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  • Master Class with John Hankey, II: The Debate Debacle: An Introduction


    If you have not caught Part I, you will see John Hankey has featured in three previous CTKA articles. Including this new batch of essays, he now has a grand total of six studies detailing his myriad pratfalls.

    Last year Hankey and Gary King were pestering Jim DiEugenio for a live debate concerning CTKA’s articles on Hankey. They appeared to be at odds with Jim’s appearance on Black Op Radio discussing my article. Indeed, for some rather callow folk it appears that Jim’s discussing my article means I did not write it and Jim did. I take it as a compliment. I always aim to be as diligent as Jim DiEugenio.

    Jim appeared on Black Ops Radio simply because I did not want to go on. Jim is an old hand with interviews, and I felt he would better present my case. Furthermore, Len Osanic and Jim go way back and they are adept at each other’s styles. Clearly, Hankey’s work had me riled. Quite clearly, John has no idea of how things work here at CTKA.

    Jim did a lot for of my first ever CTKA piece. Because he and John Kelin had to edit some fifty thousand words of text and then HTML format the finished article. As I had little access to Jim Hougan, and the best Watergate literature, Jim helped me out with the faux Nixon, Hunt, and Bush stuff Hankey used. This is not unique. Should Hankey ever write for CTKA (something of a longshot, admittedly) he would get Jim’s helpful expertise, as all contributing writers, in particular baby faces as I was, received. Now, depending on the topic I occasionally help people out with their first time articles. It is a small community and it is what we do.

    The Ballad of the Rejected Prima Donna

    If we count, the introduction t the debate by Fetzer and John Hankey’s presentation, the show is nearly two hours long. What is funny about all of Hankey’s cries of victimization is the fact he can jump on any crank supporting radio show, write on any crank blog, and debate his case. What perturbs Hankey however, is that this crank nexus is shallow. His ideas are just as good as the next hack that comes along.

    CTKA is highly regarded by genuine JFK researchers. Serious researchers do not engage with the likes of John Hankey, nor his pals at the “Oswald Innocence Project.” Apparently, John Hankey really wanted to be a name. He fooled himself into believing he was one until he got snapped out by those who really understand the field and really are careful about the facts of the JFK case. I have likened his behaviour to that of some deluded amateur singer shot down on X-Factor. As a result of his rejection, he certainly made a name for himself. Just not in the deluded way he had imagined.

    To save you the pain of listening to Hankey’s rather loose interpretation version of a debate, I have listed the highlights as I heard them. So sit , grab a coffee, tea, or beer, and giggle along with us.

    Name the Time and Date

    Radio host Gary King really wanted to make a splash for the 50th by having Jim or I debate John Hankey. We were very busy at the time. Indeed, we both emailed him saying when either of us were able that we would be more than willing to debate him. I did not have the energy for it debate preparation, and the last thing I wanted at the time was to do more JFK stuff. Sure, anything involving Hankey is some fun, but in many ways, it is also exhausting because of the sheer amount of crap shovelling.

    Then I eventually got a second wind and prepared for the debate. But I noticed someone affiliated to Hankey and King had put a profile of me on Zimbio as the DCI of the CIA. I suspected something was up, and after listening to Gary’s show, I felt his promises of a moderated debate were empty and Hankey would run rough on him. I was out of there… at least until now. If John wants a piece, I will give him all the CTKA he can handle.

    Hell, I will even find a decent neutral venue for us to chat if he so wants. Sorry John and Gary but after being named as head of the CIA by your rabid pals it just would not feel right to cooperate with you. At the end of this overlong piece, (which you can blame on almost two hours of Hankey’s rant) I was left with a host of questions I would like to have answered in a debate with him.

    Questions for a Debate With Mr Hankey

    Were I to debate the man, I would like the following questions to be tabled for moderation. I will probably kick myself for not remembering more; however, he has made so many calls it is impossible to keep track of them all. These questions come from CTKA’s original reviews and essays, not to mention Hankey’s new rants. I anticipate this list will grow.

    Hankey’s Deletions

    • Why did Hankey (JH) drop his Roman numerals line for “J” equalling three (i.e., Barbara III GHWB’s plane in WWII) did CTKA have anything to do with this?
    • Why has JH never admitted splicing interview footage of Governor Connally?
    • Why has JH dropped the angle of Connally being involved in the assassination, but when he was debating Jim on the Murder Solved forum, he still backed it. Where is that position now and did CTKA force his re-evaluation?
    • Why has JH apparently dropped the bogus body alteration in the plane idea he pushed in “JFK II” and “Dark Legacy.”
    • Why has JH not explained how it was he who proved it was GHWB in the Hoover/Bush memo before Joseph McBride in 1985 – 1988?
    • Why did Hankey insist the Bay of Pigs was launched from around Cal Say when it was launched from Guatemala and Nicaragua? Why did he drop this angle?
    • Why has Hankey dropped the Nixon/LBJ phone call as evidence of Nixon discussing the plot.
    • Why does Hankey rely on a known unreliable source like Paul Kangas?

    John Hankey on Literature & Documents

    • How could JH say I misquoted Gaeton Fonzi on Murder Solved when it was clear JH had never even read Fonzi’s book “The Last Investigation?”
    • Why did JH say David Talbot’s book “Brothers” confirmed JH’s thesis of mafia/CIA plots against Castro when Talbot used sources known since the 70’s?
    • Was JFK II, cited in Talbot’s book?
    • Why did Hankey say he only made one mistake concerning the CIA in Guatemala a few years ago but now admits two more errors with Nixon while denying all the rest? Yet, he now denies he made a mistake about Guatemala again?
    • Why did Hankey confuse “Rush to Judgement” with” Plausible Denial” in a written piece after all these years of chattering on about the latter?
    • Why is JH so special he can read the supposedly hidden messages behind the Hoover/Bush memo when Mark Lane and Joseph McBride cannot?
    • If the Hoover/Bush memo was so important, why didn’t GHWB track it down and destroy it as head of the CIA, before it ever got out?

    Prescott Bush/George Bush and Dealey Plaza

    • What evidence does JH have for George Bush being part of a hit team in Dealey Plaza? Surely, he is not using the photo?
    • Why didn’t George give a false job if he was arrested as Jim Braden (Eugene Hale Brading) was?
    • If PB were the architect of Kennedy’s demise, why would he entrust the mission to his son as who then faced arrest?
    • Where is the evidence his son trained covert operational mechanic?
    • Marita Lorenz is dubious as she has never mentioned meeting or seeing GWHB, nor did Frank Sturgis or Hunt.
    • The CIA did not use just two boats in the BOP invasion as JH said. Did GHWB name the others?
    • When has CTKA said GHWB was not involved with the CIA?
    • Why did JH misrepresent Joseph Trento and Bill Corson concerning Zhou En-Lai and PB?
    • Why did Hankey change the dinner dates and reasons behind the dinner Mellon arranged for Dulles and let PB tag along with?
    • Why did JH give fake identities to members of GHWB’s fellow Skull and Bones peers?
    • Why has JH dropped his Skull and Bones angle? Did CTKA have anything to do with it?
    • Why did JH say no Kennedy family members have spoken out about a plot to kill Kennedy when a cousin had, not to mention Talbot’s book. Had Hankey read “Brothers” at the time?
    • What evidence does JH have for Allen Dulles only getting the job as head of the CIA simply because he was a Nazi sympathizer?
    • Why does he ignore evidence of Dulles extensive history in intelligence work?
    • What evidence did JH have for their being no CIA operatives in the Nixon Whitehouse?
    • Why does JH call Jim DiEugenio “Jim Deeyouhayneo.”
    • Why have Mark Lane and the late Fletcher Prouty, while believing Bush was involved in the BOP never said he was running the operation?
    • Where is the documented evidence of GHWB running the Bay of Pigs?
    • Where did Mark Lane say he had never heard of George Bush?

    The Prouty/Lane Blame Game

    • Why does JH blame Lane and Prouty for his own mistakes, when there are numerous other sources Hankey has used, yet, he does not blame for his information.
    • Why does JH criticise CTKA on irrelevant points and arguments; nevertheless, he feels free to includes actor Bruce Willis’ opinions on a conspiracy to kill JFK?

    Miscellaneous Questions for Mr Hankey

    • Why could John Hankey not correct or answer one by one all the questions I asked of him at Murder Solved?
    • What evidence other than CTKA disagreeing with his analysis does JH have to prove we are CIA? Has he heard of libel?
    • Why does JH think that misappropriating Operation 40 with Alpha 66, and Operation Mongoose are irrelevant?
    • Why did JH claim he has been researching for 49 and 50 years at least 2-3 years before the 50th anniversary?
    • When has CTKA ever endorsed Barr McClellan, or Johnson and Hoover being plotters in the crime?
    • Why does JH blame CTKA for distributing his video when it was widely available years before CTKA reviewed it and Hankey was promoting it?
    • Why would Lisa Pease want to distribute JH work?
    • Why did JH not admit to sending his video to Alex Jones?
    • Why did JH hide his reply to Jim DiEugenio’s 20 mistakes he observed in the first half of his debate at “Murder Solved” on his website; furthermore, why did he delete Jim’s 20 point argument?
    • Why did JH feel the need to misrepresent Jim making up a comment JH actually made on Black Ops Radio?

    Part 1

    Part 3

    Part 4


    “The Dark Legacy of John Hankey”

    “Onwards and Downwards with John Hankey”

    Hankey/DiEugenio Debate Murder Solved

    DiEugenio’s Review Update of “Dark Legacy”

    Coogan Reply to Fetzer at Deep Politics Forum

  • Master Class with John Hankey, I: A Note for the Hankey Noviates

    Master Class with John Hankey, I: A Note for the Hankey Noviates


    Jim DiEugenio and I had no idea what we would kick up when I wrote my first article for CTKA. Since then my name and CTKA’s have been nearly synonymous with John Hankey. I do not know how I feel about that. I personally prefer that people discuss my article on James Bamford, or JFK and the MJ-12 hoax. One thing I do know is that Hankey hates being associated with Jim, CTKA, and myself. Considering how bizarre Hankey’s work has been of late, I really don’t know how to interpret that. This present essay was going to be short piece. But it ended up as a three-part essay discussing the latest hilarious installments in Hankey’s (and Jim Fetzer’s) career.


    Here are the three Hankey related articles and a reply to one of Mr. Fetzer’s silly articles.

    “The Dark Legacy of John Hankey”

    “Onwards and Downwards with John Hankey”

    Hankey/DiEugenio Debate Murder Solved

    DiEugenio’s Review Update of “Dark Legacy”

    Coogan Reply to Fetzer at Deep Politics Forum

    There are another three new additions (including this) I shall link to later.


    Veterans Today a new Hankey Haven

    In Part I, we learn he has teamed up with Jim Fetzer and written a spectacularly ridiculous article on the silly “Veterans Today” site. We discuss his new positions and get feedback from Joseph McBride. In Part II, to celebrate the 50th last year he debated a tape recording of Jim DiEugenio and still lost the argument. Part III discusses his interpretation of the Zhou En-Lai assassination attempt and his delusions concerning Prescott Bush, whom according to Hankey, was the real power behind the CIA.

    Fetzer, Hankey’s Ally against CTKA Oppression

    CTKA, essentially set Fetzer’s JFK agenda in all of this Hankey imbroglio. And almost anything we criticize Fetzer seems to admire e.g. Philip Nelson, Russ Baker. So much so, he writes about us much at Veteran’s Today. At last count, he has at least five articles defending the honor of numerous jokers we have attacked. He also has two Hankey inspired essays.

    The first article “Was George Bush Involved in the Assassination of JFK?” was a belated reply to the Bush articles we have posted here. Hankey co-authored the piece with Fetzer. My reply to Mr Fetzer’s lame critique is linked above. You will note that Mr Fetzer could not reply to any of my questions concerning his own argument against me. Furthermore, the reader will see Fetzer asked Jim to call me off in the very fight that he started, with his silly article.

    Hankey: The Gift That Just Keeps Giving

    John Hankey’s central illusion revolves around a certain FBI memo which, according to him, contains mystical properties. These properties have elevated GHWB into the realms of Kennedy assassination kingpin. Nevertheless, the person who discovered it has recently challenged Hankey’s interpretation of the document.

    Before I get to that tasty morsel, let us explore some new Hankeyian standards.

    First, perhaps in reaction to CTKA, he has dropped many of his bogus angles. To list all of the stuff he has changed since we began tracking him closely back in January 2010, is just plain boring. He is still misappropriating Mark Lane’s work badly, so badly he now believes Lane’s Rush to Judgement was the book that mentioned the Hunt and Bush connection. Consider the following:

    “But then Mark Lane, in Rush to Judgment, did the fabulous work of demonstrating, and in fact persuading a jury, that E. Howard Hunt, a major lieutenant in the CIA’s “misguided anti-Castro Cuban” program, was in Dallas and involved in the assassination. With this background – with this framework to guide the researcher-it was then possible to assemble the evidence linking Bush to Hunt.”

    The book he is discussing is not Rush to Judgment, It’s actually Plausible Denial. If he had said this in an interview, I could understand; we all make mistakes live. What I do not understand is he actually wrote this down and has included a photo of the reprinted 1992 version. Everyone knows Rush to Judgement was based off Lane’s posthumous defense brief for Oswald. Hankey’s excuse will be there is some mention of the Hunt case in a new edition of Rush to Judgement. Which is ludicrous as it is hardly the book’s topic. Here is a shot of his comment.

    Table 1: Hunt’s Trial Main Point of Rush to Judgment

    seamus 01

    Hankey simply does not know the contents of the book. Anyhow, what is scary is my examination of John Hankey’s new angles has barely started. After this short essay, I have an interview to annotate and Bill Corson to straighten out.

    Bogus George Bush, the Vengeful Nut Sack, and Ed Lansdale

    Hankey now leaps onto Russ Baker’s book. He is trying to pull Russ’s old line about Bush using his political campaign in 1963 as a figleaf for his covert activities that day. Hankey has never really pushed this angle too heavily. Indeed, I recall he initially dismissed the Bush outside the depository angle, and I admired him for that. Yet he now clutches at straws about an old statement from Roger Craig discussing the arrest of an “Independent oil operator from Houston.”

    “Jim also asked me about the arrests made in Dealey Plaza that day. I told him I knew of twelve arrests, one in particular made by R. E. Vaughn of the Dallas Police Department. The man Vaughn arrested was coming from the Dal-Tex Building across from the Texas School Book Depository. The only thing which Vaughn knew about him was that he was an independent oil operator from Houston, Texas. The prisoner was taken from Vaughn by Dallas Police detectives and that was the last that he saw or heard of the suspect.”

    Considering how many oilmen from Houston there are to call him “Bush” is slightly selective. Indeed, Hankey’s expert analysis begs some questions…

    • Vaughn offered no physical description whatsoever. How could anyone know who this man was?
    • In Hankey’s debacle of a debate, he insists GHWB was arrested with a “frigging gun in his hand” departing dramatically from his VT article.
    • If Bogus Bush got arrested outside the Daltex building why is he supposedly outside the Texas School Book Depository un-cuffed.
    • Why does the blurred image not give any indication of a bloke in a suit and tie, Bogus
    • George’s white shirt would have stuck out in the shadows?
    • Would Russ Baker approve of this take on his ID?
    • In the Garrison book, On the Trail of the Assassins (page 205-206). Garrison describes the arrest of two men one was arrested running out of the Daltex building was picked up by Police and disappeared. This is supposedly a panicked GHWB in Hankey land. The other man arrested was inside the building, Jim Braden, whose real name was Eugene Hale Brading. He claimed he was there on oil business and was based in LA. He was obviously lying if so why didn’t bogus George give a phony business are we led to believe the police took his real name.

    Hankey has now added the alleged photos of Ed Lansdale in Dealey Plaza that day into his lexicon. Jim DiEugenio is a little more skeptical concerning photo identifications in Dealey Plaza than I am. I have always been a little more open to the idea some images may depict Ed Lansdale and another depicting Orlando Bosch. However, I happily sit on the fence with these images, my belief in a conspiracy does not hinge on their being in these photos.

    Hence, where I agree with Jim is that for every balanced observation of a suspect there are a host of irresponsible writers making all kinds of discoveries. An example of cheapening the Lansdale ID is the addition of an individual who is clearly not GHWB. However, this is just the tip of the iceberg; it seems as if every major U.S. Cold War era crook can be identified as being there, not to mention every character in the Oswald saga.

    Another problem is some like to have their cake and eat it with any photo or film. A case is Fetzer’s hypocritical and goofy OIP (Oswald Innocence Project). Fetzer insists upon the veracity of the Lansdale and Bush images. Yet if the conspirators supposedly rubbed Oswald’s face off the steps at the TSBD (a main point of the OIP) then surely, the defacement of suspects like Lansdale and Bush to protect their identities would be a matter of routine.

    Hankey rounds off another emphatically poor performance with Bruce Willis’ belief in a conspiracy. This is another favourite party trick of his. Bar a celebrity having the balls to discuss the topic. Willis is cosmically irrelevant to JH premise about anything what Bruce Willis believes about a conspiracy. Yet, the maestro somehow has the temerity to call the mass of evidence we use to bury him under irrelevant?

    Hooke, Lies, and Stinker

    Much of this information the sophomoric Richard Hooke discussed in his laughable article “Did George Bush Coordinate a JFK Hit Team”, it will be covered in my upcoming review of Phil Nelson’s book. Nevertheless, he is worth a quick mention as it was Hooke’s coloration of the Altgen’s image that gave us the multi headed blue nut sack called Bogus George and identifying George ‘W’ Bush himself in Dealey Plaza! Now if that is not ridiculous enough, Hooke also claims Mac Wallace was a Skull & Bones man alongside George Bush. Hankey once had a real fetish for the Skull & Bones angle before CTKA came along.

    Hooke’s evidence is a photo of someone who looks vaguely similar to Wallace. After looking around, I deduced the person to be one the following individuals: John Erwin Caulkins, William James Connelly, Jr, George Cook III, Richard Elwood Jenkins, Howard Sayre Weaver, and one Richard Gerstle Mack.

    Well as it turns out, I was able to contact the relatives of Mr. Gerstle Mack.

    “Dick was a member of Skull and Bones and was my uncle. He is the 3rd person on the left in the Skull and Bones photo you all are speculating about.” (Email Gerstle and Sloss Family Reunion 8/4/2014)

    I was then given the rundown on who Gerstle Mack was. He was one of the first Jewish people to join Skull and Bones. He didn’t rule the world either. He invented a baby carrier called the “Hikeapoose.” The Bush family would help him out with his medical expenses in later life. Wow, he sounds, and looks like Mac Wallace doesn’t he?

    Hooke, a man truly qualified to stand beside Fetzer and Hankey, has no evidence of Wallace attending Yale; dare I say there is no evidence of Wallace at Yale. Furthermore, Bonesmen are all tapped from the same year. Most of the lads back in the day were blue bloods that had familial connections to previous Bones members. Wallace was born in 1921, and George in 1924. Hence, it is impossible for Wallace and Bush to have been playmates.

    There is a good takedown (bar the incorrect date) of this ludicrous scenario at the “Oswald Innocence Campaign is a Fraud.”

    “Just long enough for him to be accepted to Yale in the first place, of which there is no proof, and then accepted into the Skull and Bones society, of which there is no proof, just long enough to be photographed for the 1947 edition of the Skull and Bones society? And then he said, okay, I got into the photograph, bye-bye, and went back to Texas? He didn’t stick around and graduate from Yale? He decided the Univ of Texas at Austin was a better school?”

    I could not have said it better myself.

    Hankey is now trying to forge himself something of a new identity as an anti-LBJ did it researcher. Unfortunately his reputation has been ruined by his inane dabbling in the Bush zones. From what I have seen, he has been cribbing a lot of his anti-LBJ stuff from CTKA anyway. Nevertheless, this is not the point. The main issue is Fetzer’s acceptance of Hankey’s stance.

    Addendum: John Please Read The Following

    Here it is my grand finale… at least for Part I anyway.

    John Hankey has long been fixated with the supposed mystical properties of the discovery by Joseph McBride of a Bush/CIA document. But Hankey has misconstrued this memo and Mark Lane’s book “Plausible Denial” that published it so often and so badly, he has created his own nearly solipsisitc unvierse.

    Mark Lane

    Answering questions on a 2/4/2012 thread at the Education Forum Mark Lane said the following concerning Bush’s non-appearance in Rush to Judgement, the Hoover/Bush memo, and E Howard Hunt’s role that day.

    “No, I did not mention George Herbert Walker Bush in Rush to Judgment. I did report in Plausible Denial (pp. 329-33) the facts about Bush, the former director of the CIA and later president, and his suspicious engagement which demonstrates that he had been involved in the CIA before the assassination of President Kennedy — a statement that he falsely denied — as well as his likely involvement during 1961 with the CIA’s planned Bay of Pigs invasion. I was asked why I have not spoken much about that subject. I published it in full in the New York Times bestselling book, Plausible Denial, and I discussed it during lectures on the Kennedy Assassination. Since I was not asked by network TV to discuss anything in Plausible Denial, I did what I could.”

    Lane also commented on E Howard Hunt’s role. Note he does not back the idea of Hunt being a sniper. Or actually being in Dealey Plaza that day despite the Trento memorandum, Lane appears to believe it was a limited hangout.

    “I don’t know where Hunt and Sturgis were during the shooting, but I know they were in Dallas the day before the shooting helping to plan the operation. If they had any sense of self preservation, they got out of town before the shots were fired.”

    Now ain’t that a kick in the head for Hankey’s hypothesis all based on Lane’s book?

    Joseph McBride

    The Deep Politics Forum is a fascinating place with some crackling reseaerchers, including Joe McBride. McBride is a jouralist/author in the vein of the illustirous Jim Hougan. In The Dark Legacy of John Hankey I quoted the following from Joe:

    “Bush’s duties with the CIA in 1963 – whether he was an agent for example or merely an “asset” – cannot be determined from Hoover’s memo.”

    At the DPF I emailed Joe at the start of the year and asked him about Hankey’s use of the document that he (McBride) had unearthed. This is what he said in reply: “I have read the Hankey piece. It is bizarre what he has done with the information.”

    If you do not believe me John, contact Joe. I am sure he would love to hear about how after all the hard work he did identifying it as GHWB, that it was actually you who destroyed the idea of the memo not referring to him. Can you remember saying the following…

    “I will give myself props for destroying Bush’s claim that the memo did not refer to him.”

    Prop away John, prop, prop, prop away, and deny you ever said it.


    Part 2

    Part 3

    Part 4

  • The Deaths of Two Unsung Heroes: John Judge and Mike Ruppert

    The Deaths of Two Unsung Heroes: John Judge and Mike Ruppert


    In the space of a few days in mid April, two fighters for the truth about America’s recent history were lost to us. John Judge passed away in Washington D.C. and Mike Ruppert passed in Napa, California. It’s appropriate that the two deaths in essence straddled the country. Because in a real sense, John and Mike worked hard to create an alterative paradigm to the MSM’s version of contemporary American history.

    John Judge

    I knew both of these authors and activists for many years. In both a personal way and also in a professional manner. I first met John Judge (left, 11-22-96) at the ASK Symposium in Dallas back in 1991. This was the first of the research conferences, which became annual events when Oliver Stone’s film JFK debuted. John was a working research partner of the late Mae Brussell and he was selling a collection of her best essays there in a pamphlet called the Mae Brussell reader. John and Mae had researched the major assassinations of the sixties at length and in depth. That is, the murders of John Kennedy, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy. And since Mae had such a wide variety of interests, John also had a cosmopolitan view of modern American history. John had opinions on things like the Tate-LaBianca murders and the Jonestown tragedy. In all these instances John and Mae came to radically different views of these events than the MSM did.

    Mae’s work was backed up by a huge archive of documents and books and clippings. I know this for a fact since I was one of the very few people who was allowed to utilize this archives. After Mae died in 1988, there ensued a rather unseemly battle over her legacy. This included her collection of broadcast tapes called World Watchers International. These had been made on radio station KAZU FM in Pacific Grove. It also included over 40 file cabinets of newspaper and magazine clippings and documents. In addition to that Mae had about 4000 books, some of which were very hard to come by. Lisa Pease and myself were allowed to go through these materials for a weekend in Santa Barbara when the late bookseller Tom Davis had them in his possession. Although Brussell was caricatured by many in and out of the research field, there were very few in the community that had the wherewithal and stamina to do the very difficult work she did on so many current topics. John benefited from this relationship in much of his work and in his viewpoint of how the importation of the Nazi scientific and spy apparatus through Reinhard Gehlen’s relationship with Allen Dulles and John McCloy impacted the American intelligence community at its inception.

    As I said, at the time I met John and interviewed him for my first book, the first edition of Destiny Betrayed, he really was not a researcher anymore. He first became a public relations liaison for Mae’s work. But that effort was hamstrung over the internecine strife over who Mae actually left her archives and legacy to. John founded the Committee for an Open Archives along with Bill Kelly. That group then joined with CTKA and the AARC to form the Coalition on Political Assassinations, and John became the front person for the COPA. In the late nineties, when that group was formally disbanded, John continued to hold conferences under that banner. In addition to holding seminars on the JFK case, John also did the same in Memphis for the King case, in Los Angeles for the Bobby Kennedy case, and even in New York for the Malcolm X case.

    When the 9-11 attacks happened, John immediately became involved with the family members in trying to get a federal inquiry off the ground. And he also monitored the work of that commission. From 2005 to 2007 he worked as a Special Projects Director for the exceptional Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney. Two things he did for her was to arrange a 2005 conference of the very best 9-11 researchers for congress to hear, and he helped draft articles of impeachment for George W. Bush.

    One of the researchers who John invited to speak at that McKinney arranged conference was Mike Ruppert. (This conference can be viewed at You Tube under the title, Cynthia McKinney on CSPAN-Report Card 1 of 4.) Which is as it should have been. Mike Ruppert was involved in his alternative journalism career in September of 2001. Mike had been a police detective in Los Angeles for a number of years. While on this job he became romantically involved with a woman who introduced him to the importation of drugs into the US by a combination of the CIA and Halliburton. This led to his resignation from the force. He then got interested in reopening the RFK case. Mike had learned some fascinating things about the RFK cover up while on the force. So he joined forces with the likes of the late Jonn Christian to try and introduce new evidence to the LA Police Commission about that case.

    But when Gary Webbs’s sensational stories in the San Jose Mercury News exploded onto the national agenda in 1996, Ruppert found his moment. When John Deutch visited Los Angeles, Mike confronted him on camera. This was an electric and iconic example of the old adage of “speaking truth to power”. Mike capitalized on this moment by launching his own publication called From the Wilderness. This began as a mailed periodical and then became an online journal. It was one of the very few alternative voices that arose during the so-called Internet Revolution that really was a vibrant and strong media outlet in the tradition of Ramparts and the LA Free Press. (Two others were David Talbot’s Salon and Bob Parry’s Consortium News.)

    There were very few people who were as good as Mike was on the issues of CIA drug dealing. And From the Wilderness helped launch a vibrant speaking tour for Mike. From the Wilderness grew to have a circulation in the tens of thousands. And I eventually wrote for that fine journal. (See here and here.)

    But when the 9-11 attacks happened, Mike pounced on this event like a tiger. As he told me, there just seemed to be too many anomalies about it: the late arriving interceptors, the large stock market manipulation which no one collected on, the many war games in progress that day. Mike had learned from the JFK case. He was not going to concentrate on the physical evidence in 9-11. After all he said, what is more compelling than the Zapruder film? Yet, the MSM casts that aside. So he concentrated on building an internal evidentiary case, showing how a series of acts built to the final denouement. The case he made was not against George W. Bush. It was against the dyed in the wool Neocons Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld. His book on the subject, Crossing the Rubicon, is a bit long, but it is surely one of the finest books on that subject one can read.

    As Mike’s manager, Ken Levine, told me, Ruppert was as bad a businessman as he was a good journalist. Therefore, because he was not a good delegator and manager, From the Wilderness never prospered the way it should have. He then moved out of California into the Pacific Northwest and ran into legal problems. This essentially brought down From the Wilderness. I actually tried to buy the publication from him, but he either never got the offer or never seriously considered it.

    Mike tried to make a comeback with the documentary film Collapse. But although that film was a good one there were too many of them out at the time about the economic collapse of 2007-08. It did not do for him what he expected. But Mike kept up his talking and speaking engagements. And I think it’s fitting to remember him by two interviews he did with Allison Weiner on her fine program Media Mayhem. (Click here for these two appearances and here.)

    I didn’t agree with John and Mike on every issue. But most of the time they were on the right track. Beyond that, they provided a serious and credible counterweight to the nonsense of the dying MSM.

    We are all a bit poorer with their leaving us.

    – Jim DiEugenio

  • Robert Groden, Absolute Proof


    Robert Groden occupies a rather illustrious position in the research critical of the Warren Commission. First, he is undoubtedly one of the very foremost experts on the photographs and films in the JFK case. From the past, only people like the late Richard Sprague were in his league. Today, only say a Robin Unger, or Richard Trask can navigate in his territory. (See Unger’s collection.)

    Secondly, Groden was the man who began showing first class copies of the Zapruder film in the early seventies. This culminated in his appearance with Dick Gregory on national television in 1975. On an ABC program hosted by Geraldo Rivera, Groden first revealed to all of America what was on the Zapruder film. Images that Time-Life, Henry Luce, Clare Booth Luce and C. D. Jackson wanted to conceal from the public. Namely that President Kennedy’s entire body rockets backward at Z frame 313, simultaneous with him getting struck in the head from what appears to be a projectile from the front. That signal event, which Gregory and Groden deserve much credit for, was largely responsible for creating a firestorm of controversy throughout the nation. That firestorm quickly led to the creation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). Groden served as chief photo consultant for the HSCA for its duration.

    Groden was later a consultant for Oliver Stone on his film JFK. And then he served as a chief talking head on the TV series The Men Who Killed Kennedy. In 1993, at Abby Rockefeller’s Harvard Conference, he showed the complete Zapruder film, i.e. with no frames missing. That convinced this reviewer that Kennedy was undoubtedly hit before he went behind the freeway sign. Which meant the shot could not have been fired by Oswald, since his vision was obstructed by the branches of an oak tree at that time.

    Groden then moved to Dallas to set up shop to sell his wares in Dealey Plaza. He was a counterweight to the propaganda put out by Gary Mack and The Sixth Floor. Since then the Power Elite in Dallas has harassed him legally by ticketing him over 80 times and actually arresting him. They have not been able to make the charges stick. And Groden has a lawsuit pending against the city at this time. Groden is clearly a heroic figure in the cause of demonstrating the truth about the JFK murder to the public.

    All of which makes me really wish I could like his new book, Absolute Proof, more. Undoubtedly, there are many good things in the oversized, profusely illustrated, coffee table type of book. And I will mention some of those good things in this review. But there are also some very questionable things in the book. Ultimately, the volume comes out as a very mixed bag.

    I

    Groden leads off his book with what is by now the hotly debated McCone-Rowley document. He does here what he did at the Cyril Wecht Conference in Pittsburgh in October. He states that he thinks it is a genuine document. Others, to put it mildly, disagree. For example, Gary Buell has done much good work on it. (See his blog.)

    Besides the document itself, in that link, please note the fax from the National Archives to attorney Jim Lesar. It says that they the archivist checked and there is no such document listed in their index with that date or title on it. Secondly, a document with this kind of information in it, namely that Oswald was trained for espionage work by the CIA and the Navy, would not be classified as just Confidential. Which this is. Because that is the lowest security clearance. Something like the McCone-Rowley document would be classified with the highest security clearance. Which, to my knowledge, is Above Top Secret, For Yours Eyes Only. Third, as Oswald expert John Armstrong has pointed out to this reviewer, in paragraph five, where McCone tells Rowley that Oswald was at Camp Peary in September and October of 1958, Armstrong’s files reveal this not to be the case. Oswald was in the Far East at that time. (E mail from Armstrong, February of 2014.)

    In paragraph six, McCone seems to admit that certain agents of the CIA were involved in what he calls the “Dallas Action.” This is incredible. First, why would McCone ever admit to this in writing? Second, as most observers of the CIA know, McCone was not an insider, or part of the Old Boys Network. He was Kennedy’s personal appointee. The idea that those involved would either 1.) Tell him they were part of the plot, or 2.) Leave a trail that he could attribute it to them, that is, for this reviewer, kind of preposterous.

    In paragraph 8, a real red flag leaps out. The document reads, “It is possible that Oswald, given his instability, might have been involved in some operation concerning Hoffa…” First, as an undercover agent, Oswald displayed little “instability”. From what chroniclers of his intelligence career note, he basically did what he was told. Also, what on earth could be the operation against Hoffa? Why would the FBI or Justice Department need someone like Oswald to use against Jimmy Hoffa? This is so nonsensical that, in and of itself, it should lend a pall of suspicion across the document. Finally, there is the common problem with these suspect documents: there is really nothing in the document information wise which one can verify as being new. Which would have to be the case if McCone really had unearthed the genuine secret files on Oswald.

    In his text, Groden states that this document first surfaced during the Church Committee investigation of the CIA and FBI in 1975. But if the reader clicks through to the discussion of the document on the Randi forum, one will see that it seems to have first appeared in that year also. Originating with a tabloid reporter named James L. Moore. In his book, Groden proffers a document from the Church Committee requesting information from the Secret Service. (p. 8) But there is no proof he produces to show that they sent back this particular document upon the Church Committee’s request. In fact, that the Secret Service would do so seems quite far-fetched. Especially when one realizes the furor that the Church Committee created at the time e.g. with its exposure of the CIA-Mafia plots to kill Castro, and Frank Church calling the CIA an “out of control rogue elephant.”

    In light of all the countervailing evidence suggesting the document is ersatz, the author gets a bit strained when, on page 13, he relies on the McCone-Rowley document to knock down specific “lies and denials’ about Oswald’s ties to intelligence. It gets worse when he then relies for corroboration upon the famous story leaked by the Commission about Oswald having an FBI payroll number of 179. (p. 15) Since many people also suspect that story to be suspect.

    But if the McCone-Rowley document is dubious, it also appears another piece of evidence Groden features near the beginning of the book is also suspect.

    II

    For at least the last 3-4 years Groden has trumpeted a new witness who he says gives Oswald an absolutely airtight alibi. This reviewer actually heard the author talk about this person at the COPA Conference in Dallas three years ago. He again discusses this witness in Chapter 2 of Absolute Proof. Here, he calls this witness Geraldine Reid.

    He begins his discussion by saying that Mrs. Robert Reid, who the Warren Commission interviewed, was named Delores Reid. He then says there was a second Mrs. Reid who also worked on the second floor of the Texas School Book Depository and her name was Geraldine Reid. (Groden, p. 20) It is important to detail from his book the importance that Groden gives Geraldine Reid. He writes that the Commission “avoided mentioning this Mrs. Reid like the plague.” Why? Because she was flown to Washington and interrogated by the Commission but her testimony “was so devastating to their preconceived conclusions of Oswald’s guilt that they buried all references to her.” (ibid) Referring to an interview he did with her, Groden writes, “I was threatened to keep my mouth shut, or else.” He then says that the Commission tried to keep Geraldine a secret and concealed the fact there were actually two Mrs. Reids. He then quotes more fully from his interview with the second Mrs. Reid which took place before she passed away relatively recently.

    There were some unusual circumstances to the interview Groden did with this woman. For instance, no tapes were permitted, and Groden was not allowed to refer to her testimony before she passed away. Reid told Groden that about one minute before the shots rang out, Oswald walked into the office on the second floor across from the snack room. He needed some change for the soda machine. He went to Geraldine and gave her a dollar and asked her for change. At that moment they both heard the sound of gunshots. But, oddly, neither of them said anything about the sounds. She continued giving him change and he walked toward the snack room. She concluded her story with, “That’s the last time I saw him until he passed by me a few minutes later as he was leaving the building.” (Groden, p. 21) By this time she had learned what happened and told him that Kennedy had been shot.

    Groden then says he was introduced to Geraldine Reid and her story by a man names David Thiess, a former investigator for the Office of Naval Intelligence. Thiess told him he knew she had been interviewed by the Commission and they had suppressed her story and wiped her out of the record. But further, he had seen the concealed documents about her. Both Reid and Theiss died, Theiss as Absolute Proof was going to press. (ibid)

    After the book was published, Richard Gilbride talked about the Geraldine Reid story at Greg Parker’s fine forum, Reopen Kennedy Case. As the reader can see by reading this fascinating review of the facts, it appears that, to begin with, Groden got some of the details wrong. There was no Delores Reid working in the Depository Building. The Mrs. Robert Reid Groden refers to was first named Geraldean (at times spelled Jeraldean). And she passed away in 1973. So it turns out that there was no Geraldine Reid also, at least with his exact spelling.

    What appears to have happened is that in an FBI report made on November 24th, a Mrs. Sanders talked about Geraldean Reid but the FBI agent incorrectly spelled it as “Geraldine”. But the giveaway is that Sanders gave the agents the phone number of Mrs. Geraldine/Jeraldean Reid, a key point Groden apparently missed. So they were talking about the same person. Obviously, if this was the only Geraldean/Geraldine Reid at the Depository, and she died in 1973, then this could not be the person that Groden talked to several years ago, and who died relatively recently.

    What appears to have happened here is that Mr. Theiss, who conveniently died right before the book came out, somehow concocted a hoax to play on the research community. This is a problem that has plagued the community since 1964. And Groden did not do the proper follow-up to prevent himself from falling for the phony “Geraldine Reid” playlet. We owe thanks to Greg Parker and the frequenters of his forum for correcting the record on this issue.

    III

    Groden also apparently believes in the phenomenon called Badgeman. (See p. 302. I had not really investigated this issue until the 50th anniversary. About a month after that MSM pig out, Oliver Stone got in contact with me and gave me a short list of items he wanted clarified in the wake of that singular and monumental orgy of denial. One of the items on his list was Badgeman. Therefore, I actually began to investigate Badge Man in earnest for the first time.

    For the record, Badge Man first came to the limelight in a big way on Nigel Turner’s original series The Men Who Killed Kennedy. The first go round for the now discredited Turner was broadcast in America in 1991. On that show, the soon to be turncoat Gary Mack, and the late Jack White greatly enlarged, enhanced and colorized an aspect of the famous Mary Moorman photograph which depicts the grassy knoll at the time of the fusillade in Dealey Plaza. After spending several days researching this image I wrote Mr. Stone a memo of about 1.5 pages. I will now excerpt from that memo since Groden accepts Badgeman as an image of a Dallas cop (or someone wearing the uniform)atop the knoll.

    “The last matter you wanted me to look at was Badgeman. I am glad I did since I did not understand all of the problems with this image…it is not an easy matter to decipher.

    First, there is a debate about where the Badgeman figure actually is. At first glance, it appears not to be behind the stockade fence, but behind the shorter retaining wall on the knoll, but not atop it.

    If that is the case, then the problem is simple: How did no one see this guy if he is supposed to be doing what he is doing: shooting at Kennedy? Clearly, someone should have seen a policeman with a rifle there on the grass. The other problem is that when one sees the image here, the top part, head and shoulders, appear too small to be a normal sized person.

    Because of these significant problems at this location – and it sure does seem to me to me to be the correct location – some have said that Badgeman is not really there. He is really behind the stockade fence. In other words, one must add depth perspective. But again, this creates problems. First of all, if one postulates this new position, its not where most observers, including me, think the actual shooting location was. I for one think the actual location was further down the fence, near the triple underpass. Where the fence juts out creating a kind of crease over a sewer grate. To me, that is the best position for an assassin on the stockade fence. This adjusted location for Badgeman is much more further down the knoll, toward the Depository, allowing for a more oblique angle. So much so that I am not sure if the “back and to the left” reaction, which was a keystone of your film, would apply.

    Second, if one postulates this other position, then the problem of having him too small in the foreground now becomes reversed: for now the exposed portions appear much too large to be showing a above the fence line. Therefore, some defenders have provided explanations, like the man is standing on a car bumper further behind the fence.

    Although Lee Bowers did not see what he testified to at this location, but the one further down, if someone had been on a car bumper, it would have been almost right in front of him here. Hard to believe Bowers did not see that.

    It is a really complicated puzzle. Because of all the work done on Badgeman photographically by Jack White and Gary Mack, I agree the photo is suggestive. But I simply do not see how it can be viable with all these inherent problems attached to it.”

    Groden does not even begin to mention these problems with the image. He simply vouches for it as being genuine.

    All of this seems to me to bring up another problem with the book, a lack of sources. Which would be acceptable if the prose was just descriptive of the pictures, and did not relate to any other information besides the photos. But such is not the case. For example, the author places the infamous Dan Rather/Walter Cronkite CBS special in 1966. It aired in 1967. (p. 84) In discussing the treatment of Kennedy at Parkland Hospital, the author says some people turned over the body and saw the back wound. (p. 142) Something like that needed to be profusely annotated. Its not. Apparently under the influence of Philip Nelson, Groden writes that it was Lyndon Johnson who ordered Kennedy’s body to be removed from Parkland Hospital before an autopsy could be performed. (p. 145) Again, this needed to be annotated. Because much of the evidence says this was actually done by the Secret Service, on orders of the Kennedy entourage, e. g. Ken O’Donnell.

    Groden also writes that the Harper Fragment, which many suspect was from the rear of Kennedy’s skull, was found 54 feet to the left rear of the point of impact. (p. 159) Yet in the first FBI reports about the discovery of the fragment, the description attributed to the man who discovered it was that he found it 25 feet to the south of the limousine. Which puts the location to the front of the car. (See this map for the fragment location and the Badgeman height problem.)

