Kennedys and King Test host626

Category: John Fitzgerald Kennedy

Original essays treating the assassination of John F. Kennedy, its historical and political context and aftermath, and the investigations conducted.

Brad Pitt, Joyce Carol Oates and the Road to Blonde: Part 1/2

How did the recent movie version of the Joyce Carol Oates novel Blonde ever materialize? A big part of the answer is Brad Pitt. The actor/producer had worked with film director Andrew Dominik on the 2007 western The Assassination of Jesse James by the Coward Robert Ford and again on the 2012 neo noir crime film, Killing Them Softly. It was around the time of the latter production that actor/producer Pitt decided to back Dominik in his attempt to make a film about Marilyn Monroe, based upon the best-selling Blonde, published in 2000. (LA Times, 6/3/2012). Pitt also showed up at the film’s premiere at the Venice Film Festival in September of 2022 to support the picture.

Blonde is the first film with an NC-17 rating to be streamed by Netflix. No film submitted to the Motion Picture Association of America had received such a rating since 2013. (Time, September 9, 2022, story by Moises Mendez) After watching the film I can understand why, and its surprising that Netflix even financed the picture. Some commentators believe it was through the powerful status of Pitt that the film ultimately got distributed. But before we get to just how poor the picture is, I think it necessary to understand how the American cultural scene gave birth to a production that is not just an unmitigated piece of rubbish but is, in many ways, a warning signal as to what that culture has become.

I

By the time Oates came to write her novel, the field of Marilyn Monroe books and biographies was quite heavily populated. After Monroe’s death in 1962, the first substantial biography of Monroe was by Fred Lawrence Guiles entitled Norma Jean, published in 1969. Norman Mailer borrowed profusely from Guiles for his picture book, Marilyn, released in 1973. Originally, Mailer was supposed to write an introductory essay for a book of photos packaged by Lawrence Schiller. But the intro turned into a 90,000 word essay. Mailer included an additional chapter, a piece of cheap sensationalism which he later admitted he had appended for money. In that section he posited a diaphanous plot to murder Monroe by agents of the FBI and CIA due to her alleged affair with Attorney General Bobby Kennedy. (Sixty Minutes, July 13, 1973). Because the book became a huge best-seller, as John Gilmore pungently noted, it was Mailer who “originated the let’s trash Marilyn for a fast buck profit scenario.” (Don McGovern, Murder Orthodoxies, p. 36)

Mailer inherited his flatulent RFK idea from a man named Frank Capell. Capell was a rightwing fruitcake who could have easily played General Ripper in Dr. Strangelove. In August of 1964, Capell published a pamphlet entitled The Strange Death of Marilyn Monroe. It was pure McCarthyite nonsense written solely with a propaganda purpose: to hurt Bobby Kennedy’s chances in his race for the senate in New York. Capell was later drawn up on charges for conspiracy to commit libel against California Senator Thomas Kuchel. (Chicago Tribune, February 25, 1965) This was not his first offense, as he had been indicted twice during World War 2 for accepting bribes while on the War Production Board. (NY Times, September 22, 1943). Capell did not like Kuchel since he was a moderate Republican who was backing Bobby Kennedy’s attempt to get his late brother’s civil rights bill through congress. Which tells the reader a lot about Capell and his poisonous pamphlet.

The next step downward involves Mailer, overtly, and Capell, secretly. I am referring to the materialization of a figure who resembled the Antichrist in the Monroe field, the infamous Robert Slatzer. Slatzer originally had an idea to do an article about Monroe’s death from a conspiratorial angle before Mailer’s 1973 success. He approached a writer named Will Fowler who was unimpressed by the effort. He told Slatzer: Now had he been married to Monroe that would make a real story. Shortly after, Slatzer got in contact with Fowler again. He said he forgot to tell him, but he had been married to Monroe. (The Assassinations, edited by James DiEugenio and Lisa Pease, p. 362)

The quite conservative Fowler then cooperated with Slatzer through Pinnacle Publishing Company out of New York. Capell was also brought in, but due to his past legal convictions, his cooperation was to be secret. (Notarized agreement of February 16, 1973). The best that can be deciphered through the discovery of the Fowler Papers at Cal State Northridge is this: Capell would contribute material on the RFK angle through his files; Slatzer would gather and deliver his Monroe personal letters, mementoes, and marriage license; and Fowler would write the first draft, with corrections and revisions by the other two. (McGovern, pp. 90-91)

But in addition to Capell’s past offenses, another problem surfaced: Fowler soon concluded that Slatzer was a fraud, so he withdrew from the project. (LA Times, 9/20/91, article by Howard Rosenberg). The main reason Fowler withdrew is that Slatzer could not come up with anything tangible to prove any of his claims about his 15-year-long relationship, or his three day marriage, to Monroe. Several times in the Fowler Papers it is noted that Slatzer’s tales changed over time “as they also veered into implausibility”. As a result, Fowler started to question his writing partner’s honesty. (McGovern, p. 79) Consequently, other writers were called in to replace Fowler, like George Carpozi.

II

The subsequent book released in 1974 was entitled The Life and Curious Death of Marilyn Monroe. To my knowledge, it was the first book published by an alleged acquaintance of Monroe to question the coroner’s official verdict that Monroe’s death was a “probable suicide”.

Whatever unjustified liberties Capell and Mailer took with the factual record, Slatzer left them in the dust. In addition to his –as we shall see– fictional wedding to Monroe, Slatzer also fabricated tales about forged autopsy reports, 700 pages of top-secret LAPD files, hidden Monroe diaries, inside informants, and perhaps the wildest whopper of all: a secret deposition by Attorney General Robert Kennedy. If ever there was a book that violated all the standards of both biography and nonfiction literature it was The Life and Curious Death of Marilyn Monroe. It was a no holds barred slander fest of both Monroe and Robert Kennedy.

Slatzer claimed that he and Marilyn went to Tijuana, Mexico on October 3, 1952 and were married there on October 4^th. After returning to LA, they had second thoughts about it, and they went back and got the proceeding annulled; actually the attorney who did the service just burned his certification document on October 6th. This tall tale has been demolished by two salient facts. First, there is documented proof produced by author April VeVea that Monroe was at a party for Photoplay Magazine on October 3^rd. (See VeVea’s blog for April 10, 2018, “Classic Blondes”.) Secondly, Monroe wrote and signed a check while on a Beverly Hills shopping spree on October 4^th. The address on the check is 2393 Castilian Dr., the location in Hollywood where she was living with Joe DiMaggio at the time. Monroe authority Don McGovern has literally torn to pieces every single aspect of Slatzer’s entire Mexican wedding confection. (McGovern, pp. 49-67, see also p. 100)

Just how far would Slatzer go to string others along on his literary frauds? How about paying witnesses to lie for him? Noble “Kid” Chissell was a boxer and actor. According to Slatzer, he happened to be in Tijuana and acted as a witness to his Monroe wedding. Years later, when asked about it, Chissell recanted the whole affair to Marilyn photographer Joseph Jasgur. He said that there was no wedding between Slatzer and Marilyn. He went further and said he did not even think Slatzer knew Monroe. But Slatzer wanted Chissell as a back-up to his phony playlet and promised to pay him to go along. Which, by the way, he never did. Which makes him both a liar and a welsher. (McGovern, pp. 98-99). It also appears likely that Slatzer forged a letter saying that Fowler had actually seen the Slatzer/Monroe marriage license and Fowler met Monroe while with him. Fowler denied ever seeing such a document or having met Monroe. (McGovern, p. 81)

III

One would think that The Life and Curious Death of Marilyn Monroe could hardly get any worse. But it does. To add a layer of official intrigue inside the LAPD, Slatzer created a figure named “Jack Quinn”. Quinn had been an employee of LA County and he got in contact with Slatzer and informed him of a malignant cover up about the Monroe case inside City Hall, particularly the LAPD. (Slatzer, pp. 249-53) The enigmatic Mr. Quinn described a secret 723 page study of the Monroe case. That study stated that the original autopsy report had been deep sixed. Further, that Bobby Kennedy had been in LA at an official opening of a soccer field on August 4, 1962 and he had given a deposition in the case. In that deposition he said that he and his brother-in-law, Peter Lawford, had been at Marilyn’s house and they had a violent argument, to the point he had to bring in a doctor to inject her to calm her down.

The above is why I and others consider Slatzer’s work a milestone in trashy tabloidism: the forerunner to the manufactures of David Heymann. The only thing worse than writing that RFK would submit to such a legal proceeding is postulating that the LAPD would have any reason to question him. In their official reporting, the first three people at Monroe’s home all said that Monroe was alone in her bedroom when she passed. This included her housekeeper Eunice Murray, her psychiatrist Robert Greenson, and her physician Hyman Engelberg. Engelberg made the call to the LAPD saying that she had taken her own life. (LA Times, 12/21/2005, story by Myrna Oliver) Later in this essay, I will explain why, if anyone should have known the cause of death, it was Engelberg.

But complementary to this, Robert Kennedy was nowhere near Brentwood–where Monroe lived–at this time. Sue Bernard’s book, Marilyn: Intimate Exposures proves this beyond doubt, with hour by hour photographs and witness testimony. (pp. 184-87; see also, Gary Vitacco-Robles’ Icon, Pt. 2, p. 82) In fact, in his book Icon, VItacco Robles documents Bobby Kennedy’s four days in the Gilroy/San Francisco area from August 3-6^th. (See Icon Part 2, pp. 82-83). Therefore, at both geographic ends, Slatzer’s “secret RFK deposition” is pure hogwash, an invention out of Capell.

In 1982 Slatzer opined in public at the Greater Los Angeles Press Club that the Monroe case should be reopened. The DA’s office began a threshold type inquiry to see if there was just cause to do a full reopening. That inquiry was run by assistant DA Ron Carroll with investigators Clayton Anderson and Al Tomich (Icon Pt. 2, p. 108) They interviewed Slatzer about his “Quinn” angle. Very soon, problems emerged with his story. Allegedly, Quinn called Slatzer in 1972, saying he worked in the Hall of Records building and he had the entire 723 page original record of the case. He said he was leaving his position to move to San Mateo for a new job. Slatzer said he met Quinn, who had a badge on with his name, at Houston’s Barbeque Restaurant. Slatzer gave him 30 dollars to copy the file. Quinn said he would meet him at the Smokehouse Restaurant in Studio City for delivery. Quinn added that he lived in the Fair Oaks area of Glendale.

Quinn did not show up. Slatzer went to the Hall of Records and found no employee by the name of Quinn, which should have been predictable to Carroll because The Smoke House is not in Studio City, it’s in Burbank. And Fair Oaks is a popular boulevard going from Altadena through Pasadena to South Pasadena, but not Glendale. Slatzer now added something just as sensational. Ed Davis, LA Chief of Police, flew to Washington a month later to ask questions about RFK’s relationship with Monroe. (Was this the secret deposition?) Davis replied that no such thing happened. (Icon, Pt. 2, p. 110) When Carroll began to go through databases of City Hall employees from 1914-82, he could find no Jack Quinn. He also found out that the files of the LAPD would, in all likelihood, not be stored at the Hall of Records. Like his Tijuana wedding, Slatzer’s “Jack Quinn” was another fictional creation from a con artist.

With Carroll, Slatzer also tried to insert two other phony “clues”. First, that there was a three hour gap between when Monroe’s doctors were summoned and when the call to the police was made. Carroll discovered that the original LAPD inquiry by Sgt. Byron revealed that it was really more like a 45 minute delay. Eunice Murray did not call the doctors until about 3:30 AM. (Icon, Pt. 2, p. 110)

Slatzer also tried to question the basis of Murray’s initial suspicions of something being wrong with Marilyn. In the original investigation, Murray told Byron that what puzzled her was the light being on in Monroe’s room through the night. She noticed this at about midnight but was not able to awaken Monroe. She then noticed it again at about 3:30 AM and this is when she made a call to Dr. Greenson. (Icon. Vol. 1, p. 278) Slatzer said this was wrong since the high pile carpeting prevented light being seen under the door. It turned out—no surprise– that this was another of Slatzer’s whoppers. With photos and witness testimony, Vitacco-Robles proves that one could see light under the door, and further there were locking mechanisms on the doors. (Icon, Pt. 1, p. 255, p. 380) Slatzer wanted to disguise this fact because it indicates that Monroe ingested the pills, 47 Nembutals and 17 chloral hydrates, and then slowly lost consciousness and slipped into a coma, in spite of the light being on—which normally she was quite sensitive to.

I could go on and on about Slatzer’s malarkey. For instance, both Vitacco-Robles and Slatzer’s former wife clearly think that the whole years long Monroe relationship Slatzer writes about in his book is balderdash. Gary advances evidence that from 1947-57, Slatzer was not cavorting around LA with Monroe but lived in Ohio. (Icon, Vol. 2, p. 119) Slatzer’s Ohio wife, Kay Eicher, said Slatzer met Monroe exactly once, on a film set in Niagara Falls where Monroe—always kind to her fans- posed with him for impromptu pictures. She added about her former husband, “He’s been fooling people too long.” (ibid, p. 123) Which Slatzer also did with Allan Snyder, Monroe’s makeup artist. This again was supposed to show he knew Monroe. But Snyder later said he never heard of the man while Marilyn was alive. Slatzer just approached him to write up an intro and paid him for it. (ibid, p. 126)

The reason I have spent a bit of time and space on slime like Slatzer is simple. If a figure like Slatzer had surfaced in the JFK critical community, his reputation would have been blasted to pieces in a week. But back in 1974, there was no such quality control in the Monroe field. Therefore, not only was his book a commercial success, he then went on to write another book, and marketed two TV films on the subject. But beyond that—and I wish I was kidding about this–Slatzer had a wide influence on the later literature. It was not until much later, with the arrival of people like Don McGovern, Gary Vitacco-Robles, April VeVea and Nina Boski that any kind of respectable quality control developed in the field.

IV

In the October, 1975 issue of Oui magazine, Tony Sciacca, real name Anthony Scaduto, wrote an essay called “Who Killed Marilyn Monroe.” That article was expanded into a book the next year, Who Killed Marilyn? This book owes much to Slatzer. Including lines and scenes seemingly pulled right out of his book. For example Monroe says that Bobby Kennedy had promised to marry her. ( p. 13). Another steal is Monroe’s red book diary. Where she wrote that RFK was running the Bay of Pigs invasion for his brother. (pp. 65-69). The idea that Bobby Kennedy was going to divorce his longtime wife Ethel, leave his eight children, resign his Attorney General’s position, and forego his future chance at the presidency—all for a woman he met socially four times—is, quite frankly, preposterous. Further, as the declassified record shows, Bobby Kennedy had nothing to do with managing the Bay of Pigs operation. That was being run by CIA Director of Plans Dick Bissell, along with Deputy Director Charles Cabell. (See, for example, Peter Kornbluh’s Bay of Pigs Declassified.) And it turns out that Monroe had no red book diary. What she kept were more properly called journals or notebooks which were found among her belongings decades after she died. These were then published under the title Fragments. And they contain nothing like what people like Slatzer, Scaduto, and later Lionel Grandison, said was in them. (McGovern, pp. 268-71)

But incredibly, Slatzer lived on in the writings of Donald Wolfe, Milo Speriglio and Anthony Summers. Summers’ 1985 book Goddess became a best-seller. In the introductory notes to the Oates’ novel, she names Goddess as one of the references for her roman a clef. As Don McGovern observes, Summers references Slatzer early, by page 26—and then refers to him scores of times in Goddess, even using Chissell. But yet, Slatzer’s name, address and phone number never appeared in Monroe’s phone or address books. Would not someone so close to Monroe be in there? (McGovern, p. 102)

But the belief in Slatzer is not unusual for Goddess. In fact, after reading the book a second time and taking plentiful notes, I would say it is more like par for the course. Let us take the case of Gary Wean. Because its largely with Wean that the book begins its character assault on both John Kennedy and Peter Lawford. (For example, see pgs. 221-224). The idea is that Lawford arranged wild parties with call girls, John Kennedy was there and Monroe was at one of them. Summers characterizes Lawford like this: “It was this sad Sybarite who played host to the Kennedy brothers when they sought relaxation in California…”. Geez, I thought JFK and RFK knew Lawford because he was married to their sister.

These rather bizarre accusations made me curious. Who was Gary Wean and how credible was he? So I sent away for his book There’s a Fish in the Courthouse. Wean was a law enforcement officer in both Los Angeles and Ventura counties; he later became a small businessman. His book has two frames of focus. The first is on local corruption in Ventura County, California. Apparently realizing that this would have little broad appeal, Wean expands the frame to a national level with not just Monroe and Lawford, but also, get this, the JFK assassination! According to Wean, Sheriff Bill Decker and Senator John Tower explained the whole plot to his friend actor Audie Murphy. I don’t even want to go any further. But I will say that Wean’s tale says it was Jack Ruby who was going to kill Oswald, but when J. D. Tippit’s car pulled up, Ruby killed the policeman instead. (Wean, p. 588) Mobster Mickey Cohen got Ruby to now also kill Oswald, and somehow reporter Seth Kantor was tied in to the conspiracy since he could place Ruby at Parkland Hospital and he knew Cohen.

The primacy of Cohen in this theory can be explained by the fact that Cohen was Jewish and Wean’s book is extremely anti-Semitic. In fact, he later called the JFK murder a Jewish plot. (Wean, p. 593) As we shall see, this directly relates to the accusations about Lawford and John Kennedy. Wean says that these wild parties were at Lawford’s Malibu beach house. (Wean, p. 567) This puzzled me since, from what I could find, Lawford owned homes in Santa Monica and Palm Springs, and no Southern Californian could confuse those places with Malibu. Wean also says that Monroe met JFK at such a party during the Democratic Convention in 1960. But Monroe was not in Los Angeles for the convention. She was in New York City with her then husband Arthur Miller and her friend and masseuse Ralph Roberts. She was working on preparations for the upcoming film The Misfits. (McGovern, pp. 147-48)

But this is just the beginning of the problems with using Wean as a witness. Because in his book Wean says that it was really Joey Bishop who set up the wild call girl gatherings through Lawford. Why? Because Bishop, who was Jewish, was working with Cohen to get info on how Kennedy felt about Israel–through Monroe. (Wean, p. 567, p. 617). If that isn’t enough for you, how about this: Cohen was meeting with Menachem Begin at the Beverly Hills Hotel and there was plentiful talk about Cuba, military operations and the Kennedys. (Wean, p. 575). Further, Cohen had one of his mob associates at Marilyn’s home the night she died, at some time between 10-11 PM. (Wean p. 617) Wean calls this all part of the Jewish Mishpucka Plot. I could go even further with Wean, but I don’t think the reader would believe it.

The capper to this is that Wean writes that Summers called Bishop and the comedian admitted the arrangements he made. (Wean, ibid). At this point I thought two things: 1.) Wean was so rightwing he was a bit off his rocker. 2.) Was there anyone Summers would not believe in his Ahab type pursuit of a Monroe/Kennedy plot? Because according to Wean, Summers wanted him to go on TV.

But there is another Summers’ witness who was pushing the whole Lawford/Kennedy fable about call girl parties at the beach. This was Fred Otash. Otash was a former policeman turned detective who also worked for Confidential magazine, which was little more than a scandal sheet. He was once convicted for rigging horse races. After interviewing him for Sixty Minutes in 1973, Mike Wallace said he was the most amoral man he ever met. He once had his detective license indefinitely suspended.

In 1960 the FBI found out something rather revealing about Otash. In July of 1960, while JFK was running for president, a high-priced LA call girl was contacted by Otash. He requested information on her participation in sex parties involving JFK and Lawford, plus Frank Sinatra and Sammy Davis. The woman said she could not comply since she had no such knowledge. Otash then asked if she knew any girls who perhaps were there. She said she knew of no one. Otash then asked if she could be introduced to Kennedy, and if so, he could equip her with a tape recorder to take down any “indiscreet statements’ the senator might make. She refused to do so. (FBI Report of 7/26/60)

The hooker had a higher moral code than the pimp. By those standards who could rely on Otash for anything?

Go to Part 2 of 2

February 22, 2024
Our Lady of the Warren Commission: Part 2/2
The Inconvenient Witness

Thomas Mallon. “And he (Oswald) had gotten away with it. The bullet had almost grazed the top of Walkers head, the hair, and he got away on foot, he didn’t drive a car… (And) he hid the rifle by the railroad tracks…”

To rebut Mr. Mallon’s claims, it is crucial to highlight that there is a substantial and irrefutable body of evidence indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald was never seen at or near General Walker’s home at4011 Turtle Creek Boulevard before, during, or after the attempted Walker assassination on April 10th, 1963. This point is not merely speculative but grounded in well-documented and verified accounts.

Furthermore, the weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that the assassination attempt involved not just one, but two individuals. Particularly compelling testimony comes from Walter Kirk Coleman, a 15-year-old residing near the General’s residence. On the night of April 10th, 1963, Coleman reported hearing a gunshot, an ominous sound aimed at ending General Walker’s life. In a swift reaction, Coleman dashed outside and peered over his fence. His vantage point provided a clear view of the church parking lot adjacent to General Walker’s residence. What he witnessed there is crucial to understanding the events of that fateful night.

Coleman observed:

A man getting into a 1949 or 1950 Ford, which was parked headed towards Turtle Creek Boulevard, with the motor running and the headlights on. (Before the man got into the car, he) glanced back in the direction of Coleman and (took) off. Also, further down the parking lot was another car, a two door, black over white, two-door Chevrolet sedan and a man was in it. He had the dome light on, and Kirk could see him bend over the front seat as if he was putting something in the back floorboard. Kirk described the car as; “black with a white stripe.” The man who took off in the Ford was described as; “a white male, about 19 or 20 years of age, about 5”10 tall, and weighing about 130 pounds. He was attired in “Kakhi pants and a sports shirt with figures in it. Kirk stated, “that this man had dark bushy hair, a thin face with a large nose, and was real skinny”. The second man was described by Coleman as, “a white male, about 6”1, about 200 pounds, wearing a dark long sleeve shirt and dark pants. Kirk could furnish no information on this man’s facial features nor his age.

Was one of the men Kirk Coleman saw, Lee Harvey Oswald?

“Coleman stated that he had seen numerous pictures of Lee Harvey Oswald, and he was shown a photograph of Oswald among several other photographs. He stated that neither man resembled Oswald and that he had never seen anyone in or around the Walker residence or the church before or after April 10, 1963, who resembled Lee Harvey Oswald”.

This testimony is a significant piece of evidence, as it directly challenges any claims that Oswald was present at the scene of the attempted assassination. (see this and this)

Coleman’s account is corroborated by Walker himself who testified to the Warren Commission that; “As I crossed a window coming downstairs in front, I saw a car at the bottom of the church alley just making a turn onto Turtle Creek. The car was unidentifiable. I could see the two back lights, and you have to look through trees there, and I could see it moving out. This car would have been about at the right time for anybody that was making a getaway. (Volume XI; p. 405)

April 8^th, 1963.

