochenaur: “Yes, Moore talked to Perry and, I guess, really laid it on to the poor guy.”
Gilbert: “In what respect, what areas did he badger Perry with respect (sic)”
Gochenaur: “Ah, what Perry had seen, as he was doing his emergency operation, apparently.”
Gilbert: “Well, in what way’s did he indicate to you that he had Perry distort the truth?”
Gochenaur: “In – I think that what he was trying to say was him [sic] to making a flat statement that there was no entry wound in the neck, or that where the position of the wound in the back [sic], what Moore was telling me after he talked about that was the fact that his study, and the study that went into talking with the Doctors [sic], is that there was no conclusive evidence where any of the shots had come from, at that point. Ok? If the report that he had written up …” [38]
Mr. Gochenaur said that Agent Moore offered him an explanation why he’d done the things he did in investigating the Kennedy case: ” [W]e had to do what we were told, in regards to, you know, the way the way they were investigating the assassination, or we get our heads cut off.” [39]
Conclusion
It’s clear that the story Dr. Perry told about the JFK assassination on the day of the murder is different than the story he later gave. It’s not clear, however, why he changed it. Mr. Moore might well have been the agent of change. Or it could have been the influence of Mr. Specter, both in open Warren Commission session or before that in the off-the-record interviews he conducted with the Parkland doctors. Perhaps the influence of both Agent Moore and Mr. Specter explains Dr. Perry’s turnabout.
I have written elsewhere that the government has made myriad errors in its various investigations of JFK’s medical and autopsy evidence. [40] And rather than the errors being typical human, random mistakes – some favoring conspiracy, some against it – they instead tended uniformly to distort evidence along anti-conspiracy lines. The same pattern seems evident in the behavior of Dr. Perry, who appears to have allowed himself to be used to further the anti-conspiracy agenda by publicly denouncing accurate, pro-conspiracy press reports, which the government irresponsibly never cross checked; by contradicting his own, earliest (and therefore most likely reliable) statements; and even by ridiculing the account of a highly esteemed, close medical colleague, Robert McClelland, MD. Unfortunately, as I’ve also elsewhere written, [41] a scenario such as we’ve seen with Dr. Perry could be written about a number of the other Dallas doctors, with Dr. McClelland, MD being a notable exception. (William Kemp Clark, M.D. was another notable exception, and his story is should be the subject of a separate article.)
Although it’s scarcely a surprise to many who are familiar with their work, celebrated Warren Commission defenders Gerald Posner and Vincent Bugliosi were silent on Dr. Perry’s peculiar flip-flopping when they selectively quoted his comments to make their anti-conspiracy case. Not only did neither address Dr. Perry’s inconsistencies, neither ever mentioned the official HSCA memo to counsel Robert Tanenbaum concerning the plausible explanation Mr. Gochenaur gave for the doctor’s flip-flopping.
Following his brush with history in the early sixties, Malcolm Perry quietly carried on a long and distinguished career as a professor of surgery at several respected universities, including the University of Washington, Cornell, Vanderbilt, and the University of Texas Southwestern. He died at age 80. During those years he apparently spoke almost nothing of the assassination, even when among fellow physicians. [42]
~Gary L. Aguilar, MD
End Notes
1. David Stout, “M.O. Perry, Kennedy Surgeon, Dies at 80.” New York Times, 12.8.09 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/08/us/08perry.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Malcolm%20Perry,%20obituary&st=cse
2. http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/press.htm
3. New York Times, 11.23.63.
4. Boston Globe, 11.24.63. p. 9
5. 3H378 http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh3/html/WC_Vol3_0193b.htm
6. 3H378 http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh3/html/WC_Vol3_0193b.htm
7. 3H377 http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh3/html/WC_Vol3_0193a.htm
8. 3H375-376 http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh3/html/WC_Vol3_0192a.htm
9. 3H376 http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh3/html/WC_Vol3_0192b.htm
10. Warren Report, p. 90 http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wr/html/WCReport_0057b.htm
11. Warren Report, p. 90-91. http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wr/html/WCReport_0058a.htm
12. 3H368 http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh3/html/WC_Vol3_0188b.htm
13. 3H372 http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh3/html/WC_Vol3_0190b.htm
14. 3H388 http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh3/html/WC_Vol3_0198b.htm
15. 3H373 http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh3/html/WC_Vol3_0191a.htm
16. http://begthequestion.info/
17. Prodigy interactive personal service, 2-14-92, 7:45 AM, in:” Arts Club” bulletin board, books-nonfiction. In a posting to John Hensley (NXVX71A) from Robert Artwohl (BSMK63A)-copies available by request with SASE to author.)
18. 17H6, Warren Commission Exhibit #392. http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh17/html/WH_Vol17_0016b.htm
19. 3H368 http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh3/html/WC_Vol3_0188b.htm
20. 3H372 http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh3/html/WC_Vol3_0190b.htm
21. 7HSCA295. http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol7/html/HSCA_Vol7_0153a.htm
22. 7HSCA302. http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol7/html/HSCA_Vol7_0156b.htm
23. Lifton, David. Best Evidence. New York: Carroll & Graf, 1988, p.704.
24. Charles Crenshaw, MD, JFK – Conspiracy of Silence. New York: Signet Book, 1992.
25. Breo, D. “JFK’s death, part II – Dallas MDs recall their memories.” JAMA, May 27, 1992; v. 267(20):2805. http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/267/20/2804
26. Breo. JAMA. Vol. 267:2804. http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/267/20/2804
27. Breo. JAMA. Vol. 267:2805. http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/267/20/2804
28. 6H40. http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh6/html/WC_Vol6_0025b.htm
29. 15H761 http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh15/html/WC_Vol15_0386a.htm
30. http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache:yjWxy-jARHcJ:findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1374/is_n4_v58/ai_20979803/+Charles+Crenshaw,+JAMA,+lawsuit&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
31. Crenshaw, p. 79.
32. Gerald Posner. Case Closed. New York: Random House, p. 312.
33. Ibid.
34. 7HSCA302. http://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol7/html/HSCA_Vol7_0156b.htm
35. Posner, p. 235.
36. ARRB depositions of Parkland witnesses, p. 19.
37. ARRB depositions of Parkland witnesses, p. 23.
38. HSCA Memo from Howard Gilbert to Robert Tanenbaum, dated June 1, 1977, HSCA Record Number: 180-10109-10310, Agency File Number: 014182, p. 22. http://spot.acorn.net/JFKplace/03/g2t.txt
39. HSCA Memo from Howard Gilbert to Robert Tanenbaum, dated June 1, 1977, HSCA Record Number: 180-10109-10310, Agency File Number: 014182, p. 21. http://spot.acorn.net/JFKplace/03/g2t.txthttp://spot.acorn.net/JFKplace/03/g2t.txt
40. Gary Aguilar, Kathy Cunningham, “How Five Investigations into JFK’s Medical/Autopsy Evidence Got It Wrong.” http://www.history-matters.com/essays/jfkmed/How5Investigations/How5InvestigationsGotItWrong.htm
41. GL Aguilar, CH Wecht. The Medical Case for Conspiracy. In: Crenshaw, CA, Trauma Room One. New York: Paraview Press, 1992, p. 170-286.
42. Obituary, Dallas Morning News, 12.08.09. http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/120909dnmetperryob.3fc0b99.html