    In his discussion of the autopsy, Groden proclaims that Robert Knudsen actually took a second series of photographs of Kennedy’s body. In my opinion, as I discussed in my review of Doug Horne’s book Inside the ARRB, this simply overstates the evidence for forgery. Knudsen may have done this, but it is far from a proven case. (Groden p. 162) Groden also says that Lt. Commander Bruce Pitzer filmed the entire autopsy on 16 mm black and white film. He was working on an edit when he was murdered in his office on October 29, 1966. He then adds that “the murderer stole the film and it hasn’t been seen since.” (ibid, p. 301) It took Pitzer three years to edit an autopsy film? But beyond that, the men Groden relies upon for this version of the Pitzer story, Dan Marvin and Dennis David, have some credibility problems. No one has done more work on the Pitzer case than the estimable Allan Eaglesham. And his final essay on the subject reveals the problems with the testimony of these two men.

    Then there are the problems with Groden’s macro view of the conspiracy. He writes that Carlos Marcello was part of the CIA/Mafia plots to kill Castro. (p. 199) Not according to the Church Committee. This was actually added on later by Dan Moldea, a source I would avoid at almost all costs. Groden then writes like Bob Blakey and says that Oswald and Guy Banister were being supervised by Marcello in the summer of 1963. He offers no proof of this, and this reviewer, who has done much work on New Orleans, believe its balderdash.

    After this, the author now turns to Dallas. Groden buys into the whole Murchison ranch assassination party scenario. (pgs. 201-02) And he buys into the most extreme versions, that is as rendered by LBJ did it zealots like Harrison Livingstone and Barr McClellan. That is he puts J. Edgar Hoover, Richard Nixon, H. L. Hunt and John McCloy in the midst of the festivities. Along, of course, with LBJ’s oh so late arrival. This is all recycled by these authors through none other than Madeleine Brown. And Groden adds that Brown’s son, Steven, was LBJ’s offspring. Yet, he does not reveal that mother and son waited until after LBJ was dead for 14 years to sue Lady Bird Johnson. (Dallas Morning News, June 19, 1987) That case was dismissed when Steven failed to show in court.

    But years before that, Madeleine and Steven sued another man, lawyer Jerome Ragsdale, on the same charge: that Ragsdale was Steven’s father. Question: What is the worth of a witness like this? Who when the first lawsuit failed, which it did, then sues a “second” father and now begins to talk about the second father’s role in the Kennedy murder. I would say, it’s not worth very much at all. And we should not be dealing with such tales today.

    IV

    As I said, there are good things in the book. Groden was the first to demonstrate–with photos of witnesses indicating the rear of the skull–where they saw a blasted out hole in the back of Kennedy’s head. That is in this book also. Except the author actually extends the number of medical witnesses who say they saw this phenomenon. One which would be impossible if the Warren Commission was correct. These photos of witnesses pointing to the rear of the skull extend from page 149 of the book to page 155. Groden snapped pictures of over 20 of them who saw this damage to the back of Kennedy’s skull. He then uses testimony of some witnesses he could not actually photograph, like Nurse Diana Bowron. Instead he uses a sketch by Bowron of the back of Kennedy’s head. She then wrote that she saw a large wound in the lower right quadrant. She said it was so large she could almost put her fist through it. (p. 152) Another example of testimony used by the author are the words of Petty Officer Chester Moyers at Bethesda Hospital. He said, to the HSCA, that he saw a massive wound of the dimensions of 3 inches by 3 inches in the rear of the head. (p. 156) All in all, the author has collected the testimony of close to 80 witnesses in this regard. Undoubtedly, some skeptics will question some of these people e.g. Jim Tague. But the overwhelming majority of these witnesses seem to me to be credible. When one combines this work with that of Dr. Gary Aguilar on the declassified HSCA depositions on the matter, then the evidence for this gaping rear hole in the rear skull seems to me to be simply overwhelming. This might be the strongest part of the book and the most relevant to the case.

    Groden is a traditionalist in his method of deconstructing the Single Bullet Theory. That is, instead of arguing the provenance of CE 399, he relies on the absurdities of the trajectory analysis. Here he adds in a piece of evidence that is very often absent from the debate: the clothing of Governor John Connally. The entrance hole in the back is way to the right of the jacket, it actually seems beyond the shoulder seam. While the exit is well below the lapel in the front. But further, the author couples these with the Arlen Specter/FBI reconstruction of the motorcade. Clearly, someone told the lawyer about the true location of the back wound, since it was marked well below the president’s jacket collar. (p. 146) And the wound to the extreme right of Connally’s jacket is also marked accurately. Therefore, the question becomes: How did a bullet traveling from right to left hit Kennedy near the middle of the back, slightly to the right of the midline, and then emerge going rightward all the way over to the outside of Connally’s right shoulder? Connally’s comments to Groden about this is quotable. He told the author that the SBT was “absolutely ridiculous”. (p. 147)

    Today’s excuse for this bizarre flight path is the Bugliosi/Dale Myers concoction of Connally sitting inward of Kennedy by six inches. That was pretty much vitiated by Pat Speer when he got the limousine schematic diagram which explicitly showed that the jump seat in front of Kennedy was only 2.5 inches inward from the door. But Groden here goes beyond that. Through a series of photos taken throughout the motorcade, some by Dave Powers who was traveling just behind Kennedy, he shows that Kennedy and Connally were pretty much lined up in tandem to each other. And any discrepancy between the two was pretty minimal. Certainly not enough to account for the bizarre flight path outlined above. (See the photos and discussion on pages 38, 47-48, p. 249 and on pgs. 255-56. This last series of photos seem to me to be quite convincing.)

    Continuing with the medical and ballistics evidence, Groden shows the document which states that there was an FBI receipt for a missile recovered from JFK at the autopsy. (p. 86) He also displays a newspaper article I had never seen before. Here, Dr. George Burkley, the White House doctor, said Kennedy died of a bullet wound in the right temple. (ibid) This was from the Chicago Daily News of November 22, 1963.

    Concerning the SBT, Groden also notes that Dr. Jim Humes wrote notes from messages he got from Parkland Hospital about the diameter of the throat wound as seen by Dr. Malcolm Perry in Dallas. Those notes say the wound was 3-5 mm. (p. 86) Which, if the Warren Commission was right, make the exit wound smaller than the entrance wound in the back. If so, this was pretty much unheard of prior to the Kennedy assassination.

    In more than one place throughout the book, the author shows blown up photos of Kennedy’s back wound. (See pgs. 91, 97-99, p. 144) He makes an interesting argument that 1.) The actual pictures appear to show two wounds, and 2.) The HSCA doctored the original photos in their artistic renditions to show only one wound. Groden argues that the hole on top is an exit wound from the shot to the throat. The hole below it, by about 1.5 inches, is the entrance wound in the back. Groden adds that Humes took the projectile out of this wound and it’s the “missile receipt” mentioned above. I must say, Groden’s photos are so large and clear that this argument, which I had never really encountered before, has some cogency to it.

    The author has always maintained that certain photos and frames from the Zapruder film do show a hole in the back of Kennedy’s skull. He does that here again with an extreme blow up of the Mary Moorman photograph. And it does seem to show some kind of cavity in the back of Kennedy ‘s head during the shooting sequence. (p. 179)

    Groden has always been a believer in the acoustics evidence. This was a dictabelt motorcycle tape recording made in Dealey Plaza, supposedly of the shots ringing out. Professor Don Thomas gave the acoustics evidence some ballast when he published a peer reviewed paper supporting that evidence. Since then Thomas has jousted with critics of his work several times. By any objective means, he has defended himself adequately. Groden brings up the argument that if one buys the acoustics evidence, the shots are arranged too close together to be fired by Oswald. The time interim separating two of the shots is 1.7 seconds. Yet, when the FBI tested the rifle, it took them 2.3 seconds to recycle the weapon. (p. 82)

    In relation to this point, Groden prints an FBI document from the day of the murder. It was from the agent in charge in Dallas, Gordon Shanklin. This document clearly implies that Shanklin is referring to two separate bullets which struck Kennedy and Connally. It was written before the cover story about the SBT had been enacted. (p. 253)

    Furthering this quandary about the ballistics evidence, Groden chimes in on the debate begun by Noel Twyman concerning just how many shells and live rounds were found by the Dallas Police on the sixth floor of the Texas School Bok Depository. Through the work of Allan Eaglesham and his interviews with photographer Tom Alyea, we know that the crime scene as depicted in the Warren Commission photos was made up after the fact. It does not show what was really there in the early minutes after the shooting. (Destiny Betrayed, Second Edition, by James DiEugenio, p. 343) Groden devotes three pages to this issue. (Groden, pgs. 273-75) He features five photos and five documents. He makes a rather interesting case that there were two spent rounds and one live round found on the sixth floor, not three shells. For this author, this point has become an issue of real and vital contention in the evidentiary record.

    Another good point Groden makes is about he configuration of witnesses in Dealey Plaza, and which way they ran once the shots were heard. Propagandists like John McAdams and Dave Reitzes try to say that there really was not much of a difference between the number of witnesses who heard shots from the grassy knoll, and those who heard them from behind the president. But the problem with this is that the FBI never made a systematic attempt to track down each and every witness in Dealey Plaza and elicit their best recollection about the direction and number of the shots. Clearly, what J. Edgar Hoover and the Warren Commission did was to cherry pick the witnesses who testified before the Commission in order to cover up what the real ear witness testimony would have been. Because, as Groden shows in his book, and as he did in Black Op Radio’s 50 Reasons for 50 Years segment, is that the vast majority of witnesses ran to the grassy knoll area once they heard the shots ring out. And it does not seem to even be really close in number to those who ran to points behind the limousine. (See the photos from pgs. 68-75)

    There are also good things in the book about the media. Groden touches on the relationship between Bill Paley of CBS and the CIA. And he especially hones in on the recent wave of dubious documentaries (which should actually be called mockumentaries) on cable television, e.g. the Discovery Channel .

    As I said, Bob Groden has been a true champion of the case for the public. He has devoted much of his adult life trying to show that the Warren Commission was nothing but a sham meant to conceal the true facts of Kennedy’s death. His current book is a decidedly mixed bag of virtues and liabilities. But taken as a trilogy, his last three books – this one, The Killing of a President, and The Search for Lee Harvey Oswald – form what is the best photo library available in book form on this case. Although this volume, as demonstrated above, is not up to the standard of the previous two, the series as a whole is very much worth having.

  • “Maurice Bishop … was David Atlee Phillips”

    “Maurice Bishop … was David Atlee Phillips”


    When he first confirmed that David Atlee Phillips was the CIA contact known as “Maurice Bishop,” Cuban exile leader Antonio Veciana did so tacitly. But Veciana’s meaning was so clear, and his guile so transparent, there was no doubt; both he and House Select Committee investigator Gaeton Fonzi began laughing.

    Now, decades later, Veciana has explicitly stated that Phillips (right) was indeed Bishop, and that he did indeed see Phillips with Lee Harvey Oswald in September 1963 – thus formally linking a high ranking CIA officer with the JFK assassination.

    Veciana’s admission came in a written statement issued November 22, 2013, the fiftieth anniversary of the assassination. In a letter to Fonzi’s widow Marie, Veciana, the elderly, former leader of Alpha 66, said, “Maurice Bishop, my CIA contact agent was David Atlee Phillips. Phillips or Bishop was the man I saw with Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas on September 1963.”

    phillips

    Fonzi wrote of his encounters with Veciana in his 1993 book The Last Investigation, which describes his experience with the House Select Committee on Assassinations in the 1970s.

    At the time of his first meetings with Veciana, Fonzi was a staff investigator for Sen. Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.), a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and co-chair of the Sub-committee on the John F. Kennedy Assassination. Fonzi told Veciana he was exploring links between government agencies and Cuban exile groups.

    On March 2, 1976, Veciana told Fonzi that two months before the assassination he rendezvoused with his CIA contact “Maurice Bishop” in the lobby of a downtown Dallas office building. Bishop was already there when he arrived, Veciana said, and in the company of a young man he later recognized as Lee Harvey Oswald, the alleged JFK assassin.

    In subsequent HSCA testimony, however, Veciana did not identify Phillips as Bishop. But Fonzi independently determined that “Bishop” and Phillips were one and the same.

    Phillips was also called before the HSCA, and under oath, denied both using the name Maurice Bishop and knowing Veciana. That ended the matter. Although Fonzi believed they could make a case for perjury, HSCA Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey declined to bring charges against Phillips.

    In the early 1960s Alpha 66 was a leading anti-Castro organization, funded by the CIA. During the course of their meetings Veciana never explicitly told Fonzi that Bishop was really Phillips. Fonzi believed that Veciana would not make the identification because he thought Bishop/Phillips could further aid him in his goal of toppling Cuban leader Fidel Castro.

    David Atlee Phillips was a CIA officer for 25 years. At the time of the assassination he was Chief of Cuban Operations, based in Mexico City. He died in 1988.

    Initial reports of Veciana’s 2013 statement erroneously said Veciana had died.

    CTKA obtained a copy of the statement from former HSCA staff member Dan Hardway, who got it from Marie Fonzi.

    The bulk of this account is derived from the Appendix to Hearings Before the Select Committee on Assassination of the U.S. House of Representatives, Vol. X, pp. 37-56, and from The Last Investigation, by Gaeton Fonzi, Chapters 16 and 44.

  • Vincent M. Palamara, Survivor’s Guilt


    Vince Palamara is, with little question, the critical author who has the most knowledge of the failures of the Secret Service in their obligation to protect President Kennedy on November 22, 1963. In other fields of knowledge and information e.g. who is the most outstanding expert in the medical field, on Jim Garrison, on the HSCA etc., there is some room for debate. But very few would argue about Palamara being on first base in regards to the Secret Service.

    Well over a decade ago, Palamara put together a self-published manuscript of his work in that area. It was also called Survivor’s Guilt. By his own admission, he then burnt out on the case. He succumbed to the hype about Vincent Bugliosi’s colossal charade of a book, Reclaiming History. Impressed by the prosecutor’s reputation, the author put together a You Tube video in which he said that Bugliosi had solved the case. Thankfully, several months later, Palamara then reversed himself on the subject of Reclaiming History. He has since written some good reviews for this site on books by Gerald Blaine and Clint Hill. He also has his own blog, and maintains a site which commemorates the heroism of Abraham Bolden. So today, Palamara is back in good standing among the critics.

    The 2013 version of Survivor’s Guilt runs to about 430 pages of text. In this reviewer’s opinion, the first half of the book is rewarding, informative and well worth reading. That first half makes up one of the more distinctive efforts timed for the 50th anniversary of JFK’s murder. It is well argued, profusely and accurately documented, and is quite frank and candid about what went wrong in Dealey Plaza, and why it is hard to buy the Secret Service’s incredibly poor performance as a case of pure negligence. There are 18 chapters in the book. The first half, that is up to Chapter 9, makes up the worthwhile part of the work. So let us discuss that valuable part at this time.

    I

    Palamara begins the book with what most would think is some of his strongest material indicating a cover up after the fact by the Secret Service. In the days after the murder, there were questions as to why there were no agents riding on the rear bumper of Kennedy’s limousine at the time of the shooting. After all, this is what the specially modeled bumper is designed for. But at the time the limousine entered Dealey Plaza, there were no agents in place on the rear bumper.

    This is an important point to explore. Because if one buys the Warren Commission verdict of three shots from the rear, then having no agents on the rear of the car probably had an effect on the shooting. At the least, if they had been in place, it would have made it more difficult. The Warren Commission had questions about this also. (Palamara, p. 3) Therefore, Secret Service Director James Rowley had five affidavits prepared about their experiences with President Kennedy. As the author notes, “At first glance, all five reports appear to support the notion that President Kennedy did not want agents on or near the rear of his limousine.” (ibid, emphasis added) The five reports were allegedly done by Jerry Behn, Floyd Boring, Emory Roberts, John Ready and Clint Hill.

    The problem with this evidence is that it seems clearly coerced by Rowley. Why? Because when Palamara later interviewed many of these agents, they contradicted what they had written for the Commission. For instance, when Palamara talked to Boring, the agent said that Kennedy did not exercise control over them at all. (ibid, p. 6) Clint Hill told the author that Kennedy never told the agents not to ride on the car. But he further added that, “I had never heard the president ever question procedural recommendations by his Secret Service detail. (ibid, p. 14) In fact, earlier in the Dallas motorcade, Hill actually was on the bumper. (ibid, p. 11)

    Palamara notes other oddities about these submissions. Three of the five reports are not even on official Secret Service stationery. They are on plain typing paper. Clint Hill’s report is not even dated. Four of the five reports are based on exchanges with Boring. In other words, the agents heard this from him. Yet, as the author points out, this was later contradicted by Boring. Gerald Blaine even says there was a Secret Service meeting on November 25th, in which it was decided to cover up Kennedy’s orders not to ride on the car. As Palamara points out, this is absurd. The implication is that Rowley made some of the agents switch the blame for the Secret Service’s lack of protection to Kennedy.

    Palamara further points out the absurdity of Blaine and Rowley’s positions by mentioning the famous film of agent Donald Lawton being called off the back of the limousine by Emory Roberts as it pulled out of Love Field. Lawton memorably shrugs his shoulders in bewilderment three times as this recall. Palamara further adds that agent Henry Rybka was supposed to be in the follow up car. But, in fact, inexplicably, Rybka was left at the airport. (ibid, p. 9)

    Further, and quite compellingly, Palamara now goes to other agents ignored by Rowley. He asks them if Kennedy ever directed the Secret Service not to ride on the back of the limousine. This list of agents goes on well into the double digits. It includes people like Winston Lawson , Rufus Youngblood, and Sam Kinney. Almost none of them back up what Rowley is proffering. For instance, Kinney states, “That is absolutely, positively false … no, no, no. He [Kennedy] had nothing to do with that. No, never.” (ibid, p. 27) Arthur Godfrey said, “That’s a bunch of baloney; that’s not true.” When Palamara asked John F. Norris about the charge against Kennedy, he replied, “I would doubt that very much.” (ibid, p. 28) Jerry O’Rourke wrote to the author, “Did President Kennedy order us off the steps of the limo? To my knowledge, President Kennedy never ordered us to leave the limo.” (ibid, p. 37)

    Clearly, from this opening episode the author is implying that there was some very odd behavior by the Secret Service in Dallas. And secondly, Rowley was intent on covering it up, by any means necessary. Even if it meant he was going to blame the victim for his own death. Palamara then goes on to mention how this myth then got enshrined in the literature by writers like William Manchester, Blaine and Ron Kessler. (ibid, pgs. 19, 20) In fact, Palamara points out that fellow Secret Service agent Talmadge Bailey told him that Blaine made up the information about the November 25, 1963 meeting. (ibid. p. 23) Palamara also points out that Blaine submitted what he termed to be contemporaneous handwritten notes to the National Archives. The author then notes glaring discrepancies which indicate that these “contemporaneous notes” were obviously composed at least months, if not years later. (ibid)

    This opening chapter closes with more interesting evidence discrediting the “Kennedy ordered the agents off the car” myth. Roy Kellerman was the de facto man in charge of the Secret Service detail in Dallas. This was because, Gerald Behn, who should have been in charge on the ground, decided to take a leave at the time. Kellerman testified to the Warren Commission for two days. If Boring had actually relayed a Kennedy order to the Secret Service on this point, would not have Kellerman known about it? If that is so, then why did he not mention it during his two days of testimony? (ibid, p. 43)

    II

    In Chapter 2, Palamara notes another rather bizarre oddity about the failure of the Secret Service in Dallas.

    Most informed observers understand that Dallas was not really in Kennedy’s back pocket politically. In fact, there were many sectors of rightwing animus towards the president. And for a variety of reasons: civil rights, his failure to invade Cuba in 1961 or 1962, his attempt to lower the oil depletion allowance etc. In Miami when the Secret Service checked the security index, they came up with six pages of warnings about people like Orlando Bosch and Pedro Diaz Lanz.(p. 169) Yet, when Secret Service agents Winston Lawson and Kellerman checked the indices of the Protection Research Section (PRS) files for any threats on November 8th and 10th, none were found. Youngblood did a check on the morning of November 22nd. Again, no warnings turned up. This is astonishing; on many different levels. First of all, there was a Cuban exile community in Dallas. In fact, there was a small unit of Alpha 66 in town, one of the most high profile and militant anti-Castro groups in existence. Second, Dallas was the home of former General Edwin Walker. Kennedy had removed Walker from his command for passing out John Birch literature to his men. After this, Walker lived in Dallas. He became quite close to some extreme rightwing groups there. He was also active in the riots at Ole Miss over the entry of James Meredith, an entry which Kennedy backed forcefully. Third, a few months earlier, Kennedy’s UN ambassador Adlai Stevenson had been in town. He was reportedly spat upon and even jostled with a placard. Fourth, in November, Joseph Milteer had already told FBI informant Willie Somersett about a coming assassination attempt on Kennedy from an office building with a high-powered rifle. Why did the Secret Service not have this information in their PRS files? Or anything about the failed attempt to kill Kennedy in Chicago, which predated all three checks.

    Further, there seems to have been some last minute switches in personnel in the November trips to Chicago, Miami, New York and Dallas. For instance, although Glen Bennett was on a temporary assignment for the Presidential Protection Division (PPD), he was on the trips to Tampa and Dallas. Yet, Bennett told the HSCA he was not on this Florida trip, which was on November 18th. (ibid, p. 62) Bennett was detailed from PRS to PPD and then onto protection duty in New York, Tampa and Dallas. Tim McIntyre also denied he was on protection details in November in Chicago and Miami. Yet, he was. This is interesting because there were threats on JFK’s life in both Miami and Tampa. Therefore, PRS and the White House Secret Service detail should have been ratcheted up to the equivalent of Defcon 5 by Dallas. Especially after the (now famous) Chicago attempt on Kennedy’s life. Yet, as everyone knows, most significantly the author, nothing of the sort happened in Dallas. In fact, as Palamara is at pains to show, quite the opposite occurred. Instead of a tightening of security around Kennedy, a loosening of security occurred. A loosening so blatant and extraordinary, that it seems today to cross over into the negligent. If not worse.

    III

    In Chapters 3 and 4, Palamara details two significant aspects of the Secret Service failure in Dallas. He devotes Chapter 3 to denuding another attempt by the White House detail to blame the victim for his own murder. With ample evidence, he shows that it was not Kennedy who wanted the bubble top removed in Dallas. That was a Secret Service decision. (p. 91)

    Chapter 4 is devoted to the setting of the motorcade route. This is a key point. Because as anyone who has been to the Dealey Plaza, triple underpass site will know, the two turns made by the motorcade into the plaza, onto Houston and then Elm, created an almost ideal situation for what military assassins call an L shaped ambush. That is a slow moving target, vulnerable to snipers from concealed places at three points surrounding the target. In addition, the location allowed for easy exits since there were parking lots adjoining at least two sniper locations: the Depository and the grassy knoll. Palamara does some good and interesting work in regard to the mystery of how this bizarre, indefensible route was chosen. He states that considering the fact that agent Gerald Behn, White House assistant Ken O’Donnell and Kennedy advance man Jerry Bruno were all opposed to the Trade Mart as the dinner destination, its seems odd that it was ultimately chosen. (pgs. 98-101) As late as November 14th, there was no dogleg on the motorcade route. The route came straight down Main Street. (ibid, p. 102)

    The author makes the case that the two men who added the dogleg onto Houston and Elm Streets were Secret Service agents Forrest Sorrels and Winston Lawson. There were other routes possible, and the motorcade route was not automatically determined by the selection of the Trade Mart. (ibid, p. 103) Palamara later adds that the final route was not actually decided upon until November 20th. He feels that this change, which included the dogleg, was kept secret after being authorized in Washington by agent Floyd Boring. In a suppressed Commission document the author found, the assistant police chief, Charles Batchelor, revealed that the secrecy about this change in the route made it hard for the local authorities to furnish any help to the Secret Service. (p. 105) Another witness, Sgt. Sam Bellah told the author that the police did not know about the route change until the evening of November 21st. Bellah said the original plan did not have the motorcade pass in front of the Texas School Book Depository. Bellah said that his commander, Captain Lawrence, came to his home late on the evening of the 21st. He took him to the triple underpass to show Bellah the new route for the motorcycle advance escort, of which Bellah was a part. (ibid) Bellah said that there was never any explanation as to why the route was changed at the last moment.

    Another local policeman, Captain Orville Jones told author Larry Sneed the same thing. That the motorcade route was changed just prior to the 22nd. Jones told the author that many people he knew in the Secret Service did not approve of going through Dealey Plaza at all. There were other routes discussed which avoided the triple underpass. (ibid)

    Another witness to this strange alteration was motorcycle officer Bobby Joe Dale. Dale said that there was more than one route discussed and reviewed by the police. In fact, three had been bandied about. Dale said it was not until Kennedy’s arrival at Love Field that morning that he was alerted to what the actual route was going to be. (ibid, p. 106)

    Winston Lawson told the Warren Commission that the dogleg was necessary, “Because it is my understanding there isn’t any entrance to the freeway on Main Street.” (ibid, p. 108) But as the HSCA correctly noted, ” … the Trade Mart was accessible from beyond the triple underpass in such a way that it was not necessary to enter the Elm Street ramp to the expressway. The motorcade could have proceeded westward through Dealey Plaza on Main Street, passed under the underpass and then proceeded on Industrial Boulevard to the Trade Mart.” (ibid) In fact, this is the route that Jones thought Kennedy would take that day. As the HSCA attorney in charge of the motorcade route inquiry wrote, “Any map of Dallas in 1963 shows that it was easy to reach the Trade Mart on streets that join Main on the West side of the overpass.”

    Compounding this shockingly poor choice of a route was the fact that Secret Service protocol was then broken while it was being navigated. Two years before Kennedy’s murder, Mike Torina, Chief Inspector, stated that whenever a motorcade must slow down for a turn, the entire intersection must be checked in advance.(p. 109) That did not occur here.

    James Rowley wrote to the Commission that he had no knowledge of who actually released the motorcade route to the press. This seems another deception by Rowley. Palamara says it was Betty Forsling Harris a Dallas socialite on the local committee, who did so. She was working closely with representatives of John Connally, the Secret Service, and LBJ aide Bill Moyers. Palamara concludes that this false information was given out for purposes of plausible deniability. That is, the Secret Service could later say that the route was purposely advertised in more than one configuration to show that there was more than one option in hand. When, in reality, the Secret Service knew between November 18th and 20th what the actual route was, including the dogleg.

    This is a quite disturbing issue. In and of itself it seems simply bizarre that Lawson and Sorrels would choose this incredibly dangerous route. But then to not protect the president as he was going through this dangerous path is even more bizarre.

    Once this route was chosen, then the only way it could be made secure was by the Secret Service being supplemented by local law enforcement agents i.e. the police, the sheriff’s office, military intelligence. Again, none of this happened. According to the author, Sheriff Decker told his men not to participate in any security operations. Palamara then writes that the local Dallas police force was called off the night before by the Secret Service. (p. 118) Captain Will Fritz was supposed to commander a detail riding behind the Vice-President with rapid-fire machine guns. According to two sources, this was changed the night before. Instead, this detail was sent to the Trade Mart to protect the speaker’s stand.

    Palamara now brings in witnesses like former Eisenhower press secretary Jim Haggerty, and former agent Darwin Horn who state that supplementing the Secret Service with local police was a common practice. He then quotes Winston Lawson as denying this before the Warren Commission under oath. His specific words were, “This was not usual procedure.” (ibid)

    Palamara now makes a penultimate point about the arrangement of the motorcade. Military aide Godfrey McHugh almost always rode in the president’s car on these occasions. Yet, in Dallas, another anomaly took place. In Dallas, he was asked by the Secret Service “for the first time” to “ride in the back, instead, as normally I would do, between the driver and the Secret Service agent in charge of the trip.” (p. 119) The reason given was this would allow the president fuller exposure to the crowd. As Air Force aide, one of McHugh’s duties was to supervise Air Force One.

    Finally, the author notes that Batchelor told the Commission that he did not think any local authorities were in place below Houston Street. He then quotes William Manchester as writing, “Possibly [Police Chief] Curry’s department met its responsibilities by deciding to end supervision of Friday’s crowd at Houston and Main, a block short of the ambush … ” Manchester then added, perhaps for ironic effect, “The weakest link in downtown Dallas was Dealey Plaza.” (p. 120)

    As Palamara points out with detailed accuracy, everything about this route, from its unnecessary choice, to the lack of supporting personnel, to the violation of protocol, to the secrecy about which route was actually to be used, to the almost incredible lack of protection at its most exposed point, cried out for a thorough investigation. To put it mildly, that did not happen.

    IV

    From here, Palamara now moves to probably his most grievous charge against the Secret Service. He calls it “security stripping”. The author notes that as of November 10th, there were 18 motorcycles listed in the motorcade. Buy by November 21st, Winston Lawson had decreased the amount or motorcycles on either side of the limousine from four to two. (ibid, p. 131) At Love Field the orders were relayed for the cycles to ride to the rear of the car. Dallas policeman Marrion Baker wrote the author that he never got to the bottom of this strange order. Fellow policeman cyclist B. J. Martin said the same thing about this formation. That it was given to them at Love Field. And it was the weirdest formation he ever heard of. Martin said, “Ordinarily, you bracket the car with four motorcycles, one on each fender.” (ibid, p. 133) HSCA attorney, Belford Lawson wrote about this matter: “The question that must be answered is why the instructions were given to the officers so shortly before the motorcade…” (ibid, p. 132) In fact, two of the motorcycle cops were so far to the rear of Kennedy, that they weren’t even on the same street with him when he was shot. (ibid, p. 134)

    By way of comparison, the author compares the protection in Tampa, with that in Dallas. There it was much tighter and there were police on top of tall buildings. (ibid, p. 136) Interestingly, Lawson was the advance man on presidential visits that year to Little Rock and Billings, Montana. Those records were destroyed in 1995, after the creation of the ARRB.

    The HSCA shined a light of this issue when it wrote the following: “The Secret Service’s alteration of the original Dallas Police Department motorcycle deployment plan prevented the use of maximum possible security precautions.” It then continues with another comparison, “Surprisingly, the security measure used in the prior motorcades during the same Texas visit shows that the deployment of motorcycles in Dallas by the Secret Service may have been uniquely insecure.” (ibid, pgs. 137-38)

    Palamara now points out still another anomaly about the Dallas motorcade. There was a flat bed truck with the media aboard that was supposed to ride in front of the president’s car. Again, according to members of the press, this was cancelled at the last minute. The press was moved much further back and placed in Chevy convertibles. (ibid, p. 139) Palamara fairly poses the question: “Was the motorcade manipulated to prevent photographic records of the crime from being made.” (p. 139) Which they probably would have been if the truck was in front of Kennedy.

    The same exchange of proximity applies to the president’s physician George Burkley. Burkley said he virtually always rode in close proximity to the president. He could think of only one previous exception, the visit to Rome in July of 1963. But in Dallas, he was actually relegated to a bus at the rear of the motorcade. (ibid, p. 142) This, of course, delayed his reaction time in getting to the president. Towards the end of this discussion of the out of order cars, and passengers, Palamara then drips in another interesting tidbit. It was Lawson who was in charge of the car numbers for the motorcade. (p. 143) The author says these changes occurred somewhere between November 19th and the 22nd. And Lawson tried to pass them off to advance man Jack Puterbaugh. (ibid) But Palamara writes, Puterbaugh never made any mention of any such responsibility on his part. HSCA attorney Belford Lawson again summed the situation up well: “Why was there so much juggling around and controversy about seating at Love Field, and why was there so much constant repositioning and shuffling of dignitaries’ cars in relation to press cars during the Texas trip?” Lawson then added another tantalizing question: “Why was the [Dallas] motorcade longer than any other motorcade on the Texas trip?” (ibid, p. 144) Unfortunately, the HSCA never answered these pointed and crucial questions in anywhere near a satisfactory manner.

    From here Palamara now segues to violations of Secret Service protocol according to various manuals. A prime example was the overpass over Elm Street . It should have been cleared of bystanders. It was not. (ibid, p. 144) Buildings were not checked. Even on the dogleg through the Plaza. Buildings should have been checked in the dogleg onto Houston Street. They were not. (ibid, p. 146)According to inspector Michael Torina, agents and police officers should have been standing atop tall buildings. (p. 147) There should have been policemen facing the crowds. As they had been in Fort Worth. There also should have been military officers on hand, as they had been in San Antonio the day before. (p. 150)

    And, of course, there was the incident at the late night bar called The Cellar. This is where several agents spent the night before drinking hard alcohol. The agents stayed there until at least 3:00 AM. Some stayed even later than that. This was an obvious violation of rules of conduct since the morning call was at seven. But further, the Secret Service then hired local firemen to protect the president while they were partying. In a high-risk city like Dallas. Yet, no one was punished for this clear violation. As many have asked, how can agents react quickly and smoothly with so much alcohol in them. (pgs. 150) Palamara compares the reaction time of Johnson’s Secret Service protector, Rufus Youngblood, which was almost instant, with JFK’s which was very slow. Perhaps fatally slow. Or as former Secret Service officer John Norris stated in colorful language, “Except for George Hickey and Clint Hill, everybody else just basically sat there with their thumbs up their butts while the president was gunned down in front of them.” (Palamara, p. 152) Making this violation even worse was Hill’s comments on the later Secret Service sex scandal in Cartagena Columbia. Hill said, “There’s no tolerance at all , no room for any misbehavior in the Secret Service. There’s no loose chain. You are on the clock from the time you leave, until the time you return home.” As many know, Rowley deliberately chose not to punish anyone even though he knew about the incident.

    As the author then notes, what makes all this malfeasance even more suspicious is that there seems to be an institutional memory about it. For as Palamara notes in the book, in January of 1995, the Secret Service destroyed some records, including presidential protection survey reports for some of Kennedy’s visits in the fall of 1963. (p. 161) This was after the formation of the Assassination Records Review Board. Further, it was discovered that agent James Mostrovito did destroy documents, but he also got rid of a vial containing a portion of Kennedy’s brain. He then went on to a career in the CIA.

    The author concludes this section of the book with a look at the behavior of agent Bill Greer, the driver of Kennedy’s car. He first notes that ordinarily, the Secret Service liked to maintain speeds of at least 20-30 MPH. Which was much faster than what Dealey Plaza allowed. He also adds that, at the first shot, Greer slowed the car down. He then turned around. Kellerman shouted, “Let’s get out of here!” But Greer did not. He disobeyed a superior and turned around again. (p. 188)

    Later on, Greer and Kellerman said there was bullet expelled from the president’s body through cardiac massage. (p. 195) Further, even though agent Richard Johnsen was an important witness to the chain of possession of CE 399, he was not interviewed by the FBI or the WC. The author then makes an error in his discussion of the provenance of CE 399. He writes that Elmer Lee Todd initialed CE 399. Not so. Hoover said this happened. But his initials are not on the bullet today. Which is utterly bizarre. Palamara recovers a bit when he then writes that Dr. Robert Shaw announced that CE 399 was still in Connally’s leg, when in fact, according to the Commission it was being carried on a plane to Washington. And secondly, as Robert Harris has noted, Connally wrote that a bullet fell out of his body after CE 399 was discovered. (Palamara pgs. 197-98)

    Palamara goes on with Secret Service malfeasance in the wake of Kennedy’s murder. The Secret Service did not produce the clothing of the president when the doctors asked for it at Bethesda. A roll of 120 film was destroyed by a Secret Service agent that night. (ibid, p. 199) Admiral David Osborne sated that an intact bullet fell out of Kennedy’s clothing at Bethesda. Osborne added, “Several people had it. I know the Secret Service had it…” And Palamara also notes the role of the infamous Secret Service agent Elmer Moore in altering the first day testimony of the Parkland doctors about the direction of the bullet that pierced Kennedy’s throat. Originally reported as being an entrance wound, after Moore was done massaging the testimony of the doctors and nurses at Parkland, the Commission had enough leeway to make this an exit wound for the SBT.

    V

    The above constitutes what I believe to be the contributions of (considerable) value in this book. From about page 210 on, that is approximately the second half, the quality of the work drops off. And the approach changes. As does the level of the analysis. For instance, at around this point, Palamara begins to rely upon witnesses like Gerry Patrick Hemming, a man who the late, great Gaeton Fonzi warned us all about. Recall, Hemming is the guy who confirmed the Marita Lorenz assassination caravan. Palamara interviewed him twice. (pgs. 213-14) As if that is not enough, the author now brings in DNC advance man Martin Underwood in a big way. (p. 214) Underwood is the guy who the lamentable Gus Russo dug up to try and say that Fabian Escalante and the Cuban G-2 were actually in on the Kennedy murder plot. When Underwood testified before the ARRB, as they revealed in their report, it turned out his so-called contemporaneous notes on official stationary were neither contemporaneous nor official. This was such a blatant Russo ploy, even Max Holland saw through it. I mean when one Oswald did it zealot goes after another zealot, you know the witness has problems. As Underwood does.

    Underwood tells the author that CIA station chief Win Scott told him things he never told anyone. Including his wives and son. Underwood was on a mission for LBJ. LBJ wanted to know what really happened with the JFK case. So Marty goes to talk to Scott in Mexico. Scott tells this low level flunky that the CIA, FBI and the Mob all knew Kennedy was going to be hit. But not just that. They all knew it was going to be on 11/22/63 in Dallas! But eve that it not good enough for Underwood, who here actually goes beyond his flights of fancy for Russo. Let me quote what Underwood tells Palamara: “His number was on the board. I found out later, if they missed him in Dallas, they were thinking of getting him at the LBJ ranch.” (p. 215) This is Alex Jones stuff. But now, good ole Marty goes to see Sam Giancana. Sam tells him to tell Johnson that the Mafia had him on their hit list also.

    But Underwood now tells the author that 18 hours before the landing at Love Field, they were getting all sorts of solid reports about Kennedy being assassinated in Texas. Well, Underwood now goes to the president and tells him about this. What does JFK say? According to Underwood, he replies with “Marty, you worry about me to much.” (ibid)

    Enough about Underwood.

    From here, Palamara now begins a long section of the book which he would have been well advised to forsake. For literally scores of pages, he catalogues the names of dozens of Secret Service agents and what their performance was like in relation to the JFK assassination. I did not understand why he did this. In the fine opening 200 pages of the book, Palamara clearly named the agents he felt should have been seriously investigated, and why. Further, many of the people he names here had little or nothing to do with the assassination. So this gets both superfluous and boring. It’s not all like that of course. But the author would have been much better off trimming this section down by at least 50%. It goes on for more than a hundred pages.

    At the end, Palamara concludes with a couple of more dubious chapters. In Chapter 15, where he talks about a motive for the Secret Service to go along with a plot, he actually brings up Sy Hersh’s excremental book, The Dark Side of Camelot. In other words because Kennedy was having affairs, the Secret Service looked askance at him as being of low character. (p. 385) I didn’t know whether to laugh or cry at this. These are the same guys who Abe Bolden said were heavy drinkers and also serial womanizers. But yet, they could not stomach Kennedy’s philandering? Which we know through many good sources was exaggerated. In fact, by these same Secret Service agents who Hersh enlisted in his cause.

    The author gets back on track a bit by mentioning Elmer Moore’s rightwing politics and his outburst against Kennedy for selling out the country to the Reds. This seems much more realistic as a motive for complicity.

    At the end, Palamara lists a very good chronicle of failures by the Secret Service in Dallas. (p. 387) It goes on for three pages. It is very provocative and even disturbing. The author uses it to crystallize the argument he has been making without being explicit about it. That is, after explaining all these serious lapses in protection which enabled the murder to take place, he concludes that the Secret Service was not just negligent, but culpable in the assassination. With the amount of evidence in the first half of the book, it’s hard to disagree with him.

    In sum, I feel about this work as I do about Doug Horne’s multi- volume set. Palamara needed an editor to control his excesses. If he had done that a book worth reading would have been sterling.

  • Dale Myers, With Malice (Part 2)


    The following is Part Two of a review of the 2013 Kindle edition of Dale Myers’ book With Malice.


    VIII: Proof positive

    Myers dedicates this chapter to a discussion of Tippit’s autopsy, and the physical evidence against Oswald such as the revolver allegedly used to kill Tippit, and the bullets and the spent shell casings. He also discusses the fingerprints found on Tippit’s squad car, and the light gray jacket discarded by the killer in the parking lot behind the Texaco Service station. Myers quotes from DPD captain Will Fritz’s interrogation report where he allegedly asked Oswald where he had obtained the revolver, to which Oswald allegedly replied that he bought it in Fort Worth, Texas (With Malice, Chapter 8). Fritz allegedly asked this question during an interrogation on Saturday November 23, 1963. But in order to believe Fritz, including the FBI and USSS agents who were present during Oswald’s interrogations, one must ignore all of the evidence discussed throughout this review that the DPD had framed Oswald for Tippit’s murder, and that the FBI and the USSS also wanted Oswald to be found guilty. As far as the USSS is concerned, consider that several researchers such as Ian Griggs have explained that the USSS was by all likelihood involved in coercing Howard Brennan into claiming that he was at a DPD line-up, during which he allegedly identified Oswald as the man he saw in the so-called sniper’s nest window on the sixth floor of the TSBD (Griggs, No Case To Answer, page 91).

    It is Myers’ contention that Oswald ordered the revolver from Seaport Traders Inc., Los Angeles, California, on January 27, 1963, under the name A.J. Hidell, and then had it shipped to his P.O. Box in Dallas which was under his real name (ibid). To begin with, Myers simply has no qualms about Oswald having ordered the revolver using an alias, only to have it delivered to his P.O. Box which was under his real name. Obviously, the purpose of Oswald allegedly using an alias to purchase the gun was to hide the fact that he (Oswald) was purchasing it. So then why would he have it shipped to a P.O. box under his real name? Does that not defeat the purpose of having purchased a revolver using an alias? Myers admits that it is not known whether the application for P.O. Box 2915 (to which the revolver was allegedly shipped) listed A.J. Hidell as someone entitled to receive mail at that box (ibid). Myers then uses the Warren Commission testimony of postal inspector Harry Holmes, during which Holmes stated that the portion of the P.O. Box application which listed others entitled to receive mail at the same P.O. Box was discarded in accordance with postal regulations, after the box was closed in May, 1963 (ibid). Myers also uses Holmes’ testimony to explain that regardless of who is entitled to receive a package at a P.O. Box, a notice is placed inside the P.O. Box, and the person who has rented that particular P.O. Box can then take the notice to a window and is given the package.