Between 9:00-9:30pm on April 8^th, 1963, Robert Surrey, a disciple of General Walker’s, was proceeding up Avondale Avenueto the house at 4011, Turtle Creek Boulevard. It was Surrey’s intention to enter the General’s property via the alleyway entrance. However, just prior to turning off Avondale, Mr. Surrey, “Observed a 1963 dark brown or maroon, four door Ford, parked on Avondale with two men sitting in it.” Surrey decided to avoid taking the alley, instead continuing around to block the car-park near the Mormon Church. Surrey observed the two men, “Get out of the car, walk up the alley and onto the Walker property and look into the windows of the Walker house.” At this point Surrey went to their automobile, where he checked the rear of the car, and observed there was no license plate. He then opened the door and looked into the car and opened the glove compartment. He observed nothing in the car or glove compartment which would help identify the occupants. He then went back to his car and drove to a position where he could observe the 1963 Ford leave.

Surrey testified to the Commission regarding the strange behavior of these two individuals…

Robert Surrey.“Well, the gist of the matter is that two nights before the assassination attempt, I saw two men around the house peeking in windows and so forth, and reported this to the general the following morning, and he, in turn, reported it to the police on Tuesday, and it was Wednesday night that he was shot at. So that is really the gist of the whole thing.”

Surrey told the FBI that, “He had never seen either of these two men before or since this incident, and (believed) neither of these two men was identical with Lee Harvey Oswald. (Surrey) “Described one of the men as a white male, in his 30s, about 5’10” to 6’ tall and weighing about 190 pounds. (Surrey) described the second individual as a white male, in his 30’s, 5’10” to 6’ tall, and weighing about 160 pounds. Both men were well dressed in suites, dress shirts and ties.FBI 105-82555 Oswald HQ File, Section 186 (maryferrell.org)

The Ballistics Evidence

From April 10, 1963, the bullet which was fired at General Walker, “Appeared to be from a high-powered, 30.06 rifle, and was a Steel jacketed bullet”. (see this)

This information was highly disseminated throughout the press and was reported in a New York Times article of April 12, 1963.

A Mystifying Metamorphosis: The “Magic Bullet” Phenomenon

From the ashes of President Kennedy, Officer Tippit and Lee Oswald’s tragic murders, a bewildering transformation occurred within the confines of the Dallas Police Evidence Room. Here, the “Walker bullet” performed a baffling act of alchemy, transforming from its official initial classification as a 30.06 steel-jacketed projectile into a 6.5 Mannlicher Carcano bullet—its steel guise mysteriously supplanted by copper. This near-miraculous change provided the Warren Commission with a serendipitous twist in their narrative, allowing them to lay the blame for the attempted assassination of Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker squarely on the now-silenced Oswald. This switch, a masterpiece of evidentiary sleight of hand, was instrumental in allowing the Commission to fortify their case of circumstantial evidence, confidently proclaiming in their report: “Oswald had attempted to kill Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker (Retired, U.S. Army) on April 10, 1963, thereby demonstrating his disposition to take human life.” (WCR; p. 20). Through this narrative legerdemain, the Commission could weave a more compelling, albeit convenient, story of guilt. (WCR;p..20)

A Dichotomy of Possibilities: Incompetence or Subterfuge?

The ballistic evidence bifurcates into two realms of possibility. One path leads to a conclusion of stark incompetence on the part of General Walker and the Dallas Police Department investigators, a lapse in judgment and identification that stood unchallenged for over seven months. The alternate path veers towards a more sinister landscape, positing that the bullet now residing in the National Archives (CE573) and officially linked to the Walker case was, in fact, a posthumous plant designed to frame Oswald. While this theory may initially seem steeped in the realms of far-fetched conjecture, it gains a semblance of plausibility when juxtaposed against the backdrop of questionable evidence marshalled against Oswald in both the JFK and Tippit cases.

The FBI’s Spectrographic Analysis: A Tale of Suppressed Evidence

Adding to the enigma, the FBI’s spectrographic analysis of Q-188 (CE573) painted a divergent picture. Special Agent Henry H. Heilberger, in his analytical report (PC-78378), discerned that the lead alloy comprising the Walker bullet bore no resemblance to the lead alloy from the two large bullet fragments allegedly retrieved from beneath the presidential limousine’s jump seat. This revelation, chronicled in Breach of Trust (pp. 49-50), never saw the light of public scrutiny, as both the FBI and Warren Commission elected to sequester Heilberger’s findings from the official record, and notably, his testimony was conspicuously absent from their proceedings. One ponders the alacrity with which the Commission might have embraced Heilberger’s testimony had it tilted the scales of evidence towards Oswald’s guilt in the Walker affair.

In the police report filed by Officers Van Cleave and McElroy, the authors noted that the projectile was steel jacketed. Both local Dallas newspapers, and an Associated Press story depicted the projectile as being 30.06 in caliber. (James DiEugenio, The JFK Assassination: The Evidence Today, p. 100) But three weeks after the assassination, the FBI now had transformed the bullet to a 6.5 caliber, copper jacketed projectile. In fact, the bullet today in the National Archives, allegedly shot at Walker, is copper coated. But none of the Dallas policemen who handled that bullet were called to testify under oath before the Commission. (ibid) In other words, unlike what Mallon and Ruth Paine told their spectators, the eyewitness testimony and the ballistics evidence is exculpatory of Oswald.

I now wish to posit some questions to Mrs. Paine & Mr. Mallon regarding some substantial inconsistencies in their narrative surrounding Oswald’s guilt in this case.

Marina testified that Lee allegedly extracted the rifle from their Neely Street residence three days before the attempt, concealing it in bushes near Walker’s home. However, this raises significant questions about the practicality and rationality of such a decision. Why would a logical individual choose to stow this surplus WWII, Mannlicher Carcano, in a bush for an extended period, subjecting it to various environmental elements, only to later retrieve it for an assassination attempt? This scenario, frankly, challenges the bounds of credibility. (Breach of Trust; p.53)

Storing a rifle in a bush for three days before committing a crime poses several significant issues:
If Lee Harvey Oswald had been brought to trial for the alleged attempt on General Edwin Walker’s life, the task facing Dallas District Attorney Henry Wade would have been daunting, to say the least. The prosecution’s case would have been fraught with a series of significant hurdles, each casting a shadow of doubt over Oswald’s culpability. Key among these were the logistical improbabilities – the complex chain of events leading up to the incident that seemed almost too convoluted to be feasible. Coupled with this were glaring inconsistencies in the evidence presented, gaps large enough in the witness testimonies to drive a truck through, and serious procedural questions that begged to be answered.

To surmount these formidable challenges, the prosecution would have needed more than just the usual evidentiary fare; it would have required exceptionally strong and unimpeachable alternative evidence, alongside coherent and convincing explanations to iron out the existing inconsistencies. The absence of direct testimonies and conclusive photographic evidence only compounded the issue, necessitating an even more persuasive argument to bridge these gaps.

It’s noteworthy that, to this day, no one, whether officially or unofficially, has truly grappled with these glaring deficiencies in the case against Oswald for the attempted assassination of General Walker. The shortcomings in the case are not merely minor quibbles or legal technicalities; they represent fundamental flaws that go to the very heart of the judicial process and the principles of fair trial and justice. For any defense attorney, these issues would not just be talking points; they would be central pillars of a defense strategy rooted in the bedrock of reasonable doubt.

“I had no way of knowing that Oswald attacked me. I still don’t. And I am not very prone to say in fact he did.” Edwin Walker. (Volume X1; p.426)

Thomas Mallon Praises the Warren Commission

“Before publication of the Warren Report, there was the irresistible reaction against the audacity of those who loudly proclaimed the dead man’s guilt but asked those who had doubts to keep silent. After the Report, there was something even more irresistible: the feeling that, in this case, silence would give consent to injustice.” Leo Sauvage. (see this)

Thomas Mallon. All these years later, how do you feel The Commission, that Report, it still essentially holds up?

Ruth Paine. Oh yea, oh yea. They were very thorough…

Advocating for the Warren Report’s conclusions, 60 years after the fact, is not just a matter of differing historical interpretation; it’s a position that, quite frankly, borders on the delusional or suggests a profound misapprehension of the facts. In my detailed analysis in ‘Assassination 60’, particularly in point 13, I underline the profound skepticism held by key figures regarding the Report. Notably, Bobby Kennedy dismissed it as ‘a shoddy piece of craftsmanship,’ a stark indictment from a figure intimately connected to the events.

Sylvia Meagher.”It was appalling to find how many of the Commission’s statements were unsupportable or even completely contradicted by the testimony and/or exhibits. I began to list what is now a long series of deliberate misrepresentations, omissions, distortions, and other defects demonstrating not only extreme bias, incompetence, and carelessness but irrefutable instances of dishonesty.” (Praise from a Future Generation; pp. 149-150)

Penn Jones Jr. “I really believe that the only way you can believe the Warren Report is not to read it.” (Praise from a Future Generation; p. 130)

The Commission’s credibility is further eroded by the dissent within its own ranks. Commissioners Richard Russell, Hale Boggs, and John Cooper explicitly expressed their disbelief in the Single Bullet Theory (SBT), a cornerstone of the Commission’s findings. John Sherman Cooper was unequivocal: “I could not convince myself that the same bullet struck both of them. No, I wasn’t convinced by [the SBT]. Neither was Senator Russell.” (James DiEugenio, JFK Revisited, pp. 30-31)

Hale Boggs voiced similar concerns, “I had strong doubts about it [the single bullet theory], the question was never resolved.” (Edward Epstein, Inquest; pp.149-150)

Commissioner Gerald Ford told French President d’Estaing that the President’s murder “was something set up. We were sure it was a set up, but we were not able to discover by whom.” (JFK Revisited; p. 57)

Even more damning is the disbelief expressed by Richard Russell, a sentiment shared by President Lyndon Johnson himself: “…they said that they believed…that the Commission believed that the same bullet which hit Kennedy hit Conaolly… well I don’t believe it.” To which Johnson replied, “I don’t either.” (Phone call of 9/18/64).

In the fantastic new collaborative book The JFK Assassination Chokeholds by Jim DiEugenio. Paul Bleau, Matt Crumpton, Andrew Iler and Mark Adamczyk, Professor Bleau presents a modern, critical examination of the Warren Report, demonstrating conclusively that the official record challenges, rather than supports, the Commission’s findings. This contemporary analysis further undermines the Report’s standing.

Perhaps the most scathing indictment comes from the late United States Senator Richard Schweiker, who declared, “The Warren Commission has in fact collapsed like a house of cards and I believe it was a set up at the time to feed pablum to the American people for reasons yet known, and one of the biggest cover-ups in the history of our country occurred at the time.” (JFK Revisited, p. 108)

A Tumultuous Marriage?

Thomas Mallon. “Not everybody knows (this) about Oswald, he was not a good husband… he beat Marina, this is very well documented in Pricilla McMillian’s book…”

Lee and Marina Oswald’s marriage remains a subject of intrigue and speculation. While Lee’s character has often been scrutinised, Marina’s role in their relationship is less frequently examined.

In a memorandum written in 1964, Norman Redlich reports that, “James H. Martin stated that (after the assassination) he had consciously attempted to create a public image of Marina Oswald as a simple, devoted housewife who had suffered at the hands of her husband and who was now filled with remorse for her husband’s actions and deeply grateful for the generosity and understanding of the American people… As Martin’s testimony indicates, there is a strong possibility that Marina Oswald is in fact a very different person— cold, calculating, avaricious, scornful of generosity, and capable of an extreme lack of sympathy in personal relationships. A wife who married him for selfish motives, degraded him in public (and) taunted him about his inadequacies…” (see this)

The George and Jeanne De Mohrenschildt testimonies also revel the mutual abuse the young couple would engage it.

George DeMohrenschildt.“I don’t like a woman who bitches at her husband all the time, and she did, you know. She annoyed him. She bickered. She brought the worst out in him. And she told us after they would get a fight, you know, that she was fighting also. She would scratch him also. ‘He has been beating me’, but she said, ‘I fight him back also…She was annoying him all the time ‘Why don’t you make some money?’, why don’t they have a car, why don’t they have more dresses, look at everybody else living so well, and they are just miserable flunkeys. She was annoying him all the time. Poor guy was going out of his mind. She openly said he didn’t see her physically–right in front of him. She said, ‘He sleeps with me just once a month, and I never get any satisfaction out of it.’ A rather crude and completely straightforward thing to say in front of relative strangers, as we were.” (Volume IX; p. 166-284)

Jeanne De Morenschildt.…His greatest objection was that people helped them too much, they were showering things on Marina. Marina had a hundred dresses given to her…He objected to that lavish help, because Marina was throwing it into his face. He could never give her what the people were showering on her. So that was very difficult for him, no matter how hard he worked–and he worked very hard. (Volume IX; p. 309)

The Assassination & Mrs Paine

Mrs. Paine, in a response to a question from Mr. Mallon, then highlights her displeasure at the recent documentary by researcher Max Good, The Assassination and Mrs. Paine. She states;

Ruth Paine. “What troubles me is, for instance there is this new DVD out… Mrs Paine and the murder of John F. Kennedy… I asked him, you know, what do you think, what is your opinion about the attempt on Walker and he (Max) says well I don’t think that happened. So that’s how some of the plot people, follow their stories, they just take what they want and leave the rest alone, and that is not good research.”

Thomas Mallon.“Yea, which is the way they pick and choose from the Warren Report, the different ‘facts’”.

I was interested if Max had seen this segment, so I reached out to him and asked what his thoughts were on it;

Max Good.“I think Ruth was referring in this talk to my meeting with her several months ago, which was set up and filmed by the producers of “Four Died Trying.” She did ask me my thoughts on the Walker shooting. I believe I said that I had doubts that it happened the way the official story describes. The way Ruth states it in this talk with Mallon, it sounds like I am denying that anything happened. In reality, I believe the Walker shooting was probably a staged event and that if Oswald was involved, it was as a pawn. The evidence throws all kinds of doubt on the official story, including the type of bullet not matching Oswald’s rifle and a witness seeing two suspects each leaving in separate cars. I’ve never heard Ruth discuss any of these details of the investigation. She seems to depend solely on the dubious “Walker note” and testimony of Marina, and the conclusions of the Warren Commission. It seems that she’s just as guilty of “taking what she wants and leaving the rest alone.” (Personal Correspondence) (buy the documentary here)

With the session now moving into its question-and-answer phase, Mr. Mallon assumed the role of a careful gatekeeper, sifting through and discarding the numerous inquiries presented to him. He selectively allowed only a subset of questions, primarily the less challenging ones, to be presented to Mrs. Paine. More demanding questions put forward by Dealey Plaza UK members in the audience were amongst those discarded. In this sea of generally unremarkable questions, however, there was one that emerged as notably intriguing. This question is detailed below.

Thomas Mallon. “Ruth someone asks, do you think Dallas being The City of Hate, as it was sometimes called, because there was such fierce opposition to Kennedy, do you think any of that motivated Oswald”

Ruth Paine.“No… no… no, he (Oswald) saw an opportunity on Wednesday morning, and he fired the gun on Friday.

Thomas Mallon. …And the really awful part of the journey home (from New Orleans to Dallas) was you didn’t know that one of the items, that was in the car, that he had packed, that was with everything… and one of the things in the car was the rifle.

Ruth Paine.“It has to have been.”

Thomas Mallon.“Yes.”

Ruth Paine.“There were two large Marine duffel bags, standing this high, he could have easily put a full-fledged rifle, it wouldn’t even have to have been broken down to fit in there, so yea, looking back it has to have been in there.”

In a notable deviation from recent disclosures, Mrs. Paine had testified to the Warren Commission about Oswald’s luggage and the alleged concealment of the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle within. When probed specifically about the possibility of these bags containing a long, slim object like a rifle, Mrs. Paine firmly denied noticing anything that would suggest the presence of such an item, asserting that the bags appeared to be filled with clothes and showed no signs of concealing a weapon. (Volume II; p. 462-463)

Let He Who is Without Sin, Cast the First Stone

Thomas Mallon.“He (Oswald) was not shy about asking for favours sometimes, one of the extraordinary things he did on the Saturday (November 23^rd) after the assassination, when he was in the Dallas City Jail, he called and what did he want?

Ruth Paine.“… he called and wanted me to contact a man named John Abt, who had acted as a lawyer for the American Communist Party, he gave me a phone number, this is Saturday, the day after the assassination. So, I did as he asked, rang up the phone and nobody answered, which is not really a surprise.

Thomas Mallon.“But he was still willing to be helped by you, a day after he had upended, you’re own life.”

Ruth Paine.“Oh yes”

Michael Paine was a Christian Unitarian, and Ruth came from a Quaker background. Quakerism is sometimes called the Society of Friends. Quakerism arose in England as a religion without creeds, or clergy. A religion coming from an Inner Light. Quakerism is usually attributed in America to the founding of Pennsylvania by William Penn. In addition, that state is usually considered one of the hotbeds of the American Revolution and the Bill of Rights, the latter of which is perhaps what the revolution was about. Oswald had a right to counsel, he was also supposedly granted the presumption of innocence. Therefore according to both religion and the American Creed what was so jarring about Oswald requesting Ruth to make a call for an attorney?

What makes this even worse is that neither Mallon nor Paine ever refer to how Greg Olds of the local American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was apparently bamboozled in his attempt to represent Oswald by the Dallas Police. (WC Vol. 7, pp. 322-25) But here is the capper that Mallon never asked: “Ruth were not you and your husband members of the ACLU? And did not your husband take Oswald to an ACLU meeting? And did not Oswald later join that group?” (Philip Melanson, Spy Saga, pp. 56-57) The icing on the cake would be this: the ACLU came to prominence due to the deprivation of legal rights during the Palmer Raids.

The Final Curtain

Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored. Aldous Huxley.

Thomas Mallon. “Fundamentally as we look back… do you think the assassination fundamentally was more of a psychological crime rather than a political crime? Meaning it grew form Oswald’s psychology more than from any ideology he picked up?”

Ruth Paine.“His life wasn’t going well at all, and he wanted to be a big shot and he was not.”

From the moment of Lee Oswald’s arrest on November 22, a narrative of presumption has shrouded him in guilt. This presumption was swiftly embraced by Dallas Police and Prosecution officials and eagerly disseminated by the media. As the soul of the nation was entrenched in grief, the martyred President’s remains were solemnly returned to Washington, and Oswald’s guilt was prematurely declared aboard Air Force One.

The Dallas officials quickly branded Oswald—a man without an attorney– as the sole assassin, casting an unjust shadow over his reputation and grossly violating that bedrock of American jurisprudence: the presumption of innocence. Yet, a crucial inquiry persists: What definitive evidence did they possess to warrant such a precipitous rush to judgment?

A critical examination of the evidence reveals a narrative fraught with inconsistencies, credibility issues with key evidence, and outright fabrications, suggesting a narrative far more complex and disturbing than Oswald’s solitary guilt. The tampering with evidence, the distortion of facts, and the neglect of judicial fairness hint at a conspiracy that does not include Lee Oswald.

The failure to conduct a comprehensive and impartial investigation into the full scope of President Kennedy’s assassination has not only failed Oswald but has veiled the truth from both the American people and the world at large.

Faced with such profound doubts, it becomes our imperative duty to challenge the oversimplified and unfounded assertions advanced by Mrs. Paine & Mr. Mallon. In the face of such overwhelming doubts, it is our fundamental duty to reject the simplified and unsupported claims of Oswald’s guilt.

“The worst form of injustice is pretended justice.” – Plato.

The full talk is on YouTube.

Go to Part 1 of 2
February 18, 2024
Our Lady of the Warren Commission: Part 1/2
“I frankly don’t like to talk to the people who think it was a conspiracy….” Ruth Paine (November 20th, 2023).

“The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that President John F. Kennedy was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy.” House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA)

On November 15th, 2023, I set course for a place once dubbed the ‘city of hate’ Dallas, Texas, a city forever haunted by the specter of November 22nd, 1963. This journey was not just a traversal across the Atlantic; it was a pilgrimage borne of a reverence for President Jack Kennedy

My itinerary in the United States was bursting with pivotal events, among these seminal moments was a night imbued with historical significance at Irving’s Dupree Theater on November 20th. Attending ‘An Evening of Conversation: (with) Ruth Paine & Thomas Mallon,‘ I wanted to take an opportunity to see Mrs. Paine and delve into her narrative, all be it one entrenched in the lore of the Warren Commission Report.

The Dupree Theatre, usually pulsating with the dynamism of the arts, had metamorphosed into a solemn sanctuary of contemplation that evening –its seats filled with an eclectic mix of individuals— Warren Commission stalwarts and those who advocate for the innocence of Lee Oswald, sat side by side united by a shared reverence for history.

We had all gathered to witness Mrs. Ruth Paine, a figure whose role in the Kennedy case oscillates between acclaim and controversy. As the most frequent witness before the Warren Commission, her accounts played a significant role in condemning Oswald as the lone assassin of President Kennedy— a portrayal I find quite contestable. Her testimonies, often cited as crucial in cementing Oswald’s culpability, added layers of complexity to an already convoluted historical puzzle. As she spoke, the air brimmed with a mix of reverence and skepticism.

Right on cue and wielding a tone steeped in certainty, Mrs. Paine delivered her highly questionable condemnation of the late Lee Oswald;“It was Lee who murdered President Kennedy, and he acted alone,”she declared, her voice imbued with a conviction that brooked no opposition.

Voltaire’s words echoed in my mind, “It is better to risk saving a guilty person than to condemn an innocent one.” Yet, in the Dupree Theater, Ruth Paine’s stance was unyielding, projecting Oswald’s guilt as an indisputable fact to the captivated audience.

When Mrs. Paine declared Lee Oswald guilty of assassinating President Kennedy, she entered a realm where ethics and legal principles intersect. Such public declarations, especially from those closely linked to a high-profile event, carry an inherent moral duty to provide evidence, even though not legally required. Her statements, lacking substantial corroboration, significantly influence public opinion, placing on her an implicit obligation for fairness and evidence-based assertions. Moreover, her avowed disdain for Oswald, highlighted by a remark about regretting her association with him, raises questions about her objectivity in this historical discourse.

Mr. Mallon, assuming a notably sanctimonious demeanor, then steered the discussion towards the attempted assassination of General Edwin Walker on April 10, 1963. His shift in focus, however, was not underpinned by the presentation of empirical evidence, eyewitness accounts, or ballistic analysis against Oswald. Instead, he chose to spotlight the highly contentious backyard photographs, just then projected onto the overhead screen.

Thomas Mallon. Something which helps to explain the Assassination of The President and that was Oswald’s attempt in April of 63, to shoot General Edwin Walker… This is Oswald in the backyard of the house on Neely Street in Dallas, holding a rifle and a copy of the Daily Worker and he has got his pistol at his waist. Marina took these photographs in the backyard in Neely Street, I think on March 31^st 1963. About 10 days later, he used that rifle, which was the same rifle he would kill the President with, to shoot at General Walker”.

