Author: James DiEugenio

  • Gordon Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster


    Virtual JFK 3


    Part One of this essay reviews the film accompanying this book, which has the same title.

    Part Two of this essay reviews the book accompanying this film, which has the same title.


    See the Virtual JFK web site


    In my discussion of the book Virtual JFK: Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived I first mentioned the name of Gordon Goldstein. Goldstein was to be the co-author, with McGeorge Bundy, of a book Bundy was going to write about his experiences with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson over the Vietnam War. That book was never completed because Bundy died before it was finished. The two had worked on it together for a bit less than two years. From the description of the travail here, plus what Goldstein was able to salvage, it would have been a real contribution to the literature. After Bundy passed away, Goldstein wanted to complete the book on his own. But Bundy’s widow would not allow it. So what he decided to do was to compose this memoir of his many months working with Bundy, and to also offer his own view on the Vietnam issue. Lessons in Disaster is not the book that might have been, but it’s still an interesting effort that is worth reading. Among other things, it gives us an insight into what one of the people directly involved in an epic tragedy thought of that terrible episode many years later. Or as Bundy said to Goldstein before they started, “I was part of a great failure. My wish now is that we had done less.” (p. 24)

    It is interesting to note how this effort began. In 1995, Robert McNamara published his book In Retrospect. In that book, he admitted to three things: 1.) The Vietnam War was a huge mistake 2.) He had determined by April1966 that it could not be won in a military sense (McNamara p. 261), and 3.) President Kennedy would not have Americanized the war and escalated it as President Johnson did ( ibid p. 96).

    (Let me interject something here as a personal sidelight. Although McNamara does not specifically mention John Newman in that book, Newman told me that he had several talks with McNamara before he started writing it. John was surprised at how many things McNamara had forgotten about, especially from the Kennedy years. I asked him how that could be so: How McNamara could have not recalled how different Kennedy’s plans had been? Newman replied, “Jim, if you were part of a decision that eventually took the lives of over 58,000 Americans and over two million Vietnamese, you would want to forget about the option you discarded too.”)

    When In Retrospect created the controversy it did, Bundy was asked to appear on a TV show to discuss the book. He did so. During the program, one of the other guests spoke up in defense of McNamara. He said, “You have a guest on your program, McGeorge Bundy, who was certainly as complicit as McNamara. I don’t know why McNamara should take all the heat.” (Goldstein, p. 22) A few days later, McNamara called Goldstein, and the book project began. Goldstein had worked with the former National Security Adviser while completing his Ph. D. in International Relations at Columbia. Unfortunately, Bundy died in the fall of 1996 before the book was completed. Before the two started in earnest, Bundy told Goldstein something that was to pithily sum up everything that followed, “Kennedy didn’t want to be dumb. Johnson didn’t want to be a coward.”

    McGeorge Bundy was Boston Brahmin. He was born there in 1919. His mother was related to the Lowell family, which was an institution in the area. His father Harvey was educated at Yale, where he was a member of Skull and Bones, and then went to Harvard Law School. In 1931, Mac Bundy joined his brothers Bill and Harvey Jr., at the famous boarding school of Groton, whose motto was “To serve is to rule.” (p. 7) Past attendees had been people like Dean Acheson and Franklin Roosevelt. After achieving a perfect SAT score, he went to Yale and joined Phi Beta Kappa. Like his father he joined Skull and Bones. After graduating, Bundy went to Harvard for post graduate work. During World War II, he joined the Navy and became an aide to Rear Admiral Alan Kirk. After the war, he co-authored a book with Secretary of State Henry Stimson. In 1948, he worked on the presidential campaign of Tom Dewey as a speech writer. After that he went to the Council on Foreign Relations to do a paper on the Marshall Plan with the help of Allen Dulles and Dwight Eisenhower. (p. 11) In 1949 he took a teaching position at Harvard in the Government Department. In 1953, at the young age of 34, he became Dean of Harvard faculty. It is here that Bundy met Senator John Kennedy, who was a member of the Harvard Board of Overseers. (p. 14) When Kennedy won the election for president in 1960, Bundy became his National Security Adviser. There is little doubt that, as Goldstein mentions, he revolutionized the position. He actually brought it out of the shadows and made it a position of primacy in the Cabinet.

    Bundy left the White House in 1966 to run the Ford Foundation. While there, the Pentagon Papers were published. Two Bundy assistants tried to coax him into making pubic the memos he had written under Johnson expressing the doubts he had about the war at the time. (p. 17) Bundy, out of the loyalty he felt to LBJ, decided not to. ( I should note here something the author leaves out of his outline of Bundy’s career. In a famous article published in the seventies in Penthouse, it was revealed that Bundy was the secretary of the Bilderberger Group, working directly under David Rockefeller.)

    In 1979, Bundy left the Ford Foundation and, amid great controversy—since, due to his involvement with Vietnam, most of the faculty did not want him there—became a professor of history at New York University. While there in 1984 he talked to journalist David Talbot about the subject. He told Talbot that he did have doubts about the war, “and it can be argued that I didn’t press hard enough.” (p. 19) He did not go any farther and told him he would sort it out later. He did with Goldstein.

    II

    One of the reasons I have detailed the remarkable pedigree of Bundy is that it proves the opposite of what one would expect. Namely that things like Ivy League credentials, secret societies, upper class origins, and Eastern Establishment connections really don’t mean that much on their own. Why? Because Bundy was not a good National Security Adviser. Although Richard Goodwin and Arthur Schlesinger tried to talk Bundy out of it, Bundy OK’d the Bay of Pigs invasion to Kennedy. (p. 38) Even though Bundy possessed a memo that the operation would not succeed unless it was fully supported by the CIA and Pentagon, he did not forward it to the Oval Office. (p. 40) Bundy offered to resign in the wake of that fiasco but Kennedy would not accept his resignation. He probably should have. Because later in1961, Bundy was one of the advisers urging Kennedy to commit American troops to Vietnam. Then in 1962, Bundy first backed air strikes to solve the Cuban Missile Crisis. He then switched to McNamara’s suggestion of a quarantine around Cuba during the Missile Crisis. He then switched back to the Pentagon plan for surgical air strikes, 800 of them. (pgs. 72-73) Although he later said that he switched at Kennedy’s request, this reason never surfaced until many years after. As Goldstein notes, at the time, Ted Sorenson said that Kennedy was actually a bit disgusted with his National Security Adviser.

    But as Bundy noted to Goldstein, one thing to note about Kennedy’s management of the Bay of Pigs was this: Under very strong pressure from the CIA and the Pentagon, Kennedy did not commit the American military to save the day. (p.44) Bundy also noted another pattern to Goldstein. During the Laotian crisis of the same year, the Pentagon wanted JFK to commit combat troops because if not, as Admiral Arleigh Burke said, all of Southeast Asia would be lost. (p. 46) Again, Kennedy did not go along. After calling for a high alert on Okinawa, Kennedy instructed Averill Harriman to produce a diplomatic solution. (p. 45) And he was so appalled by the advice he was getting that he now requested both Sorenson and Bobby Kennedy sit in on National Security Council meetings. (p. 46) Bundy told Goldstein that, after the way Kennedy handled Laos, he saw that, unlike many others—for instance, LBJ—President Kennedy had not bought into the Domino Theory. The idea that if one country went communist, it would take several nearby nations with it.

    Goldstein does a nice job at this point in sketching the background of the Vietnam crisis as Kennedy first inherited it. After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Ngo Dinh Diem then rigged the plebiscite in order to succeed the proxy French emperor Bao Dai. But as the communist insurgency in the countryside grew larger, Diem’s security forces, led by his brother Nhu, became more brutal and repressive. Captured rebels were beaten, had their legs broken, and females were raped. (p. 51) In 1959, Diem restored the guillotine. Traveling courts in the countryside were now authorized to behead convicted communists. (ibid) Goldstein sums up the scene upon Kennedy’s ascendancy to the White House: “By 1961, as Kennedy assumed power in Washington, the situation in South Vietnam was characterized by an ascending nationalist and communist movement and an oppressive regime that was progressively losing control of the country and credibility with its people.” (ibid)

    What follows is one of the highlights of the book. Goldstein enumerates the number of times Kennedy turned down requests to commit combat troops to save the day before the White House debate over the Taylor/Rostow mission in November of 1961. He starts out with the request of Gen. Ed Lansdale in January of 1961. (p. 52) In April of 1961, McNamara suggested the same. (p. 53) That same month, Kennedy rejected a backdoor: he refused combat troops as trainers. (p. 54) He was asked twice in May and turned down both requests. (ibid) By July he had turned down a total of six requests. (p. 55)

    On July 15th, Max Taylor and Walt Rostow again requested combat troops. Bundy kept notes on this colloquy which Goldstein prints here. He wrote, “Questions from the president showed that the detailed aspects of this military plan had not been developed … the president made clear his own deep concern with the need for realism and accuracy in … military planning. He had observed in earlier military plans with respect to Laos that optimistic estimates were invariably proven false in the event … He emphasized the reluctance of the American people and of many distinguished leaders to see any direct involvement of US troops in that part of the world.” Rostow and Taylor tried to argue back but Kennedy said, “Gen. DeGaulle, out of painful French experience, had spoken with feeling of the difficulty of fighting in this part of the world.” Vice-President Johnson then called for a firmer military commitment to the region, including Laos. Kennedy resisted by saying, “Nothing would be worse than an unsuccessful intervention in the area, and that he did not have confidence in the military practicability of the proposal which had been put before him.” (pgs 56-57) This now made seven rejections of American direct intervention in seven months.

    On October 11th, Deputy Defense Secretary Alexis Johnson joined the push for combat troops. Again, Kennedy did not agree. But he did authorize a mission to South Vietnam by Max Taylor and Walt Rostow. (p. 57) At this time, the hawks in the White House begin to leak stories that Kennedy would now probably commit troops to Vietnam. When Kennedy saw the stories, he himself leaked a story denying it. (ibid)

    On October 20th, Frederick Nolting, the American ambassador in Vietnam, requested combat troops for flood relief purposes. Taylor was on the scene, and he agreed with the request—if he did not put Nolting up to it. Kennedy consulted with an agricultural expert and turned it down. Taylor then talked to the press about the issue. Kennedy telegrammed Taylor to stop doing so. (p. 58)

    When Kennedy received the Taylor/Rostow report, it again requested the sending of combat troops to Vietnam. And it couched the request in dire terms. It said if such a commitment was not made, the fall of South Vietnam would likely follow. (p. 60) The formal White House debate over the recommendation was taken up on November 7th. In addition to Taylor and Rostow, Defense Secretary McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Bundy, and the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff told Kennedy to send combat troops. On November 15th, Kennedy closed the debate. At this point, Goldstein makes two cogent observations. There were only two people in the entire White House who sided with Kennedy on this issue. They were George Ball and John Kenneth Galbraith. When Ball personally approached Kennedy since he thought he might be weakening and could give in, Kennedy replied to him: “George, you’re just crazier than hell. That just isn’t going to happen.” (p. 62) And after this debate, Kennedy told Galbraith he was going to send him to Saigon. He wanted him to render a report also. (p. 61) Knowing what it would say, he would only give it to McNamara. And McNamara would now become Kennedy’s point man on his withdrawal plan. The third result of this debate was Kennedy’s issuance of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 111, which increased the number of advisers to above 15,000, with no provision for combat troops.

    When Bundy reviewed all the above with Goldstein, he was impressed with both Kennedy’s insight and his steadfastness. He also told Professor James Blight, one of the co-editors of the fine book Virtual JFK, that Kennedy simply did not think that combat troops would work in South Vietnam. Because he did not see the struggle as a conventional war but as a classic counter-insurgency conflict. Bundy and Goldstein came to the conclusion that much of this was instilled in Kennedy from his visit to Vietnam in the early fifties during the last throes of the French imperial war there. (p. 235) Another strong influence was his discussion of the issue with Douglas MacArthur. The general told Kennedy it would be foolish to fight a large land war in Southeast Asia. He told him that he could pour a million men into the struggle and still be outnumbered. (p. 235) Alexis Johnson was skeptical of MacArthur’s stance but he admitted that it made a profound effect on President Kennedy. Max Taylor agreed with him. He said MacArthur’s analysis made a “hell of an impression on the President.” (ibid) Kennedy later told Bundy’s assistant Michael Forrestal “that the odds against an American victory over the Viet Cong were 100 to 1.” (p. 239) Since, as Bundy said, Kennedy did not buy into the Domino Theory, those odds were simply not worth it. Consequently, Bundy saw these ten rejections in eleven months as Kennedy’s final decision on the issue. And Bundy described a following meeting in January of 1962 in Palm Beach, Florida where Kennedy emphasized the advice and support role to be played by the Americans. (p. 71) That was a line Kennedy was not going to cross. And he didn’t.

    III

    After receiving Galbraith’s report, McNamara went to work on putting together the withdrawal plan. While he did that, the increased advisory team sent in by NSAM 111 managed to keep the lid on a deteriorating situation. But in 1963, things started going downhill fast. In January of that year, the Viet Cong defeated a regular detachment of the South Vietnamese army at the battle of Ap Bac. (p. 72) As things began to spiral downward, the reactions of the Ngo brothers worsened. Diem demanded that all public gatherings, even funerals, would have to have official state sanction. He even asked for total control over all anti-guerilla operations from the US. Then the epochal Hue crisis broke out in June. In response to a discriminatory edict passed by Diem, a huge Buddhist rally took place in the city of Hue. After a day of speeches, a radio station was bombed with many protesters standing outside. In the resultant chaos, shots were fired into the crowd. Several people were killed and even more were wounded. (The best account of this incident is by Jim Douglass, in JFK and the Unspeakable, pgs. 128-131) As a result of the crackdown ordered by Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, one of the monks leading the demonstration set himself on fire. (Goldstein, p. 75) This horrifying image was captured on both film and photograph and was relayed all over the world. Making it worse was the heinous reaction of Nhu’s wife, Madame Nhu (aka The Dragon Lady). She ridiculed his martyrdom as a “barbecue” and said if any others did the same “we shall clap our hands”. (ibid p. 76) Unfortunately for her, seven others did do the same. (ibid) This chain reaction mushroomed into a huge political crisis since it spawned marches, demonstrations, work stoppages and hunger strikes. (Douglass, p. 133) In reply, Nhu ended up arresting over 1,400 Buddhists.

    It was against the backdrop of this image of a collapsing government and an intractable leader that a small cabal in Washington and Saigon decided to take the next step and remove Diem and his brother from power. Goldstein does a decent job describing the events that led to the eventual coup and deaths of the brothers. (pgs. 76-81) But the best, most detailed description of how it began is by John Newman in his masterful book, JFK and Vietnam. There had been a small group in State and on Bundy’s staff that was waiting for an event like this to get rid of Diem. The group consisted of Averill Harriman and Roger Hilsman at State, and Michael Forrestal of the NSC. While Kennedy was away, Hilsman began sending cables to his ally William Trueheart in the Saigon embassy threatening to ostracize Diem. This was in defiance of Kennedy’s wishes. (Newman, p. 336) But once Henry Cabot Lodge had arrived as the new ambassador in Saigon, this group took an even bolder step.

    As with the sending of the threatening message, they waited until a strategic moment when all the principals of government were out of town. This came on the weekend of August 24-25th. JFK, McNamara, Bundy, Rusk, and CIA Director John McCone were all out of Washington. Three cables came in from Lodge and the CIA officer in contact with the South Vietnamese army, Lucien Conein. The message was that the Army was unhappy with the Ngo brothers and if the USA indicated to the generals that it “would be happy to see Diem and/or Nhu go, and the deed would be done.” Lodge added that he did not think it would be that easy. It could be a “shot in the dark”. (Newman, p. 346) This was all that Hilsman-Harriman-Forrestal needed. They sent a cable back on the 24th. It said that Diem must be given a chance to oust Nhu, “but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem. You may also tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown … ” (ibid)

    Forrestal was given the job of getting this cable cleared. He read it to Kennedy over the phone. Kennedy did not understand why it had to be sent that day. But he said to see if others would OK it, especially McCone. Kennedy probably said this because he knew McCone would not approve it. (ibid p. 347) But, in fact, McCone was never shown the cable. (ibid, p. 351) The cabal also fudged getting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Maxwell Taylor to approve it. Hilsman and Forrestal concocted a story that said that no clearance from the Defense Department was required, meaning McNamara and Alexis Johnson. And further, that Taylor had approved it without question. Neither of these is true. (ibid p. 348) In fact, Taylor never approved the cable. When he saw it he perceptively thought, ” … my first reaction was that the anti-Diem group centered in State had taken advantage of the absence of the principal officials to get out instructions which would never have been approved as written under normal circumstances. ” (ibid p. 349) He also thought it would have never even been passed around if Bundy had been in town. Yet, Taylor did not call Kennedy to tell him what he thought was actually happening. The cable was sent that Saturday night.

    On Monday, Kennedy was upset at what had happened: “This shit has got to stop!” When Forrestal offered to resign Kennedy replied with, “You’re not worth firing. You owe me something, so you stick around.” (ibid, p. 351) But the problem now was that in Saigon, Lodge had immediately jumped on the cable. And, seemingly as if he was part of the plan, he bypassed putting pressure on Diem to fire his brother Nhu, and instead he went straight to the generals. This was on Sunday, the 25th, less than 24 hours after getting the Saturday night cable. (ibid, p. 350) Bypassing Diem was a crucial switch from the original cable, which said that Diem was to be given a chance to oust his brother Nhu. (ibid, p. 346) So now, by the end of Sunday the 25th, the effort to overthrow Diem was in motion with almost irreversible momentum. Even though Kennedy advised Lodge that he was against it and wanted to work with Diem, even though RFK was against it also, Lodge and Conein had cast their lot with the coup plotters. (Goldstein, pgs. 81, 86-88) This ended, of course, with the coup finally succeeding in early November. With the cooperation of Lodge and Conein, the Ngo brothers were not just ousted, they were killed. (Douglass deals with this episode exceedingly well on pgs. 206-210) The death of the brothers deeply troubled Kennedy both morally and religiously. He ordered a complete review of how the August 24th cable was sent, why it was so urgent to do on the weekend, and why it was skewed so much in favor of the generals. (Goldstein p. 90)

    In the aftermath of the coup, Bundy felt that perhaps the USA was now more committed to South Vietnam. But Kennedy did not waver from his withdrawal plan as helmed by McNamara. Goldstein quotes McNamara as saying to his biographer, “I believed that we had done all the training we could. Whether the South Vietnamese were qualified or not to turn back the North Vietnamese, I was certain that if they weren’t it was not for lack of training. More training wouldn’t strengthen them; therefore we should get out. The president agreed.” (ibid p. 84) Therefore in early October, NSAM 263 was issued. This stated that the US would withdraw a thousand advisers by the end of 1963. The White House announcement coupled with this issuance said that it was the first step in the eventual removal of the bulk of American personnel by the end of 1965. (Newman, p. 402) And after November coup, Kennedy said in a speech on November 14th that he did not want the US to put troops in Vietnam. His intent was to bring the Americans home. (Goldstein, pgs 95-96)

    As Goldstein notes, this was all changed by what happened in Dallas a week later.

    IV

    Like most current scholarship, Goldstein describes the sea change that took place on the Vietnam issue after Johnson took over. Bundy told Goldstein that LBJ was not going to jeopardize his election by losing any aspect of the Cold War. (pgs. 98-99) He also told Goldstein that he did not really want to serve under LBJ, but he felt he had to until at least November of 1964. Bundy, and others, felt the real successor to JFK was Bobby Kennedy. (ibid)

    The National Security Advisor states that there is no doubt that, from the first day, Johnson was preoccupied with Vietnam. (p. 105) For instance, Rusk said, “The President has expressed his deep concern that our effort in Vietnam be stepped up to the highest pitch, and that each day we ask ourselves what more we can do to further the struggle.” (p. 105) McCone said, “Johnson definitely feels that we place too much emphasis on social returns; he has very little tolerance with our spending so much time being “do-gooders”. (ibid) Johnson told McNamara that the USA was not doing everything it should in Vietnam. (p. 106) He sent McNamara to Saigon in order to give him a ground level report. Right before Christmas of 1963, McNamara returned with a bad report. (ibid, p. 107) The South Vietnamese had been lying about their progress in the war. A month after that, the Joint Chiefs sent a proposal to the White House recommending bombing the North and the insertion of US combat troops.

    This is quite interesting of course. Not just because of the speed of the reversal. That has been noted by several other authors. But because the fulcrum of Kennedy’s strategy had been to partly base his withdrawal strategy on the false reports he knew he was getting from South Vietnam. In fact, this was one of the main themes of Newman’s milestone book. Namely, that Kennedy knew these were wrong. But he was going to utilize them to base his withdrawal plan on. But the Pentagon and the CIA finally understood what Kennedy was up to and began to change these reports. And they backdated the changes to July, 1963. (Newman, pgs 425, 441) McNamara had to have known this, since Kennedy had appointed him to run the withdrawal plan. But like the others, he understood a new sheriff was in town. So McNamara presented to LBJ the revised figures, the ones done as a reaction to Kennedy’s withdrawal strategy. In light of this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) responded with plans for both an American air and land war in Vietnam. On March 2, 1964 the JCS passed a new war proposal to the White House. This one was even more ambitious. It included bombing, the mining of North Vietnamese harbors, a naval blockade, and possible use of tactical atomic weapons, in case China intervened. (Goldstein, p. 108)

    Johnson said he was not ready for this proposal since he did not have congress yet as a partner and trustee. (ibid, p. 109) But he did order the preparation of NSAM 288. This was essentially a target list of bombing sites that eventually reached 94 possibilities. (Edwin Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, pgs 24-25) By May 25th, with both Richard Nixon and Barry Goldwater clamoring for bombing of the north, LBJ had made the decision that the US would directly attack North Vietnam at an unspecified point in the future. (ibid, p. 26) In fact, the specific campaign, with the steps involved leading to a continuous air campaign, had already been mapped out in time intervals. This plan included the passage of a congressional resolution. (ibid, p. 27) The rough draft of the resolution was drawn up by a young lawyer in the State Department. (ibid) In June, Mac Bundy’s brother, William Bundy, finalized it. That month, Johnson began to lobby certain people in congress in advance. ( ibid, p. 26) On June 10th, McNamara said, “that in the event of a dramatic event in Southeast Asia we would go promptly for a congressional resolution.” (ibid) But Bill Bundy added, the actual decision to expand the war would not be made until after the election. (ibid, p. 44) This is precisely what happened.

    As Goldstein points out, there were other views being voiced at the time. People like Sen. Richard Russell, journalist Walter Lippmann, and French Premier DeGaulle were all pushing for a neutralization plan. It’s interesting to compare Johnson’s reaction to DeGaulle with Kennedy’s. Whereas Kennedy took DeGaulle’s opinion very seriously, Johnson told Bundy to call DeGaulle and get him to take back his appeal for neutralization. (Goldstein, p. 111) Considering all of the above, the only thing Johnson needed now was a casus belli—the “dramatic event” McNamara spoke of. LBJ himself had planted the seed for one.

    As John Newman notes, when Johnson became president, he altered the rough draft of NSAM 273 in more than one way. The most significant alteration was probably to paragraph seven. (Newman, p. 446) In the rough draft prepared by Bundy, it allowed for maritime operations against the north—but only by the government of South Vietnam. (ibid, p. 440) This was changed by LBJ. He struck the sentence specifying that maritime operations be done by the South Vietnamese government. (ibid, p. 446) Probably because this would have taken time, since South Vietnam had no sophisticated navy to speak of. As Newman writes, “This revision opened the door to direct US attacks against North Vietnam, and CINCPAC OPLAN 34-63, which became OPLAN 34A, was promptly submitted to the White House…” (ibid)By December 21, 1963—less than one month after Kennedy was killed—McNamara presented Johnson with a paper entitled “Plans for Covert Action into North Vietnam”. (ibid) One of the actions was to couple OPLAN 34A with DESOTO patrols in the Tonkin Gulf, all along the coast of North Vietnam. OPLAN 34 A consisted of hit and run strikes by small, quick patrol boats manned by South Vietnamese sailors. But outside of that, almost everything else about those missions was American in origin. The DESOTO patrols were completely American. These were destroyers manned with intelligence collecting machines to collect data on where things like North Vietnamese radar installations and torpedo boat harbors were. In other words, they worked in tandem.

    The first naval operations went into effect in February of 1964. (Moise, , p. 6) The destroyer used at that time was called the Craig. The destroyer used for the second set of missions, beginning in July, was the Maddox. An important part of the mission was to “show the flag”. (Moise, p. 55) And part of that was violating the claim the North Vietnamese made about the limits of their territorial waters. They said the limit was twelve miles. Yet on the July/August missions both the attacking patrol boats and the Maddox were in violation of that limit. Not just in relation to the mainland, but also relative to the islands off the coast, which were also attacked. (Moise, p. 68) As many authors have concluded, the design and action of the mission was a provocation. (ibid, p. 68) In fact, people inside the White House, like Forrestal and McCone, later agreed it was. (Goldstein, p. 125)

    There were two incidents that took place in the first week of August, which gave Johnson the pretext to pass his resolution. On August 2nd the Maddox was attacked by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Although torpedoes were launched, none hit. The total damage to the destroyer was one bullet through the hull. (Moise, p. 80) When the Defense Department briefed the senators on this first incident, they misrepresented it. They said the North Vietnamese fired first, that the USA had no role in the patrol boat raids, that the ships were in international waters, and there was no hot pursuit. These were all wrong. (Ibid, p. 87)

    At this point, Captain Herrick of the Maddox suggested the missions be stopped. They were not. And the mission was given direct orders to violate the twelve mile territorial waters claim. Which they did. (ibid, p. 95) LBJ himself authorized the new OPLAN 34A attack on August 3rd. (ibid, p. 105) On this particular DESOTO patrol, the Turner Joy joined the Maddox. On August 4th, the Turner Joy reported that torpedo boats were approaching her. This message was relayed to Washington. McNamara used these messages in his discussion with Johnson. The Turner Joy then opened fire, eventually expending 300 shells. It was later discovered that they were firing at nothing. No attack took place that night. And in fact, the records of the Turner Joy were later altered ” to make the evidence of an attack seem stronger than it actually was …” (ibid, p.147)

    The morning he first heard of the second incident, Johnson marched down to his National Security Advisor’s office. Bundy told Goldstein that this, in itself, was quite unusual. (Goldstein, p. 126) LBJ then told Bundy, “Get the resolution your brother drafted.” Bundy replied, “Mr. President, we ought to think about this.” Johnson said, “I didn’t ask you what you thought, I told you what to do.” (ibid) That exchange should throw the final pile of dirt on the myth of Johnson as the “reluctant warrior”

    But it’s actually worse than that. Because today there is a debate on whether this exchange took place after the phony news of an actual attack, or whether Johnson talked to Bundy just upon hearing that the torpedo boats were approaching. According to Goldstein’s chronology, LBJ told Bundy to get the resolution out before any of the phony news of an attack got to him. (ibid pgs 126-127) Which would mean of course that the attack, which did not occur, was superfluous to Johnson. He was going to use the non-event to get his pre-planned resolution through congress. And in fact, during a meeting on August 5th, Bundy actually said that the evidence for the first attack had stood up, but the evidence for the second attack was questionable. (White House Memorandum. 5 August, 1964.) In 2003, the National Security Archive, released a memo saying that on August 4th, Herrick had actually relayed a message to McNamara saying that the evidence for the second attack was doubtful. McNamara later believed that LBJ did what he did because he did not want to be attacked by the hawks as being weak or indecisive. In other words, he was protecting his right flank. (Moise, p. 211) But at the same time, by campaigning with slogans like “I will not send American boys to fight a war Asian boys should be fighting”, he disguised his real designs from his Democratic base. (Goldstein, p. 129)

    Sticking with his plan, Johnson took out the target list prepared by NSAM 288. He ordered air strikes that very day. But before the planes actually hit their targets, Johnson went on national television to announce the retaliation late on the night of August 4th. This alerted the North Vietnamese anti-aircraft batteries. So in the wee hours of August 5th, two pilots were shot down. (ibid, p. 219) But in another sense, the air strikes did the trick. Johnson’s approval ratings on his handling of the war went up drastically. (ibid p. 226) Afterwards, Johnson continued to deceive congress. He told Sen. William Fulbright that OPLAN 34A was a South Vietnamese operation. ( ibid p. 227) The Tonkin Gulf resolution was passed by both houses, almost unanimously. The whole idea in ramming it through was to change the outline of the event from a provocation by the US into America being a victim of North Vietnamese aggression.

    On August 7th, LBJ sent a message to Maxwell Taylor. He wanted a whole gamut of possible operations presented to him for direct American attacks against the North. This was received in the White House two days later. The target date for a systematic bombing campaign against the North was set for January of 1965. (Moise, p. 244) As we will see, Johnson missed this target by one month.

    After Johnson ordered the reprisal bombing for the non-existent second attack, the government of North Vietnam met. They decided that direct American military intervention in the South was on its way. They also concluded that a continuous bombing campaign was also probable. They decided the public had to be made aware of the coming onslaught. In September, they also began to send the first North Vietnamese regulars down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. (Moise, p. 251)

    All the above was made possible by the alterations in NSAM 273, which Johnson made four days after Kennedy was killed. In other words, LBJ was going to war over one bullet in a destroyer’s hull.

    V

    The last part of Lessons in Disaster describes Bundy’s slightly less than two years in the White House as Johnson implemented his plan to Americanize the war. If ever there was a case for dramatizing John Newman’s axiom about 1964, it is in these pages. Newman said that Kennedy was using the 1964 election to disguise his withdrawal plan; Johnson used the election to disguise his intervention plan. In fact LBJ had once said, Vietnam could not be lost before the election, but it also could not blossom into an all-out war before it either. (Goldstein, p. 133) In fact, CIA analyst Ray Cline had told Bundy that if America waited to intervene until after the election, it would still allow time to save the day. (ibid pgs. 136-37)

    For this book, Bundy threw himself into a review of Vietnam policy, especially under Johnson. The State Department had issued a report saying that a sustained aerial war would not be effective there. And it would not stop Hanoi from aiding the Viet Cong. Bundy ignored these warnings. He favored an air campaign. So did Max Taylor. LBJ disagreed. He told Taylor, “I have never felt this war will be won from the air, and it seems to me that what is much more needed and would be more effective is larger and stronger use of Rangers, and Special Forces, and Marines, or other appropriate military strength on the ground and on the scene.” (ibid, p. 151) Gen. William Westmoreland, the commander in South Vietnam, also agreed in a ground war. In February of 1965, Bundy was touring the country. The Viet Cong attacked an officers HQ in Pleiku, where several Americans were killed and even more injured. Bundy recommended air strikes in retaliation. When Bundy got back to Washington, he asked Johnson about his recommendation. LBJ replied, “Well, isn’t that all decided?” (ibid p. 158) And it had been. Operation Flaming Dart quickly escalated into Rolling Thunder, the greatest aerial bombardment campaign the world had ever seen. Johnson wanted Eisenhower’s approval for it first. He got it in spades. Eisenhower even recommended tactical nukes if necessary. (p. 161) The Domino Theory was quite powerful.

    The only person actually arguing with Johnson, in both public and private, was Vice-President Hubert Humphrey. When he addressed a long memo to Johnson arguing against escalation on quite practical grounds e.g. the instability of the South Vietnamese government, LBJ went ballistic. He barred him from any future meetings on Vietnam, and actually wanted surveillance put on him to see who he was talking to. (p. 162)

    Once the air war escalated, Westmoreland argued for troops to protect the air base at Da Nang. Interestingly, Taylor argued against it since it would break the line in the sand that Kennedy had drawn. (p. 163) LBJ sided with Westmoreland. And the first American combat troops arrived in Vietnam in March of 1965. Within two months of his inauguration, Johnson had begun both the air and land war he had been planning for over a year.

    Johnson’s next step was to ask the Secretary of the Army how many troops it would take to win the war. The response was 500,000 men and at least five years, probably more. (p. 165) On April 1st, just three weeks after the Da Nang landing, Johnson began to pour in the combat troops he felt he needed to win. The first contingent was of 20,000 men, and LBJ specifically changed their mission from base protection to offensive operations. By April 20th, Westmoreland was asking for an increase to 82,000 troops. He got them. (p. 171) At this point, Taylor understood what Johnson’s aim was: He was going to give the military all the men it needed as fast as possible to win the war. He was right. Westmoreland asked for more combat troops on June 7th. He got 42,000 more. He then asked for 52,000 after that. He got them also. By the end of 1965, Johnson’s first 11 months in office, there were over 175,000 combat troops in Vietnam. Under Kennedy there had been none.

    Bundy understood by the end of 1965 that Westmoreland was committed to a war of attrition. He felt he did not do enough analysis of what the war was devolving into. He didn’t press the story of what the real prospects for success were. He didn’t measure the strengths and weaknesses of each side. He didn’t ask: What kind of war will this be?, or How many losses will we sustain? (pgs. 178, 182) He had become a staff officer aiding his commander instead of a detached analyst measuring options in advance and giving the president the ups and downs of each option he takes. He felt that one of his greatest failures was that he never commissioned a detailed study as to what it would cost the USA in every aspect to completely secure South Vietnam. He failed to do this because he was initially in favor of intervention. He later told Goldstein that it was a serious error and he failed to ever address it. (p. 185) Bundy felt that another failure of his was that he did not understand that in this kind of war, numerical success did not equal military victory. Therefore Westmoreland’s famous “body count” tally was not a good barometer of how the war was actually progressing. (p. 188) The incredible thing was that the worse it got, the more people like Eisenhower and Rusk urged Johnson on. And the more troops LBJ committed. But yet, Westmoreland wanted still more. By the second half of 1965, he wanted a doubling of the troop commitment, and a tripling of the air war. (pgs. 201-202) This is where Bundy and Johnson began to part company. Another issue where they parted was on how much to tell the American public. Bundy thought Johnson had to sell the war more to keep America committed. Johnson wanted to keep it low profile. (p. 198)

    But there was something else that bothered Bundy about Johnson’s constant escalation. That’s because he found out the reason the military always got what they wanted. It was because the White House debates were nothing but a piece of choreographed stagecraft. The director being Lyndon Johnson, on instructions from Westmoreland. Bundy discovered that Westmoreland had a secret telegram channel to Johnson. Through this he would make a request, and Johnson would then OK it. It was at this point that LBJ would call the meeting on the requested escalation—after it had been approved. (pgs. 214-15) It was all meant to give people like him the feeling that they had a say in the decision, when they really did not. The decision was a fait accompli.

    Bundy felt that both he and Johnson got caught up in the whole war of attrition fallacy: That even if they achieved only a stalemate, that was better than losing because it would show the world the USA was not a paper tiger. (pgs. 221-222) This was the level of sophistication that was guiding the decisions of this great epic tragedy by the end of 1965.

    After it was all over, and the recriminations and many books had been written about it, Bundy decided to look back on his role in the debacle. One of the first books he read was David Halberstams’s The Best and the Brightest. A book in which he figured prominently. Although he thought it was an entertaining and informative read, he concluded that the central thesis was just wrong. (pgs. 148-49) It was not the advisers—the best and brightest—who did the staff work who got us into the Vietnam War. It was the difference in the men who occupied the Oval Office. It was the difference between Kennedy and Johnson.

    And with that, Lessons in Disaster joins a growing list of books that now almost fill up a shelf. In fact, we have now had two in the last year: Goldstein’s and Virtual JFK. It’s a shame it took so long for the truth to arrive. But finally, as Michael Morrissey wrote years ago, the second biggest lie about Kennedy’s assassination can be laid to rest.

  • James Blight, Virtual JFK (Part 2)


    Virtual JFK:  Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived


    Part One of this essay reviews the film accompanying this book, which has the same title.

    Part Three, Virtual JFK 3: Gordon Goldstein’s Lessons in Disaster


    See the Virtual JFK web site.


    It’s not possible for me to make a joke about the death of John F. Kennedy.

    —Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.


    This Vonnegut quote appears on the first page of Virtual JFK. It was a good signal for me. One of the things it conveyed was that finally, after so many years, the mainstream academic community was going to seriously look at a painful but glaring question: If President Kennedy had lived, would he have withdrawn from Vietnam and not have Americanized that war?

    In 2005, a little less than twenty scholars and former policy makers gathered at a place called the Musgrove Conference Center at St. Simons Island, Georgia. The subject was this very question. All of those involved had a distinct interest in either the Kennedy presidency, the Johnson presidency, or the Vietnam War. Many of them had studied all three. To give you an idea of who was there let me mention who several of the attendees were. Jamie Galbraith is the son of one of Kennedy’s chief advisers and confidantes, John Kenneth Galbraith. He is a Professor of Government and Business relations at the University of Texas at Austin. Inspired by what his father told him about Kennedy and Vietnam, he has been an intelligent, articulate, and authoritative proponent of Kennedy’s desire to withdraw all forces by 1965. Frederick Logevall is a Professor of History at Cornell who in 1999 wrote an extraordinary volume called Choosing War. This was an exhaustive study of Johnson’s decision making from Kennedy’s death until the great escalations of 1965 and beyond. A rather surprising revelation of the book was that, far from stumbling errantly into a colossal debacle, Johnson fully understood and measured what the potential costs in blood and treasure would be. His generals told him in 1965 that the conflict in Vietnam would take 500,000 troops to fight and would last anywhere from five to twenty years. Johnson gave the military 538,000 troops and much more. Chester Cooper was an assistant to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and later worked for Asst. Secretary of State Averill Harriman. He was closely involved in the formation of Vietnam policy under both men and under both presidents. Tom Hughes worked for Chester Bowles, a chief Kennedy adviser during the campaign of 1960. Once Kennedy was elected, Hughes worked first for Bowles and then succeeded Roger Hilsman as director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department. He stayed there for the great escalations of 1965-68. Another policy-maker in attendance was Bill Moyers. Moyers first worked for Lyndon Johnson on his senatorial staff. He then worked for JFK as Deputy Director of the Peace Corps. When Kennedy was killed, he reverted back to being an advisor for Johnson and then rose to Press Secretary. He parted ways with LBJ over Vietnam and left the White House in 1966.

    The point is made. It’s an impressive yet relatively mainstream roster. Some of the other participants are Frances Fitzgerald, author of the Pulitzer Prize winning book about America in Vietnam, Fire in the Lake; Tim Naftali, co-author of One Hell of a Gamble, a history of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Russian viewpoint; and Marilyn Young, Professor of History at NYU and author of The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990. The three people who essentially arranged and ran the conference were David Welch, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto; Janet Lang an associate professor at the Watson Institute, and last but not least, James Blight a Professor of International Relations at Brown. Blight has been part of a few books on the Kennedy presidency, especially dealing with the Missile Crisis.