    Contrary to what Myers wants the reader to believe, Holmes has been caught lying on these issues. As author Jim DiEugenio explains, postal regulation No. 355.111 dictates that; “Mail addressed to a person at a P.O. box who is not authorized to receive mail shall be endorsed ‘addressee unknown’ and returned to the sender where possible” (DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland, pages 60 and 61). Furthermore, according to postal regulation 846.53h, it was customary for the post office to retain the application forms for the P.O. boxes for two years after the box was closed (ibid, page 61). In assessing Holmes’ credibility, the reader should also bear in mind that Holmes was an FBI informant (John Armstrong Baylor collection, tab entitled: Harry Holmes). On November 26, 1963, a memorandum was sent from Alan Belmont to William Sullivan stating that the FBI’s report on the assassination is to; ” … settle the dust, in so far as Oswald and his activities are concerned, both from the standpoint that he is the man who assassinated the President, and relative to Oswald himself and his activities and background, et cetera.” (Church Committee: Book V, page 33). By helping to cement Oswald’s guilt as Tippit’s murderer, the FBI (much like the DPD) could then use Tippit’s murder as evidence that Oswald was more than capable of assassinating the President in cold blood. As an FBI informant, Holmes would only be too happy to help out in that regard. In fact, as Jim DiEugenio explains, Holmes subservience to the FBI was so extreme that his family actually contacted the JFK Lancer group and told them to try and understand his behaviour in this regard (DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland, page 61). Predictably, none of this is mentioned by Myers.

    Myers also cites the testimony of Heinz Michaelis, the office manager of George Rose and company, as evidence that a balance of $19.95 plus a $1.27 shipping charge was collected from Oswald under the name Hidell, and allegedly shipped to P.O. Box 2915 on March 20, 1963 (ibid). However, as author Jim DiEugenio explains, the Railway Express Agency was required to send a postcard to Oswald’s P.O. Box informing him to pick up the revolver (DiEugenio, Reclaiming Parkland, page 104). But there is no proof, or even evidence, that a postcard was ever sent to Oswald’s P.O. Box (ibid). This is a very odd hole in the evidence trail. Another requirement was that a 5024 form be filled out by Oswald for the revolver. But again, there is no proof that this was done (ibid). There is also no proof of a signed receipt by Oswald (as Hidell) for the revolver; or that he ever produced a certificate of good character to pick-up the revolver as required by the law (ibid). Again, these serious lacunae are glossed over by Myers. In a normal criminal case, they would not be.

    Finally, although Myers mentions in his endnotes that the rifle Oswald allegedly used to assassinate President Kennedy was also shipped to the same P.O. Box, he nevertheless omits that both the rifle and revolver were shipped to Oswald’s P.O. Box on the same day; even though they were ordered over a month apart and from different suppliers! Namely, one supplier (Klein’s Sporting Goods) was from Chicago and the other (Seaport Traders) was from Los Angeles. As it defies the odds that such a thing occurred, Myers is careful not to point this fact out to his readers. Readers should bear in mind that no ammunition for the revolver was found by the DPD at the rooming house at 1026 North Beckley where Oswald was allegedly living at the time of the assassination. Although a holster (WCE 144) was allegedly found at the rooming house by the DPD, researcher Lee Farley has demonstrated that it was actually Larry Crafard who was living at the rooming house and not Oswald! (See the thread entitled A House of Cards? on Greg Parker’s research forum Reopen Kennedy Case).

    Naturally, Myers also uses the Warren Commission testimony of Marina Oswald as evidence that Oswald actually owned the revolver allegedly used to kill Tippit (With Malice, Chapter 8). Unfortunately for him, Marina Oswald has been exposed as an incredibly compromised witness by a multitude of researchers. For one thing, Marina initially denied that Oswald ever used the name Hidell (WCE 1789). However, when she testified before the Warren Commission in February 1964, she now claimed that she first heard of the name Hidell, “When he [Oswald] was interviewed by some anti-Cubans, he used this name and spoke of an organization.” (WC Volume I, page 64). She was referring to Oswald’s debate with Ed Butler of INCA and anti-Castro Cuban Carlos Bringuier on William Stuckey’s radio show on August 21, 1963. The problem is the name Hidell was never mentioned during the debate by anyone (WC Volume XXI, Stuckey Exhibit No. 3).

    When Marina testified before the Warren Commission on June 11, 1964, she now claimed that she signed the name “A.J. Hidell” on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee card (WCE 819), which Oswald allegedly had in his possession when he was arrested in New Orleans on August 9, 1963! (WC Volume V, page 401). It should be obvious to any intellectually honest researcher that Marina was being pressured into being less than honest.

    In assessing Marina Oswald’s credibility as a witness, the reader should also bear in mind that according to Oswald’s brother Robert, Marina may have been deported back to Russia if she didn’t co-operate with the FBI (WC Volume I, page 410). Marina also admitted during her testimony before the Warren Commission that a representative from the United States immigration service had advised her that it would be better for her to help the FBI, in the sense that she would have more rights in the United States (WC Volume I, page 80). Although she testified that she didn’t consider this a threat, the mere fact that she had been advised she would have more rights in the United States if she co-operated should send the message to researchers that she would even lie to obtain those rights (ibid). Marina Oswald also testified that she initially ” … didn’t want to say too much” to evidently protect her husband (WC Volume I, page 14). However, Marina’s friend Elena Hall told the Warren Commission that she didn’t think that Marina ever actually loved her husband, and would apparently belittle him (WC Volume VIII, page 401). Such a revelation undermines the notion that Marina lied to protect her husband. None of these problems with Marina Oswald’s credibility as a witness is ever discussed by Myers.

    But if Myers use of Marina Oswald as a witness isn’t bad enough, then consider that he also cites the book Passport to Assassination, by KGB Colonel Oleg Maximovich Nechiporenko, as evidence that Oswald owned the revolver allegedly used to kill Tippit. According to Nechiporenko, Oswald pulled out a Smith and Wesson revolver inside the Soviet embassy in Mexico City (With Malice, Chapter 8). Sadly for Myers, it has been demonstrated by several competent authors that Oswald was impersonated inside the Soviet embassy in Mexico City; and that he probably never even travelled to Mexico City as postulated by the Warren Commission (see Jim DiEugenio’s long discussion of Oswald’s alleged trip to Mexico City). Finally, as many researchers have explained, the so-called backyard photographs (WCE 133-A and B) of Oswald which show him with the rifle he allegedly used to assassinate the President, and the revolver which he allegedly used to kill Tippit, are very likely ersatz.

    Another piece of evidence cited by Myers as proof that Oswald owned the revolver allegedly used to kill Tippit is the holster (WCE 142). This was discovered in the rooming house on 1026 North Beckley Avenue where Oswald was said to be living at the time of the assassination. However, as previously mentioned, researcher Lee Farley has demonstrated the likliehood that Oswald didn’t live there as claimed. In the final paragraph of his discussion of Oswald’s alleged ownership of the revolver, Myers writes; “There can be little doubt that Oswald owned the 0.38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver pulled from his hand in the Texas Theater” (With Malice, Chapter 8). In light of everything discussed previously in this review about the revolver, this is a tremendously fatuous statement to make. Still, the question remains as to why the FBI would want to forge the order coupon for the revolver using the name Hidell instead of Oswald? Although this reviewer cannot provide a definitive answer, perhaps the FBI believed that this is precisely what Oswald would have done to try and conceal from them that he had ordered a rifle and revolver. Bear in mind that the FBI were well aware of Oswald when he returned from the Soviet Union, but were not aware that Oswald (allegedly) used the name Alek James Hidell as an alias prior to his arrest in New Orleans on August 9, 1963. Therefore, the FBI probably thought they could sell the idea that since Oswald knew the FBI was keeping an eye on him, he would use an alias they weren’t aware of at the time to order both the rifle and revolver.

    On the night of the assassination, FBI agent Vincent Drain confiscated several pieces of evidence against Oswald, such as the Mannlicher Carcano rifle he allegedly used to murder the President. Included amongst the evidence confiscated were the revolver (WCE143) and the bullet removed from Tippit’s body at Methodist Hospital after he was pronounced dead (WCD 81, page 448). However, what the DPD did not release to the FBI were the four spent shell casings discarded by Tippit’s killer, and the three bullets removed by Dr. Earl Rose at Parkland Memorial Hospital during Tippit’s autopsy. The omission of the shell casings is significant, as the unique markings of the breech face and the firing pin of the revolver could be used to determine whether the shell casings were fired from the revolver in question; which the FBI eventually determined was the case (WC Volume III, page 466).

    The implication is that the DPD were concerned that the shell casings were not actually fired from “Oswald’s” revolver. In his endnotes, Myers acknowledges that the DPD did not release the shell casings to the FBI on the night of the assassination, but writes that; “At the time of the submission [of the evidence to the FBI], the Dallas Police had no reason to believe that the bullet and revolver would not be sufficient to connect Oswald’s pistol to Tippit’s death.” But the DPD surely must have known that the markings from the firing pin and breech face of the revolver could be used to determine whether the spent shell casings were fired from the revolver, and therefore, they should have released them to the FBI along with the revolver.

    As FBI agent Cortlandt Cunningham told the Warren Commission, the bullet the DPD released to the FBI on the night of the assassination (WCE 602) was too mutilated, and that; “There were not sufficient microscopic marks remaining on the surface of this bullet, due to the mutilation, to determine whether or not it had been fired from this weapon [WCE 143].” (ibid, page 475) Cunningham also testified that unlike WCE 602, the other three bullets removed from Tippit’s body and head (WCE 603, 604, and 605) did bear microscopic marks for comparison purposes (ibid). As any ballistics expert will be able to confirm, the most mutilated bullet will be the hardest in determining whether it had been fired from a particular gun. Whilst the DPD may not have known just by looking at WCE 602 that it was the most mutilated bullet, a photograph of WCE 602 shows that its nose is bent out of shape. Furthermore, the DPD may have thought that by releasing all four of the bullets to the FBI on the night of the assassination, they would have had a better chance of determining that the bullets had been fired from a different gun.

    But is there actually an innocent explanation for why the DPD initially only released WCE 602 to the FBI? According to Myers, after Dr. Earl Rose had removed the three bullets from Tippit, he gave them to DPD detective Frank J. Corkery. Corkery then delivered them to Captain Will Fritz. When FBI agent Vincent Drain questioned Fritz as to why the DPD had not released these three bullets to the FBI on the night of the assassination, Fritz told Drain that a detective had placed the bullets in his (Fritz’s) files, and had not made a record of their location. Although Myers considers Fritz to be an honest officer who would not deliberately conceal evidence, let’s consider one example which suggests otherwise.

    As every researcher of the assassination is probably aware, DPD officer Marrion Baker and TSBD superintendent Roy Truly allegedly spotted Oswald inside the second floor lunchroom of the TSBD within ninety seconds of the assassination. But contrary to this belief, Baker made no mention of an encounter with Oswald inside the lunchroom in his first day affidavit, writing instead that he had encountered a man walking away from the stairway on either the third or fourth floor of the TSBD (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Item 4). In fact, as researcher Sean Murphy has convincingly demonstrated, Oswald was most likely standing outside the TSBD (on top of the front entrance steps), when the shots were fired at the President! (The Education Forum, thread entitled; Oswald leaving TSBD?).

    Although Roy Truly provided an affidavit to the DPD on November 23, 1963, in which he claimed they had encountered Oswald inside the lunchroom, DPD detective Marvin Johnson wrote in his report to Chief Curry that Officer Baker had encountered a man he ” … later identified as Lee Harvey Oswald … ” on about the fourth floor of the TSBD, walking away from the stairway (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 5, Folder 5, Item 26). However, this was a lie by Johnson, as Baker did not claim in his affidavit that Oswald was the man he encountered; even though, as researcher Greg Parker has pointed out, Baker had to pass by Oswald at DPD headquarters when he made out his affidavit. Johnson’s lie was one which was repeated by Captain Fritz in his note to Chief Curry, where he claimed that Baker had stopped Oswald on either the third or fourth floor, whilst he (Oswald) was coming down the stairs (Papers of Capt. Will Fritz: Note from J.W. Fritz to Jesse Curry of 23 December 1963).

    When Fritz testified before the Warren Commission, he explained that Truly or someone else had told him while he was still at the TSBD that Truly and Baker had “met” Oswald on the stairway, but then added; ” … our investigation shows that he [Baker and/or Truly] actually saw him in a lunchroom … ” (WC Volume IV, page 213). Fritz then claimed that Oswald had told him when he was being interrogated that he was eating his lunch in the lunchroom (ibid).

    Despite what one may believe about where Officer Baker had actually accosted Oswald, Fritz’s claim that Baker had encountered Oswald when Oswald was coming down the stairs was a lie. In this reviewer’s opinion, the most viable explanation for this lie was to make it seem like Oswald was coming down from the sixth floor of the TSBD after allegedly assassinating the President. With all this in mind, it seems very likely that Fritz (and others) would conspire to release only one of the bullets removed from Tippit’s body to the FBI on the night of the assassination, to minimize the chances of the FBI determining that Tippit was shot by a gun other than WCE 143. Although this reviewer is not aware of when the bullets were supposedly handed to Captain Fritz by detective Corkery, it was presumably on the night of the assassination after Dr. Rose had concluded the autopsy on Tippit’s body.

    As probably every researcher is also aware, three of the bullets removed from Tippit were of the Winchester Western brand, and one bullet was of the Remington Peters brand. However, only two of the spent shell casings discarded by Tippit’s killer were of the Winchester Western brand, and the other two were of the Remington Peters brand. This has led conspiracy advocates to believe that the actual shell casings discarded by Tippit’s killer were substituted to help incriminate Oswald; a point of view which this reviewer shares. Myers explanation for this discrepancy is that there were actually five shots fired at Tippit, with one Remington Peters bullet missing him and going astray, and one Winchester Western shell casing being discarded but not handed over to the DPD (With Malice, Chapter 8). Myers admits that the number of shots heard, and the sequence in which they were fired, varied from one witness to another, but then used Ted Callaway’s belief that he heard a total of five shots to bolster the notion that there were indeed five shots fired at Tippit.

    According to Myers, “Over the course of six separate interviews, Callaway has consistently reported hearing five shots coming from the direction of Tenth and Patton [Streets].” (ibid). When Myers interviewed Callaway in 1996, Callaway explained that when he was questioned by the DPD, he informed them that he had heard five shots (ibid). What Myers doesn’t point out to his readers is that when Callaway (allegedly) wrote out his affidavit to the DPD on the day of the assassination, he merely claimed that he heard “some” shots (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 2, Item 1). Whilst some will argue that by “some” shots Callaway could easily have meant that he really heard five shots, why wouldn’t he have just said so in his affidavit? Taking into account all of the aforementioned problems with Callaway as a witness, and the likelihood that he was coaxed into identifying Oswald as Tippit’s killer, it also seems likely that he was coaxed into claiming that he had heard five shots as a way of explaining the aforementioned discrepancy between the bullets and the spent shell casings. The first interview, during which Callaway claimed that he had heard five shots, appears to be his interview with the USSS on December 3, 1963 (WCD 87, page 552). The DPD released the four spent shell casings allegedly discovered at the Tippit murder scene to FBI agent Vincent Drain on November 28, 1963 (WCD205, page 206). Therefore, if the authorities had realised before Callaway’s interview with the USSS that there was a discrepancy between the discarded shell casings and the bullets removed from Tippit’s body, they could have coerced him into claiming that he had heard a total of five shots.

    Another problem with using Callaway to explain a missed shot (which Myers evidently wants to ignore), is that Callaway claimed that he heard two shots fired, followed by three more shots in rapid succession (With Malice, Chapter 8). However, Myers also wants his readers to believe that Jack Tatum heard two or three shots fired, followed by a single shot to Tippit’s head after a slight pause (ibid). So if Tatum is correct, then Callaway’s “recollection” must be in error; and as this reviewer has discussed previously, Tatum’s claim that he witnessed Tippit being shot is not to be trusted. Suffice it to say, Myers cannot have it both ways. This reviewer should also point out that Frank Griffin, who allegedly witnessed Tippit being shot, told Myers during an interview in 2004 that he ” … vividly recalled hearing five gunshots … ” However, Griffin also claimed that he heard the five shots fired “equally spaced” (With Malice, Chapter 8). But if Griffin’s “recollection” is correct, then Jack Tatum’s own “recollection” can’t be true. Griffin also claimed that he saw Oswald fleeing the scene of the murder after the shots were fired (see the thread entitled FRANK GRIFFIN – TKS WITNESS CLAIMS BEFORE 2010? on John Simkin’s Education Forum).

    In his endnotes, Myers writes that Griffin remained silent about what he witnessed because his father, Johnnie Frank Griffin, was murdered after he testified before a grand Jury concerning what he witnessed when Alabama attorney General- elect Albert Patterson was murdered, and evidently feared that he may share the same fate as his father. But as Myers admits, there are several discrepancies between what he told Myers in 2004 and what appeared in his own book in 2008; though he assures us that most of these discrepancies are “minor and of no consequence.” On the contrary, given the discrepancies between his interview with Myers and what he wrote in his book, including the lack of any credible evidence that five equally spaced shots were fired at Tippit, Griffin’s claim that he heard five equally spaced shots and then observed Oswald should be not be considered credible.

    To bolster the notion that one “discarded” shell casing was not recovered, Myers quotes from the interviews of witnesses B.M. (Pat) Patterson, and Harold Russell, both of whom said they witnessed Tippit’s killer come down Patton Street and turn West onto Jefferson Blvd. (With Malice, Chapter 8). Patterson informed the FBI that the killer; “stopped still, ejected the cartridges, reloaded the gun, and then placed the weapon inside his waistband.” (ibid). Russell informed the FBI on February 23, 1964 that; “the man [gunman] unloaded the gun, jammed it in his pants under his belt and disappeared down Jefferson Boulevard.” (ibid). But Myers omits information from his discussion which contradicts what he’s trying to sell to his readers. First of all, in his initial interview with the FBI on January 21, 1964, Russell only stated that the killer was attempting to either reload the gun or place it into his belt. There was no mention of the killer unloading the gun (WC Volume XXI, Russell exhibit A). When Russell was interviewed by the FBI on February 23, 1964, he also claimed that he was put into a DPD squad car by officers to point out the area where he had last seen the killer; even though he made no mention of being put into a squad car in his interview with the FBI one month before (WCD 735, page 270). This is yet another example of how Russell’s story evolved over time.

    With regards to Patterson, during his initial interview with the FBI on January 22, 1964, he made no mention of the killer stopping to eject shells from his gun (WC Volume XXI, Patterson exhibit A). In an affidavit to the FBI on August 25, 1964, Patterson now allegedly claimed that the killer had stopped, ejected cartridges, and then reloaded the gun (WC Volume XXI, Patterson (B.M.) exhibit B). Patterson also allegedly told the FBI on August 26, 1964, that he saw the killer cross over to the North side of Jefferson Blvd (thus implying that the killer went down to the south side of Jefferson Blvd.) after he had stopped (ibid). However, Patterson’s latter claim that the killer had stopped to eject empty shells from the gun is not corroborated by Lewis, Russell, Warren Reynolds, Ted Callaway, and Sam Guinyard. In fact, Harold Russell told the FBI during his interview with them on February 23, 1964, that the killer was ejecting the shells as he was “hurrying down” Patton Street. In light of all of the above, there is no good reason to believe that Tippit’s killer had discarded one or more spent shell casings from the revolver as Russell and Patterson allegedly claimed he did during their latter interviews with the FBI. Besides, if Russell and Patterson really did see the killer discard empty shell casings from the revolver, why didn’t they inform the DPD Officers present at the Tippit murder scene of this observation, or why wouldn’t they have picked up the empty shell casings and hand them to the DPD officers?

    Myers also quotes from his interviews with Barbara and Virginia Davis in 1996 and 1997, during which they told him that their father-in-law, Louis Davis, had discovered a spent shell casing a short time after Tippit’s murder; which was allegedly similar to the ones which the Davis sister-in-laws discovered and gave to the DPD (With Malice, Chapter 8). Louis Davis allegedly kept it as a souvenir. However, given the aforementioned problems with the Davis sister-in-laws as witnesses, and the likelihood that they were coaxed into identifying Oswald as Tippit’s killer, their story that a fifth shell casing was discovered by their father-in-law should not be trusted. Even Myers admits that; “Whether the shell [allegedly found by Louis Davis] was one ejected by Tippit’s killer is likely to remain a mystery” (ibid).

    Suffice it to say, there is no credible evidence that more than four shell casings were discarded by Tippit’s killer, or that more than four shots were fired. There is no evidence that any bullets hit one of the houses in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene, or anything else such as the road surface. The only other explanation for a missing bullet which this reviewer can think of is that for some bizarre reason, Tippit’s killer had fired a shot in the air. However, the eyewitness statements do not support such an assertion. Despite Myers attempt to explain the discrepancy between the shell casings and the bullets, the fact remains that there is no credible evidence that one Remington Peter’s bullet had missed Tippit, and that one Winchester Western shell casing was unaccounted for. All alternative explanations for this discrepancy are also pure speculation.

    There is yet another problem with the spent shell casings which Tippit’s killer allegedly discarded. As most researchers are probably aware, DPD Officer Joe Mack Poe, who was at the Tippit murder scene with his partner Leonard Jez, informed the FBI on July 6, 1964, that he marked the two spent shell casings which were given to him by Domingo Benavides with the initials J.M.P. (WCE 2011). The problem is that Poe’s mark from the two shell casings are curiously missing, and Myers wants his readers to believe that Poe didn’t mark the shells as he claimed. Conspiracy advocates, on the other hand, believe that Poe missing marks are due to the shell casings being substituted for the ones he marked. When Poe testified before the Warren Commission on April 9, 1964, counsel Joseph Ball asked him if he put any markings on the shell casings, to which Poe responded; “I couldn’t swear to it; no, sir.” (Volume VII, page 68). When Ball again asked Poe if he made a mark on the shells after showing them to him, Poe explained; “I can’t swear to it; no, sir.”, but then claimed; “There is a mark. I believe I put on them, but I couldn’t swear to it. I couldn’t make them [the marks] out anymore.” (ibid, page 69). In other words, Poe was implying that he did mark the shells, but was unable to recognise them on the shells he was shown.

    According to Myers, the fact that Poe was reluctant to swear that he had marked the shells, raises the question of whether Poe had marked the shells as he claimed (With Malice, Chapter 8). However, consider that if Poe was an honest police officer who really did mark the shells, but now couldn’t make out his marks on any of the shells shown to him whilst testifying under oath, then his reluctance to swear that he had marked the shells is perfectly understandable. One thing which Myers never bothers to mention in his book is Poe’s interview with author Henry Hurt in 1984. According to Hurt, Poe told him that he was “absolutely certain” that he had marked the shells, and explained that he couldn’t be certain of a single other instance during his twenty eight years as a police officer when he failed to properly mark evidence (Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, page 153). Poe also told Hurt that prior to his testimony before the Warren Commission; he was interviewed by the FBI concerning the shell casings (ibid). However, this reviewer has been unable to locate such an interview.

    Poe also informed Hurt that he “felt certain” that the shell casings entered into evidence were the ones at the scene and that perhaps the reason he couldn’t find his marks was because somebody else had placed their mark on top of his (ibid). Clearly, Poe was implying to Hurt that the shell casings were not switched. After examining the shell casings at the National Archives, Hurt informed Poe that he wasn’t able to find any evidence that this was the case, to which Poe indignantly responded; “I [have] talked to you all I’m going to talk to you. You already got your mind made up about what you’re gonna say. I know what the truth is.” and then abruptly hung up the phone (ibid, page 154). The fact that Hurt included this indignant response from Poe speaks well for Hurt’s credibility on this issue. Hurt also explains that in each of the spent shell casings he examined; “at least 50 percent of the surface area around the inside rim has no marking at all, leaving ample space for even additional identifying marks.” (ibid).

    In an apparent attempt to discredit Poe, Myers quotes from his interview with detective Jim Leavelle in 1996. According to Myers, Leavelle claimed that Poe told him (Leavelle) that he didn’t remember marking the shells, and that Poe only told the FBI that he marked the shells because he was ” … afraid he would get in trouble for failing to mark evidence.” (With Malice, chapter 8). As previously mentioned, Leavelle informed the Warren Commission that ” … the only time I had connections with Oswald was this Sunday morning [November 24, 1963]. I never had [the] occasion to talk with him at any time …”, but then lied to Myers when he claimed he had interrogated Oswald on Friday shortly following his arrest. Evidence discussed below further demonstrates Leavelle’s duplicity. Although Myers doesn’t state that he absolutely believes Leavelle, merely writing that “In retrospect, Leavelle’s explanation has a sense of truth about it”, the fact that Myers uses someone such as Leavelle to discredit Poe, whilst ignoring Poe’s interview with Henry Hurt (even though he quotes from Hurt’s book elsewhere), is yet another example of Myers’ lack of objectivity. Readers should also keep in mind that Leavelle is a dyed in the wool supporter of Oswald’s guilt, who wrote the following blurb for Myers’s book; ” … Dale Myers has finally cut through the veneer of insinuations and innuendos applied by the conspiracy buffs for the past thirty odd years. He has cleared up the points of confusion brought on by the rumors and hearsay that had no basis in facts.” Therefore, it should come as absolutely no surprise to any honest researcher that Leavelle would proffer Poe not marking the spent shells.

    Myers also speculates that due to the presence of DPD Sgt “Pete” Barnes at the Tippit murder scene, allegedly “a few minutes” after Benavides had handed Poe the two spent shell casings, Poe may have handed the shell casings to Barnes without marking them (With Malice, Chapter 8). Whilst Myers is free to speculate as much as he wants, the fact remains that Poe insisted he had marked the two shell casings given to him by Benavides. Then again, we cannot know with absolute certainty that Poe did mark the shell casings. In fact, perhaps the best argument against the shell casings being switched (ironically) came from Sgt. Gerald Hill. When Hurt interviewed Hill in 1984, Hill explained that if the spent shell casings discovered at the Tippit murder scene had been switched, then Poe’s marks would have been forged onto the shell casings (Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, page 155).

    Myers also briefly discusses the issue of Sgt “Pete” Barnes identification of the shell casings which were given to him at the murder scene by Officer Poe. As Myers explains, Barnes ultimately decided that Poe gave him the spent shell casings designated by the FBI as Q-74 and Q-77; which Myers claims were both of the Remington Peters brand (With Malice, Chapter 8). According to his interview with the FBI on June 15, 1964, Barnes had located his mark (this being the letter B) on the aforementioned shell casings (WCE 2011). However, when he testified before the Warren Commission on April 7, 1964, Barnes claimed that the two shell casings he was given were actually Q -74 and Q-75. Myers actually admits that this was the case in his book (With Malice, Chapter 8). Barnes also told the Warren Commission that he placed the letter B ” … the best that I could, inside the hull of Exhibit 74 -I believe it was Q-74 and Q-75 … “ (WC Volume VII, page 275).

    In his demeaning article on researcher Don Thomas’ work on the Tippit murder, Myers explains that Barnes’ mark, “a crude letter B”, can be seen on the inside of the spent shells casings designated Q-74 and Q-77. Myers then went on to explain that this means Barnes did mark the spent shell casings after Poe had given them to him (see the blog post The Tippit Murder: Why Conspiracy Theorists Can’t Tell the Truth about the Rosetta Stone of the Case Against Lee Harvey Oswald on Myers’ blog). Curiously, this explanation is absent from Myers’ book. Although Barnes may very well have placed this crude looking B (which actually looks like the letter D) inside the spent shell casings, this reviewer discusses below that Barnes lied about the fingerprints discovered on Tippit’s squad car in order to conceal the possibility that Oswald didn’t shoot Tippit. Therefore, it is entirely conceivable that Barnes deliberately placed his crude looking mark inside the spent shell casings which the DPD had substituted for the ones which were actually discarded by Tippit’s killer after he shot Tippit, in order to make it appear as though there was no substitution for the spent shell casings.

    Myers writes that; “Two of the four shells recovered at the [Tippit murder] scene have a clear, unbroken chain of custody and were proven to have been fired in Oswald’s revolver to the exclusion of all other weapons” (With Malice, Chapter 8). Myers is referring to the two spent shell casings allegedly discovered by the Davis sister-in-laws shortly following Tippit’s murder, which they then gave to the DPD. Of course, Myers’ explanation ignores all of the aforementioned evidence (including evidence discussed further on) that the spent shell casings recovered from the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene were switched. Myers also discusses the allegations that Tippit’s killer was actually armed with an automatic handgun. The first report that Tippit’s killer was armed with an automatic handgun was from DPD Officer Howell W. Summers, whom reported over the DPD radio that an “eyeball” witness claimed the killer was armed with an automatic (WCE 705/1974). Although Myers believes this witness was Ted Callaway; as discussed previously, there is very good reason to believe that Callaway didn’t actually observe Tippit’s killer; and that the witness could have been the elusive B.D. Searcy.

    In any event, this reviewer should point out that Ted Callaway told Myers during an interview in 1996 that the reason he allegedly thought the killer was armed with an automatic was because; “he [the gunman] had his pistol in a raised position and his left hand going to the pistol. My sidearm was a forty-five. When I was in the Marine corps, and I’d used that same motion before in pushing a loaded magazine up to the handle of a forty-five, you know? And so, when they [the DPD] asked me what kind of gun that he had I told them it was an automatic; on account of that motion.” (With Malice, Chapter 8). No matter whom one might believe was the witness who provided Officer Summers with the information that the killer was armed with an automatic, the witness may have been mistaken if he didn’t get a really good view of the weapon, and if he thought the shots were fired in rapid succession. Keep in mind that the recollections of how many shots, and the sequence in which they were fired at Tippit, were recalled differently by the witnesses who heard the shots. Therefore, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the gun used to kill Tippit was an automatic if a particular witness recalled hearing the shots fired rapidly.

    The second claim that the spent shell casings found in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene were fired from an automatic was by Sgt. Gerald Hill. Hill broadcast the following message over the DPD radio at approximately 1:40 pm; “The shell at the scene indicates that the suspect is armed with an automatic .38 rather than a pistol.” (WCE 705/1974). As this reviewer will explain in the upcoming essay on Hill, Hill had by all likelihood framed Oswald for the murder of Officer Tippit, and that Hill only claimed that the spent shell casings were fired from an automatic handgun to divert suspicion away from himself. Unlike many other conspiracy advocates, this reviewer believes that the revolver Oswald allegedly had in his possession was the gun used to kill Tippit. Shortly following Oswald’s arrest at the Texas Theater, Gerald Hill was filmed showing reporters the revolver and the live rounds removed from the revolver. As Myers explains in his book, the bullets removed from Officer Tippit were of the 0.38 special caliber and had five lands and five grooves with a right twist; which are the class characteristics of the barrel of WCE 143 (With Malice, Chapter 8). The bullets removed from Tippit’s body also had microscopic scratches similar to those found on the test bullets fired from the revolver (ibid). Finally, the bullets removed from Tippit’s body showed signs of gas erosion, which results from the bullets being fired through the barrel of a gun where the diameter of the barrel is slightly larger than the diameter of the bullets; as was the case with the “Oswald” revolver (ibid).

    In his endnotes, Myers discusses the DPD’s alleged discovery of five Winchester Western cartridges inside Oswald’s front left pants pocket following his arrest. The cartridges were allegedly discovered by detective Elmer Boyd, as Boyd and his partner, detective Richard Sims, allegedly searched Oswald just prior to the first line-up (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 4, Item 5). Sims confirmed that the cartridges were removed from Oswald’s left front pants pocket when he testified before the Warren Commission (WC Volume VII, page 173). However; there are several problems with this alleged discovery. First of all, when Gerald Hill was interviewed by Eddie Barker in 1967, he claimed that Oswald was frisked inside the theater, but made no mention of any live rounds of ammunition being found in Oswald’s pants pocket (read Hill’s interview with Barker). Although Hill denied during his testimony before the Warren Commission that Oswald was searched by the arresting officers after he was handcuffed, his denial may have been to conceal the fact that after Oswald was searched, they had failed to discover the five cartridges in his pants pocket (WC Volume VII, page 66). If this was the case, then Hill had probably forgotten that he was meant to deny during his interview with Barker that Oswald was searched shortly following his arrest at the theater.

    Secondly, as researcher Gil Jesus explains on his website, the five rounds of ammunition allegedly removed from Oswald’s pants pocket show corrosion which is consistent with the cartridges having spent a considerable amount of time in either a gun belt or a bullet slide; neither of which were found amongst Oswald’s possessions. Jesus claims that police departments were known to use gun belts and bullet slides; and concludes, based on this assertion, that the five cartridges had originated from the DPD (Read more.) The reader should also keep in mind that the DPD didn’t release the five cartridges to the FBI until November 28, 1963; thus there was more than enough time to fabricate the discovery of the cartridges inside Oswald’s pants pocket (WCD 205, page 206). Finally, consider that, at the time detective Boyd allegedly discovered the five cartridges inside Oswald’s pants pocket, detective Sims had allegedly discovered a bus transfer inside Oswald’s shirt pocket. However, when DPD Chief Jesse Curry was asked by a reporter on the day following the assassination how Oswald had travelled to “the other side of town”, Curry replied that; “We have heard that he [Oswald] was picked up by a negro in a car”, but made no mention of a bus transfer being found in Oswald’s pocket (WCE 2146). Furthermore, researcher Lee Farley has demonstrated that Oswald’s alleged bus ride following the assassination was a likely fabrication (see the thread entitled Oswald and Bus 1213 on John Simkin’s education forum). Therefore, this is more evidence that the DPD would falsify evidence against Oswald.

    In the endnotes to his book, Myers acknowledges that several officers who participated in Oswald’s arrest had observed what appeared to be a nick from the firing pin on one of the live rounds inside the revolver allegedly removed from Oswald inside the theater. This included officers Nick McDonald, Bob Carroll, Gerald Hill, and Ray Hawkins. As Myers also acknowledges, when FBI agent Courtlandt Cunningham testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that there was no evidence that the firing pin of the revolver had hit the bullet (WC Volume III, page 460). In fact, the nick was offset from the centre of the bullet’s primer (ibid). Myers is at a loss to explain what had actually caused the nick. One explanation is that it was put there by the DPD, after perhaps learning from Officers Charles Walker and Thomas Hutson that they heard what they allegedly thought sounded like the snap of the revolver’s hammer (Dallas Municipal archives Box 2, Folder 7, Items 25 and 47). This reviewer will be further discussing the nick on the live round in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill.

    This reviewer should point out that Officer Ray Hawkins told the Warren Commission that “I didn’t know whether it was a snap of the gun or whether it was in the seats someone making the noise” (WC Volume VII, page 94). When Johnny Brewer testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed ” … we heard a seat pop up, but couldn’t see anybody” (ibid, page 5). Therefore, the snapping sound may have been from one of the seats during the scuffle with Oswald, just as Hawkins evidently thought that it might have been. Based on all of the evidence discussed previously, it is this reviewer’s belief that the DPD switched the four spent shell casings found in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene with spent shell casings they had removed from “Oswald’s” revolver after they fired four live rounds from it. For those who doubt that the DPD could have done this, keep in mind that the revolver was returned to them by the FBI on November 24, 1963, and as stated previously, the DPD released the four spent shell casings to the FBI on November 28, 1963 (WCD 5, page 161), (WCD 205, page 206).

    Following his discussion of the ballistics evidence, Myers moves onto a discussion of the fingerprints found on Tippit’s squad car, which were photographed by DPD Sgt. W.E. “Pete” Barnes. As Myers explains, Barnes testified before the Warren Commission that he was told that Tippit’s killer had come up to the right side of Tippit’s squad car, and had possibly placed his hands there (With Malice, Chapter 8). Although Myers admits that Barnes testified that none of the fingerprints found on the car were of value, he nevertheless omits that Barnes also claimed that; “No legible prints were found” after Counsel David Belin asked him; “Were you able to find any identifiable prints?” (WC Volume VII, page 274). (See the photographs of the fingerprints found on Tippit’s squad car.) Looking at the photographs, it is apparent that Barnes was lying when he said that no legible prints were found, as the ridge patterns of some of the fingerprints are distinguishable.

    Furthermore, Myers explains that Herbert Lutz, a senior crime scene technician for Wayne County, Michigan, U.S.A, with twenty six years of experience as a latent fingerprint examiner, had examined the fingerprints found on Tippit’s squad car, and that Lutz; ” … was of the opinion that one person was probably responsible for all of them” (With Malice, Chapter 8). Myers then explains that Lutz believed the ridges and furrows of the fingerprints obtained from the top of the right side passenger door of Tippit’s squad car were consistent with the fingerprints obtained from the right front fender of the car (ibid). Significantly, Myers explains that Lutz compared a fingerprint from Tippit’s squad car, which Lutz identified as being created by the “right-middle index finger”, with the print from Oswald’s right-middle index finger on one of his fingerprint cards (ibid). Based on his examination, Lutz concluded that the fingerprints taken from Tippit’s squad car were not Oswald’s (ibid). But if none of the fingerprints from Tippit’s squad car were legible, as Sgt. “Pete” Barnes testified, then how was an experienced latent fingerprint examiner like Lutz able to determine that the aforementioned print was not caused by Oswald’s right middle index finger?

    Furthermore, if the fingerprints from Tippit’s squad car were not “legible”, then Lutz would surely have said so. Although Barnes never stated how many years of experience he had photographing and dusting for fingerprints during his testimony before the Warren Commission, he nevertheless stated that he had been doing photography work for the crime scene search section of the DPD since the year 1956, and that he had also been personally making Paraffin tests since that same year (WC Volume VII, pages 272 and 279). Therefore, it is apparent that Barnes also had seven years of experience photographing and dusting for fingerprints by the time Tippit was killed. With that in mind, it is inconceivable that Barnes could possibly believe that the prints from Tippit’s squad car were not legible. As stated previously, Barnes testified before the Warren Commission that he was told that Tippit’s killer had come up to the right side of Tippit’s car, and had possibly placed his hands on there. Therefore, it is apparent that Barnes and the DPD wanted to conceal evidence that showed Oswald might be innocent of killing Tippit. Myers must surely be aware of this fact, but by omitting the fact that Barnes testified there were no legible prints found on Tippit’s squad car, he can pretend that this was not the case.

    Of course, the question remains as to whether or not Tippit’s killer did in fact place his hands on the right side of Tippit’s squad car. As Myers explains, witness Jimmy Burt claimed that Tippit’s killer had placed his hands on the right side of the car, as he leaned down and talked to Tippit through the window (With Malice, Chapter 8). In his endnotes, Myers references this claim to Burt’s interview with Al Chapman in 1968. However, Myers also explains that Jack Tatum “specifically recalls” that as he drove past Tippit’s squad car, the killer had both of his hands inside his zipper jacket as he spoke to Tippit (ibid). As this reviewer has discussed previously, it is quite unlikely that Tatum actually witnessed Tippit being shot as he proclaimed; and was coerced into claiming that he had. Thus, his claim that Tippit’s killer had both of his hands in his pockets may have been to dispel the notion that the fingerprints found on the right door of Tippit’s squad car belonged to Tippit’s real killer. By the same token, Jimmy Burt’s claim that he observed Tippit’s killer place his hands on the right side of Tippit’s squad car should also be taken with a grain of salt; as Burt made no mention of having seen the killer talking to Tippit through the window during his interview with the FBI on December 15, 1963, (WCD 194, page 29).

    One other witness who claimed she saw Tippit’s killer lean over and place his hands on the right door of Tippit’s squad car was Helen Markham. Although Myers mentions that Markham demonstrated to the DPD officers at the Tippit murder scene how the killer had leaned on the passenger (right side) door of Tippit’s squad car as he spoke through the “cracked vent window” in chapter five, he curiously omits this from his discussion of the fingerprints in chapter eight. When Markham testified before the Warren Commission, she stated that the killer had placed his arms; “On the ledge of the window” (WC Volume III, page 307). In fact, during a television interview, Markham demonstrated that the killer had placed both of his hands on the top of the window ledge as he leaned over to talk with Tippit (See the footage.) Yet, all of the fingerprints in question were (allegedly) removed from the outside of the right front door.

    If Tippit’s killer had placed his hands on the outside of the right front door of Tippit’s squad car; then the killer (by Hubert Lutz’s examination of the fingerprints) was not Oswald. Although Markham was consistent with her claim that she observed Tippit’s killer place his hands on the right front door of Tippit’s squad car, this reviewer should point out that given the angle from which she observed Tippit’s killer as she was standing on the northwest corner of the tenth and Patton street intersection, and given her overall lack of credibility as a witness, Markham’s claim that Tippit’s killer had placed his hands on top of the window ledge should not be taken too seriously. In conclusion, given that there is no credible eyewitness account that Tippit’s killer was responsible for the fingerprints found on the right side of Tippit’s squad car, the lack of Oswald’s prints on the squad car shouldn’t be used as proof that Oswald didn’t shoot Tippit.

    The final piece of evidence which Myers uses to convict Oswald for Tippit’s murder is the light gray zipper jacket (WCE 162) which the killer discarded in the parking lot behind the Texaco Service station located on Jefferson Blvd. The DPD allegedly discovered the jacket under the rear of a car in the parking lot (With Malice, Chapter 8). It is alleged that Tippit’s killer discarded the jacket to alter his appearance. This reviewer has no qualms with that assertion. Myers uses Marina Oswald’s testimony before the Warren Commission as evidence that the light gray jacket was owned by Oswald, but once again neglects to inform his readers of the problems with Marina’s credibility. Although Myers acknowledges that the jacket had the size M (Medium) printed in its collar, he never mentions that Oswald wore size small shirts and sweaters (WCD 205, pages 162 and 163). In light of this fact, it makes little sense that Oswald would be wearing a size medium jacket.