Mr. Mallon, I must press upon a critical point: How do you reconcile the significant leap in logic required to use photographs, taken weeks before the attempt on General Walker’s life and months prior to President Kennedy’s assassination, as conclusive or even suggestive evidence of Oswald’s involvement in both crimes? These photographs, temporally distant from the events in question, seem to offer scant connection to the actual incidents. Could you elucidate how such a substantial leap in deductive reasoning is justified in this case, especially in the absence of more direct, contemporaneous evidence?

Marina Oswald, A Credible or Compromised Witness?

The issue of Marina Oswald’s credibility is not only discussed in depth in my series, ‘Assassination 60’’, but is also a well-acknowledged concern among experts on the case. Freda Scobey, a lawyer on the staff of Warren Commission dissenter Richard Russell, was one of the first to highlight the inconsistencies and contradictions in Marina’s testimonies, casting serious doubt on her reliability as a witness. Scobey’s observations underscore the problematic nature of using Marina’s testimony as a reliable source. (see this)

Moreover, as highlighted by my compatriot, Scott Reid, an expert on the Walker shooting, in his critical article ‘Oswald and the Shot at Walker:Redressing the Balance,’ zealous prosecutor, Norman Redlich, voiced similar reservations regarding Marina in a 1964 memorandum. He specifically addressed Marina’s pattern of deception: ‘Marina Oswald has repeatedly lied to the (Secret) Service, the FBI, and this Commission on matters which are of vital concern to the people of this country and the world… (Marina) may not have told the truth in connection with the attempt on General Walker.’ (see this)

Fellow commission counsel, J. Lee Rankin also voiced similar concerns to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, stating; “Marina’s testimony on the Walker shooting to the FBI and Secret Service was giving the Commission lawyers fits because it was riddled with contradictions.” Marina’s statements, Rankin complained, “Just don’t jibe.” (Gerald McKnight, Breach of Trust; p. 57)

And for those still harboring any skepticism, I earnestly encourage delving into the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) 29-page report, “Marina Oswald-Porter, Statements of a Contradictory Nature.” This segment offers a thorough exploration of the discrepancies within her testimonies. It diligently documents the divergences in her narratives across different aspects of the case, presenting a compelling study of inconsistency. (see this)

Taken together, these factors paint a picture of a witness whose credibility has been seriously compromised. As such, the reliance on Marina’s testimony by Mr. Mallon to link Oswald to the Walker case becomes a weak foundation for his argument, raising profound questions about its overall validity.

Oswald Denies the Backyard Photographs

According to the report by Captain Will Fritz, chief of the Homicide & Robbery Division, regarding the interrogation of Lee Harvey Oswald, Oswald himself contested the authenticity of the Neely Street photographs. Fritz’s account reveals that Oswald denounced the backyard photographs as sophisticated forgeries. He reported that Oswald claimed: “I again asked him about his property and where his things might be kept, and he told me about the things at Mrs. Paine’s residence and a few things on Beckley…I showed Oswald an enlarged picture of him holding a rifle and wearing a pistol. This picture had been enlarged by our Crime Lab from a picture found in the garage at Mrs. Paine’s home. He said the picture was not his, that the face was his face, but that this picture had been made by someone superimposing his face, the other part of the picture was not him at all and that he had never seen the picture before. When I told him that the picture was recovered from Mrs. Paine’s garage, he said that the picture had never been in his possession… He denied ever seeing that picture and said that he knew all about photography, that he had done a lot of work on photography himself… and (that it) had been made by some person unknown to him. He told me that he understood photography real well, and that in time, he would be able to show that it was not his picture, and that it had been made by someone else”. (WCR; p. 607-609)

The Legal Considerations of the Backyard Photographs

“As far as I know, according to the local laws here, a wife cannot be a witness against her husband”, Marina Oswald. (Volume I; p.18)

As I also highlighted in ‘Assassination 60’, the question of whether Marina Oswald could have legally testified against Lee raises interesting forensic considerations for the case. Under Texas law, spouses are generally permitted to serve as witnesses for each other in criminal cases. However, a crucial exception exists they cannot testify against each other unless one spouse is being prosecuted for an offense committed against the other. In the context of Oswald’s hypothetical trial, Marina’s testimony would have been excluded based on this spousal privilege. This means that the controversial backyard photographs, which were allegedly linked to Lee, could not have been admitted into evidence to be used against him. This is because Marina’s testimony, which was the sole source of corroboration for the photographs, would have been inadmissible due to the spousal privilege.

A Tribute to Priscilla

“…Priscilla Johnston [sic] … also had contact with Oswald in Russia. [Priscilla was] formerly [a] State Department employee at the American Embassy and [her] contact with Oswald was official business.” (FBI Memo, November 23^rd 1963.)

Thomas Mallon. “Ruth, could you speak, to why you think this (Walker shooting) is so key to understanding the assassination?”

Ruth Paine. “It certainly is.”

At this, Mrs. Paine paid tribute to Priscilla Johnson McMillan, symbolized by a folder in her possession. Addressing the audience, Mrs. Paine conveyed, “That she (Priscilla) described it (the attempt on Edwin Walker) as the Rosetta Stone to understand the attempt on the President (Kennedy), (Oswald’s) trying to kill the President. That knowing what was going on in his mind and how he plotted and did all the preparation for trying to shoot General Walker. Said so much about his personality, his sense of being, not recognized and that he wanted to have notoriety.”

During the tribute, an image of Mrs. Johnson-McMillan suddenly appeared on the screen. Just then, my phone vibrated with a message. Neale Safety, the secretary of Dealey Plaza UK, had sent a message to the DPUK WhatsApp group. It read “Michael, Priscilla & Ruth at a CIA BBQ…” This one liner had undoubtedly become the highlight of the evening.

For those interested in learning more about Mrs. Johnson, I strongly recommend the insightful series ‘Priscilla and Lee; Before and After the Assassination,’ authored by Peter R. Whitmey. (see this)

The Oswald Paradox: Seeking Fame or Framed by Fate?

Mrs. Paine & Mr. Mallon’s narrative is a rehash of the weary, well-worn trope that the Warren Commission clung to in their attempts to explain Oswald’s hypothetical motives in the assassination of President Kennedy. As I dissected in ‘Assassination 60’, this theory buckles under the weight of its own contradictions. If Oswald was indeed driven by a deep-seated craving for notoriety, a thirst to bask in the infamy of such a heinous act, then why did he vehemently and persistently proclaim his innocence during his harrowing detention at the hands of the Dallas Police? His resolute denials, voiced with an unwavering firmness even in the face of grave accusations, starkly undercut the narrative that he was a man hungry for the dark spotlight of historical infamy. This incongruity casts a long shadow of doubt over the simplistic explanation offered by the Warren Commission and echoed by Mrs.Paine & Mr. Mallon, challenging us to look beyond the surface in our quest for truth.

Pleading Innocence: The Forgotten Voice of Lee Oswald

Reporter. “Did you shoot the President?”
Lee Oswald. “I didn’t shoot anybody, no sir.”

Reporter. “Oswald did you shoot the President?”
Lee Oswald. “I didn’t shoot anybody sir I haven’t been told what I am here for.”

Reporter. “Kill the President?”
Lee Oswald. “No sir I didn’t. People keep asking me that.”

Reporter. “Did you kill the President?”
Lee Oswald. “No, I have not been charged with that in fact no one has said that to me yet. The first thing I heard about it was when the newspaper reporters in the hall asked me that question.”

Lee Oswald. “I don’t know what dispatches you people have been given but I emphatically deny these charges… I have not committed any acts of violence.” (see this)

Oswald’s Last Defense: Proclaiming Innocence Against History

On November 24, 1963, in the dim, oppressive confines of the City Hall basement, a critically wounded Lee Harvey Oswald lay in a dire state. Surrounded by the urgency and chaos of the moment, his life precariously hanging by a thread, a profound silence enveloped him. Officer B.H. Combest of the Dallas Police Department, amidst the turmoil, sought to extract a final confession or declaration from Oswald, particularly about the assassination of President Kennedy. This was Oswald’s moment, if ever there was one, to claim the notoriety that some believed motivated him. Yet, in this charged atmosphere, where each second could have been his last, Oswald chose silence. He uttered no words of confession, no statements of guilt or pride; he merely shook his head in response to direct prompts. This silence, in such a critical juncture, resonated with a powerful implication of innocence. It stood in stark contrast to the allegations that he sought fame through infamy. Oswald’s refusal to embrace a narrative of notoriety in these final, fleeting moments, where a single word could have immortalized him in infamy, spoke more emphatically than any verbal declaration could. His silence in the face of death, under the weight of such grave accusations, became his most resounding and final testament to his claim of innocence. (Volume XII; p. 176-186)

Mrs Paine: On what firm bedrock of evidence do you anchor your assertion that Oswald was propelled by a voracious yearning for infamy and fame? This supposition appears to starkly contrast with the profound narrative woven by his actions, most notably his resolute silence in the face of imminent mortality.

This pivotal silence speaks volumes, challenging the notion of his supposed thirst for recognition.

As Mrs. Paine’s trenchant condemnations of Oswald continued, they resonated powerfully with the audience, evident in the synchronized nods of her supporters, symbolizing a shared conviction. She complained; “I seem to think that the shooting of Walker is absolutely crucial to understand what was going on with Oswald and what happened… not enough has been said about it!”This crescendo of influence reached its zenith when she directed a leading question to the assembled crowd, skillfully crafted to further cast Oswald in the role of the guilty. Her inquiry, loaded with implication and designed to sway opinion, hung heavily in the air, compelling the audience to view the situation through her lens of accusation; “How many of you know that Oswald, and most of you should because you are here, but how many of you ‘know’ that Oswald tried to kill Edwin Walker in April” (1963).

In a choreographed motion, her hand ascended first, soon echoed by a sea of hands in the crowd. Recognizing this solidarity, Mrs. Paine responded with a mix of satisfaction and camaraderie, remarking, “There you go, good crowd, “laughing as her supporters returned the favor. I would call it kind of a dull crowd. It was hard to comprehend that no one asked the obvious question:

Why would Oswald try to kill a right-wing fascist like Walker and then shoot the most liberal president since FDR? I mean, you must know Ruth that Kennedy sent in troops to put down a riot over integration at Ole Miss staged by Walker in 1962? You do know that don’t you? And you also must know that Kennedy retired Walker from the service for distributing John Birch Society material to his troops?

Absent one sentient person, the dog and pony show continued.

Thomas Mallon.“How did it finally come to light that he had shot Walker?”

Ruth Paine.“ When he went out to try and shoot Walker, he wrote a note for Marina… it started out here is the key to the post office box, if I am arrested here is where the police station is and of course she was frightened, terrified as she didn’t know what to do, who to tell… so she (Marina) tried to threaten him, I am going to hide this and if you ever do anything crazy like this I will go to the police with it, but it didn’t work. The amount of preparation that he did, for trying to shoot Walker, is in no way mimicked in the preparation he did before shooting Kennedy, because that was an impulse. He was working on a place that turned out to be on the parade route, with the car going by. He learned that when he was at work on Wednesday (November 20^th) called and came and got right out to my house, he had never come out on a weekday, he had never come out before asking permission, this was very different… He came out to get his rifle which was hidden in my garage, which I did not know. Got it and went in and shot the President as we ‘know’. It was a little bit later that the note came to light.

Thomas Mallon.“How did the note reach her?”

Ruth Paine.“…I sent the book to Marina (which contained the note). Of course, what is the first thing a Secret Service man going to do when he sees a book? See what falls out, and out came this note. She was confronted with this note and had to explain that it was the note he wrote when he went out to try and shoot Walker. If that note had not been found then I don’t think that we would ever have found out, because she was not going to tell”.

The Walker Note

“Did it seem strange to you at the time, Marina, that Lee did make these careful plans, take pictures, and write it up in a notebook, and then when he went out to shoot at General Walker, he left all that incriminating evidence right in the house so that if he had ever been stopped and questioned and if that notebook had been found, it would have clearly indicated that he was the one that shot at General Walker?” Wesley Liebeler.

If Exhibit A in the case against Lee Oswald—anchored by Mrs. Paine and Mr. Mallon’s account of the attempt on General Walker—draws heavily from Marina Oswald’s testimony, then Exhibit B is undoubtedly the infamous ‘Note,’ which surfaced, via Mrs. Paine, only after Oswald’s death. This ‘Note,’ has become a cornerstone of controversy. Its posthumous discovery raises pressing questions: What does the ‘Note’ truly prove? At the heart of this debate, several critical concerns undermine the ‘Note’s’ validity and its connection to Oswald:
1. Absence of Mention of General Edwin Walker: The note’s content does not reference General Edwin Walker, which is a significant omission if it was intended to be related to the assassination attempt on him. This raises questions about the note’s intended purpose and relevance to that specific incident.
2. Lack of Signature and Date: The note’s anonymity and lack of a temporal marker further cloud its authenticity. An unsigned and undated note lacks the definitive characteristics necessary to firmly tie it to a specific individual or time frame, undermining its credibility as a piece of evidence.
3. Fingerprint Analysis Results: The FBI’s analysis revealed that none of the seven latent prints found on the note matched Lee Harvey Oswald or Marina Oswald. This forensic evidence is crucial as it directly challenges the assumption that Oswald had physical contact with the note, casting serious doubts on its connection to him.View Source
4. Secret Service Inquiry into Mrs. Paine’s Possible Involvement: Mr. Gopadze of the Secret Service accosted Mrs. Paine over the “Walker note” suspecting her potential role in its creation. “
5. Expert Consensus on the ‘Walker’ Note’s Authenticity: The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) consulted three experts to assess the authenticity of the ‘Walker’ note. Notably, there was no majority consensus that the note was written by Lee Harvey Oswald. This raises serious doubts about the note’s legitimacy and its alleged connection to Oswald.View Source
6. Oversight in Dallas Police Search: Despite an extensive search of the Paine residence on November 22-23, 1963, specifically aimed at uncovering evidence that could incriminate Lee Oswald, the Dallas Police failed to uncover the ‘Walker’ note. This oversight is particularly striking given Ruth Paine’s testimony indicating the thoroughness of the search. The fact that such a potentially incriminating item eluded the police during their detailed search adds a layer of mystery to the case and raises questions about the note’s whereabouts during this critical period.
  Ruth Paine:“I was just preparing to go to the grocery store when several officers arrived again from the Dallas Police Office and asked if they could search…and held up their warrant and I said, yes, they could search. They said they were looking for something specific… Before I left, they were leafing through books to see if anything fell out but that is all I saw… “(WC Volume III; p. 86-87)
  
  th, 2023, and Mrs. Paine stated that the note was contained within “a little book we had, a small book of advice to Russian mothers. It happened to be in the kitchen where we were reading, which made it different from the things in the garage… but they didn’t get that note because it was in my kitchen.”
  
  Considering your statement, Mrs. Paine, that the note was hidden “inside a little book of advice to Russian mothers’”in your kitchen – a location and item distinct from those in the garage – several deeply perplexing and troubling questions arise.
  
  Firstly, if this book was indeed in regular use by Marina in the days or weeks prior to the President’s assassination, it seems utterly baffling that neither of you noticed a note concealed within its pages? This oversight becomes even more confounding when considering the ease with which the Secret Service later discovered it. How is it possible that this note remained undetected in a book that was actively being used?
  
  Secondly this is 1960’s Texas, this period was marked by intense suspicion towards anything remotely associated with communism or the Soviet Union, it stretches credibility to suggest that a book intended for Russian mothers would go undetected by Texas police officers during a property search. My own visit to the property at 2515 W Fifth Street, in November 2023, offered insightful perspectives on this matter. As I toured the house, I found that the garage could be accessed directly from the kitchen/dining area, a detail clearly illustrated in the floor plan I have referenced above. This observation becomes critical when considering Mrs. Paine’s own admission of having given the police unfettered access to search her home in her absence, thus leaving them unsupervised. Given this level of access, and the fact that the garage is directly connected to a central living area of the house, the suggestion that their search would exclude the kitchen, and by extension, overlook a culturally and politically charged item like the book, seems strained. (see this)
7. Marina Oswald’s Initial Disavowal of Knowledge: In a striking turn of initial testimony, Marina Oswald professed complete ignorance regarding the existence of the ‘Walker’ note. This initial declaration of ignorance is pivotal, casting a veil of doubt over her subsequent revelations and the evolution of her narrative. View Source
8. Evidence Destroyed? The scenario as detailed in Marina Oswald’s testimony regarding the Walker shooting incident indeed unravels into a web of paradoxes and inconsistencies. Her claim that she urged Oswald to destroy a notebook, rich with intricate details of the attack on General Walker, stands in stark contrast to their apparent preservation of the ‘Walker’ note. This dichotomy is not just perplexing but contradictory. If Oswald, as suggested by Marina, felt compelled to incinerate the notebook due to its incriminating nature, it is logical to assume that similar caution would extend to all related materials, including the ‘Walker’ note, pictures of Walkers home found in the Paine garage and the notorious Neely Street photographs. The decision to eradicate one potential piece of evidence while seemingly safeguarding others defies logical reasoning and casts a shadow over their approach to handling such sensitive materials.
Marina Oswald. “I was so afraid after this attempt on Walker’s life that the police might come to the house. I was afraid that there would be evidence in the house such as this book… I told him that it is best not to have this kind of stuff in the house…I suggested to him that it would be awfully bad to keep a thing like that in the house.” (Volume XI; p.293-294)

The scenario presented by Marina Oswald’s testimony regarding the Walker shooting incident is fraught with paradoxes and inconsistencies. It is indeed paradoxical that while she claimed to have urged Oswald to destroy a notebook detailing plans for the attack on General Walker – an act acknowledging the danger of retaining incriminating evidence – she seemingly allowed the ‘Walker’ note to remain in their possession. This contradiction is puzzling. If Oswald took the drastic step to burn a notebook for fear of its incriminating nature, logic would dictate that all related materials, such as the ‘Walker’ note, the infamous backyard photographs, and the photographs of Walkers property would also be destroyed to eliminate any trace of involvement.

This inconsistency in the handling of evidence is succinctly highlighted by Wesley Liebeler’s poignant question:’If Oswald was guilty in the Walker shooting, why would Oswald keep the photos and the note around for almost eight months?’

Go to Part 2 of 2
February 18, 2024
Pipe the Bimbo in Red
Some time in 2022, I gave an online talk for UK Dealey Plaza about the Garrison Files, which I had just completed reading…all nine thousand pages. During the question period, one audience member asked me…Paul, do you have any idea why someone like Dean Andrews would represent someone like Clay Shaw? like Dean Andrews was chosen to represent Clay Shaw (1:08:33)? I have to admit my answer was quite vague. As the moderator of this talk, Neale Safaty, pointed out: Dean Andrews is very enigmatic.

In their book, the authors ask, for anyone has a minimum of critical thinking abilities: Why would Andrews get a call from Clay Shaw, AKA Clem or Clay Bertrand on the day of JFK’s assassination to represent an already doomed Oswald?

At 44:32 of this same video, the questions of sexual orientation of Oswald and Ruby come up, where you can witness my own confusion about sightings of a scruffy-looking Oswald vs. the neat, clean Oswald.

When Donald Jeffries asked me if I would do a book review of this book, I was at first hesitant—as I had just gone through a year of writing and promoting The JFK Assassination Chokeholds with four colleagues and frankly, I needed a break from JFK. But a book about Dean Andrews, played so enticingly by fellow-Canadian John Candy in JFK, I decided to give it a go. I am happy I did. I now have a better grasp of whom Andrews was, the mystery of the unkempt Oswald, and the scene in New Orleans during the summer of 1963.

Their interview with Andrews’ son represents an important find. Not that we can take what Dean junior says as gold. Like the children of many of the cast of characters associated with the JFK saga, Dean Andrews III and other members of the Andrews family paid a heavy burden that reminds one of the Saint John Hunt story. Dean will be seriously challenged for what he reveals because of whom he became, and not necessarily what he says. You will see that I have reservations with some of his statements. His dad clearly had his safety in mind when he answered Dean’s questions when he was a youngster by being evasive, cryptic, and mysterious. His father’s non-denials in certain instances speak volumes. So, on the weight alone of the Dean Andrews III interviews, well conducted by Law, assassination researchers will have plenty to consider, debate and research further and is reason enough to read this book. Other than the ad-hominems Dean is certain to face, there will be some who may want to unfairly shoot the messengers: Don Jeffries and William Law.

While I do recommend Pipe the Bimbo in Red, I would urge the authors to consider writing a revised version, or maybe even a second edition to clear up loose ends, and synthesize by adding information and plucking out irritants. Some of the weaknesses in this book are self-inflicted through overreach and sloppiness which will distract from the key themes before they are even presented and provide a juicy target for lone nut theorists.

First Impressions

I have to say that I do not know Donald Jeffries, so I felt his request came a little out of the blue. I had a negative impression of the title but must admit that it unmistakably projects the image we all have come to associate with Dean Andrews.

Next, I found out that it was co-authored by William Matson Law, whom I had the pleasure of listening to at last November’s Lancer Conference. Law’s interviews of FBI agents Jim Sibert and Frank O’Neill are landmarks and help obliterate the Warren Commission by underscoring what they witnessed during JFK’s autopsy and reveal bias of the Warren Commission. The authors’ work received an endorsement by Garrison authority William Davy, who wrote a foreword that also goes a long way in proving that Clem Bertrand and Clay Shaw were one and the same.

The preface by Edward Haslam does a fine job in presenting how important the setting of NOLA was for the goings-on in 1963, and just how tightly knit the characters were in this small, big city.

Their bibliography includes the following:
- William Davy, Let Justice be Done: New Light on the Jim Garrison Investigation
- James DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed: JFK, Cuba, and the Garrison Case
- Paris Flammonde, The Kennedy Conspiracy: An Uncommisioned Report on the Jim Garrison Investigation
- Jim Garrison, A Heritage of Stone
- Jim Garrison, On the Trail of the Assassins: My Investigation and Prosecution of the Murder of President Kennedy
- Edward T. Haslam, Dr. Mary’s Monkey
- Marrs, Jim, Crossfire: The Plot That Killed Kennedy
- Joan Mellen, A Farewell to Justice: Jim Garrison, JFK’s Assassination, and the Case That Should Have Changed History
- Jack Roth, Killing Kennedy: Exposing the Plot, the Cover-Up, and the Consequences
- Richard E. Sprague, The Taking of America 1-2-3
One element not included is the raw data available from the 9000 pages of the Garrison files. This, in my view, reduced their sources of information, though the best of these may have surfaced in the many books they referenced…but certainly not all. Thanks to Paul Abbott from Australia, there is now a master index to help navigate dozens of files. Dean Andrews name is associated numerous times in over twenty different files. I would argue that this is a much richer source than what we can find in any other government investigation.