    They have made an interesting volume. It’s uneven, and in the purest sense, not really a book. But it’s interesting, even compelling, nevertheless. When I say it is not really a book, what I mean is that it is more an oral history plus a document annex. But since the discussions are footnoted, the oral history has a real basis in fact. And since all the participants were issued a thousand page briefing book of the most currently declassified documents on the Vietnam War, most of the discussion is state of the art. Further, the conference organizers arranged for audiotapes to be piped into the room so that the latest declassified phone calls and taped meetings could be heard too. Blight did his homework well. Many of the things that I talked about that were missing from the film of the same name, do appear here. And to say the least, the document annex is quite forceful. A matter I will get to later.

    The conference lasted for two days. And the discussion centered on whether or not there was continuity or breakage between Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Vietnam policy. The book acknowledges the fact that, as John Newman noted in Vietnam: The Early Decisions (edited by Lloyd Gardner and Ted Gittinger), the myth of continuity has been chiefly maintained by prominent mainstream academics. (p. 158) So this conference was a milestone in that regard. It was precipitated by the influence of Newman’s compelling and fully documented 1992 book, JFK and Vietnam. (Newman is mentioned at several points in the discussion.) Prior to that volume some writers had talked about this breakage in policy. But it had been sporadic, the evidence mostly anecdotal, and not really sustained. In fact all the material I could summon for my first book Destiny Betrayed, could not even flesh out a moderately sized book. To give these people their due though, they included Roger Hilsman in To Move a Nation, Ted Sorenson in his book Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger in his long biography Robert Kennedy and His Times, Ralph Martin in A Hero for our Time, and Dave Powers and Ken O’Donnell in Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye. The last is the most interesting. Although it was published in 1972, the same year as David Halberstam’s best-selling The Best and the Brightest, it took serious issue with that standard reference book which argued for continuity. It went on for several pages (pgs. 13-18, 442-444), sternly denying there was any continuity at all. Actually taking issue at one point with proclamations made by Johnson in his memoirs. (This is a theme, Johnson’s attempt to rewrite the record, that I will take up later.) Like Newman would argue in 1992, that book said that Kennedy had decided not to commit combat troops to Vietnam as early as 1961. They based this on two long discussions Kennedy had on the issue with French Premier Charles DeGaulle and General Douglas MacArthur.

    In another form, the two authors who wrote about this subject in essays prior to Newman were Fletcher Prouty and Peter Dale Scott. Scott based most of his work on the Pentagon Papers. Prouty worked from that, plus his own experience inside the Pentagon. He wrote about Kennedy’s plans to withdraw in his fine book The Secret Team (pgs. 401-416), and in a short essay in High Treason (466-473). Scott wrote two interesting essays on the subject. One was originally published in Ramparts and the other in the Gravel edition of the Pentagon Papers.

    But, as I said, John Newman’s book went much further than any of the above. So much further, that the publisher ditched the book. As Galbraith writes in his fine 2003 essay in Boston Review, 32,000 copies of JFK and Vietnam were initially printed in 1992. After 10,000 were sold, Warner Books ceased selling the hardcover. Even though the book had high visibility because of Oliver Stone’s film JFK, the company never spent anything on promoting the book. Incredibly it was never reprinted in trade paperback. When Newman complained about this in 1993, the company quietly returned his rights. But in spite of this, because the book was so well-documented, contained so much new material, and was so convincing in its argument, it has had a strong influence with both public opinion and with scholars.

    Let me note an important point here in order to give Newman’s book its full due. Even though the books and essays noted above had interesting snippets of information, and Scott and Prouty had serious arguments to make, their cumulative impact was minimal. Outside of those interested in President Kennedy’s assassination, and to a lesser degree, his short presidency, they made the briefest of ripples into the general public, the mainstream press, or the halls of academia. The double impact of the film JFK plus the publication of Newman’s book had the effect of a shotgun blast at close range. Newman had labored over his book for ten years. Completely by coincidence, it was being finished at the time Oliver Stone was filming his movie of Jim Garrison’s book On the Trail of the Assassins. And it fit in perfectly with the film because this is something that Garrison sincerely believed in at the time of his prosecution of Clay Shaw. (He had garnered this from things like the Sorenson book plus another source that I will reveal in Part Five of my review of Reclaiming History, which discusses Vincent Bugliosi’s treatment of both Garrison and Stone.) So in the immense controversy that followed the film—and actually preceded it—Newman’s book figured prominently. For instance, when it came out in 1992, Arthur Schlesinger reviewed it on the front page of the New York Times Book Review.

    After the controversy subsided, Newman’s book began to have an impact in academia. The reason it took awhile is because his book absolutely humiliated many of the previous standard bearers in the Vietnam field. Like say Halberstam, and Stanley Karnow, and William Conrad Gibbons. The book was so clear and logically argued that the question became: How could all of these so called “scholars” have acted like lemmings and missed this easily delineated dividing line? In the aforementioned Gardner book, Newman states that the underlying tow is the collective attempt to deny that the Vietnam War was, contrary to popular belief, not an inevitable tragedy. (p. 158) That who actually occupies the Oval Office does make a difference. (p. 159) And Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived furthers this argument substantially. Once an historical paradigm is set, it is very difficult to surmount it. Even if it is wrong. That’s because, contrary to popular belief, there is strong pressure in the academic world not to rock the boat, not to break out of preconceived paradigms. That is, to become part of the Establishment. Much of this comes down through the influence of foundations, conservative think tanks, and of course, the CIA’s influence on campus. Two men written about in Probe previously, Thomas Reeves and Max Holland, are good examples of this.

    But, for reasons stated above, JFK and Vietnam could not be denied. Slowly but surely it began to turn the paradigm around. The shocking thing about the book is that, not only did it enrage the conservatives; it also infuriated the so-called Leftist leaders at the time, namely Alexander Cockburn and Noam Chomsky. Galbraith’s 2003 article in Boston Review, using the since declassified record, negates the rather silly arguments of both polemicists. (And I will detail this further in Part Five of the Bugliosi review.) And the great triumph of Newman ‘s work is that the documents declassified by the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) only fortify what he wrote. Because of that, other historians who wrote after him, followed in his footsteps: LBJ broke with Kennedy’s policies on Vietnam. This included David Kaiser in American Tragedy, Robert Dallek in An Unfinished Life, and Howard Jones in Death of a Generation. Two other books which should be mentioned in this regard which favor Kennedy not Americanizing the war, but are more equivocal in their judgments, are the works of the aforementioned Logevall and Lawrence Freedman’s ironically titled Kennedy’s Wars. (I say “ironically” because the book comes to the conclusion that Kennedy was determined not to get involved in any wars.)

    II

    This book takes a leap forward. Because at the end of the conference a vote was taken on whether, if he had lived, Kennedy would have Americanized the war. Half the respondents said he would not have and would have withdrawn. Thirty percent said he would have escalated as Johnson did. And twenty percent said it was too difficult to say. (p. 210)

    Let me add here, the discussion of the issue is quite wide ranging. As the film did, the book takes in the other opportunities Kennedy had to get involved in wars, which he refused to do. The authors put great weight on Kennedy’s acceptance of failure at the Bay of Pigs rather than sending in American forces, which Admiral Arleigh Burke wanted him to do. As many commentators do, including myself, they see this as a defining moment in President Kennedy’s presidency. In the document section of the book, they print three memoranda that depict Kennedy’s reaction to the disaster he was led into by the CIA. Clearly, Kennedy went through a definite pattern after the Bay of Pigs: shock and dismay at his advisers, feedback as to what exactly had gone wrong, and how the debacle had now placed America in the eyes of its trusted allies abroad. In other words, he grew from the experience. And the book also notes briefly, the two reports that were issued as a result of the Bay of Pigs: the presidentially commissioned Taylor Report, and the internal CIA report by Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick. Both of the reports concluded that the operation was poorly planned and weakly reviewed. As writers like Paul Fay have noted, Kennedy vowed that he would never again accept the advice of his CIA and Pentagon advisers without grilling them at length and in depth.

    What is important about this episode is that it occurs just seven months prior to the first dramatic milestone in Kennedy’s conduct of the Vietnam War. In the fall of 1961, Maxwell Taylor and assistant National Security Adviser Walt Rostow went to Vietnam. They then delivered a report to Kennedy in late October. The recommendation was that, since the Viet Cong were gaining strength and Ngo Dinh Diem’s position was weakening, the time had come for the USA to commit combat troops to the conflict. The debate on this issue lasted for over two weeks. It appears that the only person resisting the siren song of direct military intervention was President Kennedy. One of the real valued documents included in the book is what is probably the only set of notes taken on this debate. They are by White House military aide Col. Howard Burris (pgs 282-283). They deserve to be summarized and paraphrased at length. Here is the gist of it:

    Kennedy stated that Vietnam is not a clear-cut case of aggression as it was in Korea. He says that the conflict in Vietnam is “more obscure and less flagrant.” Kennedy notes that in a situation such as Vietnam, allies are needed even more since the USA would be subject to intense criticism from abroad. He compared the record of the past, where the Vietnamese had resisted foreign forces who had spent millions against them with no success. He then compared the situation in Berlin with Vietnam, saying that in Berlin you had a well-defined conflict whereas the Vietnam situation was obscure. So obscure that you might soon even have Democrats in his own party bewildered by it. Especially since you would largely be fighting a guerilla force, and “sometimes in a phantom-like fashion.” Kennedy said that because of this, the base of operations for American troops would be insecure. At the end of the discussion Kennedy turned the conversation to what would be done next in Vietnam, “rather than whether or not the US would become involved.” I should add, during the talk, Kennedy turned aside attempts by Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Lyman Lemnitzer to derail his thought process. Kennedy had learned his lesson well.

    One of the most important discoveries in the volume is that in the mid-nineties, National Security Advisor Bundy had decided to write a book about his experience with Kennedy and Johnson over Vietnam. His co-author on that endeavor was at the Musgrove Conference. His name is Gordon Goldstein. The two had worked on the book for two years. But Bundy unfortunately passed away in 1996 before it was finished. Goldstein says that one of the great surprises he had in working on the book was that Bundy had virtually no memory of the debate in November of 1961. (p. 76) In fact, Goldstein says that Bundy was actually surprised at 1.) How hawkish he was in the 1961 debate, and 2.) How resistant at all costs Kennedy was. At this time, Bundy actually wrote a memo to Kennedy in which he recommended a force of 25,000 troops be sent because South Vietnam actually wants to be part of the USA! (pgs 280-281) How resistant was Kennedy to all this? When General Max Taylor tried to sneak 8,000 combat troops in for “flood relief” purposes, Kennedy consulted with an agriculture expert to prove you didn’t need them for that purpose. (p. 77) After two years of delving into the record, Bundy had come to the conclusion that Kennedy would not have committed combat troops to Vietnam. As he told Goldstein: “Kennedy very definitely was not going to Americanize the war in Vietnam; and Lyndon Johnson very definitely, from the moment he succeeded Kennedy was going to do whatever it took to win the war in Vietnam, including sending US combat forces in large numbers … ” (p. 53, emphasis added. The phrase in italics is a key point I will return to later.) This now makes it unanimous. The three men in closest proximity to Kennedy concerning military strategy are now on record as saying that Kennedy was not going to commit troops to Vietnam: McNamara in his book In Retrospect, Taylor (pgs. 357, 365), and now Bundy.

    Another point the book makes is that it nails Walt Rostow. As I said, Rostow accompanied Taylor on the Vietnam trip of 1961. Rostow was one of the biggest hawks in the White House up until Kennedy’s 11/61 decision to increase the advisors but not to send in combat troops. This decision was memorialized in NSAM 111, in late November of 1961. Right after this, Kennedy got so tired of Rostow’s memoranda suggesting further American commitment to Vietnam-like invading the north with a million man US army—that he took him out of the White House and placed him in the Policy Planning Department of the State Department. (p. 182) Now, Rostow writes his myriad hawkish memos for Rusk to read. And they seem to have had an effect. Because when Johnson took over, Rusk now became a real hawk on the war. (p. 154) But further, when Bundy decided to resign as National Security Advisor, he suggested two men to replace him: Thomas Hughes or Moyers. Johnson rejected them both. He placed Walt Rostow in the job. Johnson had to have known what he was getting with Rostow. Because he was around for the debates of November of 1961. He knew that the Taylor-Rostow Report recommended American combat troops. He had to have known that Kennedy argued eloquently and soundly against the commitment of combat troops. After all, Howard Burris, the man who wrote the memo containing Kennedy’s arguments—which I quoted from above—was working for Johnson. So when LBJ rescued Rostow from his figurative Siberia in the State Department, he knew what he was getting. And he would have recalled him only if he knew that Rostow’s agenda coincided with his own. Which was to escalate the war. (p. 175) In fact, when Rostow was appointed National Security Advisor, he told Johnson about Kennedy’s “deep commitment to the independence of Vietnam from which he would not have retreated.” (p. 152) According to Chester Cooper, Rostow looked upon negotiations as tantamount to surrender. Rostow wanted a simple goal: an independent South Vietnam. By 1965-66, the actual goal of both Johnson and Rostow was this: “Bringing the Vietnamese communists to their knees via continuously escalating the level of punishment they received from US air and ground forces until the communists gave up.” (p. 179) This was nothing but a delusional fantasy. And Kennedy understood this in 1961 from 1.) His visits to Vietnam during the French imperialist war there in the fifties, 2.) Through his talks with MacArthur, and 3.) His conversations with DeGaulle.

    After this November 1961 decision and the reassignment of Rostow, Kennedy went to Seattle and made a speech. This is the day after NSAM 111 is signed. He talked about how America had to be cautious on the world stage because any crisis might escalate into a catastrophic nuclear war. He specifically mentioned how the massive amount of US firepower could be rendered useless by guerilla warfare and infiltration. He then added that although the US could ship arms abroad, it was up to those peoples to use them correctly and for the right ideals. We could not impose our will on others, and there could not be “an American solution to every problem.” (pgs. 287-288) These were wise and prophetic words, which Rostow and Johnson did not understand or even wish to comprehend.

    III

    One of the most fascinating parts of the book is the discussion of the role of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in Kennedy’s administration. When Kennedy sent Rostow and Taylor to Vietnam in the fall of 1961, he seems to have understood what they would come back with. After all, JFK fully comprehended what Rostow was about pretty quickly. What I will discuss next reveals just how wise Kennedy had become and how smart he was at maneuvering the people in his own Cabinet after the Bay of Pigs. Almost concurrently with the trip by Rostow and Taylor, he also sent John Kenneth Galbraith to Vietnam. (p.129) He realized that what Galbraith wrote up would counter the Rostow-Taylor recommendations. It did of course. But Kennedy did not throw this report out for open discussion. He told Galbraith to give it to McNamara only. This becomes crucial in any discussion of Vietnam in the JFK administration. Because as the book notes, after the issuance of NSAM 111, the only person in the Cabinet who seems to understand what Kennedy is headed for is McNamara. And in fact, Howard Jones discovered that Roswell Gilpatric, McNamara’s Deputy Secretary, talked about the fact that Kennedy eventually entrusted his boss with putting together a withdrawal plan. He referred to it as “part of a plan the president asked him [McNamara] to develop to unwind this whole thing.” (p. 371) This began in earnest in 1962 when McNamara went to the Joint Chiefs and told them to put together a plan for withdrawal. As Jim Douglass wrote in his fine book JFK and the Unspeakable, the Chiefs dragged their feet on this one for a year. Finally at the so-called SecDef conference of May 1963, they presented a plan to the Secretary. He criticized it as being too slow. (pgs 288-291) After telling them to hurry it along, he had a taped conversation with Kennedy and Bundy in October of 1963. He told Kennedy the military mission of the US would be completed by 1965, and if it were not, the South Vietnamese would be ready by then to take it over. Bundy then interjects, “What’s the point of doing that?” McNamara replies, “We need a way to get out of Vietnam. This is a way of doing it. And to leave forces there when they’re not needed, I think is wasteful and complicates both their problem and ours.”

    The above ARRB declassified tape was heard and shown on screen in the accompanying film to this book. When played at the conference its effect was startling. (pgs 100, 124) Why? Because mainstream writers like Karnow and Halberstam had always depicted Vietnam as McNamara’s War. Plus much of the documentation showing this as false had been concealed from the public. In fact, Goldstein actually asked, “Who is the Robert McNamara on these tapes?” To me the comment by Bundy—”What’s the point of doing that?”—is the key. As Gilpatric explained, and Galbraith elucidated, McNamara was appointed by JFK to be his point man on the withdrawal. He was going to drive it home with occasional encouragement from Kennedy. This “back channel” idea was endorsed by James Galbraith, who talked about it with his father. John Kenneth Galbraith told his son that JFK often operated like this. In James Galbraith’s words about McNamara at the conference: “Kennedy and he [McNamara] were agreed in advance that this was the course of policy they were going to follow. That was a position they didn’t share … with virtually no one else. They then imposed this, with McNamara playing the role of giving the argument he already knows Kennedy is going to accept, because Kennedy told him to do it.” (p. 129) This concept was posthumously endorsed through Bundy. When co-author Goldstein talked to Bundy about why McNamara switched so quickly from endorsing combat troops in November of 1961 to being so dovish a month later, Bundy said there was only one answer to explain the apparent paradox. Kennedy had asked him to do so. (p. 125) In fact, McNamara was so immersed in making the withdrawal plan work that he asked the State Department intelligence group (INR) to give him more optimistic scenarios of what was happening on the ground. (p. 117) According to Newman, this was probably done because once the CIA and Pentagon realized Kennedy was going to withdraw, they began to change their intelligence estimates from rosy to pessimistic. And further, they backdated the revisions to July of 1963. (Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 425, 441 Gardner and Gittinger, p. 172) Realizing Kennedy’s plan to use the false and rosy estimates to hoist them on their own petard—that is, to withdraw US forces since they were not needed anymore—the CIA and Pentagon began to fight back.

    What this all says of course is that, as in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy understood that his Cabinet and military advisers were not giving him what he wanted fast enough. In October of 1962, he worked secretly through his brother Robert Kennedy, and to a lesser extent with Rusk. This time around he worked with McNamara, and to a lesser extent with Galbraith. With McNamara running interference, NSAM 263, ordering the withdrawal of the first thousand advisers from Vietnam was signed in October of 1963. (It should be added here that the death of the Nhu brothers in November of 1963 had no effect on the withdrawal plan. See page 372) The press release that announced NSAM 263 also stated that this first thousand troop draw down was part of a phased withdrawal of the major part of all US forces. And that withdrawal would be completed by the end of 1965. (p. 300)

    Finally, when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Max Taylor wrote his memo on NSAM 263 to the service Chiefs, there was no mention about the withdrawal being contingent upon victory. (pgs 106, 110) This is a myth promulgated by anti-Kennedy polemicist Noam Chomsky. Virtually no one at this conference bought it.

    IV

    Ever since the portrayal of Lyndon Johnson’s role in the escalation of the Vietnam War was dramatically depicted in Oliver Stone’s film JFK, there has been an attempt by some e.g. Michael Beschloss and Vincent Bugliosi, to soften that image. What these two try to say is that Johnson was a reluctant warrior who was manipulated by others into plunging America into an epic tragedy that needlessly consumed the lives of over 58,000 Americans and two million Vietnamese. In other words Stone and John Newman (who served as a consultant on the film) got it wrong. They unfairly distorted what Johnson’s real role was in this affair. What this book shows, and with utter finality, is this: it is Beschloss and Bugliosi who have it wrong. If anything, Stone and Newman were being kind to Johnson. The reality is actually worse. And the recall of Walt Rostow to commandeer the escalation is only part of it. The book brings in a new angle: Johnson understood that he was breaking with Kennedy’s policy, and he consciously tried to cover his tracks.

    The story begins with the alterations in NSAM 273. This was the rough draft of a presidential order as assembled by Kennedy’s advisers in Hawaii just prior to Kennedy’s trip to Dallas. The conference there was meant to make any necessary adjustments to Vietnam policy after the death of the Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother. Because of his murder in Dallas, the rough draft of this order, actually written by Bundy, was never signed by President Kennedy. The opening of the draft said that the US mission was still to assist the Government of South Vietnam against the Communist insurgency. It also mentioned that the US intended to withdraw as made clear by the White House announcement of October. Paragraph seven stated that there should be actions against North Vietnam using South Vietnamese resources, especially sea resources. (Newman, p. 440, emphasis added)

    At Johnson’s first Vietnam meeting on November 24, 1963 there was a quite different tone and attitude than anything Kennedy had said with his Cabinet. The new president stated clearly, “I am not going to lose Vietnam. I am not going to be the president who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went.” He ordered South Vietnamese Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to “tell the generals in Saigon that Lyndon Johnson intends to stand by our word.” (Newman, p. 442) This is rather an odd thing to say. Because the word prior to Dallas was that the USA was intending to withdraw and turn the war over to South Vietnam. Johnson then said that he was unhappy with our emphasis on social reforms, he had little tolerance for the US trying to be “do-gooders”. (ibid, p. 443) He then added that he had “never been happy with our operations in Vietnam.” (ibid) His intent was clear: it was to win the war. (McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 102) He then issued a stern warning: He wanted no more dissension or division over policy. Any person that did not conform would be removed. (This would later be demonstrated by his banning of Hubert Humphrey from Vietnam meetings when Humphrey advised Johnson to rethink his policy of military commitment to Vietnam.) When the meeting was over, Bill Moyers remained in the room with Johnson. LBJ said, “So they’ll think with Kennedy dead we’ve lost heart … they’ll think we’re yellow …” Moyers asked whom he was referring to. Johnson replied the Chinese and the Russians. Moyers asked his boss what he was going to do now. Johnson said he was going to give the generals what they wanted, more money. LBJ continued by saying that he was not going to let Vietnam slip away like China did. He was going to tell those generals in Saigon “to get off their butts and get out in those jungles and whip the hell out of some Communists.” (Newsweek, 2/10/75)

    It’s hard to believe, but it is imperative to remember: this is just 48 hours after Kennedy’s death. As the book notes, Johnson’s presidential style was completely different from Kennedy’s. And it locked him into his blinkered view of Vietnam. He tended to personalize the war. He was intolerant of dissent. He wanted to intimidate the opposition. Both in the White House, and on the battlefield. (p. 192) By the summer of 1965, Johnson had so cowed any dissent within his Cabinet that after he had already committed 85,000 combat troops to Vietnam, Gen Westmoreland actually requested another 85,000. LBJ called for a meeting and asked for a vote. The minutes of this meeting end with: “There was no response when the president asked whether anyone in the room opposed the course of action decided upon.” (p. 193) Westmoreland got his troops.

    This drastic change in tone accomplished two things. First, it gave the signal to the hawks and closet hawks that, unlike with JFK, they would now have Johnson’s ear. Secondly, the altered intelligence reports about the declining fortunes on the battlefield would now have their intended effect. Bundy now changed the rough draft of NSAM 273 in accordance with Johnson’s “stronger views on the war”. (Newman, p. 445) First, in keeping with Johnson’s “no dissension or division” reprimand, the new NSAM expressly forbade any public criticisms of the war effort. Second, paragraph seven about South Vietnamese operations against the north was rewritten. And it was rewritten in a way that allowed the US to participate in these covert operations against North Vietnam. (ibid, p. 446) Thus began OPLAN 34A, which was submitted to Johnson less than a month later. Johnson approved it on January 16, 1964. This resulted in Operation DESOTO, consisting of US maritime patrols acquiring visual, electronic, and photographic intelligence in the Tonkin Gulf. These patrols began on February 28, 1964. In early August, the second patrol resulted in the North Vietnamese attack on the US destroyer Maddox. And this opened the door to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which Johnson vigorously pursued as his approval to begin the US air war against North Vietnam. And these first air strikes were considered by Ho Chi Minh to be acts of war by the USA. (p. 162) As the air war intensified—eventually turning into the colossal Operation Rolling Thunder—the US needed protection for the air bases being built. So in early March of 1965, just seven months after the Maddox incident, the first US combat troops arrived in South Vietnam. And 1965 was the year Kennedy had intended to complete his withdrawal plan—after he was reelected. Johnson did the opposite. He inserted combat troops after his reelection. As Newman notes in JFK and Vietnam, the November 1964 election was used by Kennedy to disguise a withdrawal. Johnson used it to disguise his plan for intervention. (Newman, p. 442) In fact, Johnson essentially said this to the Joint Chiefs in December of 1963. He told them at a Christmas party, “Just get me elected, and then you can have your war.” (Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, p. 326)

    V

    Much of the above is taken from Newman’s 1992 book. In working with John after meeting him in 1993, he told me that one of the problems he had in writing JFK and Vietnam was that the CIA eventually found out what he was doing. And they would visit archival institutions—like the Hoover Institute at Stanford—and remove certain things in advance.

    This problem was alleviated by the arrival of the ARRB. I say alleviated. It was not completely cured. For instance, although the ARRB interviewed several people who attended the Honolulu Conference of November 1963, none of them could produce the stenographic record of the meeting. In late 1997, the Board released the records of the SecDef Conference in May of 1963. This was McNamara’s meeting with his Vietnam advisers in Hawaii. Clearly, at this meeting, McNamara is hurrying the withdrawal plan. And as I wrote in Probe, (Vol. 5 No. 3) “On page after page of these documents, at every upper level of the Pentagon, everyone seems aware that Kennedy’s withdrawal plan will begin in December of 1963 … and this would be the beginning of an eventual complete withdrawal by 1965.” (p. 19) How clear was the message McNamara was carrying for Kennedy? General Earle Wheeler wrote, “that proposals for overt action invited a negative PRESIDENTIAL decision.” (ibid, capitals in original) Compare this to Johnson’s telling the generals to get off their butts and whip hell out of some communists. Also, in the November 26th version of NSAM 273, Johnson ordered “intensified operations against North Vietnam” both overt and covert, covering “the full spectrum of sabotage, psychological and raiding activity.” Further, the intensified operations were also against the country of Laos. These operations could now be made without clearance from the State Department. Concerning Cambodia, the new order was to show that charges of US clandestine operations against that country were groundless—which they were not—with no actual measures taken to show they were. (ibid) The entry into Laos and Cambodia were also added by LBJ and Bundy and were definitely alterations of Kennedy’s policies.

    But Virtual JFK: Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived goes even further in this regard. At the 11/24 Cabinet meeting mentioned above, McNamara must have gotten the message that the withdrawal plan was now in the crosshairs of a newly hawkish president. And this surely must have been even more evident when Bundy made the appropriate alterations to NSAM 273 that Johnson desired. But in a newly declassified phone call of 2/20/64 the point that there was a new sheriff in town was hammered home. Johnson told McNamara “I always thought it was foolish for you to make any statements about withdrawing. I thought it was bad psychologically. But you and the president thought otherwise, and I just sat silent.” (p. 310) This is stunning. It clearly denotes that Johnson was aware of what Kennedy was planning. And that he was planning it through McNamara. Further, that he was so opposed to it that he thought it was “foolish”. But since he was in a subordinate position he had to suffer through it. But now he was subordinate no more. And now he was telling the guy who he knew was running the withdrawal plan that it was over.

    In another conversation, less than two weeks later, he actually makes McNamara take back what he said in 1963 about the initial thousand-man withdrawal and the eventual complete withdrawal in 1965. He begins to formulate excuses to say that the plan didn’t really mean that “everybody comes back, that means your training ought to be in pretty good shape that time.” And then Johnson tries to soothe McNamara’s silence over this contradiction—read “lie”—by saying that there was nothing really inconsistent in these new statements he wanted McNamara to make. (ibid) LBJ is consciously breaking with Kennedy’s policy and he is getting Kennedy’s point man on board as he tries to cover his tracks. In January of 1965, Johnson continues this strategy with McNamara. Johnson calls McNamara and tells him that at a Georgetown party the Kennedy crowd had got the word out that Johnson was using CIA Director John McCone “to put the Vietnam War on Kennedy’s tomb. And I had a conspiracy going on to show that it was Kennedy’s immaturity and poor judgment that originally led us into this thing, that got us involved … And that this was my game: to lay Vietnam off onto Kennedy’s inexperience and immaturity and so forth.” (p. 306) Johnson then continues by saying that since McNamara was part of Kennedy’s administration, that he did not resent very much what was said or he would have spoken up. (ibid) Johnson later had Rostow collect all of Kennedy’s public statements supporting the war to show there was no breakage in policy between the two men. Johnson’s co-opting of McNamara was now complete. The war that was unfairly tagged as McNamara’s War was really imposed on him by Johnson.

    But even prior to these conversations, on February 3, 1964 LBJ revealed that he knew what he was going to do way before Rolling Thunder and the commitment of combat troops. In a phone call with John Knight of the Miami Herald, he said that there were three options he had. The first was to get out. But he said the dominoes would now start falling over. “And God Almighty, what they said about us leaving China would just be warming up compared to what they’d say now.” So getting out was eliminated. He then said that “you can sit down and agree to neutralize all of it. But nobody is going to neutralize North Vietnam, so that’s totally impractical.” So now, neutralization was eliminated. “And so it really boils down to … getting out or getting in.” (p. 211) Now if you compare the getting out option with the dominoes falling all over Southeast Asia , and even greater historical Red baiting than losing China, which option do you think Johnson had in mind? And further, what kind of foreign policy thinker compares losing a country the size of China with the narrow peninsula of South Vietnam? Answer: A thinker with—unlike Kennedy—no discrimination or sophistication. As Logevall notes here, Johnson was a hawk from the beginning. With him it was “We can fight them in South Vietnam, or we can fight them in San Francisco.” (p. 169)

    But it was actually even worse than that. Johnson was so shallow in his foreign policy views that he actually compared losing South Vietnam with what Neville Chamberlain did with Hitler at Munich! He actually said this to biographer Doris Kearns. (Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, p. 264) He then added, “And I knew that if we let Communist aggression succeed in taking over South Vietnam, there would follow in this country an endless national debate … that would shatter my presidency, kill my administration, and damage our democracy.” (He was exactly wrong of course. It was his prosecution of the war that destroyed his presidency.) Incredibly, he then compared the loss of China and the rise of McCarthy and the Red Scare with the loss of South Vietnam. After comparing them, he actually said the loss of the latter would be worse! “Losing the Great Society was a terrible thought, but not so terrible as the thought of being responsible for America’s losing a war to the Communists. Nothing could possibly be worse than that.” This is ignorance that is almost beyond description.

    But it is particularly stark when compared with what Bundy told Goldstein Kennedy was planning for in his second term. The goals were 1.) A reduction in East-West tensions 2.) Reduction in nuclear weapons held by the US and USSR 3.) Strict arms control, and 4.) Normalization of relations with China. (p. 227) If anyone thinks Bundy was talking through his hat, Dean Rusk vouched for the China venture.

    Further contravening Beschloss and Bugliosi, Johnson could not wait for a confirmation of the second attack on the Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin. There was real confusion about whether such an attack occurred. And it turned out that it had not. But in listening to the dialogue between Admiral Sharp, McNamara and Johnson it became clear that Sharp’s efforts to discern the truth “were gradually eclipsed by the need LBJ felt to order some kind of retaliation and to do it quickly.” (p. 379) To me, all the above is indicative of a man who has been thoroughly indoctrinated into the complete, and false, paradigm of the Cold War. As Richard Mahoney showed in JFK: Ordeal in Africa, Kennedy had not been so indoctrinated. So the agony and depression LBJ felt as the Vietnam disaster unfolded was in part because he knew there were other options he could have chosen. And unlike Kennedy, he had not. As Moyers stated, “He knew more than anyone in the room what it was going to cost him: everything, as he kept saying, was on the table. His agenda, and lives, and knowing more than anyone else, he still made the choice. It was his to make; no one made it for him.” (p. 197)

    The book is well worth buying. In my view, it closes the chapter on a debate that has been going on since 1992. As shown here, it’s a debate that should have never started.

  • James Blight, Virtual JFK (Part 1)


    Virtual JFK:  Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived


    Part Two of this essay reviews the book accompanying this film, which has the same title.

    Part Three, Virtual JFK 3: Gordon Goldstein’s Lessons in Disaster


    See the Virtual JFK web site.


    Virtual JFK: Vietnam if Kennedy Had Lived is introduced by historian James Blight as a “What if” film. That is, it tries to recast and reshape history as if some definite historical event had not happened. For example, what if Robert E. Lee had not invaded the North and met disastrous defeat at Gettysburg? What if Hitler had not overruled his generals and postponed the invasion of Russia until the next April, instead of the delayed June launch in 1941? Would world events have turned out differently?

    The film takes this point of view with President John Kennedy and the war in Vietnam. The question: If Kennedy had lived, would the Vietnam War have escalated into the colossal disaster it did under President Johnson? Director Koji Masutani and James Blight take a rather unique approach to this question. What they do is examine the number of opportunities President Kennedy had to go to war previously in his administration. They then prognosticate what he would have done in Vietnam based upon that record. Although others have done this to a limited degree, I don’t recall anyone else doing it over the expanse of time and multiplicity of instances as Blight and Masutani do here.

    The documentary begins with an aerial view over Vietnam while some statistics are shown to the viewer. They are quite familiar to anyone who has read up on this issue. There were 16,000 advisers in Vietnam during Kennedy’s last year in office. In 1968, right before the Tet Offensive, Lyndon Johnson had committed over half a million ground troops to the conflict. And the air war that raged over the country was the largest in history. Which, considering what the Allies did to Japan and Germany in 1944 and 1945, is saying something.

    From here Masutani cuts to Blight in an image that seems borrowed from Errol Morris, the godfather of the modern documentary. Blight, just about full figure, is standing in front of what looks like a huge cyclorama, which is colored a kind of liquid silver. Blight begins with an explanation of the Cold War. How the accumulation of atomic weapons precluded any direct confrontation between the USA and Russia. Therefore, the American war in Vietnam started out as a proxy war with the Russians and Chinese aiding the north and the USA helping the south. The question then becomes, how did that initial proxy confrontation turn into direct American involvement on such a massive scale? And secondly, would Kennedy have gone along with it?

    Here, Blight and Masutani begin an examination of six instances during Kennedy’s presidency. They posit each of these as incidents that Kennedy could have used as casus belli to escalate into war. In fact, Blight later adds that no other president he knows faced this many temptations in such a short period of time as President Kennedy. Which is probably true. At least I can’t think of another president who was faced with these many tension filled episodes in three years.

    The first was the Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961. Here was a poorly planned and weakly reviewed operation left over from the Eisenhower administration. CIA Director Allen Dulles and Director of Plans Richard Bissell kept the written blueprints close to the vest. To the point they would not even let JFK take them home with him. And two predictions that the CIA made to Kennedy did not come true and sealed defeat for the invaders. First, there was no general uprising on Cuba to support the exile attack. And secondly, Castro was able to get enough armor into position to stop the beachhead from forming. At this point, Blight points out something that JFK did which sealed defeat for the Cuban exile force. Admiral Arleigh Burke was off the horizon heading a Navy fleet at the time. Realizing all would be lost if the USA did not intervene, he asked Kennedy for permission to intercede. Kennedy called Burke and told him not to. He had no desire to get into a war in a tropical jungle 90 miles away from Florida. Richard Nixon, the action officer for the operation under Eisenhower told Kennedy he would intercede if it were his call. And he later snickered about JFK choosing failure.

    Blight very smartly emphasizes Kennedy’s altered demeanor after this debacle. Those close to him said Kennedy was shocked by what had happened. He would sit through meetings about it and not say anything for 45 minutes. Clearly, during those many days in his private purgatory, Kennedy was reevaluating those around him who had all endorsed the plan. This was a turning point in who he decided to trust from here on in.

    The second incident mentioned is the Laotian Crisis of 1961. This is a subject that had been relatively ignored by most historians. So I am glad it gets brought up here. The best treatment of it that I have seen is in David Kaiser’s volume American Tragedy. When Eisenhower left office, he actually told Kennedy that Laos was more important on the world stage than Vietnam. Kennedy decided to act fast on this and negotiate a settlement with the Russians. The Pathet Lao, aided by both the Soviets and North Vietnamese, was making strong progress against the anti-Communist Prince Boun Oum. In early 1961, the Pathet Lao opened a strong offensive on the Plain of Jars, which the Royal Laotian Army under General Phoumi Nosavan could not contain. Kennedy alerted the Army and Navy units in the Pacific, CinCPac, to go on alert. With this stick in hand, Kennedy then began to extend the carrot of a cease-fire. This was achieved in Geneva, with fourteen nations convening a conference in May of 1961. As Blight notes, not one American combat troop set foot in Laos.

    The third episode was the Berlin Crisis of late 1961. In the summer of 1961, the Russians and East Germans were worried about the great number of emigrants fleeing from East to West Berlin. They began to take up preparations to build the Berlin Wall. On August 13, 1961, the border between the two cities was closed. Then construction teams were sent out to start erecting the wall. On August 30th, JFK called up 148, 000 reservists. The KGB started a wide-ranging diversionary plan to stir up trouble in places like Central America and Africa. The crisis was clearly escalating into high gear. At this point, 10/22/61, Army General Lucius Clay decided to send diplomat Albert Hemsing to East Berlin to see if the Soviets and East Germans would allow him to travel into East Germany as provided for by the 1945 Potsdam Conference. They let him proceed. But the next day, a British diplomat was stopped and his passport was seized. Five days later, Clay asked Hemsing to try again. But, in advance, and without Kennedy’s permission, he sent tanks and an infantry battalion to a nearby airfield. Hemsing was allowed to proceed but the Russians now moved 33 tanks to the Brandenburg Gate. Clay’s tanks now moved opposite the Russian tanks. As the film notes, Kennedy called Clay and told him he wanted the tanks removed. Russian Premier Khrushchev and JFK now talked and decided to mutually remove the tanks. As the film notes, Kennedy ended up being grateful for the Berlin Wall. As historian John Lewis Gaddis notes, Kennedy later stated, “It’s not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war.” (The Cold War: A New History, p. 115)

    The fourth incident took place in November of 1961 and concerned a crucial tactical decision about American involvement in Vietnam. In October of 1961, there was a debate raging within the administration on whether or not to commit combat troops to South Vietnam to support the failing regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. Kennedy decided to send Gen. Maxwell Taylor and National Security Assistant Walt Rostow to Vietnam for an on the ground inspection. While there, Taylor suggested to Diem committing 8,000 US combat troops to the area. Diem enthusiastically agreed. (John Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 133) When Taylor and Rostow returned, a two week long drama was enacted over their recommendation. On November 22, 1961 Kennedy issued National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 111. It increased the number of advisers, but it committed no combat troops. And further, it made no commitment to saving South Vietnam from communism. As John Newman notes, this NSAM was a milestone in Kennedy’s Vietnam policy. First, it drew a line in the sand: Kennedy was not going to commit combat troops to the area. Even when things looked desperate and the fate of the country was in the balance. Second, learning from the Bay of Pigs, he was now more than willing to buck the opinions of both the generals and his advisers on a subject they perceived as vital to American national security. (Newman, p. 138)

    The fifth episode was, of course, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Here President Kennedy again refused to take the advice of both his military commanders and his chief advisers. As with Vietnam in November of 1961, when virtually everyone in the room told him to either invade or launch an air attack, he chose not to. Instead he decided to blockade the island. And meanwhile he worked out a back channel with the Russians through his brother Robert Kennedy and Russian diplomat Georgi Bolshakov. A potential attack on the island was averted. As was probably nuclear war. Since, as was later discovered, in addition to the atomic missiles the Russians had transported to the island, they had also given the Cubans tactical nukes which were portable. The Cubans controlled these. And if any American invasion had crossed the Caribbean, Che Guevara was urging Castro to use them.