    The DPD discovered that the light gray jacket had a dry cleaner tag inside it with the number B 9738. This was broadcasted over the DPD radio at about 1:44 pm (CE 705/1974). The jacket also contained the laundry mark “30” in its collar (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 9, Folder 4, Item 5). Myers admits that the FBI had canvassed hundreds of dry cleaners in Dallas and New Orleans; and that they were unable to determine if any of them had served Oswald, or had even used a laundry tag identical to the one found inside the jacket (With Malice, Chapter 8). In fact, the FBI also claimed that none of Oswald’s other clothing contained a dry cleaners or laundry mark that could be associated with the laundry tag of the light gray jacket (ibid). Although Myers states that none of Oswald’s belongings contained any dry cleaning tags, a pair of Khaki-colored trousers and a Khaki long-sleeved shirt which belonged to Oswald, contained laundry tags bearing the number “03230”. However, this is not identical to the laundry mark or dry cleaning tag found on the light gray jacket. Finally, even Myers admits that Marina Oswald told the FBI that she could not recall if Oswald ever sent the light gray jacket to a dry cleaner; but that she recalled hand washing them herself (ibid).

    Myers admits that the eyewitness recollections of what color the jacket that Tippit’s killer was wearing varied from one witness to another, and that Earlene Roberts, the housekeeper at the rooming house on 1026 North Beckley where Oswald was allegedly living at the time of the assassination, gave differing accounts of what color the jacket the man (whom she thought was Oswald) was wearing as he left the rooming house (With Malice, Chapter 8). Oswald had allegedly returned to the rooming house following the President’s assassination, and left after allegedly retrieving the jacket and the revolver used to kill Tippit. When Roberts testified before the Warren Commission, she explained that as “Oswald” was leaving the rooming house, he was zipping up a jacket (WC Volume VI, page 439). When Counsel Joseph Ball showed Roberts the light gray jacket, she claimed that the jacket which “Oswald” was wearing when he left was a darker colored jacket (ibid). However, Myers explains that when Roberts was interviewed on radio during the afternoon of November 22, 1963, she “accurately described” the jacket “Oswald” was wearing when he left as a “short gray coat” (With Malice, Chapter 8).

    Whilst Roberts may certainly have been describing the light gray jacket found in the parking lot behind the Texaco Service station, this reviewer has previously pointed out that researcher Lee Farley has explained that it was actually Larry Crafard (and not Oswald) who was living at the 1026 North Beckley rooming house at the time of the assassination. Therefore, it may well have been Crafard whom Roberts observed entering and then leaving the rooming house with the jacket. In fact, as Greg Parker has explained to this reviewer, researcher Mark Groubert believes the jacket Crafard was wearing when he was photographed by the FBI on November 28, 1963, was from the same manufacturer of WCE 162; namely Maurice Holman of Los Angeles, California (See the thread entitled The Stevenson Incident and the Assassination on Greg Parker’s research forum).

    There are also problems with the discovery of the jacket. To give one example, the Warren report states that the jacket was discovered by DPD captain W.R. Westbrook (WCR, page 175). However, this was a lie! When Westbrook testified before the Warren Commission, he stated that as the jacket was still lying on the ground, it was pointed out to him by “someone”; whom he thought might have been a DPD Officer (WC Volume VII, page 115). In fact, Westbrook testified that the jacket was pointed out to him after the false alarm at the Jefferson Branch Library (ibid). But according to the transcripts of the DPD radio recordings, an unidentified Officer (whom Myers believes was motorcycle officer J.T. Griffin) broadcasted the discovery of the jacket at approximately 1:25 pm (WCE 705/1974). According to the same transcripts, Officer Charles Walker broadcasted on the radio that he had seen whom he thought was Tippit’s killer entering the Jefferson Branch Library at approximately 1:35 pm! So unless the Officer(s) who discovered the jacket decided to leave it lying on the ground for over ten minutes following its discovery, Westbrook lied when he said it was lying on the ground when it was pointed out to him. Myers mentions none of this to his readers.

    Myers asks the reader; “If Oswald didn’t kill Tippit, what happened to his [Oswald’s] jacket?” He then cites an a FBI lab report, dated December 3, 1963, in which it is stated that dark-blue, gray-black, and orange-yellow cottons fibers were found in the debris removed from the inside areas of the sleeves of the jacket, and that the fibers “match” in their microscopic characteristics to the fibers from the shirt (WCE 150) which Oswald was wearing when he was arrested inside the Texas theater. However, this finding is nowhere to be found in the Warren Report, and it was not mentioned by Paul Morgan Stombaugh, the FBI’s hair and fiber examiner, when he testified before the Warren Commission. In his endnotes, Myers explains that in a letter he wrote in the year 1998 to former Warren Commission counsel, David Belin, he asked him why this alleged finding was not used by the Commission. According to Myers, Belin’s response was that there was “overwhelming” evidence to tie Oswald to the Tippit shooting, such as the “positive” identification of Oswald as the killer by witnesses, and the ballistics evidence. Belin went on to explain that the “experts” retained by the commission determined that individual fibers are not unique, and that apparently he didn’t believe that the quality of the fiber evidence was as good as the ballistics identification of the spent shell casings allegedly recovered from the Tippit murder scene as having been fired from “Oswald’s” revolver. In spite of Belin’s explanation to Myers, it seems incredibly odd to this reviewer that the Warren Commission would never mention this alleged finding.

    Myers naturally believes that the fibres allegedly found inside the sleeves of the light gray jacket are authentic, and that they weren’t placed there by either the DPD or the FBI. However, this ignores all of the previously discussed evidence that the spent shell casings discovered at the Tippit murder scene were switched to ensure that the shell casings would be ballistically matched to the revolver which Oswald allegedly had in his possession when he was arrested. It also ignores all of the previously discussed evidence that the eyewitnesses were coaxed by the DPD into identifying Oswald as Tippit’s killer; and the aforementioned memorandum from Alan Belmont to William Sullivan on November 26, 1963. On his website, researcher Pat Speer explains that the DPD had likely planted fibers from the shirt Oswald was wearing when he was arrested onto the butt end of the rifle discovered on the sixth floor of the TSBD (Read more.) Such a notion reinforces the belief that it was the DPD who planted fibers from that shirt into the sleeves of the light gray jacket.

    Should the reader remain unconvinced that the DPD wanted Oswald to be found guilty of Tippit’s murder, then consider the following from Ted Callaway’s testimony before the Warren Commission. Callaway explained to Counsel Joseph Ball that when he and Sam Guinyard were waiting to view the line-up of Oswald, detective Jim Leavelle told them; “When I show you these guys [in the line-up], be sure, take your time, see if you can make a positive identification … .. We want to be sure, we want to try to wrap him [Oswald] up real tight on killing this officer. We think he is the same one that shot the President. But if we can wrap him up tight on killing this officer, we have got him” (WC Volume III, page 355). Sam Guinyard, who allegedly viewed the line-up with Callaway, denied during his testimony that any DPD Officer had said anything to them before they viewed the line-up (WC Volume VII, page 400). Cecil McWatters; the bus driver who also allegedly viewed the line-up of Oswald with Callaway, also failed to confirm that any DPD Officer had said anything to them before they viewed the line-up.

    Despite the lack of corroboration by Guinyard and McWatters, during an interview with author Joseph McBride, Leavelle claimed that captain Fritz told him to ” … .go ahead and make a tight case on him [for Tippit’s murder] in case we have trouble making this one on the presidential shooting.” (McBride, Into the Nightmare, pages 235 and 236) Not only do these statements imply that the DPD were determined that they wanted Oswald to be convicted for both Tippit’s murder and the President’s assassination, but that they would also fabricate evidence to ensure that such was the case. One could rightly ask why Callaway would want the Warren Commission to know that the DPD wanted Oswald to be found guilty of Tippit’s murder if he was coerced by them into identifying Oswald as the killer. This reviewer can think of two alternative reasons. Perhaps Callaway was under a fair amount of pressure (and nervous) when testifying, and therefore, he didn’t realize the implication of what he told the Commission. On the other hand, perhaps Callaway, feeling guilty for helping to implicate Oswald, wanted to give the Commission a clue that he was coerced into identifying Oswald by the DPD. One could also ask why Callaway, and indeed all the other witnesses who had been coerced into identifying Oswald, wouldn’t eventually confess that they had been coerced into identifying Oswald as Tippit’s killer. In this reviewer’s opinion, it was probably because they didn’t want to expose themselves as liars who helped convict an innocent man for murder.

    Myers concludes this chapter with the following remarks: “The physical case against Oswald is impressive. When combined with his actions, there seems little doubt he killed J.D. Tippit.” But as this reviewer has demonstrated throughout this review, this is hyperbole of the first order. Myers then writes; “But before drawing any conclusions, it’s important to consider some of the claims that challenge the notion of Oswald as perpetrator.”

    IX: Hints and allegations

    Throughout this chapter, Myers discusses many of the allegations made by conspiracy advocates concerning Tippit’s murder. For the purpose of this review, I will only be discussing two of the allegations which Myers writes about in his book. According to Myers; ” … many claims have been proven to be groundless, but some hold just enough intrigue to make us wonder if there really isn’t more to the whole story” (With Malice, Chapter 9). The first allegation which Myers discusses is the discovery of a wallet in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene containing identification for Oswald and his alleged alias, Alek James Hidell. The wallet can be seen in film footage by WFAA-TV cameraman Ron Reiland, as it is shown to DPD captain George M. Doughty by Sgt. Calvin “Bud” Owens (ibid). A third person, believed to be Captain Westbrook, reaches for the wallet with his left hand, just as Reiland’s footage of the wallet concludes (ibid).

    The allegation surfaced when former FBI agent James Hosty wrote in his book Assignment Oswald that captain Westbrook had shown FBI agent Robert M. Barrett a wallet allegedly found at the Tippit murder scene which contained identification for Oswald and Hidell; and had asked Barrett if the FBI knew anything about Oswald and Hidell (ibid). However, Myers writes that when he interviewed Barrett in 1996, Barrett told him that he wasn’t shown any of the identification inside the wallet, but that Westbrook merely asked him if he knew who Lee Harvey Oswald or Alek James Hidell were, as he held the wallet in his hand (ibid). In fact, Myers explains that Barrett was adamant that he was asked about the names at the Tippit murder scene (ibid). But contrary to Barrett’s claim, identification for Hidell was allegedly found inside Oswald’s wallet after he was arrested inside the Texas Theater. After Oswald had been placed into an unmarked DPD car to be taken to DPD headquarters, detective Paul Bentley removed a wallet from Oswald’s pants pocket (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 4).

    If both accounts are true, then the implication is that Tippit’s killer left the wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell after he killed Tippit to incriminate Oswald. The only other explanation is that for some bizarre reason, Oswald was carrying two wallets with him when he shot Tippit, and then he (unbelievably) left one of them behind which had identification for Hidell in it. However, it makes little sense that Oswald would be carrying two wallets on his person; let alone that he would have identification for Hidell in his wallet on the day he allegedly used a rifle he ordered under that name to assassinate the President. According to Myers, Barrett also told him that a witness claimed that Tippit’s killer had handed Tippit a wallet through the right front passenger window of his squad car (With Malice, Chapter 9). However, the identity of this so-called witness is unknown. As this reviewer has discussed previously, Barrett wrote in his report on the day of the assassination that he heard Oswald yell in a loud voice; “Kill all the sons of bitches!” inside the Texas Theater as he was scuffling with DPD Officers (WCD 5, page 84). But as stated previously, Barrett was almost certainly lying about this, as no other witness or DPD Officer involved in Oswald’s arrest ever claimed that Oswald yelled out “Kill all the sons of bitches!” This then raises the possibility that Barrett was lying when he said that Captain Westbrook had asked him at the Tippit murder scene if he knew who Oswald and Hidell were; in order to reinforce the notion that Oswald was Tippit’s killer.

    Myers’ contention is that Barrett had simply misremembered where he was when Westbrook asked him if he knew who Hidell and Oswald were, and that the wallet which Paul Bentley removed from Oswald’s pocket en route to DPD headquarters contained identification for both Oswald and Hidell (With Malice, Chapter 9). Myers explains that Barrett failed to mention the wallet in his report which he wrote on the day of the assassination, and that he had failed to mention the wallet again when he testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities in 1975 (ibid). This also raises the possibility that Barrett lied when he claimed that Westbrook asked him if he knew who Oswald and Hidell were to counter all the claims that Oswald wasn’t Tippit’s murderer. On the other hand, perhaps Barrett didn’t mention the wallet in his report on the day of the assassination because he had assumed that the DPD would have mentioned it to the media, and that the officers present at the Tippit murder scene would have mentioned it in their own reports. Hence, Barrett may have thought that there would be no point of him mentioning it in his own report. Alternatively, Barrett may have neglected to mention it if he had observed/heard one of the DPD Officers broadcast the discovery of the wallet with identification for Oswald and Hidell over the police radio at the Tippit murder scene. Although no such transmission exists in the transcripts of the DPD radio recordings, this transmission may have been removed from the recordings to hide the fact that Oswald had been framed for Tippit’s murder.

    Rather than simply speculating whether Barrett lied, or even misremembered where he was when Captain Westbrook asked him if he knew who Oswald and Hidell were, let’s consider all of the evidence which supports Barrett’s claim; evidence which Myers either omits, distorts, or buries in his endnotes.

    But first, it’s important to keep in mind that several disinformation shills such as Vincent Bugliosi and David Von Pein have argued that the wallet filmed by Ron Reiland belonged to Tippit. However, Myers explains that in the year 2012, he was shown photographs of Tippit’s wallet which; ” … clearly show that Tippit’s black billfold was different in style than the one depicted in the WFAA-TV film footage [by Ron Reiland]” (ibid). The bottom line is that Tippit’s wallet was definitely not the wallet which Reiland filmed. Myers also explains that in the year 2009, he interviewed reserve Sgt. Kenneth Croy, the first officer to arrive at the Tippit murder scene. Croy told Myers that after he arrived at the murder scene, he recovered Tippit’s revolver and a billfold (wallet) which he thought had seven different ID’s in it; but that none was for Oswald. In fact, Myers writes that Croy was “particularly adamant” that there was no identification for Oswald in the wallet (ibid). However, researcher Jones Harris told George Bailey that when he (Jones) interviewed Croy in 1990, Croy claimed that he didn’t examine the contents of the wallet (See George Bailey’s review of With Malice on his blog).

    Croy told Myers that a witness claimed that Tippit’s killer threw the wallet away as he fled. However, Myers explains that no witness has come forward saying that the killer discarded a wallet as he fled (With Malice, Chapter 9). But if Croy’s recollection was correct, then it would seem that Oswald wasn’t Tippit’s killer, as there was no identification for Oswald inside the wallet. Croy also told Myers that Tippit’s killer picked up Tippit’s revolver then threw it away; and that it was allegedly found with the wallet a short distance from the murder scene (ibid). But contrary to Croy’s recollection, when he testified before the Warren Commission, he said that; “There was a report that a cab driver [William Scoggins] had picked up Tippit’s gun and had left, presumably”, but made no mention of a witness who allegedly saw the killer toss Tippit’s revolver (WC Volume XII, page 202). In fact, it was allegedly Ted Callaway who had picked-up Tippit’s revolver from the ground, and then placed it on the hood of Tippit’s squad car (WC Volume III, page 354). Furthermore, T.F. Bowley claimed that he had taken Tippit’s gun from the hood of Tippit’s car, and placed it inside the car (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 14). Suffice it to say, Kenneth Croy’s forty six year old recollections are not particularly credible.

    In his endnotes, Myers explains that assassination researcher John Armstrong wrote in his book Harvey and Lee that when researcher Jones Harris interviewed Kenneth Croy in the year 2002, Croy told him that an unidentified civilian had handed him a wallet “later found to contain identification for Lee Harvey Oswald and Alex Hidell.” Myers then reminds his readers that Croy told him during his interview in the year 2009 that the wallet didn’t contain identification for Oswald. According to researcher George Bailey, Harris told him that when he interviewed FBI agent Robert Barrett, he asked Barrett why didn’t mention the wallet in his report. Harris claimed that Barrett replied; “What was the point Mr. Harris, after all, the man is dead” (See George Bailey’s review of With Malice on his blog). Although it is not clear from reading Bailey’s review whether Barrett was referring to Oswald or Tippit when he allegedly told Harris ” … after all, the man is dead”, if he was referring to Oswald, either Barrett was mistaken or lying (or perhaps Harris was lying), as Oswald was very much alive when Barrett wrote out his report on the day of the assassination (WCD 5, page 84). Suffice it to say, it would be foolish to consider what Harris told Bailey (including what Croy allegedly told Harris for that matter) as being unquestionably reliable.

    During a filmed interview, former FBI analyst Farris Rookstool claimed that Kenneth Croy informed him that he had recovered Oswald’s wallet at the murder scene. (See the interview of Rookstool.) Robert Barrett was also interviewed, and again insisted that he was asked about Oswald and Hidell at the Tippit murder scene. Croy’s claim to Rookstool that he recovered Oswald’s wallet contradicts what Croy allegedly told Myers in 2009. Given all of the contradictions between the statements which Croy allegedly made to the aforementioned researchers, this reviewer takes everything Croy allegedly had to say about the wallet with a grain of salt. Also, readers are encouraged to read through Lee Farley’s discussion of Croy’s credibility in the thread entitled Kenneth Hudson Croy at Greg Parker’s research forum.

    Myers explains to his readers that a number of people who were at the scene “in the first moments”, such as Jack Tatum, Ted Callaway, and ambulance attendant Eddie Kinsley and Clayton Butler, insisted that no wallet was found near Tippit’s body (With Malice, Chapter 9). However, as this reviewer has discussed previously, Tatum and Callaway should not be regarded as credible witnesses, as they were most likely coerced into identifying Oswald as the killer. With this mind, if a wallet containing identification for Oswald was really found at the Tippit murder scene (which would imply that Oswald was framed for the murder), then perhaps Callaway and Tatum were also coerced into saying that no wallet was found. As for Kinsley and Butler, Myers explains that the only thing they reported seeing lying near Tippit’s body was his revolver (ibid). Of course, this doesn’t discount the possibility that the wallet with identification for Oswald and Hidell may have been found on the right side of Tippit’s squad car.

    When Myers interviewed former DPD Officer Joe Mack Poe in 1996, Poe told him that to his knowledge, no wallet was found at the scene (ibid). However, given the controversy created by his missing marks from two of the spent shell casings recovered at the murder scene, Poe may only have said that to Myers to avoid stirring up another controversy. Myers also interviewed Poe’s partner, Leonard Jez, and he also claimed that he knew nothing about a wallet being found at the murder scene (ibid). However, in his endnotes, Myers explains that when Jez had attended a conference for JFK assassination researchers on November 20, 1999, he allegedly told researcher Martha Moyer that Oswald’s wallet had been found at the Tippit murder scene! According to Myers, Moyer told him in an email exchange in December, 2012, that she was listening to Jez as he was talking about his experiences at the Tippit murder scene during the conference banquet, when she asked him whose wallet was found there. Moyer also explained to Myers that she thought Jez said he heard the names Oswald and Hidell mentioned as the wallet was being examined at the scene. When Moyer asked Jez if he was certain that a wallet containing identification for Oswald was found at the murder scene, Jez told her (without smiling); “Missy, you can take it to the bank!”

    Myers attempts to discredit what Jez allegedly told Moyer by noting that during the morning of the conference when Jez was interviewed on camera, he claimed that he didn’t remember seeing a wallet. Myers then smugly writes that “more importantly”; Moyer’s account is at odds with what Jez told him (Myers) during his interview with him in 1996. Namely that he didn’t know anything about a wallet being found. However, Jez may have only said this to Myers, because at the time, Jez may not have known that James Hosty had published Barrett’s allegation that the wallet discovered in the vicinity of the murder scene contained identification for Oswald and Hidell in his book Assignment Oswald, and didn’t want to start a controversy over it. Furthermore, as researcher John Armstrong explains in his book, a confidential source who knows Jez claimed that Jez doesn’t want to be formally interviewed on the issue of the wallet, but he told her (the confidential source); “You can bet your life that was Oswald’s wallet.” (Armstrong, Harvey and Lee: How the CIA framed Oswald, pages 856 and 857). Revealingly, Myers doesn’t mention this information; even though he did mention the allegation that Croy was given a wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell which was on the same page of Armstrong’s book!

    If Jez didn’t want to be formally interviewed on the issue of the wallet, as the confidential source claims, then this could explain why Jez didn’t tell the audience at the JFK assassination conference that a wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell was examined at the Tippit murder scene. As for why he would later tell Martha Moyer about the wallet; perhaps after learning (sometime prior to the conference) that Barrett claimed a wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell was found in the vicinity of the murder scene, Jez felt comfortable enough to tell someone about it to get it off his chest. The reader should keep in mind that in the endnotes to his book, Myers wrote that after the first edition of his book was published in 1998, he gave Jez a copy of the book. Therefore, it would seem that Jez learned about Barrett’s allegation from reading Myers book. The end result is that two independent sources claimed that Jez told them it was Oswald’s wallet which was found at the murder scene, and although Jez referred to the wallet as belonging to Oswald, he naturally would have assumed this to be the case if he heard Oswald’s name mentioned as the contents of the wallet were being examined.

    In addition to Robert Barrett, Kenneth Croy, and Leonard Jez, evidence that the DPD were examining a wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell at the murder scene comes from Julia Postal, the Texas theater cashier. In her interview with the FBI on February 27, 1964, Postal claimed that the Officers who were arresting Oswald identified him to her by calling out his name (WCD 735, page 265). However, the official story is that Oswald’s wallet was removed from Oswald’s left hip pocket after he was taken out of the theater, and that the DPD didn’t broadcast over the radio that Oswald was missing from the TSBD after the superintendent, Roy Truly, had informed Captain Fritz of this fact. But if the DPD had discovered identification for Oswald in the wallet being examined at the Tippit murder scene with his photograph on it, then this would explain how they knew his name was Oswald.

    Myers acknowledges in his endnotes that Postal told the FBI that Oswald’s name was called out by the arresting officers. But Myers explains that in her interview with the USSS on December 3, 1963, she made no mention of the “onsite identification” (WCD 87, page 819). Myers also explains that in her affidavit to the DPD on December 4, 1963, Postal claimed that “Later on I found out that the man’s name, who the officers arrested at the Texas Theater, was Lee Harvey Oswald.” (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 21). Finally, Myers writes that when Postal testified before the Warren Commission, she explained that; ” … the officers were trying to hold on to Oswald – when I say ‘Oswald’, that man, because as I said, I didn’t know who he was at that time … ” (WC Volume VII, pages 12 and 13). Whilst all of this true, the fact that Postal didn’t inform the USSS that she heard Oswald’s name being called doesn’t actually contradict what she told the FBI.

    As for what Postal said in her affidavit to the DPD, Postal may have only claimed that she found out later on that Oswald was the man who was arrested, if the DPD had coerced her into saying so. Think about it. If the DPD wanted to hide evidence that a wallet containing identification for Oswald was found in the vicinity of the Tippit murder, they would coerce Postal into not mentioning that Oswald’s name was called out before his wallet was removed from his pocket. But then why would Postal inform the FBI that Oswald’s name was called out? In this reviewer’s opinion, it is entirely conceivable that Postal forgot that she was not to mention it when she was interviewed by the FBI. If the DPD had learned that she did tell the FBI, then they would have reminded her not to mention it when she testified before the Warren Commission. This could explain why she stated during her testimony that she didn’t know who he was at the time.

    Myers explains that after Oswald was arrested, Sgt. Gerald Hill was ” … the first person on record talking about Oswald’s wallet” (With Malice, Chapter 9). During a television interview recorded by NBC-TV, a reporter asked Hill; “What was his [Oswald’s] name on the billfold?” (WCE 2160). The reporter surely meant to ask Hill what the name inside the billfold was. Hill responded that it was Lee H. Oswald (ibid). Myers acknowledges this in his book, but omits that Hill never told the reporters that the name Hidell was also found inside the wallet. When Hill testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that after detective Paul Bentley removed Oswald’s wallet from his pants pocket, he called out Oswald’s name from the wallet (WC Volume VII, page 58). He went on to say that Bentley called out another name which he couldn’t remember, but that it was the same name (Hidell) that Oswald “bought the gun under”, and that Hidell sounded like the name her heard Bentley call out (ibid). But despite allegedly knowing at the time he was questioned by reporters that the name Hidell was inside Oswald’s wallet when Oswald was arrested, Hill only mentioned the name Oswald.

    Myers writes that when detective Paul Bentley was interviewed on the day following the assassination by WFAA-TV, he stated that he obtained Oswald’s identification from his wallet (With Malice, Chapter 9). However, what Myers omits is that Bentley was specifically asked during that interview what kind of identification Oswald had in his wallet. Bentley responded that he obtained Oswald’s name from a Dallas public Library card, and that he thought Oswald had a driver’s license, credit cards, and “things like that”, but made absolutely no mention of any identification for Hidell being discovered! (See the interview.) In fact, Bentley also made no mention of identification for Hidell being found in Oswald’s wallet in his arrest report to Chief Curry; the same report in which he wrote that he had obtained Oswald’s name from his wallet en route to police headquarters (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 4). When the FBI interviewed Bentley on June 11, 1964, he allegedly admitted that he removed a Selective Service System, Notice of Classification Card; and a United States Marine Corps Certificate of Service Card, both bearing the name Alek James Hidell from Oswald’s wallet (WCE 2011). Despite whether or not Paul Bentley actually informed the FBI that he did remove these cards from Oswald’s wallet, it is utterly inconceivable that Bentley would not remember one day following the assassination that he had found identification for Hidell inside of Oswald’s wallet.

    Myers informs his readers that detective Bob Carroll also testified before the Warren Commission that he recalled two names being mentioned inside the unmarked DPD car which took Oswald to Police headquarters (With Malice, Chapter 9). However, Myers does not inform his readers that Carroll made no mention of this in his arrest report to Chief Curry. In fact, none of the five Officers who were with Oswald inside the car; Bob Carroll, Kenneth Lyon, Gerald Hill, Paul Bentley, and Charles Walker mentioned anything about identification for a second name being found inside of Oswald’s wallet (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Items 4, 12, 23, 28, and 47). Though granted, the fact that none of the five officers mentioned in their reports that identification for a second name was found inside Oswald’s wallet, doesn’t necessarily mean that no identification for a second name was found.

    It is also noteworthy that Dallas DA Henry Wade didn’t mention that identification bearing the name Hidell was found inside of Oswald’s wallet during his press conferences on November 22 and 23, 1963. In fact, Wade first mentioned the Hidell name on Sunday, November 24, when he told reporters that Oswald had ordered the rifle allegedly used to assassinate President Kenney under that name (WCE 2168). According to Mark Lane’s testimony before the Warren Commission, Henry Wade’s office had released the name “A. Hidell” on November 23, 1963, after the FBI had “indicated” that Oswald had ordered the rifle under that name (WC Volume II, page 46). However, it would seem that Lane was in error, as Wade apparently didn’t tell reporters about the name Hidell until Sunday November 24, 1963. Myers does not point this out to his readers.

    On the day following the assassination, DPD chief Jesse Curry informed reporters that the FBI had the money order which Oswald allegedly used to order the rifle under the name “A. Hidell” (WCE 2145). However, Curry did not inform the reporters that identification for Hidell was found in Oswald’s wallet after he was arrested. In fact, Curry claimed that he didn’t know if Oswald had ever used the name Hidell as an alias before (ibid). Myers does not mention this to his readers. In that same press conference, Curry explained that this evidence would be shown to Oswald by Captain Will Fritz, but gave no indication that Fritz was already aware of the fact that the rifle was ordered using the name A. Hidell (ibid). When Fritz testified before the Warren Commission, Counsel Joseph Ball asked him if he had questioned Oswald on the day of the assassination about ” … this card which he [Oswald] had in his pocket with the name Alek Hidell?”, to which Fritz responded that he did (WC Volume IV, pages 221 and 222). When Chief Curry testified before the Warren Commission, he indicated that he had spoken to Captain Fritz on the day of the assassination following Oswald’s first interrogation (WC Volume IV, page 157).

    If identification for Hidell was found in Oswald’s wallet, then presumably, Fritz would have informed Curry of that fact. And if he did, it is inconceivable that Curry would not have informed the reporters that identification for the same name which Oswald allegedly used to order the rifle was not found in his wallet following his arrest. However, it’s possible that since a connection between the name Hidell and the money order for the rifle had not yet been established on the day of the assassination, Fritz may not have informed Curry that identification for Hidell was found in Oswald’s wallet. Therefore, it should not be assumed that just because Curry didn’t inform the reporters that identification for Hidell was found in Oswald’s wallet, Oswald actually didn’t have such identification in his wallet.

    The reader should keep in mind that in his report to Chief Jesse Curry, detective Paul Bentley claimed that he turned Oswald’s identification over to Lt. T.L Baker of the homicide and Robbery bureau (Dallas Municipal archives Box 2, Folder 7, Item 4). According to Myers, when he interviewed Lt. Baker in the year 1999, Baker told him that; “The Officers [who brought Oswald from the Texas Theater] handed [the wallet] to me and I left it on Captain Fritz’ office desk for just a couple of minutes. I asked that two officers stay with him in the interrogation room because all our Officers were out at the time. So then, I went back in Captain Fritz’ office and I started going through his billfold [wallet] and I came across two sets of identification -Hidell and Oswald” (With Malice, Chapter 9). Baker then went to explain that Oswald told him his real name was Oswald; and that he then turned the wallet over to Captain Fritz (ibid).

    What Myers doesn’t tell his readers is that, contrary to what Baker told him in 1999, Baker never once mentioned in his lengthy report to Chief Curry that there was identification for Hidell inside Oswald’s wallet (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 5, Folder 5, Item 4). Also, despite telling Myers that; “all our [homicide and Robbery bureau] Officers were out”, Baker wrote in his report that Oswald was being held inside the interrogation room by detectives Guy “Gus” Rose and Richard Stovall, both of whom were homicide detectives (ibid). As stated previously, detectives Rose and Stovall confirmed in their own report to Chief Curry that they were with Oswald; and confirmed this when they testified before the Warren Commission (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 1, Item 3), (WC Volume VII, pages 187 and 228).

    Myers writes; “Two officers remembered Oswald’s wallet and identification being in close proximity to the suspect shortly after his arrival at Police headquarters.” He then names Charles Walker and Jim Leavelle as the two officers, but never tells his readers that the two officers to whom Baker was referring to in his aforementioned interview were almost certainly Gus Rose and Richard Stovall; and that Baker was mistaken when he told Myers thirty six years later that all of the homicide and Robbery Bureau officers were “out” (With Malice, Chapter 9). The reader should keep in mind that although Rose and Stovall both testified that they found identification for Hidell inside of Oswald’s wallet when they spoke to him, they made no mention of any such identification being found in their report to Chief Curry (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 1, Item 3). When Rose testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that after Oswald was asked what his name was, he told him that it was Hidell (WC Volume VII, page 228).

    But when Richard Stovall (who was in the interrogation room with Oswald and Rose) testified before the Warren Commission, he stated that Oswald said his name was Lee Oswald ” … as well as I remember.” (ibid, page 187). Both men cannot be correct, and it is inconceivable that they could have confused one name for the other, as the two names sound nothing alike. It also makes no sense that Oswald would admit that he was Hidell if he had allegedly ordered the rifle used to assassinate the President under that name; let alone that he would be carrying identification for Hidell in his wallet on the day he allegedly used that rifle to murder the President. The reader should also keep in mind that both Rose and Stovall testified that they found a card inside Oswald’s wallet which said “A. Hidell” (WC Volume VII, pages 187 and 228). However, the Selective Service System, Notice of Classification Card; and the United States Marine Corps Certificate of Service Card which Oswald allegedly had inside of his wallet when arrested bore the name “Alek James Hidell”, and not “A. Hidell”

    When Officer Charles Walker testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that after he had escorted Oswald from the Texas theater; “I sat down there [in the interrogation room], and I had his pistol, and he had a card in there with a picture and the name A.J. Hidell on it.” (WC Volume VII, page 41). It is apparent that by “Pistol”, Walker actually meant wallet. Therefore, he either misspoke, or the transcription of his testimony was in error. Walker also stated that after he allegedly asked Oswald if Hidell was his real name, Oswald told him that it wasn’t (ibid). If both Walker and Richard Stovall were telling the truth, then it’s fairly obvious that Gus Rose was lying when he told the Warren Commission that Oswald said his name was Hidell. Myers acknowledges that Walker told the Warren Commission he had Oswald’s wallet, but also cites Walker’s interview with the HSCA, during which Walker stated that he remembered taking Oswald’s wallet out of his pants pocket, and that he had found a card inside it with the name Hidell on it (With Malice, Chapter 9).

    There can be little doubt that Walker was lying when he said that he had Oswald’s wallet, and that he found a card inside it with the name Hidell on it. First of all, as stated previously, detective Paul Bentley was interviewed on the day following the assassination by WFAA-TV, and stated that he obtained Oswald’s wallet en route to police headquarters; and verified this in his report to DPD Chief Jesse Curry. Secondly, Gerald Hill testified before the Warren Commission that it was Bentley who had removed Oswald’s wallet from his hip pocket (WC Volume VII, page 58). Thirdly, as even Myers indirectly acknowledges in his book, Walker made no mention of obtaining Oswald’s wallet in his own report to Chief Curry (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 47).

    The reader should also bear in mind that detective Gus Rose told the Warren Commission that two uniformed Officers had brought Oswald into the interrogation. However, it is an established fact that Charles Walker was the only uniformed Officer who brought Oswald into the interrogation room (WC Volume VII, page 228). Rose also stated that he didn’t know if the officer (Charles Walker) who brought Oswald into the interrogation room had Oswald’s wallet or not (ibid). However, during a television documentary, Rose claimed that it was he who had removed Oswald’s wallet from his pants pocket; despite making no such claim when he testified before the Warren Commission! (Dealey Plaza Echo, Volume 13, Issue 2, page 3). It should be readily apparent to any intellectually honest researcher that both Walker and Rose were lying; and that there is no good reason to believe either one of them when they claimed that Oswald had identification for Hidell in his wallet when he was arrested. Myers avoids Rose, but he simply cannot bring himself to admit that Walker was lying. In fact, how desperate must Myers be to cite both Walker’s claim that he had Oswald’s wallet; and the evidence which actually contradicts it in order to assure his readers that Oswald had identification for Hidell in his wallet? In this reviewer’s opinion, Myers desperation is almost humorous.

    When Myers interviewed Jim Leavelle in the year 1996, Leavelle claimed that Oswald’s wallet was still in the interrogation room when he allegedly arrived to question Oswald following his arrest (With Malice, Chapter 9). Leavelle claimed that he remembered seeing an identification card with Oswald’s name, but apparently, he couldn’t remember if there was any identification for Hidell (ibid). Once again, Myers neglects to inform his readers that Leavelle testified before the Warren Commission that he had not spoken to Oswald prior to the morning of Sunday November 24, 1963; and was therefore likely lying to Myers when he said that he had questioned Oswald (WC Volume VII, page 268). During his testimony, Leavelle claimed that when Oswald was interrogated on the morning of Sunday November 24, 1963, inspector Thomas Kelly of the USSS asked Oswald; “Well, isn’t it a fact when you were arrested you had an identification card with his [Hidell’s] name on it in your possession?” (ibid, page 267). According to Leavelle, Oswald admitted that he did, and that when inspector Kelly asked Oswald; “How do you explain that”, Oswald responded with words to the effect; “I don’t explain it.” (ibid, page 268). However, in his report on Oswald’s interrogation, inspector Kelly made no mention of asking Oswald about any identification card bearing the name Hidell (Warren report, Appendix XI: Reports relating to the interrogation of Lee Harvey Oswald at the Dallas Police department).

    In fact, U.S. Postal inspector Harry Holmes, who was also present at the Sunday morning interrogation, wrote in his own report on the interrogation that it was Captain Fritz who had asked Oswald about the Selective service card bearing the name Hidell (ibid). According to Holmes, Oswald indignantly told Fritz; “I’ve told all I’m going to about that card … . You have the card … . you know about it as much as I do” (ibid). When Holmes testified before the Warren Commission, he stated that when Captain Fritz asked Oswald about the card with the name Hidell on it, Oswald allegedly responded; “Now, I have told you all I am going to tell you about that card in my billfold … . You have the card yourself, and you know as much about it as I do.” (WC Volume VII, page 299). What’s noteworthy is that unlike in his interrogation report, Holmes claimed that Oswald admitted to having the card in his wallet.

    But if this were true, then surely Holmes would have mentioned it in his report. Furthermore, Oswald’s claim that Fritz knew as much about the card as he did implies (in so many words) that Oswald actually didn’t know anything about the card. With this mind, it is apparent to this reviewer that Holmes was lying when he told the Warren Commission that Oswald admitted to having the card in his wallet. But if the rest of what Holmes claimed concerning the Selective Service card bearing the name Hidell is true, then it is apparent that Jim Leavelle was lying when he testified that it was USSS inspector Thomas Kelly who had asked Oswald about the card, and was also lying when claimed that Oswald admitted to Kelly that he had it in his wallet. Not that it matters to Myers.

    But to gain a broader understanding of how the authorities lied about Oswald having the selective service card with the name Alek James Hidell in his wallet following his arrest, the reader should consider the following. According to the report by Lt. T.L. Baker to DPD Chief Curry, Oswald was interrogated twice on the day following the assassination. The first interrogation began at approximately 10:30 am, and the second at approximately 6:30 pm (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 5, Folder 5, Item 4). FBI agent James Bookhout and Inspector Thomas Kelly of the USSS were present during both interrogations (ibid). According to Bookhout’s report on the morning interrogation, Oswald admitted to Captain Fritz that he had carried this card in his wallet, but that he declined to stated that he wrote the signature of Hidell on the card (Warren report, Appendix XI: Reports relating to the interrogation of Lee Harvey Oswald at the Dallas Police department). Bookhout repeated this when he testified before the Warren Commission (WC Volume VII, page 310).

    In his own report concerning that interrogation, Thomas Kelly made no mention of Oswald admitting that he carried the card, stating instead that Oswald refused to discuss it after both Bookhout and Captain Fritz allegedly asked Oswald for an explanation of it (Warren report, Appendix XI: Reports relating to the interrogation of Lee Harvey Oswald at the Dallas Police department). If Oswald really did admit to carrying the card in his wallet, then surely Kelly would have no reason not to mention this in his report. On the other hand, if Fritz didn’t actually ask Oswald if he carried the card in his wallet, then both Bookhout and Kelly were lying in their reports. Either way, both men could not have been telling the truth.

    It is also noteworthy that in that same report, Clements omits that a United States Marine Corps Certificate of Service Card with the name Alek James Hidell was found inside Oswald’s wallet. This reviewer should also point out that although DPD detectives Walter E. Potts and B.L. Senkel mentioned in their own reports to chief Curry that upon arrival at the rooming house on 1026 North Beckley, they checked the registration book for a person named Hidell, what’s significant is that none of the officers who claimed to have handled Oswald’s wallet (Bentley, Walker, Rose, Stovall, and Baker) mentioned in their own reports that any identification bearing the name Hidell was found inside his wallet (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 9, Item 32), (ibid, Box 3, Folder 12, Item 1).

    Myers explains that ultimately, three wallets were catalogued by the FBI as being part of Oswald’s property (With Malice, Chapter 9). Myers lists them as a brown billfold, found in the residence of Ruth Paine (with whom Oswald’s wife Marina was living with at the time of the assassination) by the DPD, a red billfold also found by the DPD in the residence of Ruth Paine, and the wallet Oswald had in his left hip pocket when he was arrested at the Texas theater (ibid). In his endnotes, Myers states that a fourth wallet described as; “black plastic with an advertisement that reads: ‘Waggoner National Bank, Vernon, Texas.’”, which was given to Oswald by his mother Marguerite, was allegedly found on Marina Oswald’s bedroom dresser following the assassination. This wallet was catalogued by the USSS. Myers states that neither the brown or red billfolds discovered in the residence of Ruth Paine resembled the wallet being handled by DPD Officers at the Tippit murder scene (With Malice, Chapter 9). However, Myers also states that the wallet removed from Oswald’s left hip pocket following his arrest does resemble the wallet being examined at the Tippit murder scene (ibid).

    After obtaining permission from the national archives, Myers took photographs of the wallet Oswald had when he was arrested, and compared them with the film footage of the wallet being examined at the Tippit murder scene. According to Myers, both wallets were “apparently” made of leather, both had a photo picture sleeve area covered with a leather flap, both had a snap and a metal band mounted on the photo flap, and both had a zipper for the area holding paper money (ibid). Myers concludes that the wallet examined by the DPD is not the wallet which was removed from Oswald’s hip pocket following his arrest at the Texas Theater. According to Myers, the wallet which was examined at the Tippit murder scene is ” … thinner and considerably more worn than Oswald’s arrest wallet”, and the metal band on the wallet which was examined at the Tippit murder scene covers the leather flap “edge to edge”, whereas Oswald’ wallet has a metal band which is “shorter and centered” (ibid). Myers adds that the corners of the leather flap of the wallet which was examined at the Tippit murder scene are square, whereas the corners of the leather flap of Oswald’s are “rounded”; and that surface imperfections which are “visible” on the wallet examined at the Tippit murder scene are not seen on Oswald’s wallet (ibid).