Overall, the book was certain to rest on a solid foundation if the information was well absorbed.

The Preface, Foreword and Introduction

The preface by Haslam is really useful for describing the NOLA setting and the network that Dean Andrews, Oswald, Clay Shaw and Garrison roamed around in. It is a network that hated the Castro threat because of their business ties to Latin America, that saw Kennedy as Castro’s enabler, one that was well connected to intelligence, the mob and Cuban exiles all working in sync to reclaim their kingdom. New Orleans was the last place for a Fair Play for Cuba Committee chapter to set up shop, unless it was a front. Haslam remembered that on the day of the assassination, very threatening skies were forming west of the city…skies no normal person would drive into for an ice-skating outing, as David Ferrie said he was doing that day.

Davy continues the strong start with more than just a normal plug of what I was about to read. For this author, Shaw and Bertrand being the same person is a fact. Shaw told Officer Aloysius Habighorst that Bertrand was an alias he used, which was transcribed on an arrest form that is now part of the official record. Attempts to explain this away border on the loony, as in another person in the crowded, noisy room when Shaw revealed his secret identity did not hear him say this (in other words he simply did not hear). Davy reinforces this with another salvo:

By the time of my interview with Weisberg (ca. 1997) he had long since turned bitter towards Garrison and his investigation—which made one of his comments to me inexplicable. When I asked him about the shadowy figure of “Clay Bertrand” he confidently stated that “Bertrand was Clay Shaw. No doubt. Monk Zelden confirmed it to me.”

Of course, Shaw was the defendant in Garrison’s case and Zelden was a New Orleans attorney who worked with one of the more colorful characters in Lee Harvey Oswald’s orbit, Dean Andrews. Davy then, in a few surgical paragraphs, sets the stage for the book by explaining how Andrews’ links with both Shaw and Oswald were a catalyst for the Garrison investigation—which led to the municipal court attorney’s demise.

He also adroitly points out the extremely revealing INS information about Oswald that Law and Jeffries rely on and that so few in the research community have utilized. Somewhere around 2017 when this information was pointed out, I remember Davy telling Len Osanic on Black Op Radio words to the effect: The fact that we have a governmental agency affirmation that Oswald could be seen entering the building where Banister had his offices with Ferrie and his gang of nuts represents an official intelligence confirmation about Oswald’s connections and exclaimed that this is game, set and match!

That introduction does a good job setting up the highlight of the book, that is the Dean Andrews III interviews. In the view of the authors, the considerable time spent with Dean was enough to convince them that his unique vista of the case and the access he had to his father’s perspective (which was not without limitations) were grounds for relating his story and shedding light around the enigma that is his dad.

Through their relationship with Dean Junior, the authors even heard briefly from Dean Andrews’ wife, who described her deceased husband as a very unstable individual which caused so much hardship.

Beyond bringing fresh, untapped information, the authors argue that Garrison uncovered the ground-level conspirators alluded to in the movie JFK. While this statement may please some of the Garrison disciples, it is clearly too all-encompassing. The plot was too complex for Garrison to grasp the whole ground-level operation. Gaeton Fonzi and some of his followers would argue that there was plenty of intrigue related to Miami that also qualifies as ground level. Who the ground players were for what happened in Dealey Plaza depends on roles that likely did not emanate entirely from Ferrie and friends…at least this book does not prove this. This does not diminish in any way the importance of what took place in New Orleans in 1963.

CHAPTER ONE: Harold Weisberg in New Orleans

Readers in this chapter will understand just how much of a threat Garrison became to the conspirators and they will see an early example of how pro-conspiracy forces can turn bitterly against one another through the Weisberg/Garrison break-up…Something we have witnessed time and time again over the years up to today where the infighting around the legal procedures concerning the breaches of the JFK Act is in full swing, to the delectation of lone nut propagandists.

The authors do not pull any punches when it comes to covering Weisberg whether it is describing his research or his underhanded jabs at Garrison and the movie JFK. They also in this chapter meander into a number of subjects including the organized smear campaign against Garrison by media assets and the infiltration of his office.

There are a lot of nice nuggets here. But one problem began to emerge that permeated throughout the first three chapters: while we are getting a summary of a lot of what has been written about Garrison and New Orleans and even more, the authors are inconsistent with their sources. For example, on page 18 they write: A rough draft of Aynesworth’s May 15, 1967, Newsweek article, “The JFK Conspiracy,” is in the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. There is also a cover letter addressed to LBJ’s press secretary George Christian. Aynesworth wrote, “I am not offering this for comment of any kind, nor a check of the validity of any part…My interest in informing government officials of each step along the way is because of my intimate knowledge of what Jim Garrison is planning…I intend to make a complete report of my knowledge available to the FBI, as I have done in the past.” Interesting weaseling about for certain, but no direct source to prove the existence of this highly incriminating behavior, either by a link or a book source.

Consider this reference: Regis Kennedy (no relation to the president) is among several witnesses connected to the events in Dallas in 1963 who died “before they could be fully questioned,” according to online sources. No careful researcher will take such a statement seriously. There is also this one on page 79: In an interview aired two years after his death in 1990, (Judge) Haggerty would say, “I believe he [Shaw] was lying to the jury. Of course, the jury probably believed him. But I think Shaw put a good con job on the jury.” I found this so important that I had to ask Jim DiEugenio if it really happened, and he confirmed that it did, but an author needs to be more precise than this. In one case the source is the controversial Torbitt document, and the authors seem unaware of the true name of its author: (Lawyer David Copeland). Sometimes the source is Quoting from the Spartacus Educational Forum. There is also a preference by the authors to refer to a book as a source rather than the primary data the book info is based on. I paid a price for this when I used Ultimate Sacrifice as a source about potential patsy Policarpo Lopez. I got panned by some whereas I could have avoided all the flack by quoting directly from the HSCA files on Lopez.

This to me is an irritant because I often cannot refer directly to a source to learn more, and I cannot repeat it as fact until I know that the source is solid. Where this sloppiness came to bite the authors hard can be seen on page 58 where they hover around a Carlos who was seen in the company of Oswald and Sergio Arcacha Smith, a little later they say Garrison attorney Lou Ivon asked witness Dave Lewis if he recognized the name Carlos Corega…In so doing they completely messed up the Carlos Quiroga incident which is well covered in two sources they had referred to elsewhere: Destiny Betrayed and this author’s KennedysandKing articles about the FPCC. Quiroga is known to have met Oswald at his place, bringing a stack of FPCC flyers, being with Oswald at Mancuso’s restaurant in the presence of Arcacha Smith and other usual suspects and revealing that Oswald used the FPCC as a front through a failed polygraph test. Lewis strengthened some of these revelations in his own polygraph test.

Do not get me wrong, dismissing the authors and this book because of improper sourcing would be in my view an error. There is too much good information and new insights to throw away the baby with the bath water. The work put into talking to Dean Andrews III and his mother as well as Ed Voebel’s sisters, niece and son, John Barbour, Garrison investigator Stephen Jaffe, etc. represent important developments.

Chapter 1 showcased another problem with Bimbo that can also be seen in chapters 2 and 3: it lacks structure. The first chapter is supposed to be about Weisberg, but many tangents are taken that bring the reader into whole other subject matters that are interesting yes, but certain to create confusion with information overload. I also think that they should have broken down the chapters into subsections. They have only one subsection in the whole book as far as I can remember which sticks out like a lonely outlier: Kennedy. In a second edition, and I really hope they write one, they will need to break down the information into more chapters with multiple subsections.

CHAPTER TWO: A Ground Level Plot

If one wants to get a snapshot of what has been said and written about the central characters operating out of New Orleans, this part of the book throws everything at the reader, plus the kitchen sink. Since my book readings about Garrison go back for a while, it was good to be reminded of the many anomalies that took place in the Crescent City. There is plenty here that I did not know or recall.

This chapter is also inconsistent with sources and tends to wander. I believe it should be retitled. While many interesting links are made around shady people, I would have trouble describing this the ground-level plot based on the information we are given. Objectives, strategies, timelines, roles…there is a lack of clarity around the “said” plot. The chapter is really more about hanky-panky in New Orleans.

CHAPTER THREE: Dean Andrews and His Fluid Recollections

After the strong start to the book, I found the first two chapters to be interesting, but a mixed bag in terms of reliability. The authors make it difficult for the readers to digest the sheer quantity of information thrown at them and to come away with a high level of confidence in what is written. You sometimes feel as if you are on a carousel ride in a figure eight trajectory while in gallop mode.

While some of the sloppiness and meandering continues, Chapter 3, for this reader, was a turning point and was appropriately titled. Dean Andrews is one of the keys to understanding the New Orleans network of shady characters that link Oswald to Clay Shaw. New Orleans was so toxic to the Warren Commission that Andrews was coerced into confabulating (because he was supposedly under sedation) that a call from Shaw AKA Bertrand that he got asking him to represent Oswald while he was sick in the hospital was a figment of his imagination. The FBI also decided not to delve into Oswald’s 544 Camp Street office and the cast of right-wingers and intelligence actors that the office was a fulcrum for…a mistake according to the HSCA.

From Andrews’ own mouth, an open-minded reader should be left with a clear impression that:
- Andrews represented Oswald a number of times.
- Clay Shaw backed this relationship as well as Andrews’ representation of members of the gay community.
- Andrews was a small-time fixer. Better Call Saul comes to mind.
- The call did occur and was corroborated.
- Andrews was intimidated and scared out of his wits.
- He professed Oswald’s innocence.
- He admitted that the FBI turned the heat on him.
- Oswald’s representation of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was a front, and he was paid.
- He was part of a network that includes Shaw, Oswald, Wray Gill, Ferrie, Marcello and the anti-Castro movement.
- The contradictory comments he made were for self-preservation.
The authors deserve credit for making this clear to the world.

CHAPTER FOUR: The Dean Andrews III Interviews

This chapter represents the apex of the book. Dean Andrews was 12 when JFK was assassinated. During the Garrison Investigation, he witnessed and lived through a downturn of his father’s fortunes and career and the quasi break-up of his family. The impact on Dean Junior’s health and ambitions were immense. It is a tragic story that seems to be a recurring theme for so many of the family members of those connected the assassination. Perhaps the real perpetrators of JFK’s assassination never went to jail for the crimes, but many paid a personal price with a lot of collateral damage to their close ones.

Those who did seek the truth also risked a lot. The traces they left likely caused trauma for the ones they cared for, but hopefully left them with a sense of pride for fighting the good fight. The cover-up artists live in denial. The more that comes out throughout the years, the less their positions are tenable. Yet they plod on even though they are at the opposite end of the official records. With a great majority of the population and more and more traditional and new media open to the conspiracy scenarios, lone nut advocates are swimming in a much smaller pond and are the ones who come across as Q-ananonish.

What Jeffries and Law do in these interviews is shed light on what a son, who is knowledgeable about the case and who decoded his father the way only a family member can, said, thought, knew, guessed, heard about his father and the case. Dean’s father was very abstract when talking about the saga but revealed so much anyway. Sometimes through non-denials you can figure things out. A son picks up patterns, signals from non-verbal communications and knows when his father is hiding something.
- The authors deserve kudos for recognizing Dean’s importance, gaining his trust and making a record of what he can relate no matter how troubled he became.
- I will not tell you what he has to say because you need to read it for yourself and ponder:
- Dean talks about his dad’s sexuality;
- What he thinks about Jim Garrison;
- The Bertrand-Shaw identities;
- Attempts to harm, intimidate and even kill his dad;
- The divide in his family;
- His dad’s links to Shaw, Marcello, Garrison, Oswald, Mork Zelden, David Ferrie;
- Oliver Stone and the film JFK;
- Oswald and the FPCC;
- His dad’s links to intelligence;
- His father’s personality and biography.
You will ponder, debate and hopefully research on your own to build around this new low-hanging fruit in figuring out the enigma of Dean Andrews. These revelations will likely be polarizing due to the fact that they focus on Jim Garrison and New Orleans. But they are very much worth reading.

I would encourage the authors to try and get corroboration. Dean claims the Figaro ran an article about Garrison being arrested for sexual misconduct…where is it? The only sources that I have seen around such allegations come from discredited smear tacticians. Challenge Dean on whom he confided to, who he thinks could corroborate what he has to say. Not much was said about David Ferrie in the interview…Query William Davy and others about what other questions should be asked. We are actually reaching a point where even the offspring will not be available for much longer.

CHAPTER FIVE William Law 1993 Interview with Perry Raymond Russo

I am not certain why this part gets to be labeled a chapter, while the two that follow the aftermath are labeled appendices. They are essentially decades old interviews that they decided to highlight as blasts from the past. I am happy they did, as I believe that what is in them is pertinent and not necessarily well known.

This section underscores many themes we can find elsewhere in the book but recounts them as seen and felt through the important witness—Perry Russo.

One detail that came screaming out at me that would help explain the differences in appearance in Oswald: The unkempt, messy, unshaven Oswald vs. the neat, clean Oswald. Despite the use of impostors, there had to be something more to these seemingly conflicting sightings. Here is what Russo says: “I’m saying that the guy stayed over at this other guy’s house. Well, the wife should know. How the fuck would this dude, Perry Russo, how would he know? Well, he didn’t. And then she admitted that he used to beat the fuck out of her, and then run out on her. And he’d be gone for three or four days. And she’s glad to see him go. And she said in 1969, telling her when we were in court, she said that he always was immaculately clean. Well, he wasn’t when he was away from her. He was dirty and unshaven. Well and understandable, because he didn’t bring his shaving stuff. He didn’t bring his deodorant. He didn’t give a fuck. He was mad at the world. I didn’t get along with him. But I maintain that. I look like the Lone Ranger. No one could believe me. His wife said he slept every night with her. He took care of the kids. He was never dirty. He was always clean and meticulous about his appearance. I’m saying he’s unshaven three days in. Now, that comes out in 1979. He used to beat the fuck out of her, leave for a week. And all of a sudden, it becomes reasonable that Lee Oswald went over to his friend’s house, Dave Ferrie. Not that far from 4905 Magazine Street, where he lived, with her…in Louisiana.”

When you connect the dots between what Russo, Andrews Sr. and Andrews Jr. have to say, we get a better idea of how the whole Andrews, Ferrie, Oswald, Shaw, Marcello, Cuban Exile network is linked as well as the many double lives led by so many of these characters.

CHAPTER SIX Conclusion: The Conspiracy Is Clear

In chapter 6 the authors pick the brain of author and former TV personality John Barbour. Here I discovered what Garrison confided to his good friend off the record. We get to know what Garrison speculated as to the nature of the conspiracy…From what happened in Dealey Plaza to the catalyst behind the decision to remove JFK to how the murder was sanctioned. Garrison also had a contact who described the very weird goings-on during the Oswald interrogation after the murder. The source was there and wished to remain anonymous. This is also very interesting.

Then they come back and touch on a Dean Andrews’ claim that his father’s hospitalization just before the assassination was due to an attempted murder because of what he knew. What is not asked here, is that if this were the case, did this attempt likely involve the very person who called him to represent Oswald? How Clay Shaw even knew where to reach Andrews is a point that is raised.

Here again the title is misleading. While it is clear that there was a conspiracy, and this book adds food for thought around some of the characters, it does not come close to clarifying what the conspiracy was…not even what they call the ground-level conspiracy. New Orleans on its own, if completely decoded, cannot explain even one quarter of the ground-level conspiracy. As Hancock and Boylan show in Tipping Point, so much else was revolving around players in Miami who were the real architects of regime change operations and were way more determining of what happened in Dealey Plaza than Ferrie et al. There is a big difference between getting Oswald to goosestep in a charade vs. participating in an ambush of a president.

The Afterword by Jack Roth, and the Three Appendices

I have visited Dealey Plaza and Oswald’s “said” flight trajectory, guided by Dallas resident and researcher Matt Douthit and found it to be fascinating. Jack Roth has convinced me to tour New Orleans. His brilliant description in just a few pages culminates with the following statement from a tour guide he met: “…there’s no way anybody could’ve walked these streets, been engaged in this kind of activity, and been involved with people of this caliber in this city and have it not been something more than what it seemed.”

When he goes into the Judy Baker stuff however, I cringe and worry for the authors. I don’t know how many serious writers contaminate their work and tarnish their own reputations on frivolous yarns. Some stories require qualifiers like the not yet substantiated story by…(the Paul Landis revelation comes to mind). Others are sure to polarize those who believe there was a conspiracy and provide a big juicy target for lone-nut advocates: Madeleine Brown, Judith Exner Campbell and Baker clearly fall in this category.

The three appendices are excellently chosen: Dean Andrews’ fascinating Warren Commission testimony; a letter from Fletcher Prouty to Oliver Stone (September 2, 1990) which sheds light on how a coup emanates from the highest levels of power in the U.S. and excerpts from a little exposed speech before a November 18, 2006, JFK Lancer Conference by Anne Dischler who worked with State Trooper Francis Fruge for Jim Garrison.

Conclusion

Just last fall, we had completed our book, The JFK Assassination Chokeholds, after going through through a very strict regime of trying to only include fact-based, primary evidence and carefully backing up each statement we made. All in all, there are close to 800 footnotes, exhibits and direct quotes with sources within the text. Among my other co-authors, there are three attorneys grounded in how to write on a legal basis and one of the world’s premier researchers. Reading Bimbo, I needed to completely change my base of references on how to write a book: questionable sources, lack of focus and fallacious thinking pop up too often to avoid the poison pen of critics. It would have been easy to pan it. But in a sense the authors are really telling a story.

Bimbo offers too much to be ignored and opens the doors to further exploration around the subject of New Orleans which was clearly toxic and threatening to the early, biased investigators with an agenda. They talked to Andrews III, Davy, Barbour, Jaffe and Voebel’s close ones. They revealed important, little-known records that are decades old yet still so very important. Not reading Bimbo is tantamount to not accessing fresh, controversial information from none other than the son of one of the most enigmatic personages in this whole affair. Even if we discount everything else in Bimbo (which one should not do) and even if we do not believe everything Dean Andrews III says, a serious researcher should hear and consider it closely, just like we listened to William Kent’s daughter, E. H. Hunt’s son and David Atlee Phillips’ relatives.

Interviewing Dean junior was a coup!

As for the rest of the book here are my suggestions for a second edition.
1. Get yourselves an editor, someone like William Davy, who acts as a real devil’s advocate to rethink the chapters, improve the focus, break down the information better, get rid of the frivolous, add crucial data, correct grammar, etc.
2. Really improve choice of sources and how these are disclosed for every affirmation made.
3. Add a master chronology of events in New Orleans, a full Dean Andrews bio, a glossary of names and a map with key locations.
4. Consider showing exhibits from the Dean III scrapbook.
5. Re-interview Andrews with questions, people like Davy, DiEugenio, Mellen would like to ask and try and get some corroboration from people Dean himself may be able to identify.
6. Order the Garrison Files from Len Osanic as well as Paul Abbott’s master index and see what you can find there. There are many files on Andrews.
7. Try and increase the Dean Andrews research and write more about him and cool it on the ground-level plot.
Dean Andrews is to this book what the Big Mac is to McDonald’s…Your cash cow! Milk it!!!
February 10, 2024
Oswald in Japan: How the CIA Deceived Congress
[Fig. 1]
The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) reinvestigated the murders of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King (Credit: U.S. Congress)

The excellent Solving JFK podcast, hosted by Matt Crumpton, reminds us of a thought-provoking anomaly. The 1964 final report of the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (the “Warren Commission”) says that during his service as a Marine in the Far East, Lee Harvey Oswald, accused assassin of President John F. Kennedy, was in Taiwan from Sept. 30, 1958, but returned to Atsugi, Japan, by Oct. 5. The Warren Report does not say what Oswald was doing in Taiwan, but the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), which reinvestigated the JFK and Martin Luther King murders in 1976-79, concluded that Oswald never visited Taiwan at all.

The Solving JFK episode can be heard here.

This astonishing discrepancy in the official record is another arrow in the quiver of those entertaining the irrepressible theory of the “Two Oswalds.” That thesis essentially holds that there were two men who not only bore an uncanny resemblance to each other but also went by the same identity as a matter of official record in furtherance of an intelligence operation that desperately needed to be suppressed after the assassination.

The incongruity also, incidentally, strengthens the widespread and more general conviction that agencies controlling information on Oswald, whether the CIA, FBI, military intelligence services or others, repeatedly deceived official investigators. Although the HSCA at least concluded that JFK was “probably” murdered “as a result of a conspiracy,” its inquiry proved to be a “damp squib” overall. It is no longer controversial to assert that the CIA deliberately diverted and stonewalled the HSCA. One area in which CIA deception appears especially vigorous is Oswald’s time in Japan, a chapter that remains an information “black hole,” to paraphrase John Newman, author of JFK and Vietnam (2017) and Oswald and the CIA (2008). The Taiwan episode is just one example.

This “black hole” has exacerbated suspicions of Oswald’s ties to U.S. intelligence in Japan, as alleged by a former CIA employee based in the Tokyo Station at the time of the assassination. Such connections have never been proven, but in light of the CIA’s obvious deception of the HSCA about Oswald in other areas, especially New Orleans and Mexico City, Agency trickery on Oswald in Japan is also worth studying. JFK researchers of integrity are convinced that the CIA is still concealing the extent of its ties to Oswald, and these links may very well go back to his time in Japan — or even earlier.

The House of Representatives Inquiry

On June 12, 1978, a document handwritten by HSCA investigator Harold Leap was forwarded within the CIA. Fully declassified on Aug. 24, 2023, it summarizes Leap’s interviews of 12 employees of the CIA’s Tokyo Station pursuant to “critic publications and specific allegations by former CIA employee James Wilcott that LHO was a CIA agent.” Wilcott had stated in a closed-door HSCA session that “a CIA case officer stationed in Tokyo, Japan, told him that LHO was a CIA agent and also mentioned LHO’s cryptonym.”

The 71-page document that includes Wilcott’s HSCA testimony and related material refers to an unspecified “Oswald project” requiring disbursements of funds, and to Atsugi as “a plush super-secret cover base for Tokyo Station [i.e., CIA] special operations.” Wilcott, a CIA finance officer, testified that the conversation occurred “in the Tokyo Station shortly after the word of the JFK assassination was received on 23 Nov 1963.” Although Wilcott “could not recall the name of the case officer or the cryptonym,” he said that “considerable conversation took place among CIA employees at the time concerning the Oswald-CIA agent issue.” All 12 interviewees were asked whether they had come across any indication that Oswald was an intelligence agent. All said no.

The interview notes appear in summarized form for all officers but one, William Crawford, the CIA’s deputy chief of station in Tokyo from March 1959 to October 1960. In fact, all interview subjects are identified as having worked in the station in the period from 1959 through 1964, presumably to account for any CIA employees who were working in the Tokyo Station when Wilcott was, and whom Wilcott might thus have overhead. Yet Oswald was based in Japan from September 1957 to November 1958, and it is striking that no one but Crawford is identified as having served there during that period too.