    The sixth and last incident was the announcement of Kennedy’s Vietnam withdrawal plan in the fall of 1963. This announcement actually began in earnest in May of 1963. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara made it clear at his conference in Hawaii with State Department and military personnel from Vietnam that President Kennedy wanted to begin a phased withdrawal. And he wanted the South Vietnamese to begin taking over the war. Secondly, he wanted to achieve a thousand man American troop withdrawal by the end of the year. (Newman, p. 359) This was then accelerated by the McNamara/Taylor trip to Saigon in September. And also by Kennedy’s hand in writing the report based on that trip. During which he explicitly told McNamara he did not want a coup attempt against Diem. (ibid, p. 401) The report included the thousand man withdrawal. This recommendation was then formalized in NSAM 263, which was signed on October 11th. The film includes little of the above factual background. It concentrates on a phone conversation between McNamara and JFK in which they discuss the need to find a way to get out of Vietnam. And it then follows this up with the McNamara-Taylor Report as the device to arrange the withdrawal around. Blight then intones that Kennedy was willing to risk failure in Vietnam rather than commit US combat troops.

    The film then cuts to a snippet of the Zapruder film: Kennedy being assassinated in Dallas. We then watch the terrain of Vietnam from B-52’s flying overhead. Blight then says that with the historical models established beforehand, it seems unlikely that Kennedy would have committed to Vietnam.

    The film concludes with what I think is its best section: the Johnson reversal of Kennedy’s policy. It takes a different angle here by saying that due to the landslide election of 1964, Johnson had heavy majorities in both houses of Congress. Therefore he had a wide leeway politically for whatever his policy in Vietnam was going to be. In February of 1965, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey wrote him a memo strongly advising LBJ not to continue the escalation of the war that he had started after the Tonkin Gulf Incident of August 1964. Which, of course, is just eight months after Kennedy’s death. Humphrey wrote that this policy had already damaged America’s credibility with its allies. But further, the South Vietnamese government was a mess, and it seemed the Viet Cong rebels were winning. To escalate further would involve the USA in a war that would be fought without the generals really knowing what they were doing. This was a prophetic warning. What did Johnson do in reaction to these wise words? As the film notes, he did three things: 1.) He had Humphrey blackballed from further policy meetings on Vietnam 2.) He had surveillance placed on him, and 3.) He told National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy to keep an eye on who Humphrey was talking to.

    One month later, Johnson unleashed Operation Rolling Thunder in earnest. This would later evolve into the greatest air campaign in military history. That same month, the first detachment of 3, 500 Marines would land at Da Nang. This would eventually expand to 538, 000 combat troops at its pinnacle in 1968. The film notes that by the summer of 1965, five months after the Humphrey memo, 500 American troops were dead. By January of 1967 8,000 were dead. By March of 1968, 19, 000 were dead. As Newman notes, Johnson was so befuddled by what had happened, that around this time period he was actually wondering if his error had been waiting too long to commit combat troops! (ibid, p. 449)

    And with this, the film makes an important point. It concludes that Vietnam wrecked Johnson’s presidency, ravaged his personality and character, and made his family rue the day that he ascended to the presidency. But whatever the personal consequences that make Johnson into a sympathetic figure, and no matter how reluctant he was in this new path, once he became president he committed to it completely. To the point that, as with Humphrey, he would harbor no contrary view. And, as the film notes, this was a huge difference with Kennedy. JFK learned his lesson well on those Cuban beaches in April of 1961. He learned not to implicitly trust his military advisers. Since they always thought they would win. And therefore, if unchallenged, would always paint a rosy scenario. And afterwards, he would have to clean up the mess.

    The film is less than ninety minutes long. And I have added a lot of background detail in the above that is not actually in the film in order to flesh it out more for the reader. I actually wish the film had been longer so it could incorporate more of these facts and more of the revelations of the Assassination Records Review Board. Since these all but closed the book on this ersatz debate about JFK and Vietnam. The only two people who probably think Kennedy was not getting out at the time of his death are Noam Chomsky and Alex Cockburn. And they are not historians. They are political polemicists.

    This now makes four mainstream historians who have come around to the view of Kennedy’s intent to withdraw from Vietnam as expressed in Oliver Stone’s film JFK. First there was David Kaiser’s American Tragedy in the year 2000. Second, there was Robert Dallek’s An Unfinished Life in 2003. Third was Howard Jones’ Death of a Generation published in 2004. And now there is Blight in this film and also an accompanying book. (I should also mention in this regard a volume that preceded these, yet was clearly in line with them: 1995’s In Retrospect, by Robert McNamara.)

    Let me take a moment to pay tribute to the man I believe is behind this paradigm shift, which is one of the hardest things there is to achieve in the field of history. Clearly, but without naming him, this film owes its genesis to John Newman’s splendid 1992 volume JFK and Vietnam. That book was packed with so much factual data that no serious and interested person could dismiss it. Newman took ten years to complete that book. And finally it has begun to take hold in the halls of academia. Just three years after that masterly performance, Newman wrote another extremely important book called Oswald and the CIA. Perhaps no author achieved as much in such a short time as John did in this field. I understand he is retired from it now. He is therefore probably leading a much happier life. If so, works like this film are an homage to his earlier effort. We all owe him thanks.

  • Douglas Horne, Inside the ARRB

    Douglas Horne, Inside the ARRB


    Jim DiEugenio’s review of Inside The ARRB originally appeared in four installments.  These have been combined into a single article here for convenience.


    Volume One

    Douglas Horne’s five volume set is formally titled Inside the Assassination Records Review Board: The U.S. Government’s Final Attempt to Reconcile the Conflicting Medical Evidence in the Assassination of JFK. In almost record time it has become an object of heated and almost embattled controversy. There was at first a barrage of advance, and pretty much unqualified, praise from certain quarters of the research community. The book was then attacked by both Krazy Kid Oswald advocates and certain Warren Commission critics. In reading Horne’s series two things strike me about the book’s reception. First, the reaction seems to me to be predictable since Horne is postulating a rather radical interpretation of the medical evidence and the Zapruder film. Second, although Volume Four was released first, and has generated the most controversy, it seems rather shortsighted to concentrate on that particular book in explaining this work. To understand Horne, and where his book is coming from, one has to read Volume I first. I read it twice and consider it crucial in any evaluation of this rather large outpouring of writing and research.

    Doug Horne
    Doug Horne (CTKA file photo)

    The first time I ever heard of Horne was through the estimable and respected lawyer-researcher Carol Hewitt. It was around the summer of 1996, and through her output in Probe, Carol had developed a reputation as an important writer and careful researcher. Since I edited her essays, I had developed a professional relationship with her. So around this time, or a bit later, I had a phone conversation with her at her home in Florida. She asked, “Jim, have you heard of this ARRB guy named Doug Horne?” I said no I had not. She said words to the effect that Horne had become friends with David Lifton when the latter was speaking in Hawaii. He then secured a position on the ARRB and he was now trying to bolster Lifton’s theories and discredit those Lifton disagreed with, e.g., John Armstrong and his Oswald doppelganger concept. It’s clear that Carol was correct. All one has to do is read the rather long Preface to the first volume to understand that. For there Horne discusses Lifton’s Hawaii speech and their following friendship. (p. lxix) Further, in the photo section of the volume you will see two pictures of Lifton. One is with Horne outside the National Archives. The important point about the photo is that it was taken in 1999, after the ARRB closed shop. Horne’s friendship with Lifton began before he took his position and continued after his ARRB function was completed.

    This is important in any analysis and/or evaluation of Inside the ARRB. And in fact, Horne clearly explains why in his Preface. He says that he has read Best Evidence four times. (For comparison purposes, I have not read any assassination book from cover to cover more than twice.) And the praise he lavishes on that book is, to say the least, lush. He is so intent on enshrining it in the pantheon that he indulges in a technique that, heretofore, only Gus Russo and David Heymann had used. He says Best Evidence was a nominee for the Pulitzer Prize. (Horne, p. 4) This startled me since I had never even heard Lifton say this. I also found it hard to believe that a committee as mainstream as that body would so honor a book that postulates a conspiracy in the JFK case – and a rather extreme one at that. So I went to the Pulitzer site. As with Russo and Heymann, I discovered that Best Evidence was not a finalist that year. It may have been submitted for consideration. But as Lisa Pease noted in her review of Heymann’s trashy book Bobby and Jackie, scores of people do that.

    In measuring the importance of Best Evidence, Horne writes that Lifton reminded us that gunshot wound evidence is a road map to any shooting, and it is evidence that trumps all eyewitness testimony and human recollection. (p. lxi) After this, he calls Best Evidence a “paradigm-buster”. (ibid) He continues his medical evidence primacy argument by saying that such evidence was used to counteract the impact of the Zapruder film when it was shown in 1975. He then adds, “…the medico-legal evidence from an autopsy will always outweigh eyewitness testimony. [Therefore] the debate had grown tiresome and inconclusive …” before Lifton published his volume. (p. lxiii) In discussing the House Select Committee on Assassinations, he talks about the differing recollections of medical observers of Kennedy’s body, those in Dallas, and those at Bethesda. Although the HSCA sided with the latter’s observations, Horne writes: “What if both groups of medical witnesses – all medical professionals – had told the truth and provided an accurate description of the President’s wounds at the time they saw them.” (p. lxiv) And with this, the author now introduces the critical concept of “old paradigm” research versus “new paradigm” research. For anyone familiar with these rubrics and line of argument, it follows naturally that, to Horne, Best Evidence represents the new paradigm and Josiah Thompson’s Six Seconds in Dallas represents the old paradigm.

    The reason I use the phrase “follows naturally” is that this demarcation of “old and new” is familiar to anyone who has read Best Evidence, which was published back in 1980. In fact, Lifton begins the book with a recital of the major points the critical community had achieved until that time. He also discusses the methods of research such as reading documents and considering redactions, and minutely examining photographs from Dealey Plaza. After many rather condescending pages of this review of the state of the evidence at the time, the author then launched into the chronicle of his “search for new evidence” in the JFK case. This is why he calls Part 2 of the book, “A New Hypothesis”. As Roger Feinman pointed out in his essay Between the Signal and the Noise, there is in Best Evidence a not so subtle disdain for what the critical community had accomplished up to that time. And as Feinman also noted, in an odd way, Lifton seemed to actually defend the Warren Commission against the polemics of Sylvia Meagher, Mark Lane and Thompson. For instance, Lifton wrote that some critics did not understand the “best evidence” concept and how the Commission had relied on the autopsy as a talisman for all that came afterwards. Lifton continued in this vein by writing that the critics “actually believed the Commission first decided Oswald was the lone assassin” and then colluded with the pathologists, namely James Humes, to concoct a lone assassin autopsy report. (Lifton p. 144. All references to Best Evidence are to the trade paperback, 1988 edition.) Right after his long prelude, Lifton began to concentrate on pathologist James Humes as a “central figure” in his book. From there, Lifton proceeded to put together his rather dramatic reconstruction of what really happened in both Dealey Plaza and at Bethesda. To say that it was a radical scenario is putting it mildly.

    But to return to the point, it is really Lifton who started this whole “old paradigm” versus “new paradigm” mode of thinking about assassination literature. For Horne to adapt it shows the clear and deep influence of Best Evidence on his thinking. In retrospect, it is hard not to detect a bit of self-promotion at the expense of those who came before him in Lifton’s gambit. And I don’t believe it’s merited. Why? Because as Pat Speer has pointed out on his web site, the first real milestone in the medical evidence did not come from the HSCA or Best Evidence. The first real giveaway movement was from the proponents of the official story itself. In 1968, Attorney General Ramsey Clark tasked Dr. Russell Fisher with reviewing the work of the autopsy surgeons: Humes, Thornton Boswell, and Pierre Finck. Fisher and Clark did three things that do not happen in normal medical practice. They moved the head wound up 4 inches, they noted particles in the neck, and they saw something that the pathologists had not seen: a 6.5 mm fragment in the cowlick area at the rear of the skull. As Speer notes, the Fisher panel was put together to specifically negate the work that Thompson had done on the ballistics and the autopsy. So in other words, Thompson, the “old paradigm” guy had actually been the first to rock the official story of the medical evidence in the JFK case. In my view, these movements of wound location, and the appearance and notation of fragments in the neck and high in the head – largely endorsed by the HSCA – have caused defenders of the official story many more problems than the more dramatic parts of Best Evidence. Again, this was caused by the author that both Horne and Lifton consider “old school”, i.e., Josiah Thompson. (For the exact way Thompson caused it, see my review of Reclaiming History, Part 4, Section IV)

    The next big crack in the medical evidence occurred in 1969. And it was caused by the inquiry of another man who Lifton showed clear disdain for: Jim Garrison. Lifton actually called the Garrison investigation “a farce”. (Lifton, p. 717) At the trial of Clay Shaw, under sharp cross-examination by Garrison’s assistant DA Alvin Oser, Pierre Finck finally raised the curtain on the autopsy. He admitted that it was largely controlled by the military officers in attendance. He also admitted that he did not examine the president’s clothes, and he did not see the autopsy photos until 1967. (James DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, pp. 290-309) The impact of Finck’s testimony was greatly underplayed by the media. But to serious students of the Kennedy case it went a long way in explaining just why the autopsy was so deficient in every aspect.

    Lifton’s book was published a year after the HSCA released its Final Report. The HSCA acknowledged that a serious difference existed with the observations of the back of Kennedy’s head between the Dallas doctors and the personnel at Bethesda. Many of the former witnesses said they saw a rather large hole in the rear of Kennedy’s skull. Yet the famous back of the head photographs, which are in Horne’s book and labeled Figures 64 and 65, depict no such wound. In fact, the head seems intact and untouched. Therefore the HSCA said the Dallas doctors were wrong about this. They added that the observations of the Bethesda doctors differed from the Dallas doctors on this issue. And since the Bethesda doctors had the body in front of them for hours instead of minutes, they were correct. Since Lifton’s book was published many years before the ARRB declassified the HSCA files, Best Evidence made much of this discrepancy. In fact it was one of the main underpinnings of Lifton’s theory of body hijacking and alteration. (Which we will discuss later.)

    But when the ARRB did declassify the HSCA medical files on this subject, it turned out that this was all a subterfuge. The medical personnel at Bethesda largely agreed with the Dallas observers about a gaping hole in the back of Kennedy’s skull. The witness statements were all there in the newly declassified files which Robert Blakey and Michael Baden had chosen to keep hidden from the public. Gary Aguilar did a magnificent job in collecting and collating these newly declassified witness affidavits. He put them on a chart and showed that, except for a small minority, most of the witnesses from both locations agreed that there was a gaping hole in the rear of the skull and where it was located. (See Aguilar’s essay in Murder in Dealey Plaza, especially pages 188, 199. In my view, this is one of the three or four best long pieces written on the medical evidence since the ARRB closed shop in 1998.) What had happened was that the HSCA realized that if these statements were published then the Dallas vs. Bethesda dichotomy would be largely minimized. And you would have a near unanimous verdict that this hole in the rear skull existed. This would create serious problems for the official story in two ways. First, the avulsive nature of the wound strongly suggested a front to back trajectory through the skull. Second, these observations would bring into doubt the autopsy photos mentioned above which reveal no trace of such a violent wound in the rear skull area.

    As noted above, Aguilar’s work on this issue posed a problem for Lifton’s theory. Because now the split between the Dallas observations and the Bethesda observations were at least slightly ameliorated. Milicent Cranor’s essay on Malcolm Perry, “Ricochet of a Lie,” posited another problem for Best Evidence. Her work poses a question about the differing size of the tracheotomy. As Robert McClelland stated at the Lancer Conference in 2009, a wide tracheotomy was not unusual practice for Parkland. And for Malcolm Perry to have seen the organs in the throat that he reported on, he almost had to have cut a wider tracheotomy than he let on about.

    This brings us to the main thesis of Best Evidence. Lifton was making the following proposals:

    1. All the shots in Dealey Plaza came from the front
    2. The Parkland Hospital doctors saw this evidence
    3. The body was then hijacked as it left Air Force One
    4. The body was then altered to show shots from the rear
    5. The conspirators dug out the bullets from the body
    6. The Commission was fooled by this alteration

    There were always very serious problems with these proposals. For instance, the nature of John Connally’s wounds and the testimony of Dr. Robert Shaw make number one nearly impossible to believe. Concerning number two, since Kennedy’s body was not flipped over, the Parkland personnel could not see Kennedy’s back wound. (Lifton postulated that this was later “punched in”. See p. 376)) There isn’t any credible evidence for the casket being secretly diverted to another hospital. (The author suggests Walter Reed. See p. 681) Further, Lifton could come up with no credible witnesses to his pre-autopsy extensive surgery. Finally, as the declassified records of the Warren Commission show, at the very first meeting of December 5th, the fix was in against Oswald. This was before there was any discussion of the autopsy report. So the idea that the Commission based their guilty verdict of Oswald on Humes was not valid.

    Consequently, Best Evidence has not worn well. Today, there are very few medical experts inside the research community who back the book. On the other hand, the book has plenty of critics, e.g., Feinman, Milicent Cranor, Cyril Wecht. As for myself, although I found Best Evidence entertaining to read, and thought the book contained some interesting information and anecdotes, two things troubled me. First, Lifton’s concentration on the medical evidence implicitly discounted other physical evidence that I felt was more solid and probative than what he was relying upon. Second, the author had a troubling tendency to take a piece of evidence that was not really well-grounded and then use it as a springboard to launch into all kinds of hyper-dramatic criminal scenarios. As Gary Aguilar once said to Lifton: Extravagant claims demand extravagant evidence. One example of this would be the sentence in the FBI’s Sibert-O’Neill report on the autopsy, which states that Humes noticed surgery of the head area when he looked at Kennedy’s body for the first time. What Lifton did with this piece of hearsay was rather remarkable. Just consider how he begins Chapter 8 shortly after he surfaces it: “I arose on Sunday morning convinced I had discovered the darkest secret of the crime of the century.” (Lifton, p. 181) This is before he even talked to Humes. For when he did, Humes denied any such pre-autopsy surgery. (ibid p. 256) But that didn’t matter to the author. He deduced that Humes was just covering up.

    Speaking of this specific accusation, Best Evidence severely dissipated for me on April 3, 1993. That is when I heard Lifton speak during a famous debate on the medical evidence in Chicago. This was part of a conference sponsored by Doug Carlson and called the Midwest Symposium. Lifton’s presentation consisted of two main parts. The first consisted of him rattling off about 20 almost violently accusatory charges he would ask Humes about if he ever got him on the witness stand. From this artillery barrage against the doctor, one would have guessed that people like Arlen Specter, J. Edgar Hoover, James Angleton, and Allen Dulles were all guiltless in the cover-up of the Kennedy murder. Humes was the real linchpin of the plot. And it was his work that gulled these four fine men. (I have little doubt that Lifton supplied similar questions to Horne in preparation for Humes’ ARRB deposition. And it was these “When’s the last time you beat your wife?” type queries that Jeremy Gunn bawled Horne out about behind closed doors. See Horne, p. 85)

    Lifton concluded in Chicago by playing a tape recording of a phone conversation he had with Humes concerning this subject, i.e., pre-autopsy surgery. In his book, due to Lifton’s description of phrasing and pauses, plus the author’s seemingly telepathic attribution of hidden knowledge to the pathologist, Humes’ words carried a certain sinister weight to them – almost like the pathologist was hiding something in this regard. But when the tape was played, this all but evaporated. It was clear to me – and many, many others – that Lifton had left out the tone and inflection of the doctor’s voice and words. And these betrayed that Humes was actually playing with Lifton: a playfulness grounded in his being taken aback by the insinuation, so much so that he didn’t take it seriously. I found it hard to believe that Lifton could not detect this when most of the spectators I talked to could. This indicated to me that the author had lost critical distance from his subject.

    II

    In spite of all the above, Horne still genuflects to Best Evidence. To the point that he essentially admits that the main reason he joined the ARRB was to prove or disprove Lifton’s thesis. (p. lxviii) Sealing and qualifying this emotional bond is the following statement: “David Lifton’s work has been a great inspiration to me over the years, and he and I eventually became very close personal friends, as well as fellow travelers on the same intellectual journey.” (p. lxix) In light of the warm feelings betrayed in that statement, it is hard to believe that Horne expended a lot of time on disproving Lifton’s thesis. In fact, I feel comfortable in writing that if Horne had never read Best Evidence, he would never have written his series or joined the ARRB.

    All the above introductory material is necessary to understand my decidedly mixed feelings about Inside the ARRB. There seem to me a lot of good things in Horne’s very long work. And I will discuss them both here and later. But where the author gets into trouble is when he tries to fit the interesting facts and testimony he discusses into an overarching theory. Because as we will see, although Horne has revised Best Evidence, he still sticks to the concept of pre-autopsy surgery, and extensive criminal conduct by the pathologists. And as Lifton clearly suggested in his book, Horne will also argue that the Zapruder film was both edited and optically printed. (Lifton pp. 555-557)

    For me, the most interesting chapter in Volume I is also a disappointing one. And it has little, if anything, to do with Horne’s attempt to revive and revise Best Evidence. Horne entitles it “Prologue: The Culture of the ARRB”. Here he offers his insights into the personalities and stances of the people he worked with and for at the Board. Specifically the other staffers, the Executive Director, and the ARRB members. I thought this chapter was both valuable and unique for the simple reason it had not been done before from anyone who was actually there at the time. One of the most startling revelations is that Executive Director David Marwell regularly talked to and lunched with the likes of Max Holland, Gus Russo, and the anti-Christ himself Gerald Posner. (p. 13) In fact, when Marwell was hired he told a newspaper interviewer that he found much of value in Case Closed. Although this was startling, it only set the stage for what the book reveals about that body as a whole: information the research community did not know at the time and which now sets off retroactive light.

    For beginners, not one Board member – historians Anna Nelson and Henry Graff, Dean Kermit Hall, archivist William Joyce, or Judge Jack Tunheim – believed Kennedy was killed by a conspiracy. (p. 10) Further, Horne estimates that well over half of the staff members believed Oswald did it. To the point that many exhibited a prejudice bordering on condescension toward those who did not believe the Warren Commission fairy tale. (p. 11) Chief Counsel Jeremy Gunn actually told Horne not to talk to the Board members about conspiracy angles, no matter how well founded they were. (p. 12) Why? Because the Board members were so mainstream oriented they would probably doubt his suitability for the ARRB.

    Horne believes this was done by design. It originated with the Board members in their choice of Marwell. It was then transmitted from Marwell to his hiring of staffers. Horne observes that Marwell’s orientation resulted in the following: 1.) Few staffers were concerned with the conflicts in the evidence 2.) Most were not well versed in the nuances of the case, and 3.) Most did not even have a natural interest in the Kennedy assassination. This fulfilled Marwell’s mandate of having an ARRB staff that was “neutral”. But it also resulted in a staff that was way behind the curve when it came to fulfilling their mandate of looking for records, interviewing witnesses who knew where the records were and/or could resolve conflicts in the evidence. I can certify this as true. When the ARRB started up, Anne Buttimer, their first chief investigator, called me and discussed the New Orleans aspect of the case for about an hour. From her questions I could tell she did not know a lot about that famous milieu. Anne eventually quit. (Horne does not mention Buttimer or why she left.)

    The Board members never got any briefing in any controversial evidentiary aspect of the case. When Marwell gave Jeremy Gunn permission to interview some medical witnesses, Gunn’s first chosen assistant dragged his feet in preparation for the depositions. He then secretly lobbied Marwell to halt the medical deposition process completely. (p. 15) While this interview process was ongoing, not one Board member read a single deposition Gunn had done. (p. 17) It wasn’t until the end of the ARRB, when the medical investigation gained some publicity, that three of the Board members asked to read these now “hot” items. (ibid)

    How obsessed was Marwell and the Board with the image of “neutrality”? There were no wall photos or portraits of President Kennedy in the waiting room or foyer of the ARRB offices.

    Did the ARRB do a good job? That is open to question today, especially with the new discoveries about the documents they missed. The most famous example being the George Johannides documents which were originally kept from the HSCA. But consider this about the HSCA’s Lopez Report on Mexico City: the Board never found out what happened to the annex of that report entitled “Was Oswald an Agent of the CIA”. It is not attached to the report today. Further, the Board never surfaced the working notes Ed Lopez and Dan Hardway made while assembling that report. Even though Lopez strongly recommend they do so since he filed the notes every day in the safe the CIA had built at HSCA headquarters. Finally, the Board never even seriously contemplated interviewing Ruth and Michael Paine. Even though much interesting material had been declassified about them, which authors like Carol Hewitt and Steve Jones utilized to the couple’s detriment.

    Up to now, these failings were generally written off due to lack of time and money. But with what Horne reveals here, there may have been more to it than that. The ARRB’s effort to appear “neutral” may have meant sacrificing some important opportunities and not following up on others. While in operation, this failing was generally kept from the public because the Board had two good front people who managed to shield the inner dynamic. They were Tunheim and public relations director Tom Samoluk. But this new information sheds light on the Board members’ desire to proclaim that they declassified no “smoking guns”. But since the Board members were already convinced the Warren Commission was correct, those proclamations are hollow since they were predictable. With what Horne writes about here, it appears the Board members saw their mission as declassifying as much as possible, looking as neutral as possible in the process, and then proclaiming that the two million new pages didn’t make any difference anyway. The Warren Commission got it right back in 1964.

    I wish Horne had spent more time and length on this chapter. It only fills 14 pages. If I had been advising him, it would have easily been two or three times as long. And his contribution would have been comparable to Edward Epstein’s Inquest or Gaeton Fonzi’s The Last Investigation. In other words an explanation of not just what happened, but why and how it went down that way.

    III

    After this, and throughout the rest of this volume, Horne concentrates on the investigation of the medical evidence by the ARRB, as headed by Jeremy Gunn. Before approaching that inquiry and evaluating it, let me add some qualifications to this ARRB endeavor. As others, like medical investigator Pat Speer, have written, one has to qualify some of this testimony simply because it came so late in the game. From the chart Horne produces on pages 59-64, the ARRB medical interviews started in early 1996 and extended to October of 1997. So the witnesses were addressing the issue anywhere from 33-34 years after the fact. Further, many of the witnesses were quite old at the time. And although I am not that old, I can attest to the fact that memories do not get better as one gets older, they usually get worse. Third, because of all the controversy on this issue, plus the fact that it is politically charged, testimony tends to get altered or fudged. And Horne describes two witnesses who changed their stories on an important issue: John Stringer and Floyd Riebe. In 1972, autopsy photographer Stringer – who, incredibly, was not contacted by the Warren Commission – said that the damage to Kennedy’s skull was in the rear. He then changed his story for the HSCA and ARRB. He now said it was on the right side above the right ear – which coincides with the autopsy report. (p. 183) Riebe, Stringer’s assistant, earlier told researchers about this gaping hole in the back of Kennedy’s head. When Gunn showed him the alleged autopsy photos which show an intact rear skull, he now agreed that this is what he saw that night. (p. 229) Further, Stringer says that Riebe took no photographs. (p. 166) Riebe has always said he did. Although the number and type have slightly varied through the years. (See chart on page 226) Further, Robert Knudsen, a White House photographer who insisted that he, at the very least, developed photographs from the autopsy is not even known by Stringer! (p. 177) I found this remarkable. Gunn asks Stringer about Knudsen in more than one way. Yet Knudsen’s name is so foreign to Stringer that he actually asks Gunn if Knudsen was a doctor. (The Knudsen mystery is an interesting episode which I will return to later.)

    Having established these serious qualifications, let me state why I think they exist. It is not the fault of Doug Horne, or Jeremy Gunn, or the ARRB. In my view, and disagreeing with David Lifton, this much varied and at times, unfathomable and irreconcilable medical record is owed to one man above all: Arlen Specter. It is not possible today to read Specter’s 3/16/64 examination of the three pathologists and not be disgusted. Specter understood that something was seriously remiss with the medical evidence in the JFK case. So he decided to cover up the many discrepancies in the record. He did things like deep-sixing the testimony of Jim Sibert and Frank O’Neill since it would wreck the single bullet theory and raise questions about the trajectory of the fatal head shot. The Commission did not print the death certificate signed by Kennedy’s personal physician George Burkley because Specter understood that it would show that the wound in the back entered too low to exit the throat. Specter then cooperated in a scheme to misrepresent the Kennedy wounds before the Commission. After rehearsing both men over a period of weeks, he had Humes and Boswell testify to false drawings prepared by student illustrator Harold Rydberg. In these drawings the back wound was raised into the neck area, and Kennedy’s head position was magically anteflexed to allow for the shot in the lower skull to exit above the right ear. (See my review of Reclaiming History, Part 4, Section III.) Specter understood that if he did otherwise, this would open up a Pandora’s Box of questions that would unravel the official story forever. So he did what his masters on the Commission wanted: He deliberately concealed the truth. And this robbed us all of a true cross-examination of the medical witnesses at the time when they were not old and infirm and when their memories were fresh.

    The fact that Specter did what he did guaranteed that pieces of the story would dribble out piecemeal over the years. And this made the purveyors of the official deception alter the official story, e.g., as did the Fisher Panel. So today, the JFK medical record is scattered all over the place. So much so that one can marshall evidence for both versions of the official story: the Warren Commission’s with low skull wound entry and a neck-throat wound; or the HSCA’s with high skull wound entry and upper back wound. Third, one can argue that the evidence is authentic and still argue conspiracy, e.g., Pat Speer, Dr. Randy Robertson and Roger Feinman. Fourth, one can make a case for what can be termed moderate alterations, that is the x-rays and photos have been tampered with, e.g., Robert Groden, Harrison Livingstone, Gary Aguilar, Cyril Wecht, Doug DeSalles and many others. Fifth, one can argue for a radical alterationist view. That is the body was hijacked, wounds were physically altered, and the x-rays were also, e.g., Lifton and Horne. But the very fact that one can make all five arguments should tell almost everyone that something is wrong someplace. Because this does not happen in real life.

    As I pointed out, Horne is in the last school. He therefore – and somewhat understandably – picks and chooses things to bolster his view. This mars the book, and I will explain why later. But I want to make the point that when Horne does not adhere to this practice he reveals a lot of valuable and interesting information. And although one can say that much of it is in other books, I know of no other volume that has as much of it between two covers. (Or in this case, ten covers.)

    Some of the remarkable testimony includes autopsy photographer John Stringer saying that he shot no basilar views of Kennedy’s brain. (p. 41) Yet there are basilar – that is, shot from below – views in the autopsy collection. If Stringer says only he shot all the autopsy photos, then who took these shots? Stringer also says that he recalled the cerebellum being damaged. (p. 43) This is the part of the brain almost at the stem, low in the rear of the skull. This damage is not depicted in the extant photography. As Horne appropriately notes, both of these observations by Stringer lead one to question the condition of the brain as depicted in the present pictures. Stringer was the official photographer and he’s raising questions about the authenticity of his photos. These two particular questions lead one to doubt the rendering of what the HSCA artist Ida Dox depicted as an almost intact brain. Especially when one factors in how many witnesses said that Kennedy’s brain was not just blasted, but that much of it was gone. (For example FBI agent Frank O’Neill said half of it was gone. See p. 45) One does not have to agree with Horne – that there were actually two viewings of the brain and that Pierre Finck was snookered by the dastardly duo of Humes and Boswell – to understand that something is wrong here. Especially when there is no official weight given to the brain at the autopsy, but later it weighed in at 1500 grams – which is actually at the top end for an intact brain. This is very hard to believe. Especially considering the fact that so many witnesses saw a brain that was nowhere near intact.

    IV

    Jeremy Gunn’s questioning of the pathologists was interesting in multiple aspects. The highlight for me is when he got Jim Humes to admit that not only did he burn the notes from his autopsy, but that he also burned the first draft of that report. (p. 95) In his discussion of this issue in the End Notes to Reclaiming History, Vincent Bugliosi tries to say that Humes became confused on this point. (Bugliosi EN pp. 276-280) The problem with Bugliosi trying to say that is that Humes testified to it three times. And Horne prints them all. (p. 95) When Gunn asked him why he burned the draft, Humes replied, “I don’t recall. I don’t know … You’re splitting hairs here and I’ll tell you it’s getting to me a little bit, as you may be able to detect.” (ibid) Clearly, Humes did something he should not have done. He does not want to reveal why he did it. And he is angered that he is finally being exposed on this point.

    Another fascinating point Gunn uncovered is that Humes never saw the Burkley death certificate that I mentioned earlier. (p. 97) Which depicts the back wound much lower than where the Warren Commission said it was. One has to wonder if Specter deliberately kept it from him, since it would have blown to smithereens the phony Rydberg drawings. Humes is kind of pathetic when asked his reason for not dissecting the neck wound the night of the autopsy: “But it wouldn’t make a great deal of sense to go slashing open the neck. What would we learn? Nothing you know. So I didn’t – I don’t know if anybody said don’t do this or don’t do that. I wouldn’t have done it no matter what anybody said. That was not important.” (p. 99) I love the use of the word “slashing”. I mean what else do you do when you dissect a wound track? And the rhetorical question of “What would we learn?” is almost priceless. Well Jim, how about if the back wound exited the throat? And then him not knowing if anyone said not to do so, this is obviously in reference to Pierre Finck’s testimony at the Clay Shaw trial where he said Humes was told not to dissect the track of the back wound. Humes was clearly in denial on this whole dissection issue. Again, he knows he did something seriously wrong and can’t admit it.

    Thornton Boswell stated that he suspected that Malcolm Perry’s tracheotomy was cut over a bullet wound. (pp. 109-110) Which is quite interesting since the official story has always been that Humes did not realize this until the next morning when he called Dallas. But Gunn never asked the obvious follow up question: If you did, did you tell Humes that at the time? (If Gunn did pose this query, Horne did not include it here.) Boswell differed with Humes as to when the composing of the autopsy report began. Boswell said it started on Saturday during the day. (pp. 116-17) Humes said he did not start it until Saturday night and completed in the wee hours of the morning on Sunday. Finally, Boswell saw a probe go in the back. (p. 120) But it only went in three inches.

    Pierre Finck also agreed that the probe did not go through the body. (p. 122) But as Horne notes, the significant thing about Finck was how many times he said, “I can’t remember” or “I can’t answer that.”(ibid) For instance, when asked who told him that he could not see the president’s clothing after he asked for it, Finck said he couldn’t recall who. (p. 124) And further, many times he would ask for a document and then read his answer from that record.(p. 123) Finck was intent on being evasive and giving away as little as possible. This was probably a reaction to his all too revealing testimony at the Shaw trial.

    Robert Karnei was the fourth pathologist on hand that night, although he did not participate in the autopsy. Karnei saw the actual probe that Finck inserted in Kennedy’s back. He also says it did not go through the body. But beyond that, he insisted that there were photographs taken of this. He was clearly agitated when he was told those photographs do not exist today. (p. 127) According to Karnei, no exit for the wound in the back was ever found. He recalled the pathologists searching for one until almost midnight. (p. 128) So clearly, in opposition to Humes, the failure to dissect the back wound created a real problem. Finally, Karnei said that he did hear from someone that Humes had called Dallas that night to learn about Perry’s tracheotomy. (p. 128) I should add here, John Stringer also stated that Humes called Dallas that night. (p. 165) By the end of the night, did Humes know about the throat wound? If he did, could he not admit that because the many probe attempts could not connect the back wound with the throat wound?

    From here, Horne goes into a thorough chronicling of the photographs taken the night of the autopsy. Near the beginning of this section, Horne adduces more evidence that Arlen Specter and the Warren Commission lied about their access to the autopsy photographs. One of the excuses the Commission always gave for doing such a poor job was that they did not have access to the autopsy photographs and x-rays. People like Specter and John McCloy usually blamed this on the Kennedy family. But as time has gone on, more and more evidence has accrued that reveals this to be a deception. For the Commission did view the autopsy photographic record. And Horne adds to that growing accumulation here. Secret Service officer Robert Bouck told the HSCA that he recalled that a representative of the Warren Commission looked at the autopsy photographs. Horne feels this had to be either J. Lee Rankin or Specter. Further, there is a Treasury Department memorandum noting that the Warren Commission was briefed on the autopsy procedures by using the actual x-rays to do so. (p. 135)

    Another curious point that Horne develops is that at least some of the photos were not developed at either Bethesda or the Secret Service lab. Some of them were developed at the Navy Processing Center at Anacostia where color prints were made from positive transparencies. (p. 135) Why some of the films were taken there is not clearly known. When Gunn asked Stringer about this, the photographer said that the Anacostia lab was larger and more secret. (p. 208)

    But as early as 1966, for a Justice Department review, Humes, Boswell and Stringer all stated that some pictures were missing. Stringer specified three of them to be gone, including a full body shot taken from overhead. (p. 146) But this fact could not be admitted to the public at the time. Especially since the first books critical of the Commission were now entering the market. So Justice Department official Carl Belcher arranged for another lie to be formalized. Belcher requested that some of the Bethesda witnesses sign a false inventory saying that at this 1966 review all the autopsy photos taken in 1963 were accounted for. Yet to get himself off the hook, Belcher had his name removed from the final draft of the false document. Horne discovered this by uncovering the fact that the preliminary draft did contain his name. (pp. 146-47) Stringer admitted to Gunn that he knew the inventory list was false before he signed it. He said he was told to sign it anyway. (p. 206) As to why Stringer knowingly signed a false document, I wish to relate one of the most memorable exchanges in all the ARRB depositions. After Gunn noted to Stringer that certain protocol was not followed in the taking of photographs, he asked him why he did not object. Stringer replied, “You don’t object to things.” Gunn replied with, “Some people do.” Stringer shot back with the following rather pithy remark, ” Yeah, they do. But they don’t last long.” (p. 213) Those eight words tell us all we need to know about how the lid was kept on the autopsy cover up for so long.