    This reviewer is unable to tell by comparing film footage of the wallet examined at the Tippit murder scene to photographs of the wallet removed from Oswald’s left hip pocket, whether the former wallet is considerably more worn and has surface imperfections not seen on the latter wallet. However, it appears that Myers is correct in stating that the wallet examined at the Tippit murder scene is thinner, and has a different metal band and leather flap than Oswald’s wallet. Therefore, it is also this reviewer’s opinion that they are two different wallets. Myers states that Captain Fritz kept the wallet removed from Oswald’s left hip pocket until November 27, 1963, when he released it to FBI agent James Hosty (ibid). Indeed, there is a receipt for a billfold and for 16 cards and pictures taken from Oswald following his arrest (Dallas Municipal archives Box 15, Folder 2, Item 61). Myers writes that Hosty photographed Oswald’s wallet and other items prior to them being shipped to Washington for analysis (With Malice, Chapter 9). In his endnotes, Myers references this claim to pages 79 and 80 of Hosty’s book, Assignment Oswald. Myers explains that on the day following the assassination, Captain Fritz sent Oswald’s wallet and its contents to the DPD crime lab for photographs to be made (ibid). This is based on the crime scene search section form, which lists 16 miscellaneous pictures, Identification cards, and the wallet to be photographed (Dallas Municipal archives Box 7, Folder 2, Item 23).

    Although Myers writes that the wallet itself was not photographed, in his endnotes, he explains that a 1966 Police report describing evidence pertaining to the assassination states that the wallet was photographed. According to the report, the aforementioned items were brought to the DPD crime lab by homicide detective Richard Sims. However, Myers states that no photograph of the wallet was found ” … among any of the official records.” The fact that the DPD apparently took no photographs of the wallet, and the fact that Captain Fritz released the wallet to FBI agent James Hosty five days following the assassination, has led to speculation that perhaps the wallet which was given to Hosty was the one found in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene. Although this reviewer doesn’t dismiss that possibility, it seems unlikely that Fritz would actually give that wallet to the FBI if he wanted to conceal its existence.

    In this reviewer’s opinion, the weight of the evidence strongly suggests that the wallet which was examined by DPD Officers at the Tippit murder scene contained identification for Oswald and his alleged alias, Alek James Hidell. It is also this reviewer’s opinion that the wallet did not belong to Oswald, but was a mock-up wallet left behind by Tippit’s real killer in order to frame Oswald for the murder. When FBI agent Manning Clements testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that the Selective Service System, Notice of Classification Card with the name Alek James Hidell allegedly found in Oswald’s wallet following his arrest was “obviously fictitious”, as it had a photograph on it (WC Volume VII, page 321). Therefore, if Oswald had ordered the rifle he allegedly used to assassinate the President under the name Hidell, why would he be carrying in his wallet a fake card with a photograph of him (and with the name Hidell on it) on the day of the assassination, when the only purpose it served was to incriminate him?

    Myers speculates that perhaps it was either Ted Callaway’s or Williams Scoggins’ wallet the police were examining, as both men went after the killer with Tippit’s revolver, and then returned to the murder scene. But Myers admits that neither one of them claimed that their wallet was examined by the DPD (With Malice, Chapter 9). Myers states that if a wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell was really found; “It certainly would have been trumpeted by the world press that very afternoon, held up for the world to see by the Police that weekend, and served as prima facie evidence in the Warren Commission’s case against Lee Harvey Oswald.” (ibid). Myers then snidely remarks; “Even conspiracy theorists who fancy the wallet filmed by WFAA-TV as a plant, left behind by Tippit’s ‘real’ killer, would have to admit that police would have no reason to hold back the discovery of a discarded wallet with Oswald’s name in it the night of the assassination; and even less reason for the press to ignore such an important detail.” (ibid).

    In his blog post chastising Farris Rookstool (and others), Myers also snidely remarked that; “Anyone with a brain knows that if Oswald’s wallet had been found at the Tippit murder scene it would have been printed in every newspaper and broadcast on every radio and television station in America before the end of the day, Friday, November 22, 1963” (see the blog post entitled JFK Assassination Redux: The best and the worst of 50th Anniversary Coverage on Myer’s blog). By the same token, anyone with a brain, aside from perhaps Myers, must understand that after the President of the United States of America was arrogantly gunned down in full public view in broad daylight, Captain Fritz and the DPD would have been under a tremendous amount of pressure to find those responsible for the crime. If Fritz and the DPD were unable to find those responsible, they would undoubtedly have faced severe embarrassment. Therefore, they had to place the blame on someone! That someone was Lee Harvey Oswald. When Captain Fritz testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that after TSBD superintendent, Roy Truly, allegedly informed him that Oswald was missing from the building, he “immediately” left the TSBD as he ” … felt it important to hold that man [Oswald]” (WC Volume IV, page 206). Fritz also explained that he wanted to check to see if Oswald had a criminal record, and that after learning that Oswald was arrested for Tippit’s murder, he wanted to ” … prepare a real good case on the officer’s [Tippit’s] killing so we would have a case to hold him [Oswald] without bond while we investigated the President’s killing where we didn’t have so many witnesses” (ibid, page 207).

    Evidently, from the time he left the TSBD to the time he arrived at police headquarters, Captain Fritz had determined that Oswald was President Kennedy’s assassin. By implicating Oswald for Tippit’s murder, Fritz and the DPD could portray Oswald as a homicidal maniac who was not only capable of assassinating the President, but that he shot Tippit because he thought the DPD suspected he killed the President, and wanted to avoid being arrested. However, after learning that Oswald’s wallet was removed from his hip pocket following his arrest, and that a wallet bearing identification for Oswald was also discarded in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene, an experienced detective like Fritz would surely have realised that Oswald was framed for Tippit’s murder, and quite possibly for the President’s assassination as well. But Captain Fritz and the DPD needed Oswald to be found guilty for both crimes, so that they could then inform the public (and the entire world for that matter) that President Kennedy’s assassin was caught.

    Therefore, the decision was made that the wallet left behind to implicate Oswald for Tippit’s murder would be concealed. By the account of FBI agent Robert Barrett, the last known person who handled the discarded wallet was Captain W.R. Westbrook. It is with little doubt that as soon as Captain Westbrook arrived at Police headquarters, he would have turned over the discarded wallet to Captain Fritz, or to one of Fritz’s men to give it to him. Although Westbrook wrote in his report to DPD Chief Jesse Curry, and also informed the Warren Commission that he asked Oswald what his name was inside the Texas Theater following his arrest, he may have only stated this to cover up the fact that he already knew what his name might be from the contents of the discarded wallet (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 50), (WC Volume VII, page 113).

    But is there other evidence which supports the contention that the DPD were determined early on that Oswald was both President Kennedy’s assassin, and Tippit’s murderer? As it turns out, there is. When Johnny Brewer testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that one (or more) of the officers yelled out to Oswald; “Kill the President, will you.” (WC Volume VII, page 6). When Julia Postal testified before the Warren Commission, she claimed that she overheard an officer using the telephone inside the box office of the theater say “I think we have got our man on both accounts” (ibid, page 12). Although Postal only wrote in her affidavit to the DPD that some officer said; “I’m sure we’ve got the man that shot officer Tippit”, she may have been coerced into not making any statements that the DPD were determined from the time Oswald was arrested that he was also President Kennedy’s assassin; as they may have thought that people would suspect they would falsify evidence against Oswald to implicate him for the President’s assassination as they didn’t have evidence at the time that the Mannlicher Carcano rifle allegedly used to murder the President belonged to Oswald (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 21).

    Myers also spends several pages discussing the attempted murder of Tippit murder witness, Warren Reynolds. On the night of January 23, 1964; two days following his initial interview with the FBI, Reynolds was shot in the head by a .22 caliber rifle inside the basement of Johnny Reynolds Motor Company (WCD 897, page 417). As Myers explains, the man suspected of shooting Reynolds was Darrell Wayne Garner. (With Malice, Chapter 9). Garner had been at Johnny Reynolds Motor Company on Monday January 20, 1964, and had gotten “extremely upset” with Warren Reynolds when Reynolds refused to buy a 1957 Oldsmobile which Garner was trying to sell (WCD 897, page 418). Garner had boasted to his sister-in-law that he had shot Reynolds, but then claimed that he only said this because he wanted her to think that he was a “big shot” (ibid).

    Nancy Jane Mooney, who allegedly worked at Jack Ruby’s carousel club as a stripper, provided Garner an alibi for the time of the shooting; and apparently committed suicide by hanging herself with her toreador slacks in her jail cell on February 13, 1964, after she was arrested by the DPD for disturbing the peace (ibid). Although many researchers believe that Mooney was killed because she provided Garner an alibi for the time Reynolds was shot, an acquaintance of Mooney’s named William Grady Goode claimed that she had attempted suicide on two occasions (WCD 897, page 420). Readers should also keep in mind that the DPD had allegedly determined that a .22 caliber rifle removed from the home of Garner’s mother was not the rifle used to shoot Reynolds (ibid, page 419).

    Prior to being shot, Reynolds informed the FBI that although he believed Oswald was Tippit’s killer ” … he would hesitate to definitely identify Oswald as the individual [he observed].” (With Malice, Chapter 9). Reynolds suspected that he was shot because he had observed Tippit’s killer; a belief which is shared by many researchers (ibid). When Reynolds testified before the Warren Commission, he now claimed that in his own mind, Oswald was Tippit’s killer (ibid). However, given his belief that he was shot because he had observed Tippit’s killer, Reynolds’ latter claim to the Warren Commission should not be considered reliable; as he may have thought that he would be shot at again (and killed) if he didn’t identify Oswald as the killer.

    Many researchers, such as Robert Groden, have suggested that witness Domingo Benavides was also targeted by the conspirators because he failed to identify Oswald as Tippit’s killer. As Myers explains, in February, 1965, Edward (Eddie) Benavides, who was Domingo Benavides’ brother, was allegedly shot and killed in a Dallas tavern by accident; after he was caught in the middle of an argument inside the tavern (ibid). Many researchers have alleged that Edward Benavides was shot because he was mistaken for Domingo, and that he was shot in February, 1964. This then allegedly caused Domingo to tell the Warren Commission when he testified on April 2, 1964, that Tippit’s killer resembled Oswald.

    But in spite of the allegation that Eddie Benavides was shot in February, 1964, Dallas county death records show that Edward Benavides was shot and killed in February, 1965! (John McAdams’ website: The Not-So-Mysterious Death of Eddie Benavides). According to a Dallas Morning News article dated February 17, 1965, witnesses to Edward Benavides’ death claimed that he was not involved in the fight inside the bar, but was seeking cover when he was shot (ibid). Furthermore, if Domingo Benavides was truly fearful that he would be shot if he didn’t identify Oswald as Tippit’s killer, then why didn’t Benavides positively identify Oswald as the killer, instead of merely informing the Warren Commission that Oswald looked like the killer? (WC Volume VI, page 452).

    In his discussion of whether Edward Benavides was shot because he was mistaken for his brother, Myers reminds his readers that Benavides allegedly told his boss, Ted Callaway, that he didn’t actually see Tippit’s killer (With Malice, Chapter 9). But as this reviewer has explained previously, Myers conceals evidence from his readers which indicates that Callaway’s claim is not to be trusted. But despite his misrepresentation, Myers then has the smugness to write that: ” … this book shows that much of Benavides’ story, including his identification of the gunman, was embellished after the fact.” (ibid).

    The reader should keep in mind that John Berendt from Esquire magazine wrote that after Benavides had changed jobs, the man who replaced him in his job, and who allegedly resembled him, was also shot (Esquire, August, 1966). Berendt also wrote that, amongst other things; “Threats had become a daily occurrence”, and that Benavides’ father-in-law had also been shot at (ibid). However, it is not known whether any of this is related to the fact that Benavides had initially failed to positively identify Oswald as Tippit’s killer. But Myers mentions none of this.

    X: Profile of a killer

    We now come to what is probably the most asinine chapter of Myers’ book. Myers begins by explaining to his readers that the Tippit murder scene ” … clearly fits the profile of a disorganized murder” (With Malice, Chapter 10). He explains that a disorganized crime scene ” … is one in which the crime was committed suddenly and with no plan for deterring detection.” He then writes that; “In a disorganized crime scene, the victim is usually left in the position in which he was killed. No attempt is made to conceal the body. Fingerprints, footprints and physical evidence are usually left behind at the crime scene providing police with plenty of evidence” (ibid). He references these findings to an FBI law enforcement bulletin entitled; Crime Scene and Profile Characteristics of Organized and Disorganized Murders, and to a book by a forensic psychiatrist named John Marshall McDonald entitled; The Murderer and His Victim (published in 1986). Continuing on, Myers writes that; “Tippit was caught off guard by his murderer and was left in the street where he fell … The killer then fled, unloading his gun and dropping incriminating evidence [the spent shell casings] at the scene” (ibid). As discussed previously, if Oswald was framed for Tippit’s murder, then it only makes perfect sense that the real killer would leave behind the spent shell casings hoping that the authorities would be able to determine that they had been discarded from the revolver which Oswald allegedly had in his possession when he was arrested at the Texas Theater.

    Quoting Herbert Lutz, whose police work included extensive work in the field of criminal personality profiling, Myers writes; “Another clue to the murderer’s desperation is seen in the quickness with which the gunman reloads. This indicates that he feels he will need his weapon again almost immediately. In other words, he doesn’t feel the threat [to him] has been totally eliminated by the death of Officer Tippit.” (ibid). Of course, Lutz’s explanation to Myers ignores all of the evidence that Oswald was framed for Tippit’s murder. Once again referring to John Marshall McDonald’s book The Murderer and His Victim, Myers writes that; “The murderer of a disorganized crime scene was likely below average intelligence and a high school dropout. If he served in the armed forces he may have been discharged within a few months. He has a menial job and a poor work record. He does not own a car and may be unable to drive, so he rides a bicycle or relies on public transportation. He is a sloppy dresser and a loner of solitary interests such as watching television or reading books. He lives alone or with his parents. He may have a physical handicap or a speech impediment and has a poor self- image” (ibid).

    In yet another attempt to link Oswald to Tippit’s murder, Myers writes that like the above character profile, Oswald was a high school dropout, with an employment history of menial jobs ” … none of which lasted long”, who didn’t own a car and instead used public transportation “religiously”, had a small number of friends and was living alone at the time of the assassination (ibid). He also writes that Oswald took a hardship discharge from the U.S. Marines, had a “voracious appetite for reading”, but allegedly suffered from Dyslexia; which Myers believes was the cause of his reading, writing, and spelling problems (ibid). However, much of the above can be accounted for by Asperger’s syndrome; an autism spectrum disorder which was apparently first recognized in the United States as a separate disorder in 1994 (Cognitive -Behavioral Therapy for Adult Asperger Syndrome, by Valerie L. Gaus).

    Readers are encouraged to read through the research of Greg Parker on the likelihood that Oswald had Asperger’s Syndrome, and to spend some time researching Asperger’s syndrome themselves (Readers are also encouraged to read through researcher Allen Lowe’s comments concerning this discussion on Greg Parker’s research forum.) Although expert opinions on whether a person with Asperger’s syndrome is likely to commit a crime such as murder vary, in the book The Complete Guide to Asperger’s Syndrome, author Tony Attwood explains that; “Experience has indicated that people with Asperger’s Syndrome who have committed an offence have often been quick to confess and justify their actions” (this information can be found through a Google search of Attwood’s book). Although it will probably never be known with certainty whether Oswald had Asperger’s Syndrome, researchers should not solely rely on Myers’ narrow minded evaluation of Oswald’s habits and personality traits. But on the issue of Oswald’s so-called hardship discharge from the U.S. Marines, many researchers such as Jim DiEugenio have shown that it was nothing but an utter sham, so that it is truly laughable that Myers would use it to try and portray Oswald as a “disorganized” murderer.

    Like every supporter of the lone assassin theory before him, Myers believes that after Oswald left the TSBD building, he first attempted to return to the rooming house on 1026 North Beckley avenue (where he was allegedly living) by first boarding the bus driven by Cecil McWatters, but then riding in the cab driven by Cab driver William Whaley after McWatters’ bus allegedly became jammed in traffic (With Malice, Chapter 10). However, as researcher Lee Farley has thoroughly demonstrated, both the bus ride and cab ride stories were fabricated by the DPD (see threads entitled; Oswald and cab 36 and Oswald and bus 1213 on John Simkin’s education forum). Myers portrays Oswald as a man desperate to escape the TSBD following the assassination, but he nevertheless believes that Oswald stayed inside the rooming house for over two minutes after he allegedly returned there and retrieved “his” revolver (With Malice, Timetable of events). But if Oswald was a man desperate to avoid capture by the DPD, it seems likely that he would have left the rooming house in less than a minute.

    In a pathetic attempt to again portray Oswald as a guilty man to his readers, Myers writes; “Unlike an innocent man, Oswald did not cooperate with [the] police upon capture” (With Malice, Chapter 10). In this reviewer’s opinion, this statement is laughable. Does Myers honestly believe that after being assaulted by DPD Officers inside the Texas Theater, and after having his face forcibly covered by officer Charles Walkers’ hat outside the Theater (as shown in a photograph taken by Stuart Reed), and after the humiliation he faced with bystanders shouting out words such as “Kill the dirty ‘Sob’” (as detective Bob Carroll wrote in his report to Chief Jesse Curry), that Oswald (guilty or not) would be acting friendly towards the police? Myers then explains that when detective Jim Leavelle allegedly questioned Oswald shortly following his arrest, Leavelle asked him about shooting Tippit, to which Oswald allegedly remarked; “I didn’t shoot anybody” (ibid). According to Leavelle, Oswald’s remark that he didn’t shoot “anybody”, as opposed to saying that he didn’t shoot “the cop” or “that officer”, was an indication to him that Oswald knew that the DPD were also going to accuse him of assassinating the President (ibid). However, Myers once again fails to inform his readers that when Leavelle testified before the Warren Commission, he denied questioning Oswald prior to the morning of Sunday November 24, 1963; and that Leavelle was likely dissimulating when he claimed later on that he had questioned Oswald.

    Myers also spends several pages discussing the question of whether or not Oswald could have reached the Tippit murder scene from the rooming house at 1026 North Beckley in time to shoot Tippit. Although Myers places the time of Tippit’s murder at approximately 1:14.30 pm, as this reviewer has explained previously, Tippit was most likely shot at about 1:06 pm. Although Earlene Roberts told the Warren Commission that “Oswald” arrived at the rooming house circa 1:00 pm, and then left after spending “about 3 or 4 minutes” inside his room, when she was interviewed by KLIF radio on the afternoon of the assassination, she claimed that “Oswald” had “rushed in -and got a short gray coat and went on back out in a hurry” (WC Volume VI, page 438). Roberts’ claim suggests that “Oswald” did not spend about three to four minutes inside the rooming house, but had left much sooner. If the person whom Roberts thought was Oswald (entering the rooming house) was in fact Tippit’s actual murderer, it seems highly unlikely that he would spend over a minute inside the house before leaving to murder Tippit. Bear in mind that witnesses such as William Lawrence Smith and Jimmy Brewer claimed that Tippit’s killer was walking west along Tenth Street when he confronted Tippit, and that as this reviewer has explained previously, there is no credible evidence that Tippit’s killer was walking east.

    When the FBI timed how long it would have taken Oswald to have walked the assumed 0.8 mile (approximately 1.29 km) distance from the rooming house to the Tippit murder scene, they determined that it would have required twelve minutes to cover that distance (WCE 1987). However, as Myers more or less explains, the FBI had assumed that Tippit’s killer was initially walking east and not west along Tenth Street when he confronted Tippit (With Malice, Chapter 10). This reviewer will be discussing the issue of whether or not Oswald could have made it to the Tippit murder scene at about 1:06 pm to shoot Tippit in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill. It is also worth pointing out that Myers admits, in so many words, that no witnesses have ever come forward claiming that they had seen Oswald going towards the Tippit murder scene on foot (ibid).

    According to former assistant Dallas district attorney William F. Alexander, the DPD were unable to determine whether Oswald had travelled towards the Tippit murder scene by a bus or a cab from the rooming house (ibid). Myers then writes that; “If Oswald did hitch a ride, it apparently had to come from the private sector”, and that if an “innocent citizen” had given Oswald a lift, he or she would not have come forward and admitted this “for obvious reasons” (ibid). Indeed, if one or more persons had given Oswald a lift form the rooming house towards the Tippit murder scene; they almost certainly would have been embarrassed to publicly admit that they had given the alleged murderer of a police officer a lift. Besides, they may have feared that the DPD might charge them as accessories to Tippit’s murder. Myers also snidely remarks that; ” … it’s difficult to imagine any believable scenario that has conspirators picking up Oswald at his room, only to discharge him a short distance later” (ibid). First of all, this belief assumes that Oswald actually was living at the rooming house on 1026 North Beckley Avenue at the time of the assassination. Secondly, it dismisses the likelihood that DPD squad car 207 was outside the rooming house at the time “Oswald” was inside, just as Earlene Roberts told the FBI when they interviewed her on November 29, 1963, that it was (WCE 2781). As this reviewer will explain in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill, Hill had (by all likelihood) commandeered DPD squad car 207, and that he and another DPD Officer picked up Tippit’s murderer from the rooming house, and then dropped him off somewhere to the east of where Tippit was shot.

    But despite the question of whether or not Oswald could have made it on time to shoot Tippit, Myers writes that; ” … one thing is certain; eyewitness testimony and physical evidence proves Oswald’s presence on Tenth Street” (With Malice, Chapter 10). He then reminds his readers that Helen Markham, William Scoggins, Ted Callaway, Sam Guinyard, and the Davis sister-in-laws all identified Oswald as the killer from the DPD line-ups. But as this reviewer has previously explained, none of these identifications should be considered credible. Myers then adds that Warren Reynolds, Harold Russell, and B.M. “Pat” Patterson all subsequently identified Oswald as the man they observed from photographs. Although (as discussed previously) Reynolds informed the FBI when they interviewed him on January 21, 1964, that he thought Oswald was the man he observed coming down Patton street, but would hesitate to definitely identify Oswald as the man, his later “certainty” that it was Oswald should not be considered credible, as he informed the FBI that he thought he was shot on January 23, 1964, due to the fact that he had observed the gunman (WCE 2587). Therefore, he may have only claimed that Oswald was the man he observed out of fear of being shot again.

    Although Harold Russell “positively” identified Oswald as the man he observed when he was interviewed by the FBI on January 21, 1964, Russell’s “positive” identification may have been influenced by the fact he had seen Oswald’s face on television and in the Newspapers following his arrest for Tippit’s murder and the President’ assassination (WC Volume XXI, Russell exhibit A). There can be little doubt, as explained in this review, that Tippit’s actual killer would have resembled Oswald somewhat, and after seeing Oswald’s face on television and in the newspapers in connection with Tippit’s murder, Russell may have convinced himself that Oswald was indeed the man he observed. Whilst some researchers may believe that the two FBI agents who interviewed Russell fabricated Russell’s “positive” identification of Oswald as the man he observed, readers should keep in mind that those same two FBI agents also interviewed witness L.J. Lewis on the same day they interviewed Russell, and claimed that Lewis told them that he ” … would hesitate to state whether the individual [he observed] was identical with Oswald” (WC Volume XX, Lewis (L.J.) exhibit A).

    As for B.M. (Pat) Patterson, Myers omits that in his interview with the FBI dated August 25, 1964, Patterson claimed that he couldn’t recall being shown a photograph of Oswald when he was interviewed by the FBI on January 22, 1964 (WC Volume XXI, Patterson (B.M.) exhibit B). However, when Patterson was interviewed by the FBI on August 26, 1964, he was allegedly shown two photographs of Oswald, and claimed that Oswald was “positively and unquestionably” the same person he had observed coming down Patton Street (ibid). But as discussed previously, in that same interview, Patterson allegedly claimed that Oswald had stopped still and removed spent shell casings from the revolver; even though this is not what he claimed in his initial interview with the FBI (WC Volume XXI, Patterson (B.M.) exhibit A). Readers should also keep in mind that Warren Reynolds, Harold Russell, L.J. Lewis, Ted Callaway, and Sam Guinyard never claimed that they had seen Tippit’s killer stop still and then remove spent shell casings from the revolver. Therefore, Patterson’s interview with the FBI should not be considered credible. Even if we are to believe that Patterson had simply forgotten that he had been shown a photograph of Oswald (and identified him as the man he had observed) in his initial interview with the FBI, he may have been influenced in a similar way to Harold Russell into believing Oswald was the man he had observed.

    Mary Brock, who observed Tippit’s killer going north towards the parking lot behind the Texaco service station located on Jefferson Blvd., was interviewed by the FBI on January 21, 1964, and told them that the man who went past her was Oswald (WC Volume XIX, Brock (Mary) exhibit A). However, she may also have been influenced in a similar way to Harold Russell into believing Oswald was the man she observed. Readers should keep in mind that her husband, Robert Brock, who was with her and also observed Tippit’s killer head north towards the parking lot, failed to identify him as Oswald when he was interviewed by the FBI on the same date (WC Volume XIX, Brock (Robert) exhibit A). Another witness who later on claimed that Oswald was Tippit’s killer was William Arthur Smith. When the FBI interviewed Smith on December 12, 1963, he informed them that he was ” … too far away from the individual [who shot Tippit] to positively identify him” (WCD 205, page 243). When Smith testified before the Warren Commission, he now claimed that Oswald was Tippit’s killer. However, he also stated that he only saw the side and back of “Oswald” as he was running away (WC Volume VII, page 84). Furthermore, although Smith “identified” WCE 162 as the jacket the killer was wearing during his testimony, he told the FBI that the killer was wearing a “light brown” jacket (WCD 205, page 243). It seems apparent to this reviewer that Smith was coerced into identifying Oswald as the killer when he testified before the Warren Commission, and therefore, his claim that Oswald was Tippit’s killer should be taken with a grain of salt.

    Despite Murray Jackson’s ridiculous explanation for why he allegedly ordered Tippit to move into the central Oak Cliff area, the discovery of the wallet bearing identification for Oswald and Hidell in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene is strong evidence that Oswald was framed for Tippit’s murder, and that Tippit was lured to Tenth Street to be shot. Although several researchers are of the opinion that Tippit attempted to contact the DPD dispatchers at approximately 1:08 pm (per WCE 705) because he had just encountered a suspect, it seems highly unlikely that he did try to contact the dispatchers, as the last thing the conspirators would have wanted was for Tippit to become suspicious. As for how Tippit was lured to Tenth Street, this reviewer can only speculate that perhaps one of the DPD conspirators, such as Gerald Hill, told Tippit (for example) that he was to meet up with a confidential informant along Tenth Street who would be wearing a light gray jacket so that Tippit would be able to recognise him, and that the “informant” would have confidential information to give him “related” to a DPD investigation. Keep in mind that Helen Markham told the Warren Commission that Tippit was driving “real slow” along Tenth Street (WC Volume III, page 307). Similarly, William Scoggins told the Warren Commission that Tippit was driving “Not more that 10 or 12 miles [an] hour, I would say” (ibid, page 324). It is almost as if Tippit was looking to meet up with someone.

    After Tippit spotted his would be killer wearing the light gray jacket, he probably called him over through the cracked vent window of his squad car, and asked him if he was the man he was to meet up with. If the statements by Helen Markham and Jimmy Burt are to be believed, the killer then leaned down to talk to Tippit through the front right window with his hands on the door. In this reviewer’s opinion, the killer probably told Tippit to step outside of his car so that they could talk, and as Tippit got to the hood of the car, the killer shot him. Several witnesses such as T.F. Bowley and Ted Callaway claimed that Tippit’s gun was out of his holster when he was lying down on the ground (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 14), (WC Volume III, page 354). According to Murray Jackson, Tippit usually walked with his hand on the butt of his gun, “western style” (With Malice, Chapter 4). Therefore, if Tippit had seen his killer pull out the revolver used to kill him, he probably had enough time to pull out his own revolver before he was shot.

    In yet another apparent attempt to reinforce the notion that Oswald shot Tippit, Myers explains that Oswald’s brother Robert wrote in his book; Lee: A Portrait of Lee Harvey Oswald By his Brother, that Oswald had once made the remark “That dumb cop!” about a police officer who had given Robert a ticket for running a red light (With Malice, Chapter 10). Myers then explains that William Scoggins recalled hearing Tippit’s killer mutter the words “poor dumb cop” or “poor damn cop” as he went by his cab (ibid). Another explanation for why Tippit’s killer would have snidely muttered the words “poor dumb cop” is because he thought Tippit was “dumb” for unwittingly allowing himself to be lured to Tenth Street and then be shot.

    One mystery about Tippit’s murder which remains to be answered is why Tenth Street was chosen by the conspirators as the location to murder Tippit? First of all, we should keep in mind that several witnesses have indicated through their statements that Tippit was a frequent visitor to neighbourhood in which he was killed. When Jimmy Burt was interviewed by the FBI, he claimed that he recognised Tippit as an officer who frequented the neighbourhood, and that the residents of that area knew him by the name “friendly” (WCD 194, page 29). When Mark Lane interviewed Aquilla Clemmons, he asked her if she knew Tippit. Clemmons remarked; “Yes, I saw him … many times” (See Lane’s interview with Clemmons.) When William Scoggins testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that he wasn’t paying too much attention to Tippit as he went by his parked cab because he ” … just used to see him [Tippit] every day … ” (WC Volume III, page 325).

    Most interesting of all, Virginia Davis stated during her testimony that Tippit’s car was parked ” … between the hedge that marks the apartment house where he [Tippit] lives in and the house next door” (WC Volume VI, page 468). Although Tippit certainly didn’t live in that house, Davis’s statement clearly implies that Tippit (for some reason) was a frequent visitor to that particular house. Myers explains that when he interviewed Virginia Davis in 1997, she “recalled how nervous she was” when she testified before the Warren Commission, and that what she probably meant to say was that Tippit’s car was parked between the hedge that marked the apartment house where “we” were living in at the time of Tippit’s murder, and the house next door (With Malice, Chapter 9). She also allegedly told Myers that she had never known or seen Tippit prior to time he was shot (ibid).

    The reader should keep in mind that when Myers interviewed former DPD Officer Tommy Tilson in 1983, Tilson claimed that Tippit was having an affair with a waitress who lived in the house directly in front of where he was killed (ibid). However, Tilson is also well known for his ludicrous allegation that he had seen a man come down the grassy slope from the railroad tracks on the West side of the triple underpass, then throw something into the back seat of a black car, and then took off, with Tilson chasing after him (The Dallas Morning News, Ex-officer suspects he chased ‘2nd gun’, by Earl Golz). Although Tilson’s daughter, Judy Ladner, “verified” her father’s allegation, there is absolutely no independent corroboration for Tilson’s tale (ibid). Furthermore, there doesn’t appear to be any independent corroboration for Tilson’s claim that Tippit was having an affair with a waitress who allegedly lived in the house directly in front of where he was killed; and therefore, Tilson should not be considered a reliable witness.

    As for Virginia Davis, although this reviewer believes that she is a compromisedwitness, it is entirely possible that she did misspeak when she testified before the Warren Commission. Finally, whilst we may never know why Tippit was specifically lured to Tenth Street to be shot, it was nevertheless in close proximity to the rooming house in which Oswald was allegedly living in at the time of the assassination. Thus, the conspirators probably thought that with a wallet left behind bearing identification for Oswald and his alleged alias Hidell, the DPD would be convinced that Oswald could easily have traversed the distance from the rooming house to Tenth Street.

    Perhaps the most important question pertaining to Tippit’s murder is if Oswald didn’t shoot Tippit, then who did? Although shills such as David Von Pein believe that researchers who doubt that Oswald murdered Tippit are under an obligation to provide an answer to that question, the reality is that they are under no obligation whatsoever. Just consider that when a defendant appears in court in the U.S. for a crime, the presiding judge doesn’t tell the defence attorney(s) that he/she must find out who actually committed the crime, otherwise their client will be found guilty for the crime for which they have been charged. With that said (and as stated previously), in an upcoming essay, this reviewer will make the case that Tippit’s killer could have been Larry Crafard.

    Throughout this review, this reviewer has explained how Myers omits, distorts, or buries evidence in his endnotes which contradicts or undermines his contention that Lee Harvey Oswald shot and killed DPD Officer, J.D. Tippit. Although this reviewer doesn’t pretend to have explained/demonstrated beyond any doubt that Oswald didn’t shoot Tippit, this reviewer can state beyond any doubt that With Malice is not the definitive book on Tippit’s murder! Not by a long shot. It is a thoroughly deceptive book with a strong bias against any notion that someone other than Oswald killed Tippit. The truth is that many who praise the book e.g. Vince Bugliosi, David Von Pein, care not one iota about the truth behind Tippit’s murder or President Kennedy’s assassination. Their only interest is in upholding the myth that Oswald murdered both Tippit and the President. According to Von Pein; ” … Myers leaves no room here for even the slimmest sliver of doubt with regard to the question at hand: ‘Who Killed Officer Tippit?’” Recall, Von Pein is fond of calling hard working and honest researchers such as Jim DiEugenio “kooks”. He cannot bring himself to admit that Myers cherry picks evidence which bolsters the notion that Oswald shot Tippit. According to David Reitzes, Myers has; ” … done, in essence, what all the king’s horses and all the king’s men couldn’t: closed the Tippit case.” But as this reviewer has explained throughout this review, nothing could be further from the truth.

    September 27, this year, will mark the 50th anniversary of the day the Warren Report was released for the public to read. After all these years, it is time for people interested in learning the truth behind the tragic events of November 22, 1963, to stop paying attention to these disinformation shills.

    Acknowledgements

    I would like to thank researchers Jim DiEugenio, Greg Parker, Lee Farley, Steven Duffy, Martin Hay, and Robert Charles-Dunne for all the help and advice they have given me. With all of the disinformation out there concerning Tippit’s murder and President Kennedy’s assassination, even after 50 years, we need honest and hardworking researchers such as them more than ever.


    Go to Part 1

     

  • Greg Parker, The Korean War Intelligence “Failure”

    Greg Parker, The Korean War Intelligence “Failure”


    Introduction to the “Korean War” section of
    Lee Harvey Oswald’s Cold War, Vol. One

    The Korean War. The “forgotten” war. If war is ugly, this was Quasimodo without the redemptive heart.

    The “conflict,” as it is sometimes euphemistically called, likely helped test and refine germ warfare, and may have been started just for that purpose. It provided the raison d’etre for expanded programs and funding in the search for radiological weapons and enhanced interrogation and “mind control” techniques. Further, it provided the impetus for more research and development within the field of military hardware and munitions, and kept the money rolling in for military contractors.

    It should also be regarded as the starting point to our understanding of the Oswald “legend.” This legend began to be built when Oswald became a teenager and took to skipping school in New York City.

    The Chinese had developed a profile for potential defectors from the West and used this profile to target individual POWs for recruitment.

    The indicators being looked for were soldiers who had unstable childhoods, were raised in female dominated house-holds, had high IQs but low prospects, or had physical differences, an aversion to authority, a thirst for knowledge, or had been involved in activity that may result in some type of State sanction.

    By the time Oswald left for the USSR, he not only had the profile in New York court and school records, but also in his military records. And as if that wasn’t enough, he wore it ostentatiously. For our purposes however, we are not just looking at the Korean War from the micro as one mirror into Oswald (which it is) – we are also looking at the macro – how the war was used as a testing ground for biological warfare; how it was used to justify all manner of covert activity and experimentation, how it ramped up the profits of the war industry, saw the emergence of the US as Sheriff on the world stage and paved the way for the emergence of the Neoconservative movement.

    Without the Korean War, Oswald would have remained obscure, Kennedy may have lived to see a second term and the march toward Fascism would not be quite so bold.


    The Korean War Intelligence “Failure”

    The undeclared war began on June 25, 1950 when the North Korean Army crossed the 38th Parallel that divided the Soviet backed north from the US backed south.

    The official story has barely wavered. The aggressors were the North Koreans and the CIA had failed to foresee imminent danger. This obstinately obtuse view is encompassed best in a story broadcast by National Public Radio (NPR) to mark the 60th anniversary of the conflict. In fact, it takes a leaf out of the Warren Commission’s ode to vitiation (officially known as The President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy) by citing the very CIA documents to support its case that could and should have been used to destroy it.

    One clear example of this come from a CIA memo dated January 13, 1950 which states inter alia:

    Troop build-up. The continuing southward movement of the expanding Korean People’s Army toward the thirty-eighth parallel probably constitutes a defensive measure to offset the growing strength of the offensively minded South Korean Army. The influx of Chinese Communist trained troops… [is] further bolstered by the assignment of tanks and heavy field guns … [yet] despite [these increases] in North Korean military strength, the possibility of an invasion of South Korea is unlikely unless the North Korean forces can develop a clear cut superiority over the increasingly efficient South Korean Army.

    The CIA is then excused for this (supposed) completely dumbfounding and appallingly bad misreading of both North Korean intent and South Korean military superiority because it was “just three years old and lacked resources.” This excuse completely ignores the fact that the CIA had been granted greater autonomy (and probably resources) after its “failure” in Bogota. It also ignores the fact that despite being a mere three years old, the CIA was heavy with former OSS and SIS agents with many years of experience in the field. The fact is, there was no misreading. This was an accurate assessment.

    Not all scholars have held with the official line. According to Oliver Lee, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, the South Korean government provoked the north into a counter-attack in order to draw in the US and thus ensure the survival of the unpopular regime. Lee further pointed out there were no credible witnesses to North Koreans being the aggressors because, conveniently, UN observers had left the thirty-eighth parallel two days before the outbreak, and all but one of the five hundred US advisors had gone to Seoul for the weekend!

    Professor Lee listed the following circumstantial evidence in support of his thesis:

    1. Syngman Rhee’s government in Seoul was extremely unpopular and insecure, able to rule only by imposing upon South Korea “a cloud of terror that is probably unparalleled in the world,” according to a New York Times reporter on March 6, 1950. Despite the terror, Rhee’s party was dealt a disastrous defeat in the parliamentary election held four weeks before the war broke out. Rhee thus had a plausible motivation to start the war so as to create a totally new ball game.

    2. Rhee had several times announced his ambition to “regain” North Korea, boasting in January 1950, for example, that “in the new year we shall strive as one man to regain the lost territory.”

    3. Rhee received encouragement from certain US high officials, such as John Foster Dulles, who said in Seoul six days before the war broke out, “You are not alone. You will never be alone so long as you continue to play worthily your part in the great design of human freedom.”

    4. There had been a long pattern of South Korean incursion into North Korea. The official US Army history of the American Military Advisory Group in Korea, referring to the more than 400 engagements that had taken place along the 38th parallel in the second half of 1949, reports that “some of the bloodiest engagements were caused by South Korean units securing and preparing defensive positions that were either astride or north of the 38th parallel. This provoked violent actions by North Korean forces.”

    5. South Korean troops were reported by the Seoul government as having captured Haeju, one mile north of the parallel, on June 26. While we can accept this as an acknowledgement of their troop incursion into the north of the 38th parallel, such acceptance does not require us to believe their report as to the timing. They may well have made the capture one day earlier, touching off the counterattack.

    6. The two captured North Korean documents which allegedly prove that the North had started the war exist only in English, supposedly translated from the Korean original. Ostensibly titled “Reconnaissance Order No. 1” and “Operation Order No. 1,” the originals were never made public, nor have they subsequently ever been found.

    7. Rhee made a self-incriminating statement when he said to US News & World Report in August 1954, “We started this fight in the first place in the hope that the Communists would be destroyed.” Although the context of this statement was not explicitly military, certain American leaders knew enough about Rhee to understand what he meant, and indeed to be worried about his possible provocation of yet another Korean War.

    Meanwhile the Pentagon budget, which had not exceeded $60 billion between the years of 1947 and 1950, needed a crisis to get Congress to dig deeper into the treasury coffers. Undersecretary of State, Dean Acheson, who was among the first to nominate North Korea as the aggressors, put it succinctly when he said “Korea saved us.” The “us” cited by Acheson clearly didn’t include John or Joan Q. Citizen.

    After 1952, the Pentagon budget would never drop below $143 billion.

    The Korean “Conflict” was, in reality, a limited war that spun nearly unlimited gold for the War Machine, shifted goal posts at the UN and saw the US emerge as the world’s sheriff.

    It would also be the catalyst for Lee Harvey Oswald’s eventual involvement in covert interplay between the two Superpowers.

    Peace Talks and the Geneva Convention Failures

    Talk of a peace settlement began in July, 1951 and took two long years to reach an agreement – one sticking point being the disposition of what was nothing other than a tract of wasteland. For that, more casualties accrued than in the previous two years combined.

    Though a lack of trust and good faith no doubt, also played a major role in dragging the war out , the other major sticking point was an issue that was far more complex on political, moral, legal and propagandistic grounds. Some prisoners on both sides simply did not want to be repatriated. At the end of hostilities the problem was that Article 118 of the Geneva Convention did not allow a choice. Repatriation had been a thorny issue from the beginning with sick and wounded prisoners – who were covered by Articles 109 through 115 of the Convention – eligible to be treated in a neutral country or returned to their country of origin.

    Legitimately owning the “moral high ground” was a dystopian nightmare to the architects of this war. Owning it by means of psychological warfare was another matter entirely. There was, admittedly, not much new within that situation. What was new was one of the psy-op ploys used: accusations of brainwashing from the Americans against accusations of using germ-warfare from the opposite camp. Propaganda is best defined as ideas, facts, or allegations spread deliberately to further one’s cause or to damage an opposing cause. There is still debate as to whether either of these allegations had any basis in fact.

    Operation Little Switch

    The death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, seems to have been the catalyst for a change in policy by the North Koreans and China . On March 28, the respective Communist leaders not only agreed to an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners; but suggested that such an exchange may provide a platform for a resolution of all POW and cease-fire issues.

    Operation Little Switch took place between April 20 and May 3. It was not until May 25 that the residual disagreements were resolved through the creation of a UN sponsored Neutral Nations Repatriations Commission (NNRC). The Commission would be tasked with maintaining responsibility for non-repatriates over 60 days. The fate of those men would be determined during the course of the next few months by means of peer pressure or via a political conference that was allowed for under Agenda Item 4 of the July 27 Armistice Agreement.