Crawford is listed in another CIA document as “acting executive officer” of “Detachment C” when Oswald was serving at the Atsugi Naval Air Station. Detachment C was the CIA unit deployed to Atsugi to operate the U-2 spy plane program, which conducted surveillance missions over Communist China and the Soviet Union. But Crawford was not among the 18 CIA personnel that Wilcott recommended for interview by the HSCA. Even Detachment C’s actual executive officer for the relevant period, Werner Weiss, was not interviewed, despite the fact that he was alive and well in 1978.

[Fig. 2]

In all, Leap only interviewed four out of Wilcott’s 18 recommendations. Wilcott obviously provided the names of these 18 people because he knew they were working in the Tokyo Station when he (Wilcott) was, but, again, of the four employees that the CIA made available to the HSCA for interviews, nothing indicates that any of them were even in Japan when Oswald was. No explanation is given for this, even though, of the 14 people on Wilcott’s list who were never interviewed by Leap, most were actually serving in Japan during the time Oswald was at Atsugi. Why were they left out of the interviews?

Leap’s notes from his interview of Crawford say that the subject “didn’t know [Lee Harvey Oswald] and never heard the name until after the assassination.” The only reason Oswald was connected to the U-2 program (and thus the CIA) at all, Crawford said, was that “the CIA at Atsugi did not have their own radio-radar facilities,” so the U-2 planes “utilized the naval base communications only for take-off and landing clearance.”

Crawford did note that the “CIA recruited personnel for the program from the military service,” however, and “[a]ll program employees were paid by CIA.” He also outlined the system for U-2 personnel resigning from and returning to regular military service. [Note: As Oswald’s tax returns are still withheld in full from the public, we can’t know whether an intelligence agency paid JFK’s accused assassin during his time at Atsugi.]

[Fig. 3]
Aerial view of Atsugi Naval Air Station as it appeared in 1988 (Credit: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism of Japan/Public Domain)

CIA Sleight of Hand

The CIA apparently composed an undated document entitled, simply, “LIST OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES,” in preparation for the HSCA’s 1978 investigation. A table featuring several operatives includes operations officers, and four names — Jerome Fox, William V. Broe, Frederick C. Randall, Robert P. Wheeler — are recognizable from the Leap write-up.

However, others — notably Japanese-American CIA officers — are included in the still-redacted file and were in the Tokyo Station in the years 1957 and 1958. The most recent declassified version (June 27, 2023) retains redactions in the “Security Posture” column for Chester H. Ito, a CIA operations officer in the Tokyo Station for more than 20 years. Since Ito died in 1999, the Agency is concealing the profile of an employee who died a quarter-century ago but likely worked at Atsugi when Oswald was based there.

A conspicuous redaction in the CIA’s “LIST OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES” is the name of Number 6, whose security posture suggests a possible Soviet connection:

Former Department of Army employee in Japan picked up as contract employee. Poly revealed unresolved issues regarding Communist contacts and/or associations.

[Fig. 4]

Although the name is redacted, it is in the same position in the table as “Robert S. Hashima” in Wilcott’s list of 18 recommendations, and Hashima appears in other documents composed in preparation for the HSCA’s investigation. In his “executive session” testimony to the HSCA, Wilcott describes Hashima as a “deep commercial cover agent,” and elsewhere as a representative of “Fuji Shoji Co. Ltd.” Under or alongside Hashima’s name in CIA documents, regarding whether he should be made available to HSCA investigators, there is simply an unexplained (yet familiar) notation: “Disregard.”

Yet the most remarkable aspect of the case is this: the HSCA understood the importance of investigating the years 1957-1958 in connection with Oswald. HSCA Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, in a letter dated April 26, 1978, requested that the CIA make available for interview the “chief officers and deputy chief officers of the CIA base at Atsugi, Japan from 1956 to 1960.” These years encompassed Oswald’s time in Japan.

[Fig. 5]

This line of inquiry mysteriously fizzled. On the next day’s routing and records sheet, a handwritten note by Norbert Shepanek of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations says:

I do not know if there were any DDO officers at Atsugi 56-60. [Deputy Directorate of Science & Technology] is answering separately. Negative reply requested. Shep

Following this, in a handwritten note on an official routing slip dated (apparently) May 2, 1978, S&T officer Carroll Hauver (later CIA Inspector General) disseminates the falsehood that Atsugi was just a “support base staffed by support personnel” during 1956-60. That seems to have shut the inquiry down, yet as anyone who has looked into this subject in any depth knows very well, Atsugi was far more than just a “support base.”

The Biggest CIA Base in the Far East

While Oswald was based at Atsugi, the CIA’s “Joint Technical Advisory Group” (JTAG), whose activities remain obscure to this day, was located at the naval air station. Oswald was a radar operator and performed sentry duty at the U-2 hangar, but he also lived and worked in close proximity to JTAG, which encompassed more than the U-2 facility. As early as 1964, the CIA’s deputy director of plans, Richard Helms, had described the CIA’s Atsugi facilities — in particular JTAG — to the Warren Commission more extensively as

consisting of 20 to 25 individual residences, two dormitories, an office area, a power plant, several Butler-type warehouses, and a club building used for recreation and a bachelor officers’ mess.

The Warren Report avoided mention of either JTAG or Detachment C, never interviewing anyone about either. Helms, the No. 3 man at CIA, admitted 60 years ago that a specific CIA program (the U-2) operated from Atsugi while Oswald was there, but that was all.

Still, even this was more than the CIA told the HSCA.

In his book, The Missing Chapter: Lee Harvey Oswald in the Far East, Jack Swike — a former Marine Corps security officer at Atsugi — explains that JTAG was set up in 1950, employed “[a]bout 1,000 people” and occupied “50 acres of the Atsugi base.” Originally devoted to training clandestine agents infiltrating enemy areas during the Korean War, it served — according to Swike’s Marine Corps intelligence source — as a base where “weapons were flown in from hostile areas and were tested.”

Researcher Dick Russell, in The Man Who Knew Too Much, refers to JTAG as “the CIA’s main operational base in the Far East” and quotes L. Fletcher Prouty, former chief of special operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Kennedy administration:

“I went into Atsugi just as World War II ended, taking some of MacArthur’s bodyguard in there. A monstrous stairway went down into caverns, you could drive a truck into it. A huge underground base. The agency used it for a lot of things.”

[Fig. 6]
Left: Tunnel under the Atsugi base (1950s), reproduced by Jack Swike in The Missing Chapter: Lee Harvey Oswald in the Far East (Credit: USMC); Right: Photo of Oswald (doctored around head and shoulders), possibly in Atsugi, 1958 (Credit: Unknown)

In 1983, Jack Swike sued the CIA for information about JTAG but lost the case.

“I believe that the U.S. Department of Defense did not want any investigations conducted into military matters in Atsugi in the late 1950s because the Marine Corps Nuclear Weapons Assembly team was located in MAG-11. Thus, the U-2 Spy Plane was not the top-secret program on the base.” ~ Maj. Jack R. Swike, USMC

In other words, according to Swike, in 1957-58 Oswald’s unit (MAG-11) had a more sensitive purpose than the U-2, a program the Soviets already knew about anyway. Moreover, the CIA itself consistently downplayed the significance of the U-2 in Japan. An internal report titled “EIDER CHESS” (codename for the U-2 program), “Subject: DDS&T Interim Reply to HSCA Request, 8 May 78,” gives “General Background” on Detachment C, noting that Atsugi was not the usual departure point for U-2 missions over Russia:

The first overflight of the USSR from Atsugi occurred on 1 March 1958 and this flight was the only and last flight. This flight, as other previous flights by other Detachments, was tracked by Russian radar…

This seems to have ended the U-2 matter for the HSCA, though it shouldn’t have. Even if the U-2 made only one surveillance flight over the USSR directly from Atsugi, Oswald was serving there at that time. If Oswald’s defection to the USSR was part of a U.S. espionage operation to deceive the Soviet enemy, this detail would have served the scheme.

As early as Apr. 13, 1978, a routing and record sheet from the CIA’s Office of Legislative Counsel (OLC), released in full on Dec. 15, 2022, reflects that the HSCA had inquired about at least one CIA resident of the Tokyo station during Oswald’s time in Japan. The request from the OLC’s Rodger Gabrielson to the Directorate of Operations (DO) reads:

Harold Leap, HSCA staff, wants the name of COS [Chief of Station] Tokyo Station for the years 1957 and 1958 to close the loop on his inquiry as to whether Tokyo Station had any relationship with Oswald when he was in Japan.

Shepanek of the DO gives a handwritten answer: “The COS Tokyo for the years 1957-58 was: Mr. John Baker. Mr. Baker died in 1964.”

Leap’s handwritten document also contains anonymous entries in different handwriting. At the end of Leap’s notes from the Crawford interview, someone has written:

“Harold: Can you add the following statement?”

Crawford said that had LHO been associated with the Atsugi CIA Station, he, as exec officer, would’ve known about it.” (A crossed-out note after this is still legible: “However he would not been aware of his exsistence.”)

Doubts as to how forthright the CIA was about Oswald’s exposure to U.S. intelligence operations in Japan are compounded by these facts:
1. None of Leap’s interviewees began working at the CIA’s Tokyo Station until after Oswald had returned to the U.S., even according to the CIA’s own records; and
2. None of them discuss or are asked about the substantial JTAG complex.
The episode looks like another instance of CIA diversion of investigators, similar to the CIA’s assignment of former clandestine operations officer George Joannides as its liaison to the HSCA, in violation of the Agency’s agreement with Congress.

Soviet Connections

[Fig. 7]
U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps chart for Soviet recruitment of Japanese prisoners of war as agents in the early 1950s (Credit: 441st CIC Detachment). The 441st CIC Detachment was the unit of Richard Case Nagell, discussed below.

Some of Leap’s interviewees said they thought Soviet intelligence might have recruited Oswald because “the CIA station in Tokyo had identified a KGB program specifically designed to recruit U.S. military personnel in Tokyo.” Japan was a venue for active recruitment of U.S. servicemen by Soviet intelligence, and Soviet engagement of American base personnel likely had in mind operations far more sensitive than the U-2 when Oswald was at Atsugi. The still-mysterious JTAG closed in December 1960 (more than six months after the U-2 program folded in Japan), but a highly secret, heavily guarded nuclear weapons assembly center known as “METO” was also on the base.

Swike writes that, “Lee Harvey Oswald saw some activities in the METO area,” and when Oswald told U.S. consul Richard Snyder in Moscow on Oct. 31, 1959, that he knew “something of special interest,” he was “probably referring to the METO Site.”

[T]he belief was that he had information about the U-2 Spy Plane, which was not the most important item in Atsugi at the time. The Russians were well aware of the U-2s in Atsugi, and were seeking other information. Oswald probably gave them some clues about U.S. nuclear intelligence.

Knowing that Soviet intelligence in Japan was interested in cultivating agents among U.S. military and intelligence personnel, the CIA would, it is reasonable to conclude, have employed double agents to trick its Soviet counterpart there. In the CIA’s LIST OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES document, the notation in the “Security Posture” column for the CIA employee with the redacted name (presumably Robert S. Hashima) of “unresolved issues regarding Communist contacts and/or associations” is reminiscent of the story of a better known, self-described U.S.-Soviet double agent in Japan, Richard Case Nagell.

As is now well known, ex-U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) officer Richard Nagell was arrested in El Paso, Texas, on Sept. 20, 1963, and later claimed to have orchestrated his own arrest to ensure he was in U.S. custody when JFK was assassinated. In fact, while it is not known whether Nagell ever submitted to a polygraph, and the years for the redacted employee (1953-1954) do not coincide with Nagell’s time in Japan, the rest of the description coincides almost exactly with Nagell’s account of himself.

In the above-mentioned The Man Who Knew Too Much by Dick Russell, whose research forms the backbone of the recent Who Killed JFK? podcast series, Nagell described himself as a former Department of the Army employee when explaining the nature of the Foreign Operations Intelligence (FOI) agency for which he worked:

“On paper, FOI was subordinate and operationally responsible to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. In function, however, FOI was merely an augmentation to CIA special (military) operations, in effect a covert extension of CIA policy and activity designed to conceal the true nature of CIA objectives.” (p. 50)

This would have qualified Nagell, like Hashima, as a “contract employee” of the CIA, and the “unresolved issues regarding Communist contacts and/or associations” square with Nagell’s description of himself as a U.S.-Soviet double agent working for the CIA. “Robert S. Hashima,” or whoever is redacted in the CIA document, was very likely one of the double agents the CIA used to interact with and infiltrate Soviet intelligence in Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. He may very well have interacted with Oswald in that capacity as well, and may thus have talked about Oswald in front of Wilcott in the Tokyo Station.

Nagell was never called before the HSCA in spite of his claim to have alerted the FBI from jail about Oswald and an assassination plot against JFK. Nagell claimed to have known Oswald in Japan and to have attempted to persuade the Soviet military attaché in Tokyo to defect in place. Nagell said he had met Oswald in New Orleans and Mexico City, and that he had warned the ex-defector about associating with Cuban exiles.

Suspicion of Oswald’s double-agent status endures. His “double agent” activity in New Orleans consisted of first posing as a sympathizer with anti-Castro Cubans of the CIA-funded Student Revolutionary Directorate (DRE), offering to train them for attacks against their Communist homeland, then posing as a Castro sympathizer and Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) supporter, getting in the faces of the DRE members on camera as he passed out FPCC leaflets to passers-by on the street.

Nagell, when he was arrested, had a mimeographed FPCC newsletter addressed to him in his possession and FPCC contact data in his notebook. He refused to explain to Russell the extent of his own FPCC ties, but parallels with Oswald are unmistakable. One of three versions Nagell gave for orchestrating his own arrest in El Paso was to avoid becoming a patsy for the JFK assassination. In 1995, Nagell was found dead in his home at age 65, a day after the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) had summoned him to testify.

[Fig. 8]
Left: Richard Case Nagell, Bronze Star and 3-time Purple Heart recipient (Credit: U.S. Army); Center: Nagell under arrest in El Paso (Credit: El Paso Herald-Post); Right: Oswald under arrest in Dallas (Credit: The Sixth Floor Museum at Dealey Plaza)

Special Treatment for a Lowly Private

According to the Harold Leap interview document,

All the subjects worked within the SR [Soviet Russia] Branch of the Tokyo Station and theoretically one of them would have handled or had knowledge of the recruitment. All thought if Oswald [had] been recruited without their knowledge it would have been a rare exception to the working policy and guidelines of the station.

Unfortunately, all of these “subjects” appear irrelevant as far as Oswald’s time in Japan is concerned. The CIA was no doubt very happy to keep it that way. But one thing is unquestionably correct about the above statement. From the circumstances of his defection to the USSR, to the inexplicably late opening of his 201 file under an erroneous name in the CIA’s Office of Security, to the lack of any proper debriefing of him after his arrival back in the US in June 1962 (unlike contemporary US defector Robert Webster, debriefed for over two weeks on his return), and the CIA’s close surveillance of him right up until the assassination itself, Lee Harvey Oswald remains a “rare exception” indeed.

Omission from the HSCA’s investigation of CIA personnel active in Japan during Oswald’s time there — as the CIA’s own files show — is inexplicable for a serious investigation. The witnesses that the CIA made available to the HSCA were mostly irrelevant to James Wilcott’s allegations, yet the HSCA mysteriously never followed up. The author of the LIST OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES document is unknown, but the style resembles that used by George Joannides, the CIA officer assigned to stonewall HSCA investigators, as evidenced by another tabular document known to have been his work.

[Fig. 9]
Excerpt from a 248-page document prepared by George Joannides in preparation for the HSCA investigation, dated July 24, 1978

Whether the HSCA was complicit in its own hoodwinking, the CIA successfully protected its information “black hole” around Oswald in Japan before congressional truth-seekers in 1978. Today, with its “Transparency Plan” for JFK files approved by President Biden in December 2022, the CIA is making sure the void in the historical record is never filled.

[This article first appeared on January 25^that the substack site: The Larger Evils.]
February 1, 2024
Edward Epstein: The Critic who Flipped

The 88-year-old Edward Epstein was found dead in his apartment on Tuesday January 9^th. His nephew, Richard Nessel , said the cause of death was complications from CV 19. (NY Times obituary by Sam Harris of January 11, 2024)

The obituary notes the first of Epstein’s many books was entitled Inquest, published in 1966. As Epstein wrote in his memoir, Assume Nothing, he wrote this book after he flunked out of Cornell and was trying to get back into the college. The man trying to help him, Professor Andrew Hacker, was with him on campus when the news came in that President Kennedy had been killed. Hacker said that finding the truth about the assassination would be a test for American democracy. This gave Epstein the idea of writing a Master’s thesis on the subject. Hacker wrote letters for him in order to talk to the Commissioners, and all agreed except for Earl Warren.

Inquest was published in 1966, and it helped form something of a wave effect, since it just preceded Mark Lane’s Rush to Judgment, Sylvia Meagher’s Accessories After the Fact and Josiah Thompson’s Six Seconds in Dallas. But, as Joseph McBride notes in his book on the media Political Truth, there was a difference between Epstein’s book and the others. McBride quotes from the ending of Inquest:

If the Commission had made it clear that very substantial evidence indicated the presence of a second assassin, it would have opened a Pandora’s box of doubts and suspicions. In establishing its version of the truth, the Warren Commission acted to reassure the nation and protect the national interest. (McBride, pp. 192-93)

In fact, the first part of the book is titled “Political Truth”. McBride comments on this by saying its pretty obvious that the author knew “full well that the assassination was covered up.” But it would seem that he was at least partly trying “to justify the reason for the cover-up.” Further, Warren Commissioner John McCloy told Epstein that the function of that body was to “show the world that America was not a banana republic, where a government can be changed by a conspiracy.” (McBride, p. 137)

Epstein went even further in this regard in first his E-book, The JFK Assassination Diary, and then again in his printed memoir Assume Nothing. In those two places, both published in the 21^st century, he revealed that when he asked Arlen Specter how he convinced the Commission about the Single Bullet Theory, he said he told them that it was either that or start looking for a second assassin. (Epstein E book, p. 24) Norman Redlich, one of the most powerful members of the Commission staff agreed with Specter. (Epstein, The Assassination Chronicles, p. 155). As anyone should know, even without being a lawyer, that path is not 1.) Following the evidence, or 2.) A viable standard of proof.

There was also something else that Epstein knew, namely that the Commission was basing their case on unreliable witnesses. For instance, he knew that attorney Burt Griffin had told Dallas police officer Patrick Dean that he was a liar. Dean was in charge of security the day Jack Ruby entered city hall and gunned down Oswald on national TV. (The Assassination Chronicles, p. 110) The Commission also thought that Marina had fabricated a story about Oswald attempting to kill Richard Nixon. And Redlich had written this about her: “Marina Oswald has lied to the Secret Service, the FBI and this Commission on matters of vital concern.” Commission lawyer Joe Ball did not trust Helen Markham or Howard Brennan either. (ibid, pp. 142-44) In an interview Epstein did with Commission lawyer Wesley Liebeler, he referred to the Commission as Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs with Marina as Snow White and Earl Warren as Dopey. (E book, p. 17)

In reviewing Epstein’s work on the Commission in his book and diary –the latter may have been created after the fact—what is puzzling is how many important things escaped him. To point out just two: he did not find out about Commissioner Jerry Ford changing the entering location of the Magic Bullet from the back to the neck in the final draft of the Warren Report. Even though he interviewed Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin. Rankin had this evidence in his files, and his son turned it over to the Assassination Records Review Board in the nineties. Epstein interviewed J. Lee Rankin.

Another important fact that escaped him is that there was no transcript made of the final executive session meeting of the Commission. Although he describes the debate that took place on this issue at that meeting, he relies on interviews he did for his information. (The Assassination Chronicles, pp. 154-56; p. 604) He could have gone to the National Archives and found out that no transcript of this meeting was made. That is what Harold Weisberg did. (Gerald McKnight, Breach of Trust, pp. 295-97)

If Epstein would have done that, he could have informed people like Senator Richard Russell and Senator John Cooper that they had been hoodwinked about their objections being recorded. And that could have opened up just how deeply they were opposed to not just the Magic Bullet, but the way in which the Commission was being conducted. Author Gerald McKnight later revealed Russell’s disharmony in his book on the Commission, and Cooper assistant Morris Wolff did the same about Cooper. (Wolff, Lucky Conversations, pp.103-15)

Something appears to have happened to Epstein shortly after he wrote Inquest. For instance, he appeared on the record album for the book Scavengers and Critics of the Warren Report. That book was published in January of 1967 and was clearly a cheap smear of the Commission critics, co-written by FBI informant Larry Schiller. There is further evidence for Epstein’s sudden switch in John Kelin’s fine book Praise from a Future Generation.