    After his ARRB testimony, Gunn and Horne came to believe that by the time of the HSCA, a total of five views taken by Stringer had disappeared. (pp.182-83) Reinforcing this was one of the real finds of the ARRB: an interview done with photographer Karl McDonald. After taking the formal picture of the Board members, Marwell found out that McDonald had been the medical photographer at Bethesda for eight years. Further, that he had been tutored by, and worked with, Stringer. (p. 152) And he had ended up by being that institute’s senior instructor in medical photography. In his ARRB interview he shed a lot of light on just how bad the extant pictorial record of Kennedy’s autopsy is.

    He first said that he always developed his own pictures. He never sent anything to Anacostia. He also said that he was always sure to take a battery of full body shots – of which none exist in the Kennedy case. He testified that there was always an autopsy card included with each and every photo. The card included an autopsy number and the year. Again, none exist in the Kennedy case. He said for trauma shots – places on the body where bullets impacted – he always took three views: wide-angle, medium shot, close-up. In light of the above strictures, Gunn asked him to give an overall grade to what purports to be Stringer’s work today. McDonald replied that he would grade the collection with very low marks. This was the guy who was taught photography procedure by Stringer. Did Stringer forget the very lessons he once gave? Not likely.

    V

    I will conclude this review of Volume I by discussing what can only be called the enigma of Robert Knudsen. Knudsen has been discussed before by other writers, like David Mantik. But in light of the fact that Horne spends seven pages on him (pp.247-254), and he implies that he may have actually taken at least some of the autopsy photographs in existence today, I think it’s necessary to write a bit about the unplumbed mystery of the man. Because, to me, he has been ignored for too long.

    One way to begin to point out the strangeness of Robert Knudsen is with this fact: Although Stringer denied knowing who Knudsen was, Knudsen had Stringer’s name and phone number in his appointments book. (p. 252) Which strongly implies that Knudsen did know Stringer. The question obviously becomes: How could Knudsen know Stringer if Stringer didn’t know Knudsen? And in fact, if Stringer did know him, is he feigning that he did not? If so, why? Because as we will see, under the circumstances we will describe, it is hard to believe that Stringer completely forgot about the man.

    Knudsen was one of two White House photographers in 1963. The other was Cecil Stoughton. (p. 249) As he revealed in his HSCA interview, Knudsen began his career as a Navy photographer who was then detailed to the White House in 1958. (8/11/78 HSCA transcript, p. 4) Generally speaking, Knudsen covered President Kennedy on state trips, and Stoughton covered the First Lady. (p. 250) In fact, Knudsen was scheduled to cover the Dallas trip. But he injured himself the week before. Therefore he did not accompany President Kennedy to Texas, Stoughton did. (ibid) At around 3:00 PM on the afternoon of the murder, Knudsen received a phone call. He was ordered to go to Andrews Air Force Base to meet Air Force One and to accompany the body of President Kennedy to Bethesda. And thus begins a fascinating puzzle. For, as Horne writes, there is no documented evidence that Knudsen was ever interviewed by the Warren Commission. (If this is true, the fact that the Commission never talked to either Knudsen or Stringer tells us plenty about Specter’s investigation of the autopsy.) The first, and only, on the record interview with Knudsen about this subject came with Andy Purdy of the HSCA. And that transcript was classified by Robert Blakey and Michael Baden. The ARRB declassified it in 1993. And on the version of the audiotape at the History Matters site, Knudsen’s voice is not audible on the actual recording. It sounds like a woman who is phrasing the transcript for copying purposes is repeating his words. (See for yourself.)

    How did the HSCA find out about Knudsen and the autopsy? In 1977, Knudsen gave an interview to a trade magazine in which he said that he was the only photographer to record Kennedy’s autopsy. (Horne, p. 250) What makes this odd is not just that Knudsen was not on the Bethesda staff, but that Stringer and his assistant Floyd Riebe have always maintained that they were the only photographers in the morgue that night. There were no civilian photographers taking pictures. Obviously, Knudsen did not have to say what he did to a magazine. But since the HSCA had been convened in 1976, after the electrifying viewing of the Zapruder film on ABC in 1975, Knudsen may have felt compelled to reveal what he knew.

    Unfortunately for Gunn and Horne, Knudsen had passed away before the ARRB was formed. But the Board got in contact with the survivors of his family, his widow and two children. What they told the ARRB about the aftermath of Knudsen at Bethesda makes the story even more tantalizing. They told the Board that Knudsen disappeared for three days after he was called to report the day of the murder. (ibid) He didn’t return home until after Kennedy’s funeral on the 25th. Knudsen told his son Robert that he had been present at the beginning of the autopsy. (ibid) Further, he told his family that he had photographed probes going into he back of President Kennedy. Which, as noted before, do not exist today. In a statement that is hard to reconcile with the record, Knudsen told them that he was the only one with a camera in the morgue. (Horne, p. 251) He also told his son that he did not recognize 4 or 5 of the photos shown to him by the HSCA. And at least one had been altered. Hair had been drawn in on it to conceal the missing portion of the top-back of Kennedy’s head. (ibid) In keeping with many other witnesses, Knudsen told his wife that much of Kennedy’s brain was blown away. (ibid) When Knudsen tried to get a copy of his HSCA transcript, he was told that “there was no record of him or his testimony.” (ibid)

    I have saved for last what is probably the most fascinating piece of information that the ARRB garnered from Knudsen’s survivors. All three of them said “Knudsen appeared before an official government body again some time in 1988, about six months before he died in January of 1989.” They all agreed “Knudsen came away from this experience very disturbed, saying that four photographs were missing, and that one was badly altered.” Gloria Knudsen continued by saying that Knudsen felt “that the wounds he saw in the photos shown to him in 1988 did not represent what he saw or took.” (p. 252) One reason he was disturbed by the experience was that “as soon as he would answer a question consistent with what he remembered, he would immediately be challenged and contradicted by people whom he felt already had their minds made up.” (ibid) Knudsen told his wife that he knew who had possession of the autopsy photographs he took. That based on that, he could then find out who had made some of them disappear and who had altered the back of the head picture. But he was not going to stick his neck out on something this huge because he had a family to protect. (p. 253)

    Andy Purdy’s HSCA interview with Knudsen is a disappointment. As Horne notes, Purdy concentrates almost completely on the photo negatives that were sent to the Navy Photographic Center at Anacostia. Knudsen notes that this was done because of the color facilities there. And Navy officer Saundra Spencer handled the color operation there. (HSCA transcript, p. 47) Secret Service photographer Jim Fox accompanied Knudsen there. According to Knudsen they were ordered to do this by George Burkley on the morning after the autopsy. (ibid, p. 5) Knudsen told Purdy that afterwards, Burkley ordered seven prints made. (ibid, p. 8) Which, as Purdy later noted, was an unusually high number that no one else recalled. Knudsen noted that after he turned in the work product to the White House, he never saw the photos again until Purdy showed them to him that day. (ibid, p. 16) When asked, he distinctly recalled photos of a large cavity in the back of Kennedy’s head and a side view with probes going through the body. (ibid, p.22) Unlike others, the views he saw showed the probes extending all the way through the body. Again, Purdy reminded him that no one else recalled such a photo. There was another photo of the chest cavity which Knudsen recalled that today is not in existence. (ibid, p. 39)

    Now, Knudsen said that it took about two hours for him to develop the color photos at Anacostia. But yet he told Purdy that the four-day period of the assassination and its aftermath were like a fog to him. He recalled working continuously through it. (ibid, pp. 9-12) This period roughly coincides with how long his family said he was gone from home. Incredibly, Purdy never asked the obvious question: “Mr. Knudsen, if the processing took two hours, but you worked for 3-4 days, what did you do the rest of the time?” And as Horne notes, even though Knudsen told the trade magazine the previous year that he actually took photos of the autopsy, Purdy never asked him any direct questions on this point. Like, how many pictures did he take, what kind of camera did he use, when did he take the shots, and did he give his photos to Stringer or Riebe?

    Now, as is his usual tendency, Horne makes an extreme assumption: There were actually two sets of photographs made and Knudsen shot pictures of the intact back of the head. And he did it at the request of Humes, Boswell and Finck. (Horne, p. 247) Or as he puts it, it was an “intentional creation by higher authority of a fraudulent photographic record designed to replace the real photos taken by Stringer and Riebe of a huge occipital defect in the head …”(ibid) Which ignores the fact that, as I noted, Knudsen saw just such a photo. Horne even uses the testimony of a friend of Knudsen’s, USIA photographer Joe O’Donnell to make his case. Yet this is a man who, as his own family has noted, was likely suffering from dementia brought on by his failing health at the time the ARRB interviewed him. After all, he had two rods in his back, suffered three strokes, had two heart attacks, incurred skin cancer and had part of his colon taken out. Not the best witness. (NY Times, 9/15/2007) Further, O’Donnell had been known to testify falsely about photographic records before. (ibid)

    To me, the incomplete evidentiary record does not conclusively lead to Horne’s bold conspiratorial denouement. The case of Robert Knudsen, as I said before, is and remains a mystery. What it actually reveals about the JFK case is that there has never been anywhere near a first-class criminal inquiry into what really happened. In any professional inquiry, with say someone like Patrick Fitzgerald in charge, Knudsen would have been called in under oath with an attorney. He would have been warned in advance that he was expected to answer all questions under penalty of perjury. If he refused to answer he would be charged with contempt. He would have been asked to bring in any corroborative witnesses and exhibits. He would have been asked specifically, “Did you take any autopsy pictures at any time in 1963?” If he said yes, he would have been asked specific questions about when and where he took them and with whom. He would have been specifically asked if he worked with anyone else in making them. Stringer would have been asked the question, “Do you recall anyone else taking pictures at the autopsy?”, and also, “If you did not know Knudsen then how did he get your name and phone number?” And this inquiry would have been followed to its ultimate destination: to find out if Knudsen took or did not take any photos. To me that is where the status is of the evidence concerning Knudsen. I believe Horne goes too far in making his assumptions about the man.

    But to give Horne his due, at least he brings these matters to the attention of the reader. That is to his credit, since very few others have done it. And no one else has done so in such a complete way.


    Volume Two

    The second volume of Doug Horne’s Inside the ARRB ostensibly deals with the following topics: a second section on autopsy photography, a very long section on the x-rays (about 200 pages), interviews with the morticians from Joseph Gawler’s Sons, and Horne’s report on the ARRB interviews with Parkland Hospital staff. But as we shall see, it actually deals with a lot more than that. For it is here where Horne begins to reveal his revisions to David Lifton’s Best Evidence concerning the skullduggery he believes happened at Bethesda before the autopsy.

    I

    Volume II picks up with a continuation of Horne’s discussion of what he perceives as Robert Knudsen’s role in autopsy photography. As I noted at the end of my review of Volume I, Horne and I have a disagreement about just what that role was. Horne believes Knudsen took a second set of pictures. I believe that whatever Knudsen’s role was, it is mysterious and unproven. But Horne does good work in reviewing just how many different photographic views were actually taken of Kennedy’s body and what is missing from the collection today.

    He also sticks with Knudsen’s friend and professional colleague Joe O’Donnell as a witness for Knudsen taking a second set of autopsy photos. (See, for example, pp. 285-86) As I noted in my previous installment, the deceased O’Donnell has some real credibility problems. But in spite of that, in this volume, Horne uses and then extends him. He is now a witness to Zapruder film alteration. This deserves some elaboration.

    O’Donnell stated that he showed Jackie Kennedy the Zapruder film a few weeks after the assassination. (Horne, p. 287) The two were in the projection room alone. Jackie was unsettled by the sight of the head shot. She told him she never wanted to see it again. O’Donnell took this to mean she wanted it excised from the film. He then said he cut out about ten feet from the film. (ibid)

    This tale poses further problems for O’Donnell as a witness. First, as we shall later see – according to Horne – he is altering the film a second time. Because in his discussion in Volume 4, Horne believes the film was altered shortly after the assassination at a CIA photographic center. Yet O’Donnell here is talking about a few weeks afterwards in Washington. Secondly, O’Donnell says that he showed the widow an original version, not a copy. (ibid) But he says this film was in 16 mm format. The Zapruder film was shot in regular 8 mm. So how could this be an original? Third, if O’Donnell actually cut about ten feet out of this film, then you have some real statistical problems. Thirty seconds of 16 mm film is about 18 feet long. Considering the fact that the Zapruder film is less than thirty seconds long, the man chopped off more than half the film. How could any editor, no matter how gifted, put together a film with any continuity after eliminating over half the sequence?

    But when one analyzes it, this story is even more untenable. O’Donnell says that Jackie told him she did not want to see the head shot again. The actual head explosion takes only a matter of several frames. So why did O’Donnell cut out over half the film? Further, has anyone ever reported seeing a 16 mm version of the Zapruder film without the head explosion? This all seems not just untenable, but rather wild. Yet Horne actually takes the time to consider O’Donnell seriously. In fact, he composes a topic heading (not included in his Table of Contents) entitled “Analysis of the O’Donnell Interviews” (See p. 287). For all the reasons I have noted here and in Part One of my review, I would have just discarded the man as a witness. Horne does not. This may owe to Horne’s desire to give Knudsen his previously mentioned secret photographic assignment. Therefore he uses O’Donnell, even with all his credibility problems.

    There is another indication of Horne’s strong desire to keep Knudsen’s “second set of photos” secret assignment. Toward the end of Volume I Horne made his first notable mentions of Knudsen and O’Donnell. (See pp. 252-254.) But there, he also mentions Dr. Randy Robertson. He states that it was Robertson who first brought O’Donnell to the Board’s attention. Robertson, a board certified radiologist, has done some interesting work on the Kennedy autopsy. So when he heard that O’Donnell was in his vicinity, he talked to him. After listening to his unusual statements about Knudsen’s photographs of the autopsy, Robertson then called Knudsen’s widow, Gloria. After this, he relayed some of this information to the Board so they would follow up on it. In Volume I, Horne described his own conversations with the widowed Gloria Knudsen. Through information garnered from her, Horne wrote that 1.) Randy told her that he was the only person with access to the JFK medical materials 2.) Randy found Gloria through the ARRB 3.) Robertson challenged the woman on whether or not her husband had actually taken autopsy photographs.

    I have the good fortune of knowing Randy Robertson. As do several people in the JFK research community. When I read the above, I decided to get in contact with him. Why? Because it just does not sound like him. To the people who know him, Randy is the epitome of the well-mannered southern gentleman.

    In my conversation with him he said he had just one phone call with Gloria. Since he had been at the National Archives, he sent her some autopsy materials. He discussed nothing of substance with her at all. And he represented himself as no one except who he was, i.e., a board certified radiologist who had seen the autopsy materials. He found out about her through O’Donnell and the ARRB declassified documents. In their brief call, he did not challenge any specific claims of her husband. In fact, at the time, he did not even know that Knudsen claimed to have taken any autopsy photographs. (Communication with Robertson, 5/31/10)

    But further, Randy told me that Horne did not interview him for his book. Which is odd. To most people, what Knudsen’s widow said about Robertson would be perceived as rather derogatory. After all, the first two statements are lies, and the third is a direct challenge to her dead husband’s credibility. As I noted, it would also seem to be out of character to anyone who knows the man. Consequently, as a matter of fairness, one would extend Randy the courtesy of a conversation. And then one would at least state his denials in a footnote at the bottom of the page. According to Randy, Horne didn’t do the former, so he couldn’t do the latter.

    But there is also an evidentiary issue here. For if Randy is accurate about his version of the call, then it touches on the credibility of Knudsen’s widow. Which, apparently, is an issue that Horne does not want to surface.

    In the first part of this review, I noted Horne’s strong allegiance to Best Evidence. That characteristic is manifest through Volume II. For me, one of the most difficult things to accept about Lifton’s book is his explanation for the apparent intactness of the rear skull in the back of the head photos. In fact, I recall having an argument with another fan of Best Evidence in Dallas at the ASK Symposium in 1993. The argument consisted of whether or not Lifton said that these dubious photos were achieved through posing and altering of the skull in order to conceal the gaping hole beneath, or whether they were done by photographic alteration. The fan said that Lifton was not certain on this issue. I said that I recalled he was pretty close to being that. It turned out I was right. In a conversation Lifton had with HSCA investigator Andy Purdy, Lifton agrees that he believed that “somebody rebuilt the back of the head” before photography. (Best Evidence, p. 560) Later on, in discussing the findings of the HSCA, Lifton concurs with their verdict, i.e., that the x-rays and photos of Kennedy were not altered and that they represented JFK. (ibid, p. 659)

    The work of others in the interim makes this statement dubious today. By others, I mean Robert Groden, Gary Aguilar, David Mantik and Milicent Cranor. (Cranor knows more about the medical evidence – and in finer detail – than anyone I have ever encountered.) We will see why later, when Horne discusses the work of David Mantik on the skull x-rays. But to be brief, it seems to me hard to believe that neither set of images were altered. Yet Horne comes down on the Best Evidence side with the photographs. He says they were not altered. (Horne, p. 290) To be exact, he writes that “I believe the autopsy photographs showing the back-of-the-head to be intact are not photographic alterations, but instead represent fraudulent (but authentic) images showing the result of major manipulation and relocation of scalp by the pathologists after the autopsy … .” (ibid) When one looks at these pictures, this is a difficult hypothesis to maintain. For, as Cyril Wecht has said, it would take more than one expert surgeon hours to perform such faultless reconstructive surgery. And where were they that night? Who was such a highly skilled reconstructive surgeon at Bethesda? No one that I can see. Horne’s thesis seems to be that the autopsy pathologists somehow arranged what was left of Kennedy’s multi-fractured – even fragmented – skull, and then seamlessly fit the torn scalp over that rebuilt mess. Then Knudsen shot the pictures. To me, and many others, the easier and more sensible process would have been to insert a matched matte over certain parts of the skull. This is what Robert Groden has argued for in such books as High Treason.

    But further, in this volume, Horne now says that Knudsen was picked for this job by Robert Kennedy! What is the evidence the author lists for this? As far as I could discern it’s this: Knudsen’s son told the ARRB staffers that his father was close to both RFK and JFK. (Horne, p. 297) And because of that, Horne now says that somehow RFK was in on the cover-up of his own brother’s murder. The author is using the hearsay testimony of both O’Donnell and Knudsen’s surviving family for a lot of mileage.

    II

    One of the sub-sections in the first chapter of this volume is entitled “Vincent Madonia and Autopsy Photography” (p. 292) Madonia was involved in the transfer of photographs from the Secret Service to Evelyn Lincoln at the White House. He was also mentioned by Knudsen in his HSCA testimony as one of those he encountered in the processing of pictures at Anacostia. (ibid)

    Madonia told the ARRB that there was a Secret Service/White House processing facility at Anacostia. Outside of that, I thought his testimony was rather weak and indefinite. He could not be specific about what autopsy photographs he developed, since he said he developed hundreds of pictures of all kinds that weekend. (p. 296) All he could recall was that President Kennedy looked “pretty beat up”. (p. 294) In fact, he made a point about not being too curious about the pictures, because he felt that “the less I know about it, the better.” (ibid) Madonia was not even positive about Knudsen being there, or if he was, when he saw him. (p. 293) All in all, I just didn’t think there was a heck of a lot of value in what he said.

    Imagine my surprise when, about forty pages later, Madonia now constitutes evidence “that a compartmented operation was taking place” concerning the autopsy pictures. Horne now postulates that Madonia was unwittingly part of a “culling” operation. The aim of which was to delete the pictures taken early and include the ones taken later, that is, the reconstructed ones shot by Knudsen. (p. 331)

    When I read this, my eyebrows arched. For two reasons. First, as I wrote above, Madonia’s statements are rather anodyne, nebulous, and non-distinctive. Second, Horne did not mention anything about such a “culling” operation when he first discussed Madonia. So, using my notes, I went back and reread this section to see how I had missed all of this rather important material.

    As far as I can deduce, this is what Horne uses to say that Madonia is part of a “compartmented culling operation”: Madonia told the ARRB that ‘agents did come back for some photos which “may have been about the autopsy” during subsequent weeks, during a couple of subsequent visits. Other than the subsequent visits having taken place, he could not remember any specific details about the work done.’ (p. 294. Italics added.) To be brief but direct: I find this testimony rather unconvincing for the uses that the author makes of it.

    But it brings up an important criticism of Inside the ARRB. As John Costella has pointed out, the organizational guides to the book make it difficult to go back and locate details like the above. The entire set of books is 1,807 pages long. Yet no individual Table of Contents is over a half page in length. This particular volume is over 400 pages long. Horne lists four chapters in his Table of Contents. This averages out to one heading per hundred pages. Yet, as I noted above, Horne does divide his chapters into sub-chapters. Why did he not list these in his Table of Contents? I don’t understand why this was not done, simply as an organizational guide for the reader.

    The lack of an upfront descriptive guide for a very long work would be ameliorated if there were an overall or individual volume index. There are neither. As Costella noted, this is also hard to comprehend. Maybe Horne didn’t have the money to pay an indexer. But the software exists today with which you can arrange your own index. In fact, John Armstrong did just that with his important work Harvey and Lee. That book has 983 pages of text. With such skimpy Contents pages, and with no indexing of any kind, it is quite hard to locate specific points. Especially when they are strung across five volumes.

    This is unfortunate. Because whatever one thinks of Inside the ARRB, Horne uses a lot of valuable and interesting primary source material of many types. Therefore, the book could have been quite useful as a reference work. But how can one use it as such if it is so hard to locate the data inside? But secondly, Horne sometimes refers to matters he previously noted. But in so doing he often fails to use page references – which was the case in this Madonia instance. I found the questionable Madonia reference because I take copious and paginated notes. I do that for these reviews. But who else does? No one that I know. Again, Horne was not served well by whoever was advising him in this very long travail.

    Saundra Spencer is a more interesting witness than Madonia. She also worked at Anacostia. She recalled seeing a photo of a hole in the rear of Kennedy’s skull. Which, of course, is not there today. (p. 302) She also said she saw a full-length picture of the body, which is also absent. (p. 314) And, as we saw in Volume I, was standard practice. But Spencer also presents some problems as a witness. Her description of the anterior neck wound is unlike what anyone recalls, a clean pristine wound like a thumb puncture. (p. 316) Horne is honest enough to note that the famous paper discrepancy that she noted may not be as clear-cut as some have stated. (Horne, p. 330) Spencer brought some paper with her that she had used on the job to compare with the autopsy photos in existence. She said the paper used in the extant photos was different. When Horne took both samples to Kodak, they said the Kodak logos and watermark on the Spencer paper, though a bit darker, were actually the same size. And the experts there had no reason to believe that these autopsy photos were not developed at Anacostia. (ibid)

    In this volume, Horne reviews the testimony of the pathologists and tries to get specific about what autopsy photographs are not in existence today: the photo of the bruise of the chest cavity, a photo of the inside of the skull, and one of the interior of the thorax. (pp.335-340, 373-74) These are all crucial photos because they depict places where one can see bullet impacts. And as the ARRB was told, Stringer taught his students to do three exposures of these areas. Today we have none.

    From here, Horne goes into a discussion of what the panel appointed by Attorney General Ramsey Clark did in its review of the medical evidence in February of 1968. This panel met for only a short period of time, less than a week. (p. 344) Yet, its findings were held back from the public until January 16th, 1969! Yep, for about ten months. Ramsey Clark and the Justice Department decided to announce the findings right on the eve of the Clay Shaw trial. This was part of the huge effort waged by Washington and aimed at 1.) Burying the Garrison investigation in a tidal wave of propaganda, and 2.) Capsizing his inquiry by subversion.

    As most observers know, the Clark Panel was headed by pathologist Russell Fisher, and is sometimes called the Fisher Panel. Fisher moved the entrance wound in the rear skull up four inches into the cowlick area from its original location at the external occipital protuberance (EOP). Horne tells of a related problem encountered by the ARRB. That body hired three experts to look at the x-rays. None of them could find an entrance wound at that point. (p. 346)

    Horne also notes that Humes slightly altered his own location for the EOP entrance for the HSCA. For the HSCA he moved his entrance wound from the right and slightly above the EOP to below it. (p.347) But, of course, this was only a prelude to what the HSCA did to Humes. They eventually made him move the wound from the EOP to where the HSCA Panel wanted it, up into Fisher’s cowlick area. Horne notes that Dr. Charles Petty of the HSCA Panel later revealed that Humes was coerced into doing this. (p. 355) This kind of dancing around of wound locations over decades does not happen in real life. And it is all very interesting material to go over, for it poses what is today one of the weakest parts of the official story. Namely, how and why did this shift occur? But again, in my view, Horne overplays his cards. Under the influence of Best Evidence, this is how far he pushes the issue in posing a hypothetical question for pathologist Jim Humes: “Dr. Humes, did you participate in a cover up of the medical evidence by manipulating loose scalp to cover an exit defect in the posterior skull, and by simulating a higher entry wound (more consistent with being shot from the Book Depository) by puncturing the scalp in the cowlick area.” (p. 364) To which I am sure Humes would have readily broken down, started weeping, and admitted to such culpability.

    Horne closes his section on the autopsy photographs with something which, for me, is even wilder. So much so that I actually find it hard to write about it. So I will deal with it briefly just to get it out of the way. By using the mention of the word incision by a pathologist, the questionable testimony of Dennis David about the late Bruce Pitzer, and the equally questionable testimony of Joe O’Donnell about Robert Knudsen, Horne stitches together something about an “incised wound” being present on the autopsy photos. This is how much he wants to revive Best Evidence. (pp. 382-84) He then says that Robert Kennedy ordered Knudsen to take these shots and that somehow those photos got to Pitzer. He couches this all with Lamar Waldron type qualifiers like “it is just possible” and “then it would be theoretically have been possible” etc. Why he included it at all mystifies me.

    Did Horne have an editor? Someone who knew him well and who he trusted would get tough with him when necessary? Unfortunately, it does not appear that he did.

    III

    From here, Volume II proceeds to a long discussion of the autopsy x-rays. Horne begins by saying that there were officially 14 x-rays taken of President Kennedy. (p. 389) He then brings up an interesting point. The official story maintains that the x-rays were taken the evening of the 22nd at Bethesda. Yet the Harper fragment – a rather large piece of what most observers believe to be occipital bone – did not arrive in Washington for a couple of days after that. (pp. 393-94) So can these x-rays be genuine as they appear to show an intact back of the skull? (According to a man Horne holds in high esteem, this may be possible since David Mantik says the depictions are not fully intact. See Murder in Dealey Plaza, edited by James Fetzer, pp. 227, 281) The absence of the Harper fragment also touches on the question of the photographs, which show a perfectly intact posterior skull also. (Horne, p. 394)

    From here, Horne proceeds to discuss at extreme length the ARRB depositions of Ed Reed, Jerrol Custer, and the HSCA testimony of John Ebersole. Custer was the assistant to Ebersole, who maintained he was Acting Chief of radiology at Bethesda. Reed was a student of Custer at the time.

    Horne begins by quoting Ebersole saying that someone from Dallas had called and said that there had been an exit wound of the neck that had been stitched up. Further, that he had seen such a sutured wound when Kennedy’s body was placed on the table. (p. 399) This is obviously faulty information that Ebersole gave the HSCA. As far as I know, no one else is on record as saying this, and I can recall no author ever using this information to prove any point. But not only does Horne use it, he goes on for two pages about it. Since it is clearly an outlier, I would not have used this particular testimony for anything. Yet Horne uses it to say that Dallas did communicate with Bethesda. Yet that can be established by other testimony – and Horne admits this. (p. 400)

    His second purpose in using it is to say that this was part of the cover up in process at the time to conceal an anterior throat wound. To which I reply: If so, it wasn’t very smart or effective was it? Because no one has ever used this singular information to conceal that since. And, of course, Horne then uses this orphaned story to further the thesis of his friend David Lifton. He writes the following in that regard: “I conclude that David Lifton was correct when he speculated in Best Evidence that conspirators had retrieved the bullet from a frontal shot that impacted the anterior neck just below the larynx to the right of the midline, by probing deep inside the tracheostomy incision … with forceps, and that in doing so they had greatly enlarged the wound … Suturing the enlarged tracheostomy may have been an attempt to disguise the amount of damage inflicted by the clandestine probing.” (ibid)

    How “clandestine” can clandestine be? No one saw or did the suturing in Dallas, and no one saw it except Ebersole in Bethesda. In further undermining this Liftonesque “clandestine” thesis, the wide throat wound is quite obvious in the extant photos. So the clandestine operation hid nothing. Somehow, like with O’Donnell, Horne just can’t admit that Ebersole was either wrong, or he relayed some misinformation. Anything that supports Best Evidence, no matter how weakly substantiated, is somehow in bounds.

    From here, in his next few pages, Horne now proposes something that I think is even wilder than the above (pp. 401-08). What he seems to be saying there is this: What most everyone thought were late arriving bone chips from Dallas that night … well … they weren’t really from Dallas. Horne clearly implies that what was happening was that the Secret Service was stage-managing an illusion worthy of the likes of Genet and Balanchine. In reality, these pieces of skull matter were actually part of the pre-autopsy surgery done somewhere nearby, and the Secret Service was somehow concealing all this and saying the chips came in from Texas.

    What is the evidence that such a rather complex, bizarre scenario was occurring? From what I can see it is this: In referring to a rear skull wound before the Warren Commission, Secret Service agent Roy Kellerman used the phrase that this “skull part was removed”. (p. 403) To Horne, Kellerman gave the pre-autopsy plot away with the use of the word “removed” instead of using the word “missing”. The author then combines that one-word confession with the “surgery to the head area” hearsay that is in the Sibert-O’Neill report. And from what I can discern, that is the foundation for a fantastic plot that eluded so many for so long. (Horne goes into this aspect more a bit later in the volume. But it is not at all clear that what he is discussing at that point is the same pre-autopsy surgery instance discussed here.)

    At this point, the author goes into his long, detailed summary and analysis of the ARRB depositions of both Reed and Custer. Reed says that he recalled taking two skull x-rays (p. 429). When in fact there are three in existence today. Further, Reed told Lifton that the skull exit was posterior parietal in location. But to the ARRB, he said this wound was anterior parietal. (p. 424) This is a quite significant divergence. But further, Reed went on to say that he did not see any wounds in the back of Kennedy’s head and the scalp was intact. (ibid) He further added that he precisely recalled the time distance between the lateral and anterior-posterior skull x-rays since he had them developed on his own. (p. 432) Custer contested this later.(p. 432) Reed also said there were eight x-rays taken of Kennedy’s extremities. Yet there are four in existence today. (p. 433) At one point, when speaking about a technical matter concerning x-ray film exposures, Horne says that Reed went “on and on here, making no sense whatsoever.” (p. 428) Reed also said that, unlike anyone else, he saw the famous and mysterious 6.5 mm fragment on the skull x-ray that night! (p. 446) This is the disk shaped bright object at the rear of the skull table that, today, anyone can notice. Yet, the doctors, FBI agents, and other radiologists did not note that evening. Yet somehow Reed did. And somehow he did not alert anyone to this enormously important observation.

    But beyond the above, there are things in Reed’s deposition that Horne does not mention. Reed told Jeremy Gunn that he recalled being ordered to set up a catheter room for President Johnson since he had had a heart attack. (ARRB deposition, p. 17) He was not sure about when the autopsy ended. It may have been at 1:00 AM, or it may have been at 10:00 PM. (ibid p. 39) And Reed was even worse at when the body was first placed on the table. He says it was between 4-4:30 PM. This is way too early for even the earliest estimates. (ibid p. 76) And what makes all the above a bit worse is the fact that when Gunn asked Reed to characterize his memory of the autopsy events, he rated it at “about 95% correct.” (Horne, p. 423)

    Now, even leaving some of the above items out, Horne still states in several ways that Reed left something to be desired as a witness. For instance, Reed said he had briefly read Ebersole’s deposition when it was first written. Horne writes that when he heard this he “began to get a sinking feeling.” (Horne, p. 423) Why? It was highly improbable since Ebersole’s HSCA deposition was classified and not declassified until 1993. (ibid) Horne further adds that Reed was “not the kind of witness you want to have before you at a neutral, fact-finding deposition …” (ibid)

    In the face of the above, the reader may be surprised to learn that the author then uses Reed as his prime witness to Jim Humes eliminating the evidence of a frontal shot to Kennedy’s head. (p. 437) During his ARRB testimony, Reed described Humes as taking out a mechanical saw and applying it to Kennedy’s forehead. He mentioned it only in passing and Jeremy Gunn made nothing of it. But Horne combines this with the testimony of mortician Tom Robinson and Dr. Boswell’s ARRB drawing to postulate this other part of his Best Evidence revision. Let me describe how he uses Robinson and Boswell.

    At the beginning of Volume I, Horne goes through what he considers are his personal highlights of the Gunn/Horne medical review for the ARRB. One of these is a diagram by Dr. Boswell of how he remembered Kennedy’s head wound. This was a very large wound that extended from the back of the skull far forward to near the forehead. As per Tom Robinson of Gawler’s mortuary, Horne quotes him as saying he saw some sawing also. (p. 613) Robinson also told the ARRB that he thought the damage to the top of the skull was caused by the pathologists. (p. 630) From this, Horne stitches together his revival and revision of Lifton’s original “pre-autopsy surgery to the head” theory.

    He then goes on to explain why this was necessary. He gives three reasons, all of them reminiscent of Best Evidence. First, to remove bullet fragments from the brain that would reveal the existence of a crossfire in Dealey Plaza. Second, to change the appearance of an exit wound in the rear of the skull to more of a blowout wound toward the front of the head indicating a shot from the rear. Third, to remove brain tissue containing a track from front to back. (p. 630)

    In my review of Volume I, I mentioned that one of my problems with Best Evidence was the fact that Lifton would take a piece of rather inconclusive evidence and use it to launch into a rather hyper-dramatic conspiratorial scenario that eliminated other alternatives. In my view, Horne does the same thing. For instance, as Custer and others have stated, the condition of Kennedy’s skull when it arrived at Bethesda was that parts of it were so multi-fractured that it was fragmented. Custer once used the word “egg-shells” to describe how fragile and brittle the condition was. (Horne, pp. 456, 602-13) If this were so, then as the body arrived and as the pathologists handled the skull, would it not then fall apart as they progressed? And therefore, is it not possible that what Boswell drew – which is another outlier that Horne likes to use – was his memory of this wound later on?

    Second, if this sawing was part of a covert operation that the military honchos told Humes to perform, why on earth would they let people like Reed and Robinson see it? And why would they then let Humes talk about it to the Warren Commission, which he did? Third, if the objective was to eliminate the wound to the temple, then why did Robinson still see this wound later? (p. 599)

    Further, like Lifton, Horne gets so involved building these Seven Days in May type plots, that he doesn’t seem to notice when they don’t jibe with the results of what actually happened. For instance, why would it be necessary to remove the evidence of a crossfire from Kennedy’s brain when Horne writes as fact that the brain in evidence is not Kennedy’s?

    As per altering the existence of an exit wound to the rear, the problem here is that too many witnesses saw such a wound in Dallas. The drawing in Josiah Thompson’s Six Seconds In Dallas by Dr. Robert McClelland was something that would forever haunt the official story. (See Thompson, p. 107) Thompson describes McClelland’s memory of this wound as such: “McClelland is quite clearly describing an impact on the right side of the head that blasted backward, springing open the parietal and occipital bones and driving out a mass of brain tissue.” (ibid) Thompson then linked McClelland’s testimony to that of others in Dallas to show that this was clearly what most of the Parkland Hospital witnesses recalled: an avulsive, exit wound to the rear of the skull. Also, if the objective of the military brass in attendance was to alter this exit appearance, why did so many of those witnesses say they saw something pretty much the same as was seen in Dallas? As I noted in my review of Volume I, Gary Aguilar has proven this was the case. Is it not then more logical and deductive to postulate that the picture of the rear skull is in fact an alteration done by photography?

    Clearly, what Horne is describing in this whole pre-autopsy wound alteration scenario is similar, but not the same, as what Lifton described in Best Evidence. But as I noted in Part One of this review, Lifton seemed to say that the pre-autopsy cutting took place at a different location, not at Bethesda. Horne says that it took place at Bethesda. But to show just how wedded to Best Evidence Horne is, please note the following ( I actually had to read this part over twice). If the pre-autopsy surgery was done at Bethesda, then this would seem to bring into serious doubt another very controversial aspect of Lifton’s theory. Namely, the body-snatching from one casket to another. As Roger Feinman has noted in Between the Signal and the Noise, Lifton tried to minimize alternative ways that people could have seen a different casket both upon arrival and inside the morgue. (See here.) For instance, there was a decoy ambulance, the first casket Kennedy was in was damaged, and there was another body ready for burial in the building. But in spite of all this, Horne still wants to insist on this casket-snatching plot. Even though his revision renders it unnecessary! So how does he preserve Lifton in that regard? Let me quote the author: “…the alterations were attempted elsewhere, in a very hurried and inexpert manner – probably in the forward luggage compartment of Air Force One on the ground at Love Field, prior to takeoff…” (Horne, p. 636) This idea – of alterations on Air Force One – has been so discredited by so many different authors that it actually unsettled me when I read it. In his allegiance to Best Evidence, Horne just disregards the serious problems with this concept.

    And since I am describing Horne’s reliance on Best Evidence, I should note another parallel: Horne also insists that Kennedy’s corpse arrived at Bethesda in a bodybag. As Feinman has pointed out, no one ever really made a point of this until the testimony of Paul O’Connor for the HSCA. (See Best Evidence p. 595) Lifton then used this to say that the corpse was “intercepted”. Now, as other witnesses noted – and Horne notes elsewhere – the body was wrapped in sheets. But there was a clear plastic liner that the corpse was lying on. (Lifton, ibid) Now what Horne does not note, and neither did Lifton as I recall, was that between the time Kennedy was shot in 1963 and the beginning of the HSCA in 1976, a rather significant historical event happened. Namely the Vietnam War. For a period of about ten years, the American public was inundated, saturated, overwhelmed, by pictures, video, and reports of the so-called Living Room War. One of the most memorable phrases and images was of soldiers being brought home in “bodybags”. The phrase was repeated so many thousands of times that it became epitomic of that war – almost a part of America’s collective unconscious of the time period. But somehow Lifton and Horne leave all this psychological conditioning and how it can influence memory out of their works. Yet to me, it seems of the greatest importance as to how this angle first surfaced when it did.

    IV

    Horne goes on at almost stultifying length detailing the testimony of Jerrol Custer. How long does he spend on this? I counted: it’s 84 pages.