    During Operation Little Switch, the Communists released 471 South Koreans, 149 Americans, 32 Britons, 15 Turks, 6 Colombians, 5 Australians, 2 Canadians, and one prisoner each from The Philippines, South Africa, Greece and The Netherlands. On the other side, the United Nations Command (UNC) returned 5,194 North Koreans. 1,030 Chinese, and 446 civilians. These were the men most in need of medical treatment. The figures corresponded to about a fifth of the total prisoners held by either side. Although accusations arose that the Communists only released those who were most likely to provide a positive portrayal of their captors, those released later in Operation Big Switch were certainly in overall better physical condition.

    Operation Big Switch

    Operation Big Switch was the operation which would see the remaining POWs sent home (save those who had not accepted repatriation). It began at 8:56 on the cool, dull morning of August 5, 1953 when Russian built trucks rattled and clunked to a halt in front of the triple arched gates at Panmunjom. The trucks were ferrying the first batch of UN POWs to leave the peninsula since Little Switch.

    It took until September 6 for the operation to be completed.

    The final disposition of this second group was that the North Koreans and Chinese handed over 12,773 to the UNC and another 359 to Indian Custodial Forces. Of the latter, 9 were returned to the UNC, 347 were returned to the Communists, 1 escaped and 2 were shipped to the NNRC based in India.

    The UNC meanwhile returned 75,773 POWs to the Communists and 22,604 to the Indian Custodial Forces. Of the latter, 629 were returned to the Communists, 21,820 were returned to the UNC, 13 escaped (or were otherwise missing), 38 died while in Indian custody, 18 remained in Indian custody and 86 were shipped off the NNRC .

    The unofficial war was now unofficially over. New CIA Director Allen Dulles called the armistice “one of the greatest psychological victories so far achieved by the free world against Communism.”

    Germ(ane) Warfare

    Unit 731 of the Imperial Japanese Army – officially titled the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army – was based in Harbin. Harbin was a city in what is now Northeast China, but was at that time the Japanese puppet state popularly known as Manchuria.

    The history of Unit 731 actually traces back to the poor performance of the medical system during the 1894 war with China. To remedy that, army doctors were shuttled off to Europe for intense training.

    By the commencement of the Russo-Japanese War, military medicine in Japan had reached a new pinnacle in performance, especially in dealing with the types of disease outbreaks common in war-time. Having reached that benchmark, Japan turned its thoughts to weaponizing chemicals and biological materials. This program, headed by bacteriologist and physician Shiro Ishii, accelerated after Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933 while deep in dispute over its invasion of Manchuria. The invasion had been predicated on a false flag operation, and marked the beginning of the end for the toothless League.

    By the time of World War II, the unit was well versed in the art of black medical experimentation. The unit’s activities included infecting men, women and children with various diseases and then performing vivisections upon them; performing amputations on live victims to study the effects of blood loss; and removing parts of organs such as brain, liver and lungs from other living subjects.

    Japan’s entry into the war opened up opportunities for Unit 731 to exploit even more diverse groups while offering unbridled rein to the sickening imagination of Ishii and his team. Such were the atrocities and tortures that thousands of victims no doubt welcomed death when it was finally granted.

    Among the many selected to take part in this perverse lottery were 1500 American, British and Australian POWs who were shipped to Manchuria and infected with everything from bubonic plague to typhoid. In one 5 day period alone, 186 deaths occurred. The nature of the deaths however, was suppressed by the Allies.

    The main aim of the exercise was to ascertain which strains of which diseases were the most virulent for use in war.

    In August, 1945, the staff of Unit 731 fled Manchuria to escape the invading Russian Army. The Japanese homeland however provided only a temporary haven, with formal surrender a looming and forlorn certainty. The surrender finally arrived on September 2nd.

    The International Military Tribunal for the Far East held its war trials in Tokyo, commencing April 29, 1946. High on the agenda was the prosecution of Ishhi and others responsible for the atrocities of Unit 731, but the Tribunal was blindsided by General McArthur and his Chief of Intelligence, Charles Willoughby. McArthur and Willoughby’s idea of interrogating Ishhi involved convivial dinner parties at the home of the germ warfare specialist. As soon as it became apparent that Ishii would not be prosecuted (due in no small measure to the withholding of evidence gathered by MacArthur’s men), MacArthur conspired to have him and others granted blanket immunity in return for their full cooperation. The boys from Fort Detrick Biological Warfare Laboratories quickly moved in. It was by now 1948 and the US was not only desperate to have the data for itself, it was equally desperate to keep it out of other hands; allies and new Cold War enemies alike.

    The Tribunal was not the end of court action. The Soviet Union commenced War Crimes Trials in 1949, and the trials must have given MacArthur and Willoughby ulcers when a court sitting in Siberia took testimony to the effect that Unit 731 had tried out lethal germs against American POWs. The POW experimentation had been undertaken “to ascertain the degree of vulnerability of the American army to different combat infections.” In any event, MacArthur wasted no time in issuing a denial, letting the press know that “there are no known cases in which Japanese used American prisoners in germ warfare experiments.” It was a lie of significant proportions, but one that was necessary in MacArthur’s eyes given the deal that had been struck with Ishhi, and the need to conceal anything that could lead to uncomfortable questions being asked.

    The Japanese germ warfare materials collected by Unit 731 now complimented what Fort Detrick had produced.

    The US was about to become akin to an urban teenage street gang (straight out of a Hollywood short, circa 1950) with a newly acquired baseball bat and glove. Someone just needed to find a rival gang and get the game started.

    Six months later, the Korean War began.

    In the meantime, the US press was doing what it does best; preparing the citizenry to accept what was coming. This work started just prior to the Tokyo War Crime Trials.

    March 12, 1949. UP reports Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal as stating that the US “leads the world in germ warfare research;” that germ weapons are “definitely not the fantastic killers they have been labelled,” but could be “a cheap and most important means of warfare.” Major General Alden H Wyatt, head of the Army Chemical Corp reiterates that “potentially” the spreading of disease germs “is a most important means of warfare.” It is stressed that the US program is aimed “primarily” at defense and that the US is quite prepared to strike back with biological weapons if other nations should attack with them.

    May 27, 1949. UP reports an assertion by the former chief of the air-borne infection project at the US biological warfare headquarters at Camp Detrick, Dr. Theordor Rosebery. Dr. Rosebery states that the practicality of germ warfare cannot be proven unless it is used in war. He also warns that “defense against BW (biological weapons) as a whole is pitiably weak, so weak that none of us, civilian or military, can find much comfort in its prospect.”

    July 21, 1949. AP reports that the army has asked Congress for an extra 3.3 million to improve both the “defensive and offensive aspects of war with biological weapons.”

    September 10, 1949. AP reports Director General of the World Health Organization, Dr. Brock Chisolm as declaring that biological weapons would make “large armies, navies and air forces” obsolete along with the atomic bomb. Dr. Chisolm also claims that scientists have found “one substance so deadly that seven ounces, properly distributed, could kill the people of the world within six hours.” He does not name the substance.

    June 25, 1950. The undeclared war in Korea begins.

    July 26, 1950. UP reports that “defensive measures against germ warfare are being drawn up.” The scientist being quoted is familiar with the program and adds “that they include no new rays or other ‘magic’ means of coping with germs. Instead, the measures would consist of “training health officers in known medical and public health practices – but on an emergency basis.”

    November 3, 1950. AP reports that the armed forces are looking ahead to wars fought with radiological poison weapons, germ warfare, guided missiles and special devices to make maps of enemy terrain under cover of night or clouds.

    December 28, 1950. UP reports that the Federal Government is urging “civil defense workersto prepare for nerve gas and germ warfare attacks upon American Cities.” The story adds that a manual issued by the Health Resources division states that automatic detection devices are essential for adequate protection” but ominously concludes such devices are not available at a price which would make their purchase and use for civil defense practical.”

    There is a clear design in these stories. It goes like this: the US has the most advanced germ warfare program in the world. It wants to use this program in a defensive manner only, but is carefully leaving the door ajar for a first strike option. We also learn that the program needs to be evaluated under combat conditions. Next, we are treated to the prospect that the US will probably soon suffer a germ warfare attack – followed by the awful truth that civil defense is inadequately trained and equipped to cope with such an attack if it ever occurs. Once these seeds have been planted, the reader is left to conclude for themselves that a pre-emptive strike is the only viable option.

    But first things first. A limited land war was needed to test Fort Detrick’s arsenal.

    Allegations from the Communists that the UNC was using biological weapons against North Korea began in March 1951 and grew into a crescendo of specific charges by February the following year. The charges indicated that US forces had been “systematically scattering large quantities of bacteria-carrying insects by aircraft in order to disseminate infectious diseases over our front line positions and rear. Bacteriological tests show that these insects scattered by the aggressors on the positions of our troops and in our rear are infected with plague, cholera and the germs of other infectious diseases.”

    In response, General Ridgway stood before Congress and emphatically denied the allegations. Elsewhere, the counterclaim was being made that North Korea and China were engaging in propaganda, and that they could even be using the accusations as an excuse to launch their own bioweapons offensive.

    The Red Cross offered to investigate, if both sides agreed.

    Both sides duly agreed.

    The Red Cross put together a Blue Ribbon Panel.

    The Red Cross Blue Ribbon Panel duly found no substance to the allegations.

    The Reds duly accused the Red Cross of having a pro-West bias.

    And so it goes.

    The specific allegations expanded into claims of attacks on animals and crops, and by September, the Reds had commissioned their own investigation through the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) – a body organized by participants at the Nuremburg Trials. The IADL was later accused of being a Communist Front.

    The IADL issued two reports during March and April, 1952. Both reports read like indictments, with the second report concluding, “We consider that the facts reported above constitute an act of aggression committed by the United States, an act of genocide, and a particularly odious crime against humanity. It indeed hangs over the whole world as an extremely grave menace, the limits and consequences of which cannot be foreseen.”

    If the Red Cross had a pro-West bias, the bias charge could equally be levelled against the IADL – not to mention all other organizations that had been commissioned by either side. It was a courtroom drama on a grand scale replete with dueling experts.

    Time thankfully has the grace to allow some detachment – enough to permit a determination based on good faith rather than partisanship, and any conclusion about these events must now take into account the very strong circumstantial case against the US. The case includes the planning of covert actions for conducting biological warfare. It includes the actual production of disease-laden insects, and the subsequent discovery of such insects in the war zone. It includes the preparation of disease-laden feathers and the discovery of such feathers around exploded bombs in the war zone. It also includes the manufacture of specific weapons and delivery systems and the discovery of same in the war zone. Finally, it includes America’s secreting away of Japan’s biological warfare secrets.

    The discovery of all this physical evidence underlines the means. The motive, as already explored, can be found in the alleged need for the US to test such weapons in combat conditions. The opportunity came via the manufacturing of a pretext for war and the railroading of the United Nations.

    The Great Un(brain)washed

    On December 26, 1948, Cardinal József Mindszenty of Hungary was arrested and charged with treason and conspiracy. The specifics included theft of the Crown Jewels, and plotting the eradication of Communism through aiding America to start World War III. The payoff for the Cardinal would be political power in his homeland should America prevail.

    A few days prior to being arrested, the Cardinal wrote a very prescient letter to his Bishops advising that if he should resign or confess, and even if his signature was appended to any such declarations, they should know that it was the result of “human frailty” and he declared it “null and void in advance.”

    A few days after the arrest, but still weeks out from the trial and acting on instructions, one of his clergy issued a document stating that the Cardinal feared that the Communists would use the drug Actedron on him. Actedron, the document claimed, had been used in previous trials to break morale and extract bogus confessions.

    The release of this document caused a world-wide furore.

    The broth was starting to bubble.

    Actedron is an amphetamine and used historically as an appetite suppressant. More recently, it has been prescribed to sufferers of ADHD.

    The Security Research Section of the CIA was internally admitting that though they saw the drug as having some potential in interrogations, the drug alone could not produce the results being credited to it in relation to what would later become known later as “mind control.”

    News of US pilots confessing to dropping deadly germs behind enemy lines broke in early May, 1952 when it was reported that 1st Lt. Kenneth L. Enoch and 1st Lt. John Quinn had made certain admissions which had been taped and broadcast over Radio Peiping (the previous name for Beijing). Among the details supplied by Enoch, whose B-26 had been shot down on January 13, was that the undetonated bombs he had dropped would be called “duds.” His confession is now kept in the grandiloquently titled “Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum” in Pyongyang.

    That story was followed by one which told of five British businessmen who had been to a trade conference in Moscow before moving on to Peiping to discuss trade expansion with China. The five reported that they had been played the taped confessions of four American POWs and believed that the confessions warranted being taken seriously.

    The immediate response to the charges was typified by Dean Acheson who dismissed the confessions as having been “dictated by Red propagandists,” without stating outright that they were fake.

    Experience tells us that cover stories come in phases as need may, from time to time, dictate. That was phase one. Phase two was claiming that collaborators had been brainwashed. Phase three was blaming the upbringing and lack of discipline of the soldiers and also in not having any unified and ingrained American doctrine on liberty to help withstand Communist indoctrination.

    The term “brainwashing” was coined in September 1950 by Edward Hunter, a CIA operative with non-official cover as a journalist. Hunter used the term to describe how China was forcing its citizens into joining the Communist Party, and claimed that the use of drugs and hypnotism were paramount to success.

    This was a distortion of the historical truth , but with Cardinal Mindszenty’s confessions still fresh in the public mind, alongside the claimed use of drugs, it stuck, as it was no doubt meant to.

    The POW Homecoming

    Each returned prisoner was interviewed during the course of the trip home about their symptoms and experiences. Chief among the POW’s symptoms were a lack of spontaneity, flat affect, apathy, retardation and depression. Incongruously, many also exhibited signs of tenseness, restlessness and suspicion of their surroundings.

    Other systems in combination could have been associated with chronic physical and mental disease, or vitamin deficiency.

    Once on home soil they became subjected to several studies (including at least one lasting a number of years). Some of the studies were aimed ostensibly at searching for answers as to what exactly happened in Korea and the short and long term effects thereof. Others were aimed at profiling those who collaborated as a means of having the ability to weed out potential turncoats at the time of enlistment, and putting in place such public policies that might produce a better, more resilient fighting force. Public reaction meanwhile, was being manipulated in whatever direction the winds (along with sundry windbags) were blowing. History is not driven by individuals acting alone, or by conspiracy or coincidence, but a combination of those as end products (or sometimes mere by-products) of philosophies, agendas, policies and contingencies which colloquially and collectively, these may all come under the heading of “mind-sets,” The repatriated prisoners were thus put through three phases of thematic nuance as various philosophies, agendas, policies and contingencies were deployed in the fight for control over the POW “reality.” First came the “atrocities” theme, following by the “brainwashing” theme, and ending at the more tenaciously entrenched theme of blaming the victims for lacking discipline, moral compasses and patriotism.

    Each theme was responded to as if true.

    The fear that these men had been victims of atrocities led to hero homecomings. The fear of brainwashing led to trainees at Stead AFB, Nevada being forced to spend hours in a dark hole up to their shoulders in water, fed only raw spaghetti and uncooked spinach, given electric shocks and being verbally abused – all to make them capable of withstanding such treatment, if captured. The Navy conducted similar training at Camp Mackall in North Carolina. Additionally, it offered up excuses to expand “mind control” programs at home (yes indeed, there was purportedly a “mind control” gap). Finally, the fear that American men were soft led to the Military Code of Conduct which had to be signed by all personnel. Various other programs involving forms of indoctrination in “Americanism” also soon appeared.

    In short, symptoms which should have been associated with chronic physical and mental illness and vitamin deficiencies, were instead being attributed to brainwashing or moral decay (if not complete moral turpitude) on the home-front.

    Militant Liberty & the Code of Conduct

    To those who blamed the POW situation on the “softness” of American soldiers, the response was to seek a strengthening through a deeper understanding of American values. Militant Liberty was the 1954 brainchild of John C Broger, President of the Far East Broadcasting Company (FEBC) and consultant to the Joint Subsidiary Activities Division in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What the proposal boiled down to was the use of Chinese indoctrination methods through rigid programs of re-education and proselytization. The whole shebang was being sponsored by Abraham Vereide and his secretive organization known as “The Fellowship.”

    The program imploded barely a year into its mission amid criticism that it breached the line between military and civilian life through politicization of the troops. Despite this, it did manage to insinuate itself into Hollywood scripts for movies like John Ford’s Wings of Eagles starring the All-American epitome of Rugged Individualism, John Wayne, and Cecil B. DeMille’s The Ten Commandments which according to author Professor Alan Nadel, attempted to equate “God’s perspective with American global interests.” In short, it was produced with the aim of gaining acceptance for the doctrine of Manifest Destiny through the use of cinema magic and psychology. Put another way, it was yet more of what author Jeff Sharlet termed Vereide’s “bastardized Calvinism” at work.

    Nor did it hurt Broger’s career . In 1956 he was made Deputy Director of the Directorate for Armed Forces Information and Education within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) before taking over as Director and holding that position until 1984.

    Broger’s stint as the Pentagon communications Czar was not without controversy. In 1977, Jack Anderson reported that Broger had once used his position to arrange a two-day seminar in “Christian Counseling,” had military techs record the entire event, then packaged the tapes and sold them commercially through the National Association of Evangelicals at $34.95 a set. Meanwhile, internal complaints of mismanagement, malfeasance, corruption and conflicts of interest abounded until finally, the Defense Department’s general counsel and Air Force Special Investigators were called in. Their findings were forwarded to the Justice Department which found no evidence of criminal culpability. According to Anderson however, the reason no evidence was found was that the most damaging facts were omitted from the submitted report. This document should be tagged “Exhibit A” and presented to anyone holding to the fantasy that official reports are sacrosanct.

    Anderson also gave some insights into Broger’s background and mindset. His world was black and white – populated only by “good guys” and “bad guys.” The “good guys” were “conservatives, anti-Communists and Christian fundamentalists who believe in the God-given American right to make a buck.” The “bad guys” were, unsurprisingly, “liberals, hippies and Communists.” Anderson also described Broger’s old broadcasts with the FEBC as “right-wing anti-Communist propaganda to alien lands in the guise of Evangelical Christianity.”

    Meanwhile, as the debate over Militant Liberty was being waged, the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War was tasked with drafting a code which would outline US POW obligations while augmenting the Geneva Convention on their treatment. It also investigated the extent of treasonable conduct which had occurred and found that it had been exaggerated. This should have negated the need for such a code, but the POW “scandal” was going to be spun into programs addressing the nation’s ideological needs, come hell or high water.

    The Code was signed into law through Executive Order 10631 on August 17, 1955. Evangelicals determined to refashion the American gestalt by promotion of a civil-military-religious Menage a trois were definitely on a roll.

    One of those most responsible for bringing in the code was Dr. Winfred Overholser. Overholser had testified at the inquiry on behalf of Colonel Frank Schwable, another POW who had confessed to the use of biological weapons. The doctor recommended to the inquiry that the military do more to “condition our people to resist communist brainwashing.”

    After facing possible execution for cowardice, Schwable was instead awarded the Legion of Merit and given a desk job at the Pentagon.

    Dr. Overholser will re-enter our narrative soon.

    Fred Korth & the Korean War

    Korth was brought to Washington in March 1951 by Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace. The two were old acquaintances, having served together in Air Transport Command during WWII. Pace offered, and Korth accepted, the position of Deputy Counsel for the Army. This did not last long. In yet another response to the Korean POW situation, the position of Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) had been created, and on Pace’s recommendation, Korth was appointed by Truman in May, 1952.

    The following year, with a newly inaugurated Republican president, Pace and Korth were back doing business in the Lone Star State. Pace had been appointed CEO at General Dynamics Corp and Korth returned to law, while also taking the role of vice president of Continental National Bank in Fort Worth. It is important to note however, that his services were retained as a consultant by the new Secretary of the Army, and this consultancy continued up until 1960.


    NOTES

    1. The Korean War, June 1950 – July 1953 Introductory Overview, Naval History & Heritage @ history.navy.mil

    2. CIA Files Show US Blindsided By Korean War, by Tom Gjelten, NPR broadcast transcript

    3. South Korea Likely Provoked War with North by Oliver Lee, Star-Bulletin, June 24, 1994

    4. Ibid

    5. US Military Spending In The Cold War Era: Opportunity Costs, Foreign Crises, and Domestic Constraints, by Robert Higgs, Professor of Political Economy, Lafayette College

    6. CenturyChina.com, Korean War FAQ

    7. “Long Delay on Peace: Korea talks ‘might take four weeks,’” AAP report, The Courier-Mail, July 10, 1951, p4 “The United States has not ruled out the possibility that the talks may fail altogether. In the meantime United Nations’ forces will continue to press their field operations against the enemy. There is much uneasiness that should the talks fail, the Communists would have brought time to mount a smashing counter-offensive.”

    8. ABC-CLIO History and Headlines: The Korean War 60th Anniversary: Remembering a “Forgotten” Conflict – Operations Big Switch/ Little Switch by Clayton D. Laurie

    9. Ibid

    10. Time Magazine, August 17, 1953 article, “Korea: Big Switch”

    11. A Substitute for Victory: Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) by Rosemary Foot, p191

    12. Military Medicine: From Ancient Times to the 21st Century, by Jack E McCallum, p337

    13. The Pariah Files: 25 Dark Secrets You’re Not Supposed to Know by Philip Rife, p 134

    14. The Scramble for Asia: US Military Power in the Aftermath of the Pacific War, by Marc Gallicchio, p 157

    15. Russians Press Germ War Trial, UP wire story, Dec 27, 1949

    16. Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology and History, Volume 1, edited by Eric A. Croddy, James J. Wirtz , p 175

    17. The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea, by Stephen Lyon Endicott and Edward Lagerman, p195

    18. “The Adelaide Advertiser,” Catholic Church News, p9, February 12, 1949 and derived from the breaking article in The Tablet published on January 1.

    19. “China Reds Broadcast Germ Warfare ‘Confessions,’” UP report appearing in the Oxnard Press-Courier, May 5, 1952, p1

    20. Acheson Attacks Red Germ Warfare Charge, AP report appearing in The News & Courier, May 8, 1952, p1

    21. AP Report, Claims Airmen were Tortured to “Confess,” Oct 23, 1952. The story claims information was gathered in Indo-China, Hong Kong, India and elsewhere that the airmen had been “brainwashed” in the same way as Mindszenty and others using a combination of prolonged questioning, sleep deprivation, threats to friends and relatives, drugs and perhaps hypnosis.

    22. When the Army Debunks the Army: a legend of the Korean War by William Peters (Encounter Magazine, July 1960)

    23. AP Report, “Yanks Brainwashed in Survival Training,” Spokane Daily Chronicle, p55, September 8, 1955

    24. Military Medicine, vol. 167, November, 2002, Psychiatry in the Korean War, p902

    25. The Family: Power, Politics and Fundamentalism’s Shadow Elite, by Jeff Sharlett, pp201-202

    26. The US Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War: The State-Private Network, edited by Helen Laville, Hugh Wilford,

    27. The Nevada Daily Mail, “Communication Czar Uses Pentagon Post,” by Jack Anderson with Joe Spear, p18, Jan 12, 1977

    28. International Society for Military Ethics article, University of Notre Dame. Article, “Evangelicals in the Military and the Code of Conduct,” by Lori L. Bogle

    29. The Pentagon’s Battle for the American Mind: The Early Cold War, by Lori L. Bogle, p131.

    30. American Torture: from the Cold War to Abu Ghraib and Beyond, by Michael Otterman, p35

    31. Act of Retribution: The Military-Industrial-Intelligence Establishment and the Conspiracy to Assassinate President John F Kennedy, by J. P. Phillips, p343

    32. Texas Bar Journal, 1962, vol. 25, p201

    33. Current Biography Yearbook, 1963, by Charles Moritz, p244

  • Dale Myers, With Malice (Part 1)


    The following is a review of the 2013 Kindle edition of Dale Myers’ book With Malice.

    Commonly used abbreviations throughout this review:

    DPD = Dallas Police department
    WCD = Warren Commission document
    FBI = Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Sgt. = Seargent
    USSS = United States Secret Service
    Lt. = Lieutenant
    WCE = Warren Commission exhibit


    For the 50th anniversary of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the murder of Dallas Policeman J.D. Tippit, Dale Myers decided to publish an updated version of his book on Tippit’s murder entitled, With Malice. The updated book contains new text, photographs and maps pertaining to Tippit’s death. I had never read With Malice before, and it was only at the insistence of Jim DiEugenio that I decided to review the updated book. As anyone who is familiar with Myers knows, his contention is that Lee Harvey Oswald murdered Tippit in cold blood, after allegedly assassinating the President. As I hope to explain throughout this review, the notion that Oswald shot Tippit is utterly absurd. But before getting to the book itself, it is first important to outline some of the reasons why Dale Myers is not to be trusted when it comes to both Tippit’s murder and President Kennedy’s assassination.

    As most researchers of the JFK assassination are probably aware, Myers has claimed to have proven through his 3-D animation of President Kennedy’s assassination that the single bullet theory is actually true. However, as researchers such as Milicent Cranor, Bob Harris, and Pat Speer have shown, Myers’ work is highly deceptive. Speer’s comprehensive analysis of the statements of the ear/eye witnesses to the assassination has demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the majority of ear/eye witnesses didn’t hear the so-called single bullet shot, and that the shot(s) to Governor Connally did not originate from the sixth floor of the Texas School book depository. Myers is also known for his support of the ludicrous notion that the first shot missed the President’s limousine, and caused the injury to bystander James Tague. Contrary to this belief, Tague always denied that the first shot was responsible for the cut to his left cheek. In fact, following the airing of Max Holland’s utterly fallacious documentary, The Lost Bullet, in which Holland claimed Tague’s injury was caused by the first shot, Tague indignantly exclaimed; “Holland is full of crap. One thing I know for sure is that the first shot was not the missed curb shot. Another thing I am positive about is that the last shot was the missed shot. You may not want to believe the Warren Commission’s final findings, but you can believe the 11 witnesses who state it was the last shot that missed.” (Read Tague’s remark). Although Tague was not always certain whether it was the second or third shot he heard which caused his injury, his confusion is understandable given that like the majority of ear/eye witnesses, he claimed that the next two shots he heard were fired in rapid succession (WCD 205, page 31). The fact that Myers pretends this theory is true in spite of Tague’s adamant denial, speaks poorly for his credibility as a researcher.

    Then there is Myers’ interview with John Kelin in 1982. During that interview, Kelin asked Myers what he thought about Oswald, to which Myers responded with the following remark; “…First off, I don’t think Lee Harvey Oswald pulled the trigger.” Myers also said that as far as saying Oswald is guilty, “…I find that extremely hard to believe”. However, most revealing of all was his denial that Oswald had shot Tippit; namely that “I think I will be able to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Oswald was not the killer of J.D. Tippit.” Researcher and author Jim DiEugenio once asked what had caused Myers to suddenly believe that Oswald hard murdered Tippit? Although we may never know the real answer to that question, it hardly matters. However, in this reviewer’s opinion, it was most likely due to Myers fondness for many of the DPD Officers he had interviewed, such as former DPD dispatcher Murray James Jackson. In fact, as this reviewer demonstrates below, Myers shows favouritism towards these very same officers.

    Although there are some people who believe that With Malice is the definitive book on Tippit’s murder, nothing could be further from the truth. Myers omits many facts and pieces of evidence which tend to exonerate Oswald as Tippit’s killer. Myers also shows favouritism towards witnesses who support Oswald’s guilt (even though, as I will explain, they lack credibility). In the introduction to his book, Myers also quotes many of Tippit’s family members and friends who dismiss the notion that Tippit was somehow involved in a conspiracy to murder either President Kennedy or Oswald. For example, Myers quotes Marie Frances Gasway, Tippit’s widow, who said the following during an interview in 2003: “The conspiracy stuff is so untrue, so totally unfounded.” (With Malice, Introduction). Quoting Tippit’s youngest son, Curtis Tippit, Myers writes: “People want sensationalism. Mom’s been abused by conspiracy theories and tabloid publications… Too many people want to cling to a false history, believing my father was in on something with Jack Ruby… Really it’s all kind of silly and funny” (ibid).

    Although it is perfectly understandable that Tippit’s family and friends want to feel a sense of closure by believing that the man who allegedly murdered Tippit was arrested by the DPD, it is nevertheless important that an honest analysis of the evidence and facts pertaining to his murder be presented to current and future researchers of that case. Furthermore, given the shame and embarrassment any allegation that Tippit was somehow involved in a conspiracy would bring to his family members and friends, it is also perfectly understandable that they would vehemently deny any such allegations. Readers should keep in mind that since writing several articles on Tippit’s murder on my blog, I have since changed my mind on a number of issues, and have come to realize that I had also made a number of mistakes and misjudgements.

    I: The search begins

    Myers begins his above titled Chapter 1 with the following sentences: “Lee Harvey Oswald murdered J.D. Tippit. The Dallas Cops believed it. The newspapers reported it. The Warren Commission made it official and the House Select Committee on Assassinations reaffirmed it.” (With Malice, Chapter 1). Myers and his fellow Warren Commission defenders scoff at the idea that the DPD and the Dallas district attorney’s Office could have helped frame Oswald for the murders of President Kennedy and J.D. Tippit. In fact, Myers snidely writes the following: “It was claimed [by Warren Commission critics] that Oswald was framed by a zealous Police force” (ibid). Thanks to Dallas district attorney Craig Watkins, we now know that with Henry Wade as District Attorney of Dallas, the DPD was one of the most corrupt Police departments in the entire United States; something which Myers and his ilk want to pretend isn’t true. To give the reader one example of just how bad the DA’s Office and the DPD were, let’s take the case of James Lee Woodard. Woodard was an African American man who spent twenty seven years in prison for a murder he didn’t commit. As it turned out, Henry Wade’s Office had withheld evidence from Woodard’s defence attorney which exonerated him as the killer. According to Michelle Moore, the President of the Innocence Project of Texas’ “…we’re finding lots of places where detectives in those cases, they kind of trimmed the corners to just get the case done”. She also added; “Whether that’s the fault of the detectives or the DA’s, I don’t know.” (Readers are strongly encouraged to read through this article, to see for themselves just how corrupt Wade’s Office and the DPD were).

    As for why the DA’s Office and the DPD would want to frame Oswald, just consider the following. The president of the United States of America (the most powerful man in the world) was gunned down in broad daylight and in full public view. Naturally, the entire United States, including the leaders of foreign countries, were anxiously waiting to learn who was responsible for the crime. Since the assassination of a sitting President was not a federal crime in 1963, the DPD had jurisdiction, and were undoubtedly under a tremendous amount of pressure to find those responsible, in order to avoid embarrassment for not being able to identify those responsible. Naturally, the DPD also had to find those responsible for the murder of one of their own policemen. As many researchers of the assassination have pointed out, a wallet bearing identification for Oswald and his alleged alias, Alek James Hidell, was discovered in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene. This allegation first appeared in the book by former FBI agent James Hosty entitled Assignment Oswald. Myers dismisses the idea such a wallet was left behind to incriminate Oswald. But as this reviewer explains later on in this review, there is very good reason to believe that this was the case.

    It’s important to keep in mind that with a wallet left behind to incriminate Oswald, the DPD had a viable suspect for Tippit’s murder. The DPD could then use Tippit’s murder to portray Oswald as a violent man who was capable of assassinating the President. In fact, Warren Commission counsel David Belin once remarked that: “Once the hypothesis is admitted that Oswald killed patrolman Tippit, there can be no doubt that the overall evidence shows that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin of John F. Kennedy”. (ibid). To say that such a belief is narrow-minded would be an understatement. Myers also makes several demeaning comments against those who refuse to believe that Oswald shot Tippit. For example, Myers writes that; “Many eyewitness accounts of the [Tippit] shooting were twisted to exonerate Oswald” (ibid). The readers of this review can make up their own minds on whether or not this is the case. Myers also writes that; “Lee Harvey Oswald murdered Officer J.D. Tippit. There can no longer be any doubt about that”, and that no matter what role Oswald had in the President’s assassination “…Oswald’s guilt in the Tippit shooting must be hereafter considered a historic truth.” (ibid). In light of all the evidence to the contrary, to say that Oswald’s guilt in the Tippit murder must be considered a historic truth is almost absurd. However, Myers can make that claim, because he omits a lot of the evidence which tends to exonerate Oswald.

    II: The quiet cop

    In this chapter, Myers discusses Tippit’s life from his childhood, his high school years, his service in the United States Army as a paratrooper, on to his career as a DPD Officer. Myers portrays Tippit as a good and honest cop, killed in the line of duty. In his discussion of Tippit’s Army experiences, Myers explains that it had “…made deep impressions…” Namely that Tippit’s friends recalled that he would be startled by any loud noise and that he was “…still a little nervous…” (With Malice, Chapter 2). What Myers omits however, is that Tippit’s DPD personnel files contain evidence that he may possibly have been unstable. (Reopen Kennedy case forum, thread entitled: J.D Tippit: the perfect DPD recruit). In his discussion of Tippit’s career as a DPD Officer, Myers explains that since joining the DPD as an apprentice Policeman in July, 1952, Tippit was an “exemplary” Police Officer (With Malice, Chapter 2). However, Myers also mentions that in 1955, Tippit had received several reprimands for not appearing in court as ordered (ibid). In order to bolster his claim that Tippit was a good and honest Police Officer, Myers quotes several of Tippit’s fellow Police Officers, such as Tippit’s supervisor, Calvin “Bud” Owens, who vouched for this (ibid). Even if these claims are true, it has little bearing on whether Tippit was lured to Tenth Street to be shot and killed. The evidence for that lies in the fact that a wallet was left behind to incriminate Oswald for his murder. Furthermore, the DPD would naturally want to avoid making claims to the contrary, as any such claims could lead to speculation that Tippit was somehow involved in a conspiracy; and bring about embarrassment to the DPD.

    III: The final hours

    In this chapter, Myers relates to the readers the final hours of Tippit’s life; from the time he left his home at 6:15 am, to the time he was shot and killed on Tenth Street in the central Oak Cliff area of Dallas (With Malice, Chapter 3). The issues which Myers deals with here include why Tippit was in central Oak Cliff when he was killed, the sighting of Tippit at the Gloco Service station located at 1502 North Zangs blvd., the sighting of a DPD squad car which Earlene Roberts, the house keeper at 1026 North Beckley where Oswald was allegedly living at the time of the assassination, a car she claimed was outside the rooming house when “Oswald” was inside following the assassination, and finally, Tippit’s alleged presence at the Top Ten records store a few minutes prior to his death. Myers writes that; “Tippit wished he could have seen the President, whom he had voted for and admired.” (ibid) Whilst that may be true, it is this reviewer’s belief that it has little (if any) bearing on his death. Myers also relates to his readers the all too familiar tale that Howard Brennan was sitting directly across from the TSBD on Elm Street, when he allegedly observed Oswald firing the shots at President Kennedy (ibid). But what Myers doesn’t tell his readers is that the Zapruder film shows beyond any doubt that Brennan was sitting directly across Houston Street, and that Brennan was lying when he said he sitting directly across from the TSBD.

    In his discussion of whether or not Earlene Roberts had really seen a DPD squad car outside of the rooming house, Myers does everything he can to discredit her story. When Roberts was interviewed by the FBI on November 29, 1963, she told them that the number of the car she observed outside the rooming house was 207 (WCE 2781). As Myers explains, that particular car was assigned to DPD Officer Jim M. Valentine, and which took DPD Sgt. Gerald Hill and Dallas Morning News reporter Jim Ewell to Dealey Plaza from Police headquarters. As this reviewer will explain in an upcoming essay on Gerald Hill, Hill had by all likelihood commandeered car 207 from Officer Valentine, and was one of the two Officers inside the car when it was seen by Roberts outside of the rooming house. In that same essay, this reviewer will discuss Myers’ narrow minded attempt to discredit Roberts.

    On the day of the assassination, Tippit was assigned to patrol district 78 (testimony of Calvin Bud Owens, WC Volume VII, page 80). However, the patrol district in which Tippit was killed (district 91) was assigned to a DPD Officer named William Duane Mentzel (WCE 2645). Tippit and another Officer named Ronald C. Nelson were allegedly ordered to move into the central Oak Cliff by DPD dispatcher Murray Jackson at approximately 12:45 pm (WCE 705/1974). According to DPD chief Jesse Curry, the central Oak Cliff area included patrol district 91 (WCD 1259, page 3). According to the map of the DPD patrol districts, it stands to reason that districts 92, 93, 94, 108, and 109 which were adjacent to district 91 were also part of the central Oak Cliff area (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 7, Folder 10, Item 2). Although Jackson was never called to testify before the Warren Commission, during a filmed interview with Eddie Barker from CBS, he explained that he had ordered Tippit into the central Oak Cliff area because “We [the dispatchers] were draining the Oak Cliff area of available Police Officers….” (See the interview). Myers accepts that this was the case, and writes that Jackson told him during an interview that he had ordered Tippit into the central Oak Cliff area because Tippit had once helped him out during an incident with seven drunk teenagers, and that allegedly feeling that he could once again rely on Tippit, Jackson ordered Tippit into the Oak Cliff area to “help him [Jackson] again…. to cover Oak Cliff” (With Malice, Chapter 3).

    But contrary to Jackson’s claim, there is very good reason to believe that he never ordered Tippit and Nelson to move into the central Oak Cliff area. In the first transcript of channel one of the DPD radio recordings (Sawyer exhibit B), the order to send Tippit and Nelson into the central Oak Cliff area is curiously missing. Myers doesn’t mention this to his readers. In that very same transcript, the channel one dispatchers (Jackson and Clifford Hulse), allegedly broadcast the following message over the DPD radio at approximately 12:43 pm; “Attention all squads in the downtown area code three [lights on and sirens blazing] to Elm and Houston with caution.” (Sawyer exhibit B, page 398). Myers acknowledges this in his timetable of the events which occurred on the day of the assassination, but hides from his readers the fact that according to the next transcript which the DPD had provided to the FBI on March 20, 1964, the dispatchers had actually broadcast the following message: “Attention all squads, report to [the] downtown area code 3 to Elm and Houston, with caution.” (WCE 705).

    Whilst it certainly makes more sense that only the squads in the downtown area would be dispatched to the assassination scene, thereby leaving all the “outer” area squads in their assigned districts in the event a crime such as a robbery were to occur, the exact same transmission appears in the next transcript on the DPD channel one and two radio recordings (WCE 1974). On July 21, 1964, DPD chief Jesse Curry furnished the FBI a copy of the “original” tape recordings of the DPD radio traffic, which were reviewed by an agent of the FBI at the DPD (ibid). If the transmission “Attention all squads, report to [the] downtown area code 3 to Elm and Houston, with caution” was not recorded on the tapes, then the FBI would surely not have allowed it to be placed into the new transcript. Confirmation that the dispatchers had actually ordered all squads and not only the squads in the downtown area to proceed to Elm and Houston comes from DPD chief Curry himself. In a letter to the Warren Commission on July 17, 1964, Curry wrote; “…between 12:37 p.m. and 12:45 p.m., the dispatcher requested all squads to report to Elm and Houston in the downtown area, code 3” (WCD 1259, page 3). Curry then added; “It might further be pointed out that Officer Tippit remained on his district until the dispatcher had requested all squads to report to Elm and Houston…” (ibid). But perhaps most significantly of all, Jackson himself confirmed that all squads had been dispatched to Elm and Houston Streets in his filmed interview with Eddie Barker in 1967. According to Jackson; “…we immediately dispatched every available unit [squad] to the triple underpass where the shot was reported to have come from.” Myers mentions none of this to his readers.

    In light of all of the above, the notion that Jackson was only concerned that the Oak Cliff area was being “drained’ of available DPD Officers when all squads had been ordered to Elm and Houston seems strained. Jackson’s next transmission to Tippit was at approximately 12:54 pm, when he asked Tippit if he was in the Oak Cliff area (WCE 705/1974). Tippit allegedly responded that he was at Lancaster and Eighth. Jackson then allegedly instructed Tippit; “You will be at large for any emergency that comes in.” Keep in mind that the alleged order to Tippit and Nelson was to move into the central Oak Cliff area. On the day of the assassination, districts 93 and 94 were assigned to Officer Holley M. Ashcraft, and districts 108 and 109 were assigned to Officer Owen H. Ludwig (WCE 2645). Although the tape recordings of channel one of the DPD radio reveal that the dispatchers sent Ashcraft to Inwood road and Stemmons expressway to cut traffic (Listen to the recording), and although Ludwig was allegedly guarding the front of the Sheraton-Dallas-Hotel, Jackson never bothered to try and contact William Mentzel on the radio, who was on a lunch break at approximately the time of the assassination (ibid). None of the transcripts of the DPD radio communications show that Jackson had attempted to contact Mentzel; and the notion that Jackson would order Tippit and Nelson to move into the central Oak Cliff without even once bothering to contact Mentzel to ensure that Mentzel was patrolling his assigned districts (91 and 92) is also strained (ibid). Again, Myers does not mention to his readers that Jackson never bothered to contact Mentzel by the DPD radio.

    Finally, there is the fact that despite being allegedly ordered to move into the central Oak Cliff area, Ronald Nelson proceeded to Dealey Plaza, and even told the dispatcher that he had gone there at approximately 12:52 pm (WCE 705/1974). But despite disobeying Jackson’s order, we are supposed to believe that he had the audacity to then ask the dispatchers if they wanted him to go over to the Tippit murder scene (ibid). Myers explains that after Jackson allegedly ordered Tippit and Nelson to move into the central Oak Cliff area, Tippit responded; “I’m at Kiest and Bonnieview”, and Nelson allegedly responded that he is “…going North of Marsalis, on R.L. Thornton” (With Malice, Chapter 3). What Myers doesn’t mention is that the aforementioned alleged responses by Tippit and Nelson do not appear in either WCE 705 or Sawyer exhibit B. They first appear in WCE 1974. Myers also writes that Nelson told the dispatchers that he was at the South end of the Houston Street Viaduct (ibid). However, according to both WCE 705 and WCE 1974, the Officer who made the transmission was actually B.L. Bass; and that Bass had identified himself to the dispatchers by his radio number (101).