On November 30, 1966 there was a debate on the Warren Report in Boston. Epstein had been invited to participate, but he declined. Vince Salandria was a participant. After the debate, Salandria was surprised to see Epstein in the audience walking toward him. They had a brief discussion during which Epstein said, “I’ve changed Vince.” Salandria replied with, “You mean you made a deal.” Epstein smiled and said, “You know what happened” and walked away. (Kelin, p. 335, E book version). In fact, years later, when he made an appearance on the Larry King Show he actually said he thought “the men who served on the Warren Commission served in good faith.” (Probe Vol. 7 No. 1, p. 14). Today we have two sources telling us that Jerry Ford knew the Commission was a sham: Morris Wolff and Valery d’Estaing. (See Interview with Wolff, Black Op Radio, 1/11/2024; the film JFK Revisited)

To say that Epstein changed is an understatement. In his next two books, he now became an unrepentant defender of the official story. Because he wrote a book on the Warren Commission, he was invited by The New Yorker to go to New Orleans and write a long article on the JFK investigation being done by DA Jim Garrison. It’s pretty clear from the beginning of his “diary” entries that Epstein had a bias against any new inquiry into the Kennedy case that would lead elsewhere than where the Commission had. For instance, he distorts Garrison’s dispute with the local judges and also on how David Ferrie was initially released by the FBI in 1963. (Epstein, pp. 39-41). In fact, Epstein was accepting advice from the likes of Tom Bethell and Jones Harris on Garrison. Some people who encountered Harris, like the late Jerry Policoff, thought he was rather erratic in his beliefs on the JFK case. Tom Bethell had all the earmarks of being a plant in Garrison’s office. (Click here for that)

But that was just the beginning of Epstein’s lack of fairness. Epstein also had many contacts with Shaw’s lawyers. Beyond that he was also in contact with a lawyer who represented both Gordon Novel and Jack Ruby, Elmer Gertz. Within one week of The New Yorker publishing Epstein’s article, the CIA was circulating it as an example of how they could counter critics of the Warren Report. (Op. cit. Probe, p. 15)

To give just one example of Epstein’s objectivity: he believed Dean Andrews when Andrews said Clay Shaw was not Clay Bertrand. (Epstein’s diary, p. 46). Even though Epstein’s JFK diary was published in the new millennium, he avoids the fact that Dean Andrews was indicted and convicted for perjury on this point. But beyond that, Andrews secretly admitted to Harold Weisberg that Shaw was Bertrand. Weisberg kept that promise until after Andrews passed. And today, there are about a dozen witnesses to this fact. (See the book JFK Revisited, p. 65)

Then there was Legend. With the Church Committee exposing the crimes of the CIA, and issuing a report showing how poorly the FBI had investigated the case, there was movement to reopen the Kennedy case. Clearly an establishment lion like the Reader’s Digest would want to get a jump on such a reopening. Knowing what they wanted, they called in Epstein to do a full scale biography of Lee Oswald. Ken Gilmore, a managing editor there, contacted the FBI and told them the book would put to rest recurring myths surrounding the Kennedy assassination. Gilmore requested that the Bureau allow Epstein to access their files on the case. Epstein did visit the FBI offices at their invitation. (Op. cit. Probe, pp. 15-16)

John Barron, a senior editor, was also friendly with the CIA. Therefore, the Agency did something remarkable, they gave Epstein access to Soviet defector Yuri Nosenko. They also told him he would have access to the tapes made at the Mexico City station of Oswald at the Soviet and Cuban embassies. (ibid) The only other writer I know who had CIA assisted access to Nosenko was Gerald Posner. Before the ARRB I know of no writer who had access to those tapes. Finally, Epstein was in contact with James Angleton both by phone and in person. Epstein freely admits to this in his diary. And here is the capper in that regard. Jim Marrs interviewed a Legend researcher. He asked her why the book did not explore Oswald’s ties to the CIA, which were at least as obvious as those to the KGB, which the book accented. She replied that they were advised to avoid that area. (ibid, p. 24)

According to Don Freed, the book was budgeted by Reader’s Digest for 2 million. Epstein got a $500,000 advance, over 2.5 million today. As noted above, they also furnished him with a fleet of researchers, including Pam Butler and Henry Hurt of Reader’s Digest. All this for a book that tries to convey the almost indefensible tenet that Oswald was first recruited by the Russians, and then upon his return was now pledged allegiance to Castro and this was why Oswald shot Kennedy. The Russians then sent Nosenko over to discourage any thought the KGB was involved, since he said Oswald was never recruited by Moscow.

With all we know today, for Epstein to maintain these types of theses well into the 20^th century is simply inexcusable. Because for example, today it appears that Oswald’s file at CIA was being rigged before he went to Russia. And we know that from the declassified work of HSCA researcher Betsy Wolf. And it appears that it was only Angleton who had access to all the files on Oswald at the Agency. (See this) Secondly, Clay Shaw had two CIA clearances and was employed by them as a highly paid contract agent. (JFK Revisited, p. 65). Finally, in a declassified file attained by Malcolm Blunt, it appears that Angleton was in charge of commandeering operations against Garrison. For that file, we only have the cover sheet, with several folders missing.

Let me conclude with two interesting anecdotes about Epstein. Epstein was the last person to see George DeMohrenschildt alive. He was paying him about a thousand dollars a day for interviews down in Florida. On the second day, after the Baron left, he went to a friend’s house where he was staying and allegedly took his own life by shotgun blast. Dennis Bludworth was the DA investigating the case. He wanted to see the notes of the interviews. Epstein said he had no notes or tape recordings. Bludworth did not believe that, not with Epstein paying him that kind of money. Under further questioning Epstein told Bludworth that he was also paying for the Baron’s rented car and he added that:

…he showed DeMohrenschildt a document which indicated he might be taken back to Parkland Hospital in Dallas and given more electroshock treatment. You know, DeMohrenschildt was deathly afraid of those treatments. They can wreck your mind… (Mark Lane, November 1977, Gallery)

Finally, let us make one other note as to how plugged in Epstein was to the power elite on Legend. Billy Joe Lord was on the same ship that Oswald took to Europe in 1959 on his voyage to Russia. In fact, Lord was Oswald’s cabin mate. The pair spent about two weeks together crossing the Atlantic. For this reason Epstein wanted to interview him for the book. Lord did not want to talk to Epstein since he knew he was a critic of anyone who contested the Warren Report. Lord then related that he did meet with two of Epstein’s researchers. (FBI Report of March 15, 1977) One of them said that they may have to apply pressure to Lord. And they knew two people who could do so. One was James Allison, a local newspaper chain owner and a friend of the Bush family. The other was no less than future governor and president, George W. Bush.

These are the perks you get with the equivalent of a $2.5 million advance—on a JFK assassination book.

For more on the career of Epstein on the JFK case, please click here.

January 28, 2024
Prouty on Vietnam: NSAM 263 and 273 60 years on
“This was the most important fallout of working on this movie JFK for me personally. As soon as we put into the movie the fact of history that John F. Kennedy had signed a White House paper, (a) National Security Action the highest most formal paper the executive branch could publish, number 263, it was dated 11 October 1963, in the month before he died. And that paper clearly said he was not going to put Americans into Vietnam. It went even further, in so many words it said that all American personnel were going to be out of Vietnam by the end of 1965. And the minute we put that into the script of the movie, even before the movie was made and put in the theaters, the newspapers and other pseudo-historians began to say ‘there’s no such thing. Prouty and Oliver Stone are wrong’.” (Col. Fletcher Prouty, May 5, 1994)

Prior to the release of Oliver Stone’s blockbuster film JFK, few people were aware of the implications contained within two policy directives generated about seven weeks apart in the autumn of 1963. These directives concerned American involvement in Vietnam, specifically crucial decisions regarding whether to expand or decrease the U.S. military’s role in the country’s future. The eventual decision to expand – massively – became one of the most polarizing events in American history–with consequential effect continuing to reverberate at the time of the release of Stone’s film in late 1991. The George H.W. Bush administration, for example, had been celebrating the supposed vanquishing of the “Vietnam Syndrome”, which had been lamented as a brake on the use of the military as a means of enforcing US foreign policies. With a presidential election looming in 1992, and the generation most directly affected by the Vietnam war fully coming into positions of influence, the dominant Cold War establishment, focused on global hegemony, was not interested in critical reassessments which might reveal cold calculation rather than tragic “mistakes”.

Retired Air Force Colonel L. Fletcher Prouty served as an advisor for Oliver Stone as the script for JFK was developed. Prouty was the key initial source influencing the insertion of information regarding the policy directive known as NSAM 263 into the film. While active in the Pentagon in 1963, Prouty had directly witnessed the development of the policy while serving under his boss, General Victor Krulak. Prouty’s later descriptive work on this subject, as it appeared across numerous essays and interviews, remains insightful, through its combination of personal experience with close readings of the documentary record.

Sixty years after the fact, the texts for NSAM 263 and 273 remain a controversial point of contention. Sharp differences regarding their actual meaning continue to influence the understanding of the historical record of the Vietnam war and both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ conduct of the war. On the occasion of Prouty’s birthday, and the 60^th anniversary of JFK’s murder, it is useful to re-examine these policy initiatives through the work of Fletcher Prouty.

NSAM 263

Expressed interest in reducing U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, on behalf of the Kennedy administration, dates back at least as early as the spring of 1963. In a memorandum of discussions between Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Joint Chiefs held on April 29, 1963, McNamara is said to be “particularly interested in the projected phasing of US personnel strength” in Vietnam and the “feasibility of bringing back 1000 troops by the end of this year.”^[1] McNamara specifically noted two aspects for consideration: “a) phased withdrawal of US forces, and b) a phased plan for South Vietnamese forces to take over functions now carried out by US forces.” Shortly thereafter, a high-level military meeting in Honolulu featured discussion along the same lines, and indicated that South Vietnam President Diem had already been advised of withdrawal plans.^[2] McNamara at this time emphasized a withdrawal plan was necessary for purposes domestic and foreign “to give evidence that conditions are in fact improving”.^[3] Both the withdrawal of 1000 troops by year’s end and a lengthier phased withdrawal based on training South Vietnamese to replace US personnel, were key elements of National Security Action Memorandum 263, which was certified as official policy little more than five months later.

For the Kennedy administration, Vietnam was an inherited problem. The partition of the country, the installation of Diem, the Viet Cong insurgency, and a growing U.S. “advisor” population was attributable to the influence of the Dwight Eisenhower era’s Dulles brothers combination at CIA (Allen) and the State Department (John Foster). In 1961 and 1962, crises in Berlin, Laos and Cuba were more immediately acute. However, in the summer of 1963, internal divisions and protests, exacerbated by South Vietnam President Diem’s harsh treatment of political dissenters and the huge Buddhist crisis, these called into question the near-term stability of his government. An American backed coup was contemplated in August, and then walked back, leaving unresolved divisions of power to percolate in an atmosphere intensified by the imposition of Diem’s approval of martial law.

At noon on August 26, 1963, with President Kennedy in attendance, a meeting was held at the White House to discuss pressing issues regarding Vietnam. At least fourteen such meetings were held from this date through October 11, when NSAM 263 was made official policy.^[4] As head of the Pentagon’s Office for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, General Krulak was assigned to attend most of those meetings. From his position in Krulak’s office, Prouty observed: “…such a full schedule in the White House, and with the President among other high officials in such a concentrated period is most unusual. It shows clearly Kennedy made an analysis of the Vietnam situation his problem, and it relates precisely the ideas he brought to the attention of his key staff on the subject.”^[5]

The initial meetings dealt with the immediate political crisis in South Vietnam, and were concerned with the implications of a potential coup against Diem. It was hoped that a well-chosen approach or negotiation with Diem could isolate Ngo Dinh Nhu – the headstrong Diem brother deemed responsible for the current troubles, whose removal became the minimum requirement derived from these meetings. By September 6, the topics under discussion expanded to hard talk on the political realities in South Vietnam, whether the counter-insurgency programs could be successful with Diem remaining in power, and what should otherwise be done.^[6] It was generally agreed a “reassessment” of Vietnam was necessary, and it was recommended that Krulak be sent to Vietnam to gather informed opinions at ground level.

Krulak left immediately and returned from Vietnam in time to appear at a White House meeting convened September 10.^[7] Krulak reported the counter-insurgency effort was not too badly effected by the political crisis, and that the war against the Viet Cong “will be won if the current U.S. military and sociological programs are pursued.” Others disagreed, claiming success would not be possible short of a change in government. Kennedy called for another meeting the following day, and asked that “meeting papers should be prepared describing the specific steps that we might take in a gradual and selective cut of aid.” At that meeting, frank views across a spectrum of options were expressed. A following gathering, on September 12, continued to hone in on a precise description of “objectives and actions”, and the “pressures to be used to achieve these objectives.”^[8]

Other than the unanimous resolve that Diem brother Nhu should be separated from the South Vietnamese government, the expression of opinions during this process could vary in emphasis and focus dependent on who the receiving party was. For example, in a draft letter to Diem at this time, Kennedy emphasized the need for frank discussion, while acknowledging “it remains the central purpose of the United States in its friendly relation with South Vietnam to defeat the aggressive designs of the Communists.”^[9]Five days later, Kennedy would express in a memorandum to Robert McNamara: “The events in South Vietnam since May 1963 have now raised serious questions both about the present prospects for success against the Viet Cong and still more about the future effectiveness of this effort unless there can be important political improvement in the country.”^[10] McNamara, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Maxwell Taylor, were about to be dispatched to Vietnam for an “on the spot appraisal of the military and paramilitary effort”.

McNamara and Taylor met with the President on the morning of September 23, just ahead of their departure. This was an unusual meeting on the Vietnam topic due to the small number of participants: four plus the President (previous meetings over the past month had featured at least a dozen, and upwards to twenty, partakers).^[11] After Kennedy expressed his opinions on the most appropriate means of convincing Diem to heed to advice from American officials, Taylor referred to a “time schedule” for direct U.S. support of South Vietnam, similar to the theme expressed in late April / May by McNamara:

General Taylor thought it would be useful to work out a time schedule within which we expect to get this job done and to say plainly to Diem that we were which we expect to get this job done and to say plainly to Diem that we were not going to be able to stay beyond such and such a time with such and such forces, and the war must be won in this time period. The President did not say yes or no to this proposal.

The McNamara-Taylor trip to Vietnam occurred September 23rd to October 2nd, 1963. During this time, information pertaining to Vietnam generated by the White House meetings of the past month were being collated in Krulak’s office. According to Prouty, this was the work which appeared in a thick bound volume known as the McNamara-Taylor Trip Report, presented to Kennedy in the Oval Office on the officials’ return. Prouty maintained the contents reflected “precisely what President Kennedy and his top aides and officials were actually planning, and doing, by the end of 1963. This was precisely how Kennedy planned to ‘wind down’ the war.“^[12] These “plans” appeared in the McNamara-Taylor Trip Report Memorandum, generated from the October 2 meeting with Kennedy, as specific recommendations to withdraw 1000 troops by year’s end, and to wind up direct U.S. involvement by end of 1965. Previously, in a missive to Diem dated October 1, Taylor had written: “… the primary purpose of these visits was to determine the rate of progress being made by our common effort toward victory over the insurgency. I would define victory in this context as being the reduction of the insurgency to proportions manageable by the National Security Forces normally available to your Government.”^[13]

At a meeting of the National Security Council followed at 6PM on October 2, President Kennedy opened the meeting by summarizing what he considered the points of agreement on Vietnam policy going forward, as derived from the past weeks of concentration. “We are agreed to try to find effective means of changing the political atmosphere in Saigon. We are agreed that we should not cut off all U.S. aid to Vietnam, but are agreed on the necessity of trying to improve the situation in Vietnam by bringing about changes there.”^[14]McNamara emphasized the “value” of the language on withdrawal of U.S. personnel as it answered domestic political criticism of being “bogged down” in Vietnam by revealing there was in fact a “withdrawal plan.” As well, “it commits us to emphasize the training of Vietnamese, which is something we must do in order to replace U.S. personnel with Vietnamese.” A Record of Action resulting from this NSC meeting noted, echoing Taylor’s words to Diem, “major U.S. assistance” was needed only until the insurgency had been either suppressed or until the national security forces of South Vietnam are capable of suppressing it.”^[15]

The official statement of U.S. national policy, National Security Action Memorandum No. 263, is dated October 11, l963.^[16] It was typed on White House stationary and signed by Special Assistant to the President McGeorge Bundy. It records that President Kennedy approved “the military recommendations contained in Section 1 B (1-3) of the (Taylor McNamara) Report.”^[17] The specified recommendations are:
1. General Harkins review with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas by the end of 1964, and in the Delta by the end of 1965…
2. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.
3. In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.
Antecedent and Context

In several of his essays, Prouty emphasized two important antecedents to the Kennedy administration’s Vietnam policies which culminated in October 1963 with NSAM 263. Both antecedents were related to operational programs run by the CIA, and both featured an expansion of scale during the period between Kennedy’s election and his inauguration.

The first involved the introduction of helicopter squadrons in response to “the worsening of internal security conditions in Viet Nam.” Described as an “emergency measure”, an initial total of eleven H-34 Sikorsky helicopters were requested December 1,1963.^[18] As Prouty described:

“In December 1960 just after Kennedy’s election, Eisenhower’s National Security Council did direct the Defense Dept. to send a fleet of helicopters to Saigon under the operational control of the CIA …This was the situation Kennedy inherited by the time of his inaugural. It all happened between the election in Nov 1960 and the inaugural of Jan 1961.”^[19]

The provision of the helicopters would require additional resources, as acknowledged by the JCS as they recommended the plan, including personnel attached to “ground support equipment” and “helicopter maintenance capability.”^[20] In this way, the U.S. effort was bound to expand. Prouty:

“On Oct 30, 1963, there were 16,730 U.S. military personnel in Vietnam. A study performed at that time at the request of the senior military commander, General Harkins, revealed that barely 1,000 of them were in what might be called combatant roles.The rest were in such logistics tasks as helicopter maintenance, supply and training functions for the newly formed and unskilled Vietnamese armed forces.”^[21](Ed. Note, by “might be called combatant roles” Prouty means Special Forces and combat advisors, since elsewhere he stated there was not one more combat troop in Vietnam when Kennedy died than when he took office.)

A few months after Kennedy’s inauguration, the Bay of Pigs invasion/uprising directed at Fidel Castro’s Cuba failed ignominiously. This CIA project had also notably expanded in scope during the lame duck period after Kennedy’s election. The fallout from this failure was magnified by the scale the project had accumulated, leaving a large number of persons directly affected and embittered. During the event, Kennedy had faced enormous pressure to escalate using US military assets directly, and a source of this pressure came from the clandestine milieu assembled by CIA’s regime-change program. Kennedy responded by creating a Cuban Study Group,^[22] which was given two formal tasks:

a) to study our governmental practices and programs in the area of military and paramilitary, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activity which fell short of outright war with a view to strengthening our work in this area.
b) and to direct special attention to lessons which can be learned from the recent events in Cuba.

The first task – to study clandestine “practices and programs” with the aim of “strengthening our work in this area” – resulted in two National Security Action Memoranda which foreshadowed some of the policy directives later applied to Vietnam. These policies would represent a direct challenge to the CIA’s control over covert activity, as established by Allen Dulles during the Eisenhower administration. Prouty identified a moment during the Study Group’s May 10, 1961 interview with Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Dulles’ immediate predecessor as Director of Central Intelligence, as articulating the need for a new direction. Prouty:

“This meeting with General Smith emphasized the direction that President Kennedy and his closest advisors were taking on the two related subjects: the future of the CIA and of the warfare in Vietnam. Both were going to be put under control, and ended…at least as they had been administered up to that time.”^[23]
Question: Should we have intelligence gathering in the same place that you have operations?
General Smith: I think so much publicity has been given to CIA that the covert work might have to be put under another roof.
Question: Do you think you should take the covert operations from CIA?
General Smith: It’s time we take the bucket of slop and put another cover over it.

Taylor submitted an 81-page report on the Bay of Pigs to Kennedy on June 13, 1961. Two weeks later, on June 28, NSAM 55 was signed and disseminated. Its subject was “Relations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President in Cold War Operations” ( Prouty identified the phrase “Cold War Operations” as a reference to Clandestine Operations).^[24]As delivered directly to the Chairman of the JCS Lyman Lemnitzer, the document began:

a) I regard the Joint Chiefs of Staff as my principal military advisor responsible both for initiating advice to me and for responding to requests for advice. I expect their advice to come to me direct and unfiltered.
b) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility for the defense of the nation in the Cold War similar to that which they have in conventional hostilities…”.

Kennedy clearly felt that the Pentagon had let him down in their advice on the Bay of Pigs operation and that the CIA had lied to him. Because this was a distinct change in direction from the Eisenhower administration’s National Security Council directive 5412 (1954), which designated responsibility for clandestine or covert operations (Cold War Operations) to the CIA. Kennedy was redirecting this responsibility to the Department of Defense.^[25]A subsequent memorandum, NSAM 57, was drafted with the subject heading: “Responsibility for Paramilitary Operations”. This document outlined a more detailed breakdown of responsibilities:

Where such an operation (clandestine) is to be wholly covert or disavowable, it may be assigned to CIA, provided that it is within the normal capability of the agency.
Any large paramilitary operation wholly or partly covert which requires significant numbers of militarily trained personnel, amounts of military equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled stocks and/or military experience of a kind and level peculiar to the Armed Services is properly the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense with the CIA in a supporting role.

Examples of “large paramilitary” operations run by the CIA would, from the vantage of the summer of 1961, include the inconclusive Indonesia campaign from 1958 and the disastrous Bay of Pigs a few months before. However, this description would also apply to the CIA’s ongoing operations in Vietnam, which were then expanding, beginning with the infusion of the helicopters. In his discussions of this policy statement, Prouty made note of specific differentiating language appearing in NSAM 263, identifying separately “U.S. military personnel” followed by “U.S. personnel”. Prouty averred this distinction was deliberate, that the term “U.S. personnel” referenced in particular the ongoing CIA programs operational in Vietnam. In this way, NSAM 263 had continuity with the earlier policy developed after the Bay of Pigs, intended to shift responsibilities for covert paramilitary operations from the CIA to the Defense Department, and to reduce their scope.

NSAM 273

On November 6, 1963 Kennedy sent an Eyes Only telegram to Ambassador Lodge, referring to “a new Government which we are about to recognize.” South Vietnam’s President Diem had suffered a coup, resulting in his, and his brother’s, death, a few days before. While the coup had been tacitly accepted in advance (although not anticipating loss of life), there were attendant loose ends and adjustments requiring attention as Kennedy referred: “I am sure that much good will come from the comprehensive review of the situation which is now planned for Honolulu, and I look forward to your own visit to Washington so that you and I can review the whole situation together and face to face.”^[26]

On November 13, the upcoming meeting in Honolulu was discussed at the daily White House staff meeting.^[27] Kennedy’s Special Assistant for National Security McGeorge Bundy, who would attend the meeting, was briefed on what to expect by his assistant Michael Forrestal: “From what I can gather, the Honolulu meeting is shaping up into a replica of its predecessors, i.e. an eight-hour briefing conducted in the usual military manner. In the past this has meant about 100 people in the CINCPAC Conference Room, who are treated to a dazzling display of maps and charts, punctuated with some impressive intellectual fireworks from Bob McNamara.”^[28] The Record of Discussion also notes: “When someone asks Bundy why he was going, he replied that he had been instructed.”^[29]

The autumn Honolulu Conference was held on November 19-20. The summary of discussion which begins the official Memorandum expresses optimism: “Ambassador Lodge described the outlook for the immediate future of Vietnam as hopeful. The Generals appear to be united and determined to step up the war effort. They profess to be keenly aware that the struggle with the Viet Cong is not only a military program, but also political and psychological. They attach great importance to a social and economic program as an aid to winning the war.”^[30]

This optimism carries over to the summary’s concluding views, which reflect the policy articulated in NSAM 263:

“Finally, as regards all U.S. programs – military, economic, psychological – we should continue to keep before us the goal of setting dates for phasing out U.S. activities and turning them over to the Vietnamese; and these dates, too, should be looked at again in the light of the new political situation. The date mentioned in the McNamara-Taylor statement on October 2 on U.S. military withdrawal had and is still having – a tonic effect. We should set dates for USOM and USUS programs, too. We can always grant last-minute extensions if we think it wise to do so.”^[31]

The New York Times published a briefing on the Honolulu Conference on November 21, 1963 (datelined November 20). Titled “U.S. Aides Report Gain, 1,000 Troops to Return”, and said to be reflecting “assessments” from the “first full-scale review of the Vietnamese situation since the military coup”, the brief report “reaffirmed the United States plan to bring home about 1,000 of its 16,500 troops from South Vietnam by Jan 1.”