    There are some things of value here. For instance, Custer said that Ebersole tore a page out of the Duty Log book (Horne, pp. 490-91) Custer said he saw a large fragment fall out of Kennedy’s back. (p. 475) According to Custer, Finck relayed an order from the gallery telling Humes and Boswell to stop a certain procedure. (p. 477) Unlike Reed, Custer says he did 5 skull x-rays and he feels some are missing today. (p. 525) Custer also felt that Ebersole was not honest about his actual position at Bethesda, or the number of people in the morgue that night. According to Custer, Ebersole was not an administrator but an on call resident radiologist. (p. 537) Ebersole never carried any cassettes to be x-rayed, since he never left the morgue. As per the number of people in the morgue, Custer says Ebersole greatly underestimated this number to the HSCA. In response to looking at Ebersole’s HSCA testimony on this point, Custer commented: “Oh, come on. It was pure mayhem. The gallery was completely full … there was definitely more than 15 people in the morgue at that time. The commotion was astronomical … .he was questioned by the HSCA panel to the fact, were there any controlling factors in the gallery that controlled the morgue – the morgue procedure at the time? “No, there were not.” Come on. There were two men that constantly stood up, directed which way things would go.” (p. 537-38)

    As Horne notes, Custer is not a trained radiologist. But Horne has him commenting on the anterior-posterior skull x-rays at length – for 6 pages. He then has Custer go on about the lateral x-rays for 12 pages. And the other body x-rays for another 6 pages. To me, there is no way that the testimony of Custer merited this almost embarrassing length. Horne could have dealt with all the important matters in his interviews and depositions in at least half the length. That way his book would have been shorter and easier to read. Someone needed to tell the author: at times, less is more.

    It is an oddity of this volume that its most valuable contribution is not by either Horne or by the ARRB. It is by another researcher who discovered his evidence pretty much independently of the ARRB. Horne presents a comprehensive review of the work of David Mantik on the skull x-rays. Mantik, a radiation oncologist, has been doing fine work on the Kennedy x-rays for a number of years, actually, for well over a decade. Perhaps no other writer or researcher has made a more compelling case that these x-rays have been altered. And because Mantik’s work is not nearly so reliant on testimony, statements, and depositions done over a period of 40 some years, his work has more intrinsic value than the other things Horne presents here. I was fortunate enough to see Mantik’s first public presentation at the Dallas ASK conference back in 1993. So, of the six sources that Horne lists for his review on the subject, I have firsthand knowledge of five of them. This includes three public presentations in Dallas and Washington, and Mantik’s two long essays in the anthologies edited by James Fetzer, Assassination Science and Murder in Dealey Plaza. (The sixth source appears to be notes Mantik prepared for a co-authored article he did with Cyril Wecht for the anthology edited by Lisa Pease and myself, The Assassinations.)

    As the reader can see, Mantik’s work on the Kennedy autopsy x-rays has been out there now for about 17 years. It has become famous in the community because of its originality and its direct challenge to the authenticity of the x-rays. Horne’s contribution is that he collects it all in one place, and he then presents it clearly and understandably. In the early days, Mantik had a slight problem in making his insights and discoveries accessible to the layman. He has improved in that regard. But by going back and collecting his early work, Horne provides a service to the reader that is singular in the literature.

    Mantik’s first presentation in Dallas in 1993 dramatically and unforgettably contrasted the x-rays of Kennedy’s skull in vivo, with those done post-mortem. In referring to the former, he said they look like other x-rays. In referring to the latter, Mantik said at the time, “I have never seen x-rays that look like this.” It was easy to see why. The post-mortem x-rays have a jarring chiaroscuro effect – especially in the rear of the skull – that makes it look like someone deliberately whitened that part of the x-ray. Some commentators have tried to account for this high contrast effect by blaming the portable machines in use at the time, and saying that they were over-exposed by Custer. The problem is that even allowing for that, the pattern produced is not the same as is exhibited on these x-rays. That is, the high contrast is evenly distributed throughout the film, not concentrated in a particular area. The fact remains: no one has ever produced x-rays that look like this.

    Except David Mantik. At his office in Rancho Mirage, Mantik showed me how this can be achieved very simply. It only took him a few minutes in his darkroom to achieve this effect. Mantik believes that if this was done with the Kennedy x-rays, then it most likely was done in order to conceal a blow-out exit wound in the rear of the skull.

    Another discovery by Mantik makes the above conclusion hard to deflect. Mantik was granted permission by the Kennedy family to look at the autopsy materials at the National Archives. And he has done so on several occasions. On one visit he took an instrument which measures optical densitometry. That is, it measures the amount of light that passes through a surface, in this case a developed x-ray film. As Horne notes on a chart, if the film had an OD reading of zero, this would mean that a hundred percent of light could pass through the film. If the OD reading was ‘1’, only ten percent as much light could pass through compared to zero. And that ratio is the same up to a reading of 4. As Horne notes, “the differences between each whole number on the OD scale is one whole order of magnitude, i.e., a factor of ten.” (Horne, p. 543) The instrument that Mantik brought allowed him to take OD readings at intervals of 0.1 mm apart on the film. Mantik’s previous research revealed that on usual x-rays, the normal range of OD measurement is 0.5 for the lightest areas, and 2.0 for the darkest. (ibid) In other words, the lightest areas transmitted about three times more light than the darkest ones. Well, on the JFK x-rays, the lightest areas transmit about 1100 times more light than the dark areas. Mantik concludes that this is almost surely a physical impossibility. (ibid, p. 547) Clearly, these numbers support the idea that the white patch is artificial, i.e., it was superimposed.

    Horne does a nice job summarizing Mantik’s OD readings on the mysterious 6.5 mm fragment also. (pp. 549-551) Mantik compared OD readings on the 6.5 mm fragment with those of the 7 x 2 fragment, the one that was removed the night of the autopsy. He also compared his 6.5 mm readings with those of Kennedy’s amalgams. These readings revealed that on the anterior-posterior x-ray, the 6.5 mm fragment is “more dense than all of the dental amalgams combined.” (p. 551) It was also denser than the 7 x 2 fragment. Yet the 7 x 2 fragment was less dense on the anterior-posterior x-ray than the amalgams.

    But paradoxically, on the right lateral x-ray, the 6.5 mm object is much less dense than the dental amalgams. (ibid) This would seem to indicate that the 6.5 mm fragment was superimposed on the A-P x-ray only. And that it was imposed over a much smaller fragment. Finally, the OD readings reveal no entrance hole where the HSCA says there is one, that is near the 6.5 mm fragment. (p. 553)

    At Cyril Wecht’s superb Duquesne Conference of 2003, Mantik supplied one more compelling piece of evidence that strongly indicates that the x-rays in evidence today are not originals, but copies. On the left lateral view, there is a hand drawn symbol shaped like a capital letter ‘T’ on its side. As Horne describes it, this appears to be scratched out on the “skull x-ray in front of the cervical spine and directly underneath the jaw.” (p. 562) It was made by scraping off some emulsion on one side. Let me quote Horne on what this likely means and why: “However when Mantik closely examined the surfaces of the emulsion on either side of the lucent ‘T”, he found no disruption or damage whatsoever to the emulsion on both sides of the x-ray film. Mantik said … that the emulsion on both sides of the film in this area was as smooth as new ice in a hockey rink.” (Horne, p. 562, italics in original) As Mantik himself commented, this certainly is evidence that this film is a copy, or else the emulsion would not be so smooth.

    At the 2003 conference, Mantik stated that this is probably the most important discovery he made in his nine visits to the archives. It is consistent with his OD findings, and his x-ray duplicating experiments with both the white patch and the 6.5 mm fragment. Yet it is independent of them in means of proof.

    Horne also discusses Dr. Humes’ observations about the 6.5 mm fragment when confronted with it by Jeremy Gunn. At first, on two occasions, Humes admitted that he himself did not recall seeing the 6.5 mm. fragment at autopsy. (pp. 564, 569). Later on, realizing that this would create a serious problem that he had acknowledged for the first time in over 35 years, he tried to bail himself out by grasping at straws. (As noted in Pt. 1 of this review, Humes has a history of creating improbable cover stories when caught in corners like this.) He now actually tried to say that the 7 x 2 fragment might have been the 6.5 fragment! (p. 570) As Horne properly notes, this is hard to swallow. The first fragment is narrowly oblong in shape and was taken from the front of the skull; the latter is circular in shape and is located at the rear of the skull. Unless all three pathologists were visually impaired and had lost their powers of depth perception for this one instance, this makes for a high improbability. Further, the idea that neither the pathologists nor the FBI agents would have had this recovered as evidence, that doubles the improbability. (p. 570) Horne rightly notes that neither Thornton Boswell nor Pierre Finck recalled the 6.5 mm fragment either. (pp. 573, 580)

    Horne also comments on Gunn’s questioning of Humes about the non-existent trail of particles going from the low back of the skull to the top front of the skull, a trail which he wrote about in his autopsy report. Humes was forced to admit an odd thing during his deposition: the trail does not exist on the extant x-rays today. When pressed on this rather baffling issue, Humes replied in his own defense: “I didn’t write it down out of whole cloth. I wrote down what I saw.” (p. 571) He then added that the fact that it is not there today leads him to think that, “Well, there’s aspects of it I don’t understand.” (ibid) When the lead pathologist from the original autopsy feels that way about his own work, I then have to concur.

    As stated above, Horne’s summary and review of Mantik’s milestone work on the x-rays is the highlight of this volume. Mantik’s discoveries about the x-rays are largely made up of observable data that is difficult to discount. On the basis of that data – plus the primary source evidence about the disappearing trail of particles, and a 6.5 mm fragment that the pathologists did not see that night – it is difficult not to conclude that someone fiddled with the x-rays. The reasons being to: 1.) Cover a back of the skull blow out exit, and 2.) To raise the trajectory of the entrance wound while making it align with the ammunition from the rifle in evidence. Mantik also adds that a third reason may have been to erase evidence of two bullet trails through the skull. (p. 554)

    V

    The last two chapters of Volume II deal with the ARRB interviews of the morticians from Joseph Gawler’s Sons, and a review of interviews done in Dallas with certain 1963 staffers from Parkland.

    There were three men interviewed by the ARRB from Gawler’s: Joseph Hagan, Tom Robinson and John Van Hoesen. Generally speaking, after the discussion of Mantik’s fine and provocative work, Horne slips back into his Best Evidence revision and revival mode here. He even tries to revive the idea that a helicopter may have been used to transport the casket elsewhere. (p. 591)

    I must note here a trait that jarred me and I thought similar to Lifton’s: the tendency to run the length of the football field with one questionable piece of evidence. Hagan was being interviewed by the ARRB over 35 years after the fact. He said that when he arrived the autopsy was nearly finished and he added that photos were being taken. But he qualified this by saying that he could remember no details about this, that is, what views were shot, how many cameramen there were, or what the equipment being used was. (p. 593)

    Now, any lawyer or private investigator will tell you that its details that give a witness credibility. Usually, the more details that one recalls the better the memory of the event. And also the more realistic the memory. Hagan recalled next to nothing about the matter. But yet Horne strongly implies that Hagan was “witnessing photography by Robert Knudsen of a charade that both Knudsen and he both thought was “the end of the autopsy.” (ibid) Not only does Hagan’s hazy memory not justify this conclusion, but sometimes Horne gets so involved in what is now post-autopsy intrigue, that it is hard to understand precisely what he is talking about. What does he mean when he says that Knudsen thought he was involved with the “end of the autopsy”? Recall, Knudsen died and therefore was never cross-examined under oath by the ARRB. In his sworn testimony to the HSCA he was never questioned on this point, i.e., on whether or not he took autopsy photos. But not only does Horne think he did, he actually imagines that he was unwittingly being duped by higher-ups in the chain of command.

    Like Lifton with Humes, Horne imputes cover up motives to those who disagree with the main tenets of Best Evidence. For instance, Hagan made a notation that Kennedy’s body was removed from a metal shipping casket at Bethesda. But he told the ARRB that he never actually saw any casket that night and that someone else delivered this information to him. He also confirmed that the casket Kennedy arrived in was damaged, a handle had broken off and that it was then picked up months later at his place of work. Horne now asks about this testimony: “these remarks by him made me wonder whether he was really being forthcoming about whether or not he had seen a shipping casket at the Bethesda morgue the night of the autopsy.” (p. 597) It wouldn’t be possible for Hagan to look at the casket later on at work?

    Robinson was an interesting witness. He recalled seeing a wound about the size of an orange in the back of the skull between the ears. (p. 599) Robinson was also one of the several witnesses who Horne names who saw a wound in the temple near the hairline that was small enough to be hidden by hair. This latter description also guarantees this was an entry wound. Robinson said this wound “did not have to be hidden by make-up, and was simply plugged by him with some wax during the reconstruction.” Finally, he recalled it being about a quarter inch in diameter. (p. 600) Unlike with Hagan and the post-autopsy pictures, Robinson’s memory of this wound in the temple is vivid enough so that it cannot be easily dismissed.

    Finally, there is a point of confirmation and corroboration made by Robinson. He told the ARRB that the gallery was pretty much filled, that there were way too many people there. He then added that the atmosphere was like a “cocktail party”. He later added that it was even like a “circus”. (p. 611) He felt that there were people in attendance “who clearly had no business being there, and that there was continuous and loud discussion from the gallery which he thought was both improper and distracting”. (p. 611) It is one of the continuing mysteries of this case that no one has been able to explain precisely why all these people were there and who invited them and why they were not asked to leave.

    The volume concludes with a chapter entitled “A Short trip to Texas”. Gunn and Horne went to Texas in 1997 to interview three Parkland staffers who had not been formally interviewed by the Warren Commission: Dr. Charles Crenshaw, Dr. Robert Grossman, and Nurse Audrey Bell.

    Much of what Crenshaw observed has been published in two books of his and discussed by others as a result of his lawsuit against JAMA. But I must note that Horne gets a couple of details of the latter wrong. First, Crenshaw did not win a large settlement against JAMA. In this day and age, a bit over $200,000 cannot be considered large. Second, editor George Lundberg was not fired because of this incident. He was fired because of a later controversy over the Clinton impeachment scandal.

    For me, the two most important bits of information to come out of this visit were the following. First, when Bell saw Perry on November 23rd, Saturday morning, she said that he looked like hell. He replied to her that he “had not gotten much sleep because people from Bethesda Naval hospital had been harassing him all night on the telephone, trying to get him to change his mind” about Kennedy being hit by an entrance wound in the neck. (p. 645) Appropriately, Horne now goes into the whole controversy surrounding Secret Service Agent Elmer Moore. This was the man sent to Washington within 24 hours of the murder. He was then detailed to Dallas to ascertain what happened and then to cover up its true circumstances. (pp. 651-654) Horne adds one important piece of evidence to the Secret Service cover up.

    Arlen Specter had requested of the Secret Service that they obtain for him videotapes and transcripts of the Perry press conference from Parkland on the 22nd. James Rowley of the Secret Service wrote to Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin that, “The video tape and transcript … mentioned in your letter has not been located. After a review … no video tape or transcript could be found of a television interview with Dr. Malcolm Perry.” (p. 647)

    In light of the above it is rather odd that the ARRB found a transcript of the Perry conference that was time stamped “Received US Secret Service, 1963 Nov 26 AM 11 40, Office of the Chief”. In other words, Chief Rowley was deliberately lying about this transcript. It did exist, and he had it in his possession for months when he lied to Rankin. The problem was that what Perry said contradicted the notion of Oswald as the lone killer. Therefore, he understood that early. This was probably why he was complicit with Elmer Moore’s mission to Dallas to talk Perry out of his story.

    Let me conclude with a memorable interview that Gunn and Horne did with Grossman, who is a neurosurgeon. He said he saw a hole near the external occipital protuberance in the back of the skull. And through it he observed what he thought was cerebellum. (P. 655)

    He was then shown the famous Ida Dox drawing prepared for the HSCA which depicts an intact rear of the skull. He replied quite simply with “That’s completely incorrect.” Grossman insisted without qualification that “there had been a hole devoid of bone and scalp about 2 centimeters in diameter near the center of the occipital bone.” Unfortunately, this was not tape-recorded. But as Horne notes, “it will always be one of the most vivid memories that I have from all of our interviews and depositions.” (p. 656)

    I’ll say.


    Volume Three

    I

    Volume III of Inside the ARRB includes the end of what Doug Horne calls Part 1, and the beginning of Part 2. Horne defines Part 1 as a review of the work of the ARRB, especially the value of the witness depositions. That takes up a little more than a hundred pages of this volume. Then he launches into Part 2 of the book. This is entitled “Fraud in the Evidence”. Part 2 will continue into and take up all of Volume 4, which includes his (quite naturally) very long discussion of the Zapruder film. Then Volume 5 is called “The Political Context of the Assassination”.

    As indicated previously, Horne needed a good and tough editor. If he had one, his series could have easily and logically been divided into three neat volumes of Parts 1, 2, and 3. This would have let him thematically divide up the book into a comprehensible structure. The more accessible structure, plus pruning at least a couple of hundred pages, would have made the book easier to read and understand.

    In concluding his review of the ARRB medical depositions, Horne will now first review the testimony of FBI agents Jim Sibert and Frank O’Neill. This takes about 75 pages. Then Chapter 9 reviews Jeremy Gunn’s group interview of the Parkland Hospital emergency room doctors. For Horne, this is relatively brief, about 35 pages.

    I must comment on a recurring trait of Horne, because, on the second page of this volume, Horne comments on it himself. Although in strictest terms, the book is not an oral history, in many ways and on many pages, it is. Because Horne quotes at length from ARRB depositions. Now, oral history has real value. In fact, one of the better books on the medical evidence in the JFK case is an oral history, i.e., William Law’s In the Eye of History. There is nothing wrong with an author writing an expository introduction to an interview with one of his oral history subjects: Who is this person, why are they important, who else has interviewed them, what is new in this interview etc.

    Horne goes way beyond that. Let me use his own words to describe what he does that is rather unusual: “I have taken the liberty of engaging in lengthy, speculative discussions of the probable importance of various entries in these reports … Sibert and O’Neill participated in, and witnessed, key events … It does no good to simply report what they told someone about what they saw … without giving it context and discussing what it means in relation to what others witnessed that evening. Engaging in open, responsible, and detailed speculation now about the meaning of the observations and recollections of James Sibert and Frank O’Neill … will considerably streamline the writing (and reading) of Part II when I lay out my conclusions about what I believe really happened during and after the autopsy on President John F. Kennedy.” (pp. 668-69)

    Is Horne serious about the last part? The book is over 1,800 pages long. Where did he “streamline” anything? Part 2, which he says he actually did ‘streamline’, clocks in at 600 pages. What Horne is doing is justifying his frequent interjections into the oral history portions of the book. It is a practice that I have never seen any other author do to the extent he does. And in such a derogatory and, at times, personal way. When Dr. Petty is questioning Jim Humes about when the x-rays were taken, he is “peddling pure bullshit”. Horne actually inserts that phrase into the dialogue, like a stage direction. (p. 933) Frank O’Neill also indulges in “bullshit” (p. 724) And, of course, Horne really let’s them have it when they contradict Best Evidence. If the FBI agents say they never lost sight of the casket, they must be lying and he wants them to “come clean”. But Horne understands why they are lying: it’s because they let the conspirators get away with murder. (p. 726) At one point, O’Neill is accused of saying what he does because he hates David Lifton. (p. 719) Ironically, Horne even accuses O’Neill of being in love with the sound of his own voice. (p. 731) This from a guy who wrote a book that is close to 2,000 pages long.

    And since I am mentioning a form of editorializing, let me bring up a point that John Costella did. The accepted academic tradition in adding stress, emphasis, or drawing attention to a passage is the use of italics. Again, Horne goes beyond that tradition. He uses both bold italics and underlining. Often in the same passage. I think I get the point Doug.

    Let’s get back to facts. The testimony of Sibert and O’Neill is quite important for several reasons. First, it shows just how thoroughly compromised Arlen Specter was from the start. Specter talked to the agents informally. He never swore them in for a formal deposition. Why? Because he did not want their testimony in the record. In fact, the Sibert-O’Neill report is not in the Warren Commission volumes. The main reason being that they were told by the doctors that the back wound did not penetrate the body and that it came in at an angle of 45 degrees. Those two observations completely destroy the single bullet theory. Which it was Specter’s function to create and uphold. In the memo of his 3/12/64 interview, he writes that Sibert did not take any notes that night, and O’Neill took only a few. Both statements are completely false. (See p. 680) But further, in this memo on the meeting, Specter was careful not to ask the agents about the difference between the “non-transiting” bullet of their report, and the “transiting” bullet in the autopsy report. As Horne notes, “Specter did not want any indication in the official record that he was even aware of any discrepancy between the FBI report … and the autopsy report in evidence, CE 387.” (p. 673) Especially when it undermined the official mythology.

    When interviewed by the HSCA, the agents said that they learned that the projectile that caused the back wound ended up on a stretcher at Dallas. They learned this from a phone call that night. (p. 681) They also said that there was no discussion in the morgue that ever considered the throat wound a wound of exit. (ibid)

    Both men seriously questioned the back of the head photo. Sibert said he did not recall seeing the skull that intact: “I don’t remember seeing anything that was like this photo.” (p. 691) He then went on to add that “the hair looks like it’s been straightened out and cleaned up more than what it was when we left the autopsy.” (ibid) When Jeremy Gunn asked him if he recalled anything like that photo from the night of the autopsy, Sibert said, “No. I don’t recall anything like this at all during the autopsy.” (p. 692) When O’Neill saw the same picture, his reaction was similar. He said it looked like the photo had been, “…doctored in some way.” (ibid) He also did not recall the hair being so neat and clean. As for the depiction of the wound, he said “there was more of a massive wound”. (p. 693)

    I would be remiss if I did not note two areas that, in reading Horne, he is greatly preoccupied by. From way back when the self-published manuscript Murder from Within was issued (1975), its authors – Fred Newcomb and Perry Adams– have posited a theory of the crime that implicates LBJ and the Secret Service as the prime suspects. David Lifton was close to Newcomb at one time. In fact, he actually once said that this book stole his idea of body alteration. And it does posit that theory.

    Newcomb and Adams went way beyond the accepted knowledge of the Secret Service failure to protect Kennedy in Dealey Plaza. They seemed to imply that the Secret Service were the actual assassins, and that Roy Kellerman was actually a “stage manager” of the cover-up. In an interview in 1992, Newcomb stated that “In order to cover-up the shooting of JFK by Greer, the wounds had to be altered to make it appear that he was shot from the rear instead of the front. Control of the president’s body was paramount. The Dallas coroner at one point wanted to open the ceremonial coffin to do an autopsy in Dallas. Secret Service agent Roy Kellerman pulled a gun to stop him…” In fact, as one can read from this last linked page, many of Lifton’s concepts were clearly shared with Newcomb. Who came up with them first is probably a matter of conjecture. But it’s fairly clear that the whole Bill Cooper hoax, that is using a very bad copy of the Zapruder film to insinuate that Greer shot Kennedy, most likely originated with that book.

    Since Horne is enamored of all things in Best Evidence, Roy Kellerman now becomes a “stage manager” in the cover-up. That is, when certain skullduggery is going on, it’s Kellerman who is somehow involved in making sure certain people are present in the morgue and certain people are not. Which is odd, since most people believe that the military brass was actually controlling things. But Horne actually goes well beyond that point. In one rather outlandish excerpt, Horne seems to say that Kellerman was actually involved in the pre-autopsy surgery. As far as I could see, this was based upon the memory of a co-pilot on Air Force One who said he recalled that Kellerman had blood on the front of his shirt. (Horne, p. 696. There is no date given for when this interview took place.) So based upon this, Kellerman now joins Humes in pre-autopsy surgery. And he’s not even a doctor. Whether or not this memory is accurate, when it was recalled, whether it dovetails with anyone else, these questions are all left suspended. Assumedly, such questions are not to be asked. And the further unspoken corollary is that if this info is accurate, there can be no other way that Kellerman got blood on his shirt.

    Hmm. Talk about a hanging judge.

    Just let me note one sequence in the book that shows just how “stage-managed” Horne wants us to believe the conspiracy was. Let me describe what he projects as about a 40-45 minute time stretch at Bethesda that night. (p. 735) This is what Horne says happened from about 7:17-8:00:

    1. An inspection is made to see which wound alterations are necessary to the skull.
    2. Pictures are taken to record the true nature of the shots, and are later destroyed.
    3. Pre-autopsy surgery is done to remove the brain and to remove bullet fragments from a frontal shot.
    4. Further surgery continues as openings are made on the skull above the right ear and on top of the head.
    5. More surgery is done to camouflage evidence of a frontal shot.
    6. X-rays are taken after evidence of a frontal shot is surgically excised.
    7. A special photo shoot is arranged to take pictures of the president, but these do not include the back of the skull.
    8. The circumstances of this special photo shoot are now disguised and dismantled, and the body is transferred to the Dallas casket to be wrapped in sheets.

    Kellerman must have been one heck of a stage director. In fact, I would say he missed his calling. I mean, he managed all this without any rehearsal time. He should have been on Broadway.

    And we are also to believe that no one noticed the before and after difference in the corpse’s appearance.

    II

    The last chapter in Part 1 is Horne’s description of both the attempt to interview the Parkland Hospital doctors and the highlights of this group deposition. For Horne, this is a relatively brief chapter, about 35 pages. But I thought it was interesting because it gave us some insights into the workings of the ARRB and the relationship between Jeremy Gunn and Horne.

    The mission of the ARRB was to locate and make public as many hidden records as possible pertaining to the John Kennedy murder case. But there was also a clause written into the legislation which permitted them to explore and clarify certain ambiguities in the evidentiary record. Jeremy Gunn did this in several instances. But, by far, the one instance the Board took the most time and energy to do so was in the medical field. Nothing else was even close. Whether this was a good decision or a bad decision is not really the subject of this book or this review. But it is an unalterable fact.

    Now Horne not only wanted to do this, he also wanted it structured in a certain way. He wanted the depositions of the Dallas doctors taken first, and then the autopsy pathologists. (p. 742) Now from what Horne revealed about the temperament of the Board, and the ties that David Marwell had with people like Gus Russo, Max Holland, and Michael Baden, this was not going to be easy to attain. But evidently, at the beginning, Jeremy Gunn had some capital with Marwell and the Board. So Marwell had Gunn’s request to interview the pathologists approved. This seemed to me to be a good idea at the time since the examination of the three pathologists by Arlen Specter was pretty much a joke. Clearly, Specter understood something was weird about the autopsy, so his examination of Humes, Boswell, and Finck actually defines the phrase “dog and pony show”.

    Secondly, although the HSCA had written a report and included a lot of their inquiry into the medical evidence in it, Robert Blakey had classified much of it. Therefore, once this was declassified, there would be more information with which to prepare depositions for the three autopsy doctors.

    Third, as I noted in my review of Volume II, there were some Dallas personnel who had not been formally deposed by the Warren Commission. So Gunn and Horne interviewed Nurse Bell, and Doctors Grossman and Crenshaw.

    But, by 1995, there had been quite an extensive record established of interviews with the rest of the Dallas treating physicians who were in the Parkland emergency room. In addition to the interviews done by the Warren Commission and the HSCA, these men had agreed to be interviewed both by the press and private researchers. And generally speaking, they had done this often. So the question then became: Could a compelling case be made for ‘clarification of the record’ with these subjects? I mean, the ARRB never even seriously considered interviewing Ruth and Michael Paine. Even though neither one had been deposed by the HSCA. And much evidence had surfaced in the interim that would seem to warrant a ‘clarification of the evidentiary record’.

    But Horne urged such a process. Further, he wanted the Dallas doctors interviewed before the Bethesda personnel. This, of course, was in keeping with what he perceives as the “Dallas Lens” vs. the “Bethesda Lens”. Which is the way one would probably structure a criminal inquiry, or the presentation of a court case. (Horne, p. 742) But the point to remember is this: The ARRB was not such an inquiry. Not by any means. For Gunn and Marwell to go just as far as they did in this field could have been construed as pushing the envelope.

    But something changed that made the Dallas excursion possible. David Marwell stepped down as Executive Director to take another job. (p. 743) Most of the staffers then thought Gunn would be promoted almost automatically. It actually took three weeks. (ibid) Horne notes that this betrays the fact that the Board was never completely comfortable with Gunn as they had been with Marwell. That probably owes to the fact that Marwell was never a critic of the official story. Gunn let it be known at a speech at Stanford University, he was. (See Probe Vol. 5 No. 5) In fact, according to Horne, Gunn had actually applied for the Executive Director’s job originally. But the Board was not interested in hiring him for any position. Once Marwell was installed, it was his idea to hire Gunn. (pp. 743-44) Gunn eventually became General Counsel and in that office he earned the enmity of three Board members. (Horne does not name them. But they most likely are the late Kermit Hall, Henry Graff, and Anna K. Nelson.) But once Marwell left, Gunn did not want to push the issue of deposing the Dallas doctors further with the Board.

    So Horne decided to do an end-run around Gunn. He wrote a memorandum to Gunn and PR officer Tom Samoluk, enclosing five blind copies for the Board members. Understandably, Gunn got angry with Horne. (p. 746) Samoluk and another staffer tried to arrange a peace meeting. This did not work, but Gunn stated something interesting and relevant at the time. He said that Anna Nelson had recommended against hiring Horne because he would try to solve the assassination. (ibid) Which Gunn evidently was beginning to think Horne was trying to do. (I would disagree with Gunn on this score. As Horne wrote in Volume I, he was actually trying to prove or disprove Best Evidence.)

    Samoluk’s attempt at reconciling the two failed. Horne writes that this was the end of the working relationship with Gunn.

    In light of what I already wrote about the prolific public record of the Dallas treating physicians, one really has to wonder why Horne did what he did. Jeremy Gunn went about as far as one could be expected to go in this regard. And if there is a guy I would like to talk to and try to have a candid conversation with on the Board, it is him. I can imagine the book he could write. Horne now has no relationship with the man. (ibid)

    Further, shortly after this imbroglio, Gunn decided to quit the ARRB. (p. 748) Horne is not specific about why. He just writes that he heard it was over a matter of principle and he actually tendered his resignation before he had secured another job. To say the least, it would have been interesting to know why Gunn left. As I noted in my review of Volume I, I really wish Horne had filled out this behind the scenes part of the book, because no one else has.

    It was decided to go ahead and interview some of the Dallas doctors. But there were three serious problems with the process. First, the – now rudderless – ARRB agreed to do the interview in Dallas, not Washington. Therefore, approval had to be granted to move the autopsy materials to Texas. The approval was denied. Horne points the figure for the failure at Archivist Steve Tilley who told reporter George Lardner, “I was the one who turned off the transportation of those autopsy photos with Burke Marshall.” (p. 741 Marshall is the Kennedy representative on the deed-of-gift who has to approve requests to see the autopsy materials.)

    Second, without Gunn at the helm, the ARRB was pretty much adrift at sea the last several months of its existence. There really was no attorney who was familiar enough with the autopsy issues to do the depositions. The new and final executive director, pretty much by default, was Laura Denk. Denk once told Horne that it really didn’t matter to her where the hole in Kennedy’s skull was located. (ibid) Which pretty much fulfills the original Board intent of hiring people who had no interest or aptitude about the subject.

    Third, because the Board had essentially run aground, Gunn had to be recalled to do the interviews. But now it was decided that it would be a group interview of five doctors: Robert McClelland, Paul Peters, Ronald C. Jones, Charles Baxter, and Malcolm Perry. Which is pretty much inexplicable. I mean with all the Board had dug up just about Malcolm Perry, you could have spent hours just interviewing him. But further, Gunn seemed to be just going through the motions now. He did not bring with him the bootleg versions of the autopsy photos and he did not ask the doctors to draw on a skull their version of the head wounds. (p. 755)

    But even with all those qualifiers, some interesting observations were recorded. Dr. Jones said he saw no damage on the right side of the head above the ear-which does exist on the autopsy photos. (p. 757) More than one witness saw a left temple wound. (ibid) Peters said he saw lacerated cerebellum through a hole in the rear of the skull. (p. 758-59) McClelland agreed with this blasted cerebellum observation. (p. 762) And Jones made a quite interesting comment. He said he did see a very small wound, which he thought was an entrance wound to the head. (p. 765) As I said, Gunn by now was just going through the motions. He didn’t follow up on this important detail in order to pin down the location and appearance.

    For me, the most fascinating vignette from this interview was offered up by Jones. Gunn asked the subjects if anyone tried to get them to alter their stories. (p. 769) A question to which Perry should have jumped up at. But it was Jones who gave the interesting answer. He said that during his interview with Arlen Specter, he alluded more than once to the throat wound being a wound of entry. Specter seemed to question his expertise with projectiles. When Jones stepped down, Specter followed him out into the hallway. He then said, “I want to tell you something that I don’t want you to say anything about. We have people who will testify that they saw the President shot from the front. You can always get people to testify about something. But we are pretty convinced he was shot from the back.” Jones said that the message was that although he may have thought the neck wound was an entrance, it wasn’t. And that was that. Jones replied that he was only 31 at the time, so he didn’t say anything about this exchange. But he did think it was unusual. (p. 770)

    I agree that it was. But he knew he could get away with it.

    III

    As Horne notes, the discussion of Gunn’s group interview ends Part 1 of the book, i.e., his review of the ARRB testimony. Part 2 is where Horne applies the work of the ARRB to describe as he calls it, “Fraud in the Evidence – A Pattern of Deception”. There are three chapters that deal with this in the volume: Chapters 10-12. The first is by far the best. In fact, it may be the highlight of the entire five volumes.

    In the summer of 1998, Horne completed a long memorandum at the behest of Jeremy Gunn. In examining the history (and mystery) of the fate of President Kennedy’s brain, Horne had come to some rather surprising and startling conclusions. This memo was released to the press and it created a small buzz. What Horne was postulating was two things. First, that there were actually two examinations of the brain, one of Kennedy’s actual brain and one with a substitute brain. Second, that the photos of Kennedy’s brain in the National Archives today depict this substitute brain, not Kennedy’s actual brain after the shooting.

    This memorandum gave Vincent Bugliosi an epileptic fit. As I noted in the first part of my review of Reclaiming History, since Bugliosi could come up with almost no new evidence to support the Warren Commission, he resorted to an extraordinary barrage of invective and insults in order to demonize and dehumanize the critics. Nowhere was that litany of belittlement more pronounced than in his discussion of Horne’s memo. He called it “obscenely irresponsible” and as Horne notes, that was actually the soft-edged part of the broadside. (Horne, p. 822) The problem with Bugliosi’s polemic in this regard is the problem with his entire book: He is wrong. Which is not to say that I agree with the entire Horne memorandum. I don’t. But when all is said and done, the weight of the evidence says that the pictures in the National Archives are not what they say they are. And that creates a huge problem for the purveyors of the official story. It’s a problem that, combined with David Mantik’s work on the x-rays, is fundamentally insurmountable.

    First, let me assess what I believe to be the strengths of Horne’s work on the subject. Let us begin with something simple to understand. As I just mentioned in my review of the Dallas doctors group interview with Gunn, physicians Jones and McClelland both said the cerebellum was lacerated. FBI agent Frank O’Neill said half the brain was gone. And that a significant portion of the brain was missing from the rear. (Horne, p. 797) Mortician Tom Robinson said that a large percentage of the brain was gone “in the back” and “that the portion of the brain that was missing was about the size of a closed fist. ” (Horne, p.. 814) Dr, Boswell, during his ARRB interview, said that about a third of the brain was missing. (David Mantik, “The Medical Evidence Decoded” in Murder In Dealey Plaza, edited by James Fetzer, p. 284) In an interview he gave in 1992 to the Journal of the American Medical Association, Jim Humes said that 2/3 of the right cerebrum was gone. (ibid) Floyd Reibe recalled for the ARRB that he saw the brain removed but there was only about half of it left. (op cit, Fetzer, p. 212, in Gary Aguilar “The Converging Medical Case for Conspiracy”) James Sibert commented that “you look at a picture, an anatomical picture of a brain and it’s all – there was nothing like that.” (William Law, In the Eye of History, p. 257) James Jenkins said the brain was so damaged on the underside that it was hard to introduce needles for perfusion with formalin. (Harrison Livingstone, High Treason II, p. 226))

    At Dallas’ Parkland Hospital Dr. Robert McClelland said that “probably a third or so, at least, of the brain tissue, posterior cerebral tissue and some of the cerebellar tissue had been blasted out.” (Robert Groden and Harrison Livingstone, High Treason, p. 42) Dr. Ronald Jones said that “as the president lay on the cart with what appeared to be some brain hanging out this wound with multiple pieces of skull next with the brain and with a tremendous amount of clot and blood.” (ibid) Dr. Perry described a gaping wound at the rear of the skull “exposing lacerated brain”. Further in his testimony before the Commission he states “there was severe laceration of underlying brain tissue.” (ibid, p. 47) Dr. Charles Carrico described an avulsive rear skull wound in which the brain had both cerebral and cerebellar shredded and macerated tissue. And this was exhibited both in the wounds and on the hanging skull fragments. (ibid p. 50) Before the body left, Nurse Diana Bowron packed the head wound with gauze squares at Parkland. She later recalled that much of the brain, about a half total from both sides, was gone. (Harrison Livingstone, Killing the Truth, p. 195)

    All the above is consistent with what we see on the Zapruder film: a terrific head explosion with matter ejecting high into the air. It is also consistent with the very first witnesses in and around the car. As we all know, Jackie Kennedy turned over pieces of her husband’s skull and brain to a doctor at Parkland Hospital. Motorcycle cops Martin and Hargis recall being splattered with blood and brain. (op cit, Groden and Livingstone, p. 231) As Horne will reveal in Volume 4, a Secret Service agent later recovered a piece of the brain from the car.

    Keeping all the above in mind about the extensive damage done, when one looks at the HSCA artist’s rendition of the existing brain, it is surprising to view a pretty much intact brain. (See Fetzer, p. 232) Even Earl Rose of the HSCA noted that the underside of this brain does not match the description of the head wound described by the pathologists (ibid. As we will see, there is a real question as to who shot the basilar, i.e., underneath, views of this brain) As David Mantik has written, there is minimal impact seen in the extant brain. There is some, but only some, impact seen in the right front. And even Dr. Humes was puzzled by this fact. Before the ARRB, he said, “…the structure which is on the right side of the brain appears to be intact – the cerebrum intact – and that’s not right, because it was not.” (ibid p. 264) And recall, that is the part of the extant brain that betrays impact. The rest is pretty much intact. So here you have a brain in the record whose appearance simply does not jibe with the evidence listed above, i.e., the witness testimony and the Zapruder film.