    When author Henry Hurt interviewed Nelson in 1984, he asked him; “Did you get the call to go to central Oak Cliff” (Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, page 162). After first telling Hurt that he wasn’t sure what he meant by his question, he then said “I had rather not talk about that” (ibid). According to Hurt, Nelson apparently considered that information to be worth some money (ibid). Myers explains that Nelson had declined a request for an interview with him (With Malice, Chapter 3). Nelson’s reluctance to be interviewed may have been due to the fact that he actually wasn’t ordered to move into the central Oak Cliff area, and that his explanation to Hurt that it was worth some money was just an excuse to discourage Hurt from talking about it with him. Suffice it to say, the notion that Tippit and Nelson were ordered to move into the central Oak Cliff area is dubious, and the transcripts and tape recordings of the DPD radio communications were in all likelihood altered to make it appear as though they actually were sent into the central Oak Cliff area.

    Obviously, the DPD had to provide an explanation for what Tippit was doing there; hence Jackson was coerced into claiming that he had sent them into central Oak Cliff. In this reviewer’s opinion, the DPD claimed that Nelson was also sent into central Oak Cliff so that they wouldn’t make it appear obvious that they were covering up for Tippit’s singular presence there. But did Jackson also have a personal reason for lying about Tippit’s presence in central Oak Cliff? As it turns out, there is. Jackson told Henry Hurt during an interview with him that he was a very close personal friend of both Tippit and his family (Hurt, Reasonable doubt, page 162). As any reasonable person would be able to understand, Tippit’s unauthorised presence in central Oak Cliff would have led to rumours which would probably be upsetting for his family members. Jackson may have thought that by claiming he had ordered Tippit to move into the central Oak Cliff area, he would be sparing Tippit’s family members of these upsetting rumours.

    In his timetable of events which occurred on the day of the assassination, Myers writes that Tippit was at the GLOCO (Good luck Oil Company) service station, located on 1502 North Zangs Blvd., apparently watching traffic “coming out of downtown.”, from about 12:56 pm to 1:06 pm (With Malice, Timetable of events). In the endnotes, Myers cites David Lifton’s interview with a photographer named Al Volkland, who told him that he was well acquainted with Tippit, and that he had seen him at the service station. Volkland’s claim of seeing Tippit there was allegedly confirmed by his wife; and both claimed that they observed Tippit at the service station 10 or 20 minutes following the assassination. Furthermore, J.B. “Shorty” Lewis and Emmett Hollingshead, who were employed at the service station, and Tom Mullins who was the owner of the station at the time of the assassination, also claimed they had seen Tippit there (With Malice, Chapter 3).

    In his endnotes, Myers also cites the Ramparts magazine article by David Welsh, in which Welsh wrote that Lewis, Hollingshead, and Mullins claimed Tippit was at the service station for about ten minutes, between 12:45 pm and 1:00 pm. However, Myers explains that in an interview with him in 1983, Hollingshead claimed that he had seen Tippit at the service station before the President was assassinated. Myers also claims that in an interview with him in 1983, Lewis said that other employees of the service station had seen Tippit there, and not him. Myers offers no source for why he believes Tippit arrived at the service station at 12:56 pm, and as this reviewer explains below, there is compelling evidence that Tippit was actually shot at about 1:06 pm. If Tippit really was at the service station, his presence there is a mystery. Whilst Myers doesn’t believe that Tippit was at the service station by 12:45 pm, and that he only moved into the central Oak Cliff area following the alleged order by Murray Jackson to do so, he nevertheless ignores all of the compelling evidence that Jackson didn’t order Tippit to move into the central Oak Cliff area.

    According to the DPD radio transmission transcripts, Murray Jackson asked Tippit for his location at approximately 1:03 pm, but received no response (WCE 705/1974). However, Myers writes that as the dispatchers were trying to determine the location of Officer A.D. Duncan, a garbled transmission was made that had the tonal characteristics of other “known” transmissions made by Tippit (With Malice, Chapter 3). In his endnotes, Myers explains that the transcripts describe the alleged transmission by Tippit as “more interference”, which is true (WCE 705/1974). In fact, according to the transcripts of the DPD radio communications, the interference was due to “…intermodulation similar, according to [the] Dallas Police Department, to that most often originating from the Dallas Power and light company” (ibid). Given Myers skewed conclusion driven agenda , as demonstrated throughout this review, readers are cautioned against believing much of what Myers writes. According to Myers, Tippit was at the Tip Top Records store at 1:11 pm, where he was allegedly trying to place a phone call to someone (With Malice, Chapter 3). However, given that Tippit didn’t respond to Jackson at 1:03 pm, Tippit was probably in the store at this point in time. If Tippit really was in the store trying to call someone, it remains a mystery as to who it was, and why he was trying to call him/her.

    IV: Murder on Tenth Street

    Myers now discusses Tippit’s murder on Tenth Street, and the events that followed. It is Myers contention that Tippit was shot at approximately 1:14.30 pm (With Malice, Chapter 4). Myers writes that the tape recordings of the DPD radio communications show that Domingo Benavides had attempted to inform the DPD dispatchers of Tippit’s death at 1:16 pm, as the tape recordings show that he began “keying” Tippit’s microphone at that time; and had been doing so for about one minute and forty one seconds. Based on the eyewitness account of Ted Callaway , Myers then speculates that Tippit was probably shot ninety seconds prior to Benavides attempt to contact the dispatcher (ibid). However, let’s look at all the evidence that Myers ignores to reach his conclusion that Tippit was shot at about 1:14.30 pm. To begin with, Myers never informs his readers that according to WCE 705, T.F. Bowley, who had arrived at the murder scene shortly following Tippit’s death, reported Tippit’s death just prior to 1:10 pm! In WCE 1974 however, the time of Bowley’s transmission was noted as being made at about 1:19 pm.

    Bowley claimed in his affidavit to the DPD that when he arrived at the Tippit murder scene, he looked at his watch and it read 1:10 pm. He also claimed that the first thing he did was to try and help Tippit, and then informed the DPD dispatchers that Tippit was shot (Dallas municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 14). Assuming that Bowley took no more than a minute to try and help Tippit before informing the dispatchers of the shooting, the actual time of Bowley’s arrival would have been approximately 1:09 pm. Nevertheless, both WCE 705 and Bowley’s watch place Tippit’s death sooner than Myers time of 1:14.30. Myers deals with Bowley’s watch reading 1:10 pm in his endnotes, where he writes that no one determined whether Bowley’s watch was accurate on the day of the assassination. Whilst we will probably never know just how accurate Bowley’s watch was, WCE 705 places Bowley’s transmission at about 1:10 pm, which is fairly consistent with Bowley’s claim his watch read 1:10 pm after he arrived.

    In his endnotes, Myers also deals with the allegation by Mrs. Margie Higgins, who lived 150 feet east of and across the street from where Tippit was shot. As Myers writes, Mrs. Higgins told author Barry Ernest that she was watching the news, when the announcer stated that the time was 1:06 pm (Ernest, The Girl On The Stairs, page 90). Mrs Higgins told Ernest that she then checked the clock on top of the TV, which confirmed that the time was 1:06 pm, and that it was at that point when she heard the shooting. Myers tries to discredit Mrs Higgins’ claim by telling his readers that, “A review of archival recordings of all three networks broadcasting that afternoon in Dallas failed to verify her [Mrs Higgins’] recollection.” Myers then adds “In fact, none of the networks broadcast a time check at 1:06 p.m. as she claimed.” Although this review cannot verify whether this is true or not, readers are once again cautioned against taking Myers word for it, for this reviewer demonstrates throughout this review that Myers is not a candid or balanced researcher. Readers should also keep in mind that Mrs. Higgins’ claim is consistent with Helen Markham’s claim in her affidavit that she was standing on the corner of Tenth and Patton Streets at approximately 1:06 pm when Tippit was shot (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Item 18).

    Both Markham’s and Mrs Higgins’ claims are also consistent with the fact that Markham told FBI agent Robert M. Barrett that when she left the Washateria of her apartment to catch her bus, she noticed the time shown on the clock of the Washateria was 1:04 pm (WCD 630). Markham explained to Barrett that she was attempting to call her daughter on the Washateria phone (ibid). The FBI determined that it would have taken Markham about two and a half minutes to reach the intersection of Tenth and Patton Streets, which means Markham would have arrived at the intersection close to 1:07 pm (ibid). Myers acknowledges in his book that Markham reportedly left the Washateria at 1:04 pm, but claims that Markham “probably” didn’t leave the Washateria before 1:11 pm, and speculates that this was perhaps the case because of her “eagerness” to contact her daughter by phone (With Malice, Chapter 4). In his endnotes, Myers snidely writes that in order to believe the statements by Markham, Higgins, and Bowley of when Tippit was killed; “…one would have to believe that Tippit lay dead in the Street for eight to twelve minutes before anyone notified [the] Police.” But only by ignoring the fact that WCE 705 places the time of Bowley’s radio transmission at approximately 1:10 pm can Myers make this claim and think that he can get away with it.

    Myers writes that the Dudley Hughes Funeral home, which had dispatched the ambulance which took Tippit’s body to Methodist hospital, was informed of the shooting at 1:18 pm by the DPD, and that Dudley M. Hughes Junior, who took the call from the DPD at the funeral home, allegedly filled out an ambulance call slip which was time stamped 1:18 pm (With Malice, Chapter 5). Myers references this call slip to an essay by researchers George and Patricia Nash in The New Leader entitled: The Other Witnesses (John Armstrong Baylor collection, tab entitled: George & Patricia Nash). However, the call slip itself doesn’t appear to be amongst the Dallas Municipal archives collection, and taking into account all of the evidence which contradicts the notion that the funeral home received the call at 1:18 pm, this piece of evidence should be considered unreliable. Of course, it is entirely likely that if the ambulance call slip actually exists, the DPD had falsified it in order to bolster the notion that Tippit was shot close to 1:18 pm; and thereby allowing Oswald plenty of time to reach Tenth and Patton in order to shoot Tippit after he allegedly left the rooming house at 1026 North Beckley.

    Readers should keep in mind that justice of the peace, Joe B. Brown, filled out an authorisation permit for an autopsy to be performed on Tippit’s body, and in that permit, Brown noted that Tippit was pronounced dead on arrival at Methodist hospital, and noted the time of death as 1:15 pm (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 24, Item 2). Although there is conflicting evidence for the time Tippit was pronounced dead at Methodist hospital, researcher Martin Hay discovered that in a supplementary offense report by DPD Officers R.A. Davenport and W.R. Bardin, Dr. Richard Liguori pronounced Tippit dead at Methodist Hospital at 1:15 pm (ReopenKennedycase forum, thread entitled: Question Concerning Time). Given the fact that (according to WCE 705) T.F. Bowley’s transmission to the DPD dispatchers was at approximately 1:10 pm, and given all of the aforementioned evidence which supports the notion that Tippit was shot prior to 1:10 pm and then taken to Methodist Hospital where he was most likely pronounced dead at 1:15 pm, Myers assertion that Tippit was shot at 1:14.30 pm is simply not tenable.

    According to WCE 705, Tippit allegedly tried to contact the DPD dispatchers twice at approximately 1:08 pm. However, these alleged transmissions are curiously missing from WCE 1974; and instead, there appears to be two garbled transmission from DPD Officers with the radio numbers 58 and 488. Although some researchers believe that the alleged call by Tippit at circa 1:08 pm is proof that Tippit was still alive at that time, and that he was attempting to report that he had just encountered a suspect, there is good reason to believe that this alleged call was added into the transcript by the DPD. Consider that with Helen Markham’s first day affidavit, the DPD would have realised that Tippit was killed at approximately 1:06 pm. It is this reviewer’s opinion that the DPD took advantage of the fact that there were two garbled transmissions at about 1:08 pm, and claimed that it was Tippit to make it appear as though he was alive after 1:06 pm.

    As far as Tippit’s alleged attempts to report that he had just encountered a suspect are concerned, the discovery of the wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell in the vicinity of the Tippit murder scene strongly implies that Tippit was lured to Tenth Street to be shot. With this in mind, the last thing the conspirators would surely have wanted was for Tippit to become suspicious. Therefore, it seems very unlikely that Tippit actually attempted to report that he had encountered a suspect. Myers never mentions that WCE 705 shows that Tippit attempted to contact the dispatchers, writing instead that: “A check of the Dallas Police tapes revealed that Tippit did not notify the dispatcher that he was stopping to question the man on Tenth Street” (With Malice, Chapter 4). It is this reviewer’s belief that Myers never mentions Tippit’s alleged attempts to contact the dispatchers, because he was probably concerned that his readers would think that Tippit had stopped “Oswald” at about 1:08 pm; and by implication, was also shot at this time.

    This reviewer would also like to point out that when T.F. Bowley reported the shooting to the DPD dispatchers, Murray Jackson allegedly responded by calling out Tippit’s radio number (78), because according to Myers, Tippit was “…thought to be the only available patrol unit in the Oak Cliff area.” (ibid) By ignoring all the evidence that the DPD radio traffic tape recordings have been altered, Myers can pretend that Jackson really did call for Tippit.

    Furthermore, in an apparent attempt to explain why Jackson immediately thought of calling for Tippit instead of William Mentzel, Myers writes in his endnotes that Mentzel, and another officer named Vernon R. Nolan, were sent to a traffic accident at about 1:11 pm. Curiously, there is nothing within WCE 705 and WCE 1974 that Mentzel was sent to a traffic accident.

    Another issue which Myers discusses in this chapter is the direction in which the killer was walking when he was spotted by Tippit. Based on the observations by William Lawrence Smith, Jimmy Burt, Jimmy Brewer, and William Scoggins, Myers concludes that Tippit’s killer was initially walking west (ibid). This reviewer agrees. However, readers should keep in mind that in his interview with the FBI on December 15, 1963, Burt made no mention of seeing Tippit’s killer at all (WCD 194, page 29). Based on the statements of witnesses Helen Markham and Jack Ray Tatum, Myers speculates that Tippit’s killer then turned around and was walking east when he observed Tippit’s squad car approaching, and that this is what caused Tippit to pull over to the curb and question his soon to be killer (ibid). According to Myers: “The eyewitness accounts depict the suspect traveling in two conflicting directions, with the key moment of change occurring just east of Tenth and Patton” (ibid). But as even Myers ironically notes at the end of this chapter, Helen Markham told the USSS on December 2, 1963, that she first observed Tippit’s killer on the sidewalk after Tippit had pulled his squad car to the curb (ibid). Myers also notes that on March 17, 1964, Markham told FBI agent Robert M. Barrett that she had first seen Tippit’s killer as Tippit passed the intersection of Tenth and Patton (ibid). When Markham testified before the Warren Commission, she claimed that she saw Tippit’s killer crossing Patton street (heading east), and about to step up onto the curb (WC Volume III, page 307).

    Not only do Markham’s statements directly contradict Myers assertion that the killer changed direction just east of Tenth and Patton, but given her overall unreliability as a witness, her claim that she had observed Tippit’s killer walking east should not be considered credible. Also, consider that in her affidavit to the DPD, she made no mention of which direction Tippit’s killer was walking when she first observed him (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Item 18). According to researcher John Armstrong, a barber named Mr Clark claimed he had also seen Tippit’s killer walking west along Tenth Street, and that he would bet his life that the man he saw was Oswald However, Clark does not count as a witness to seeing Tippit’s killer walking west along Tenth Street, because he claimed he saw the man in the morning, whereas Tippit was most certainly there after 1:00 pm in the afternoon (John Armstrong Baylor research collection, tab entitled: 10th St. Barber shop).

    Myers also explains to his readers that a Mrs Ann McCravey (believed to be Mrs Ann McRavin who allegedly lived at 404 east Tenth Street) claimed that she had seen Tippit’s killer running (With Malice, Chapter 4). Although McRavin didn’t specify which direction she had seen Tippit’s killer running, Myers writes that given her vantage point; “…Tippit’s killer could only have been running in a westerly direction [when she saw him]…” (ibid). But contrary to McRavin’s claim, no other witness is on record saying that Tippit’s killer was running, and given the evidence that Tippit was lured to Tenth Street to be shot, it seems highly unlikely that his killer would have been running and making himself appear suspicious to Tippit. Therefore, if she really did see Tippit’s killer, her claim that he was running should not be considered credible.

    As far as Jack Tatum is concerned, there is good reason to believe that he may be a phony witness used not only to help incriminate Oswald for Tippit’s murder, but to also help explain the presence of a suspicious red Ford at the Tippit murder scene. When Tatum was interviewed by HSCA investigators on February 1, 1978, he claimed that after he witnessed Tippit being shot in the head, he sped off in his car, and made no mention of having returned to the murder scene (HSCA report, Volume XII, page 41). In fact, when Tatum was asked if there was anything he wished to add to the statement he made to investigators Jack Moriarty and Joe Bastori, he replied; “At this time I can’t think of anything.” (John Armstrong Baylor research collection, tab entitled: Jack Tatum). However, when Myers interviewed Tatum in 1983/84, Tatum now began to aggrandize his story and his importance in it. He now claimed that he had gone back to the Tippit murder scene, and had taken Helen Markham to a policeman (With Malice, Chapter 4). Evidently, by the time Myers had interviewed him, Tatum had experienced a case of memory improvement. It is also noteworthy that during a telephone interview on March 18, 1986, Tatum allegedly stated that he had taken Markham to the police station to give evidence (John Armstrong Baylor research collection, tab entitled: Jack Tatum). However, this allegation is dubious. As Myers acknowledges in his book, Markham was taken to DPD headquarters by an officer named George W. Hammer (With Malice, Chapter 7). According to the transcripts of the DPD radio communications, Hammer was indeed the officer who took Markham to DPD headquarters (WCE 705/1974).

    Whilst Myers and his ilk will probably argue that the interviewer was in error, the truth is that no intellectually honest researcher should assume that this was the case, and then argue that Tatum definitely didn’t make such a claim. Readers should also bear in mind that Tatum didn’t come forward as a witness shortly following Tippit’s murder because he allegedly thought that there were enough witnesses, and that he didn’t think he could “add anything” (John Armstrong Baylor research collection, tab entitled: Jack Tatum). During his aforementioned telephone interview, Tatum also claimed that he was concerned about rumors of a conspiracy, and in particular a Mafia one; and that this may have been another reason for him remaining quiet (ibid). Perhaps the most significant detail about Tatum is that he was employed by the Baylor Medical Centre in Dallas, which, according to researcher William Kelly, had received funds from both the U.S. Army and the CIA for the heinous MK/ULTRA research, between the years 1963 and 1965 (John Simkin’s education forum, thread entitled: Frank Kaiser). As many researchers have pointed out, the CIA has been involved in the cover-up of Oswald as President Kennedy’s assassin. Therefore, the possibility exists that the CIA may have been involved in coercing Tatum into identifying Oswald as Tippit’s killer in order to bolster the notion that he was President Kennedy’s assassin. Whilst this reviewer feels certain that Myers will dismiss this as ridiculous, it nevertheless remains a possibility.

    When Domingo Benavides testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that a man in a red colored Ford had stopped and pulled over following the shooting, and that he never saw him get out of his car (WC Volume VI, page 463). During his interview with John Berendt from Esquire magazine, Benavides claimed that the car he had seen was red colored Ford with a white top, and that it came back to the Tippit murder scene a few minutes following the shooting (John Armstrong Baylor research collection, tab entitled: Igor Vaganov). Jack Tatum claimed that the car he was driving in when he arrived at the Tippit murder scene was a red colored 1964 model Ford Galaxie 500 (With Malice, Chapter 10). Whilst Myers readily accepts that the car Benavides had seen belonged to Jack Tatum, several researchers are of the opinion that it actually belonged to Igor Vaganov, who quite possibly played a role in Tippit’s murder (see the thread entitled Igor Vaganov on John Simkin’s Education Forum). Whilst this reviewer believes that the driver of the red Ford was quite possibly Igor Vaganov, it is also this reviewer’s opinion that Tatum was quite likely pushed into saying that he was the man driving the red Ford to help dispel the notion that the car belonged to Vaganov. As for why Tatum wasn’t coerced into coming forward sooner with his tale, this reviewer cannot offer an explanation. On a final note, Tatum may have been coerced into saying that Oswald was walking east to make it appear as though Tippit had stopped “Oswald” because he had turned around after seeing Tippit approaching in his squad car; just as Myers contends.

    V: Search for a killer

    Myers now explains to the readers the search for Tippit’s killer by the DPD, beginning with the discovery of the spent shell casings on the sixth floor of the TSBD by Dallas County deputy Sheriff, Luke Mooney (With Malice, Chapter 5). Myers believes that DPD Sgt. Gerald Hill was on the sixth floor when Mooney discovered the spent shell casings. But as this reviewer will explain in an upcoming essay on Hill, there is very good reason to believe that Hill was on the sixth floor of the TSBD before Mooney discovered the spent shell casings. Myers writes that the first officer to arrive at the Tippit murder scene was Kenneth Hudson Croy, who was a sergeant in the DPD reserves (With Malice, Chapter 5). According to Myers, the next Officer to arrive at the scene was Howell W. Summers, arriving about one minute after Kenneth Croy, circa 1:20 pm. However, according to the transcripts of channel one of the DPD radio transmissions, Officer Summers informs the dispatchers that he is at the murder scene after 1:25 pm, and after Officers Joe M. Poe, Leonard E. Jez, and Sgt. Calvin “Bud” Owens report that they have arrived at the murder scene (WCE 705/1974).

    Now if Summers was the second Officer to arrive, he waited for over five minutes before telling the dispatchers he arrived, which seems ridiculous. Although this reviewer doesn’t know why Myers doesn’t point this out to his readers, the fact that he doesn’t speaks poorly for his credibility. But in order to bolster the notion that Summers was the second Officer to arrive, Myers writes in his endnotes that Officer Roy W. Walker, who broadcast the first description of Tippit’s killer at about 1:22 pm, told him during an interview in 1983 that when he (Walker) arrived at the murder scene, there were two Officers already there. One of the Officers would undoubtedly have been reserve Sgt. Kenneth Croy. However, the identity of the second Officer to arrive (if Walker’s recollection was accurate) remains an open question.

    According to both WCE 705 and 1974, at approximately 1:32 pm, DPD Officer Jerry Pollard informs the dispatchers on channel one of the DPD radio that; “They [witnesses] say he [the killer] is running west in the alley between Jefferson and Tenth [Streets]”. Myers explains that the two witnesses who gave this information to the DPD Officers were Jimmy Burt and William Arthur Smith (With Malice, chapter 5). In his endnotes, Myers sources this claim to Burt’s interview with Al Chapman in 1968. According to Burt’s interview with the FBI on December 16, 1963, Burt claimed that “…he ran to the intersection of 10th and Patton and when he [Burt] was close enough to Patton Street to see to the south he saw the man running into an alley located between 10th and Jefferson Avenue on Patton Street. The man ran in the alley to the right would be running west at this point.” (WCD 194, page 29). However, Burt was most certainly lying, as no less than four witnesses; Warren Reynolds, B.M. “Pat” Patterson, L.J. Lewis, and Harold Russell, claimed they observed the gunman turn west from Patton Street onto Jefferson Blvd. (With Malice, Chapter 4). When Burt was interviewed by Al Chapman in 1968, he claimed that he and William Arthur Smith “…got to the alley [between Tenth and Jefferson] and we kind of come to a stop and looked down the alley and we saw this guy down there. He was down almost to the next street.” (With Malice, Chapter 4). Myers then writes that Burt and Smith may have been the last two witnesses to see Tippit’s killer fleeing west along the alley behind the Texaco Service station located on Jefferson Blvd. (ibid).

    In his endnotes, Myers acknowledges the discrepancies between Burt’s remarks to the FBI and his remarks to Al Chapman, but tries to explain the discrepancy by stating that because of his police record, his trouble with the U.S. Military, and his alleged desire to withhold his identity from the DPD, Burt possibly “altered” his 1963 interview with the FBI to avoid “deeper” involvement in the case. However, this appears to be nothing but a pathetic attempt at trying to conceal the fact that Burt lied during his interview with Al Chapman, and that the so-called radio transmission by Officer Pollard was probably added into the recordings/transcripts of the DPD radio transmissions to dismiss the possibility that Tippit’s real killer was hiding inside the Abundant Life Temple, located on the corner of Tenth and Crawford Streets (this reviewer will elaborate on this in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill). Now if Burt really was concerned about all of the above as Myers claims, then why the heck would he lie to the FBI when he surely would have realized that he would be getting himself into more trouble? Myers also acknowledges in his endnotes that William Arthur Smith informed both the FBI and the Warren Commission that he and Burt did not follow the gunman, and also acknowledges that when he (Myers) interviewed Smith in 1997, Smith was unable to recall if they had followed the killer or not. Given all of the above, and despite what Myers wants his readers to believe, Burt should not be considered a credible witness.

    VI: Closing in

    Myers begins this chapter with a discussion of the false alarm at the Jefferson branch Library located on Marsalis and Jefferson streets, and concludes the chapter with Oswald’s arrest inside the Texas Theater. The person who triggered the false alarm at the library was Adrian Hamby, who worked there as a page (With Malice, Chapter 6). Hamby was approached by two plainclothes DPD “detectives”, and was allegedly told to go into the Library and inform management that a Police Officer was shot, and to have them lock all the doors and to not let anyone enter the Library until they secured the area (ibid). As Hamby was entering the Library, he was allegedly spotted by DPD Officer Charles T. Walker, after which Walker put a broadcast on the DPD radio that the suspect was in the library (WCE 705/1974). In his report to DPD Chief Jesse Curry, detective Marvin Buhk wrote that there were “Secret Service” men at the Jefferson Branch Library who informed DPD Officers at the Library that after Adrian Hamby came out of the Library, one of them claimed that Hamby was not the suspect (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 56).

    In his endnotes, Myers writes that detective Buhk was the only officer to mention Secret Service agents being at the Library. As far as this reviewer in concerned, Myers is correct. Myers also writes that the “Secret Service” man referred to by Buhk in his report was actually one of the two “lawmen” who instructed Hamby to go into the library and have all the doors locked. The fact of the matter is that there is no known evidence that any genuine Secret Service agents were present at the Jefferson Branch Library on the day of the assassination. Furthermore, the identity of the two men who spoke to Hamby has never been determined, and if they were DPD detectives, then surely their identity would be known to Buhk and others, and surely Buhk would not have referred to them as Secret Service agents. One alternative explanation is that the so-called Secret Service men may have been conspirators, who may have deliberately triggered the false alarm at the Library to pull the DPD Officers away from the Abundant Life Temple, where Tippit’s actual killer was perhaps hiding (this reviewer will be discussing this theory in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill). The possibility that these “Secret Service” men were conspirators is bolstered by the fact that several men who identified themselves as Secret Service men were present in Dealey Plaza shortly following President Kennedy’s assassination (readers are encouraged to read through this article on this reviewer’s blog). In his dismissal of the “Secret Service” men at the Library as being nothing sinister, Myers never mentions the fact that men identifying themselves as Secret Service men were present in Dealey Plaza.

    As perhaps every researcher of the JFK assassination is aware, Oswald was apprehended inside the Texas Theater after he allegedly tried to shoot Officer M. Nick McDonald with the revolver he supposedly used to murder Tippit. Myers’ discussion of the scuffle inside the theater with Oswald is perhaps the low point of his book, a considerable negative achievement. The author deliberately ignores evidence which contradicts the notion that Oswald had pulled out the revolver and tried to shoot Officer McDonald. Before entering the theater, Oswald was allegedly spotted by shoe store owner Johnny Calvin Brewer outside the lobby of his store on Jefferson Blvd., as he was allegedly trying to avoid the DPD (With Malice, Chapter 6). Brewer then allegedly observed Oswald duck into the theater behind Julia Elizabeth Postal, who was the cashier at the theater (ibid). Myers explains that Oswald had not paid for a ticket, and that Postal had seen Oswald “out of the corner of her eye” as he was coming towards the theater from the east (ibid). During her testimony before the Warren Commission, Postal claimed that she informed the DPD over the telephone that she hadn’t heard of Oswald’s description, but then described him as “ruddy looking.” (WC Volume VII, page 11).

    Towards the end of her testimony, counsel Joseph Ball showed Postal the shirt Oswald was wearing (WCE 150), when he was arrested inside the theatre. He asked her; “when he went in [to the Theater] was it [the shirt] tucked into his pants when he went in?” to which Postal responded; “No, sir; because I remember he came flying around the corner, because his hair was and his shirt was waving.”, and that “It [the shirt] was hanging out”! (ibid). So if Postal had merely seen “Oswald” out of the corner of her eye, how on Earth was she able to describe all of the above? The simple answer is that she did not see “Oswald” out of the corner of her eye, but actually got a good view of him. But, ironically, she also testified that she did not see him enter the theatre.

    Another pertinent piece of information which Myers omits is that when researcher Jones Harris allegedly interviewed Postal in 1963, Harris asked her if she had sold Oswald a ticket for the theater. Upon hearing the question, Postal burst into tears. When Harris asked her again if she had sold him a ticket, he received the same response. The obvious implication of Postal’s reaction is that she did sell a ticket to Oswald. Although this reviewer discusses evidence further on in this review which casts doubt on Harris’s credibility as far as the wallet containing identification for Oswald and Hidell is concerned, Postal’s own testimony as described above suggests that she did in fact sell Oswald a ticket. In fact, in both her affidavit to the DPD and in her interview with the FBI on February 29, 1964, she claimed that she had seen/noticed Oswald duck into the Theater (WCD 735, page 264), (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 21) . As the reader can see, Postal is a problematic witness. And it appears to be that she did sell Oswald a ticket.

    Which makes Johnny Brewer problematic. Brewer testified that he had seen Oswald duck into the theater without paying for a ticket (WC Volume VII, page 4). However, he also testified that he had asked Postal if she sold him a ticket (ibid). When Counsel Joseph Ball enquired why Brewer had asked Postal if she sold Oswald a ticket, he said that he didn’t know! (ibid, page 5). The notion that Brewer would have to ask Postal if she had sold a ticket to Oswald, when he already knew the answer is far fetched. Brewer, along with Warren “Butch” Burroughs, who worked behind the concession stand inside the theater, then allegedly searched the theater to find Oswald (With Malice, Chapter 6). After they were unable to find him, Postal called the police (ibid). One important detail which Myers never mentions in his book is that Brewer told author Ian Griggs during an interview in 1996 that when he allegedly observed Oswald standing outside his store, there were two men from IBM in the store with him (Griggs, No Case to Answer, page 58). According to researcher Lee Farley, one of the two so-called “IBM men” was quite possibly Igor Vaganov (see the thread entitled Igor Vaganov on John Simkin’s education forum). This reviewer believes that Vaganov was likely one of the two “IBM” men in the store, and that the purpose of these two men was to alert Brewer that they had seen a man enter the theater with a gun looking like he was trying to hide from the police, so that Brewer would then alert the theater staff to call the DPD in order for Oswald to be arrested.

    Readers should keep in mind that when Warren Commission counsel David Belin asked Brewer how he found out about President Kennedy’s assassination, he testified that; “We were listening to a transistor radio there in the store…” (WC Volume VII, page 2). Belin however, didn’t both to ask Brewer who was in the store with him. Although Postal and Brewer were the two people who purportedly led the DPD to the Theater, the DPD never bothered to take affidavits from them on the day of the assassination. In fact, Postal and Brewer provided their affidavits to the DPD on December 4 and 6, 1963, respectively (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Items 16 and 21). On the other hand, George Applin, who witnessed Oswald’s arrest inside the Texas Theater, provided the DPD an affidavit on the day of the assassination (Ibid, Folder 2, Item 3). Similarly, many of the people who witnessed the President’s assassination provided affidavits on the day of the assassination. Yet, incredibly, Postal and Brewer provided affidavits to the DPD over a week following the assassination. Curiously, there doesn’t appear to be an affidavit from Warren “Butch” Burroughs amongst the Dallas Municipal archives. Furthermore, according to both Warren Burroughs and a theater patron named Jack Davis, Oswald may have been inside the theater much sooner than when Brewer allegedly saw him outside his store at about 1:36 pm looking “funny/scared”

    After the police arrived at the Theater, the first Officer to approach Oswald as he was sitting down was Nick McDonald. Although Johnny Brewer was credited with pointing Oswald out to the DPD Officers inside the theater, Myers writes in his endnotes that the Dallas Morning News and the Dallas Times Herald published an article two days after the assassination, in which McDonald was quoted as saying; “A man sitting near the front, and I still don’t know who it was, tipped me [that] the man I wanted was sitting on the third row from the rear on the ground floor and not the balcony.” However, Brewer testified that he pointed Oswald out to the officers as he was standing on the stage of the theater (WC Volume VII, page 6) If McDonald’s account is true, then the obvious implication is that Brewer wasn’t the man who pointed Oswald out to the police. Myers evidently wants his readers to believe that the man was in fact Johnny Brewer, but doesn’t mention that Brewer was standing on the stage when he allegedly pointed Oswald out to the Officers.

    When Officer McDonald testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed he ordered Oswald to stand up, after which Oswald raised both of his hands and then allegedly yelled out “Well, it is all over now” (WC Volume III, page 300). Although McDonald also wrote in his arrest report to DPD Chief Jesse Curry that Oswald said “Well, it’s all over now”, this is not what McDonald initially claimed Oswald had said to him (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 32). When McDonald was interviewed by WFAA-TV on the day following the assassination, he explained that Oswald said “This is it” (See the video). What’s most telling about the interview is that McDonald looks down to the table and sounds nervous (both of which are indications of lying) as he explains that Oswald said “This is it”. Myers doesn’t mention this discrepancy to his readers. Furthermore, when McDonald was interviewed by Lloyd Shearer, he told Shearer that he heard Oswald say “Now, it’s all over” (Oakland Tribune Parade, March 8, 1964). When Gerald Hill testified before the Warren Commission, he informed Counsel David Belin that he thought McDonald and Officer Thomas Hutson (who was also involved in Oswald’s arrest), said that they heard Oswald say “This is it”; but that he didn’t hear this himself (WC Volume VII, page 51). However, when Hutson was asked by Counsel David Belin if he remembered hearing Oswald say anything, Hutson said that he didn’t (WC Volume VII, page 32). It would therefore seem that Hill may have been embellishing.

    When Ian Griggs interviewed Johnny Brewer in 1996, Brewer told him that he heard Oswald shout out “It’s all over”; or words to that effect (Griggs, No Case to Answer, page 64). But when Brewer testified before the Warren Commission, Brewer merely claimed that he heard some hollering, and that he couldn’t make out exactly what Oswald said (WC Volume VII, page 6). Contained within the John Armstrong Baylor collection is an interview with a little known witness named David. According to David, he was with a friend named Bob in the theater when Oswald was arrested (John Armstrong Baylor collection, tab entitled: ‘David’). Evidently, David and Bob are the two young boys spotted by Officer Thomas Hutson sitting at the rear of the theater (WC Volume VII, page 31). David claimed that when McDonald approached Oswald and asked him to stand-up, the only thing he recalled Oswald saying was words similar to “All right”, and made no mention of him saying anything else The reader should bear in mind that there doesn’t appear to be any direct corroboration for the presence of Bob and David in the theater when Oswald was arrested. Yet, none of the above is even mentioned by Myers.

    In his report to Dallas Sheriff Bill Decker, Deputy Sheriff Buddy Walthers, who also allegedly witnessed Oswald’s arrest, wrote that the only thing he heard Oswald say was “It’s all over” (WC Volume XIX, Decker exhibit 5323). However, after reading through Walther’s report, it isn’t clear whether Walthers was saying Oswald said “it’s all over” before or after he was arrested; and as this reviewer will explain in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill, former Dallas deputy sheriffs Bill Courson and Roger Craig have disputed Walther’s claim that he was inside the theater when Oswald was arrested. Readers should keep in mind that none of the other officers involved in Oswald’s arrest, or theater patrons John Gibson and George Applin who witnessed his arrest, claimed they heard Oswald shout out either “This is it” or “Well, it’s all over now” as McDonald claimed.

    As Myers writes in his book, FBI agent Robert M. Barrett, who also witnessed Oswald’s arrest, claimed in the report he wrote out on the day of the assassination that Oswald shouted in a loud voice; “Kill all the sons of bitches!” (With Malice, Chapter 6). But what Myers doesn’t tell his readers is that no other witness to Oswald’s arrest said that they heard him shout out words similar to what Barrett claimed he did; and that Barrett was almost certainly lying. In conclusion, it is readily apparent that McDonald was lying when he claimed that Oswald said; “This is it” or “Well, it’s all over now”. It is utterly inconceivable that McDonald could have confused the expressions “This is it” with “Well, it’s all over now” as they sound nothing alike. But Myers cannot admit that McDonald (and Barrett for that matter) were lying; as their agenda is to convince researchers that Oswald was guilty of killing Tippit beyond any doubt. Readers are encouraged to read through this article on this reviewer’s blog, which further demonstrates that McDonald was a liar.

    We now come to the question of whether or not Oswald tried to shoot Officer McDonald after McDonald ordered him to stand up; and whether Oswald did in fact have a gun when he was arrested. Although Myers admits in his endnotes that McDonald told Eddie Barker from CBS that he prevented “Oswald’s” gun from firing when his hand was allegedly jammed between the primer of the gun and the hammer, he nevertheless omits that when detective Paul Bentley was interviewed by reporters on the day following the assassination, he claimed that he prevented it from firing! (WCE 2157). However, Bentley also claimed that “…we [evidently referring to McDonald] got a thumb or something in between the hammer and the firing pin so that it mashed the firing [of the gun]…” and that the hammer of the gun “just snapped slightly” (ibid). But despite being allegedly confused about who had prevented the gun from firing, Bentley then almost humorously said; “…my hand was across to prevent it from firing…we don’t know if it was my thumb, finger or hand. I got a bruised hand from it. I don’t know if it was the thumb or the finger.” (ibid). Even though a photograph taken inside the Texas theater shows Bentley standing to the right of Oswald as he is apparently being handcuffed, there is no corroboration from McDonald or anyone else that Bentley prevented the gun from firing as he described (see Gerald Hill Exhibit A). It is therefore probable that Bentley was lying.

    Myers writes in his endnotes that WFAA-TV cameraman, Tom Alyea, claimed that he had seen a bandaged wound on McDonald’s hand during a filmed interview, but that when Alyea wanted to film it, McDonald objected. Although this would seem to corroborate McDonald’s claim that his hand had been jammed between the hammer and the firing pin of the revolver, Alyea described it as looking like someone had jabbed an ice-pick into it. In other words, it didn’t appear as though it was caused by the hammer of a revolver. If McDonald already had this injury before the scuffle with Oswald, then perhaps this is what gave him the idea later on to claim that the hammer of the gun had struck the fleshy part of his hand. Also, given that McDonald made no mention of his hand preventing the gun from firing in either his report to DPD chief Jesse Curry or during his testimony before the Warren Commission, it is apparent he has a credibility problem. McDonald also testified that the four inch scar on his left cheek was made by “Oswald’s” revolver during the scuffle inside the theater (WC Volume III, page 300). However, according to FBI agent Robert M. Barrett, McDonald told him that the graze on his left cheek was caused by Oswald punching him in the face, and knocking him against the seat; and not by the gun (WCD 5, page 84). Myers does not mention this contradiction in his book.

    Although McDonald implies in his report to DPD Chief Jesse Curry that officers Ray Hawkins, Charles Walker, and Thomas Hutson were with him when Oswald allegedly pulled out the revolver from his belt, during his testimony before the Warren Commission, he claimed that he had already disarmed Oswald by the time the aforementioned Officers had arrived to assist him (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 32, WC Volume III, page 300). However, Hawkins, Walker, and Hutson all testified that Oswald had pulled the revolver out of his belt after they had arrived (WC Volume VII, pages 32, 39, and 94). Although McDonald took full credit for disarming Oswald, officer Hutson testified that McDonald and “somebody else” had taken the gun out of Oswald’s hand, but added that he “couldn’t say exactly” (ibid, page 32). Walker also testified that as several hands were on the gun, a detective “…reached over and pulled the gun away from everybody, pulled it away from everyone, best I can recall” (WC Volume VII, page 40). However, McDonald told the Warren Commission that after he had disarmed Oswald, he handed the gun to detective Bob Carroll (WC Volume III, page 301). When Carroll testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that he saw a gun pointing at him (towards the south aisle of the theater) and then grabbed it and jerked it away from whoever had it (WC Volume VII, page 20).

    Myers selectively quotes from the testimony of Officer Charles Walker before the Warren Commission, during which Walker claimed that after Oswald pulled the revolver from under his shirt, it was about waist high and pointed at about a forty-five degree angle (With Malice, Chapter 6). Walker also wrote in his report to Chief Curry that the gun was being waved around approximately waist high (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 47). Although Walker also testified that one the Officers had commanded Oswald to “let go of the gun”, to which Oswald allegedly responded “I can’t” (With Malice, Chapter 6). Whilst Myers has no problem using this claim by Walker, he nevertheless neglects to tell his readers that there is no corroboration for Walker’s claim; let alone that no officer is on record claiming that he had ordered Oswald to let go of the gun. Officer Hutson told the Warren Commission that Oswald was pointing the gun towards the theater screen when he allegedly heard the snap of the gun’s hammer, and that Oswald wasn’t aiming the gun at any Officer in particular (WC Volume VII, page 32). However, when McDonald was interviewed by Eddie Barker from CBS in 1964, he demonstrated to Barker that Oswald had allegedly aimed the gun at him (towards the south aisle of the theatre), and then the gun allegedly snapped as he and Oswald were down in the theater seats scuffling (See the footage).