The decision to remove these troops was made in October after a mission to South Vietnam by Secretary McNamara and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who also attended today’s conference. Officials indicated that although there were no basic changes in United States policies and commitments to South Vietnam, the conference would probably recommend some modifications in American aid programs in an effort to intensify the campaign against the Vietcong guerrillas.” ^[32]

McGeorge Bundy attended sessions of the Honolulu Conference on November 19 and 20, and then boarded a plane headed back to Washington either very late on the evening of November 20 or very early on November 21. Defense Secretary McNamara was on the same flight, which landed in D.C. after Kennedy’s Presidential party had already left for Texas. Briefings scheduled for President Kennedy regarding discussions in Honolulu were to be held after his return from Texas. Bundy authored the first draft of National Security Action Memorandum 273 on November 21, perhaps on the plane. Kennedy, of course, was killed the following day. There is no indication that Kennedy received any direct reports on the discussions in Honolulu, although he may have seen the New York Times article. Regardless, the draft penned by Bundy on November 21 anticipates a result:

The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred in Honolulu, and has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge. He directs that the following guidance be issued to all concerned:
1. It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy. The test of all decisions and U.S. actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their contribution to this purpose.
2. The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963…”^[33]

The difference within this draft, as compared to the language of NSAM 263, is alluded in these first two sections. The second section, for example, affirms the “withdrawal of U.S. military personnel” (1,000 by the end of the year) will remain policy (emphasis added), while the absence of reference to the corresponding withdrawal of the “bulk of U.S. personnel” by 1965 infers, by its omission, that this facet of the withdrawal plan does not, as a policy, remain. This omission is also relevant to the first section, which differs from NSAM 263 by situating US Vietnam policy as primarily concerned with assisting South Vietnam “win their contest” versus the North (and therefore primarily focused on the “effectiveness” of the U.S. effort to do so), whereas NSAM 263’s primary concern was transferring the “essential functions” of the war effort to South Vietnam in the interests of removing U.S. personnel altogether. This revision is also misrepresented as the continuation of previous policy, as the opening words assert “it remains the central object…” (emphasis added)

This crucial difference, moreover, does not find articulation in the official Memorandum on the Honolulu Conference, which instead notes that deadlines for turning U.S. activities over to the Vietnamese were exhibiting a “tonic effect”. It is neither mentioned in the New York Times article dated November 20, based on an official briefing, which flatly states there were “no basic changes in United States policies and commitments to South Vietnam.”

Prouty, having worked under Krulak throughout September 1963 assembling the information apprising the Taylor-McNamara Trip Report, working from direction they understood as Kennedy’s himself, was skeptical of NSAM 273’s provenance:

Strangely, this NSAM #273, which began the change in Kennedy’s policy toward Vietnam, was drafted on Nov 21, 1963…the day before Kennedy died. It was not Kennedy’s policy. He would not have requested it, and would not have signed it. Why would it have been drafted for his signature on the day before he died; and why would it have been given to Johnson so quickly after Kennedy died? Johnson had not asked for it. On Nov 21, 1963 Johnson had no expectation whatsoever of being President…”^[34]

“We have the full record of the development of Kennedy’s Vietnam policy in the Foreign Relations of the United States series, 1961-1963 Volume IV, Vietnam, August-December 1963. There can no question of that policy as formally approved on Oct 11, 1963, and that the draft of NSAM #273 was the beginning of a change of that policy, and of the enormous military escalation in Vietnam much to the satisfaction of the military industry complex…Who could have known, before Kennedy died, that he intended to begin an escalation of the warfare in Vietnam contrary to his decision of Oct. 11th? Someone wanted to make it appear that he did. Thus this National Security Action Memorandum with its origin before his death. Or should the question be, ‘Did those connected with the creation of this document know – ahead of time – that Kennedy was scheduled to die?’ This is a measure of the pressures of that time.”^[35]

Prouty believed, based on having seen numerous copies of the November 21 draft, that it was relatively widely distributed across the senior layers of the national security apparatus. A cover note attached to a copy distributed to Bundy’s brother William, a deputy within the Defense Department, asks him to review and also consult on the draft with McNamara.^[36] The draft also appears to have been distributed on November 23 to newly appointed President Johnson, ahead of a meeting with Ambassador Lodge scheduled for the following day which, in an instance of macabre irony, had already been anticipated in the draft’s opening sentence: “the President…has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge”.^[37] A State Department Briefing Paper put together for Johnson ahead of the same meeting refers to a “draft National Security Action Memorandum emerging from the Honolulu meeting, which Mr. Bundy has initiated.” (Emphasis added).^[38]

A second draft of the proposed NSAM 273 was composed on November 24. Changes in the draft were notable in paragraph 7, which originally discussed “the development of additional Government of Vietnam resources” to be used for “action against North Vietnam.” The revision appeared to address kinetic activity generated directly by U.S. forces, in accord with established covert protocols (i.e. the “plausibility of denial”).^[39]

That same day, the anticipated meeting to discuss the South Vietnam situation was held, with LBJ, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Lodge, McCone and Bundy in attendance.^[40] This briefing for the President, focused on recommendations and updates, it represents – other than the one thousand man withdrawal slated for year-end – the internment of Kennedy’s Vietnam policies as developed in NSAM 263. Ambassador Lodge, for example, suggested that talk of a 1965 withdrawal – or “indication” thereof – was merely a negotiating ploy: “Lodge stated that we were not involved in the coup, though we put pressures on the South Vietnamese government to change its course and those pressures, most particularly on indications of withdrawal by 1965, encouraged the coup.” If ever there was a piece of high level CYA, this was it for, as James Douglass shows, Lodge was actually guiding the Diem brothers to their deaths.

CIA Director John McCone, contradicting the conclusions delivered in Honolulu to the press, said the situation was “serious” and the paucity of optimism regarding the future of South Vietnam was evidenced by large increases in Viet Cong attacks and their advanced preparations for more. For his part, LBJ expressed misgivings with poor handling of controversial situations in the country, exacerbated by internal bickering. He rejected the idea that “we had to reform every Asian in our own image” in reference to political and economic strategies discussed in Honolulu. “(Johnson) was anxious to get along, win the war – he didn’t want as much effort placed on so-called social reforms…”

“The meeting was followed by a statement to the press which was given out by Bundy to the effect we would pursue the policies agreed to in Honolulu adopted by the late President Kennedy.” This statement was given prominence in a New York Times report published November 25, 1963 (datelined Nov 24) entitled “Johnson Affirms Aims in Vietnam, Retains Kennedy’s Policy of Aiding War on Reds”. The opening sentence, presumably echoing Bundy: “President Johnson reaffirmed today the policy objectives of his predecessor regarding South Vietnam.” This reporting features the first three paragraphs of what would be published as NSAM 273 two days later, including the iteration that the “central point of U.S. policy on South Vietnam remains; namely, to assist the new government there in winning the war against the Communist Vietcong insurgents.” There is also a discussion of the political and economic measures advocated at Honolulu, but downplayed by Johnson shortly before (which is not mentioned), as well as the need for unity within the U.S. bureaucracy assigned in support South Vietnam.^[41]

On November 26, 1963, National Security Action Memorandum No. 273 was signed by McGeorge Bundy and updated NSAM 263 in United States official policy for South Vietnam.^[42] Kennedy’s policy of effecting the removal of all “U.S. personnel” (i.e. military and CIA) from South Vietnam by the end of 1965, clearly referenced during conversations held at the Honolulu Conference, had been essentially erased from memory, even as NSAM 273 and its components were being described as a continuation of, or consistent with, Kennedy’s policies. The intent is now to win the war. Prouty:

“Two months later, January 22,1964, one of the same authors of NSAM #263, General Maxwell Taylor, wrote to the Secretary of Defense, McNamara: ‘The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States must: (i) commit additional U.S. forces, as in support of the combat action within South Vietnam, and (j) commit U.S. forces as necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam.’

These were the same two top level officials who under JFK had gone along with the Kennedy plan for the withdrawal of U.S. men. Then, less than 3 months later, under LBJ, they made totally different recommendations. The only difference was that President Kennedy was against escalation and wanted the men home, and Kennedy had never approved at any time the introduction of combat soldiers under U.S. military commanders for combat purposes in Vietnam. President Johnson, with George Ball in a top position, was doing just the opposite.”^[43]

That was how fast Johnson’s militant position infected Kennedy’s advisors.

What many consider the true milestone on the road to an American war, NSAM 288, was approved in March, based on recommendations generated from yet another review of South Vietnam’s national security situation, presented by McNamara (working from an initial draft written by Bundy). Among the recommendations: a pledge to “furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control”; to put South Vietnam on a “war footing”; to increase and upgrade Air Force, Army, and Naval heavy equipment; to prepare “hot pursuit”, “Border Control”, “Retaliatory Actions”, and “Graduated Overt Military Pressure” against North Vietnam.^[44] By August, the increased tempo of activities supported by U.S. military assistance had created the Tonkin Gulf incident, and the inevitable slide to a shooting war. Prouty:

“By March 1964 the U.S. approach to the situation in Vietnam had changed 180 degrees from the Kennedy policy of NSAM #263 and on March 17, 1964, President Johnson signed NSAM #288 which broadly expanded U.S. policy. About one year later, March 8, 1965, the first U.S. Marines operating under Marine commanders invaded South Vietnam at Da Nang. This was the true beginning of military action in Vietnam.”^[45]

What Kennedy had not done in three years, Johnson had done in three months.

Obfuscation of NSAM 263

On January 6, 1992, the New York Times published an opinion piece by Leslie Gelb titled “Kennedy and Vietnam”. Gelb could be described as the consummate Washington insider, with a c.v. laden with high-profile appointments across government, think tanks, and the media, specializing in foreign affairs. In the late 1960s, Gelb served as the director of the so-called Pentagon Papers project, leading the team of analysts in setting down an extensive history of the Vietnam War. Gelb’s authority to criticize premises expressed in Oliver Stone’s then current blockbuster film JFK ensured his opinions would hold some influence in the culture at large.

In the piece, Gelb angrily accuses Stone (and by extension Prouty) of distorting the record of NSAM 263 and making “swaggering assertions about mighty unknowns.” Gelb claims of NSAM 263 that “some officials took the directive at face value”, but “most” saw it as a “bureaucratic scheme” to fudge the numbers of in-country personnel. He argues that “whatever JFK’s precise intentions” or “underlying thinking”, it was best to understand them as malleable and subject to changing circumstances and complications. Gelb ends his piece with an appeal to recognize the burden of the Presidency, particularly as involved Vietnam: the “private soul-searching” of Eisenhower, the “documented dilemmas ” and “torments” of Johnson and Nixon, matched by the “murky” musings represented by Kennedy’s occasional contradictory public statements. Stone (and Prouty) are therefore attacked for their “foolish” confidence over “decisions J.F.K. would have made in circumstances he never had to face.”^[46] Prouty responded:

“It is almost beyond belief that (Gelb)… in 1992, finds it easier to say that this was a decision ‘he never had to face’ instead of telling it as it is – the reason ‘he never had to face’ that decision was because he had been assassinated.”^[47]

The one specific reference Gelb uses to respond to the supposed misrepresentations which had him so vexed, is itself distorted with some lawyerly spin: “Most officials also viewed the withdrawal memo as part of a White House ploy to scare President Diem of South Vietnam into making political reforms…That is precisely how the State Department instructed the U.S. Embassy in Saigon to understand NSAM 263.” What Gelb is referring to (and this became a talking point for other critics as well), is a State Department telegram to Lodge’s Vietnam embassy dated October 5, 1963.^[48] While this communication is cited within the body of NSAM 263, it appears as an item of business separate from the primary matters, namely the planned withdrawal of “1000 U.S. military personnel” and the intention of withdrawing “the bulk of U.S. personnel” by the end of 1965.^[49]

Prouty’s issues with Gelb extended beyond the latter’s simplistic denial that Kennedy was just “going to abandon South Vietnam to a communist takeover.” Gelb’s previous role as director of the “Pentagon Papers” project could not be overlooked. Prouty:

“However it was in the ‘Pentagon Papers’ that the intrigue to distort and misrepresent major episodes of the Kennedy era began. Pre-eminent among these distortions is the Pentagon Papers presentation of the NSAM #263 record. What was done was quite simple, and effective. The title, ‘National Security Action Memorandum No. 263’ appears as Document #146 on page 769 in Volume II of the Gravel Edition, i.e. Congressional Record. But, this is published as only three, single-sentence paragraphs of non-substantive material with no cross referencing. This is like publishing the envelope; but not the letter.”^[50]

This is a good point. While NSAM No. 263, as it appears on pp 769-770 of the Gravel Edition (Vol.II), is accurately transcribed from the original, the presentation, lacking cross reference, is opaque.^[51] Since McGeorge Bundy’s original wording is not precise, in that it dates the discussion of the crucial McNamara-Taylor report (October 5, 1963) but doesn’t attribute identifiers to the report itself (dated October 2, 1963), the reader is either left to their own devices to put the pieces together, or must remember to consult a lengthy Chronology which appears some 550 pages previous. Prouty:

Those few who already know what a true-copy of NSAM #263 looked like will find that the ‘Memorandum For The President’ that is the McNamara-Taylor Trip Report of Oct. 2, 1963 appears as Document 142 on page 751 through 766 with no reference to NSAM #263 whatsoever. This may be why so many ‘historians’ and other writers remain unaware of this most important policy statement.^[52]

The Chronology in Vol. II of the Pentagon Papers begins May 8, 1963 and concludes on November 23, 1963.^[53] The Report of the McNamara-Taylor mission appears as a listing for October 2, 1963 (p216). In the brief description, the withdrawal of “1,000 American troops by year’s end” is noted, but there is no mention of the recommendation to withdraw “the bulk of U.S. personnel” by the end of 1965. The publication of NSAM 263 as an official document, October 11, 1963, is not listed.

The Chronology’s concluding three items feature a description of the Honolulu Conference (20 November 1963), which observes a press release “gives few details but does reiterate the U.S. intention to withdraw 1,000 troops by the end of the year.” That the press release also indicated “no basic changes to U.S. policies” is not mentioned. Then, incongruously, the Chronology concludes:

22 Nov 1963: Lodge confers with the President Having flown to Washington the day after the Conference, Lodge meets with the President and presumably continues the kind of report given in Honolulu.
23 Nov 1963: NSAM 273
Drawing together the results of the Honolulu Conference and Lodge’s meeting with the President, NSAM 273 reaffirms the U.S. commitment to defeat the VC in Vietnam

Neither of these final two items actually occurred as described. Lodge did not meet with either President Kennedy or newly sworn-in President Johnson on November 22, the day on which President Kennedy was assassinated. NSAM 273 was not made official on November 23, and the specific meeting pertaining to the document was not held until the following day. Prouty:

“NSAM 273 was signed by President Johnson on Nov. 26, 1963. It must be noted, that until an NSAM is approved and signed it does not have a formal number; therefore the subject matter that Lodge and Johnson conferred about could not have been designated NSAM #273 on the 23rd of Nov. 1963.”^[54]

Conclusion

A separate attack on Oliver Stone’s JFK movie, published by the New York Times during the film’s initial release, was written by Tom Wicker.^[55] Prouty’s response to this piece provides a good summary of his position:

(Tom Wicker) also attacked Stone’s use of Kennedy’s Vietnam policy statement, NSAM #263, with the comment, ‘I know of no reputable historian who has documented Kennedy’s intentions.’ NSAM #263 is the official and complete documentation of Kennedy’s intentions. It was derived from a series of White House conferences and from the McNamara-Taylor Vietnam Trip Report, and it stated the views of the President and of his closest advisers as is made clear in the U.S. government publication Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. IV, ‘Vietnam: August-December 1963’. That source is reliable history. Wicker’s December 15, 1991, Times article was a lengthy and unnecessarily demeaning diatribe against Stone and his movie…

The inclusion of this little-known NSAM #263 in the film became the principal point of attack of the big guns that were leveled at Stone, Garrison, and myself. It really is amazing that the most vitriolic attacks were those that attempted to inform the public that there was no such directive. The furor over that one item, NSAM #263, was evidence that Stone had hit his target. This alone uncovered the ‘Why?’ of the assassination.^[56]

Prouty’s insights pertaining to National Security Action Memorandums numbers 263 and 273 remain vitally important to understanding the development of Kennedy’s Vietnam policy. It is clear that the recommendations described in NSAM 263 were the result of a period of concentrated attention directed by the President. It is much less clear what motivated McGeorge Bundy to draft what became NSAM 273, and how it was that the changes to the earlier document initiated by 273 were long described as representing continuity with Kennedy’s policies. Clearing the web of obfuscation over these directives, as begun in Stone’s JFK, provides clarity to the historical record.

The Vietnam War, with its intensive U.S. military commitments, proved a massive disaster for the people of Southeast Asia and the American public, although it remains often officially portrayed as a “tragic” event borne of circumstance and not design. As well, the missed opportunity to rein in the CIA’s operational capabilities opened the door to ever larger corrupt cynical undertakings such as Iran-Contra and Timber Sycamore, with the clandestine services’ lack of accountability ever more entrenched. The documented record strongly infers that Kennedy’s potential re-election in 1964, as a “what-if?”, would have been consequential.

Bibliography:
L. Fletcher Prouty, Collected Works. CD-ROM
www.prouty.org

Notes

^[1] JCS – Sec Def Discussions April 29, 1963 https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=144

[2] JCS Official File. May 6, 1963. https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=122#relPageId=47

[3] ibid https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=122#relPageId=115

[4] The concentrated interest in Vietnam policy during these months is recorded in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1963, vol 3 Vietnam: January-August 1963 & vol. 4 Vietnam: August-December 1963, assembled by the Department of State and published by the U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991 https://www.maryferrell.org/php/showlist.php?docset=1036

[5] Prouty, JFK: New Preface, 1996. Collected Works

[6] FRUS Vol. 4, p117. 66. Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, September 6, 1963 https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=143

[7] FRUS Vol. 4, p 161. 83. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, September 10, 1963 https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=187

[8] FRUS Vol. 4, p199, Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, White House, September 12, 1963 https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=225

[9] FRUS Vol. 4, p231, Draft Letter from President Kennedy to President Diem, September 16, 1963. https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=257

[10] This document would also be described as “draft instructions” from the President for McNamara to guide his upcoming trip to Vietnam with General Taylor. FRUS Vol. 4, p 278. 142. Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of Defence (McNamara) September 21,1963. https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=304)

[11] FRUS Vol. 4, p 280. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, White House, September 23, 1963. https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=306

[12] Prouty, The Highly Significant Role Played By Two Major Presidential Policy Directives, 1997. Collected Works. Prouty does make the point that neither McNamara or Taylor would have had the time or resources to compose let alone print the volume seen in photographs from October 2.

[13] Taylor also wrote: “I am convinced that the Viet Congress insurgency in the north and center can be reduced to little more than sporadic incidents by the end of 1964. The Delta will take longer but should be completed by the end of 1965.” FRUS Vol. 4, p 328. Letter From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) To President Diem, October 1, 1963. https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=354

[14] FRUS Vol. 4, p 350. 169. Summary Record of the 519th Meeting of the National Security Council, White House, October 2, 1963. https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=376

[15] FRUS Vol. 4, p 353. 170. Record of Action No 2472, Taken at the 519th Meeting of the National Security Council, October 2, 1963. https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=379

[16] Item 194 Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963 Vol. IV p395 https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=421)

[17] Item 167 Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President, October 2, 1963 https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=362)

[18] Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960, Vietnam Vol 1. p705 Item 255. Special Staff Note Prepared by Department of Defense.

[19] Prouty, The Hidden Role of Conspiracy, 1993. Collected Works “(Kennedy) inherited it and revisionist historians have saddled him with the ‘Vietnam build-up’ and the ‘creation of the Special Forces’ ever since.”

[20] Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960, Vietnam Vol 1. P703 Item 254. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Gates)

[21] Prouty, 30th Anniversary of Coup, 1994. Collected Works

[22] The members of this Group were General Maxwell Taylor, Admiral Arleigh Burke, CIA director Allen Dulles, and Robert Kennedy representing the Executive

[23] Prouty, 30th Anniversary of the Coup, 1994, Collected Works

[24] copies of NSAM 55-57 as saved in Prouty’s own files can be found at https://ratical.org/ratville/JFK/USO/appE.html

[25] “When I read to (Chiefs of Staff) President Kennedy’s statement from NSAM #55…you could have heard a pin drop in the ‘Gold Room’. They had never been included in the special policy channel which Allen Dulles had perfected over the past decade, that ran from the National Security Council (NSC) to the CIA for all clandestine operations.” Prouty The Highly Significant Role Played By Two Major Presidential Policy Directives 1997. Collected Works

[26] Item 304 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam November 6, 1963. https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=605

[27] Item 312 Memorandum for the Record of Discussion at the Daily White House Staff Meeting, Washington, November 13, 1963 8 a.m. https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=619

[28] Memorandum to Mr Bundy https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=146534#relPageId=6

[29] That might infer he was instructed specifically by President Kennedy, but his reply as recorded does not actually clarify who had so instructed. Since Bundy was the author of NSAM 273, such instruction might explain the how’s and why’s of the original draft, dated November 21, which Bundy later described as drafted “for the President”. The record, however, nowhere indicates any instruction or dialogue involving Kennedy seeking revision to NSAM 263, which had been drafted only weeks previously.

[30] FRUS Vol. 4, p 608 Item 321 Memorandum of Discussion at the Special Meeting on Vietnam, Honolulu November 20, 1963 https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=634

[31] FRUS Vol. 4, p 610 Item 321 Memorandum of Discussion at the Special Meeting on Vietnam, Honolulu November 20, 1963 https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=636

[32] U.S. Aides Report Gain,1,000 Troops to Return New York Times November 21, 1963, p8

[33] a copy of the draft, along with John Newman’s discussion of it can be found here: https://jfkjmn.com/new-page-77/

[34] Prouty, Hidden Role of Conspiracy,1993, Collected Works

[35] Prouty The Highly Significant Role Played by Two Major Presidential Policy Directives 1997. Collected Works

[36] “I have other copies of this draft document that were done on various typewriters and they certainly indicate that this draft document had to have been quickly circulated through all of the highest governmental levels…on the 21st. On these draft copies there are some notes, and line outs.” Also: “in this original draft that he circulated among many of the top echelons of the Government, with personal “Cover Letters” to the Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone and to his brother William in McNamara’s office…” Prouty The Highly Significant Role Played By Two Major Presidential Policy Directives 1997. Collected Works

[37] Item 324. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=653

[38] Item 326 Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the President, November 23, 1963 https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=657

[39] The first draft of NSAM 273, and a brief discussion of it, can be accessed on scholar John Newman’s site https://jfkjmn.com/new-page-77/. In an interview, McGeorge Bundy explained to Newman his first draft approach to paragraph 7: “he tried to bring these recommendations ‘in line with the words Kennedy might want to say.’” Which, considering the change in responsibility for activity from Government of Vietnam to U.S. forces from first to second draft, is a back-handed way of admitting the difference in policy, not just of words.