    Neither does its weight. Which is 1500 grams. This is startling. Because the average weight of a brain for a 40-49 year old male is 1350 grams. If one even allows for a period of formalin fixing afterwards, Kennedy’s brain actually has more volume to it than a normal brain. Even though it had been blasted away, went flying through the air, and landed on other people in Dealey Plaza. Now, what makes this mystery even more intriguing is that the brain was not weighed the night of the autopsy in Bethesda. (David Mantik and Cyril Wecht, “Paradoxes of the JFK Assassination: The Brian Enigma” in The Assassinations edited by James DiEugenio and Lisa Pease, p. 253) As Mantik and Wecht write, this is inexplicable. And in fact, according to Boswell’s ARRB testimony, he recalled that it actually was weighed. (ibid) It is hard to gauge which is worse: if it was done and the results eliminated, or if it was not done at all. One wonders if this was part of the annotated record that was later destroyed.

    The first date in the record for an actual weight is recorded by Pierre Finck. In a report he wrote for his military superiors in 1965, he wrote that the brain was weighed at 1500 grams on 11/29. (ibid, p. 255) And here another problem surfaces. For Humes said that Admiral George Burkley came out to Bethesda to get all the autopsy materials: “He told me the family wanted to inter the brain with the President ‘s body …” (ibid) So what was Finck looking at on 11/29? Humes realized this presented a problem so he changed his story later and said he gave the brain to Burkley within about ten days. (Horne, p. 829)

    Further, Humes never tendered any receipts for this transfer to either the Commission or the HSCA. (ibid) And as we all know, Burkley later deposited the brain with White House secretary Evelyn Lincoln, who turned it over to Angie Novello, Robert Kennedy’s secretary. So Humes’ story about turning over the brain to Burkley sometime before the funeral on 11/25 appears to be problematic. And he seemed to realize this himself. What makes the intrigue deeper is that Burkley wrote in 1978 that he wanted to do further examination of the brain. (ibid, p. 256) Also, if Burkley had retrieved the brain for interment, then how long could the brain have been fixed in formalin? At most, a bit over two days.

    Which leads to another problem: the purpose of formalin fixing is to section a brain to trace gunshot trajectories. According to Humes and Boswell this was not done. (Horne, p. 792) Which, again, is incredible in a gunshot to the head case. This may be why Humes first tried to say that Burkley called for the autopsy materials early. He may have thought this could be his excuse for the lack of sectioning, not realizing it created other problems for him.

    The other problem is that photographer John Stringer said the brain was sectioned. (ibid) He said he recalled this since he photographed it. The problem is that under examination by the ARRB Stringer just about wrecked the thesis that it was he who took any archival pictures of the brain. First, as mentioned in Part 1, Stringer said he took no basilar views of the brain – but there are such underneath shots in the archives. He also said there were identification tags used in such shots. There are none in these photographs. (Horne, p. 806) Jeremy Gunn then asked him if based on those facts would he be able to identify the photographs before him as photographs of the brain of President Kennedy? Stringer said, “No, I couldn’t say that they were President Kennedy’s … All I know is, I gave everything to Jim Humes, and he gave them to Admiral Burkley.” (ibid.)

    It then got worse. Stringer had identified to Gunn the types of film he used for both black and white and color pictures. The type of film used in the brain photos is Ansco. Stringer was genuinely puzzled when he discovered this because not only was it the wrong film, but it was used in a photographic technique called a press pack, which he did not use. This was betrayed by a series number in the pictures, something which Stringer was almost stunned to see. (Horne, pp. 807-08) Stringer also did not recognize the film used in the color shots of the brain either. (ibid, p. 809) And, of course, there were no photos of the brain as being sectioned. What is most puzzling about this last is that Stringer remembered photographing the sections using a light box. (p. 810)

    To put it mildly, something is rotten in Denmark. When the pictures of an intact brain do not correspond to what the nurse who packed the skull in gauze packages recalled – along with about ten other witnesses – something is up. When Humes’ story about when he surrendered the brain to Burkley keeps on changing, something is up. When Humes and Boswell say the brain was not sectioned, but the guy who shot the sections says it was, something is up. And when that photographer who says he shot the photos, denies the photos in the Archives are his, then you have a real problem.

    As I said, I don’t agree with everything that Horne wrote in this chapter. But I agree with enough of it to grant him his major point: The pictures of the brain in the National Archives are not of President Kennedy’s brain. And they therefore do not depict that actual damage done to his skull during the assassination. I believe the evidence for this is so powerful that it could be used in a court of law. And it is a strong indication of a national security cover-up.

    IV

    The next chapter in his Fraud in the Evidence section is entitled “The Autopsy Report – A Botched Cover Up”. In this chapter Horne essentially tries to show something that many people have suspected and even written about. In fact, I wrote about it in Part IV of my Reclaiming History review. Namely that the autopsy report was an evolving document that was not actually supposed to register the findings made at Bethesda that night. It was actually meant to disguise what the actual observations were.

    Horne begins by enumerating all the serious problems with the actual autopsy procedure, e.g., the hair was not shaved, no proper labeling of pictures, clothing not checked by doctors etc. Even Michael Baden has noted just how bad it was. (pp. 845-46) Then after noting all this, he writes that the autopsy report in evidence, CE 387, is not the first version of the report. Which, of course, we know through Jeremy Gunn’s examination of Humes. For Humes admitted that he burned not just his notes, but also the first draft of the report.

    Horne is going to count the Sibert-O’Neill report as his first draft of the autopsy protocol. I guess this will suffice, but there are some problems with doing so. First, the two FBI agents left that evening. So they had no consultation with the doctors afterwards and no consultation with their paperwork. They were also not privy to any of the work done afterwards on the body, like the supplemental report.

    But even though it lacks detail and depth and technical expertise, we can grant Horne this step. Simply because whatever the failings of these two FBI agents, they are much more honest men than the pathologists. And we can see from above that they do not go along with either the Single Bullet Theory, or the intact back of the skull photos. At this point in the evolution of the autopsy, the back wound bullet had fallen out through cardiac massage.

    This idea, that the back wound was a non-transiting wound was short lived. Horne says it didn’t last long because “after the FBI agents left the Bethesda Morgue, the pathologists established communication with Dr. Perry about the bullet wound he observed in the anterior neck…” (p. 851) Horne says that Humes always stated that this did not happen until Saturday, but this is not credible today. I agree. There is just too much testimony today to indicate that this was a cover story. And Horne points it all out. (pp. 851-854)

    Horne makes a kind of odd choice for his second draft of the report. He wants to use the HSCA testimony of Richard Lipsey, aide to General Wehle, as an interim report. This is problematic since Lipsey’s testimony is oral testimony many years after the fact. Horne wants to use him because he told the HSCA that Kennedy was shot three times from behind. The FBI report says Kennedy was shot twice. (p. 857) According to Lipsey, the anterior neck wound was never a tracheotomy but known as a bullet wound of exit.

    What is interesting about Lipsey’s testimony is that he allows for two entrance wounds on the neck. One up high, near the hairline, which exited the throat. A second one very low, or in the upper back. The first trajectory is one which people like Milicent Cranor and Pat Speer have written about as being possible. (See Cranor’s article in The Kennedy Assassination Chronicles, Summer 1999 issue, entitled “The Third Wound”.)

    Image courtesy Pat Speer

     

    Lipsey’s version was then revised. Why? Horne says that it was because of the news of the hit to James Tague – which would have then given us four bullets. (p. 863) There was no footnote to this. And I found both the mention and the lack of footnoting puzzling. Because the time period the author is talking about is early morning on the 23rd. This is how Horne informs us: by the time the autopsy report was reviewed on the 23rd, “the entire nation, and indeed the world, had become aware one shot had missed, and had wounded bystander James Tague in the cheek, after striking a curb on Main Street In Dealey Plaza.” (p. 863 Let me add, that the lack of footnotes in parts of the book where Horne is making a presentation, rather than in quoting ARRB testimony, is a bit of a problem for his book. Just as the book has no index, it has no End Note section either. Horne lists the few he does use on the page, but there are many things that go unnoted and also, at times, he gives us very general references, like to a whole book.)

    Now, one of the best pieces of reporting in the critical literature on the Tague hit is Gerald McKnight’s sterling volume Breach of Trust. If you read the two parts of that book which deal with the issue, you will see that what Horne is talking about seems highly improbable, if not impossible. (McKnight, pp.97-98, 228-33) The simple fact being that the Tague bullet strike was kept under wraps by the FBI. In fact, it was not even mentioned in the FBI report of December 9th. As far as media exposure goes, there was one story about it in the Dallas papers over the weekend. So what Horne is describing, “the entire nation and indeed the world” knowing about Tague, this is just plain wrong. Which brings into question his whole line of argument here. Was Lipsey’s testimony ever really an autopsy report version? If so, then what is the real reason it was altered? Horne’s thesis about Lipsey may or may not be true. Yet Lipsey’s bullet above the hairline, at a slightly different place than where the doctors placed it, seems to be an accurate observation. But if this is so, it may be that the location of this wound changed simply to make the head exit wound more viable. As I explained in Part 4 of my review of Reclaiming History, the location of this wound has always been a problem for an exit high on the right side of the head above the ear. This actual location, since it is slightly lower, makes it even more of one. And it may be that the pathologists juggled this location later in order to ameliorate that problem. Because the other two locations for an entrance wound are problematic, since it is difficult to discern an entrance with the naked eye looking at normal sized photos.

    Horne then says that the pathologists first tried to explain the throat wound as a fragment from the head shot. (pp. 864-65) He bases this on a transcript from an executive session hearing of the Commission. This is the quote by J. Lee Rankin, “We have an explanation there in the autopsy that probably a fragment came out the front of the neck …” This is from a January 27, 1964 meeting, way after all parts of the autopsy protocol had been submitted. And Rankin is talking about other problems in the medical evidence here, like the back wound not lining up with the throat wound. Horne goes on to say that this excerpt of a sentence reveals Rankin’s apparent knowledge of “two separate and conflicting autopsy report explanations for the bullet wound in the throat.” Again, to me, this is an overstatement. We don’t know where Rankin got his “fragment theory” from. Is Horne actually saying that Humes forwarded to the Commission two autopsy protocols and said, “Pick the one you want. And then read parts of the one you discard into the record.” Highly unlikely. Rankin’s quote is an interesting one. In fact, some people, like Josiah Thompson used this idea. But to say it reveals what Horne says it does is, for me, a stretch.

    Horne then slips back onto more solid ground. In his discussion of Humes’ testimony before the HSCA about the initial writing of his report and his destruction of it, Horne makes a good case that Humes lied, and the HSCA let him get away with it in public. First, as established by two witnesses, Humes had a report during the day on Saturday, so he could not have composed it on Saturday night as he told the Committee. (Horne, p. 867) Secondly, he told the HSCA that he incinerated only his notes. But he actually burned both the notes and a first draft. (ibid, p. 868)

    The timing of this burning appears to be Sunday morning. (See Horne, Volume I, pp.94-96) Which is interesting. Because the reason for the destruction of the notes and the report may be the killing of Oswald by Ruby. More than one author, including Horne, has made a case for this. Realizing that no sharp defense lawyer was going to check his report against his notes, Humes may have felt free enough to discard both of them. And then to rewrite a document that was not bound by either. Humes also lied here about the reason for the burning. He told the HSCA that he did not want the bloodstained notes to end up in the hands of a meretricious souvenir hunter. The problem is the first draft had no blood on it since he wrote it at his home. (ibid, p. 96) Clearly, Humes was being dodgy about this entire issue. Which usually indicates the witness is concealing something.

    For some reason, Horne does not follow the chronology of this revised draft. According to Gerald McKnight, parts of this were rewritten in the office of Admiral Galloway. (McKnight, p. 163) According to the HSCA testimony of Pierre Finck, all three pathologists were in Galloway’s office on this occasion. And they all ended up signing the end result. (ibid, p. 410) McKnight notes that the changes made in this version in Galloway’s office all align with the official story. For instance, “Three shots were heard and the President fell forward.” When we know the Zapruder film depicts Kennedy rocketing backward. But further, the ARRB let Humes get away with the statement that the autopsy report in the record today is based upon the notes also in the record. This cannot be true. As McKnight notes, 70% of the “facts and statements in the final autopsy draft do not appear in any published government records.” (ibid, p. 166) Now the autopsy in evidence was checked in at around 6 PM on the 24th. (ibid, p. 162) On November 26th Admiral Burkley sent it to the Secret Service. The question then becomes: What were these facts based upon if they are not in the extant notes? I was sorry to see that Horne did not address this important point. Because Humes said something interesting in this regard to Jeremy Gunn. When caught in his web of deceit about the burning, he said, “I don’t know what was the matter with it, or whether I even ever did that.” (ibid, p. 165) Did Humes preserve the notes and burn the draft instead? Realizing that later revisions would need to be based upon them? If so, someone else deep-sixed the notes.

    What Horne does with the rest of this is, to me, questionable. In a rather weird argument, he goes back to the Rankin quote and then says that the “head fragment theory” was abandoned because of the Zapruder film. He bases this on Kennedy’s hands going to his neck before the head shot. (p. 873) I didn’t quite comprehend this argument. First, what was the evidence that the pathologists or Galloway saw the film before the 24th? If such evidence exists, Horne should have produced it. Second, can anyone see the neck wound on Kennedy at this instant in the film? If not, then this probably is not the reason it was abandoned, if it was ever really entertained.

    Finally, Horne tries to advance one last argument for saying that two versions of an autopsy report were submitted to the Commission. He says that in addition to the autopsy materials submitted to the National Archives by the Secret Service, there was a memorandum noting another report in the 1966 Kennedy deed of gift. (Horne, p. 875) But this was one of the items not available when the transfer was made. The problem with Horne spending so much time on this is that there is no credible evidence that this was a different version than what the Secret Service had and turned over to the Archives. Admiral Burkley handled the autopsy materials that went to the Secret Service and the Kennedys. Are we to believe that he handed the former group one autopsy report, and then gave the Kennedys a different one? And that before making such a huge faux pas, that he never bothered to check if they were the same?

    I agree with Horne that the autopsy protocol was an evolving document that would be very hard to defend in court. In fact, it would be quite vulnerable to attack on the grounds that it changed under special circumstances. I just don’t agree with some of the circumstances he adduces.

    V

    The last chapter of this volume is Chapter 12. It is entitled “The Autopsy Photographs and X-rays Explained”. In this, and the beginning chapter of Volume IV, Horne is going to try and explain what happened at the morgue, and in Dealey Plaza. Whenever someone tries to do this in the detail Horne does, it always puts me off. Simply because, lacking a detailed confession, one has to assume and speculate about certain things; Horne calls it “intelligent speculation”. (p. 909) In this day and age, I would prefer an author stick only with things about which he can be either sure, or fairly sure about. But allowing for that, there are three items of value in these last 100 pages.

    The first is a topic that has been reviewed by two other writers in the field, namely Pat Speer and David Mantik. In my review of Speer’s video, I discussed his pungent comments on a highly controversial photo in the autopsy collection. (Click here.) That photo is sometimes called F8, or the Mystery Photo. Horne here calls it the Open Cranium photo. The reason it’s called the Mystery Photo is that it is one of the worst autopsy pictures ever composed or shot. It is shot from such a bad angle and distance that it is hard to figure what one is looking at. But the clear consensus in the critical community today is that the photo depicts the back of Kennedy’s skull with the scalp refracted. As Speer well illustrated, Michael Baden of the HSCA lectured the public about this photo by saying it depicted a beveled wound of exit. The problem is that both the original pathologists and the panel appointed by Ramsey Clark both said that there was no wound at the point Baden was talking about. In fact, Baden was so lost in orienting the picture that he placed it upside down on the easel during his lecture.

    Horne notes the HSCA’s insistence at orienting this photo as frontal bone. Even when autopsy photographer John Stringer told them that Baden had oriented it incorrectly. (Horne, p. 900) Why all this Keystone Kops fumbling about? Because if the picture is oriented properly, that is as the rear of the skull, there goes the official story. Since it depicts external beveling, then the wound was made by a bullet from the front. What makes it even worse for the likes of Baden is that, back in 1966, when pathologists Humes and Boswell were classifying the photos for something called a Military Review, they labeled it as depicting the posterior of Kennedy’s skull! So in other words, the photographer and the original pathologists both say it is taken from the rear. But since it clashes with the Krazy Kid Oswald fantasy, this cannot stand.

    In Speer’s video, he notes about four pieces of photographic evidence that strongly indicates the picture is taken from behind. In Jim Fetzer’s Murder in Dealey Plaza, David Mantik uses the Harper fragment, the x-rays, and an anatomic landmark in the color photos, to show the same, i.e., the photo is taken from the rear. (Horne, pp. 917-18) In addition, Admiral Burkley told author Michael Kurtz that the posterior skull wound had all the appearances of an exit. (Horne, p. 927) Today, it seems to me quite difficult to argue Baden’s point of view. Baden’s insistence shows just how much he had discarded logic and evidence once Bob Tanenbaum had left the HSCA and the Blakey-Cornwell regime was installed.

    Horne includes an exchange between Allen Dulles and James Humes to illustrate the paradoxes that this photo holds. Dulles essentially asked Humes if the exit wound in the skull must have originated from the rear, that it could not have come from the front or side. (Horne, p. 922) Humes replied with one of the most bewildering and enigmatic answers in the volumes. He said, “Scientifically, sir, it is impossible for it to have been fired from other than behind. Or to have exited from other than behind.”

    What on earth does this mean? If taken literally, Humes seems to be saying that the shot came in and exited at the same point. Which is not possible. Does he mean, as many critics suspect, that the exiting point for a frontal shot became an entrance point for a rear shot? If so, that might be an obtuse way of explaining this photo.

    A second point developed in this chapter that is worth noting takes us back to Best Evidence country. As the reader will note, in his book, David Lifton postulated that all the shots came from the front. This gave the author a problem, in the sense that he now had to explain the physical evidence for shots from the rear. Lifton came up with the “puncture thesis”. That is, holes were battered into the body, including the back wound. In addition to the problem I mentioned in Part One, with the testimony of Dr. Robert Shaw about John Connally’s wounds, there is also the inconvenient eyewitness testimony about a back wound. This would include people like Secret Service agent Glen Bennett and Nurse Diana Bowron. In spite of this testimony, Horne stays true to his friend David Lifton. Horne writes that the back wound visible in the photos “could be a man-made puncture, inflicted upon the body after the conclusion of the autopsy to fool the camera.” (p. 985)

    But this is only the beginning of Horne’s puncture trail. The ARRB had the autopsy photos enhanced and digitalized. In gazing at these new reproductions, Horne came to the conclusion that the famous “white spot” at the bottom of the photo, well Horne saw a puncture there also. This is how he explains it: “I believe this puncture was man-made – a deliberate, cynical act of forgery on the body of the President instituted after the formal end of the autopsy…” (p. 911)

    And so is the “red spot”. This is the place in the upper part of the skull where most people see what they think is a spot of dried blood. The HSCA used this as their new entrance wound, replacing the one at the bottom of the skull that the pathologists designated. Well, Horne sees a puncture up there too: “I think the “Red Spot” in the cowlick is also a man-made puncture … because the conspirators managing the cover up were trying to solve several problems with one set of photos created after midnight.” (ibid. Need I add, Horne also believes Kennedy’s had was also battered pre-autopsy.)

    Horne believes the actual entrance wound is 2.5 centimeters to the right and only slightly above the external occipital protuberance. According to the author, the punctures were all the result of confusion in the conspiracy. (p. 912) No comment.

    I’ve saved what I think is something of real and lasting value for last. It does not originate with Horne but he wisely chose to include it in this volume. Although I think he erred by not including it in the previous chapter about the evolution of the autopsy report. Author Michael Kurtz interviewed Dr. Robert Canada, the commanding officer at Bethesda, in 1968. Canada told him that he observed a gaping wound in the lower right portion of Kennedy’s skull at autopsy. He said it was clearly an exit wound because the bone had exploded outward. Kurtz replied that this was at odds with the official autopsy report, which mentioned only a small entrance wound in the rear of the skull. Dr. Canada told Kurtz that “the document had to be rewritten to conform to the lone assassin thesis … Dr. Canada insisted that the contents of this interview be kept secret until at least a quarter century after his death.” (Horne pp. 927-28) In keeping with Canada’s wishes, Kurtz did not write about it until 2006 in his book The JFK Assassination Debates.

    Needless to say, if Canada was telling the truth – which his 25 year embargo strongly indicates was the case – this bombshell revelation tells us just about all we need to know about the autopsy report in our hands today. It is a piece of fiction. And the pictures accompanying it were either altered or posed. And the men involved were intimidated into going along with a cover-up over the death of their Commander-in-Chief.

    Canada was loyal to the end, and 25 years beyond that.


    Volumes Four and Five

    I almost don’t want to review the last two volumes of Doug Horne’s series entitled Inside the ARRB. For more than one reason. First of all, although this series is supposed to be about the medical evidence and testimony adduced by the Assassination Records Review Board, these last two volumes don’t really come under that rubric.

    Volume IV has two chapters in it. Chapter 13 is entitled “What Really Happened at the Bethesda Morgue (And in Dealey Plaza)?” This is where Horne tries to theorize as to what actually happened during the autopsy and from there, what was the real firing sequence and angles in the Dealey Plaza. Chapter 14 is entitled, “The Zapruder Film Mystery,” and this relates only tangentially to the new medical testimony and declassified files of the ARRB. Volume V deals with what Horne calls “The Political Context of the Assassination”. And this really has absolutely nothing to do with the medical inquiry conducted for the ARRB by Horne and Jeremy Gunn. So in these two volumes, I think Horne has gone astray from what his subject matter is supposed to be about, and what is of real value in the book.

    As noted in my previous three reviews, the book does have real value. But its value is in what Horne and Gunn discovered in their probe of the medical evidence. Here the author is largely stepping outside that boundary. The purpose of that is questionable. And in my view, in addition to losing its raison d’être, the series loses a lot of its steam.

    I

    As I mentioned above, much of Chapter 13 is given to a reconstruction of what Horne thinks happened both in Dealey Plaza and at the morgue. I could find very little of any new importance here. But there is one exception. That was an interview that Horne did with Secret Service agent Floyd Boring.

    Boring began the interview with a rather bracing general declaration: “I didn’t have anything to do with it, and I don’t know anything.” (p. 1096) Horne describes this as an “attention-getter,” which it was. It was Boring who was supposed to have turned over the fragments found in the front area of the car to the FBI. Yet oddly, he at first denied inspecting the Presidential limousine. He then said he did, but did not recall when he did it: if it happened the evening of the 22nd or the next day. But further, he had no recollection of finding any bullet fragments in the car. (p. 1097) Horne handed him SA Frazier’s testimony describing this episode, but Boring’s memory was not refreshed. Horne speculates as to why Boring said this. It may be that he thought the ARRB was conducting an investigation into whether or not the fragments had been planted, and he wanted to avoid being a target of inquiry. (p. 1098)

    But Boring really got interesting when he discussed his search of the follow-up car, sometimes called the “Queen Mary”. Completely unprompted by Horne, the witness told him that “he had discovered a piece of bone skull with brain attached in the footwell just in front of the back seat bench….” (p. 1097) He estimated it about 1 x 2 inches in size. He did not write this up and did not know the final disposition of this material. When Horne tried to correct him about where he found it, Boring insisted it was in the follow-up car. Which would be just about proof positive that Kennedy was hit from the front.

    And someone must have told Boring that after the interview. For as Horne further notes, something weird happened after the Boring interview. Something that Horne says never happened to him during his tenure at the ARRB. Boring called him back the next day. He now said he could not have found the skull debris in the ‘Queen Mary,’ it had to have been in the presidential limo. (p. 1099) This retraction convinced Horne that someone had debriefed Boring after the ARRB interview.

    A similar reversal happened with the heir to Admiral George Burkley. But this episode I had heard about before. Jeremy Gunn wanted to get Nancy Denlea, Burkley’s daughter and the executor of his estate, to sign a waiver to let the ARRB peruse the deceased admiral’s files at his attorney’s office for evidence. She agreed to this at first. So the ARRB sent her the written waiver. But she later called back and told counsel Jeremy Gunn she had changed her mind and would not sign. Again, Horne wonders if someone got to her. (p. 1054)

    As most readers of The Assassinations (by Lisa Pease and myself) know, Robert Kennedy ultimately OK’d the dispersal of the Dallas casket into the ocean, a military dump off the Delaware-Maryland coast. (DiEugenio and Pease, p. 268) Well, skipping back into his Best Evidence mode, the author now tries to insinuate that somehow this was a deliberate and willful act done by RFK to somehow conceal the true facts of his brother’s murder. (pp. 1057-1062) Yep. that’s what he does. He actually says the casket was destroyed by RFK. Yet, in the documents Jim Lesar has collected at the AARC, this does not appear to be the case.

    The movement to dump the casket was begun by the fact that Nicolas Katzenbach and Lawson Knott of General Services Administration were getting pressure from an associate of William Manchester and also from former Dallas mayor Earle Cabell. Cabell claimed to be outraged by the morbid curiosity attached to the object. (Letter from Cabell to Katzenbach, 9/13/65) Since he was now in congress, Cabell was probably sensitive to the fact that the casket drew attention to his city. Manchester was threatening to write about in 1968 – a threat which Kennedy did not appreciate. (Call between Knott and RFK 2/3/66) No one involved believed it had any value as evidence. So upon the recommendations of Katzenbach and Knott, Kennedy agreed to have the casket disposed of. Period.

    Horne equates all this to RFK somehow being the prime engineer behind the casket’s disposal. Why would RFK be a participant in this diabolical effort? Not because of the pressure described above. No. According to Horne, it is because the casket had the potential to explode the medical cover up! (p. 1057) To me, this leap – and that is what it is – is completely unwarranted, perhaps a wee bit goofy. I mean, in 1966, Lifton had not published Best Evidence. He was still in his Ramparts days, that is, doing essays that resembled the work of Josiah Thompson. Without that impetus, how RFK could then divine such a thing as the casket’s importance in Lifton’s future book is completely illogical – since no one had written about it at the time. But how Horne can somehow fathom that Kennedy understood all that anyway – despite the fact that there is no reference to such a thing in the literature at the time – well, that is a mystery for the ages.

    But Horne goes even farther. He holds out the possibility that the missing autopsy materials – the brain, tissue slides, etc. – may have been deep-sixed inside the original casket. (p. 1061) He even says that if there is no record of these materials being dumped with the casket – and there is not – then perhaps RFK relayed a message to the Chief of Naval Operations not to include it in the inventory. (ibid)

    This is what I mean about Horne needing an editor. First of all, although there is circumstantial evidence, there is no proof that it was indeed RFK who seized these materials. We simply do not know that with any real certainty. But second of all, if he did, it may not be that his intent was to cover anything up. It may have been just the opposite. One of the most interesting parts of David Talbot’s book Brothers, is that he reveals that RFK never believed the Krazy Kid Oswald story. Not for one instant. And from the beginning, he was sending out feelers to try and comprehend what really happened in Dallas. One of the things he was interested in was the physical evidence that “he thought might be vital in a credible investigation in the future – that is, one under his control.” (Talbot, p. 16)

    Roger Feinman also believes this may be the case. Let me quote him at length in this regard:

    Two different sets of photos of JFK’s mortal remains were prepared on the night of November 22-23, 1963. They were taken by different photographers and developed at different times. One set was developed on Saturday, November 23, the other not until Wednesday, November 27, after Oswald and Kennedy had been buried. The set that was developed first anticipated public disclosure in the event of a trial of the accused assassin. The set that was developed second was never supposed to see the light of day. Yet a third set, of an isolated formalin-fixed brain that carried no identifying information, was taken and developed later in conjunction with the purported supplemental procedure. The collection of photos that was ultimately deposited in the National Archives pursuant to a “deed of gift” from Robert and Jacqueline Kennedy, dated October 31, 1966, was culled from the totality of this source material, albeit who did the culling and for what purpose remain a mystery.

    The available historical record implies that Robert Kennedy authorized an independent medical evaluation of whatever materials actually wound up in his possession, custody or control. But because the ARRB, guided by Douglas Horne in consultation with author David Lifton and a handful of other conspiracy advocates, were preoccupied by theories of body alteration and photo fakery, intimates of the Kennedy family and its closest allies were never pressed by the Review Board to clarify exactly how the materials were handled, and by whom, so that a complete documentary trail could be established and responsibility for any suppression justly assigned. Therefore, Mr. Horne’s speculations notwithstanding, any imputation of a cover-up to the Kennedys is not yet warranted. Their silence should not be taken as acquiescence in the official autopsy results; it may just as plausibly reflect unease and uncertainty.

    The ARRB’s so-called “investigation” of the medical evidence was slipshod and fueled by a fervor for theories rather than a dispassionate and objective unraveling of the facts. I ascribe most of this failure to staff lawyers Jeremy Gunn and his predecessor as executive director, David Marwell, who should have known better than to give rein to a group of amateur detectives. I am particularly appalled by Mr. Gunn’s utter waste of the ARRB’s limited resources in the pointless persecution of Robert Groden, which yielded nothing of any tangible value either to the Board or to the historical record. They would have done far better to compile the areas of interest for formal investigation beyond the scope of the ARRB’s mandate, competence, and budget, and to present a compelling brief for further congressional oversight and follow-up that could not have been ignored without invoking a public outcry.

    This leads to another issue. One that I was quite curious about. As previously mentioned, this was not the first time that Horne had floated this idea that Bobby Kennedy had a role in the cover up. Which is an idea that has been surfaced by the likes of Gus Russo before, but has never been able to attain any credibility, since there has never been any evidence for it. I mean, try and find any way that Bobby Kennedy had a hand in the Warren Commission proceedings. Well, I kept reading and reading in order to find some kind of key to why Horne had joined in the “RFK as part of the cover-up” ranks. I finally found it in Volume 5. Not surprisingly, it’s David Lifton.

    Horne has gotten a look at one of the working drafts of Lifton’s long awaited biography of Oswald. He praises the book as presenting a persuasive case that the plot not only took out Kennedy, but the cover story about Oswald built in a fail-safe point against RFK. Namely that by making Oswald into a Castro sympathizer, Kennedy’s murder could be perceived as retaliation for the CIA plots to kill Castro. In which Horne thinks RFK was involved; in spite of the CIA Inspector General Report on this matter which exonerates both brothers. (pp. 1666-67) From other sources, I understand that Lifton was influenced by Joan Mellen’s thesis about RFK in A Farewell to Justice. How and why he should be so influenced is a mystery to me. (Click here for my review.) But apparently Horne then accepts this hoary, specious idea.

    II

    As I alluded to above, I take reconstructions of what happened in Dealey Plaza with a grain of salt. I feel that one researcher’s version is as good – or bad – as the next. I only even blink when something wild is written. Well, with Horne I blinked. More than once. First, he postulates five shots to the head, three from the front. (pp. 1150, 1153-54) This, to me, is incredible. In fact, I have never read of such a thing. And in keeping with his Murder from Within thesis, he writes that “The very unpleasant and tentative possibility exists that limousine driver William Greer fired a fourth head shot into the President’s left temple with his revolver.”

    I don’t understand this. There is no evidence for this in the Zapruder film. There is no evidence for this in any picture I have ever seen. The single bit of testimony used most often to bolster it is the 11/22/63 affidavit of Hugh Betzner. In this affidavit, Betzner states he was shooting pictures when he “heard a loud noise” he thought was a firecracker. He then heard another loud noise. He then saw a “flash of pink” standing up and then sitting back down. (This is obviously Jackie Kennedy reaching out to the trunk of the car, after frame 313 and the head explosion.) He then writes that he saw, in either the limousine or the following car, someone with a rifle and someone in the limousine, or around the limo, with a handgun. He then said that the car disappeared beneath the underpass. And this is the best Horne can do in this regard. (He tries Jean Hill, but her affidavit is even less definite as to location than Betzner’s.)

    To me, and to most, it’s not nearly enough. Besides the fact that the time frame by Betzner is ambiguous as to when he saw this happen, to have any credibility at all, it would seem to have to occur within the firing sequence of around Z frames 190-325. Not only does the affidavit seem to say it took place after that, but if it did take place at those frames, why on earth did no one else see it? Especially when the car was so close to so many witnesses on the grassy knoll? To me, to say they did not see it is sort of like all those witnesses in the pantry of the Ambassador Hotel who did not see Sirhan get his handgun to the back of Robert Kennedy’s skull. But in this case they missed a guy with a rifle also.

    Furthermore, there is the matter of how this murderous scenario could have been presented to Greer. He had to have known that he was going to be driving a motorcade in the midst of crowds on both sides of him. Consequently, there would be at least scores of witnesses to him turning around and shooting Kennedy. In addition, he had to understand that many of these people would have Kodaks and also movie cameras to capture the moment. So therefore, it would not just be eyewitness testimony – there could be photos and films to prove his treachery. Further, he also knew there would be some law enforcement agents along the path that probably were not involved in the plot. If one of them saw him, and arrested him, and later a photo or film was adduced, Greer would be lost. And for what? Dealey Plaza provided an ideal ambush location for what snipers call an L shaped trap. So how could either the plotters or Greer possibly be convinced to go along with a scenario that was so high-risk for both of them? When it was so unnecessary. This is what I mean about Horne needing an editor. He apparently never thought of any of this.

    There is one other thing that I wish to note about Chapter 13. And I think this will provide some insight into where Horne is coming from. The author devotes several pages to a statement by Josiah Thompson from 1988 and a speech Thompson made in 1993. (pp. 1132-1138) I was aware of both of these. And unlike Horne, I saw the speech in person in 1993, rather than watching it on DVD. In 1988, for a PBS Nova program, Thompson made the following comments: “In a homicide case, you get a convergence of the evidence after a while. There may be discrepancies in detail; but on the whole, things come together. With this case – it’s now 25 years – things haven’t gotten any simpler. They haven’t come together. If anything, they’ve become more problematical, more and more mysterious. That just isn’t the way a homicide case develops.” (Horne, p. 1133)

    In 1993 at a conference in Chicago, Thompson repeated and amplified on these remarks. He said that it is easy to wreck the Magic Bullet fantasy. But it is much harder to say what actually happened in those six seconds in Dealey Plaza. Further, he said that in most cases – Thompson is now a private investigator – the actual circumstances of the crime are never in doubt. Not like this one. Horne then writes that this speech “really lit a fire under my ass.” (p. 1135) He then writes that this was one of the major reasons he joined up with the ARRB. In order to clear up some of the ambiguities in the record so these uncertainties would be removed. He also says that the reason he felt much of this murkiness existed was because of tainted evidence, and fraud in the record. (ibid)

    As I said, I was actually in the audience when Thompson made this speech in Chicago. I had a quite different reaction than Horne’s. It did not light any fire underneath my behind. Quite the contrary. I was disappointed in both the content and tenor of Thompson’s remarks. And so were many others. Thompson was essentially saying that we were no closer to resolving this case than we were in 1967, when his book came out. In fact, we might be further away. (Horne, p. 1134) I strongly disagreed with this evaluation. And I don’t understand why Thompson said it. It is something that might have been scripted by the likes of Paul Hoch or Robert Blakey. And I don’t associate Thompson with either of those men. If you compare the state of the knowledge database in 1993 with 1967, to say there was not a ton of progress made is just plain wrong. It is to deny the contributions of writers like Henry Hurt, George Michael Evica, Howard Roffman, and Tony Summers (among others). It is to say that the investigation of Jim Garrison produced nothing of any evidentiary value. Which is ridiculous. To name just two things of the utmost importance: that inquest revealed the Clinton-Jackson incident, and it uncovered why Oswald was at 544 Camp Street. Even though, at the time, the roles and characters of people like the Paines, David Phillips, and J. Edgar Hoover had not been completely filled in, we clearly had enough information to understand approximately who they were. And through the 1969 testimony of Pierre Finck in New Orleans, we had gained valuable insight into why the autopsy on JFK was so poor. I could go on and on, but I did not accept Thompson’s thesis to any real degree.

    I also did not agree with Horne’s major reason why he agreed with this flawed thesis, i.e., fraud in the evidence. Let me say first, there is no doubt that this occurred. And elsewhere, I have noted it. And Horne has pointed some of it out. But to me, this was not the real reason why the case was so unresolved (if one really believed that). To me, the real reason was the cover-up that took place almost immediately by those in charge of the inquiry. This would be, in order: the Dallas Police, the FBI, and the Warren Commission. If this would not have happened, the case would not be so murky. Just to take one example, if Oswald had lived to stand trial, who knows what would have happened? If someone other than Hoover had been in charge at the FBI, he may have cracked open the case. If Earl Warren had been allowed to chose Warren Olney as his Chief Counsel, again, things may have been different.

    One thing that has become obvious since the releases of the ARRB, is that no real investigation was going to happen. (And the Powers That Be were not going to let Jim Garrison proceed unimpeded either.) One reason being that the cover up was built into the conspiracy. And unlike Horne, Lifton, and Joan Mellen – who somehow blame RFK for this – I believe the three telltale signs of this plan were all exhibited on that very day: 1.) The murder of Tippit; 2.) The Mexico City charade about Oswald, the Cubans, and Russians; and 3.) The unbelievable control exhibited by the military at the autopsy.

    The first made sure the DPD would do all they could to railroad that “cop-killer” Oswald. The second ensured that the national security state would go into CYA mode about Oswald’s alleged dealings with the Russians and Cubans on the eve of the assassination. The third took away any possibility that the true circumstances of how Kennedy was actually killed would ever be revealed.

    So to say we were no closer to what happened in 1993 than in 1967, I believe was just wrong. Although I like Tink Thompson and think his book is still a good one, I didn’t agree with what he said at all. To his credit, I think he has changed his tune today.

    III

    Chapter 14 is Horne’s very long essay on the Zapruder film. How long is it? Try almost 300 pages – 292 to be exact.

    Before I get started, let me indicate where I am on this bitterly contested issue. I am an agnostic on this point. For three reasons. First, although there is some interesting stuff out there, I have not seen any overwhelming evidence that convinces me the film has been altered. Second, to me this dispute has the elements of an unnecessary sideshow. Because the film itself contains a variety of evidence revealing a conspiracy. To deny this is to deny reality. The two times the film was shown to a mass audience (i.e., in 1975 on ABC television network, and in 1991 via Oliver Stone’s film JFK), its effect was overpowering. Third, to argue that the film has been altered necessitates a whole other level of proof. Because now you have to, in turn, prove that other films and photos have also been altered. It’s something that I am not interested in spending years doing.

    How did Horne and the ARRB get onto the Zapruder alteration business? It appears to be at Horne’s instigation. (p. 1186) Horne suggested an authenticity report be done through Kodak. According to Horne, he did not read the report until after the ARRB dissolved. (ibid) We will get to the results of that report later.