    Hutson also testified that the only officer who could have come between the line of fire of the gun as it was allegedly aimed towards the screen was Ray Hawkins (ibid). Although Charles Walker testified that; “…Hawkins was in the general direction of the gun”, and that the gun was pointing slightly towards the theater screen, this is not what Hawkins claimed during his own testimony (WC Volume VII, page 39). Hawkins, who had approached Oswald and McDonald from the row of seats in front of them, testified that when the gun came out of Oswald’s belt “…it was pulled across to their right, or toward the south aisle of the theatre” and made no mention of the gun being aimed in the direction of the theater screen or towards him (WC Volume VII, page 94).

    When Johnny Brewer testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that he observed a gun in Oswald’s hand aimed “up in the air” (WC Volume VII, page 6). During his interview with Ian Griggs in 1996, he now claimed that Oswald was trying to shoot McDonald in the head (Griggs, No Case to Answer, page 64). Yet, none of the other witnesses and the arresting Officers, let alone Nick McDonald, claimed that this is what they had seen during the scuffle. Moreover, Brewer’s claim is directly contradicted by Charles Walker, who stated that the gun was pointed about waist high. In his report to Chief Curry, detective John B. Toney wrote that Oswald had a pistol in his right hand, with his right arm “pinioned” across McDonald’s left shoulder (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 43). It is also worth noting that Toney told author Larry Sneed many years later that he had seen a gun in “…someone’s hand over someone’s shoulder, and someone was holding the arm.” (Sneed, No More Silence, page 308). Not only do Toney’s remarks contradict what McDonald demonstrated to Eddie Barker in the aforementioned film footage, but none of Toney’s fellow officers offered corroboration for this claim.

    John Gibson, who was a witness to Oswald’s arrest, testified before the Warren Commission that as the DPD Officers walking along the aisles of the theatre, Oswald was standing in the aisle with a gun in his hand! (WC Volume VII, pages 71 and 72). When Counsel Joseph Ball asked him if any of the DPD Officers had a hold of it that time, Gibson testified that he didn’t believe so (ibid, page 72). Gibson’s account of what he allegedly witnessed is bizarre, for not one DPD Officer or any other witness claimed that Oswald was standing in the aisle with the gun in his hand as the Officers were walking along the aisles! Readers should keep in mind that the aforementioned self-proclaimed witness named David, claimed that Oswald pulled a gun, but didn’t see it until it was “taken away from him” It would therefore seem that David had merely assumed that Oswald pulled a gun, and as this reviewer will explain in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill, this was by all likelihood the case. As for Dallas deputy Sheriff Buddy Walthers, he wrote in his report to Sheriff Bill Decker that when he reached the scuffle with Oswald; “…I could see a gun on the floor with 2 or 3 hands on it…” (WC Volume XIX, Decker exhibit 5323). Walthers also wrote that he thought it was detective Bob Carroll who reached down to the floor and got the gun. But when Walthers testified before the Warren Commission, he was now “real sure” that it was Carroll who got the gun, and curiously left out that the gun was on the floor (WC Volume VII, pages 547 and 548).

    Let’s now look at the statements by witness George Jefferson Applin. In his first day affidavit to the DPD, he allegedly wrote that Oswald “…had his arm around the officer’s left shoulder and had a pistol in his hand” (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 2, Item 3). But in his affidavit to the USSS on December 1, 1963, Applin claimed that during the scuffle between Oswald and McDonald “…one of the two had a pistol in his right hand” (WCD 87, page 558). In other words, Applin was saying that he wasn’t sure who had a hold of the gun. In his interview with the FBI on December 16, 1963, Applin allegedly claimed that Oswald pulled out a gun and aimed it at McDonald’s head, and that he thought the gun was on McDonald’s shoulder when Oswald allegedly pulled the trigger (WCD 206, page 69). Aside from what Johnny Brewer told Ian Griggs in 1996, there is no corroboration for the claim that Oswald pointed the gun at McDonald’s head. By the same token, apart from what John Toney wrote in his report to DPD chief Jesse Curry and what he told author Larry Sneed, there is no corroboration from anyone, let alone from McDonald, that Oswald had placed the gun on McDonald’s shoulder. Therefore, the aforementioned statements Applin allegedly made to the FBI should be taken with a grain of salt.

    When Applin testified before the Warren Commission, he made no mention of seeing the gun on McDonald’s shoulder or that he had seen Oswald aim the gun at McDonald’s head. In fact, when Counsel Joseph Ball asked him who pulled out the revolver, Applin claimed; “I guess it was Oswald, because -for one reason, that he had on a short sleeve shirt, and I [had] seen a man’s arm that was connected to the gun.” (WC Volume VII, page 89). Although it isn’t clear, it seems that Applin thought that the man with the short sleeved shirt was the one who had the gun, and that he thought Oswald was wearing a short sleeved shirt. However, Oswald was arrested wearing a long sleeved shirt (WCE 150). Similarly, on the day of the assassination, McDonald was photographed wearing a long sleeved shirt as he was talking to Dallas Morning News reporter Jim Ewell. As far as Applin’s claim (in his first day affidavit) that he had seen Oswald with his arm around McDonald’s shoulder and with a gun in his hand is concerned, the reader should keep in mind that according to DPD Lt. E.L. Cunningham, the officer who took Applin’s affidavit was detective John Toney; the same John Toney who claimed that he had seen a gun in his Oswald’s hand with his right arm pinioned across McDonald’s left shoulder (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 15). Given the similarity between what Toney wrote in his report to Chief Curry and what Applin allegedly claimed in his affidavit, it is entirely conceivable that Toney altered what Applin actually told him.

    None of these many contradictions and inconsistencies between the statements by the aforementioned officers and witnesses is ever mentioned by Myers. Given the fact that he is a rabid advocate of Oswald’s guilt in the Tippit murder, Myers will probably dismiss all of the above contradictions and inconsistencies as being irrelevant. However, the truth is that no intellectually honest researcher would (or should) dismiss them as being irrelevant; and when they are taken in conjunction with all of the evidence discussed in this review that the DPD framed Oswald for Tippit’s murder, there is reason to believe that Oswald never had a revolver with him when he was arrested inside the theater. In a caption to one of the photographs taken outside the theater by Stuart Reed, as Oswald is being dragged towards a police car with his face covered by Charles Walker’s hat, Myers writes that detective Bob Carroll is holding onto Oswald’s revolver (With Malice, Chapter 6). Whilst the photograph does show Carroll holding onto a gun, his own statements rule out that this was “Oswald’s” revolver.

    In his report to DPD chief Jesse Curry, Carroll wrote that; “I grabbed the pistol and stuck it in my belt and then continued to assist in the subduing of Oswald” (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 12). When Carroll testified before the Warren Commission, he confirmed that; “…I saw a pistol pointing at me so I reached and grabbed the pistol and jerked the pistol away and stuck it in my belt and then I grabbed Oswald” (WC Volume VII, page 20). He further added that; “The first time I saw the weapon, it was pointed in my direction, and I reached and grabbed it and stuck it into my belt… At the time, I was assisting in the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald” (ibid, page 24). By omitting these statements from his book, Myers deceives his readers. In the report he wrote out on the day of the assassination, FBI agent Robert M. Barrett stated that; “One of the Officers took a .38 Calibre snub nose revolver out of Oswald’s right hand and handed it to detective [Bob] Carroll”. However, as discussed previously, Barrett lied when he wrote in his report that he heard Oswald yell in a loud voice “Kill all the sons of bitches”, and therefore, his claim that someone handed Carroll “Oswald’s” gun should be taken with a grain of salt (WCD 5, page 84).

    On a further note, the gun which Carroll was photographed holding outside of the theater appears to have a longer barrel than “Oswald’s” revolver, with what appears to be sunlight reflecting off of the barrel towards the muzzle end. As for whose gun Carroll was holding outside of the theater, this review will discuss this issue in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill. In that same essay, this reviewer will be arguing that Hill framed Oswald for Tippit’s murder after he (or possibly one of his co-conspirators from the DPD) obtained the revolver Oswald allegedly had in his possession when arrested from Tippit’s real murderer. The reader should keep in mind that theater patron Jack Davis, told author Jim Marrs that Oswald had first sat next to him, but then got up and sat next to another person. (Crossfire, p. 353) In fact, Davis told Marrs that he thought it was strange that Oswald would sit right next to him inside a big theater with many seats to choose from (ibid). Warren “Butch” Burroughs told Marrs that Oswald had also sat next to a pregnant lady. Oswald’s actions imply that he thought he was to contact someone inside the theatre. And as many researchers, such as Greg Parker have noted, when Oswald was arrested, he had in his possession a torn box top with the label “Cox’s Fort Worth” printed on it, and that Oswald may have been using this to identify himself to the person he thought he was to meet inside the theater (see thread entitled Neely St Questions on John Simkin’s education forum).

    On a further note, the DPD took a list of the names of all the witnesses inside the theater after Oswald was arrested, but the list is now nowhere to be found. And the only two patrons who were interviewed concerning what they witnessed were John Gibson and George Jefferson Applin (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 35). In this reviewer’s opinion, the reason the list was made to disappear was to conceal the identity of any would be conspirators inside the theater. Keep in mind that officer McDonald was quoted by the Dallas Morning News and the Dallas Times Herald as saying that a man sitting in the front row of the theater pointed Oswald out to him as the man he was seeking. It is also worth keeping in mind that George Applin testified that he had told a man sitting in the back row of the theater; “Buddy, you’d better move. There is a gun”, and that after doing so, the man calmly remained seated and didn’t budge (WC Volume VII, page 91). Given the man’s behaviour, the possibility exists that he too may have had some involvement in Oswald’s frame-up.

    Let’s now examine what Oswald allegedly said after he was removed from the theater, words which disinformation shills like David Von Pein have used against him. The five officers who took Oswald to DPD headquarters were Bob Carroll, Kenneth E. Lyon, Gerald Hill, Paul Bentley, and Charles T. Walker. Oswald was sitting in the rear seat, with Bentley sitting to his left and Walker sitting to his right. Myers quotes from K.E Lyon’s reports to DPD chief Jesse Curry in which he claimed that whilst en route to Police headquarters, Oswald admitted to carrying a gun inside the theater (With Malice, Chapter 6). Detective Bob Carroll made this same claim in his own report to Chief Curry (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Item 12). Myers also quotes from Charles Walker’s Warren Commission testimony, where he claimed that Oswald admitted to carrying a gun inside the theater (ibid). However, Walker didn’t mention this in his report to Chief Curry.

    When Paul Bentley was interviewed by WFAA-TV on the day following the assassination, he also claimed that Oswald admitted to carrying a gun inside the theater. Given all the evidence presented in this review for Oswald being framed for Tippit’s murder, these statements should not be considered credible. The reader should also bear in mind that when Gerald Hill was interviewed by reporters shortly following Oswald’s arrest, he made no mention of Oswald admitting to carrying a gun inside the theater (WCE 2160). In fact, Hill complained that Oswald “…wouldn’t even admit he pulled the trigger on the gun in the theatre” (ibid). When Hill was interviewed by Bob Whitten of KCRA radio on the day of the assassination, he again neglected to mention that Oswald admitted to carrying a gun inside the theater; even though he did claim that Oswald allegedly said “This is it” after Officer McDonald approached him, and that Oswald admitted to being a communist (WCD 1210).

    Myers also quotes from Charles Walker’s testimony before the Warren Commission, during which Walker claimed that after Oswald was told that he was suspected of killing Tippit, Oswald made the remarks; “I hear they burn for murder” and “Well, they say it only takes a second to die” (With Malice, Chapter 6). Although Gerald Hill testified that Oswald made a statement similar to “You only fry for that” or “You can fry for that”, Hill made no mention of this to reporters on the day of the assassination, or during his interview with Bob Whitten (WC Volume VII, page 58). In fact, Hill told Whitten that when they had questioned Oswald inside the car about Killing Tippit, Oswald allegedly made the remark; “I don’t have to tell you all anything”, and made no mention of Oswald saying what both he and Walker claimed he did when they testified before the Warren Commission (WCD 1210). Furthermore, Hill made no mention of Oswald saying the above when he was questioned by reporters on the day of the assassination, telling them instead that Oswald “…did not make any definite statement other than demanding to see a lawyer and demanding his rights…” (WCE 2160).

    When detective Paul Bentley was interviewed by reporters on the night of the assassination, he told them that after Oswald was arrested, he just said “This is it, it’s all over with now” (WCE 2157). Similarly, when Bentley was interviewed the following day by WFAA-TV, he stated that Oswald was advised in the car that he was being placed in jail for suspicion of murdering Tippit; but made no mention of Oswald saying what Walker and Hill told the Warren Commission he did. There was also no mention of these alleged comments by Oswald in the arrest reports by Carroll, Lyon, Hill, Bentley, and Walker to Chief Curry (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Items 4 , 12, 22, 28, and 47). During his testimony, Walker claimed that they never put the conversations they had with suspects in their reports to Chief Curry (WC Volume VII, page 42). However, the evidence discussed throughout this book suggests that Walker was deceptive.

    VII: A bird in the hand

    In this chapter, Myers discusses the events subsequent to Oswald’s arrival at DPD headquarters after his arrest. Myers writes that shorty following Oswald’s arrival at DPD headquarters, he was interrogated by detective Jim Leavelle; the homicide detective who was placed in charge of investigating Tippit’s murder (With Malice, Chapter 7). This is based on Myers’ interview with Leavelle, and was probably one of the most dishonest statements made in the book. When Leavelle testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that the first time he had ever sat in on an interrogation with Oswald was on Sunday morning, November 24, 1963 (WC Volume VII, page 268). In fact, when Counsel Joseph Ball asked Leavelle if he had ever spoken to Oswald before this interrogation, he stated; “No; I had never talked to him before”! (ibid) Leavelle then stated during his testimony that; “…the only time I had connections with Oswald was this Sunday morning [November 24, 1963]. I never had [the] occasion to talk with him at any time…” (ibid, page 269).

    There is also nothing in Leavelle’s own report to DPD chief Curry about him interrogating Oswald shorty following Oswald’s arrival at DPD headquarters on Friday (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 8, Items 1 and 2). Myers is undoubtedly aware that Leavelle testified that he didn’t speak to Oswald before Sunday, but chooses instead to deceive his readers. But let’s understand why Myers does this. It is evident throughout his book that Myers’ agenda is to portray Oswald as the man who killed Tippit, and that the DPD did not frame him for Tippit’s murder. Since Leavelle was the homicide detective put in charge of investigating Tippit’s murder, the last thing Myers would want to admit is that Leavelle was unreliable, or an outright liar. It should also come as no surprise that Myers cannot tell the truth about Leavelle, as he is not even capable of telling readers the truth about where Howard Brennan was sitting when he allegedly witnessed Oswald firing his rifle at the President. Whilst Myers never questions Leavelle’s integrity as a DPD Officer, the reader should keep in mind that when author Joseph McBride interviewed Leavelle, Leavelle told him that the President’s assassination was no different than a South Texas “nigger” killing (McBride, Into the Nightmare, page 240). This remark reveals that Leavelle was a racist who was not really concerned about who killed President Kennedy.

    Myers also deceives his readers by omitting that DPD detectives, Gus Rose and Richard Stovall, wrote in their report to Chief Curry that they had briefly spoken to Oswald after he had been brought into the homicide Office (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 1, Item 3). Rose and Stovall confirmed that they had briefly spoken to Oswald shortly following his arrival, when they testified before the Warren Commission (WC Volume VII, pages 187 and 228). In his report to Chief Curry, Lt. T.L. Baker wrote that Oswald was brought into the interrogation room, from where he was “being held” by detectives Rose and Stovall, and made no mention of Leavelle having interrogated Oswald (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 5, Folder 5, Item 4). Suffice it to say, this reviewer knows of no reason to believe that Leavelle had interrogated Oswald shortly following his arrival at DPD headquarters.

    Myers explains that following Oswald’s arrest, Lt. Colonel Robert E. Jones of the U.S. Army’s 112th Military intelligence group (MIG) learned that a man named A.J Hidell “…had been arrested or come to the attention of law enforcement agencies.” (With Malice, Chapter 7). Myers writes that colonel Jones checked the MIG indices and discovered that there was an index on Hidell which “cross-referenced” with a file on Oswald; who allegedly used the name Alek James Hidell as an alias (ibid). Jones then allegedly pulled the file on Hidell, and notified the San Antonio FBI Office that he had some information (ibid). Colonel Jones testified before the HSCA that military intelligence officials had opened a file on Oswald after they allegedly received a report from the New Orleans Police department that Oswald had been arrested in connection with his activities associated with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (ibid). Whilst Myers apparently considers this to be the gospel truth, Australian researcher Greg Parker has pointed out that Mrs. Marcelle Madden, who worked for the identification division of the New Orleans Police department, informed the FBI agent John Quigley on November 26, 1963, that she had no identification record for a man named Alek James Hidell (Reopen Kennedy case forum, thread entitled Hidell: The frame was bold and ruthless). Although Myers doesn’t mention this to his readers, he does explain in his endnotes that Army intelligence “routinely” destroyed Oswald’s file.

    Myers then moves onto a discussion of DPD Captain Will Fritz, in which he praises Fritz’s legacy as the long-time Captain of the DPD’s Homicide and Robbery bureau. Myers writes that Fritz ran his department “with an iron fist”, and that under his command, the homicide bureau had a 90% success rate at solving murders (With Malice, Chapter 7). What Myers doesn’t mention to his readers is the horrible legacy of the DPD with Henry Wade as the district attorney of Dallas and Fritz as the department chief (as discussed previously). Myers also writes that; “For Captain Fritz, modern technology had no place in his squad room. A calm, disarming manner was his weapon.” (ibid). Evidently, this is Myers’ explanation for why Fritz never tape recorded any of his interrogations with Oswald. As the man who was charged with murdering the President of the United States of America, Fritz; along with the FBI and USSS agents who interrogated Oswald, should have tape recorded the answers Oswald gave to the various questions he was allegedly asked. There is simply no excuse for why the interviews were not tape recorded. Instead, researchers must rely on the typed summary reports by the interrogators, and their testimonies before the Warren Commission. Naturally, Myers doesn’t point this out to his readers.

    In his discussion of the credibility of Helen Markham as an eyewitness to Tippit’s murder, Myers admits that her statements are “…laced with inaccurate and inconsistent details” but omits other pieces of evidence which cast doubt on Markham’s reliability as a witness (ibid). For one thing, Myers writes that when Markham testified before the Warren Commission, she identified Oswald as the number two man in the line-up; but omits that Warren Commission Counsel Joseph Ball had asked her the following leading question during her testimony; “Was there a number two man in their [the line-up]” (WC Volume III, page 310). Ball asked Markham this question after she claimed that she didn’t recognise the men in the line-up from their faces, and had never seen any of them before. But after he asks her this question, she now testifies that she recognised Oswald “Mostly from his face.” (ibid, page 311). Markham also testified that she thought Ball wanted her to describe their clothing, which is allegedly why Markham claimed that she hadn’t previously seen any of the men in the line-up; even though he had not yet asked her that question! (ibid). It is obvious from reading Markham’s testimony that she was an unreliable witness. In fact, during a debate with Mark Lane, Joseph Ball once famously remarked that he thought Markham was “an utter screwball”. Myers does not note this to his readers.

    Myers also omits that when Markham was interviewed by FBI agent Bardwell Odum on the day of the assassination, she told him that the killer was about 18 years old, with black hair, and had a red complexion (WCD 5, page 79). However, Markham denied during her testimony before the Warren Commission that she told Odum the killer had a ruddy complexion. But despite her denial, during a filmed interview for the program The Men who Killed Kennedy, Markham explained that the killer had a ruddy (red) complexion (View Markham’s interview). Curiously, when Domingo Benavides testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that the killer’s skin looked “…a little bit ruddier than mine” (WC Volume VI, page 451). He also testified that the killer’s complexion was “…a little bit darker than average” (ibid). Yet, Oswald’s complexion did not appear to be ruddy/red or what can be described (in this reviewer’s opinion) as a little bit darker than average. The reader should also keep in mind that when Julia Postal testified before the Warren Commission, she claimed that the man who ducked into the theater looked ruddy to her (WC Volume VII, page 11). As Myers writes in his endnotes, Bernard Haire, the owner of Bernie’s hobby house which was located a few doors east of the Texas Theater, claimed he saw a man with a “flushed” appearance. This raises the distinct possibility that the man Haire saw was the same man Julia Postal observed ducking into the theatre. This reviewer will elaborate on this in the upcoming essay on Gerald Hill.

    Myers also takes a swipe at Mark Lane for (what he calls) badgering Helen Markham by asking her three times if she had ever told anybody that Tippit’s killer was short/stocky and had bushy hair (With Malice, Chapter 7). But at the same time, Myers apparently has no qualms about Warren Commission counsel David Belin repeatedly asking Virginia Davis if her sister-in-law, Barbara Davis, had telephoned the DPD before or after they had seen Tippit’s killer cut across their lawn (WC Volume VII, pages 455 to 468). Myers also never mentions that in the aforementioned film interview for The Men who Killed Kennedy program, Markham claimed that the killer was “a short guy”.

    Following his discussion of Markham, Myers moves on to a discussion of the identification of Oswald as Tippit’s killer in a line-up viewed by Ted Callaway and Sam Guinyard. Myers considers Callaway to be a reliable witness, writing that; “Ted Callaway has been one of the few Tippit witnesses whose story has remained accurate and unwavering for more than thirty-three years.” (With Malice, Chapter 8). Myers can pretend that Callaway is a reliable witness because he never notes the contradictions between the observations of Callaway and Guinyard, both of whom allegedly observed the killer fleeing south on Patton Street after Tippit was shot. At the time of the assassination, Callaway was the manager of the Harris Bros Auto sales at 501 East Jefferson Blvd, located on the northeast corner of the Patton Street/Jefferson Blvd. intersection (WC Volume III, page 352).

    Sam Guinyard testified that he worked there as a porter, and was polishing a car when he heard the shooting (WC Volume VII, page 395). According to Callaway’s testimony, Tippit’s killer crossed from the east side of Patton Street over to the west side of the street at a point just south of where William Scoggins cab was parked when Scoggins witnessed the shooting (Callaway marked this on WCE 537). In Chapter four of his book, Myers illustrates the killer’s flight path, along with the locations of Callaway and Guinyard when they allegedly saw him walking south on Patton Street; and the location of a third man named B.D. Searcy, who according to Callaway, was standing behind him when Tippit’s killer went by them (WC Volume III, page 354). Evidently, Myers based the killer’s flight path on WCE 735.

    According to Myers’ illustration, the killer had already crossed over to the west side of Patton Street when he went passed Sam Guinyard’s position. However, Guinyard testified that when he observed the gunman, he was on the east side of Patton Street, and he was about ten feet away from him when he observed him! (WC Volume VII, page 398). Guinyard further explained that the killer crossed over to the west side of Patton Street when he got to about five feet from the corner of the intersection of Patton Street and Jefferson Blvd. (ibid, page 397). Yet, Callaway testified, and illustrated on WCE 735, that the killer was already on the west side of Patton Street when he went by him (WC Volume III, page 353). Obviously, both men can not be correct.

    Callaway testified that he hollered at the gunman; “Hey man, what the hell is going on”, after which the gunman turned to look at him, shrugging his shoulders, and said something to him which Callaway claimed he couldn’t understand (ibid, pages 353 and 354). Callaway stated that he then told B.D. Searcy to keep an eye on the gunman and to follow him, after which he ran to the Tippit murder scene (ibid, page 354). On the contrary, Guinyard testified that it was Callaway who followed the gunman; “…trying to see which way he was going”, after which they allegedly went to the Tippit murder scene together (WC Volume VII, page 398). Furthermore, Guinyard made no mention of Callaway hollering at the killer, and the killer looking at Callaway and then saying something to him. When counsel Joseph Ball showed Guinyard the dark brown shirt Oswald was wearing when he was arrested at the Texas theatre, he testified that he saw Oswald wearing it as he came down Patton Street (ibid, page 400). Callaway on the other hand, testified that he couldn’t see this shirt! (WC Volume III, page 356). When Counsel Joseph Ball asked Guinyard if all the men in the line-up were about the same color, Guinyard exclaimed twice that; “…they wasn’t all about the same color.” (WC Volume VII, page 399). However, Oswald and the three men who were with him in the line-up; DPD detective Richard Clark, DPD detective William Perry, and DPD jail clerk Don Ables, were all Caucasians (see WCE 1054). If one is to believe that Guinyard’s eye sight was such that he was able to observe small differences in the skin tones of the four men in the line-up, one must simultaneously ignore all of the above contradictions between Callaway’s observations and his own.

    None of the above contradictions between the observations of Callaway and Guinyard, which raises serious questions about their credibility as witnesses, (and if they actually viewed Oswald in a line-up), are ever mentioned by Myers. Although the line-up allegedly seen by Callaway and Guinyard was conducted at approximately 6:30 pm on the night of the assassination, when Callaway was interviewed by FBI agent Arthur E. Carter on February 23, 1964, he told Carter that he recalled the line-up was conducted on the night after Tippit’s murder (WCD 735, page 262). In other words, Callaway was implying that the line-up was held on the night of November 23, 1963. However, Callaway would go on to testify that it was held on the night of the assassination. The reader should also bear in mind that when Domingo Benavides testified before the Warren Commission, he explained that after Callaway had gotten into William Scoggins cab to look for the killer with Scoggins, he asked him (Benavides) which way the killer went, but found out later on from Callaway that he did see the killer (WC Volume VI, page 452). If Callaway really did see the killer, he obviously had no reason to ask Benavides which way the killer went. Therefore, Benavides testimony strongly implies that Callaway never actually saw Tippit’s killer.

    Although Myers acknowledges in his endnotes that Benavides testified that Callaway asked him which way the killer went, he then uses Callaway and Jim Leavelle to discredit Benavides as a witness. According to Myers, during an interview in 1996, Callaway told him that Benavides confided to him that he didn’t actually see the gunman as he told the Warren Commission that he had (With Malice, Chapter 7). Myers also quotes from Jim Leavelle’s testimony where Leavelle claimed that; “I think he [Benavides] said he never saw the gunman actually…either that or he [Benavides] told me he could not recognise him, one or the other.” (ibid). Readers should also keep in mind that in his supplementary report on Tippit’s murder (evidently written on the day of the assassination), Leavelle wrote that Benavides didn’t see the killer (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 1, Folder 4, Item 3). Myers can pretend that Callaway and Leavelle are both trustworthy on this issue, because he never explains to his readers the serious credibility issues of both of these men It is apparent to this reviewer that Myers wants to discredit Benavides because he wants to maintain that both Callaway and Leavelle are credible witnesses.

    There are some issues with Benavides own credibility as a witness. For one thing, when Benavides testified before the Warren Commission, Counsel David Belin asked him if WCE 163 (the dark greyish blue jacket which Oswald allegedly wore to the TSBD on the morning of the assassination) was the jacket Tippit’s killer was wearing. To which Benavides responded; “I would say this looks just like it.” (WC Volume VI, page 453). However, Benavides had previously testified that the killer was wearing what appeared to be a light-beige jacket (ibid, page 450). In this reviewer’s opinion, Benavides could conceivably have mistaken the light gray jacket which the killer was wearing (WCE 162) as being a light beige color. Furthermore, the possibility that Belin was misquoted by the court reporter when he allegedly asked Benavides if WCE 163 was the jacket the killer was wearing cannot be ruled out.

    Benavides is also known for taking credit for notifying the DPD radio dispatchers that Tippit had been shot, when in fact it was T.F. Bowley who notified the dispatchers. Although this may seem as if Benavides lied to put himself in the spotlight, the fact is that T.F. Bowley was never called to testify before the Warren Commission. Many researchers, including myself, believe Bowley was avoided because according to his affidavit to the DPD, it was about 1:10 pm when he reported the shooting over the DPD radio; which was much too soon for the “official” time at which Tippit was shot (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 3, Item 14). Therefore, it seems likely that Benavides was coerced into taking credit for reporting the shooting over the radio. Although Benavides never positively identified Oswald as Tippit’s killer when he testified, he nevertheless claimed the killer looked like Oswald (WC Volume VI, page 452).

    Although it is this reviewer’s belief that Ted Callaway and Sam Guinyard never actually observed Tippit’s killer, there is one mystery concerning Callaway that remains. According to the DPD radio transcripts, Officer Howell W. Summers reports that he has an “…eyeball witness to the get-away man; that suspect in this shooting.” (WCE 705/1974). Summers then broadcasted the description of the suspect given to him by the witness over the radio. Although Myers claims that this witness was Ted Callaway, the distinct possibility exists that the witness was in fact B.D. Searcy, who worked at Harris Bros Auto Sales (WCD 735, page 261). Searcy is somewhat of an enigma, as there doesn’t appear to be any FBI and USSS interviews with him, and there also doesn’t appear to be an affidavit by Searcy to the DPD on what he heard and saw. Even though Ted Callaway told the FBI that both he and Searcy were standing on the front porch of the car lot, and even though Callaway was photographed standing on the front porch, there are no photographs depicting Searcy standing on the front porch (ibid, WCD 630, page 38). It is this reviewer’s opinion that Searcy was avoided because, unlike Callaway and Guinyard, he refused to be coaxed into identifying Oswald as Tippit’s killer. The reader should also bear in mind that even though Guinyard identified Oswald as the killer, there doesn’t appear to be an interview of him by the FBI and the USSS, and there doesn’t appear to be any photographs by the FBI showing where Guinyard was standing when he allegedly observed Oswald (WCD 630).

    Following his discussion of the identification of Oswald as Tippit’s killer by Callaway and Guinyard, Myers now moves onto the Davis sister-in-laws, Barbara and Virginia. Both of them allegedly identified Oswald as the killer in a DPD line-up on the evening of the assassination (With Malice, Chapter 7). The Davis sister-in-laws allegedly witnessed Tippit’s killer cut across the lawn of their apartment house, located on the southeast corner of the tenth and Patton Street intersection; emptying shells from the revolver as he did so. Myers writes that some critics have questioned the powers of observation of the two women because Barbara Davis testified before the Warren Commission that she observed the killer wearing a dark coat; even though he was actually wearing a light gray jacket (With Malice, Chapter 7). What Myers omits is that when counsel Joseph Ball asked her if Oswald was dressed the same in the police line-up as he was when she allegedly observed him after Tippit was shot, she replied; “All except he didn’t have a black coat on when I saw him in the line-up” (WC Volume III, page 347). In other words, Davis claimed that Tippit’s killer was wearing a black coat. It is incomprehensible to this reviewer that she could have mistaken or misremembered the light gray jacket (WCE 162) to be a black coat; and when she was shown the light gray jacket during her testimony, she refused to identify it (ibid). Contrary to what Myers wants us to believe, Davis’s testimony that the killer was wearing a black coat raises serious doubts about her credibility as a witness.

    Although Barbara and Virginia Davis allegedly observed the gunman together, they contradicted each other on a number of points. Barbara Davis testified that she called the DPD after the killer had gone out of sight (ibid, page 345). On the other hand, Virginia Davis was confused during her testimony as to whether Barbara called the DPD before or after they had seen the killer. Although Myers acknowledges this in his book, he nevertheless omits several other contradictions between their observations and recollections (With Malice, Chapter 7). For one thing, Barbara Davis testified she was standing on the front porch when the killer went by, whereas Virginia Davis testified that they both observed the killer through the front screen door; only to later on acknowledge that they were standing on the front porch when they saw the killer, just as she claimed in her affidavit to the USSS on December 1, 1963 (WCD 87, page 555). In that same affidavit she claimed that the killer was holding the gun in his left hand and unloading it into his right, and that she was lying down in bed with Barbara and her two children when she heard the shots (ibid).

    However, when she testified before the Warren Commission, she now claimed that the killer was holding the gun in his right hand and unloading it into his left, and that she was actually lying down on the couch when she heard the shots. Barbara Davis testified that she saw the killer cut across the middle of the yard of their apartment house, and illustrated this on WCE 534 (WC Volume III, page 344). However, Virginia Davis testified that the killer cut across the yard only about three feet from the sidewalk on Tenth Street (WC Volume VI, page 458).

    As far as the identification of Oswald in the line-up is concerned, Virginia Davis testified that she was the first to identify Oswald as the killer, and also testified that there were five men in the line-up; when in actual fact there were only four in total (WC Volume VI, page 462). However, when Barbara Davis testified, she took credit for being the first to identify Oswald as the killer (WC Volume III, page 350). Virginia Davis also testified that she went to the DPD to identify Oswald “…probably about 5:30”, which is ridiculous since according to the DPD, the line-up she and her sister-in-law allegedly viewed was conducted at approximately 7:55 pm (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 5, Folder 5, Item 4). Although Warren Commission defenders might argue that the contradictions between the two women’s recollections was due to one or both of them being nervous when they testified, the fact remains that all of the above raises doubts that they had seen the killer; or that they even viewed Oswald in a line-up, as both they and the DPD claimed. Myers actually writes in his book that Virginia Davis told him during an interview in 1997 that she was nervous when she testified before the Warren Commission (With Malice, Chapter 9)

    There is yet another piece of evidence which casts serious doubt on the credibility of the Davis sister-in-laws. Contained within the list of contacts for Jack Ruby is the name Leona Miller, with the telephone number WH3 – 8120 (WCD 717, page 6). When Barbara and Virginia Davis gave their affidavits to the DPD (allegedly on the day of the assassination), they listed their phone number as WH3 – 8120 (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Items 20 and 22). Myers acknowledges this fact in his book, but dismisses its significance by writing that; “…apart from the phone number, there is no known connection between Leona Miller, Barbara Jeannette and Virginia Davis, and Jack Ruby.” (With Malice, Chapter 9). Contrary to what Myers would like us to believe, the fact that the phone number of two witnesses who contradicted each other on their observations of Tippit’s killer (despite both of them being certain that Oswald was the killer), and the fact that Barbara Davis believed that Tippit’s killer was wearing a black coat, raises the distinct possibility that the Davis sister-in-laws were ersatz witnesses used to implicate Oswald as Tippit’s killer. According to the testimony of Curtis Laverne Crafard (a.k.a Larry Crafard), Miller was apparently a girl who had phoned Ruby seeking employment at the Carousel club as a waitress (testimony of Curtis Laverne Crafard, WC Volume XIV).

    Curiously, there was a Leona Miller (married name Leona Lane) with whom Ruby was acquainted (WCD 1121, page 35). However, it is not known whether Miller (Lane) ever lived at the address the Davis sister-in-laws were living at when they allegedly observed Tippit’s killer. In my upcoming essay on Gerald Hill, this reviewer presents evidence that Tippit’s killer could in fact be Larry Crafard; which gives credence to the possibility that the Davis sister-in-laws were fake witnesses used to implicate Oswald. Though, truth be told, there is absolutely no solid connection between Jack Ruby, Larry Crafard, and the Davis sister-in-laws.

    On the day following Tippit’s murder, cab driver William W. Scoggins, along with cab driver William W. Whaley, were brought to the DPD to view Oswald in a line-up (With Malice, Chapter 7). Myers’ book contains a photograph by Jack Beers showing what he claims to be Scoggins and Whaley leaving the DPD homicide office to view the line-up (ibid). Scoggins told the Warren Commission that as the killer went past his cab, the killer looked back over his left shoulder, and that; “It seemed like I could see his face, his features and everything plain, you see.” (WC Volume III, page 327). Although Scoggins testified before the Warren Commission that he identified Oswald as Tippit’s killer in the line-up, he doesn’t mention this in his affidavit to the DPD on November 23, 1963 (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Item 24). Myers doesn’t mention this to his readers. Myers also doesn’t mention that although DPD Lt. T.L. Baker wrote in his report to Chief Curry that Scoggins positively identified Oswald as Tippit’s killer in the line-up, detectives Marvin Johnson and L.D. Montgomery made no mention of this in their own reports to chief Curry. In fact, neither Johnson nor Montgomery mention in their reports that Scoggins viewed a line-up of Oswald (Dallas Municipal archives Box 5, Folder 5, Items 4, 26, 28, and 35).

    Although Myers admits that Scoggins told the Warren Commission that he had seen Oswald’s picture in the newspaper before he allegedly identified Oswald in the line-up as Tippit’s killer, he nevertheless omits that when Scoggins was reinterviewed by the FBI on November 25, 1963, he claimed that after viewing a photograph of Oswald, he was not certain that the man he observed fleeing from the Tippit murder scene was actually Oswald (WCD 5, page 77). The reader should bear in mind that when Scoggins testified, he claimed that some of the photos of Oswald shown to him by the FBI/USSS didn’t resemble Oswald, and that he may have picked the wrong photo (WC Volume III, page 335). However, according to his aforementioned interview with the FBI, Scoggins was only shown one photograph. Therefore, Scoggins was either lying, mistaken, or was actually referring to another interview.

    Scoggins also testified that he overheard William Whaley telling one (or more) of the cab drivers at the Oak Cliff cab company, for whom they were both employed, that he picked Oswald up at the Greyhound bus station, and then dropped him off at the 500 block of Beckley avenue in Oak Cliff (ibid, page 340). However, as researcher Lee Farley has demonstrated, Whaley did not give Oswald a ride to Oak Cliff in his cab, and that Scoggins was lying (see the thread entitled Oswald and cab 36 on John Simkin’s Spartacus education forum). It is also worth keeping in mind that despite hearing Tippit’s killer mumble either “Poor dumb cop” or “Poor damn cop” as he went by his cab, Scoggins never claimed that the killer’s voice was identical to Oswald’s (ibid, page 327), (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 2, Folder 1, Item 24). Finally, perhaps it’s also worth keeping in mind that even though Scoggins testified that he was “kind of crouched” behind his cab; and observed the killer through the windows of his cab, in his affidavit to the USSS on December 2, 1963, he claimed that he saw the killer after he (Scoggins) ran to the west side of Patton Street, opposite to his cab (WCD 87, page 553). In conclusion, much like Ted Callaway, Sam Guinyard, and the Davis sister-in-laws, William Scoggins is a witness whose credibility has question marks around it. Not that it matters to Myers.

    Many conspiracy advocates, past and present, have claimed that the Oswald line-ups were unfair. Although this reviewer shares that opinion, once it has been established that the witnesses were unreliable, and by implication, coaxed by the DPD to identify Oswald as the killer in the line-ups, the issue of whether the line-ups were fair or unfair becomes irrelevant. The contradictions between the alleged observations of Ted Callaway and Sam Guinyard are perhaps the best indication that witnesses were coaxed by the DPD to identify Oswald as Tippit’s killer, and once it is accepted that one or two witnesses were coaxed to identify Oswald as the killer, then logically, every eyewitness identification of Oswald as the killer in the DPD line-ups must be considered suspect. If Oswald was framed for Tippit’s murder by those responsible for the President’s assassination, then it only makes perfect sense that Tippit’s killer resembled Oswald, as they certainly would want any witness who saw the killer to think that it was Oswald.

    Towards the end of this Chapter, Myers discusses the paraffin tests used by the DPD to determine whether or not Oswald had fired a gun on the day of the assassination. Myers writes that; “…the lab report on the paraffin cast from Oswald’s right hand showed that the nitrate traces were not only positive, but ‘typical of the patterns produced in firing a revolver’. Such a finding suggests that, in this case, the presence of nitrates was the direct result of firing a handgun, and not due to the handling of some unknown nitrate-laced product.” (With Malice, Chapter 7). However, once again, Myers deceives his readers. For one thing, although he prints a sketch of the nitrates on Oswald’s right hand, he never explains that most of the nitrates were found on the palm side of the hand, and not on the back side of the hand where the nitrates from the revolver would have been deposited. Myers also omits that the FBI’s agent John Gallagher, who worked in the FBI’s laboratory in the physics and chemistry section, testified that; “No characteristic elements were found by neutron activation analysis of the residues which could be used to distinguish the rifle from the revolver cartridges.” (WC Volume XV, page 748 ). This further undermines the “finding” that the nitrate traces on the paraffin cast of Oswald’s hand are typical of the patterns produced by firing a revolver.

    In his discussion of the paraffin test, Myers also writes that the chemicals used in processing the nitrates will also react to nitrates found in urine, tobacco, cosmetics, kitchen matches, fertilizers and many other common items (ibid). Although Myers believes the paraffin tests applied to Oswald’s hands were valid, he never mentions that according to the report by DPD detectives Elmer Boyd and Richard Sims to Chief Curry, Sgt. W.E. “Pete” Barnes and detective John Hicks of the DPD crime lab applied the paraffin test to Oswald’s hands after Hicks had taken fingerprints from him! (Dallas Municipal archives, Box 3, Folder 4, Item 5). This was confirmed by Lt. T.L. Baker in his own report (ibid, Box 5, Folder 5, Item 4). Now if this true, it casts serious doubt on the validity of the tests, as Oswald’s hands would have been contaminated from the fingerprint ink, and washed afterwards to remove all ink. When Sgt. Barnes testified before the Warren Commission, he claimed that that he took palm prints from Oswald’s hands immediately before applying the paraffin test; only to quickly correct himself stating that it was done immediately after the paraffin test (WC Volume VII, page 284). However, Barnes’ correction should not be taken seriously, as evidence discussed below demonstrates that Barnes is not a credible witness. Readers should also keep in mind that when counsel David Belin asked Barnes during his testimony “Suppose I were to wash my hands between the time I fired it [WCE 143] and the time you took the paraffin test?”, Barnes claimed that this would “hurt the test” (WC Volume VII, page 280).

    In spite of all of his deceptions, Myers then has the audacity to write the following; “Every aspect of Tippit’s murder became the focus of relentless – and often unfair – criticism.”, adding that “Some doubters [critics] sought to exonerate Oswald of Tippit’s death by challenging the eyewitness accounts” (With Malice, Chapter 7). Yes, Dale. Shame on those of us who, unlike you, actually want to honestly point out the contradictions between the eyewitness accounts which raise serious doubts about their credibility. Suffice it to say, the readers can judge for themselves whether or not I have made unfair criticisms of the witnesses.


    Go to Part Two