[40] Item 330 Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, Executive Office Building, Washington, November 24, 1963, 3 p.m. Subject. South Vietnam Situation https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=661

[41] The concept of “unity” informs one of the paragraphs from the first draft of NSAM 273, which Prouty discussed at some length in a few of his essays. In Bundy’s draft, Paragraph Four reads: “It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and in the field.” As published, reference to unity is clarified as “support for established U.S. policy in South Vietnam” – which produces a different reading than the potentially ominous warning written on the eve of the presidential assassination. It could be fairly argued, however, even lacking the precise term “South Vietnam”, that the paragraph in the first draft was referring to policies thereof, as there had been a lot of concern in the period between the Diem coup and the Honolulu Conference with perceived divisions, stoked in part by an article written by David Halberstram. These concerns are reflected in the documents published in Foreign Relations of the United States Aug-Dec 1963 from those weeks in November. That said, Prouty’s alert reading has a context, and it should not be overlooked that McGeorge Bundy was responsible for, among other things: a) called off the flight meant to destroy Castro’s last T33, ensuring failure of the Bay of Pigs b) wrote first draft of NSAM 273 c) believed to have contacted Air Force One from White House Situation Room Nov 22/63 to report lone gunman responsible for JFK assassination d) wrote first draft of NSAM 288.

[42] Item 331 National Security Action Memorandum No. 273 November 26, 1963 https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=663

[43] Prouty, Kennedy and the Vietnam Commitment, Collected Works

[44] Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President, March 16, 1964. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d84

[45] Prouty, Hidden Role of Conspiracy, 1993, Collected Works

[46] Leslie Gelb, Foreign Affairs; Kennedy and Vietnam, Section A Page 17, New York Times, January 6, 1992

[47] Prouty, Vietnam Daze With McNamara, Collected Works

[48] Item 181 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam October 5, 1963. https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=397

[49] The Memorandum states: “After discussion of the remaining recommendations of the report” – that is, recommendations other than those involving the planned withdrawals – “the President approved an instruction to Ambassador Lodge which is set forth in State Department telegram No. 534 to Saigon.” This telegram’s featured “instruction” refers specifically to a series of proposed Actions to guide approaches to Diem, none of which refer to troop withdrawals. The attempt to tie the matters together is strained, but notably had also found expression by Lodge during the meeting with LBJ on November 24, 1963 (i.e. talk of withdrawal simply a negotiating ploy)

[50] Prouty, Vietnam Daze with McNamara, Collected Works

[51] In contrast, the presentation of NSAM No. 263 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1963, vol. 4 Vietnam: August-December 1963, published in 1991, is properly cross-referenced.

[52] Prouty, Vietnam Daze with McNamara, Collected Works

[53] Chronology, Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Vol II, Beacon Press pp 207-223

[54] Prouty, Vietnam Daze with McNamara, Collected Works

[55] Tom Wicker, Does JFK Conspire Against Reason?, New York Times, December 15, 1991

[56] Prouty, Stone’s JFK and the Conspiracy, 1996, Collected Works
January 28, 2024
Hugh Aynesworth is Dead: The Grinch is Gone

Hugh Aynesworth died on December 23^rd at age 92 after being in both the hospital and hospice care.

Aynesworth was born in West Virginia and started his newspaper career at the Clarksburg Exponent-Telegram. In the fifties he was employed in Fort Smith, Arkansas as a sports editor and then a managing editor. He then moved to Dallas as a business writer for the Times Herald, and later worked for UPI in Denver. He returned to Dallas in 1960 to write for the Morning News and it was while there that the JFK murder took place. In 1967 he shifted over to Newsweek, from where he began to cover the Jim Garrison inquiry into the JFK case.

To anyone who was really interested in the assassination of President John Kennedy, his death will be unlamented. Because perhaps no other reporter in America—excepting maybe Dan Rather– did more to cover up the facts in that case, over a longer period of time, than did Hugh Aynesworth.

He maintained that he was at three crucial venues on the day of Kennedy’s murder. First, he was a witness to the actual assassination in Dealey Plaza. Yet, does any photograph reveal this to be the case? He was also allegedly on the scene when Patrolman J. D. Tippit was killed, though it is hard to pin down a time when he was there. (More on this later.) He then pulled off a trifecta. He also said he was at the Texas Theater when the police apprehended Lee Oswald–and he added that he saw Oswald try and shoot Officer Nick McDonald. (“The Man Who Saw Too Much”, by William Broyles, Texas Monthly, March 1976). Since the evidence indicates that Oswald did not do any such thing, this is also tough to buy into. (Sylvia Meagher, Accessories After the Fact, p. 259)

But, for Hugh, that was not enough. Aynesworth also said that he was in the Dallas Police Department basement when Jack Ruby lunged forward to shoot Oswald. Again, if anyone can pinpoint a film or photo of the man being there, please do. After all, this event was captured live on television. The thesis that he was on the scene for all of these events allowed him to maintain the concept that he had “broken almost every major assassination story.” (Broyles, op. cit.) He now became the Morning News’ lead reporter on the Kennedy case.

As William Broyles wrote, Aynesworth liked to throw bouquets at himself. For instance, that he became the first reporter to break the story of Oswald’s escape route. Since Oswald was not trying to escape, this is also a dubious story. After all, how does one “escape” by using public transportation, like a bus and taxi. And in the latter case, Oswald offered the cab to an elderly lady first. (Meagher, pp. 75-83)

As anyone can see, it was not enough for Aynesworth to cover the story. He had a definite viewpoint about the JFK assassination. And he had it before the Warren Report was even published. On July 21, 1964, through his columnist colleague Holmes Alexander, it became clear that the omnipresent reporter did not trust Chief Justice Earl Warren on the JFK case. So the pair fired a shot across the bow of the Commission. The Commission had to show that Oswald was a homicidal maniac. If not, then Aynesworth would reveal that the FBI knew Oswald was a potential assassin and that the Bureau blew their assignment.

But even that was not enough for Hugh. He was now going to show that Oswald was “a hard driven political radical Leftist”. How so? The column revealed that Aynesworth had interviewed Marina Oswald. Marina had told him that Oswald had threatened to kill Richard Nixon. This one shows just how nutty Aynesworth had become on the Kennedy case. Because not even the Warren Commission bought into it. (Warren Report, pp. 187-89) This rubbish has been exposed by more than one writer. For instance: Nixon was not near Dallas at the time Marina said the incident happened. (Meagher, p. 241) But further, as Peter Scott has observed, to buy into this, Marina had to have locked Oswald in the bathroom to stop him from this heinous act–yet the bathroom locked from the inside. Finally, there was no local newspaper announcement that Nixon was going to be in Dallas at this time, April of 1963. Yet Marina clearly implied that this is what caused Oswald to plan on shooting him. (See also WC Vol., 5, p. 389, and Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK, pp. 286-91) According to Michael Granberry’s obituary for Aynesworth, the Nixon nuttiness originated with a conversation between Marina and Aynesworth.

Was there more to the Marina/Hugh relationship? In May of 1967, researcher Shirley Martin wrote a letter to Jim Garrison about her 1964 meeting with the man. Hugh started off with some “disgusting anti-Kennedy stories.” He then began to praise the city of Dallas, especially his newspaper the Morning News. Hugh then personally smeared some of the Commission critics like Thomas Buchanan and Mark Lane; the former was a “fairy” and the latter was a communist. He added that the JFK case was really a communist plot that Earl Warren would cover up. He also said that he had an affair with Marina. He then commented that Marina and Ruth Paine were involved in a lesbian relationship prior to the assassination. Martin also wrote that Aynesworth was bitter about Merriman Smith winning the Pulitzer for his JFK coverage.

But then there was this. The reporter told Shirley that he was at the scene of the Tippit shooting at 1:05, no later than 1:10. In other words, before the Commission said the murder occurred. (Warren Report, pp. 165-66). In fact, it would be impossible for Oswald to have walked from his rooming house to the scene of the crime—10^th and Patton—during that time interim. (Meagher, p. 255)

According to researcher Rachel Rendish, Aynesworth once offered to show her some sex photos of Marina. Rendish slammed the door shut like this:

Oh yes, I know all about that film and how you boys set her up. She said that was the item you always used for blackmail. I have absolutely no interest in seeing it… He was stunned. (Email to Robert Morrow, 12/27/23)

Then there was the Oswald diary heist. When the FBI did an investigation of how the alleged “Oswald diary” got into Aynesworth’s newspaper they concluded that it was likely stolen from the Dallas Police archives by assistant DA Bill Alexander and then given to Aynesworth. After running it locally, he then put it on the market to other publications. The sale garnered well into the five figures, a ducal sum in those days. The proceeds were split between Aynesworth, his then wife, and Alexander. Marina, who had a legal claim, was originally cut out of the deal.

In late 1966, Aynesworth became an FBI informant on the JFK case. There was a December 12^th report from Hugh on the progress of the Life magazine re-inquiry into the murder of Kennedy. Its odd that this would occur at all since Aynesworth was not a part of that investigative team, which included Josiah Thompson, Ed Kern and Patsy Swank. It likely happened due to the titular Life leader Holland McCombs, a friend of Clay Shaw’s, wanting to cover all the bases, and knowing he could rely on Hugh to do so. Aynesworth told the Bureau that Life had found a witness who connected Oswald with Ruby. In his report he also added that Mark Lane was a homosexual and had to drop his political career because of the allegations. If one recalls, earlier it was Buchanan who was homosexual and Lane was a communist. So now Lane was a gay commie? Like the CYA coward he was, Aynesworth specifically requested his identity not be disclosed by the FBI.

But it was during the Jim Garrison inquiry that Aynesworth really came into his own as an agent/informant for the FBI and CIA. The reporter learned about Garrison’s inquiry through Life magazine stringer David Chandler. The DA granted Hugh an interview at his home after which Aynesworth wrote to McCombs that they should not let Garrison knew they were playing “both sides”. This was after the first meeting! But recall the man’s credo: “I’m not saying there wasn’t a conspiracy….I know most people in this country believe there was a conspiracy. I just refuse to accept it and that’s my life’s work.” (July of 1979 on Dallas PBS affiliate KERA). How could he do so if he was so invested in the Krazy Kid Oswald story from the start? But there is a corollary to this: the Machiavellian rule that the one’s own ends justify the means. And, as with Marina and Nixon fabrication, he was about to prove it once more.

In May of 1967, Aynesworth wrote an article for Newsweek on the Clay Shaw case. The article was simply a cheap smear. It said that whatever plot there was out of New Orleans, it was made up by Garrison; that the DA’s staff had threatened to murder a witness; and the DA was running the equivalent of a reign of terror over the city which had the citizenry in fear. But, before the libelous story ran, the reporter sent a copy to both the White House and the FBI. In an accompanying telegram, he wrote that Garrison’s plan was to make it seem that the FBI and CIA are involved in the JFK “plot”. He again requested his name be withheld. This secrecy is what he relied upon to make it seem he was independent and not in bed with the feds. In fact, when Aynesworth helped organize a Kennedy conference in Dallas to compete with the ASK seminars in the early nineties, someone asked him that question: Have you ever cleared a story in advance with the White House or the FBI. Like any common fink, he denied it. The questioner then confronted him with this telegram.

But it was not just the FBI and the White House from whom he sought protection. British researcher Malcolm Blunt has discovered a CIA document in which the Agency revealed that Aynesworth was interested in Agency employment from back in the early sixties. (Memo of January 25, 1968). And in fact, he appears to have gone to Cuba, not once, but twice, in 1962 and 1963. Robert Morrow confronted him with this and the reporter’s answer was a clever piece of evasion. (Click here for the exchange)

James Feldman commented on this meeting, saying that Hugh never directly replied to the question of was he a CIA media asset. He only said that he did not take money from a government agency. But as Feldman added, agencies often distribute funds through business intermediaries or other types of fronts. Feldman concluded that “his failure to answer the question in a forthright, honest manner merely supports those who assert that Aynesworth has been a CIA media asset.”

About the last there can be little, if any, doubt. For in his attempt to directly obstruct Garrison’s legal proceedings against Clay Shaw, the reporter actually did what he (falsely) accused Garrison of doing: he attempted to bribe a witness. As many know, Shaw, Oswald and David Ferrie had gone to the Clinton/Jackson area–about 120 miles northeast of New Orleans– in the early autumn of 1963. Many witnesses saw the trio, with Oswald in a voter registration line and Shaw and Ferrie sitting in a Cadillac (Garrison actually had a picture of the car, see Joan Mellen, A Farewell to Justice, p. 223).

Sheriff John Manchester was one of the most important witnesses to this strange but fascinating episode. And Aynesworth understood how important he was. Hugh had essentially moved to New Orleans by 1967 and was working with Shaw’s lawyers. He had plants inside of Garrison’s office, e.g. William Gurvich. And they had supplied him with memoranda on which Garrison was working. (See Destiny Betrayed, by James DiEugenio, Second Edition, pp.252-54) One of these concerned Manchester’s testimony, in which he identified Shaw as the driver of the car. Aynesworth drove to the Clinton area with it and told Manchester something quite interesting and revelatory about himself and who he was working with in tandem. Hugh told the sheriff that if he failed to show up at Shaw’s trial he could get him a job as a CIA handler in Mexico for 38,000 dollars per year, over $300,000 today. Obviously, if he was not working with the Agency, how could Aynesworth extend such an offer?

I rather liked Manchester’s incorruptible reply: “I advise you to leave the area. Otherwise I’ll cut you a new asshole.” (ibid, p. 255)

From threatening the Warren Commission and FBI, to helping create a phony Nixon murder attempt, to allegedly sleeping with Marina Oswald and taking photos of it, to smearing Commission critics as being both gay and commies, to informing for J. Edgar Hoover and lying about it, to interfering with a DA’s investigation and bribing prospective witnesses, Hugh Aynesworth was a piece of human flotsam masquerading as a reporter on the JFK case. That Dallas holds him up as an exemplary journalist shows how deeply in denial that city is about President Kennedy’s assassination and the cover up that followed…

January 11, 2024
Doug Horne Reviews Sean Fetter’s new book “Under Cover of Night”

This review is primarily a “medical critique” of three major aspects of Sean Fetter’s UNDER COVER OF NIGHT, as well as commentary about his historiography.

(1) Fetter has fully adopted and thoroughly advanced David Lifton’s hypothesis from BEST EVIDENCE that the post mortem surgery to JFK’s head wounds (evidenced in both Dr. Boswell’s autopsy sketch of the severe damage to the top of JFK’s skull, and in the graphic autopsy photos showing the top of JFK’s cranium removed—damage that no one saw at Parkland Hospital) occurred well before the President’s body arrived at Bethesda Naval Hospital the night of the assassination. In my many telephone conversations with Lifton from 1996-2000, before we largely parted ways with each other, Lifton indicated to me many times that he still believed this to be the case, in spite of the strong evidence to the contrary that I presented to him on numerous occasions. Fetter explicitly states his support for this old Lifton hypothesis when he states the same conclusions, on pages 46 and 52; in summary, in Volume I of UNDER COVER OF NIGHT, Sean Fetter concludes that JFK’s corpse was violently mutilated (namely, that the top of the head was hacked open with a “crash axe,” and his throat wound was torn open); his spinal cord was severed; and his brain was removed from the cranium, all long before 6:35 PM when Kennedy’s body arrived at Bethesda Naval Hospital. So, as much as Fetter decries Lifton’s analytical abilities, and disparages him personally, he has endorsed THE major hypothesis in Lifton’s BEST EVIDENCE.

And yet, strong dispositive evidence exists that post mortem tampering with JFK’s wounds did NOT occur prior to the arrival of his body at Bethesda Naval Hospital—and that JFK arrived at Bethesda with his head in the same condition that was observed when his body left Parkland Hospital, in Dallas: namely, with a localized, avulsed exit wound in the right rear quadrant of his head, about the size of a baseball or small orange; with the top of the head apparently intact; and with the brain still in the cranium.

Read the rest of the article here.

Doug Horne replies to Gary Aguilar’s comments on his appearance in What the Doctors Saw.

Read here.

January 10, 2024
House of Omission

For every milestone anniversary of the Kennedy assassination comes a major documentary from mainstream media. In 1993 we saw the FRONTLINE special “Who Was Lee Harvey Oswald?”. In 2003 it was the ABC special “Beyond Conspiracy”. In 2013 came NOVA’s “Cold Case: JFK”. This time around it was National Geographic’s 3-part series “JFK: One Day In America”. However, unlike the ones that came before, rather than discussing actual evidence, the new kid on the block took a vastly different approach to the case—the simple art of omission.

Secret Service agent Clint Hill started the program off by saying “There are a few of us left. But very few.” This is hardly the case, as there are dozens of witnesses still alive from that day.

Right off the bat, the tone of the series was clear—they were going for emotion and tugging at heart strings, sad music and all. All throughout the series this tone was nonstop. Also right away, something felt off. This is because they colorized nearly every single black-and-white film from that day. This makes it offbeat to anyone familiar with the films. They did, however, sometimes use a variety of hardly seen films throughout.

EPISODE 1

The first witness we are introduced to is Buell Frazier, who drove Lee Harvey Oswald to work. Here come the omissions. They have Frazier tell the basic fact that Oswald carried a package into work that day—but omitted that Frazier has always insisted it was entirely too small to contain a rifle (2 H 240), and also his strong conviction that his friend didn’t kill Kennedy.

Up next are assassination eyewitnesses Bill and Gayle Newman. The program has them essentially tell their basic story—but omitted the basic fact that they’ve always said shots came from behind them up on the grassy knoll. (WC 19 H 490)

Agent Clint Hill tells his story—but they omitted him describing the massive blowout in the right rear of Kennedy’s head. (WC 2 H 141) Of course, all indicative of a shot from the front. He details this in every interview he does. Why did they omit it here?

Fellow agent Paul Landis was also interviewed—but left out was his recent revelation that he had found a bullet in the backseat of the limousine. And he too described the wound in the back of JFK’s head, and reported “that the shot came from somewhere towards the front.” (WC 18 H 759) Omitted too were these.

The famous Zapruder film is shown—but the headshot sequence is skipped over. One has to wonder: did they omit it simply because it’s graphic, or did they omit it because it shows JFK’s head going back-and-to-the-left (implying a shot from the front)? The first seems implausible, for it has been shown in dozens and dozens of mainstream documentaries for decades.

Strangely, when we get to Parkland Hospital, zero of the treating staff are interviewed for the program. Did they not interview these people because they have been insistent since day one that the President was shot from the front? They could’ve interviewed Dr. Ronald Jones, who’s still very much alive. Dr. Jones said in 1983: “If you brought him in here today, I’d still say he was shot from the front.” (Best Evidence, p. 705) They also could’ve interviewed Dr. Don Curtis, Dr. Joe Goldstrich, Dr. Philip Williams, Dr. Richard Dulany, Nurse Pat Hutton, etc.

EPISODE 2

Continuing at Parkland, we are given the impression JFK’s body was simply placed in the coffin and taken to the airport. Anyone with even a cursory knowledge about this case would know this is abominably incorrect. Completely omitted was the most basic fact that JFK’s body was illegally stolen from the coroner before an autopsy could be done. It wasn’t just stolen, there was a literal battle over the body. One of the doctors gave this shocking account: “[Agent] Kellerman took an erect stance and brought his firearm into a ready position. The other men in suits followed course…Had Dr. Rose not stepped aside, I’m sure that those thugs would have shot him.” (JFK: Conspiracy of Silence, p. 119)

We are taken back to Dealey Plaza, and Dallas police officer Rusty Robbins tells the audience “We were in the middle of the biggest manhunt the country had ever seen.” Well, I’m no professional historian, but wasn’t John Wilkes Booth the biggest manhunt ever? That lasted 12 days. This lasted just over an hour. Mentioning briefly the Tippit murder, Robbins tells us the reason Officer Tippit pulled over the man who killed him was because he “matched the description of the guy they thought killed the President.” Only the Warren Report believed this. If that were the case, Tippit would be pulling over every white guy in town that matched the very general description. The truth is, we have no idea why the man was stopped. Completely omitted from the program were any details or evidence about Tippit’s murder.

News anchor Bill Mercer tells the audience that “Oswald was unaccounted for” in a “roll call” at the Texas School Book Depository after the shooting. This is a common mainstream talking point. The truth of the matter is that 17 employees were never in the building after 12:30! (WC 22 H 632–686) There also wasn’t a roll call. (James DiEugenio, The JFK Assassination: The Evidence Today, pp. 123-24)

Ruth Paine then tells her story, which is nothing new.

EPISODE 3

What was completely skipped over and not even mentioned was the President’s autopsy! They could have interviewed James Curtis Jenkins, who assisted the pathologists that night. He was just 19 years old and it greatly affected him. You’d think the producers would’ve jumped for an interview with him. They could’ve interviewed pathologist Dr. Robert Karnei. They could have interviewed Ed Reed, who X-rayed the President’s body. What about Richard Lipsey, Nick Rudnicki, Dr. Gregory Cross? Etc. I’ve interviewed all these men. Why didn’t National Geographic?

Also conveniently omitted from the series is the clip shown in every documentary of Oswald shouting to reporters “I’m just a patsy!”

The “One Day in America” program then jumped to 2 days later on 11/24 to cover Jack Ruby’s shooting of Oswald. This is told from the perspective of reporter Peggy Simpson and not the usual Hugh Aynesworth or Bob Jackson. It was very striking though seeing the film of Oswald being shot colorized.

The program of course covered President Kennedy’s funeral. But for an attempted sentimental and human interest documentary, why on earth did they not interview any of the surviving honor guards who buried JFK? 5 of the 6 are still living! I interviewed 3 of them.

After a lot of more sad imagery and music, the series ended with the quick caption: “On 24th September 1964, the Warren Commission concluded that President Kennedy was assassinated by Lee Harvey Oswald alone and Jack Ruby also acted alone.” And roll credits and that’s all.

All this series did was tell the basic story of what happened that day without any details whatsoever. All it told was: JFK went to Texas, was killed in Dallas, a suspect was arrested, was killed 2 days later, and JFK was buried. That’s literally it. Nothing at all about evidence, what happened, why he died, and why it matters. It makes it seem like there’s no question at all about anything. They also made it sound like these handful of witnesses are the only ones left. Nothing could be further from the truth. This series is the biggest dud I’ve seen. As one reviewer on Rotten Tomatoes rightfully said:

“It’s just a painfully slow version of how the news was broadcast, nothing more. Asks zero questions about the greatest cold case of all time. Avoid if you are looking for answers.”

Another reviewer said: “Snooze fest I got 5 mins into episode 2 and turned it off.”

One has to wonder what we will see in the next ten years.

January 5, 2024