    First, like many others in his camp, Horne tries to discount the impact of the film and its indications of conspiracy. (p. 1190) As noted above, I disagree with this. But I do agree that it is not possible to get a precise shot sequence from Zapruder. But I believe the main reason for that is the lack of a soundtrack. Horne then goes to a chronicling of the handling of the film and its first copies in the days right after the shooting. (pp. 1197ff) And here I must note something counter-productive to his argument. If you count up the times Horne describes screenings of the film in the first 24 hours, you will note something puzzling. Abraham Zapruder saw his film four times in 24 hours. His partner Erwin Schwartz saw it three times. Harry McCormack of the Dallas Morning News saw it twice. So did staff members at Kodak.

    Which outlines a problem. If all these people saw the film more than once that soon, they had to have seen the original film. To me, that would have been a memorable experience. If the film was altered in any significant way, why did no one ever say it was altered from what they saw on the first day? I sure would have. And the wait was not until 1975. Because during the legal proceedings against Clay Shaw, Jim Garrison ran off many copies of the film for researchers like Penn Jones living in the Dallas area. Further, at the trial of Shaw, Zapruder was a witness. He was asked more than once if the film shown in court was the original. He replied in the affirmative each time. (Trial transcript of 2/13/69)

    Horne realizes this is a problem for him. So he does something that I personally had not seen before. He says that when Life went ahead and raised its offer to Zapruder by an additional hundred thousand dollars, this was not just to purchase motion picture rights in addition to still picture rights. This was really to pay out hush money to Zapruder for him to shut up about the movie being altered. (p. 1242) I don’t quite understand this. First, did Dick Stolley – the Time-Life rep with Zapruder – know the film was going to be altered? And did he transmit these oral instructions to Zapruder? If so, what is the evidence for that? Second, once the agreement was signed, Zapruder was going to get his money as long as he did not sell any picture or movie rights on his own. Which he did not. Was there a clause in the contract that forbade him from even speaking about the film? If there was, Horne does not print it. Third, the true monetary value of Zapruder’s film was in the motion picture rights, which the family made tons of money off of, not the still picture rights. So the large increase in the offer seems quite logical – since Zapruder could have made real money by leasing out those rights.

    Now, what Time-Life did with the film is reprehensible. Once they had the motion picture rights, they kept the film almost completely hidden for 11 years. (The exception being Garrison’s subpoena for the Shaw trial.) But that does not necessarily denote Horne’s alteration thesis. Most people know that men like Henry Luce and C.D. Jackson of Time-Life were staunch Cold Warrior types who dreamed of an American Century. And like John McCloy, they did not want to give away evidence that turned the USA into a version of a Banana Republic, and the Warren Commission into a kangaroo court. Especially after Life had been used to incriminate Oswald by putting one of the specious backyard photos on its cover, thereby greasing the skids for the Commission. So any dramatic evidence of conspiracy, which the Z film was and is, was going to stay under wraps with these guys.

    Let’s get to what Horne considers his best evidence for Zapruder film alteration. I see this as three main issues:

    1. The “briefing board” matters at NPIC;
    2. David Lifton’s “full flush left” argument; and
    3. The “Hollywood Group” and the painted on black patch and head burst.

    This first is an issue that Horne has written about previously. (See Murder in Dealey Plaza, (pp. 311-324) What Horne is saying is that what he thinks was the original was first sent to a CIA photographic plant in Rochester called Hawkeye Works, and then forwarded to the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in the Washington area. (Horne, p. 1220) The basis for this are 1997 interviews done by the ARRB with two men named Homer McMahon and Ben Hunter – and later interviews with Dino Brugioni. All three men worked at NPIC in 1963. Hunter worked for and with McMahon. McMahon said that a mysterious man named Bill Smith (not his real name) brought the Zapruder film to NPIC. Smith was supposed to be a Secret Service agent and they wanted the CIA to do an analysis of the film. Smith told McMahon that the original film had been flown from Dallas to a Kodak facility in Rochester, New York. It was developed there and he was delivering copies for analysis. (Horne, p. 1223-24) Briefing boards were made of certain enlarged frames.

    Again, let us note that the two men were recalling something that happened 34 years previous – which is always tricky business in measuring credibility. Horne buys it all and says he believes that Bill Smith told the truth about the film he carried to NPIC and it being developed in Rochester. Yet, no one knows who Smith really is, and the ARRB never talked to him. But based on this decades-old testimony, Horne now says that “the extant film in the Archives is not a camera original film, but a simulated “original” created with an optical printer at the CIA’s secret film lab in Rochester.” (p. 1226)

    Horne now goes to Brugioni and tries to get some tie-in between what Hunter and McMahon described and what Brugioni recalls. (p. 1231) Now recall, the above testimony is well over 30 years past the event. But Brugioni’s case is even worse. He was not interviewed until 2009! Which is almost half a century after the event. Yet Horne shows no trepidation about using the nearly five-decade-old memories of a man who was 87 years old at the time of the recall.

    Brugioni first thought his work on Zapruder began on the night of the assassination. He then changed this to the next day. But he had previously told author David Wrone that he began his work on Sunday, the 24th. (p. 1231) He eventually decided that the start date was Saturday. The actual date of his briefing of Director John McCone would help here, but I could not find any written evidence for this exact date.

    What is Horne getting at here? He is saying that these are two distinct events and the end product was two different films. Horne says that the Brugioni film was unaltered and the other McMahon-Hunter film was altered. Altered to what, he doesn’t say. But again, this scenario seems to present a problem. To go through everything the analysts did with the film would mean you would have had to study it. If the Brugioni film was unaltered, then why does no one recall any differences between what they saw at NPIC and what was later revealed in the film we have today? I don’t recall this question being addressed by Horne. Secondly, why on earth would the conspirators on this Zapruder film assignment bring both an altered and unaltered version of the film to the same place at the same time where both versions could be plainly seen and analyzed? Again, I did not see this question addressed by the author.

    Why is it not posed? Probably because Horne needs this to be another “compartmentalized” operation. If the film Brugioni worked on for McCone is the same one that McMahon and Hunter got from Smith, then his thesis is pretty much gone. The problem is this: Because of the decades-old recall and the indefiniteness of the start and end dates for all three men, that possibility is a distinct one.

    Let us now go to the Horne-Lifton “full flush left” (ffl) argument. What this means is that images on the Zapruder film bleed over into the sprocket area and even over it. Lifton believed this to be proof that the film we have is not the original but a copy, which was printed on an optical printer. Since, as he insisted, the Zapruder camera should not be able to produce this effect. Lifton also said that Kodak expert Roland Zavada had not been able to duplicate this effect in his authentication experiments for the ARRB. In fact, in a talk on You Tube for a conference by Jim Fetzer, Lifton actually said that he would take this ffl evidence “to the bank.”

    Well, I hope not too many people took that advice. The check would have been returned for “insufficient funds”. First of all, according to Robert Groden, with an optical printer working one frame at a time with a shuttle mechanism, the image would not be allowed to stray outside the sprocket area. (Communication with Groden, 7/21/10) Further, as Tink Thompson pointed out in a post at the Spartacus Educational site in December of 2009, Zavada did produce frames where this effect was exhibited. But Horne and Lifton only consulted a low resolution B & W version of Zavada’s work, which made it difficult to discern. Thompson added in another post on 1/12/10 that the effect is seen clearly in high-resolution color versions.

    Horne and Lifton then said that the experiment would have to produce continuous ffl to have accuracy. The problem here is that, for a second time, the pair seem to have ignored evidence to keep their thesis alive. Horne writes that three or four years ago he received a DVD of a film shot by Rick Janowitz. It was shot in Dealey Plaza on a same type camera as Zapruder’s Bell and Howell. (p. 1290) Horne admits that the film does “appear” to show consistent ffl. Yet he then writes that he has no way of authenticating this film. This is an odd argument to make. Janowitz is a research associate of Dave Healey and Scott Myers, whom Horne and Lifton know of. It would have been easy to call one of them, and in turn to be put in contact with Rick. He would have then testified to the terms of the experiment.

    Craig Lamson also got hold of the Janowitz test film. He posted the results on the Spartacus site on January 22, 2010. The experiment shows that you can attain consistent ffl with a camera just like Zapruder’s. And the effect is in agreement with what is on the film.

    Horne’s third major argument is that a “black patch” was inserted in the back of Kennedy’s head to conceal an exit wound there, and the front head wound is “painted in”. (ppg. 1358-61) The evidence for this is a group of Hollywood editors and restoration professionals who have made very high resolution scans of the film. Horne includes their comments on these scans: “Oh, that’s horrible, that’s just terrible! That’s such a bad fake.” Another is, “”We’re not looking at opticals; we are looking at artwork.”

    Again, there are some problems with this. First, as Robert Groden has stated, you can see a hole in the back of Kennedy’s head in the Zapruder film. So whoever put the “black patch” on, did not do a very good job. Second, Kodachrome II, the film used by Zapruder is, for that time, and that gauge, very high quality film. So when one makes enlarged slides or still pictures from it, much of the information is preserved. If this painted on effect is not visible in 35 mm enlargements or 4 x 5 Ektachrome enlargements, then how could it be so obvious on a digitalized scan? With apprehension and curiosity, I await to see the results. It should be interesting.

    Much of the rest of this chapter is Horne’s unrestrained and bitter attack on Roland Zavada. Zavada was the Kodak chemist who the company brought out of retirement to conduct the authenticity study of the film. His report concluded the film was genuine. Horne, the man who instigated the test, didn’t like that. So he wades into Zavada, fists flying. I won’t enumerate all the technical points, since to me they are arcane and somewhat boring. And as I say, I don’t have a dog in this fight. But I was put off by the personal insults Horne hurled at Zavada. On page 1283, he is referred to as “pathological.” On page 1292 he is termed an “intentional saboteur.” On page 1293 Horne scores a two-fer, Zavada is said to be “acting as a CIA agent” and also “to ignore or rewrite history.” He then says the man has destroyed his own credibility and should retire from any further involvement in the debate over the film. (p. 1281) This, from a guy who pushed the full flush left argument when, for years, he had evidence that undermined it.

    Maybe the film has been altered. Maybe it hasn’t. As I said, I don’t have a dog in this fight. But the highly inflammatory language Horne uses here does not seem to do justice to this debate. (Click here for Zavada’s reply to Horne.)

    IV

    The last volume of the series has two chapters to it. Chapter 15 is entitled “The Setup – Planning the Texas Trip and the Dallas Motorcade;” chapter 16 is called simply “Inconvenient Truths.” The first deals with the origination and planning of the trip to Texas by the White House; the second with what Horne perceives to be the motivating factors behind the murder of President Kennedy.

    This volume is 425 pages long. I took by far the least amount of notes on it than I did for any volume. If you know this material and have studied Kennedy’s presidency, there is very little that is new or enlightening in it. I feel safe in predicting that no one in the near future is going to do better than Jim Douglass at explaining the political circumstances of President Kennedy’s death. And, to his credit, Horne praises JFK and the Unspeakable. But I found very little original in this volume. And I didn’t think Horne brought any new insights into the material that he profusely borrowed. Further, as we shall see, he made two or three questionable choices in the sources he did use.

    The first chapter in the last volume is again partly owed to David Lifton. Lifton believes Lyndon Johnson was an integral part of the plot, and that Jerry Bruno’s advance man work on the motorcade route is important to the workings of the conspiracy.

    Like John Hankey, Horne feels that somehow John Connally was an agent of the plot. And that he and LBJ somehow lured Kennedy to Texas in the fall of 1963. How President Kennedy could be lured into doing something he did not want to do as major as this, escapes me. But this seems to be the premise of this chapter. Arthur Schlesinger, for one, did not see it that way. He wrote that, as the election approached, Kennedy looked to Johnson for help in Texas. He specifically wanted him to use his influence to help stop the warring factions of the Texas Democratic party. This meant the liberal and conservative wings as represented respectively by Sen. Ralph Yarborough and Governor Connally. (A Thousand Days, p. 1019) Ted Sorenson says much the same thing about the genesis of the Texas excursion: “His trip to Texas…was a journey of reconciliation – to harmonize the warring factions of Texas Democrats, to dispel the myths of the right-wing in one of its strongest citadels, and to broaden the base for his own re-election in 1964.” (Kennedy, p. 843) From these two men, who were both quite close to Kennedy, and worked with him at the White House, JFK wanted to go to Texas for quite practical political reasons.

    But Horne sees it as otherwise. And he uses John Connally’s article in Life magazine of 11/24/67 to indict the governor. He goes after Connally for saying that he was not all that eager for Kennedy to go to Texas. (p. 1386) Which considering the fact he was much more moderate than Kennedy, and the ugly incident that had just occurred with Adlai Stevenson being spat upon, is kind of understandable. Horne counters this with a quote from Evelyn Lincoln’s book, Kennedy and Johnson, in which she writes that Kennedy told her that Connally seemed anxious for JFK to go. (ibid) But Horne does not supply the timeline for this quote. The reality as pointed out in our Hankey exposé is that Connally (who had become the point man with the White House on the excursion). (ibid, p. 1387) was reluctant at first, but once persuaded, was eager to get it over and done with as quickly as possible (Jim Reston, The Lone Star: The Life of John Connally pp. 240-260)

    Connally and LBJ are not enough for Horne. He entitles one sub-chapter, “The Crucial role of Congressman Al Thomas in Luring JFK to Texas and Why It Matters.” Let’s be upfront about this: In Best Evidence, Lifton shows pictures of Thomas looking at Johnson after he was sworn in on Air Force One. Thomas appears to wink at LBJ after he has taken the oath. Consequently, this means he is part of the plot. Question: What if he had just shook hands with Johnson? What would that have meant to Horne and Lifton? More or less?

    In talks with Jim Marrs, he has told me that it is not necessarily true that the choice of the Trade Mart necessitated the dogleg turns in Dealey Plaza. He has told me that all that was necessary was to place a relatively short wood platform on the road and the motorcade could have accessed the freeway from Main Street. (Horne, p. 1397) Connally opposed a parade route. The parade route was specifically organised by Secret Service men Winston Lawson and Forrest Sorrels, who overrode the Dallas authorities they were supposed to plan it with. Horne also makes much of the insistence by Connally of having the luncheon at the Trade Mart instead of the Women’s Center. Yes, the latter could accommodate more people, but Connally’s image as a business-oriented Democrat could be said it was more in keeping with the Trade Mart, Connally loudly voiced security concerns about the final venue’s size, referring to the Trade Mart’s balcony and 53 entrances. He was also uninformed of the actual parade route (WCR pp.27-30; Vince Palamara: Survivors Guilt pp.2-9)

    To his credit, Horne uses much of Vince Palamara’s good work on the Secret Service and their incredible negligence in making the assassination possible. For instance, the number of motorcycles was reduced and, weirdly, they were placed to the rear. (p. 1401) And that this decision was later falsely placed on the president. He also mentions the quite curious behavior of Secret Service agent Emory Roberts in ordering Henry Rybka off the fender of the presidential limousine at Love Field. (p. 1410)

    But after relaying this good information, Horne does something puzzling. He feels he has to justify why the Secret Service did what it did. So he then includes a weird section in which he uses the work of Sy Hersh and his thoroughly discredited hatchet job of a book, The Dark Side of Camelot. He tries to say that the agents resented covering up for Kennedy’s affairs and this caused “deep-seated feelings of disapproval and disloyalty” among the White House detail. (p. 1421) But not only does Horne use the Hersh book, he also uses the pitiful ABC documentary derived from it, Dangerous World. But even worse, he actually takes both of these seriously. All the way down the line.

    Yet, right around when this show was broadcast, Probe did a two part series on this general subject. (Probe, Vol. 4 No. 6, Vol. 5 No. 1) It was entitled “The Posthumous Assassination of John F. Kennedy”. It was one of the most popular and influential essays we ever published. It went directly after both ABC and Hersh. And we exposed Hersh as being the long-term CIA asset he has always been. And we showed the serious flaws in Hersh’s book. But after all that, Horne wades into this dangerous morass and uses the most ridiculous parts of Hersh, e.g., that Kennedy had nude skinny-dipping swim parties at the White House when Jackie was away. It should be noted that some of the show’s charges were so outrageous, that the ARRB investigated them. They found out two interesting things: that one of Hersh’s sources would not testify under oath, and secondly, that he seemed to have been recruited for Hersh by another CIA friendly writer, namely Gus Russo.

    Horne’s indiscriminate use of material is capped by his acceptance of one of the most dubious tales in the literature: the assassination eve gathering at the Murchison ranch. Not only does Horne buy it, but he uses the most updated version of it, that is with J. Edgar Hoover and John McCloy in attendance. (p. 1429) As Seamus Coogan noted in his essay on Alex Jones, this is hard to believe since both men were in Washington the next morning. Horne borrows heavily for this from what I think is Harry Livingstone’s worst book, Killing the Truth. For many of the ‘revelations’ in that book, Livingstone used a nameless man whom he simply called ‘the source.’ Uh-huh.

    But Horne also uses two other questionable source books in the Texas aspect of his overall conspiracy. They are at about the level of the Livingstone book, maybe worse: Craig Zirbel’s The Texas Connection and Barr McClellan’s Blood, Money, and Power. (The latter is part of Alex Jones’ scripture on the JFK case.) To go through all the problems in using these two books would take an essay about half as long as this one. But to be brief, Horne wants to use Zirbel, because he describes an argument between Kennedy and Johnson about who is going to ride where in the motorcade. Allegedly, Johnson wanted to move Ralph Yarborough into the presidential limousine and have Connally ride with him. This would make no sense according to Schlesinger’s view of the whole enterprise, since the objective was to mend over the moderate vs. liberal split. According to Zirbel this happened on Thursday evening when LBJ entered Kennedy’s suite and has a knock-down, drag-out argument with him. One that was so loud that “the First Lady heard the shouting in the next room.” (Zirbel, pp. 190-91)

    There are three problems with this as I see it. First, it must have been really late at night since the entourage did not arrive at the Fort Worth hotel from Houston until after 11: 15 PM. (See William Manchester, Death of a President, pp. 88-89) How would this allow for Johnson to get to the Murchison gathering at any kind of decent hour? And if it was that kind of scene, would not people notice him going out the front or back door afterwards? Or did he really go back upstairs to his room, and then sneak out even later?

    Second, if this was the reason for the meeting, why would LBJ confront JFK with it directly? Wouldn’t it be more clever and less risky to just pull a last minute switch the next day? After all, according to Horne, the Secret Service is part of the plot. If Kennedy would object the next morning, at least it could be chalked up to a Secret Service error and not to LBJ.

    Third, this whole nasty argument takes about a page in Zirbel’s book. Not one sentence is footnoted. But what Zirbel seems to have done is switched a meeting Manchester wrote about on the night before, that is on the 20th, to the 21st. (Manchester, p. 82) I think he failed to footnote it so you would not notice that he had lifted it and switched it from Manchester. Obviously if you switch it to Thursday night, you make it more sinister and it helps explain a conspiratorial problem for the Texas angle. Namely, if Connally and LBJ were part of the plot, why on earth would they allow Connally to be in the direct line of fire, from both the front and back? So by moving it to the night before, Zirbel makes it look like LBJ was trying to prevent that dilemma for his partner, Connally.

    Horne hints at what Zirbel did, but he does not spell it out. (Horne, p. 1428) He also says that Manchester was not forthcoming about the details of this confrontation from the night before. But if you compare the two renditions of the two episodes, it is clear that Zirbel has borrowed much of what he writes from Manchester. Manchester wrote that the discussion was about Kennedy’s concern for Yarborough not being slighted. Zirbel expanded this into the seating arrangement argument. But since he does not footnote his version, we don’t know what his basis was for doing that. But most of the other details seem derived from Manchester.

    Why Horne would source Barr McClellan’s book Blood, Money and Power is a complete puzzle to me. Seamus Coogan was criticized by George Bailey who runs the “Oswald’s Mother” site about his reference to the McClellan book as the worst in the last 15 years. Bailey said that no, Case Closed was the worst. Since the Posner book was published more than 15 years ago, Bailey was off base. Perhaps Reclaiming History could then qualify. But then, how many people have read that whole book? The McClellan book did get some publicity. This is unfortunate since it really is a very bad book. (One must differentiate between the book and the annex by the late Nathan Darby on the fingerprint evidence.)

    One of the problems with it is that there is very little annotation to all of the most sensational charges. For instance, the author states that LBJ went into psychotherapy toward the end of his life and confessed to his doctor that he was behind the murder of President Kennedy. (McClellan, p. 3) What is his source for this? Not the doctor himself, nor any written report. It’s a conversation he said he had with a partner in Johnson’s law firm, Don Thomas. The obvious questions are twofold 1.) Why would the partner reveal this to McClellan? And 2.) Why would LBJ tell the partner? If you can believe it, the author says that Johnson wanted to somehow elevate his reputation out of the Vietnam gutter, and this is why he claimed credit for Kennedy’s murder. (ibid, pp. 283-84)

    The entire text of the book is like this. One gets these sensational disclosures, and then one searches in vain for the backing in the End Notes. We are to believe that LBJ learned about the art of assassination from the attempt on FDR. (ibid p. 39) Thomas told McClellan that he was involved in the famous stealing of the 1948 senatorial election by LBJ from Coke Stevenson. Then you go to the sourcing. This is what it says: “The information came in many ways. Over drinks after work, during the firm parties, at early Saturday morning coffee, and just the daily office talk.” (ibid,p. 350) Sorry, not good enough.

    McClellan later says that his boss, attorney Ed Clark, brokered a deal with Joe Kennedy to put LBJ on the 1960 ticket. When one looks for the sourcing on this, you will find: “The deal was advertised to clients on several occasions…” (ibid, p. 356)

    But this is nothing compared to how McClellan deals with the actual facts of the assassination. He says that Clark started the plot going in 1962 by looking for a second sniper – the first of course being Mac Wallace. And he called Leon Jaworksi for help. When one goes to the footnote for this, you will find: “”Despite several solid leads and close ties to Clark, the better course for the present is to withhold judgment pending further research and strong corroborating evidence. At this time our leads are through Jaworksi and Cofield, and our key suspects fit into the Clark modus operandi. The accomplices may never be identified with certainty.” (ibid, p. 358) In other words, he has nothing to back up this assumption.

    Later on McClellan writes that he doesn’t know how Wallace met Oswald, but they did meet, “and that they were together on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository when Kennedy was shot.” (ibid, p. 179) There is next to no evidence that Oswald was on the sixth floor that day. But further, the author then makes up a scenario for Wallace meeting Oswald. The problem is that it takes place at a print shop in Dallas in late 1962. Yet, Oswald did not print any flyers at that time! So how could it happen? (ibid, p. 267)

    Further, in defiance of the ballistics evidence, the author has Oswald firing at Edwin Walker and killing Tippit. (ibid, pp. 211, 267) And in further defiance of the puzzling postal records, the author says Oswald ordered the murder weapons. (ibid, p. 267)

    Backing up the whole Penn Jones/Madeleine Brown scenario, McClellan goes with the Murchison murder gathering on the eve of the assassination. (ibid, p. 271) During which the infamous ads that ran in the papers were on poster on the walls. And Mr. Clark predicted that very soon LBJ would be the new president. Cheers broke out among the partygoers. So now, even more details have been added to this ever-evolving story about the gathering.

    McClellan says he has found out how Clark was paid for the operation. (p. 234) To say his evidence is unconvincing is to give it too much credit. He then says that although Mac Wallace died in a car accident, he was actually killed by people associated with Clark. (p. 242) This is his evidence: “The medical report shows extensive physical injuries that are not consistent with the damages to the auto.” (ibid, p. 362) This is weird because McClellan says that Wallace was in a weakened state by attempted carbon monoxide poisoning, and this is what caused the accident. How could that attempted poisoning cause “extensive physical injuries”.

    Maybe someday someone will write a convincing and scholarly book on Johnson’s involvement in the JFK murder. But these two fall far short of that mark. And Horne should not have used them, since by doing so he implicitly recommends them. They are not worth recommending. Not by a longshot. In fact, once analyzed, they are the kinds of books that can be used to caricature researchers.

    V

    The last chapter in the book is titled “Inconvenient Truths.” In it, Horne tries to…well…it is hard to say what he is trying to do. I think he is trying to explain why the parts of the government turned on Kennedy. Specifically, the Pentagon, J. Edgar Hoover, and parts of the CIA – he specifically names James Angleton, David Phillip, Dave Morales, and Ed Lansdale as being in on the plot. (pp. 1628-47) And he tries to make it clear that his version is not just a Texas based one. For him, LBJ and Hoover are enablers. (p. 1800)

    In this last chapter, I think Horne was trying to pull off what Jim Douglass did so memorably in his fine book, JFK and The Unspeakable. That is, he tries to define what made Kennedy a marked man in the eyes of some. Considering this section is almost 300 pages long and JFK and the Unspeakable is 393 pages of text, Horne sure had the space to do it in. In my opinion, he doesn’t even come close. As compared to Douglass’ original, smooth, and pungent approach, I thought much of Horne’s analysis was rather trite, dull, and in some places, coarse. For example, apparently still under the influence of Hersh’s trashy book, he writes that Hoover was a closeted homosexual who prosecuted gays yet engaged in “bizarre sex with other men in private that would have destroyed his career immediately if it had become publicly known. He despised John F. Kennedy first of all simply because Jack Kennedy was somewhat of a satyr, and loved being with women.” (p. 1496) Like many things in the book, this is not footnoted. Having read most of the important bios of Hoover, I don’t recall reading this in any of the four standards (by Powers, Theoharis, Gentry and Summers). I don’t even recall it in Tony Summers’ book, which actually concentrates on Hoover’s sex life. Now Horne inserts this questionable data in his text, yet I could not find any place where he mentions Oswald’s likely status as an FBI informant as a real reason for Hoover’s willingness to cooperate in the cover-up.

    In this long last inchoate section, Horne relies almost completely on John Newman for his Vietnam material, even though we now have a small shelf of books on this issue, including books by David Kaiser and Howard Jones. He spends an inordinate amount of space on the Missile Crisis, and in my view, he slights the Bay of Pigs episode. At one point he actually says that JFK seemed “indecisive and unresponsive” during the Bay of Pigs. (p. 1534) I believe this is wrong in and of itself, but beyond that, it does not incorporate the fact that Kennedy did not fully understand what the CIA was doing to him until after the fact. Further, I actually believe that he never really understood that, in fact, if the invasion had succeeded, the Agency was not going to let the Kennedy Cubans take power in a new Cuba. In his discussion of the famous Harry Truman anti-CIA editorial of December 1963, Horne was unaware of the new bombshell revelations about Allen Dulles’ visit to Truman while he was on the Warren Commission. The CIA Director actually tried to get him to retract the essay.

    Some of the elements that Horne throws in here as motivations for the conspiracy are just, well, kind of weird. I mean the Edward Teller-Robert Oppenheimer dispute over atomic energy? Never heard of that one in any JFK book. But somehow, Horne puts it in here. (p. 1680) Kennedy’s directive to seek out cooperation with the Russians on a voyage to the moon? Horne throws that in the mixer also. (p. 1681) And some of the political commentators he uses on the case are just as unusual. Whoever thought that we would see Noam Chomsky quoted in a pro-conspiracy book? Does Gary Hart strike one as being a profound thinker on the gestalt of the JFK case? Well, Horne seems to think so. (pp. 1672-74)

    Then there are the rather jarring and simplistic errors, which betray the author’s need for both a proofreader and an editor. He calls Gaeton Fonzi’s wonderful and invaluable book about the HSCA, The Final Investigation. The author of the quasi-official history of the Bay of Pigs operation is called Dryden, when his last name is Wyden. The legendary CBS journalist – who George Clooney made a whole movie about – becomes William Morrow. And he ends, rather predictably, with an unwarranted slam at the Kennedy family. (p. 1767) The evidence of this last hodge-podge chapter shows that Horne’s reach exceeded his grasp.

    I have been at pains to show what was valuable in this book. And there is much of value, if you are willing to spend a lot of time sifting through five volumes. How many people are willing to do so? After reading this and Reclaiming History, I think there is a message in the nearly 4,500 total pages. No one should ever write another book on this case as long as these. The length of the Bugliosi book was meant to be intimidating. I mean how could a book that long not be valuable? With Horne, I think he desired to spill out almost everything he felt and knew about the JFK case into one book. Unfortunately, that resulted in a rather unorganized and undisciplined approach – an approach that left out the most important person: the reader.

    At the Actor’s Studio in New York there is a famous adage: “Bring it down,” meaning that, the less work expended conveying a thought or emotion, the better. Because, many times, more is not better. It’s just more.

    If Inside the ARRB had been half as long, it might have been twice as good.

  • The Impossible One Day Journey of CE 399


    (with a little help from J. Edgar Hoover)

    In 1966, Ray Marcus wrote a very important monograph called The Bastard Bullet. It detailed the journey of the bullet found by hospital attendant Darrell Tomlinson and chief of security O. P. Wright at Parkland Hospital to FBI headquarters on the evening of November 22, 1963. Marcus’ work was exemplary for that time. But since then, and with help from the Assassination Records Review Board, more information has emerged that fills in some of the cracks and crevices in that incredible journey. Specifically this is the work of Gary Aguilar and Josiah Thompson in the essay entitled “The Magical Bullet of the Kennedy Assassination” (The Assassinations, edited by James DiEugenio and Lisa Pease) and two essays at the JFK Lancer site by John Hunt: “Phantom Identification of the Magic Bullet” and “The Mystery of the 7:30 Bullet”.

    With this new work in mind, let us update the work of Ray Marcus in regard to the impossible journey of CE 399 on the day President Kenendy was shot. Keeping in mind, that as Dr. Cyril Wecht has noted, the Single Bullet Theory is the “sine que non” of the Warren Commission. Without it, the Commission’s verdict collapses and you hae a conspiracy. And without the Commission’s shiny copper coated, virtually pristine CE 399, there is no Single Bullet Theory.

    1. CE 399 begins its magical journey at Parkland Hospital. A bullet rolls out from under a mat and lodges against the side of the gurney. (Mark Lane, Rush to Judgment, p. 79) Question: How did it get under the mat? Remember, the Commission will later say this bullet was in John Connally’s body last. No one has ever answered this question.
    2. Even Vincent Bugliosi admits that the stretcher it originated from is under question. (Reclaiming History, End Notes, p. 426) But Bugliosi understates the problem here. The weight of the evidence says that the gurney it was found on belonged to neither President Kennedy nor Governor John Connally. (Sylvia Meagher, Accessories After the Fact, pgs. 174-176; Josiah Thompson, Six Seconds in Dallas, pgs. 154-64) It would be a physical impossibility for the bullet to somehow jump from Ron Fuller’s stretcher—where Thompson concludes it was found on- to someone else’s.
    3. When hospital attendant Darrell Tomlinson notices it, the bullet has no blood or tissue on it. (Meagher, p. 173) Yet the Commission will say that this bullet went through two men and caused seven wounds.
    4. But yet, it’s even worse than that. Why? Because the Commission will eventually say that the last resting place of this bullet was in the thigh of Governor Connally. How could 1.) The bullet reverse trajectory and work its way out? 2.) How could it emerge out of a wound it already made? Most pathologists will tell you that entry wounds slightly shrink afterwards. 3.) Further, how could it have no blood or tissue on it if it traversed backwards?
    5. Tomlinson picks up the bullet at about 1:45 PM and takes it to security officer O. P. Wright. (Thompson, p. 156) Wright is very familiar with firearms since he was with the sheriff’s office previously. (ibid, p. 175) Wright gets a good look at the bullet, he notes it as a lead colored, pointed nosed, hunting round. (ibid) This is extremely important since this bullet will change shape and color by the end of its journey.
    6. This bullet will be passed through to Secret Service officers Richard Johnsen and Jim Rowley. (Hunt, “The Mystery of the 7:30 Bullet; http://www.jfklancer.com/hunt/mystery.html) Yet neither of them will initial the bullet. (Hunt, “Phantom Identification of the Magic Bullet”; http://jfklancer.com/hunt/phantom.htm) And later, neither positively identified it. (Aguilar, p. 282)
    7. At the White House, Rowley turns a bullet over to FBI agent Elmer Todd. They sign a receipt. The time of the transfer is 8:50 PM on the 22nd. (Hunt, “The Mystery of the 7:30 Bullet”)
    8. Yet as John Hunt shows, agent Robert Frazier at the FBI lab enters the stretcher bullet’s arrival into his notes at 7:30! (ibid) As Hunt notes, if Frazier and Todd can both tell time, something is really wrong here. Frazier has received a bullet that Todd has not given him yet.
    9. But it’s even worse. For in an FBI document it says that Todd’s initials are on the bullet. (CE 2011, at WC Vol. 24, p. 412) Yet as Hunt has amply demonstrated, they are not there. (Hunt, “Phantom Identification of the Magic Bullet”) In other words, no one who carried this bullet in transit for law enforcement purposes–Johnsen, Rowley, Todd–put their initials on it. When that is what they are trained to do.
    10. Later on, J. Edgar Hoover realizes he has a problem. So he writes up a document saying that agent Bardwell Odum visited Parkland, and Wright and Tomlinson did identify the bullet in June of 1964. (Aguilar, p. 282)
    11. But later, when visited by Gary Aguilar and Tink Thompson, this is exposed as another in the long line of Hoover generated lies in this case. For Odum did no such thing, and he says he would have recalled doing so since he and Wright were friends. (ibid, p. 284)
    12. The night of the assassination, the FBI calls Tomlinson about midnight. They tell him to be quiet about what he found that day. Since what he found that day was a lead colored, sharp nosed hunting round, they must not want him to tell anyone about the bullet. (Jim Marrs, Crossfire, p. 365; David Lifton, Best Evidence, p. 591) A natural question to ask is: Why? A natural answer is: Because they have realized that the original bullet will not match the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle now attributed to Oswald.
    13. When Wright composes his affidavit for the WC, incredibly, he leaves out his co-discovery of the bullet and his giving it to the Secret Service. (Lifton, ibid) Even though Johnsen recorded this and its in the volumes. (Thompson, p. 155) Since he was a former law enforcement officer, to leave something like that out, he was probably directed to.
    14. When it comes time to write the Warren Report, Wright’s name is not in it. And there is no evidence Arlen Specter interviewed him.
    15. In late 1966, we find out why Specter avoided him. Thompson interviews him and he rejects CE 399 as the bullet he gave Johnsen. Twice. (Thompson, p.175) Interestingly, in Reclaiming History, Vincent Bugliosi leaves this powerful incident out of his discussion of the issue. (Bugliosi, End Notes, pgs. 426-27, 544-45)

    To say that the chain of evidence rule has been violated in this case is a monumental understatement. Former Chief of Homicide in New York, attorney Bob Tanenbaum once said that it would be embarrassing to present this material to a jury for the prosecution. For me, the most incriminating elements is the evidence that the FBI knew that CE 399 was not the original bullet i.e. the call to Tomlinson, the fake Odum document, possibly the influence over Wright to leave it out of his affidavit, Specter avoiding Wright in the Commission inquiry.

    So from the beginning, with its reverse trajectory out of the thigh of Connally, to its incredible tunneling under a mat, to its leaping out of Ron Fuller’s stretcher and magically knowing it has to be on the governor’s, to its shocking ability to alter its form and color, and then to actually crack the time barrier and be in Frazier’s office before Todd gives it to him, the Impossible Journey of CE 399 is even more magical than anyone ever could imagine.

    What is truly incredible about the above demonstration is that I have left all the other arguments about the Magic Bullet out i.e. weight and trajectory etc. To me, in the face of the above, they are irrelevant. The CE 399 we know was not found at Parkland. And that ends this argument.

    Everything else—the computer simulations, the drawings etc.—is irrelevant. As Shakespeare said, it is sound and fury signifying nothing. At the time of the assassination, CE 399 as we know it today, did not exist.

  • John Hankey, Dark Legacy, aka JFK2 – JFK 2 Updated


    As Seamus Coogan noted in his deconstruction of John Hankey’s deleterious and delirious quasi-documentary JFK 2, Hankey has since gotten some advice and pro bono work from Hollywood. This resulted in a more professional version of the film. The title of the redo is Dark Legacy.

    This time around, at least the presentation is smoother and slicker. Some of the music has been improved. There are more modern graphics and effects, like fades and dissolves. The overall effect is to make the film easier on the eyes. And a little easier on the ear. (At times, Hankey still puts in his old acoustical folk song.)

    And someone prevailed upon Hankey to remove three of the worst howlers in the film. First, the immortally camp scenario of George Bush going into J. Edgar Hoover’s office with two Cuban thugs and threatening him with a flechette gun is gone. Second, the phony dialogue put in the mouth of Bill Colby about knowing George Bush and Howard Hunt were involved in the assassination in Dallas is also gone. Another egregious error about Kennedy letting the Russians search for Cuban training camps in the USA after the Missile Crisis is removed.

    Hankey has also added a new opening that focuses on the attributes of Kennedy’s presidency. He notes here the Steel Crisis, his civil rights program, his disarmament pledge, among others.

    But, still, even after the technical improvements and the surgery on some of the worst segments of the first version(s), it’s surprising how many errors were left intact. In other words, after all those years it was out, Seamus Coogan was the only person who took the time and effort to go after the film with a fine toothcomb. Which, of course, speaks well for CTKA, and poorly for the rest of the research community. Are we the only people doing fact checking? It appears that way. Which, of course, doesn’t say much for the so-called JFK research community.

    One would think the man would look up the proper spellings of names if one was going to depict those names on the screen. Hankey doesn’t, therefore names like Robert Blakey, and George Burkley and Aubrey Rike are spelled wrong. One would also think that the cutting of the film would match up correctly. Well, the two HSCA acoustic experts, Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy never testified before the Church Committee. And related to this, he depicts Dallas DA Henry Wade as Texas Attorney General Waggoner Carr.

    Hankey still includes the whole incredible 13 shot fusillade scenario. Unlike what Hankey intones as narrator, Richard Helms never testified at the trial of Howard Hunt and he never admitted that Marita Lorentz was a spy. (See Mark Lane, Plausible Denial, pgs. 214-225)

    With his usual penchant for overstatement, Hankey says that the above trial depicted in the Lane book showed that Hunt was guilty of killing president Kennedy. As Coogan showed, it did not. And Richard Nixon never said to Bob Haldeman that the whole “Bay of Pigs thing” message he sent to Helms meant the Kennedy assassination. This was a deduction later made by Haldeman. Guy Banister’s secretary Delphine Roberts never testified to the Warren Commission. And she never told anyone she saw Oswald at the training camp at Lake Pontchartrain. Strangely, Hankey adds in this version that parking lot manager Adrian Alba was Oswald’s closest associate in New Orleans. Yet, reportedly, all he did was read some magazines in his office.

    I could go on and on. But the point is that although three of the worst faux pas are gone, the great majority of the errors Coogan enumerated are still there. And let me add that concerning his case against George Bush, Hankey now adds the Parrott memorandum. I discussed this at length in my Russ Baker review. Bush at first denied and then could not recall his call about James Parrott to the FBI. My question: If you were an ambitious and successful Texas politician, would you want to admit you had some rightwing nut in your campaign headquarters a few months before JFK was killed? And that this man had threatened Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs? And unlike what Hankey insinuates, Bush was not in Dallas at the time of the shooting; he was in Tyler, Texas campaigning in front of a Kiwanis Club gathering.

    All in all, although the new version is a slight improvement, this is still an inferior film that does not do our cause any good.


    “The Dark Legacy of John Hankey”

    Hankey/DiEugenio Debate Murder Solved

    “Onwards and Downwards with John Hankey”

    Coogan Reply to Fetzer at Deep Politics Forum


    Master Class with John Hankey, Part 1

    Master Class with John Hankey, Part 2

    Master Class with John Hankey, Part 3

    Master Class with John Hankey, Part 4

  • Robert Groden Arrested

    Robert Groden Arrested


    groden
    Robert Groden in Dealey Plaza
    (CTKA file photo)

    Longtime Kennedy assassination critic and author Robert Groden is among Dealey Plaza vendors who are under renewed pressure from Dallas authorities.

    Groden was arrested in Dealey Plaza on June 13 and jailed for nearly nine hours.

    In a communication with CTKA, Groden discussed a posted story about a crackdown on JFK vendors in Dealey Plaza. He says he was arrested because of a complaint by the Sixth Floor Museum transferred to the Dallas Police.

    Groden says he was arrested for selling a single magazine on the grassy knoll.

    As described in the article “How Gary Mack Became Dan Rather”, Groden was ticketed by the Dallas Police Department 80 times between 1995 and 2006, and arrested on the grassy knoll for the first time in 1998. All 80 tickets (and the arrest) were thrown out of court as being invalid. Groden told CTKA that a city Judge stated, “I can’t believe that the police would arrest anyone for a class ‘C’ misdemeanor. This is ridiculous”.

    In 2003, Groden began filing a first amendment lawsuit against the city of Dallas and the police department for violation of first amendment rights of free speech, press and assembly. An agreement was reached between Mr. Groden’s attorneys and the Dallas city attorney’s office that the police would cease such ticketing actions. And for the past seven years the police and the city had honored the agreement.

    Groden theorizes that this may be because next year Dallas will be the site of the Super Bowl, drawing tens of thousands of tourists to the city. The number one tourist attraction in Dallas is Dealey Plaza. If all the other independent vendors are essentially stopped from selling anything, the Sixth Floor will be able to be the “one-stop”, so to speak, for potentially thousands of new visitors on the JFK case.

    Groden says most of the Dallas media are reporting that all of the “peddlers” in Dealey Plaza are refusing to obtain vendor permits from the city. What they fail to say, he goes on, is that there are no vender permits available from the city for printed material and that the city ordinance states that none is needed. In fact, Groden has been trying to access the process for getting one for 15 years. He hasn’t been able to find it. So up until now, although the city has ticketed him about 80 times, each attempt ultimately was dismissed and Groden returned to Dealey Plaza.

    Groden adds that the fig leaf for the crackdown is the fact that there are three or four homeless transients that frequent the area and get pushy with visitors from time to time. Groden doesn’t know these characters and has nothing to do with them. And his work is of a different quality and class than theirs. He insists there should be a legal way to differentiate between the two.

    Robert Groden is a recognized photo expert and author of The Killing of a President and several other books.

    ~Jim DiEugenio

  • Roads to Memphis (PBS)


     

    A bit more than two years ago, the Public Broadcasting System’s series The American Experience helped bring us Robert Stone’s cover – up documentary on the assassination of President Kennedy entitled Oswald’s Ghost. This was a skillfully done program that slickly recycled the Warren Commission verdict on the JFK case. While at the same time, the director got out a not so subliminal message: those who publicly doubted that verdict were actually undermining America. In my review of that program (which you can read here), I wrote that one of the more disturbing things about Oswald’s Ghost was that there was no discussion of the new evidence that the Assassination Records Review Board had declassified ten years previous. In fact, Stone seemed to have an aversion to any discussion of either the House Select Committee on Assassination’s inquiry or the ARRB’s declassification process. Because he failed to mention either in his film. The other disturbing aspect of Oswald’s Ghost was that Stone gave much more screen time to the Warren Commission advocates than he did its critics. Consequently, there was no debate on the evidence. The film essentially recycled the Commission’s caricature of Lee Harvey Oswald through the likes of prominent talking heads like Priscilla Johnson, Edward Epstein, Hugh Aynesworth and the late Norman Mailer.

    PBS and The American Experience are at it again. In May of this year, they did a historical whitewash on another major assassination of the sixties. This time it was the Martin Luther King case. The pretext for this disservice is the publication of a book by Hampton Sides called Hellhound on his Trail. After watching this documentary, Roads to Memphis, culled from his book, there is no need for anyone to read that volume. From the film, Mr. Sides has essentially taken his cue from William Bradford Huie’s earlier disinformation volume He Slew the Dreamer, which was originally published in 1970. This, of course, was right after alleged assassin James Earl Ray had been railroaded by his second lawyer Percy Foreman – with the help of Huie. Foreman had essentially told Ray that he would sabotage his case, and he would probably die in the electric chair, unless he pleaded guilty. This is something that his first legal team advised him not to do. Since they did not think that the state had anywhere near a good case against him. In fact, based on the evidence Arthur Hanes and his son had developed, the state offered a plea bargain with which Ray would have been out in ten years. Hanes advised Ray to decline, since he thought he could do better at trial. (See the book, The 13th Juror, p. 208)

    Ray made a terrible error when he decided to dismiss the Hanes team for the celebrity attorney Percy Foreman. All one needs to know about Foreman’s defense of Ray is this: after telling Ray he would hire a Memphis lawyer to do the pre – trial work, Foreman then arranged with Judge Preston Battle to get Ray a public defender. (The Assassinations, edited by James DiEugenio and Lisa Pease, p. 464) Then, even though Hanes offered Foreman the use of his case files, Foreman looked at them for all of ten minutes. And he never copied or used them. (ibid, p. 465) Although Foreman told Ray he would beat the rap, Foreman never planned on going to trial. (ibid, p. 464) Once he had the public defender in tow, he told him to begin negotiations with the DA’s office. (ibid,p. 464) The capper is this: Ray has stated that Foreman never even asked him “if he had fired the fatal shot at King or if he had been part of a conspiracy.” (ibid, p. 465)

    And this is where Huie comes in. Huie negotiated a deal with Foreman in which the attorney would share in all funds “accrued to Huie by sale of all rights to Ray’s story, including motion picture sales.” Foreman made about a hundred grand for his non – defense of Ray. (ibid) From his cooperation with the sabotaging Foreman, Huie then wrote his “Ray did it” tome. But that was not enough for the wealthy writer. For in 1977, during the initial phases of the HSCA, Huie got in contact with a representative of Ray named Jack Kershaw. They met at Thomas Nelson Publishing Company in Nashville. Huie relayed an offer to Ray through Kershaw. He said that if Ray would state in public that he had killed King, he would give him a check for $25, 0000. Kershaw then asked what good the money would do Ray if he was in prison. Huie replied he would also get him a pardon. Ray’s reply to Huie tells us a lot about both Huie and Ray’s case. When Kershaw informed him of the offer, Ray said he wanted no part of it. (The 13th Juror, p. 393)

    All one needs to know about Roads to Memphis is this: it deals with all the above events in three end titles at the finish of the program. They say that Ray pleaded guilty, that he then tried to change his plea, and that he died in jail in 1998. After covering up all I described above about what Huie and Foreman did – and more – the show essentially follows the paradigm that Huie established in his book: Ray was a piece of southern racist white trash. He had stalked King through the south, and then killed him by himself in Memphis on April 4, 1968. The guilty Ray then tried to escape through both Canada and England. But he was caught through an FBI manhunt using an alias at Heathrow Airport. It’s all cut and dried. What Huie did is similar to what the likes of Priscilla Johnson and others have done in the JFK field. Huie caricatured Ray, cut him off from any contacts except his brothers, supplied a motive which really was not there, and then concealed the actual circumstances of the crime. That is, he shoved all that rather interesting evidence under the rug. You know, the evidence that Arthur Hanes was set to go to trial on.

    And that is what Roads to Memphis does: it shoves the evidence under the rug. Except this program is even worse than Stone’s in its choice of talking heads. After beginning with a clip of Ray’s arrival in Memphis after being extradited from England, the first onscreen commentator is none other than Mr. CBS cover up himself, Dan Rather. Director Stephen Ives then tries to top himself. For the third talking head is the now disgraced plagiarist Gerald Posner. The fifth talking head is the Rev. Billy Kyles. Kyles was a Memphis pastor and a friend of King’s. At the 1999 civil trial of Loyd Jowers, Kyles was exposed to some rather strong cross examination and testimony as to some of his weird actions in Memphis on the eve of King’s assassination. (See these in section 2 of my 13th Juror review by clicking here.) So, with this source material, this attitude toward the evidence, and these commentators, the result was preordained: Huie is recycled. We get Ray the southern trash racist who stalked King.

    Let’s go over some of the things that Hampton Sides uses to try and incriminate Ray. For instance, he says that when Ray went through Atlanta in March of 1968 he happened to leave an Atlanta map behind. On the map, places like King’s office and home were marked. (He leaves out the fact that there were seven other maps found. Maps of places like California and Mexico. Only the Atlanta map was marked.) Of course, this story originated with William Bradford Huie. (Harold Weisberg, Martin Luther King: The Assassination, p. 279) Yet as Weisberg notes, this map was not found before, but after the fact. It was found by the FBI in the room Ray rented after King’s murder. (ibid) Even though the landlord, Billy Gardner, did find a note in the room at the time Ray left. (Weisberg, p. 190)

    Huie also wrote that Ray’s fingerprints were on the Atlanta map. Yet, as Weisberg notes, this is not accurate. Ray’s prints were found on a map of Mexico. (ibid) Further, if Ray had been to Atlanta to monitor these locations, why would he need to mark them on a map? Why didn’t he just write down their addresses and then dispose of the notepad?(ibid, p. 280)

    Mr. Sides also adds that, while in California, Ray asked two friends to register to vote for George Wallace in return for a ride to New Orleans. As Weisberg notes, this story – which originated with Charles Stein and his sister – surfaced after much contrary evidence, showing Ray was not a racist, appeared in the newspapers. Stein also tried to convey the impression that many people at Wallace headquarters knew Ray. (ibid, p. 360) But when Weisberg followed up on this he found out that Wallace’s California campaign coordinator stated that none of his staff knew Ray. And that a check of their files shows no one even associated with him. (ibid) In fact, Ray did not even take the brief moment required to apply his name, or any of his aliases, to any Wallace petition! (ibid) In truth, this anti – black motive was not even used by local DA Phil Canale at the mini – trial that Foreman agreed to. (ibid) And Stein was not called by the state as a witness. (ibid, p. 188) Further, there is really no serious indication to show that Ray was ever politically engaged, involved, or interested. Finally, no credible black witness who ever associated with Ray has ever stepped forward to say he was prejudiced.

    Yet, in the face of all the above, the program uses dramatizations showing Ray in a rented room watching Wallace rant on TV sets. It then juxtaposes these “broadcasts” with some of King’s speeches at the time. The unsubtle message being that Ray was admiring and agreeing with the former, and then angered and disturbed by the latter. And somehow, this drove him to murder. As Weisberg writes, this is all specious. But even if it were true, wouldn’t it describe literally hundreds of thousands of Americans at the time?

    The other technique used to ascribe a motive to Ray is the old Posnerian standby, which he also uses in the Kennedy case. Namely that Ray was such a loser with so little self – esteem that he killed King to add meaning to his existence. Presumably he would now go down in history as a “big man”. But then, after the shooting, Dan Rather tells us that Ray realized there was a slight miscalculation. He would not be hailed as a hero. Therefore he hightailed it out of Memphis. Dan the Man now comments that Ray must have breathed a sigh of relief that he was not caught. And he must have privately gloated that he had outwitted the SOB’s again. (Rather is some corner bar psychologist eh? This is what this goofball got paid seven million a year for?)

    But yet, the program is so desperate to establish a motive that it covers another base. Near the beginning of the show, when describing Ray’s stay in prison in the early sixties, Sides and Posner say that Ray probably heard of a bounty on King’s head by some Klan type groups in the south. And this may have inspired him to do what the did. But as several people have commented, if that were so, then why did Ray never even try to attempt to collect his cash reward, reportedly of about $50, 000? After all, Ray was free to do so for about two months after King’s death. King was shot on April 4th. Ray was not apprehended at Heathrow until June 8th. Further, there is no evidence that either of his two brothers, John or Jerry, attempted to collect it for him.

    Sides also adds that upon his return east from Los Angeles, Ray took out a General Delivery post office box in Atlanta. In this regard, it is appropriate to note that during the entire hour long show, there was not one mention of the name Raul. This is the man that Ray said maneuvered him from Canada into the USA from the second half of 1967 until the murder of King. This void is even more startling in light of the fact that TV producer Jack Saltman appears to have found out who Raul actually was. Further, that Ray had pointed out his picture back in 1977 and the HSCA appears to have known who he was. But further, even the Memphis Police seemed to have leads on him back in 1968! (See part 4 of my review of The 13th Juror.)

    Toward the end of the show, Sides very briefly comments on the whole conspiracy angle of the King murder. He gives it the back of his hand by saying that it is much too complicated. The implication being that such a conspiracy could not be kept straight by the perpetrators. To be fair to Sides, let us not argue that here. (See The 13th Juror for the actual details of how it worked.) But since the program unambiguously states that Ray did kill King, let us discuss that crucial point. Does the evidence actually make that case beyond a reasonable doubt? The viewer has no chance to judge for himself, since the evidence for the prosecution – let alone the defense – – is never presented. In light of that, let us present a small amount of it here.

    Is there a witness who places Ray in the bathroom at the time of the shooting? Well, sort of. His name is Charlie Stephens. Unfortunately for Sides, the man was dead drunk at the time. Though he still cooperated with the prosecution. Further, his common law wife, Grace Stephens – who would not cooperate – was sent to a mental institution for ten years. (DiEugenio and Pease pgs. 462, 466, 500 – 501)

    What about the rifle in question? What the show eliminates is that the Game Master 30.06 was not the first rifle Ray picked up. Ray picked up a different rifle first and then returned it a couple of days later. Why would one do such a thing if one was not following orders from above? Further, as Judge Joe Brown testified at the Jowers vs. King civil trial, the Game Master is a weapon that cannot be manually sited in to ensure the telescopic site is accurate. This rifle has to be machine calibrated. If not, the aim will very likely be off. (ibid, p. 469) The place where Ray bought the rifle did not have this machine.

    Third, if Ray shot King from that communal bathroom, he would have had to be standing in a bathtub. When Paris-Match tried to simulate this position, “they had to pose their model on the rim of the tub toward the back, and then contort him into a position to lift the rifle to the window.” (ibid, p. 462) I should add here, the state of Tennessee understands this problem. So today when you visit that exhibit at the Civil Rights Museum in Memphis, the tub has been moved further away from the window.

    Fourth, if Ray did the shooting, why could the FBI never positively match up the fatal bullet to the Game Master? And when Judge Brown wanted to proceed with conclusive tests which would prove this point once and for all, he was removed from the King case. (ibid, p. 453) I should add here, one of the local DA’s involved in removing Brown at the time – John Campbell – is one of the main talking heads on this show. For PBS, Sides, Rather and Posner were not imbalance enough.

    Finally, if one is to believe the official story, one has to believe that when Ray escaped the boarding house after shooting King, he did something unbelievably stupid. He dropped a bundle of his belongings on the ground outside Canipe’s Novelty store before jumping into his white Mustang. As Mark Lane has stated, if Ray did that he should be found not guilty by reason of insanity. (ibid, p. 462) But it’s actually worse than that. For at the civil trial it was revealed that the owner of Canipe’s, Guy Canipe, told Arthur Hanes that the bundle of articles was deposited in front of his store ten minutes before the shooting took place. (ibid, p. 500)

    So just with these few points, we have established that the case against Ray is a weak one. Consider the following:

    1. No credible witness places Ray in the bathroom at the time.

    2. The aim of the rifle in evidence was not properly calibrated and therefore was not accurate.

    3. Ray could not have positioned himself atop the bathtub in order to get an accurate shot fired.

    4. The fatal bullet was never matched to the rifle

    5. The rifle in evidence was dropped in front of Canipe’s store before the shot was fired.

    Not one word of any of the above is mentioned in this show. Even though all of it has been proven, and most of it was presented under oath, subject to cross – examination, at the civil trial. If it had been presented, then of course, there probably would have been no show. Since the program’s thesis would have been seriously undermined.

    And this is what is most troubling about this program. Like Robert Stone’s rigged film on Oswald, there is no real debate or dissent allowed. Thus there is no opportunity to challenge the nonsensical comments of buffoons like Dan Rather.

    Yet, recall, this is not CBS. This is PBS. Which is billed as alternative broadcasting. It is supposed to be something different than the mainstream. Dan Rather is not different than the mainstream. He is the mainstream. He epitomizes everything that was wrong with broadcast journalism for the past fifty years. While he did quite well shilling for his corporate sponsors, he is one of the reasons the rest of us are not so well off today. Yet here he is, on so – called alternative TV reciting the same script he did for CBS. Repeating the same lies he did back in the sixties and seventies on another outlet in the new millennium.

    What a disgrace. PBS should be ashamed of itself. The worst part of this sorry production though is this: they aren’t. That’s how compromised American Experience is on the assassinations of the sixties.

    Don’t ask me why.


    Addendum to Roads to Memphis

    I should have added three other points to the above review. They show just how intent on ignoring the 1999 King vs. Jowers civil trial director Stephen Ives was. For from the very title, the program tries to insinuate that James Earl Ray was following King through America in the last several months of his life. As I noted, the program completely eliminates the personage of Raul, the apparent CIA contact who manipulated Ray at his time. Therefore it cuts off the reason for Ray’s maneuverings. But it’s worse than that. As Ray’s lawyer William Pepper stated at trial, when King arrived in Los Angeles, Ray left the city. (The 13th Juror, p. 741) Further, there were several places that Ray was not in at all when King visited them in those months: Selma, New York, Chicago, and Florida.

    Secondly, the program’s use of the map found by the FBI in Atlanta is even worse than Harold Weisberg described. As Pepper told the jury in Memphis, “The Atlanta map is nowhere related to Dr. King’s residence. It is three oblong circles that covered general areas, one where he was living on Peachtree.” (ibid)

    Finally, I should have noted an extraordinary stroke that director Ives used in his “recreations”. During the speech that King gave the night before he was shot-the famous “Been to the Mountaintop” speech-Ives clearly insinuates that Ray is standing outside the door of the church. The problem with this “recreation” is that there is no evidence in the record for it. Even though there were 2,000 people in attendance, there is no witness who saw Ray at the Mason Temple Church. (Philip Melanson, The Martin Luther King Assassination, p. 2) Secondly, at the civil trial, in a video taped posthumous deposition, Ray gave a complete, hour by hour chronicling of his comings and goings in Memphis once he arrived at the New Rebel Motel on April 3rd. The opposing attorney never even asked Ray if he was at the Mason Temple Church. He knew he wasn’t. (The 13th Juror pgs. 658-673) Let us recall: this is a documentary into which Ives is inserting something for which he has no factual basis. We’re in John Hankey country.

    Any serious student of the King case should ignore both this program and the book by Hampton Sides. Instead, read The 13th Juror.

  • Arlen Specter: The Death of Mr. Magic Bullet

    Arlen Specter: The Death of Mr. Magic Bullet


    It finally happened. One of the most blatant political opportunists in contemporary American history tried to pull one too many tricks. Except this time, someone was there to call him on it. On May 18th, Arlen Specter’s inglorious 30 year reign as a Pennsylvania senator finally came to an overdue end. Except, unlike what he was promised by his odd Democratic partners, he met his Waterloo in the primary election. It wasn’t supposed to be that way for the maestro of the Single Bullshit Theory.

    single ballot
    Courtesy Richard Bartholomew
    Copyright 2010 Bartholoviews Cartoons

    As we reported in April and May, some of the heavy hitters in the Democratic Party had promised Arlen Specter a clear field in the primary if he switched parties and ran as a Democrat. As we noted then, this was a dumb decision made by myopic men – Gov. Ed Rendell, President Obama, Vice-President Joe Biden, and Senator Harry Reid. They were so short-sighted that they could not see the forest for the trees. The reason Specter opted out of the GOP was simple: he knew he could not win the Republican primary against Pat Toomey. So the question then became: if he could not beat Toomey in the primary, was he a good bet to beat him in the general election? Probably not, since most Democrats would be lukewarm about the turncoat, and he would have little GOP support after defecting. So from the Democrats’ point of view, would it not be better to back a true Democrat who would not have those problems and therefore stood a better shot at beating the well-funded right-wing Republican?

    The inside-the-Beltway crowd didn’t see it that way. To them, it’s all a club card game anyway. If Arlen was willing to bend, why not take him? After all, he’s one of the guys. He’s been in Washington for 30 years. So the Powers That Be decided to arrange a strange deal with the author of the Warren Commission’s Single Bullet Fantasy. This was especially disturbing to many at CTKA. Why? Because it was the endorsement of then Senator Obama at American University by the late Ted Kennedy and Caroline Kennedy which gave him a rocket boost against Hillary Clinton in his race for the Democratic nomination. The other point that was bothersome was that, as noted above, it was unnecessary. The Democrats could have won the seat without Specter.

    Evidently, Representative Joe Sestak wasn’t in on the deal. Very shortly after the nauseating announcement was made in Washington, Sestak put out the word that he was seriously thinking of challenging Mr. Magic Bullet. According to Jerry Policoff, CTKA’s man on the ground in Pennsylvania, the White House and the Democratic Establishment did all they could to discourage Sestak from running, and ruining their shameful bargain. According to Policoff, they gave Sestak the carrot and stick treatment: they offered him the Secretary of Navy job and when he said no they threatened to wreck his political career. Which sounds pretty much like the kind of politics played by Governor Rendell, who is a Richard Daley type. When Sestak refused to back off, the state media – largely played by Rendell – tried to picture him as Don Quixote: a deluded man tilting at windmills. You know, he didn’t know he was DOA. As he likes to do, Specter basked in the temporary national limelight. Obama praised him for an act of “courage” in switching parties, helped him raise money, and even said to a crowd at a rally, “I love Arlen Specter.” (The Daily Beast, 5/19/10)

    It was all an illusion staged by Rendell and his ill-informed Washington cohorts. Part of the illusion was this: the Democratic electorate in Pennsylvania is much more progressive than its leadership i.e. Rendell. The other part is that Sestak is a good campaigner who could raise considerable amounts of money. This helped raise his local profile statewide rather quickly. The third part is that Specter is an old man whose two bouts with cancer have left him both looking his age, and not as mentally sharp as he was. Therefore, the more people saw of the two, the better Sestak started to look to them. Another advantage was that Specter had had a difficult time beating Toomey in the 2004 GOP primary. Being the stronger campaigner, Sestak looked like he had a better chance at winning in the fall.

    So, according to Policoff, Rendell’s illusion began to slowly dissipate. And when Sestak began to close the huge gap between he and Specter – which once was as much as 40 points – more and more Democratic Clubs and local committees began to break from Rendell’s machine and endorse Sestak. In fact, Policoff’s own Lancaster country committee did just that.

    Sestak hoarded a lot of his money until he had cut Specter’s lead down to the 15-20 point range. He then unleashed a flurry of TV ads that were well-chosen. One was a highly effective two-parter which showed just how duplicitous Specter was. It first depicted Specter shaking hands with George Bush Jr; during which Bush calls Specter a team player he can count on. The trailing ad was Obama shouting out his love for Specter and saying, “You know he’s going to fight for you!” Another ad showed Specter essentially saying that he had switched parties in order to get re-elected. Sestak then came in to say that Specter’s conversion was merely political and done to save one person’s job – his own. This whole series of ads was powerful in its effect. Especially since Specter had little defense against it. What epitomized the opportunism was when Obama nominated Elena Kagan to the Supreme Court. Why? Because Specter had voted against her as Solicitor General. But since he was now a Democrat, he said he was open to voting for her. Unlike with his lies and deceptions on the Warren Commission, Specter was out in the open, left unprotected by the political establishment and the media.

    Towards the end, Specter tried to ask for help from the White House. But sensing the political winds, they offered none. They understood they had erred. And they were not going to double down just because they had given their word to him. In the last week, Specter tried to explain his switch by saying that the GOP had moved to the right, and he had always actually been a Democrat at heart. He even tried to invoke the memory of JFK when he said, “I have been a John F. Kennedy Democrat. I have returned to the party of my roots. What’s wrong with that.” (NY Times, 5/11/10) To anyone who has studied the arc of his career, for Specter to make such a comment is nauseating. If Specter had really been a JFK Democrat, he would never have agreed to mastermind the Commission’s medical and ballistics cover up about his death. Secondly, it was after he won the Philadelphia DA job in 1965, as a registered Democrat on the Republican ticket, that he then switched to the GOP. He figured it would be easier to hold it that way.

    So Arlen Specter got his ultimate comeuppance. Much too late of course. He had already done a lot of damage. The startling thing is that he still wanted to be in the arena at all. The man has been through a debilitating struggle with cancer. He has been re-elected four times. He is 80 years old. But evidently, Specter had grown used to being in the spotlight and enjoyed having an easy job with perks that paid well.

    Of course, what this says about today’s Democratic Party is quite disturbing. Why the White House would want to be associated with the likes of Specter and Blanche Lincoln is baffling. That they would cooperate in a shabby deal with the likes of Specter tells us a lot about what the Democratic Party has become since 1968. As I wrote in the Afterword to The Assassinations, after the death of Robert Kennedy, the Democratic Party split in half between its liberal and moderate wings. Richard Nixon knew how to capitalize on the split, hence his infamous Southern Strategy. The Democrats – now toothless because of the deaths of JFK, MLK, Malcolm X, and RFK – lost its bearings. It, and the country, now drifted to the center – and then to the right. Therefore the only two Democratic presidents between 1968 and 2008 were the southerners, Jimmy Carter and the Democratic Leadership Council’s own Bill Clinton.

    Obama and his advisers don’t read a lot of history. For him to back both Specter and Arkansas senator Blanche Lincoln shows a White House and president out of tune with the times and its own electorate. That is proven by what Sestak and Lt. Governor Bill Halter have done in spite of the aid to their opponents by the White House and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. If the White House and the DSCC had either remained neutral – which they should in a primary – or backed the insurgents, Sestak would have won even bigger, and there would likely be no run-off between Halter and Lincoln. He would have won the primary outright.

    But as I wrote, the Democratic Party has never really recovered from the assassinations of the sixties. And Obama is not the transformational candidate many hoped he would be. In fact, he is a cautious and pragmatic man. The new president had a truly golden opportunity when he got elected. With the country facing the biggest economic blowout since 1929, with all three pillars of the economy on their back – housing, autos, and the stock market – he had the opportunity to be another Franklin Roosevelt. He could have launched a Second New Deal to get America back to work. He could have revived the economy and eliminated forever the nation’s reliance on fossil fuels. In fact, as revealed by GOP operative James Pinkerton, this is what the Republican establishment truly feared. For how could they vote against giving laid off Americans real jobs in a new energy market? And if it worked, and they had voted against it, they would be discredited in a way they could not easily recover from.

    Much to the relief of the Republicans, the White House did not make that choice. Which makes the backroom deal with Specter kind of predictable. Though still reprehensible. Which indicates that the Democratic Party is still sleepwalking through its nightmare. So entranced that they were not even aware they were dancing with a man who helped cause it.

    Well, at least the man who created the see-through cover story about President Kennedy‘s death is finally gone. Unfortunately, on the evidence of their ill-advised tango with him, the Democratic Party is not even close to being resuscitated. Specter and the Warren Commission did that good of a job in beginning the funeral.

  • Von Pein/Colbert Replies, and the Comedy Continues?


    Predictably, since we advertised it on the Billboard, David Von Pein was waiting for my article about him to appear. And the very day it was posted, Von Pein made one of his patented silly replies. Then, when I went on Len Osanic’s Black Op Radio on April 15th to discuss the essay, Von Pein replied again. It is hard to determine which response is more silly, but since the second one brings up more issues, let us use that one.

    1. Von Pein starts out by criticizing me for mispronouncing his name. To which I reply: “Excuse me!” Like this really matters in what is under discussion. DVP then tries to deny the fact that any initial criticism he made of Reclaiming History was negligible. This is ridiculous. In his first press release he relegated the “errors” he found in the book to a special section of his multi-sectioned review. He excused them with two qualifications: 1.) In such a huge and heroic undertaking, anyone could have made them, and 2.) The ones he listed were so minor that they in no way impacted on the worthiness of the volume. And Von Pein’s list was minor. None of Bugliosi’s major errors of commission or omission noted by either Rodger Remington or myself are there. Von Pein has to deny all this today because after the numerous, comprehensive and compelling polemics that have leveled Bugliosi’s book, his first press release looks so biased that it has no credibility. Which, of course, it did not in the first place. It was nothing but PR.Von Pein’s next point may be a valid one. Which, for him, is a real achievement. (For DVP, 1 in 17 is a good batting average.) He says that he has only reviewed two of the Discovery Channel JFK cover-up specials. So, accordingly, I will change the wording here.As per his pointing out any errors in Inside the Target Car, see point two above. As with Reclaiming History, they were so negligible as to be worthless. In fact, he actually got angry at me for coming up with so many errors that my review ended up being three parts long. His other point, about the front shot exploding the head, is misguided. The ammunition used here was a different type of round than the others. And therefore with the “replica heads”, which were not replicas, the explosion was bound to happen. This is nothing but obfuscation by Von Pein. Which is why he never answers the question of why the program’s military jacketed bullets did not fragment. Yet in the JFK case, the bullets did.Unlike what DVP maintains, if one reads any of the scholarly literature on the history of the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, one will see that the 36 inch version was called a carbine, and the 40 inch version-which was a cut down of a longer rifle-was usually referred to as a short rifle. (See John Armstrong’s fine discussion in Harvey and Lee, p. 439) I don’t think a mail order sales ad calling both versions carbines qualifies as scholarly dissertation for anyone but Von Pein. In fact the use of the word “scholarly” in the same sentence with Von Pein is an oxymoron.The next point indicates the time warp that Von Pein is in. He actually scores me for not accepting all the old discredited Warren Commission evidence against Oswald. You know, like the palm print that did not arrive in Washington until a week later; the unbelievable CE 399; the dented shell that could not have been dented that day; the Walker bullet that somehow altered its caliber and color while in transit from the rifle; the shells from the bullets fired at Tippit that are missing the officer’s initials etc etc. These deceptions were all exposed decades ago by Harold Weisberg, Sylvia Meagher, Mark Lane, Josiah Thompson and others. Yet, with Von Pein, its like those books do not exist. Which shows his denial problem. Because they are the main reason that the public lost faith in the Warren Commission.He actually says that Victoria Adams and Sandra Styles could not have been on the stairs with Oswald after the shooting since they only descended a minute or two later. This is a perfect illustration of Von Pein’s denial problem. For Adams had to correct the transcript of her testimony because it lied about this specific point. She said she was on the stairs about 15 seconds after the shots. So if Oswald was descending, she would have had to have seen or heard him. She did not. (See Gerald McKnight, Breach of Trust, p. 399) Von Pein wants to revivify the lie.Von Pein tries to obfuscate his howler about Kennedy and John Connally reacting to the same shot at Z-224. So what does he do? He shows us frames Z-223, and then Z-224. You can see very little, if anything, of Kennedy in Z-223. Which is why I did not mention it. In Z-224 you can see a sliver of his hands going upward toward his neck in reaction to being hit. While Connally is sitting serenely in front, untouched. So Von Pein was wrong about both men reacting simultaneously and is now trying to cover up his error. The proof of that is this: Why didn’t he show us frames Z-224, 225 and 226?As per his celebrated departure from JFK Lancer, Von Pein tries to say that one person actually called him polite. But this was a purely relative statement. It was made in comparison to another troll named Nick Kendrick. To me, this is like differentiating between a flea and a louse.Von Pein tries to say that the quote I used by Gene Stump does not actually refer to his almost insane frequency of posts, which flooded the JFK Lancer Forum board. He says it refers to Nick Kendrick. Actually, in the copy I have of that, it is not clear if Stump is referring to Von Pein or Kendrick. But it’s irrelevant to the main point. Von Pein himself refers to the well over 2,000 posts he made at Lancer. And even a rather conservative Commission critic like Jerry Dealey noted about Von Pein that, “I did get tired of his responding to every single thread repeatedly, and always repeating the same things over and over.” (Post of 7/28/05, italics in original.) Von Pein was flooding the board to distract everyone.In his next nonsensical point, Von Pein shows his sensitivity and warm camaraderie with propagandist John McAdams. He tries to say that McAdams does not dominate alt.conspiracy.jfk and that someone like me would feel at home there. John McAdams posts at that site regularly, and it’s always to ridicule Commission critics. In fact, he is joined there by both Von Pein and Dave Reitzes. It is their home away from home-since all three have their own web sites that support the Commission and the Single Bullet Delusion. McAdams, Reitzes, and Von Pein have made that forum a flame pit since they have polarized the debate there because of their constant ridicule and invective against any kind of Commission critiques. In fact, in Lisa Pease’s appearance on Black Op Radio on May 13th, she discusses McAdams’ techniques in this endeavor. (She begins at the 41:20 mark.) I would never set foot there because of this point: there is no real debate, it is more like mud wrestling. Which is why I call it the Pigpen. And it’s why Von Pein is at home there.Von Pein tries to obfuscate the fact that one of the reasons he was booted from John Simkin’s Spartacus forum was his failure to produce a photo of himself. He says that this was not a foolproof way to keep trolls out anyway. Duh, no kidding Dave. But unless Simkin was going to run full background checks on applicants and then make them sign an oath in advance, there really is no foolproof way to become troll-proof. But the picture was one easy step in that direction. Von Pein then tries to say that he had no picture on his computer to upload. This is almost surely a lie. There IS a photo taken in 1991 of Von Pein selling chicken at what looks like Kentucky Fried Chicken. And it is on the web. Why couldn’t he have uploaded a cropped version of that photo?Von Pein tries to defend the London trial that Vincent Bugliosi participated in. I repeat what I said: it was nothing close to a real trial. You can make that judgment just on the fact that none of the three autopsy doctors were there. Secondly, the Assassination Records Review Board had not declassified the hidden records. Finally, because no actual exhibits were used, and the three pathologists were absent, the real rules of evidence could not be followed.Both Von Pein and Bugliosi ignore the 8 questions I posed at the end of my essay which prove that CE 399 was not found at Parkland Hospital. They can’t directly answer them since they pose compelling proof that the FBI lied about the provenance of the Magic Bullet. So Von Pein does what his master Bugliosi does in his book: 1.) He ignores this direct evidence and 2.)Blows smoke by countering with senseless comments and questions. Bugliosi has honed this technique to a science. In essence it asks the respondent to demonstrate exactly how the conspiracy actually worked in each and every detail. Which is ridiculous. Why? Because it shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense. In other words, it Is not enough to prove a conspiracy happened. The defense now has to demonstrate exactly how it was implemented. Which is a preposterous standard. And it implicitly shows that Bugliosi cannot uphold his own standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Those 8 questions prove that Oswald was framed. Period. If they did not, then Bugliosi and DVP would either show that the facts I used are wrong or they would answer them. They do neither.Von Pein now really gets his dander up. He says that it is a dirty lie to state that he reviewed Rodger Remington’s book Biting the Elephant for amazon.com. This is more Von Peinian silliness. . And a diversion from the real point. While technically true, it ignores the fact that this is the only book by Remington that Von Pein has not reviewed at amazon.com. Rodger has written four books on the Warren Commission, Biting the Elephant is the most recent. Von Pein has reviewed the other three at Amazon. Incredibly, he either forgot this or does not think it’s important. But the real diversion is this: He reviews the books without reading them! Nothing in his reviews reveals any knowledge of the subject matter in the books. All they consist of is general boilerplate arguments against the Commission critics. But he then gives the books he has not read, and disagrees with, five star reviews! Evidently he hopes that people will then be more apt to read his propaganda. If that is not fraud, I don’t know what is.

      Von Pein says I was wrong to state that he has been promoting Reclaiming History since 2005. He says he has been doing it since 2003. In other words, promoting what was published in 2007 in 2005 isn’t good enough for DVP. He was promoting it back in 2003. He then says he is proud of that fact and that Reclaiming History will be the Bible on the JFK case for generations to come. Hmm. Sounds like Gerald Ford talking about the Warren Commission in 1964. But, alas, Reclaiming History did not even last that long.

    2. My last point here is one that absolutely typifies Von Pein and his almost embarrassing obeisance to Vincent Bugliosi. I have scored Bugliosi by saying that it appears he wrote Reclaiming History from his office. That is, he did all his interviews and investigation over the phone. Which is remarkable considering he had 21 years and a huge advance to spend. Von Pein tries to salvage this practice by saying that this does not matter since the same conversations would have taken place in person as over the phone. But if that is so, the question then becomes: Why do investigators go to crime scenes or interview witnesses and suspects face to face at all? For instance, if Bugliosi would have gone to Chicago and looked at the planned parade route there, he would not have written that the failure to fully investigate this assassination attempt had no impact on what happened in Dallas. The scenarios, as Jim Douglass found out by going there, were almost the exact same thing: an attempt by crossfire below, while a patsy above in a warehouse was elevated over the motorcade route. Incredibly, Bugliosi never went there to see that. Also, he evidently never went to the National Archives to see that, contrary to what he wrote, FBI agent Elmer Lee Todd’s initials are not on CE 399. But also, one can get a feel for a witness more readily in person than one can over the phone. For instance, when I talked to FBI agent Warren DeBrueys at his house north of New Orleans, he told me that he did not read any books on the JFK assassination. But in a break during the interview, I walked a bit around his house. Sitting on a shelf in his office were 15 books on the JFK assassination. That discovery could not have happened with a phone interview. So Von Pein is wrong.

    As is the sum total of Von Pein’s reply. But everyone should know that about Von Pein now. As Gil Jesus has noted, Von Pein is a lost and silly person. He likes to call Commission critics “kooks” and “nuts” to disguise his own imbalances. Namely, that he is in denial of the evidence. And of his own myopia and solipsistic personality. Therefore, he uses the psychological device of projection. That is, the cognitive failing is not actually his, the problem lies with the rest of the world.

    It’s not everyone else Dave. It’s you. Which is why you are the only one still relaying messages to Bugliosi’s secretary Rosemary Newton. And you will only get better once you admit that truth about yourself.